Studies in Intelligence (1997)

Of Market-Garden and Melanie The Dutch Resistance and the OSS (U) Maj. Stewart Bentley

On 10 May 1940, the German 10th Some Dutch citizens eagerly joined Army, spearheaded by airborne the new party and to.ok positions in troops, invaded the . the government. Others, however, The rest of the Wehrmacht force com- joined with the purpose of pretend- mitted to "the overrunning of the ing to collaborate while remaining West" executed the Manstein Plan loyal co the government-in-exile, through Belgium and the Ardennes allowing them to keep an eye on Forest. On 14 May 1940, the Dutch Dutch collaborators and steer policy commander ordered a cease-fire. and its implementation. The Three days later, the entire Nether- Leegsma family was a good example 44 lands was occupied by Nazi of this tactic. Agardus Leegsma, his Germany.- brother, and their father joined the This evacuation operation Nazi organized Dutch National to Britain of the royal The Dutch royal family, led by Police. The father had been a profes- family and a cadre of the Queen Wilhelmina, along with some sional soldier in the Guards 4,600 Dutch officers, sailors, sol- Regiment of the Royal Dutch Army Dutch Government was diers, and policemen, staged a Dutch during the interwar years. The critical in establishing a Dunkirk, assisted by remnants of the Leegsma family assisted various Resis- Dutch Navy and the entire merchant tance organizations during the Nazi government-in-exile and marine. This evacuation operation to occupation. During the liberation of the initial intelligence Britain of the royal family and a Holland, Leegsma and his brother cadre of the Dutch Government was joined different Allied units, serving networks in Holland. critical in establishing a government- as guides and combatants. in-exile and the initial intelligence 9/ networks in Holland. Additionally, As the harshness of the occupation the emigration to England of Dutch grew, so did native Dutch unrest and civilians and members of the Dutch resentment toward the Germans. armed forces from all over the Conti- Individual Dutchmen took it upon nent and from overseas Dutch themselves to strike back. With no possessions helped form the core of a central command, these brave indi- reconstituted Dutch Royal Army, viduals began recruiting relatives, Navy, and Air Force. friends, and neighbors into the first Resistance organizations. The dan- gers were exceptionally high: All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis Stirrings of Resistance captured members of the Resistance expressed in Studies In Intelligence are those of were usually shot or sent to concen- the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central The initial years of the German occu- tration camps. The primary Intelligence Agency or any other US Government pation of Holland were characterized opposition initially came from the entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents Social Democrats and Catholic should be construed as asserting or implying US by the removal of Dutch Jews from Government endorsement of an articles factual their homeland and harsh economic youth leagues. The Dutch Commu- statetnents and Interpretations. and political measures. The Nazis nists began actively resisting after the established their own puppet govern- Germans invaded the USSR. ment at The Hague headed by Maj. Stewart Bentley is a US Army Dr. Seyss-Inquart and established a military intelligence officer. Members of the Dutch royal armed Dutch National Socialist Party. forces who had noz escaped to Britain DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOOSEXEMPT ION 3929 NAZI WAR CRIMES 01 SCLOSURE ACT 47 DATE 2007 Dutch Resistance

Netherlands 1944 (U)

