En En Amendments

European Parliament 2014-2019

Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

2015/0270(COD)

20.12.2016

AMENDMENTS 92 - 342

Draft report Esther de Lange (PE592.334v03-00)

on the Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme

Proposal for a regulation (COM(2015)0586 – C8-0371/2015 – 2015/0270(COD))

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EN United in diversity EN

AM_Com_LegReport

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Amendment 92 Gerolf Annemans

Proposal for a regulation –

Proposal for a rejection

The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.

Or. nl

Justification

On a continent where major disparities exist, there is too much uncertainty as to the scale and extent that risks may spread under the EDIS. The EDIS could grow into a transfer mechanism without this being counterbalanced by sufficient responsibility on the part of the insured. The problem of moral hazard is as yet very far from being solved. The aspiration to harmonise national guarantee systems will unnecessarily impair them. The decision to introduce the EDIS is, therefore, not a balanced one.

Amendment 93 Beatrix von Storch

Draft legislative resolution Citation 2

Draft legislative resolution Amendment

— having regard to Article 294(2) and — having regard to Article 115 of the Article 114 of the Treaty on the Treaty on the functioning of the European Functioning of the European Union, Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C8- 0371/2015),

Or. de

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Amendment 94 Beatrix von Storch

Draft legislative resolution Citation 3

Draft legislative resolution Amendment

— having regard to Article 294(3) of — having regard to Articles 294(2) the Treaty on the Functioning of the and (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union, the European Union,

Or. de

Amendment 95 Sylvie Goulard

Draft legislative resolution Citation 3 a (new)

Draft legislative resolution Amendment

– having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 April 2016,

Or. en

Amendment 96 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Title 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Proposal for a Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 and order to establish a European Deposit amending Directive 2014/49/EU in order Insurance Scheme to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme

Or. en

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Amendment 97 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Title 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Proposal for a Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 and order to establish a European Deposit Directive 2014/59/EU in order to establish Insurance Scheme a European Deposit Insurance Scheme

Or. en

Amendment 98 Alain Cadec

Proposal for a regulation Title 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme Reinsurance Scheme

Or. en

Amendment 99 Beatrix von Storch

Proposal for a regulation Citation 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Having regard to the Treaty on the Having regard to Article 115 of the Treaty

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Functioning of the European Union, and in on the Functioning of the European Union, particular Article 114 thereof,

Or. de

Amendment 100 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(1) Over the past years, the Union has deleted made progress in creating an internal market for banking services. A better integrated internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic growth in the Union, to safeguard the stability of the banking system and to protect depositors.

Or. it

Amendment 101 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 2

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(2) On 18 October 2012, the European deleted Council concluded that "In the light of the fundamental challenges facing it, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) needs to be strengthened to ensure economic and social welfare as well as stability and sustained prosperity" and "that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the Union institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards Member States whose currency is not the

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euro and by respect for the integrity of the internal market". To that end, the Banking Union has been established, underpinned by a comprehensive and detailed single rulebook for financial services for the internal market as a whole. The process towards establishing the Banking Union has been characterised by openness and transparency towards non-participating Member States and by respect for the integrity of the internal market.

Or. it

Amendment 102 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 3

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(3) The European Parliament, in its deleted resolution of 20 November 2012 'Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union', also stated that breaking the negative feedback loops between sovereigns, banks and the real economy is crucial for a smooth functioning of the EMU, stressed the urgent need for additional and far-reaching measures for the realisation of a fully operational Banking Union, while ensuring the continued proper functioning of the internal market for financial services and the free movement of capital.

Or. it

Amendment 103 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 4

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(4) While key steps have been made deleted towards ensuring the efficient functioning of the Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM') established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the euro area Member States and those non euro area Member States who choose to participate in the SSM (the 'participating Member States') is implemented in a coherent and effective manner and with the Single Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’) established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 ensuring a consistent framework for the resolution of banks that are failing or likely to fail in the participating Member States, further steps are still needed to complete the Banking Union. ______11 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

Or. it

Amendment 104 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(4) While key steps have been made (4) While key steps have been made towards ensuring the efficient functioning towards ensuring the efficient functioning of the Banking Union, with the Single of the Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM') Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM')

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established by Council Regulation (EU) No established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the euro area of credit institutions in the euro area Member States and those non euro area Member States and those non euro area Member States who choose to participate Member States who choose to participate in the SSM (the 'participating Member in the SSM (the 'participating Member States') is implemented in a coherent and States') is implemented in a coherent and effective manner and with the Single effective manner and with the Single Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’) Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’) established by Regulation (EU) No established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 ensuring a consistent framework 806/2014 ensuring a consistent framework for the resolution of banks that are failing for the resolution of banks that are failing or likely to fail in the participating Member or likely to fail in the participating Member States, further steps are still needed to States, further steps are still needed to complete the Banking Union. reduce overall risks and risks specific to national banking systems before the Banking Union could be completed. ______11 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 11 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

Or. en

Amendment 105 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 4

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(4) While key steps have been made (4) While some key steps have been towards ensuring the efficient functioning made towards ensuring the efficient of the Banking Union, with the Single functioning of the Banking Union, with the Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM') Single Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM') established by Council Regulation (EU) No established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the euro area of credit institutions in the euro area Member States and those non euro area Member States and those non euro area Member States who choose to participate Member States who choose to participate

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in the SSM (the 'participating Member in the SSM (the 'participating Member States') is implemented in a coherent and States') is implemented and with the Single effective manner and with the Single Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’) Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’) established by Regulation (EU) No established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 ensuring a framework for the 806/2014 ensuring a consistent framework resolution of banks that are failing or likely for the resolution of banks that are failing to fail in the participating Member States, or likely to fail in the participating Member further essential steps are still needed to States, further steps are still needed to complete the Banking Union in a balanced complete the Banking Union. way. ______11 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 11 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63). (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).

Or. en

Amendment 106 Fabio De Masi

Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(4a) Regrettably, no agreement has yet been reached on a Bank Structural Reform, which is necessary to end the too- big-to-fail problem and to improve the resilience of the European banking sector and which constitutes a vital step to break the sovereign/bank link by removing the implicit guarantee enjoyed by systemically important institutions.

Or. en

Amendment 107 Sylvie Goulard

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(4a) An appropriate level of supervision is guaranteed for all banks through the direct supervision of the SSM and the fact that at any time the SSM can decide to directly supervise any one of the "less significant" institutions to ensure that high supervisory standards are applied consistently.

Or. en

Amendment 108 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Recital 4 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(4b) The Banking Union is a three- pillar system for Member States of the euro area, open to Member States whose currency is not the euro. For Member States whose currency is not the euro, coverage by the EDIS is therefore accessible only to those which have established a close cooperation with the SSM and the SRM.

Or. en

Amendment 109 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents deleted

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Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level for the national deposit guarantee schemes as a first step towards a fully mutualised approach. The scope of this reinsurance system should coincide with that of the SSM.

Or. it

Amendment 110 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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(EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level for the national deposit guarantee schemes as a first step towards a fully mutualised approach. The scope of this reinsurance system should coincide with that of the SSM.

Or. de

Amendment 111 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents (5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a and Monetary Union pointed to the single banking system can only be truly necessity to have an effective EU-wide single if confidence in the safety of bank system of bank supervision, bank deposits is the same irrespective of the resolution and bank deposit guarantee Member State in which a bank operates. schemes to reduce existing vulnerabilities, This requires single bank supervision, in particular with regard to the sovereign- single bank resolution and single deposit bank-nexus, and to increase the resilience insurance. The Five Presidents report of the European banking sector against therefore proposed to complete the future crises. This system should be Banking Union by establishing a European designed in such a way that moral hazard Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the is prevented. Notwithstanding the co- third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking legislators' prerogative, the Five Union alongside bank supervision and Presidents report proposed to complete the resolution. Concrete steps in that direction Banking Union and to establish a should already be taken as a priority, with European Deposit Insurance Scheme a re-insurance system at the European (EDIS) for national guarantee schemes, level for the national deposit guarantee the third pillar of the Banking Union schemes as a first step towards a fully alongside bank supervision and resolution. mutualised approach. The scope of this Concrete steps in that direction could only reinsurance system should coincide with be taken after effective risk reduction has that of the SSM. been advanced, with a reinsurance system at the European level for the national deposit guarantee schemes as a first step. The scope of this reinsurance system

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should coincide with that of the SSM.

Or. en

Amendment 112 Peter Simon

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents (5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction resolution, which should be completed should already be taken as a priority, with a with a final fiscal safeguard at the re-insurance system at the European level European Stability Mechanism. Concrete for the national deposit guarantee schemes steps in that direction should already be as a first step towards a fully mutualised taken as a priority, with a re-insurance approach. The scope of this reinsurance system at the European level for the system should coincide with that of the national deposit guarantee schemes as a SSM. first step towards a mutualised approach. The scope of this reinsurance system should coincide with that of the SSM.

Or. de

Amendment 113 Jonás Fernández, Pervenche Berès, Jakob von Weizsäcker, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill, Andrea Cozzolino, Costas Mavrides

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents (5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the therefore called for completion of the Banking Union by establishing a European Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction resolution, that should be completed by a should already be taken as a priority, with a common fiscal backstop based in the re-insurance system at the European level European Stability Mechanism. Concrete for the national deposit guarantee schemes steps in that direction should already be as a first step towards a fully mutualised taken as a priority, with a re-insurance approach. The scope of this reinsurance system at the European level for the system should coincide with that of the national deposit guarantee schemes as a SSM. first step towards a fully mutualised approach. The scope of this reinsurance system should coincide with that of the SSM.