Netherlands ,The Hague •Delft Rotterdam

Unclassified 743256 (6011.824) 7.97

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44 By operating covertly and passively, members of the Resistance were able to and successfully evaded German cap- function without attracting threat, and establish information net- ture secretly banded together and works. The telephone was their began collecting information. Under too much attention. primary means of communications, the leadership of Dr. Johan Stijkel, a and they always used nicknames. In Rotterdam lawyer, Maj. Gen. H. D. 99 face-to-face meetings, masks were S. Husselman and Col. J. P. Bolton often worn to ensure security. organized a Resistance group of young Dutch citizens. With the help MI-9 and the Evaders The Dutch Resistance command and of radio expert Cornelius Drupsteen, control hierarchy was decentralized and compartmented. Additionally, they established a wireless link with The British Military Intelligence Sec- the creation of small groups by indi- the British Secret Intelligence Service tion 9 (MI-9) was set up to exploit vidual Dutchmen with no outside (SIS) and began passing information available European Resistance net- links were widespread. Some of these assist Allied airmen shot to the Allies. works and groups' activities will never be down over Europe in returning to known, as many were captured and England. MI-9, also known as IS-9, Resistance operations were primarily executed by the Germans. Initially, infiltrated agents, usually by para- they used leaflets and underground limited to organizational and net- chute, into occupied Europe. These newspapers as means to enlist new working functions, as well as agents would link up with a Resis- members and raise money. gathering intelligence on the occupa- tance cell and organize the escape- tion forces. Probably the most heroic and-evasion efforts in a particular and dangerous aspect of resistance area, usually after being notified by The Underground Press was the hiding and sheltering of the Resistance of the presence of Dutch Jews and young draft-age downed airmen. The agents brought Underground newspapers were help- Dutch men and women by other money, maps, and false papers to ful, especially in areas where the Dutch, collectively known as onker- assist these airmen. The usual route telephone lines were monitored and duikers ("underdivers"). The best was either south to Switzerland or use of radiotransmitters was too dan- known story is that of Anne Frank. • west to southern and then to gerous because of direction-finding Spain and Portugal. operations. These newspapers helped Individual Dutch were horrified and counterbalance Nazi propaganda and One such MI-9 agent was Dick appalled at the spectacle of their the German-controlled media. ICragt, who parachuted into Holland neighbors and friends being rounded Almost as soon as the occupation in 1943. He lost his equipment, up and taken away to an unknown began, anti-Nazi leaflets began to cir- including his radio, but continued culate.3 Period photographs show fate. Most Dutch Jews who escaped on armed only with a Colt.45. He capture were smuggled out of Hol- such newspapers as Dc Union being managed to link up with a Dutch openly distributed on city streets land to England via Belgium through Jew named loop Piller, living in the despite the obvious danger.4 By France and then to Spain, or from town of Ernst, and they built a net- 1943, underground newspapers had Belgium to France, and then to Swit- work designed to hide, protect, and attained a collective circulation of zerland. Smuggling someone out via eventually smuggle downed airmen nearly 500,000. Although some were the Dutch coast was extremely dan- out of Holland. amateurish, they were effective. One gerous, as the Germans increasingly such paper was produced by the fortified the coast in anticipation of Leegsma brothers working at The an Allied invasion. Some young men Initial Operations Hague. It was a translation and tran- and women as well as Dutch Jews scription of daily BBC broadcasts.5 hid throughout the war, participat- By operating covertly and passively, ing in underground activities. The members of the Resistance were able Another newspaper was also a two- underground networks established in to function without attracting too man effort. Working out of a hotel this manner later were instrumental much attention. This allowed them room in Grave, Gerald Peijnenburg in hiding and exfiltrating Allied air- to organize their cells, gauge the level and a Dutch Jew in hiding wrote men shot down over Holland. of the German counterintelligence and copied Young Netherlands.

49 Dutch Resistance

By the middle of 1944, there were four major Resistance organizations in Peijnenburg handled the distribu- onkerduikers. Another activity cen- tion, and most of his copies were Holland. tered around the coupons used by passed from person to person, ensur- the Germans and the Dutch Nazi ing some degree of security.6 9 9 government to ration food and keep tabs on the population. The LO made counterfeit coupons, and it terrain prevented the establishment Slow Growth also obtained authentic coupons of hiding areas for large groups of from loyal Dutch citizens in the rnaquis, as was the case in France and employ of the Dutch Nazis. Other 'Ile Resistance developed slowly for Yugoslavia. Moreover, the flat ter- groups conducted raids and robber- several reasons. Because of Holland's rain, interdicted by many bodies of ies to steal authentic coupons from geographic proximity and cultural water, large and small, restricted government agencies. Arid some ties with Germany, many Dutch were movement to the established rail- Dutch civilians gave up their own sympathetic to the ideas of German roads, road networks, and bridges. coupons to the LO. nationalism, and a significant portion These were easily controlled by the of the population joined the Dutch Germans, who established check- Besides keeping an eye on Dutch col- Nazi Party and even the Wehrmacht. points to prevent complete freedom laborators, local LO groups engaged There were also Dutch civilians who of movement. Gasoline was scarce, in whatever resistance they could informed on their neighbors. and many Dutch used bicycles for without endangering themselves. transportation, sometimes riding on Occasionally, the Leegsma family at The swift German victory, combined the rims because of a shortage of rub- The Hague was able to use its posi- with Queen Wilhelmina's seeming ber for tires. On the other hand, the tion in the police force to tip off the abandonment of the Dutch popula- Germans were plagued by the inces- LO before the impending arrest of tion, disillusioned and embittered_ sant sabotage of telephone lines and an onkerduiker would occur. It was much of Holland. Many who collab- by damage to the railroads. also able to funnel genuine food cou- orated really believed that the pons to the LO. Germans represented the future and felt that the Nazis success was inevita- Major Resistance Organizations While the LO maintained a low pro- ble. For these citizens, occupation file, the "Central Government was something merely to be By the middle of 1944, there were Fighting Group" (KP) carried out sab- accepted. Ruthless German counter- four major Resistance organizations otage operations at the local level. Its measures towards any anti-Nazi in Holland. They did not coordinate estimated strength was 550 members activity further discouraged active their activities unless another group's nationally, but this figure is probably resistance. As the occupation grew help was absolutely necessary; most low. Without central direction, the more repressive, a backlash against of these groups did not answer to a KP attacked targets of opportunity in the Germans grew, which was central headquarters. They con- and around the hometowns. Some- fanned by the government-in-exile. ducted their operations as they saw times this included the killing of fit, and members of these groups individual German soldiers and The government-in-exile-made its often did not realize to which group Dutch collaborators. But such activi- presence known through the judi- they belonged. Veterans often did ties were dangerous. The Germans cious use of BBC broadcasts, listened not know the identity of their partic- would crack down on the local popu- to covertly by the Dutch population. ular group until after the war. After lation in the locale where the murder Queen Wilhelmina became a symbol the Allied landings in France on 6 occurred; sometimes, they exacted a • of hope co occupied Holland, and June 1944, many groups adopted an tit-for-tat retribution. The Germans Crown Prince Bernhard took an aggressive Resistance role. would also step up their counterintelli- active role in Allied planning for mili- gence efforts in the area in an attempt tary operations in the Netherlands. "Central Government Organizations to eradicate any underground cells. As For Help To People In Hiding" a result, the Resistance tended to tar- Geography also contributed to the (LO) was the most important organi- get railroad cracks, telegraph or slow growth of the Resistance. The zation. Its primary goal was the telephone lines, German supply lack of mountainous and forested protection and exfiltration of points, and motor pools.