Or. en

Amendment 114 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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deposits is the same irrespective of the deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with should be taken only if and when a re-insurance system at the European conditions set out in this Regulation have level for the national deposit guarantee been met. In other words, only if and schemes as a first step towards a fully when sufficient progress has been made mutualised approach. The scope of this with respect to risk reduction and all reinsurance system should coincide with banks in the Banking Union are deemed that of the SSM. to be in a comparable, financially stable position, could a fair EDIS be established.

Or. en

Amendment 115 Michael Theurer

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents (5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with could only be taken after sufficient

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a re-insurance system at the European level effective risk reducing measures have for the national deposit guarantee schemes been undertaken, with a re-insurance as a first step towards a fully mutualised system at the European level for the approach. The scope of this reinsurance national deposit guarantee schemes as a system should coincide with that of the first step. The scope of this reinsurance SSM. system should coincide with that of the SSM.

Or. en

Justification

National deposit insurance schemes already provide adequate safeguards. This is particularly the case for Member States with strong institutional protection schemes, which should be preserved. A cross-financing of deposit insurance schemes between Member States contravenes the principle of control and liability and risks setting wrong incentives for credit institutions.

Amendment 116 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents (5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with a should already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level re-insurance system at the European level for the national deposit guarantee schemes for the national deposit guarantee schemes as a first step towards a fully mutualised as a first step. The scope of this reinsurance

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approach. The scope of this reinsurance system should coincide with that of the system should coincide with that of the SSM. SSM.

Or. en

Amendment 117 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents (5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with a should already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level co-insurance system at the European level for the national deposit guarantee schemes for the national deposit guarantee schemes as a first step towards a fully mutualised as a first step towards a fully mutualised approach. The scope of this reinsurance approach. The scope of this co-insurance system should coincide with that of the system should coincide with that of the SSM. SSM.

Or. es

Amendment 118 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 5

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents (5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic Report on Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with a should already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level partial re-insurance system at the European for the national deposit guarantee schemes level for the national deposit guarantee as a first step towards a fully mutualised schemes as a first step towards a fully approach. The scope of this reinsurance mutualised approach. The scope of this system should coincide with that of the reinsurance system should coincide with SSM. that of the SSM.

Or. en

Amendment 119 Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5a) In October 2016, the Commission published an effects analysis on EDIS following calls of the ECON rapporteur in June 2016 to study the impact of EDIS. The effects analysis uses simulations based on the SYMBOL model to assess the likely effects of three European risk pooling arrangements for bank deposits.

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The usefulness of the effects analysis is constrained by the following facts: (i) While the effects analysis compares three different European risk pooling arrangements with each other, it does not compare any of them with the natural benchmark of a complete set of fully functional, unpooled national deposit guarantee schemes. (ii) While one of the concerns over a common European deposit insurance is moral hazard and increased risk taking by banks, the SYMBOL model is - by construction - unable to evaluate any effects caused by higher moral hazard in a risk pooling arrangement. Neglecting moral hazard issues biases the results of the effects analysis in favour of EDIS. (iii) While one concern over a common European deposit insurance is an increased risk of bank runs in countries which have partially or fully depleted their own DGS or similar resources in aiding other countries' banking systems, the SYMBOL model is - by construction - unable to assess increased risks of bank runs after partial or full depletion of resources. Neglecting increased risks of bank runs biases the results of the effects analysis in favour of EDIS. (iv) While one of the justifications for a common European deposit insurance is the assertion of a better defence against asymmetric shocks, the effects analysis does not reveal if and how the SYMBOL model simulations are based on any degree of assumed asymmetry. No information is provided about the correlation structure of the shocks across European banks. However, if shocks are generated from the same distribution (i. e. with the same covariance of shocks) in each of the 100,000 simulations, than either they are set up completely symmetric or they impose just one particular type of asymmetry without giving any information, explanation and

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justification for this particular form. In the unlikely event that shocks are not generated from a constant distribution, changes in the distribution would necessarily be arbitrary and the number of simulations way too small. In any case the effects analysis is unsatisfactory as far as asymmetry of shocks is concerned. (v) While risk-weighted contributions to a common European deposit insurance are a key element of the EDIS proposal, the Commission's effects analysis does not study the competitive effects in an upcoming Capital Markets Union of higher contributions to EDIS by precisely those banks which are particularly vulnerable because they have riskier assets in their balance sheets. Nor does the effects analysis try to quantify if this cost-increasing effect would be partially or fully compensated by reduction in risk premia those banks have to pay to creditors. Neglecting cost and competition issues is a serious shortcoming of the effects analysis.

Or. en

Amendment 120 Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5b) The effects analysis of EDIS published by the Commission has not been subject to any external and independent scientific referee process. Even without that, various shortcomings are apparent. Due to the importance of the matter, the effects analysis should not fall short of normal scientific standards, but should be submitted to the scrutiny of external and independent experts in a

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revised form which takes into account the deficiencies already identified. Moreover, before any further decisions on EDIS are taken, the effects analysis should be extended to cover the case of a complete set of fully functional, unpooled national deposit guarantee schemes as the natural benchmark for supranational risk pooling arrangements. Since the EDIS proposal is asserted to imply no long-run net transfers between the resources of different Member States, temporary liquidity support is the key issue in any comparison between purely national solutions and EDIS-type supranational risk-pooling. This has not been sufficiently dealt with in the Commission's proposal on EDIS or its effects analysis and should be done without delay. Various arrangements for temporary liquidity support are conceivable, including voluntary lending with discretionary decision-making by the boards of national deposit guarantee schemes which act contingent on DGS compliance of the receiving countries, size and scope of the shocks and the contagion effects of the crisis. Quite naturally, an extended and unbiased effects analysis should study the setup which is optimal in terms of timeliness, incentive compatibility (moral hazard reduction), subsidiarity, proportionality and ex-post protection for the liquidity provider. Clearly, this type of effects analysis should also be reviewed by a scientific referee process before any further decision on EDIS is taken.

Or. en

Amendment 121 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 5 a (new)

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(5a) The Banking Union has developed in an imbalanced way with considerable delays in progress on the third pillar of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, has left depositors unprotected and prolonged inequalities, with the peripheral Member States and the Member States most affected by the financial and economic crisis and their depositors as the main victims;

Or. en

Amendment 122 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 6

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(6) The recent crisis has shown that the (6) The recent crisis has shown that functioning of the internal market may be financial stability may be under threat and under threat and that there is an increasing that there is an increasing risk of financial risk of financial fragmentation. The failure fragmentation. The failure of a bank that is of a bank that is relatively large compared relatively large compared to the national to the national banking sector or the banking sector or the concurrent failure of concurrent failure of a part of the national a part of the national banking sector may banking sector may cause national DGSs to cause national DGSs to be vulnerable to be vulnerable to large local shocks, even large local shocks. This vulnerability of with the additional funding mechanisms national DGSs to large local shocks can provided by Directive 2014/49/EU of the contribute to adverse feedback between European Parliament and of the banks and their national sovereign Council12. This vulnerability of national undermining the homogeneity of protection DGSs to large local shocks can contribute for deposits and contributing to a lack of to adverse feedback between banks and confidence among depositors and resulting their national sovereign undermining the in market instability. For this reason, a homogeneity of protection for deposits and European deposit system must be contributing to a lack of confidence among established as soon as possible, which depositors and resulting in market provides a full guarantee and has a public instability. backstop provided by the ECB. ______12 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European 12 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European

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Parliament and of the Council of 16 April Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149). 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).

Or. it

Amendment 123 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 6 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(6a) the Banking Union, with progress only on the single resolution mechanism and the single supervisory mechanism and leaving EDIS behind, has resulted in a capital centralization process and in several mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector of different Member States, resulting in further concentration of deposits and investments in the major financial centres, which magnifies the "too-big-to-fail" issue;

Or. en

Amendment 124 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(7) The absence of a homogenous level (7) The existing absence of a of depositor protection can distort homogenous level of depositor protection competition and create an effective barrier has already distorted depositors’ for the freedoms of establishment and free confidence. Further delays will distort provision of services by credit institutions competition and create dangerous barrier within the internal market. A common for the freedoms of establishment and free deposit insurance scheme is therefore provision of services by credit institutions essential for the completion of the internal within the internal market. The Banking market in financial services. Union as it functions today prolongs and

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exacerbates inequalities among Member States' banking systems and national DGSs and considerably delays steps which are absolutely necessary for the development of the third pillar on EDIS, leaving depositors unprotected mainly in peripheral Member States and the Member States most affected by the financial and economic crisis. Only a timely, fully mutualised and fully insured EDIS could provide an effective framework to protect on an equal basis depositors throughout the Banking Union countries, stopping in that way the dependence between sovereign and banks.

Or. en

Amendment 125 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(7) The absence of a homogenous level (7) The great disparity in risks specific of depositor protection can distort to national banking systems and the competition and create an effective barrier absence of a homogenous level of for the freedoms of establishment and free depositor protection can distort provision of services by credit institutions competition and create an effective barrier within the internal market. A common for the freedoms of establishment and free deposit insurance scheme is therefore provision of services by credit institutions essential for the completion of the internal within the internal market. Only if and market in financial services. when sufficient progress has been made with respect to risk reduction and all banks in the Banking Union are deemed to be in a comparable, financially stable position, can a European deposit insurance scheme be instrumental to the completion of the internal market in financial services.