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After D-Day, many of the Dutch in the underground grew impatient and wanted The "Council of Resistance" (RVV) Van Papendrecht went into hiding, was a third organization which to conduct more aggressive and he eventually returned to Eind- engaged in both communications sab- operations against the hoven and established the PAN. In otage and protection of onkerduikers. Germans. June 1944, PAN had reached its full Allied planners regarded this group as strength of 80 to 100 young men "sound from the security point of and women. The PAN had reached view." With several thousand mem- 99 several small cells operating in the bers, the RVV was in radio contact small towns around Eindhoven, with the Bureau Inlichtingen7 (BI), including the Group Sander, which the government-in-exile's intelligence and conducted covert fundraising to worked as a KP and an LO group service, and had demanded arms and finance KP and LO operations.1" and was named after its leader.1' ammunition. There was some overlap in the per- sonal responsibilities among member Margarethe Kelder and her sister A fourth organization, the "Order of of both the local and regional were members of this group. They Service" (OD), focused on preparing groups. For example, in the smuggled downed Allied airmen and for the return of a Dutch Govern- district, the LO com- Dutch onkerduikers to a crossing site ment following Holland's liberation. mander was also the chief of staff of on the Belgium border, coordinating The OD was made up primarily of the district OD. 1 1 their activities with a Belgian Resis- former Dutch officers and govern- tance group. The female members of ment officials who found themselves Almost every town of any size had the PAN were primarily couriers, but supplanted by the Nazis and by one or more of these groups. It was they were also valued intelligence col- Dutch collaborators.8 Their two main also possible for one person to belong lectors. In early September 1944, missions were to collect intelligence to more than one group. In some Kelder and another female Resis- and develop "plans for the mainte- groups, members simply were referred tance member were asked to go into nance of administrative services and to by nicknames, and their true identi- the woods near Eindhoven to con- civil order on the liberation of Hol- ties will never be known. Many were firm the presence of a German land." Although the OD was thought named after their group's leader. antiaircraft battery. On the pretext of to have been penetrated, Allied intelli- gathering mushrooms, they con- gence estimated that most OD cells ducted their reconnaissance and, were still loyal and could be depended The Eindhoven and Nijmegen when confronted by German guards on to provide assistance during the lib- Undergrounds near the battery, were able to con- eration of Holland. vince them of their innocence. There were also other groups, estab- A subgroup of the OD, the "Dutch lished locally by individual Another PAN group in a town north Secret Service" (GDN) functioned as Dutchmen operating with no formal, of Eindhoven conducted sabotage an intelligence agency for the OD. structured links to other groups. In operations. It put salt in gas and oil There were also some 20 other intelli- Eindhoven, there was a group known tanks of German vehicles and blew gence agencies in wartime Holland.9 as the "Partisan Action Nederlands" up railroad tracks using smuggled Most groups conducted some level of (PAN). Although it functioned along explosives Rrovideci by mining intelligence operations, even if it was the lines of the KP, it did not con- engineers.'' only counterintelligence for security sider itself part of the KP. purposes. When these groups were After D-Day, many of the Dutch in organized at the national level, they PAN was founded by Hoynck van the underground grew impatient and were divided into regional geo- Papendrecnt. He studied engineering wanted to conduct more aggressive graphic areas of administration. at the Technical University in Delft operations against the Germans. The until April 1943, when the Germans PAN did so by conducting raids At the national level, the National closed the Dutch universities and against, among other targets, the Steunfonds (NSV) was an umbrella began forcibly relocating Dutch 20- to 30-man German garrison at financial organization which received students to Germany, both as a man- the Eindhoven airport on 5 Septem- money from the government-in-exile power and professional talent pool. ber 1944 14. It also began conducting