Or. en

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Amendment 126 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(7) The absence of a homogenous (7) For the protection of European level of depositor protection can distort consumers a common deposit insurance competition and create an effective scheme is therefore essential. barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of services by credit institutions within the internal market. A common deposit insurance scheme is therefore essential for the completion of the internal market in financial services.

Or. it

Amendment 127 Jonás Fernández, Costas Mavrides, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(7) The absence of a homogenous level (7) The absence of a homogenous level of depositor protection can distort of depositor protection can distort competition and create an effective barrier competition and create an effective barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of services by credit institutions provision of services by credit institutions within the internal market. A common within the internal market. A common deposit insurance scheme is therefore deposit insurance scheme is therefore essential for the completion of the internal essential for the completion of the internal market in financial services. market in financial services, while improving the competitive position of the Union as the safest financial area in the world.

Or. en

Amendment 128 Philippe Lamberts

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on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(7) The absence of a homogenous level (7) The absence of a homogenous level of depositor protection can distort of depositor protection can distort competition and create an effective barrier competition and create an effective barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of services by credit institutions provision of services by credit institutions within the internal market. A common within the internal market and exacerbate deposit insurance scheme is therefore negative externalities within the Single essential for the completion of the internal Market. A common deposit insurance market in financial services. scheme is therefore essential for the completion of the internal market in financial services.

Or. en

Amendment 129 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 7

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(7) The absence of a homogenous level (7) The absence of a homogenous level of depositor protection can distort of depositor protection can distort competition and create an effective barrier competition and create an effective barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of services by credit institutions provision of services by credit institutions within the internal market. A common within the internal market. A common deposit insurance scheme is therefore deposit reinsurance scheme is therefore essential for the completion of the internal essential for the completion of the internal market in financial services. market in financial services.

Or. de

Amendment 130 Sylvie Goulard

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 7 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(7a) The trust in deposits is a fundamental layer of confidence that underpins economic activities in all developed countries and a common concern.

Or. en

Amendment 131 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU (8) Since Directive 2014/49/EU is not significantly improves the capacity of the appropriate tool for protecting national schemes to compensate depositors and savers in the event of depositors, more efficient deposit crises, EDIS is considered necessary since guarantee arrangements are needed at the it would increase the resilience of the level of the Banking Union to ensure financial system against future crises by sufficient financial means to underpin the sharing risk more widely and would offer confidence of all depositors and thereby equal protection for insured depositors. safeguard financial stability. EDIS would increase the resilience of the Banking Union against future crises by sharing risk more widely and would offer equal protection for insured depositors, supporting the proper functioning of the internal market.

Or. it

Amendment 132 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU (8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU significantly improves the capacity of significantly improves the capacity of national schemes to compensate depositors, national schemes to compensate depositors, more efficient deposit guarantee more efficient deposit guarantee arrangements are needed at the level of the arrangements are urgently needed at the Banking Union to ensure sufficient level of the Banking Union to ensure financial means to underpin the confidence sufficient financial means to underpin the of all depositors and thereby safeguard confidence of all depositors on an equal financial stability. EDIS would increase the basis throughout the Banking Union resilience of the Banking Union against countries and thereby safeguard financial future crises by sharing risk more widely stability. EDIS would increase the and would offer equal protection for resilience of the Banking Union against insured depositors, supporting the proper future crises by sharing risk more widely functioning of the internal market. and would offer equal protection for insured depositors, supporting the proper functioning of the internal market.

Or. en

Amendment 133 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU (8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU significantly improves the capacity of significantly improves the capacity of national schemes to compensate depositors, national schemes to compensate depositors, more efficient deposit guarantee more efficient deposit guarantee arrangements are needed at the level of the arrangements are needed at the level of the Banking Union to ensure sufficient Banking Union to ensure sufficient financial means to underpin the confidence financial means to underpin the confidence of all depositors and thereby safeguard of all depositors and thereby safeguard financial stability. EDIS would increase financial stability. A European deposit the resilience of the Banking Union against reinsurance scheme would increase the future crises by sharing risk more widely resilience of the Banking Union against and would offer equal protection for future crises, supporting the proper insured depositors, supporting the proper functioning of the internal market. functioning of the internal market.

Or. de

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Amendment 134 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU (8) While Directive 2014/49/EU significantly improves the capacity of already significantly improves the capacity national schemes to compensate depositors, of national schemes to compensate more efficient deposit guarantee depositors, more efficient deposit arrangements are needed at the level of the guarantee arrangements are desirable at the Banking Union to ensure sufficient level of the Banking Union to ensure financial means to underpin the confidence sufficient financial means to underpin the of all depositors and thereby safeguard confidence of all depositors and thereby financial stability. EDIS would increase safeguard financial stability. A well- the resilience of the Banking Union against designed deposit insurance system should future crises by sharing risk more widely not harm the level of protection that and would offer equal protection for depositors currently enjoy and has the insured depositors, supporting the proper potential to increase the resilience of the functioning of the internal market. Banking Union against future crises and offer equal protection for insured depositors.

Or. en

Amendment 135 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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resilience of the Banking Union against resilience of the Banking Union against future crises by sharing risk more widely future crises by sharing and diversifying and would offer equal protection for risk more widely and would offer equal insured depositors, supporting the proper protection for insured depositors, functioning of the internal market. supporting the proper functioning of the internal market.

Or. en

Amendment 136 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU (8) Although Directive 2014/49/EU significantly improves the capacity of significantly improves the capacity of national schemes to compensate depositors, national schemes to compensate depositors, more efficient deposit guarantee more efficient deposit guarantee arrangements are needed at the level of the arrangements are needed at the level of the Banking Union to ensure sufficient Banking Union to ensure sufficient financial means to underpin the confidence financial means to underpin the confidence of all depositors and thereby safeguard of all depositors and thereby safeguard financial stability. EDIS would increase the financial stability. EDIS would increase the resilience of the Banking Union against resilience of the Banking Union against future crises by sharing risk more widely future crises and would offer equal and would offer equal protection for protection for insured depositors, insured depositors, supporting the proper supporting the proper functioning of the functioning of the internal market. internal market.

Or. en

Amendment 137 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8a) The key objective of the EDIS is to enhance the effective deposit guarantee framework with a view to protecting

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depositors in an equal way against the consequences of deposits becoming unavailable. At the full insurance stage, the objective is to provide an equal level of protection to all depositors of credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs.

Or. en

Amendment 138 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8a) It is important to underline that a European Deposit Insurance Scheme is a necessary tool, which appropriate supervision and an appropriate resolution framework renders a theoretical option. The main reason for such a scheme is to build trust.

Or. en

Amendment 139 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Recital 8 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(8b) Geographical diversification is a key element to enable a sound risk allocation and management and therefore an excessive concentration of assets should be taken into account when calculating the risk contributions.

Or. en

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Amendment 140 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 9

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(9) Funds used by deposit guarantee (9) Funds used by deposit guarantee schemes to repay depositors for schemes to repay depositors for unavailable covered deposits in accordance unavailable covered deposits in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU on with Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes do not deposit guarantee schemes do not constitute State aid or Fund aid. However, constitute State aid or Fund aid. where those funds are used in the restructuring of credit institutions and constitute State aid or Fund aid, they must comply with Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and, respectively, with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council13, which should be amended for that purpose. ______13 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the 13 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1). (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1). p. 1). (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1).

Or. it

Amendment 141 Jonás Fernández, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 9

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 142 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 10

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(10) Despite the further harmonisation (10) Despite the further harmonisation introduced by the Directive 2014/49/EU, introduced by the Directive 2014/49/EU, national DGSs retain certain options and national DGSs retain certain options and discretions, including with respect to discretions, including with respect to

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certain essential elements like target levels, certain essential elements like target levels, risk factors to be applied when assessing risk factors to be applied when assessing credit institutions’ contributions, credit institutions' contributions, repayment repayment periods or the use of funds. periods or the use of funds. Those Those differences between national rules differences between national rules may may obstruct the free provision of services obstruct the free provision of services and and create distortions of competition. In a create distortions of competition and highly integrated banking sector, negative externalities. In a highly uniformity of rules and approaches is integrated banking sector, common rules needed to ensure a consistently robust level and approaches are needed to ensure a of protection of depositors throughout the consistently robust level of protection of Union and so guarantee the objective of depositors throughout the Union and so financial stability. guarantee the objective of financial stability.

Or. en

Amendment 143 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(11) The establishment of an EDIS, (11) The establishment of a European with decision-making, monitoring and deposit reinsurance scheme, with enforcement powers centralised and decision-making, monitoring and entrusted to the Single Resolution and enforcement powers centralised and Deposit Insurance Board ("the Board"), entrusted to the Single Resolution and will be essential in achieving the objective Deposit Insurance Board ("the Board"), of a harmonised deposit guarantee will be essential in achieving the objective framework. The uniform application of the of a harmonised European deposit deposit guarantee requirements in the reinsurance scheme. The uniform participating Member States will be application of the deposit guarantee enhanced as a result of it being entrusted to requirements in the participating Member such a central authority. In this way, the States will be enhanced as a result of it operation of EDIS should facilitate, by being entrusted to such a central authority. supporting and providing a framework for In this way, the operation of the European the establishment and subsequent deposit reinsurance scheme should implementation of uniform rules on deposit facilitate, by supporting and providing a guarantee arrangements, the harmonisation framework for the establishment and process in the field of financial services. subsequent implementation of uniform rules on deposit guarantee arrangements, the harmonisation process in the field of financial services.

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Or. de

Amendment 144 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 11

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(11) The establishment of an EDIS, with (11) The establishment of a well- decision-making, monitoring and designed EDIS, with decision-making, enforcement powers centralised and monitoring and enforcement powers entrusted to the Single Resolution and centralised and entrusted to the Single Deposit Insurance Board ("the Board"), Resolution and Deposit Insurance Board will be essential in achieving the objective ("the Board"), could be instrumental in of a harmonised deposit guarantee achieving the objective of a more framework. The uniform application of the harmonised deposit guarantee framework. deposit guarantee requirements in the The uniform application of the deposit participating Member States will be guarantee requirements in the participating enhanced as a result of it being entrusted to Member States could be enhanced as a such a central authority. In this way, the result of it being entrusted to such a central operation of EDIS should facilitate, by authority. In this way, the operation of supporting and providing a framework for EDIS could facilitate, by supporting and the establishment and subsequent providing a framework for the implementation of uniform rules on deposit establishment and subsequent guarantee arrangements, the harmonisation implementation of uniform rules on deposit process in the field of financial services. guarantee arrangements, the harmonisation process in the field of financial services.

Or. en

Amendment 145 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(12) Furthermore, EDIS is part of the (12) Furthermore, EDIS is part of the wider EU rules harmonising prudential wider EU rules harmonising prudential supervision and recovery and resolution, supervision and recovery and resolution, which are complementary aspects of the which are complementary aspects of the internal market for banking services. internal market for banking services.

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Supervision can only be effective and Supervision can potentially be more meaningful if an adequate deposit effective and meaningful if a well-designed insurance scheme, corresponding to the EDIS, preceded by measures aimed at developments in the field of supervision, is reducing overall risks in the Banking created. EDIS is therefore instrumental to Union and risks specific to national a wider process of harmonisation and its banking systems, is created. EDIS could objectives are closely linked to the Union be instrumental to a wider process of framework on prudential supervision and harmonisation and its objectives are closely recovery and resolution whose centralised linked to the Union framework on application are mutually dependant. For prudential supervision and recovery and instance, adequate coordination at the level resolution whose centralised application of supervision and deposit guarantee is are mutually dependant. For instance, needed in cases where the European adequate coordination at the level of Central Bank (ECB) envisages supervision and deposit guarantee is withdrawing an authorisation to a credit needed in cases where the European institution or where a credit institution does Central Bank (ECB) envisages not comply with the obligation to be a withdrawing an authorisation to a credit member of a DGS. A similar high level of institution or where a credit institution does integration is needed between the not comply with the obligation to be a resolution actions and the deposit insurance member of a DGS. A similar high level of tasks attributed to the Board. integration is needed between the resolution actions and the deposit insurance tasks attributed to the Board.

Or. en

Amendment 146 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 12

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(12) Furthermore, EDIS is part of the (12) Furthermore, the European deposit wider EU rules harmonising prudential reinsurance scheme is part of the wider supervision and recovery and resolution, EU rules harmonising prudential which are complementary aspects of the supervision and recovery and resolution, internal market for banking services. which are complementary aspects of the Supervision can only be effective and internal market for banking services. meaningful if an adequate deposit Supervision can only be effective and insurance scheme, corresponding to the meaningful if an adequate deposit developments in the field of supervision, is reinsurance scheme, corresponding to the created. EDIS is therefore instrumental to a developments in the field of supervision, is wider process of harmonisation and its created. The European deposit objectives are closely linked to the Union reinsurance scheme is therefore framework on prudential supervision and instrumental to a wider process of

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recovery and resolution whose centralised harmonisation and its objectives are closely application are mutually dependant. - For linked to the Union framework on instance, adequate coordination at the level prudential supervision and recovery and of supervision and deposit guarantee is resolution whose centralised application needed in cases where the European are mutually dependant. - For instance, Central Bank (ECB) envisages adequate coordination at the level of withdrawing an authorisation to a credit supervision and deposit guarantee is institution or where a credit institution does needed in cases where the European not comply with the obligation to be a Central Bank (ECB) envisages member of a DGS. A similar high level of withdrawing an authorisation to a credit integration is needed between the institution or where a credit institution does resolution actions and the deposit not comply with the obligation to be a insurance tasks attributed to the Board. member of a DGS. A similar high level of integration is needed between the resolution actions and the deposit reinsurance tasks attributed to the Board.

Or. de

Amendment 147 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(13) This Regulation applies only in (13) This Regulation applies only in respect of banks whose home supervisor is respect of banks whose home supervisor is the ECB or the national competent the ECB or the national competent authority in Member States whose currency authority in Member States whose currency is the euro or in Member States whose is the euro or in Member States whose currency is not the euro which have currency is not the euro which have established a close cooperation in established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. The scope of (EU) No 1024/2013. The scope of application of this Regulation is linked to application of this Regulation is linked to the scope of application of Regulation the scope of application of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. Indeed, bearing in (EU) No 1024/2013. Indeed, bearing in mind the significant level to which the mind the significant level to which the supervisory tasks attributed to the SSM and supervisory tasks attributed to the SSM and deposit guarantee actions are interwoven, deposit guarantee actions are interwoven, the establishment of a centralised system of the establishment of a centralised system of supervision operated under Article 127(6) supervision operated under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is fundamentally European Union is fundamentally important to the process of harmonisation important to the process of harmonisation

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of deposit guarantee in participating of deposit guarantee in participating Member States. The fact of being subject Member States. The fact of being subject to supervision by the SSM constitutes a to supervision by the SSM constitutes a specific attribute that places the entities specific attribute that places the entities falling within the scope of application of falling within the scope of application of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 in an Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 in an objectively and characterised distinct objectively and characterised distinct position for deposit guarantee purposes. It position for deposit guarantee purposes. It is necessary to adopt measures to create a is necessary to adopt measures aimed at single deposit insurance scheme for all reducing overall risks in the Banking Member States participating in the SSM Union and risks specific to national in order to facilitate the proper and stable banking systems, before a more functioning of the internal market. harmonised deposit insurance scheme, potentially facilitating the proper and stable functioning of the internal market, could be established.

Or. en

Amendment 148 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 13

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(13) This Regulation applies only in (13) This Regulation applies only in respect of banks whose home supervisor is respect of banks and credit unions whose the ECB or the national competent home supervisor is the ECB or the national authority in Member States whose currency competent authority in Member States is the euro or in Member States whose whose currency is the euro or in Member currency is not the euro which have States whose currency is not the euro established a close cooperation in which have established a close cooperation accordance with Article 7 of Regulation in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. The scope of (EU) No 1024/2013. The scope of application of this Regulation is linked to application of this Regulation is linked to the scope of application of Regulation the scope of application of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. Indeed, bearing in (EU) No 1024/2013. Indeed, bearing in mind the significant level to which the mind the significant level to which the supervisory tasks attributed to the SSM and supervisory tasks attributed to the SSM and deposit guarantee actions are interwoven, deposit guarantee actions are interwoven, the establishment of a centralised system of the establishment of a centralised system of supervision operated under Article 127(6) supervision operated under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is fundamentally European Union is fundamentally important to the process of harmonisation important to the process of harmonisation

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of deposit guarantee in participating of deposit guarantee in participating Member States. The fact of being subject Member States. The fact of being subject to supervision by the SSM constitutes a to supervision by the SSM constitutes a specific attribute that places the entities specific attribute that places the entities falling within the scope of application of falling within the scope of application of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 in an Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 in an objectively and characterised distinct objectively and characterised distinct position for deposit guarantee purposes. It position for deposit guarantee purposes. It is necessary to adopt measures to create a is necessary to adopt measures to create a single deposit insurance scheme for all single deposit insurance scheme for all Member States participating in the SSM in Member States participating in the SSM in order to facilitate the proper and stable order to facilitate the proper and stable functioning of the internal market. functioning of the internal market.

Or. es

Amendment 149 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(14) In order to ensure parallelism with (14) In order to ensure parallelism with the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply to participating Member States. Banks to participating Member States. Banks established in the Member States not established in the Member States not participating in the SSM should not be participating in the SSM should not be subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in a Member State remains outside the SSM, a Member State remains outside the SSM, that Member State should remain that Member State should remain responsible for ensuring the protection of responsible for ensuring the protection of depositors against the consequences of the depositors against the consequences of insolvency of a credit institution. As deposits becoming unavailable. As Member States join the SSM, they should Member States join the SSM, they should also automatically become subject to the also become subject to the EDIS. EDIS. Ultimately, the EDIS could Transitional measures should be put in potentially extend to the entire internal place to ensure a smooth phasing-in of market. any DGS that joins EDIS at a later date. Ultimately, the EDIS could potentially extend to the entire internal market.

Or. en

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Amendment 150 Jonás Fernández, Pervenche Berès, Jakob von Weizsäcker

Proposal for a regulation Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(14) In order to ensure parallelism with (14) In order to ensure coherence with the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply to participating Member States. Banks to participating Member States. Banks established in the Member States not established in the Member States not participating in the SSM should not be participating in the SSM should not be subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in a Member State remains outside the SSM, a Member State remains outside the SSM, that Member State should remain that Member State should remain responsible for ensuring the protection of responsible for ensuring the protection of depositors against the consequences of the depositors against the consequences of the insolvency of a credit institution. As insolvency of a credit institution. As Member States join the SSM, they should Member States adopt the Euro and join also automatically become subject to the the SSM, or join the SSM, they should also EDIS. Ultimately, the EDIS could automatically become subject to the EDIS. potentially extend to the entire internal Ultimately, the EDIS should extend to the market. entire internal market.