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44 The Resistance organizations were part of the largely unknown story a form of psychological warfare; PAN KP members the basics of members would approach German of the strategic OSS markmanship. soldiers they knew and try to per- mission into occupied suade them of the hopelessness of Holland. Germany's situation and to surren- OSS Involvement der. Some PAN members were reported by German soldiers and 99 arrested. The punishment for belong- The Resistance organizations were ing CO a Resistance organization was the Resistance, was a member of this part of the largely unknown story of summary execution. group. The group had a radio with the strategic OSS mission into occu- which it maintained contact with a pied Holland. This story essentially In June 1944, the PAN set up its Belgian Resistance group and smug- began in May 1944, when Lt. Jan headquarters in a house in Eind- gled downed Allied airmen over the Laverge constituted the one-man hoven. Van Papendrecht had little border. By September 1944, it was Netherlands Section of Special Intel- contact with the other groups in the credited with saving the lives of 29 ligence (SI) of the OSS in London. Eindhoven area, including the RVV, airmen. The American-born son of Dutch which only numbered three of four émigrés, he had been personally members, but he was aware of their recruited for the job by Col. William existence. The PAN leader did con- The Resistance groups in the Eind- Donovan. As planning progressed duct some joint activities with them hoven area had a total of several for the invasion of Europe, Lieuten- when he felt the operational need for hundred members. The local GDN ant Colonel De Vries, the chief of SI, outside assistance. One of his outside was led by Arie Tromp, a director for asked Laverge to develop a plan for contacts was the KP leader in Rotter- the Phillips electrical firm office in using an OSS team to assist in the dam, Jan van Bijneri, whose non de Eindhoven. His nom de guerre was liberation of Holland. On 25 May guerre was "Frank." "Frank" was his "Harry." By placing their headquar- 1944, Laverge submitted his prelimi- periodic source of weapons and ters in the Eindhoven Museum, nary plan, which called for two explosives, couriered by such women GDN members were able to come officers and three enlisted men with as Margerethe Kelder and her sister. and go without arousing German sus- associated vehicles and communica- picions. The GDN began receiving tions equipment. To the east of Eindhoven, in the taskings and orders from the BI fol- small town of Helmond, there was a lowing its establishment in KP Resistance group led by Johan November 1942. Tromp and his Following the Allied invasion of Raaymaerkers, a former Dutch artil- agents used the underground electri- France, Laverge looked forward to lery captain who was a technical cal cables in the Phillips factory, having a chance to operate an OSS engineer and owned his own factory. which also had telephone lines, as mission in Holland similar to the OSS mission codenamed Sussex One of his members was Hans Ber- their primary means of which had operated in France. In tels, who began distributing an communications. 15 underground newspaper in 1941 in July 1944, the Netherlands Section the Helmond area. Bertels's contact came under the control of SI's Conti- was a man named Knaapen, who pro- There were several underground nental Division. De Vries ordered a vided him with the newspapers and groups in the Nijmegen area. In the resubmission of plans for the libera- occasional operations orders. city itself, part of the Resistance activ- tion of occupied countries, and ities apparently were centered Laverge reviewed the initial work. South of Eindhoven, in the town of around the Saint Canisius College. The OSS team designated for Hol- Roermond, was a small LO group Jules Jansen was an engineering pro- land would come under the control consisting of only 15 members. fessor at the college and one of the of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Their headquarters was in a vault in leaders of the local KP. He set up a Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) mili- the local cemetery. Anya van Lys- laboratory in his house for the manu- tary mission to Holland. The OSS sens, later awarded the Military facture of explosives and an indoor team grew to six officers and eight to Order of William for her actions in firing range in his basement to teach 10 enlisted men.