Or. en

Justification

Adoption of the Euro leads to joining the SSM

Amendment 151 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(14) In order to ensure parallelism with (14) In order to ensure parallelism with the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply the SSM and the SRM, the European to participating Member States. Banks deposit reinsurance scheme should apply established in the Member States not to participating Member States. Banks participating in the SSM should not be established in the Member States not subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in participating in the SSM should not be a Member State remains outside the SSM, subject to the European deposit

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that Member State should remain reinsurance scheme. As long as responsible for ensuring the protection of supervision in a Member State remains depositors against the consequences of the outside the SSM, that Member State should insolvency of a credit institution. As remain responsible for ensuring the Member States join the SSM, they should protection of depositors against the also automatically become subject to the consequences of the insolvency of a credit EDIS. Ultimately, the EDIS could institution. As Member States join the potentially extend to the entire internal SSM, they should also automatically market. become subject to the European deposit reinsurance scheme. Ultimately, the European deposit reinsurance scheme could potentially extend to the entire internal market.

Or. de

Amendment 152 Jonás Fernández, Cătălin Sorin Ivan, Costas Mavrides, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(14) In order to ensure parallelism with (14) In order to ensure parallelism with the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply to participating Member States. Banks to participating Member States. Banks established in the Member States not established in the Member States not participating in the SSM should not be participating in the SSM should not be subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in a Member State remains outside the SSM, a Member State remains outside the SSM, that Member State should remain that Member State should remain responsible for ensuring the protection of responsible for ensuring the protection of depositors against the consequences of the depositors against the consequences of insolvency of a credit institution. As deposits becoming unavailable. As Member States join the SSM, they should Member States join the SSM, they should also automatically become subject to the also become subject to the EDIS. EDIS. Ultimately, the EDIS could Ultimately, the EDIS could potentially potentially extend to the entire internal extend to the entire internal market.' market.

Or. en

Amendment 153 Danuta Maria Hübner

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 14

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(14) In order to ensure parallelism with (14) In order to ensure parallelism with the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply to participating Member States. Banks to participating Member States. Banks established in the Member States not established in the Member States not participating in the SSM should not be participating in the SSM should not be subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in a Member State remains outside the SSM, a Member State remains outside the SSM, that Member State should remain that Member State should remain responsible for ensuring the protection of responsible for ensuring the protection of depositors against the consequences of the depositors in the event of their deposits insolvency of a credit institution. As becoming unavailable. As Member States Member States join the SSM, they should join the SSM, they should also also automatically become subject to the automatically become subject to the EDIS. EDIS. Ultimately, the EDIS could Ultimately, the EDIS could potentially potentially extend to the entire internal extend to the entire internal market. market.

Or. en

Amendment 154 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(15) In order to ensure a level playing deleted field within the internal market as a whole, this Regulation is consistent with Directive 2014/49/EU. It complements the rules and principles of that Directive to ensure the proper functioning of EDIS and that appropriate funding is available to the latter. The material law on deposit guarantee to be applied within the EDIS framework will therefore be consistent with the one applicable by the national DGSs or designated authorities of the non-participating Member States, harmonised through the Directive

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2014/49/EU.

Or. it

Amendment 155 Jonás Fernández, Pervenche Berès, Costas Mavrides, Andrea Cozzolino, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(15) In order to ensure a level playing (15) In order to ensure a level playing field within the internal market as a whole, field within the internal market as a whole, this Regulation is consistent with Directive this Regulation is consistent with Directive 2014/49/EU. It complements the rules and 2014/49/EU. It complements the rules and principles of that Directive to ensure the principles of that Directive to ensure the proper functioning of EDIS and that proper functioning of EDIS and that appropriate funding is available to the appropriate funding is available to the latter. The material law on deposit latter. guarantee to be applied within the EDIS framework will therefore be consistent with the one applicable by the national DGSs or designated authorities of the non- participating Member States, harmonised through the Directive 2014/49/EU. The key objective of the EDIS is to enhance the effective deposit guarantee framework with a view to protecting depositors against the consequences of deposits becoming unavailable. At the full insurance stage, the objective is to provide an equal level of protection to all depositors of credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs. The material law on deposit guarantee to be applied within the EDIS framework will therefore be consistent with the one applicable by the national DGSs or designated authorities of the non- participating Member States, harmonised through Directive 2014/49/EU.

Or. en

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Amendment 156 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(15) In order to ensure a level playing (15) In order to ensure a level playing field within the internal market as a whole, field within the internal market as a whole, this Regulation is consistent with Directive this Regulation is consistent with Directive 2014/49/EU. It complements the rules and 2014/49/EU. It complements the rules and principles of that Directive to ensure the principles of that Directive to ensure the proper functioning of EDIS and that proper functioning of EDIS and that appropriate funding is available to the appropriate funding is available to the latter. The material law on deposit latter. The key objective of the EDIS is to guarantee to be applied within the EDIS enhance the effective deposit guarantee framework will therefore be consistent framework with a view to protecting with the one applicable by the national depositors against the consequences of DGSs or designated authorities of the non- deposits becoming unavailable. At the full participating Member States, harmonised insurance stage, the objective is to provide through the Directive 2014/49/EU. an equal level of protection to all depositors of credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs. The material law on deposit guarantee to be applied within the EDIS framework will therefore be consistent with the one applicable by the national DGSs or designated authorities of the non-participating Member States, harmonised through Directive 2014/49/EU.

Or. en

Amendment 157 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 15

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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2014/49/EU. It complements the rules and 2014/49/EU. It complements the rules and principles of that Directive to ensure the principles of that Directive to ensure the proper functioning of EDIS and that proper functioning of the European appropriate funding is available to the deposit reinsurance scheme and that latter. The material law on deposit appropriate funding is available to the guarantee to be applied within the EDIS latter. The material law on deposit framework will therefore be consistent guarantee to be applied within the with the one applicable by the national European deposit reinsurance scheme DGSs or designated authorities of the non- framework will therefore be consistent participating Member States, harmonised with the one applicable by the national through the Directive 2014/49/EU. DGSs or designated authorities of the non- participating Member States, harmonised through the Directive 2014/49/EU.

Or. de

Amendment 158 Peter Simon

Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(15a) It should be possible for the DIF and the participating DGSs to withdraw from a purely paybox system function and use the available financial resources for alternative measures to avoid compensation cases and the related costs, reimbursing depositors or potential risks to financial stability. These measures must be carried out within a clearly defined legal framework and the participating DGSs must be equipped with the appropriate structures and competences, so that they can plan and carry out such measures effectively and recognise potential risks. The implementation of such alternative measures should take place in accordance with Directive 2014/49/EU. The alternative measures taken to prevent a pay-out situation may not exceed the cost of fulfilling the legal or contractual mandate of the DGS and must be initiated by the DGS in consultation with the

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Board. Before a participating DGS may use financial resources for a compensation case, it is obligated, in consultation with the board, to carry out an ex-ante assessment of whether a pay- out situation can be prevented through the use of appropriate and cost-efficient alternative measures under Article 11 of Directive 2014/49/EU.

Or. de

Amendment 159 Jonás Fernández, Dimitrios Papadimoulis, Philippe Lamberts

Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(15a) It should also be possible for the DIF to go beyond a pure reimbursement function and to use the available financial means in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution with a view to avoiding the costs of reimbursing depositors and other adverse impacts. Those measures should, however, be carried out within a clearly defined framework including appropriate systems and procedures in place for selecting and implementing such measures and monitoring affiliated risks. Implementing such measures should be subject to the imposition of conditions as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU. The costs of the measures taken to prevent the failure of a credit institution should not exceed the costs of fulfilling the statutory or contractual mandates of the respective DIF with regard to protecting covered deposits at the credit institution or the institution itself.

Or. en

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Amendment 160 Jonás Fernández, Andrea Cozzolino, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 15 b (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(15b) It should also be possible for the DIF to go beyond a pure reimbursement function and to use the available financial means in order to prevent the failure of a credit institution with a view to avoiding the costs of reimbursing depositors and other adverse impacts. Those measures should, however, be carried out within a clearly defined framework including appropriate systems and procedures in place for selecting and implementing such measures and monitoring affiliated risks. Implementing such measures should be subject to the imposition of conditions as defined in Directive 2014/49/EU. The costs of the measures taken to prevent the failure of a credit institution should not exceed the costs of fulfilling the statutory or contractual mandates of the respective DIF with regard to protecting covered deposits at the credit institution or the institution itself.

Or. en

Amendment 161 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 16

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(16) In integrated financial markets, any (16) In integrated financial markets, any financial support to reimburse depositors financial support to reimburse depositors enhances the financial stability not only in enhances the financial stability not only in the participating Member State concerned the participating Member State concerned but also in other Member States, by but also in other Member States, by preventing any spill-over of bank crises preventing any spill-over of bank crises

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into non-participating Member States. The into non-participating Member States. The conferral of deposit insurance tasks to the conferral of deposit insurance tasks to the Board should not in any way hamper the Board should not in any way hamper the functioning of the internal market for functioning of the internal market for financial services. The European Banking financial services. Authority (EBA) should therefore maintain its role and retain its existing powers and tasks: it should develop and contribute to the consistent application of the Union legislation applicable to all Member States and enhance convergence of deposit guarantee practices across the Union as a whole.

Or. it

Amendment 162 Marco Zanni, Marco Valli

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve deleted from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge- financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly.