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Later that same month, Laverge con- G2. Krick apparently offered little or a bridgehead across the River sulted with the BI and used its no guidance to Laverge as to Mela- into northern Germany's Ruhr Valley contributions for the final plan, sub- nie's intended intelligence gathering industrial complex held the promise mitted on 5 August 1944. Both the B1 priorities and requirements. Accord- of a German collapse by the end of and OSS approved die mission, which ing to Laverge's report to his OSS 1944. was given the codename Melanie. The superior, Krick only made sugges- Dutch Minister of War also approved tions, which Laverge developed into Montgomery's Operation Market- the mission, which was to gather intel- the following requirements: Garden had two parts. He proposed ligence and focus on "transmitting dropping the First Allied Airborne information obtained from the Dutch • German unit composition and posi- Army to seize seven canal and river intelligence nets, trying to recruit tions behind the Siegfried Line. bridges in Holland as well as the agents, and to extending Dutch nets bridge across the lower Rhine at the 1 6 into Germany." • Location of enemy headquarters of Dutch town of (Market). any kind and names of Germans Simultaneously, the British XXX After Laverge got the green light for located there. Armored Corps would rapidly the mission, he began recruiting sol- advance the 60 miles along a narrow diers for the team, choosing men he • Locations of the planning and archi- road corridor crossing the captured had worked with before in England. val sections of German industrial bridges to link up with the airborne The lieutenant also began building interests. forces in Arnhem (Garden). The up his team to ensure maximum self- operation began on 17 September. sufficiency. In addition to his radio • Information on "controlling person- operators and two Dutch BI analysts, alities" at all levels of the Reich. The Melanie mission, with no prior he recruited an American Army coordination with the British )00: mechanic, a radio repairman, and a • Locations of command, control, and Armored Corps, deployed into Hol- Dutch-American major with no pre- communications nodes. land over the Albert Canal and vious intelligence experience. The reached Eindhoven on 21 September presence of a major on the team The OSS team was attached and 1944. The team established its base would provide Laverge with enough ordered to report to Field Marshal of operations in a house at No. 2 rank necessary to obtain resources. Bernard Law Montgomery's 21st Vestdijk Street. Army Group. In early September, Laverge moved his ream to the Palace The Dutch telephone network was an Melanie Moves Ahead Hotel in Brussels, in preparation for extremely vital communications link deployment into Holland. He also between Melanie and the Dutch Resis- As operations on the Continent reported in at Montgomery's tance cells scattered throughout speeded up, so did Laverge's prepara- headquarters. Holland. Using a TR-4 wireless tele- tions. The target date for the start of graph radio set, the team's radio the mission kept getting moved for- operators established contact with the ward, and Laverge began to feel that Operation Market-Garden OSS SI section in Paris. In addition he would not have enough time CO to the TR-4, the team used a TR-1 prepare properly. The decision was In early September 1944, Montgom- for local communications with the finally made to deploy an advance ery, seeking to maintain the momen- Dutch Resistance groups in the Mar- team of two Dutch and two American tum of the Allied breakout from ket-Garden area of operations. Even officers not later than 7 September Normandy, conceived an operation to though the team was attached to the 1944, with the remainder of the team outflank the German "West Wall" , it apparently did co follow as quicldy as possible. defensive line. Encouraged by Ultra not provide intelligence to Montgom- SIGINT intercepts which portrayed a ery's G2. Instead, its reporting When the advance team arrived in disintegrating German Army, Mont- channel was directly to Paris and the Normandy, it reported to the gomery persuaded Supreme Allied OSS Continental Division of SI. The SHAEF G2 Forward. On 9 Septem- Commander General Eisenhower that exclusion of the 21st Army Group G2 ber, 1944 I.ieutenant Laverge met his bold plan of forcing a narrow corri- from the intelligence reporting chain with a Major Krick of the SHAEF dor through Holland and establishing probably was due to the sensitive,

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Members of the Eindhoven Resistance with troops of the 101st Airborne in front of the Eindhoven cathedral. Photo courtesy ')F the author. (u)

compartmented nature of all OSS mis- and telephone operators. A Resistance possible agents for work behind the sions. The team had no contact with member named A. Jongbloed was German lines. ° As the Market-Gar- the 101st Airborne Division, whose employed as the mission's intelligence den battle raged up and down the Market-Garden objective was the sei- and liaison officer with Dutch civilian corridor along "Hell's Highway,"18 zure of Eindhoven and vital bridges authorities in Eindhoven. The OSS the OSS teamn continued its intelli- nearby. The only American para- team used the operational Dutch tele- gence-gathering mission. On trooper the OSS team saw was a one phone system co make contact with 22 September 1944, the team GI who wandered past the house one various Resistance groups throughout reported the location of the Gestapo day and asked for a cigarette. Holland. This reporting network headquarters in Kleve, Germany, a began yielding excellent information border town just east of Nijmegen, almost immediately. Laverge quickly made contact with and the location of the telephone Arie Tromp, the chief of die Eind- exchange there. This information hoven Resistance. With Tromp's The team's first message to SI in was passed via the telephone network assistance, Laverge recruited four Paris, on 21 September 1944, by Resistance members. A report Dutch civilians co work as interpreters reported that it had begun recruiting dated 24 September 1944 from a

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PAN Resistance members escorting German POWs during Market-Garden. Photo courtesy of the author. (u)

"reliable source" stated that, as of primarily concerned with obtaining guaranteed that not everyone would 22 September, all "troops leaving tactical intelligence provided by Resis- know the time and place of the attack. Rotterdam, except demolitions tance members. As Allied parachutes began blossom- squads." It also reported on other ing, those previously unaware of the concentrations of enemy troops and During Market-Garden, intelligence operation reacted by mobilizing their artillery.° supplied by the various Resistance net- cells and recovering arms caches. works, because of its noncompart- In addition to the Melanie operation, mented nature, was passed through During the operation, some which was to provide strategic intelli- the Jedbutgh teams to the various tacti- Resistance members carried out gence on the situation throughout cal commanders. They obtained infor- independent actions. Others actively Holland, OSS/SOE Jedburgh2° mation on the composition and sought out airborne soldiers and teams deployed with each Allied air- disposition of German forces, as well borne division during Market- as information on terrain and the con- attached themselves to any unit that Garden. The Jedburghs worked ditions of the bridges. Once the para- would take them. I n cases where closely with their respective division troopers were on the ground, this their loyalties were suspect, Resis- commanders and staff. These teams information flow continued. Some of tance members were presented to the performed combined civil affairs and the Resistance cells were aware in Jedburgh teams for vetting. Once unconventional warfare missions in some form of Market-Garden before this was done, the Dutch were much the same manner as latter-day its execution, but the decentralized farmed out to different units as the special forces units do, but they were nature of the underground network need arose.

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Resistance members and 101st Airborne troops consulting over a map near Eindhoven. Photo courtesy of the author. (u)

Jedburgh Team Claude, attached to area, was killed. Dutch naval com- occurred because the team carried the British 1st Airborne Division, was mander Wolters was attached to the only one radio on the operation, too small to conduct effective opera- British division, but his stated mission which was lost during the initial drop tions. One four-man ream per brigade was focused on Dutch civil affairs after on D-Day. Team Edward's inability would have been enough, but not one the liberation of Arnhem. Nothing to communicate with Team Claude team for the entire division. The split- was ever planned about his actions or and the physical isolation of the two ting of the team had disastrous responsibilities during the battle. His teams prevented a clear assessment of consequences, placing the entire ad hoc actions during the battle dem- the situation at Arnhem. responsibility For the vetting and onstrated his abilities. If Wolters's administration of the available Resis- responsibilities had been broadened tance on the junior member of Team before D-Day, he could have been Intelligence Failure Claude, Lieutenant Knottenbelt even more effective. Market-Garden ranks among the The British plan for using the Resis- The communications failures suffered most serious intelligence failures of tance fell apart after Colonel Barlow, by Market forces, especially the 1st Air- the war. Critiques of the operation the officer in charge of civil affairs and borne Division, are legendary. Team have focused on the overly optimistic use of the Resistance in the Arnhem Claude's loss of communications interpretations of SIGINT as well as

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A Dotal commando transporting 101 .st Airborne troops during the fighting outside Eindhoven. Photo courtesy of the author. (u) on the failure of planners to credit shortcoming was as much a planning economic, and industrial intelligence. airborne reconnaissance indications failure as it was an intelligence failure. A detailed report dated 14 December of recent German armored reinforce- 1944 provided the specifications on a ments in the Arnhem area. The Dutch Resistance was not alerted Mauscr small-arms factory in the to the Arnhem drop because British town of Oberndorf, Germany. The team also provided reports regarding Similarly, the operational planners, in intelligence believed the Germans had penetrated their Dutch networks. If German atrocities committed against their haste to meet Montgomery's the British had heeded word from Allied prisoners and Dutch civilians. deadlines, paid too little attention to their agents in Arnhem, they would route, terrain, and weather assess- have been alerted to the presence of ments; even these assessments suffered The unleashing of German secret the two panzer divisions. from insufficient basic intelligence weapons such as jet aircraft and the information. Drop zones, especially at V-2 rocket made information about Arnhem, were ill considered, and esti- Carrying On these weapons extremely critical. mates of the road systems' ability to Melanie responded by providing support the armored column were After Market-Garden, the Melanie information on the location of critically flawed, though this latter mission continued to collect military, V-2 launching sites with detailed

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sketches. Information on industrial infrastructure was also provided. A 3 March 1945 report stated that V-2 A Bridge Too Far parts were being manufactured in the Croecke textile factory in Hohenlim- burg, Germany.