Or. it

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Amendment 163 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) The establishment of EDIS from a reinsurance scheme into a fully balances, on the one hand, the objective mutualised co-insurance scheme over a of breaking the bank-sovereign link, and number of years. In the context of efforts on the other hand, the objective of to deepen the EMU, together with the preventing risks and perverse incentives work on the establishment of bridge- related to moral hazard. A single financing arrangements for the Single European deposit insurance scheme could Resolution Fund (SRF) and on indeed potentially lead to more risks, in developing a common fiscal backstop, this particular those related to moral hazard, step is necessary to reduce the since the large majority of national bank/sovereign links in individual economic and fiscal policy measures may Member States by means of steps towards affect banks' balance sheets and national risk sharing among all the Member States banking systems as a whole. For this in the Banking Union, and thereby to reason, EDIS provides only liquidity reinforce the Banking Union in achieving support. Also, in order to assist in the its key objective. However, such risk achievement of the objective to break the sharing implied by steps to reinforce bank-sovereign link, it is necessary to Banking Union must proceed in parallel make sure that the insolvency of a with risk reducing measures designed to Member State does not immediately result break the bank-sovereign link more in the insolvency of the banks in the directly. Member State concerned, and hence in recourse to EDIS because of sovereign default. That is why one of the conditions that need to be fulfilled prior to the establishment of EDIS should be the application of legislation introducing non-zero risk weights for sovereign exposures or measures to address concentration risks, such as large exposure limits. Moreover, as risks, for instance those related to non-performing loans, still differ greatly between different national banking systems, it is essential to prevent legacy sharing, which is unfair to the depositors that currently enjoy high levels of protection, by making sufficient progress with respect to measures aimed at reducing overall risks and risks specific to national banking systems before a more

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harmonised European deposit insurance scheme could be established.

Or. en

Amendment 164 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) The European deposit reinsurance from a reinsurance scheme into a fully scheme should progressively evolve over a mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years, provided the necessary number of years. In the context of efforts risk reduction preconditions are fulfilled. to deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge- financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly.

Or. de

Amendment 165 Jonás Fernández, Dimitrios Papadimoulis, Philippe Lamberts

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a mutualised co-insurance scheme over 6 number of years. In the context of efforts years. In the context of efforts to deepen to deepen the EMU, together with the work the EMU, together with the work on the on the establishment of bridge-financing establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more break the bank-sovereign link more directly. directly. Risks reduction measures are already supported by the SSM and SRM which aim to reduce the likelihood of bank failures and by the Banking Union single rulebook which establishes a wide range of prudential measures, taken in respect of banks, with the objective of strengthening supervision and crisis management, improving the amount and quality of capital, reducing concentration of exposures, fostering deleveraging, limiting pro-cyclical lending behaviour, reinforcing access to liquidity, addressing systemic risk due to size, complexity and interconnectedness, reinforcing depositor confidence and incentivising proper risk management via rules on governance

Or. en

Amendment 166 Jonás Fernández, Pervenche Berès, Cătălin Sorin Ivan, Andrea Cozzolino, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such achieving its key objective. In parallel, risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce such risk sharing is already supported by Banking Union must proceed in parallel the SSM and SRM, which significantly with risk reducing measures designed to reduce the likelihood of bank failures, break the bank-sovereign link more and by a wide range of prudential directly. measures which have been taken in respect of banks, with the objective of strengthening supervision and crisis management, improving the amount and quality of capital, reducing concentration of exposures, fostering deleveraging, limiting pro-cyclical lending behaviour, reinforcing access to liquidity, addressing systemic risk due to size, complexity and interconnectedness, reinforcing depositor confidence, and incentivising proper risk management via rules on governance

Or. en

Amendment 167 Michael Theurer

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) EDIS could progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully from a reinsurance scheme into an mutualised co-insurance scheme over a insurance scheme should all conditions number of years. In the context of efforts prescribed in this regulation have been to deepen the EMU, together with the met. However, such risk sharing implied work on the establishment of bridge- by steps to reinforce the Banking Union is financing arrangements for the Single possible only once sufficient risk reducing Resolution Fund (SRF) and on measures designed to break the bank- developing a common fiscal backstop, this sovereign link more directly have been step is necessary to reduce the undertaken. bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly.

Or. en

Amendment 168 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly.

Or. en

Amendment 169 Fabio De Masi

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such achieving its key objective. Bank risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Structural Reform to end the too-big-to- Banking Union must proceed in parallel fail problem is a necessary measure to with risk reducing measures designed to reinforce the Banking Union. These steps break the bank-sovereign link more must proceed in parallel with other risk directly. reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly.

Or. en

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Amendment 170 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) EDIS could evolve from a from a reinsurance scheme into a fully reinsurance scheme into an insurance mutualised co-insurance scheme over a scheme over a number of years, if and number of years. In the context of efforts when the conditions set out in this to deepen the EMU, together with the regulation have been fully met. In the work on the establishment of bridge- context of efforts to deepen the EMU and financing arrangements for the Single on developing a common fiscally neutral Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing backstop for the Single Resolution Fund, a common fiscal backstop, this step is this step could to some extent contribute necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign to reducing the bank/sovereign link in links in individual Member States by individual Member States and to means of steps towards risk sharing reinforcing the Banking Union. However, among all the Member States in the any risk sharing implied by steps to Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce complete Banking Union must be preceded the Banking Union in achieving its key by comprehensive and effective risk objective. However, such risk sharing reducing measures designed to break the implied by steps to reinforce Banking bank-sovereign link more directly. Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly.

Or. en

Amendment 171 Danuta Maria Hübner

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully from a reinsurance scheme into a partially mutualised co-insurance scheme over a mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common Fund (SRF) and on developing a common

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fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more break the bank-sovereign link more directly. directly.

Or. en

Amendment 172 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully from a co-insurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a mutualised full insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more break the bank-sovereign link more directly. directly.

Or. es

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Amendment 173 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 17

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve (17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully from a limited reinsurance scheme into a mutualised co-insurance scheme over a fully mutualised reinsurance scheme over number of years. In the context of efforts to a number of years. In the context of efforts deepen the EMU, together with the work to deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge-financing on the establishment of bridge-financing arrangements for the Single Resolution arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more break the bank-sovereign link more directly. directly.

Or. en

Amendment 174 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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and losses of participating DGSs and eventually resulting in a full insurance scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. de

Amendment 175 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(18) EDIS should be established in deleted three sequential stages, first a reinsurance scheme that covers a share of the liquidity shortfall and of the excess losses of participating DGSs, followed by a co- insurance scheme that covers a gradually increasing share of the liquidity shortfall and losses of participating DGSs and eventually resulting in a full insurance scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. en

Amendment 176 Peter Simon

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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increasing share of the liquidity shortfall participating DGSs. and losses of participating DGSs and eventually resulting in a full insurance scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. de

Amendment 177 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(18) EDIS should be established in three (18) EDIS should be established in two sequential stages, first a reinsurance sequential stages, first a co-insurance scheme that covers a share of the liquidity scheme that covers a gradually increasing shortfall and of the excess losses of share of the liquidity shortfall and losses of participating DGSs, followed by a co- participating DGSs and eventually insurance scheme that covers a gradually resulting in a full insurance scheme that increasing share of the liquidity shortfall covers all liquidity needs and losses of and losses of participating DGSs and participating deposit guarantee schemes. eventually resulting in a full insurance scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. es

Amendment 178 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(18) EDIS should be established in three (18) EDIS should be established in sequential stages, first a reinsurance sequential stages, starting with a scheme that covers a share of the liquidity reinsurance scheme that covers a gradually shortfall and of the excess losses of increasing share of the liquidity shortfall participating DGSs, followed by a co- of participating DGSs, followed by an

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insurance scheme that covers a gradually insurance scheme that covers a gradually increasing share of the liquidity shortfall increasing share of the excess loss of and losses of participating DGSs and participating DGSs. eventually resulting in a full insurance scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. en

Amendment 179 Danuta Maria Hübner

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(18) EDIS should be established in three (18) EDIS should be established in two sequential stages, first a reinsurance sequential stages, first a reinsurance scheme that covers a share of the liquidity scheme that covers a share of the liquidity shortfall and of the excess losses of shortfall and of the excess losses of participating DGSs, followed by a co- participating DGSs, followed by a co- insurance scheme that covers a gradually insurance scheme that covers a gradually increasing share of the liquidity shortfall increasing share of the liquidity shortfall and losses of participating DGSs and and losses of participating DGSs. eventually resulting in a full insurance scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. en

Amendment 180 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(18) EDIS should be established in (18) EDIS could, depending on the three sequential stages, first a reinsurance conditions set out in this Regulation, be scheme that covers a share of the liquidity established in two stages, first a shortfall and of the excess losses of reinsurance scheme that covers a

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participating DGSs, followed by a co- gradually increasing share of the liquidity insurance scheme that covers a gradually shortfall of participating DGSs and an increasing share of the liquidity shortfall insurance scheme that covers a share of up and losses of participating DGSs and to 20% of excess loss of participating eventually resulting in a full insurance deposit guarantee schemes. scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. en

Amendment 181 Tom Vandenkendelaere

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(18) EDIS should be established in three (18) EDIS should be established in two sequential stages, first a reinsurance stages, first a reinsurance scheme that scheme that covers a share of the liquidity covers a gradually increasing share of the shortfall and of the excess losses of liquidity shortfall of participating DGSs participating DGSs, followed by a co- and an insurance scheme that covers a insurance scheme that covers a gradually gradually increasing share of the excess increasing share of the liquidity shortfall loss of participating DGSs. During the and losses of participating DGSs and gradual build-up of EDIS, risk sharing eventually resulting in a full insurance and risk reduction should proceed in scheme that covers all liquidity needs and parallel. losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. en

Amendment 182 Marco Zanni, Marco Valli

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(18) EDIS should be established in (18) EDIS, being a full insurance three sequential stages, first a reinsurance scheme that covers all the liquidity needs scheme that covers a share of the liquidity and all the losses of participating DGSs,

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shortfall and of the excess losses of should be established in a single stage, participating DGSs, followed by a co- from the entry into force of this insurance scheme that covers a gradually Regulation, and should provide for full increasing share of the liquidity shortfall coverage of the liquidity shortfall and and losses of participating DGSs and losses of participating DGSs, including eventually resulting in a full insurance through support of liquidity guaranteed scheme that covers all liquidity needs and on an unlimited and unconditional basis losses of participating deposit guarantee by the ECB. schemes.

Or. it

Amendment 183 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 18

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(18) EDIS should be established in three (18) EDIS should be established in two sequential stages, first a reinsurance sequential stages, first a limited scheme that covers a share of the liquidity reinsurance scheme that covers a gradually shortfall and of the excess losses of increasing share of the liquidity shortfall participating DGSs, followed by a co- and a share of the excess losses of insurance scheme that covers a gradually participating DGSs, followed by a increasing share of the liquidity shortfall gradually increasing share of the liquidity and losses of participating DGSs and needs and losses of participating DGSs eventually resulting in a full insurance resulting at the end of the period in a fully scheme that covers all liquidity needs and mutualized reinsurance scheme. losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes.

Or. en

Amendment 184 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(19) In the reinsurance stage, and in deleted

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order to limit the liability for the European Deposit Insurance Fund (“the Deposit Insurance Fund”) and to reduce moral hazard risk at the national level, assistance from the Deposit Insurance Fund can only be requested if the national DGS has raised ex-ante contributions in accordance with a precise funding path, and if it first depletes these funds. However, to the extent that a national DGS has collected funds over and above that which is required by the funding path, it only needs to use up the funds it had to collect to comply with the funding path before being able to receive coverage by EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have collected more funds than is needed to comply with the funding path should not be in a worse position than those which have collected funds not exceeding the levels set out in the funding path.

Or. es

Amendment 185 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(19) In the reinsurance stage, and in (19) Assistance from the deposit order to limit the liability for the reinsurance fund can only be requested if European Deposit Insurance Fund (“the the participating national DGS has raised Deposit Insurance Fund”) and to reduce ex-ante contributions in accordance with a moral hazard risk at the national level, precise funding path, and if it first depletes assistance from the Deposit Insurance these funds. Fund can only be requested if the national DGS has raised ex-ante contributions in accordance with a precise funding path, and if it first depletes these funds. However, to the extent that a national DGS has collected funds over and above that which is required by the funding path, it only needs to use up the funds it

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had to collect to comply with the funding path before being able to receive coverage by EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have collected more funds than is needed to comply with the funding path should not be in a worse position than those which have collected funds not exceeding the levels set out in the funding path.

Or. de

Amendment 186 Marco Zanni, Marco Valli

Proposal for a regulation Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(19) In the reinsurance stage, and in (19) In the first three years following order to limit the liability for the European the entry into force of this Regulation, and Deposit Insurance Fund (“the Deposit in order to limit the liability for the Insurance Fund”) and to reduce moral European Deposit Insurance Fund (“the hazard risk at the national level, assistance Deposit Insurance Fund”) and to reduce from the Deposit Insurance Fund can only moral hazard risk at the national level, be requested if the national DGS has raised assistance from the Deposit Insurance Fund ex-ante contributions in accordance with a can only be requested if the national DGS precise funding path, and if it first depletes has raised ex-ante contributions in these funds. However, to the extent that a accordance with a precise funding path, national DGS has collected funds over and and if it first depletes these funds. above that which is required by the funding However, to the extent that a national DGS path, it only needs to use up the funds it has collected funds over and above that had to collect to comply with the funding which is required by the funding path, it path before being able to receive coverage only needs to use up the funds it had to by EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have collect to comply with the funding path collected more funds than is needed to before being able to receive coverage by comply with the funding path should not be EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have in a worse position than those which have collected more funds than is needed to collected funds not exceeding the levels set comply with the funding path should not be out in the funding path. in a worse position than those which have collected funds not exceeding the levels set out in the funding path.

Or. it

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Amendment 187 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(19) In the reinsurance stage, and in (19) In the limited reinsurance stage, order to limit the liability for the European and in order to limit the liability for the Deposit Insurance Fund (“the Deposit European Deposit Insurance Fund ("the Insurance Fund”) and to reduce moral Deposit Insurance Fund") and to reduce hazard risk at the national level, assistance moral hazard risk at the national level, from the Deposit Insurance Fund can only assistance from the Deposit Insurance Fund be requested if the national DGS has raised can only be requested if the national DGS ex-ante contributions in accordance with a has raised ex-ante contributions in precise funding path, and if it first depletes accordance with a precise funding path, these funds. However, to the extent that a and if it first depletes these funds. national DGS has collected funds over and However, to the extent that a national DGS above that which is required by the funding has collected funds over and above that path, it only needs to use up the funds it which is required by the funding path, it had to collect to comply with the funding only needs to use up the funds it had to path before being able to receive coverage collect to comply with the funding path by EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have before being able to receive coverage by collected more funds than is needed to EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have comply with the funding path should not be collected more funds than is needed to in a worse position than those which have comply with the funding path should not be collected funds not exceeding the levels set in a worse position than those which have out in the funding path. collected funds not exceeding the levels set out in the funding path.

Or. en

Amendment 188 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 19

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(19) In the reinsurance stage, and in (19) EDIS shall cover a gradually order to limit the liability for the increasing share of the liquidity shortfall European Deposit Insurance Fund (“the of participating DGSs. To reduce moral Deposit Insurance Fund”) and to reduce hazard risk at the national level, assistance moral hazard risk at the national level, from the European Deposit Insurance

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assistance from the Deposit Insurance Fund Fund ("the Deposit Insurance Fund") will can only be requested if the national DGS only be available if the national DGS has has raised ex-ante contributions in raised a sufficient amount of ex-ante accordance with a precise funding path, contributions, and if the national DGS and if it first depletes these funds. first depletes its own funds. However, to However, to the extent that a national DGS the extent that a national DGS has has collected funds over and above that collected funds over and above that which which is required by the funding path, it is required, it only needs to use up the only needs to use up the funds it had to funds it had to collect to comply with the collect to comply with the funding path funding requirement before being able to before being able to receive coverage by receive coverage by EDIS. Therefore, EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have DGSs which have collected more funds collected more funds than is needed to than is needed to comply with the funding comply with the funding path should not requirement should not be in a worse be in a worse position than those which position than those which have collected have collected funds not exceeding the funds not exceeding the funding levels set out in the funding path. requirement.

Or. en

Amendment 189 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in deleted the re-insurance stage, would only provide an additional source of funding and would only weaken the link between banks and their national sovereign, without however ensuring that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, the reinsurance stage should, after three years, gradually progress into a co-insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme.

Or. es

Amendment 190 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. it

Amendment 191 Peter Simon

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. de

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Amendment 192 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. de

Amendment 193 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

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Amendment 194 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 195 Michael Theurer

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

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Amendment 196 Jonás Fernández, Dimitrios Papadimoulis, Philippe Lamberts

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in (20) Only a fully mutualised Deposit the re-insurance stage, would only Insurance Scheme would ensure that all provide an additional source of funding depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an and would only weaken the link between equal level of protection banks and their national sovereign, without however ensuring that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, the reinsurance stage should, after three years, gradually progress into a co-insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme.

Or. en

Amendment 197 Paul Tang

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in (20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in the re-insurance stage, would only provide the re-insurance stage, would only provide an additional source of funding and would an additional source of funding and would only weaken the link between banks and only weaken the link between banks and their national sovereign, without however their national sovereign, without however ensuring that all depositors in the Banking ensuring that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, Union enjoy an equal level of protection, the reinsurance stage should, after three the reinsurance stage should, after three years, gradually progress into a co- years, gradually progress into a co- insurance scheme and ultimately into a insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme. fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme. Additionally, a credit line from the European Stability Mechanism is needed to act as a common fiscal backstop.

Or. en

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Amendment 198 Jonás Fernández, Pervenche Berès, Andrea Cozzolino, Costas Mavrides, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in (20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in the re-insurance stage, would only provide the re-insurance stage, would only provide an additional source of funding and would an additional source of funding and would only weaken the link between banks and only weaken the link between banks and their national sovereign, without however their national sovereign, without however ensuring that all depositors in the Banking ensuring that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, Union enjoy an equal level of protection, the reinsurance stage should, after three the reinsurance stage should, within two years, gradually progress into a co- years, gradually progress into a co- insurance scheme and ultimately into a insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme. fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme. Only a fully mutualized EDIS would ensure that all depositors enjoy an equal level of protection.

Or. en

Amendment 199 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in (20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in the re-insurance stage, would only provide the limited reinsurance stage, would only an additional source of funding and would provide an additional source of funding only weaken the link between banks and and would only weaken the link between their national sovereign, without however banks and their national sovereign, without ensuring that all depositors in the Banking however ensuring that all depositors in the Union enjoy an equal level of protection, Banking Union enjoy an equal level of the reinsurance stage should, after three protection, the reinsurance stage should, years, gradually progress into a co- after three years, gradually progress into a insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit reinsurance

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fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme. scheme.