Operation Market-Garden seize the bridge despite a heroic In late December, coinciding with the German attack through the quickly turned into a military fight. Ardennes. Melanie developed intelli- disaster. Although the American The situation in Arnhem became gence indicating a secondary, airborne divisions eventually increasingly perilous. The British supplementary German attack across achieved their objectives—the armored column which was to the Maas River. Major Van der 82nd Airborne parachuted into break through to relieve the Gracht reported to his superior, Philip Horton, that in the period of airborne fisrces fell behind its Grave and Groesbeek and a few days more than 30 German controlled the strategic river overly optimistic schedule as the commandos wearing British uni- crossings while the 101st tanks crawled along the narrow, forms had been captured in Airborne seized the bridges at congested roadway. The Eindhoven, some only a few blocks Eindhoven and Vegbe4 but not operation ended less than 10 days from the team's quarters. Van der Gracht also reported that Eindhoven before the Germans were able to later, with the British and Polish had received numerous V-2 attacks demolish one. The British 1st airborne troops surrounded in "with some accuracy." The threat Airborne Division, reinforced by Arnhem and the armored column became so ominous that Van der a Polish airborne unit, dropped stalled 10 miles away. Gracht made plans for the destruc- too far from its target, the The British were able to pull back tion of those files which could not be evacuated. Arnhem bridge. Furthermore, some of their forces, but not German strength in Arnhem was before the Germans killed or substantially greater than captured more than 7,000 On 8 February 1945, Melanie reported that Field Marshal Goering paratroopers; the two American anticipated in the intelligence had established his headquarters in a estimates. The lightly armed airborne divisions fighting along train with three coaches at the Nied- paratroopers found themselves up the corridor lost more than 3,500. eraula train station and that he had against two SS panzer divisions With the debacle in Arnhem, been there for several months. Dutch intelligence agents were routinely recently refitting in the area. hopes of an early end to the war able to report the locations of regi- Suffering from the loss in the quickly faded. In the words of the mental and higher headquarters airdrop of critical vehicles, British airborne Commander along with descriptions of vehicle artillery, and communications, General Boy Browning, Market- and uniform markings. Reports on the British/Polish force failed to Garden was "a bridge too far." German units were usually able to identify the name of the commander and sometimes what decorations he wore. This type of information came

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from underground sources living in Melanie remained in Eindhoven for provided the most accurate and com- the occupied towns and villages. the duration of war. Besides obtain- plete intelligence picture for its ing intelligence on the strategic and assigned area of any intelligence oper- tactical military situation, the team ation during the war. 24 As he SI also tasked Melanie to conduct provided economic, political, and indicated, Melanie's efforts and the battle damage assessment reports social intelligence on large and small cooperation and sacrifices of its which were forwarded on the results urban areas and on rural communi- Dutch Resistance agents contributed of Allied bombing raids in the Neth- ties. Melanie was also able to put substantially to Allied intelligence erlands. Again, such reports could together a database on Dutch operations in Holland at a crucial only be obtained through eyewitness collaborators. stage. accounts provided by Dutch Resis- tance members and Melanie agents. From 25 to 31 March 1945, Melanie sent 251 reports, messages, and maps/ NOTES A 24 December 1944 memorandum sketches to the OSS/ETO SI section. from Lieutenant Laverge states that From September 1944 to April 1. B. H. Liddell-Hart, History of the Sec- the team had recruited nine Dutch 1945, Melanie sent approximately ond World War (New York; G. P. Putnam's Sons; 1970), p.65. citizens—five observers and four 3,200 courier reports and 750 cable wireless telegraph operators—and messages to the OSS SI section in 2. E. H. Lockridge, Set Europe Ablaze was training them in Eindhoven to Paris. According to an afteraction report written by the SHAEF G-2 in (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell penetrate German lines and collect Company, 1967), p. 247. information. 21 Armed with only 1945 evaluating Dutch intelligence production and reporting, the Mela- their wits and the TR-1 radio, these 3. Gordon Wright, The Ordeal of Total Dutch tried, with varying degrees of nie mission "supplied more reports War, 1939-1945 (New York: Harper for SHAEF's Daily Digest than any success, to accomplish their assigned Torchbook ed.; 1968), p. 145. other OSS mission from September missions. From September 1944 1944 to May 1945.23 until May 1945, there were several 4. Photographic displays in the National War and Resistance secondary missions, involving at least Museum, Overloon, Holland. one agent. These missions involved Undeserved Obscurity contacting various Resistance groups 5. The BBC also broadcast messages and establishing radio contact and codewords targeted at various between the groups and Melanie for Despite its achievements, Melanie underground groups. Some messages intelligence-gathering purposes. has hardly been mentioned in most would be orders to conduct certain Some of the agents did not survive. OSS histories. The only sources on operations. Others were for the pur- Melanie are surviving participants pose of notifying particular groups and the declassified OSS records at that arms and supply airdrops would occur at a predetermined location. Operations in occupied Holland the National Archives at College were extremely difficult and danger- Park, Maryland. The records include 6. Author's interview of Gerard H. J. ous for Melanie's Dutch agents. daily situation reports, financial M. Peijnenburg, Dutch Secretary of After an OSS bureaucrat had recom- accounting records, operational the Army and Resistance member; mended shutting down the operation reports, financial accounting records, Wassenaar, Holland, 18 June 1996. because of a perceived lack of results, operational reports, and debriefs of Laverge responded angrily: "Frankly, Dutch agents sent behind the lines. 7. Ultimately, the BI was responsible for if you knew about conditions in Hol- But there are important gaps in the establishing a network of intelligence land like we do here, you don't see records, as some documents have agents inside occupied Holland. The how the hell those people [Dutch been pulled from the files and B1 also maintained communications with the Dutch Resistance, providing agents] can accomplish what we are reclassified. the Allies with valuable HUMINT. asking." 22 The lack of archival reports on the success or failure of But at least the SHAFE G2 gave 8. Author's interview of Hoynck van these missions makes it impossible to some credit where it was justly due, Papendrecht, PAN founder and evaluate them. when he reported that Melanie Sroottrophen veteran; Eindhoven,

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Holland; 14 June 1996. John W. 13. Authors interview of Margarethe 9. NARA RG 226, Entry # 148, Box Hackett, I Was a Stranger, (Boston: Kelder-Groom; Eindhoven, Holland; 26, Folder 378, Melanie Daily Houghton Mifflin Co.; 1978); p. 53. 14-15 June 1996. Report, dared 24 Sept. 1944, Sjors DeKruijff, "We Had Spread a Bed for the Allies." Unpublished 14. Van Papendrechr was against the ran- monograph, obtained from the dom killing of lone German soldiers. 10. OSS/SOE Jedburgh teams were joint Allied special operations teams which Hartenstein Airborne Museum, Arn- He seems to have regarded this as infiltrated into occupied territory to hem, Holland, 1996. DeKruijirs ungentlemanly and serving no purpose. recruit and train local Resistance orga- monograph details Resistance activi- nizations for strategic intelligence ties in the Arnhem area before and operations and sabotage. during Market-Garden. Much of his 15. Authors interview of Jan I.averge, material is drawn from veterans first- Captain, USA (Retired); OSS vet- hand accounts on file at the State eran; Richmond, VA., 2 November 11. NARA RG 226, Entry # 146, Box Archives in Arnhem. 1995. 26, Folder 384, Memorandum dated 24 December 1944, Subject: Agent 16. NARA RG 226, Entry 190, Box 214, Recruitment, Melanie Mission. 9: Authorss interview of Gerard H.J.M. Folder 162. Deployment Order, Mel- Peijnenburg, Dutch Secretary of the anie Mission, undated. Army and LO member; Wassenaar, 12. Letter from Capt. Jan 1.averge to Holland, 18 June 1996. 17. NJARA RG 226. Entry # 148, Box Captain Alden, SI Staff, 27 January 26, Folder 378, Melanie Weekly 1945, NARA RG 226, Entry # 190, Box 214, Folder 162. 10. Authors interview of Leo Heinsman, Report. LO member; Beek-Ubbergen, Hol- land, 18 June 1996. 18. XXX Corps advance (the Garden 13. Memorandum from Capt. Harry A. portion of the operation) to link up Rositzke, deputy chief, Steering with the three airborne divisions at Division; to Philip Horton, chief, 11. Authors interview of Gerard H.J.M. Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and Arnhem Steering Division; "Evaluation of Peininenburg, 18 June 1996. was restricted to a narrow two-lane Dutch intelligence Production," highway and the areas the paratroop Sept. 1944-May 1945, dated 9 June units had secured. This road won the 1945. 12. Authors interview of Hoynck van nickname "Hells Highway" for the Papendrecht; Eindhoven, Holland, ferocious fighting between the Wehr- 14 June 1996. mark and Allied units. 14. Ibid.

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