Or. en

Amendment 200 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 20 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(20a) In addition, in order to ensure that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, this Regulation establishes a fully mutualised European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') by 2024 at the latest in three successive stages: – a reinsurance scheme that, to a certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes; – a co-insurance scheme that, to a gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes; – a full insurance scheme that provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes. EDIS shall be administered by the Board in cooperation with participating DGSs and designated authorities in accordance with Part IIa. EDIS shall be supported by a Deposit Insurance Fund (the 'DIF')."

Or. en

Amendment 201 Markus Ferber

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(21) While the reinsurance and deleted coinsurance stages would share many common features, ensuring a smooth gradual evolution, pay-outs under the co- insurance stage would be shared between national DGS and the Deposit Insurance Fund as of the first euro of loss. The relative contribution from the Deposit Insurance Fund would gradually increase to 100 percent, resulting in the full mutualisation of depositor risk across the Banking Union after four years.

Or. de

Amendment 202 Peter Simon

Proposal for a regulation Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. de

Amendment 203 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. it

Amendment 204 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

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Amendment 205 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 206 Jonás Fernández, Cătălin Sorin Ivan, Neena Gill, Olle Ludvigsson

Proposal for a regulation Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(21) While the reinsurance and (21) While the reinsurance and coinsurance stages would share many coinsurance stages would share many common features, ensuring a smooth common features, ensuring a smooth gradual evolution, pay-outs under the co- gradual evolution, pay-outs under the co- insurance stage would be shared between insurance stage would be shared between national DGS and the Deposit Insurance national DGS and the Deposit Insurance Fund as of the first euro of loss. The Fund as of the first euro of loss. The relative contribution from the Deposit relative contribution from the Deposit Insurance Fund would gradually increase Insurance Fund would gradually increase to 100 percent, resulting in the full to 100 percent, resulting in the full mutualisation of depositor risk across the mutualisation of depositor risk across the Banking Union after four years. Banking Union within three years.

Or. en

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Amendment 207 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(21) While the reinsurance and (21) An initial phase of four years for coinsurance stages would share many the co-insurance stage would ensure a common features, ensuring a smooth smooth gradual evolution, pay-outs under gradual evolution, pay-outs under the co- the co-insurance stage would be shared insurance stage would be shared between between national DGS and the Deposit national DGS and the Deposit Insurance Insurance Fund as of the first euro of loss. Fund as of the first euro of loss. The The relative contribution from the Deposit relative contribution from the Deposit Insurance Fund would gradually increase Insurance Fund would gradually increase to 100 percent, resulting in the full to 100 percent, resulting in the full mutualisation of depositor risk across the mutualisation of depositor risk across the Banking Union after four years. Banking Union after four years.

Or. es

Amendment 208 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 21

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(21) While the reinsurance and (21) While the two stages would share coinsurance stages would share many many common features, ensuring a smooth common features, ensuring a smooth gradual evolution, pay-outs under the gradual evolution, pay-outs under the co- second stage would be shared between insurance stage would be shared between national DGS and the Deposit Insurance national DGS and the Deposit Insurance Fund as of the first euro of loss. The Fund as of the first euro of loss. The relative contribution from the Deposit relative contribution from the Deposit Insurance Fund would gradually increase Insurance Fund would gradually increase to 100 percent, resulting in a fully to 100 percent, resulting in the full mutualized reinsurance of depositor risk mutualisation of depositor risk across the across the Banking Union after four years. Banking Union after four years.

Or. en

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Amendment 209 Jonás Fernández

Proposal for a regulation Recital 21 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(21a) The beginning of the full insurance stage can be anticipated in the event that the risk reduction measures included in the legislative proposals presented by the Commission on 23 November 2016 (e.g. the "EU banking reform" package) have been officially adopted.

Or. en

Amendment 210 Paul Tang

Proposal for a regulation Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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no longer available if the DGS wants to no longer available if the DGS wants to benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a pay-out event or where its funds are used pay-out event or where its funds are used in resolution, a national DGS should bear a in resolution, a national DGS should bear a fair share of the loss themselves. It should fair share of the loss themselves. It should therefore be required to collect ex-post therefore be required to collect ex-post contributions from its members to contributions from its members to replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to the replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to the extent that the initially received funding extent that the initially received funding exceeds the share of loss to be borne by exceeds the share of loss to be borne by EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay-out event, EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay-out event, the national DGS should maximise the the national DGS should maximise the proceeds from the insolvency estate and proceeds from the insolvency estate and repay the Board and the Board should have repay the Board and the Board should have sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. Fourthly, the Board should have the Fourthly, the Board should have the powers to recover all or part of funding in powers to recover all or part of funding in case of a participating DGS did not comply case of a participating DGS did not comply with key obligations. with key obligations. Fifthly, in parallel with evolving into a fully mutualised co- insurance scheme over a number of years, further risk reducing measures should be taken and adhered to, including the harmonisation of the single rule book, the application of TLAC and MREL standards, a limitation to sovereign exposure, the transposition of measures from the Basel committee and the application of an effective European insolvency framework.

Or. en

Amendment 211 Jakob von Weizsäcker

Proposal for a regulation Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU and other relevant EU law, in particular and other relevant EU law, in particular their obligation to build up their funds in their obligation to build up their funds in accordance with Article 10 of Directive accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU as further specified in this 2014/49/EU as further specified in this Regulation. In order to benefit from Regulation. In order to benefit from coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs need to raise ex-ante contributions in need to raise ex-ante contributions in accordance with a precise funding path. accordance with a precise funding path. This also implies that the possibility of a This also implies that the possibility of a target level reduction in accordance with target level reduction in accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is no longer available if the DGS wants to no longer available if the DGS wants to benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a benefit from EDIS. Secondly, coverage pay-out event or where its funds are used under EDIS is only provided where the in resolution, a national DGS should bear a banks affiliated to a DGS adhere on an fair share of the loss themselves. It should aggregate basis to sovereign exposure therefore be required to collect ex-post limits as set out in this Regulation. contributions from its members to Thirdly, in case of a pay-out event or replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to the where its funds are used in resolution, a extent that the initially received funding national DGS should bear a fair share of exceeds the share of loss to be borne by the loss themselves. It should therefore be EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay-out event, required to collect ex-post contributions the national DGS should maximise the from its members to replenish its fund and proceeds from the insolvency estate and to repay EDIS to the extent that the repay the Board and the Board should have initially received funding exceeds the share sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. of loss to be borne by EDIS. Fourthly, Fourthly, the Board should have the following a pay-out event, the national powers to recover all or part of funding in DGS should maximise the proceeds from case of a participating DGS did not comply the insolvency estate and repay the Board with key obligations. and the Board should have sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. Fifthly, the Board should have the powers to recover all or part of funding in case of a participating DGS did not comply with key obligations.

Or. en

Amendment 212 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 22

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(22) Safeguards should be built into (22) Safeguards should be built into EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk and EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk and to ensure that the coverage by EDIS is only to ensure that the coverage by EDIS is only provided where nationals DGSs act in a provided where nationals DGSs act in a prudent manner. Firstly, national DGSs prudent manner. Firstly, national DGSs should comply with their obligations under should comply with their obligations under this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU and other relevant EU law, in particular and other relevant EU law, in particular their obligation to build up their funds in their obligation to build up their funds in accordance with Article 10 of Directive accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU as further specified in this 2014/49/EU as further specified in this Regulation. In order to benefit from Regulation. In order to benefit from coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs need to raise ex-ante contributions in need to raise a sufficient amount of ex- accordance with a precise funding path. ante contributions in accordance with a This also implies that the possibility of a precise funding requirement. This also target level reduction in accordance with implies that the possibility of a target level Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is reduction in accordance with Article 10(6) no longer available if the DGS wants to of Directive 2014/49/EU is no longer benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a available if the DGS wants to benefit from pay-out event or where its funds are used EDIS. Secondly, in case of a pay-out event in resolution, a national DGS should bear a or where its funds are used in resolution, a fair share of the loss themselves. It should national DGS should bear the first share of therefore be required to collect ex-post the loss themselves. It should also be contributions from its members to required to collect ex-post contributions replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to the from its members to replenish its fund and extent that the initially received funding to repay EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay- exceeds the share of loss to be borne by out event, the national DGS should EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay-out event, maximise the proceeds from the insolvency the national DGS should maximise the estate and repay the Board and the Board proceeds from the insolvency estate and should have sufficient powers to repay the Board and the Board should have safeguards its rights. Fourthly, the Board sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. should have the powers to recover all or Fourthly, the Board should have the part of funding in case of a participating powers to recover all or part of funding in DGS did not comply with key obligations. case of a participating DGS did not comply with key obligations.

Or. en

Amendment 213 Siegfried Mureşan

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(22) Safeguards should be built into (22) Safeguards should be built into EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk and EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk to a to ensure that the coverage by EDIS is only minimum and to ensure that the coverage provided where nationals DGSs act in a by EDIS is only provided where nationals prudent manner. Firstly, national DGSs DGSs act in a prudent and responsible should comply with their obligations under manner. Firstly, national DGSs should this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU comply with their obligations under this and other relevant EU law, in particular Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU and their obligation to build up their funds in other relevant EU law, in particular their accordance with Article 10 of Directive obligation to build up their funds in 2014/49/EU as further specified in this accordance with Article 10 of Directive Regulation. In order to benefit from 2014/49/EU as further specified in this coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs Regulation. In order to benefit from need to raise ex-ante contributions in coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs accordance with a precise funding path. need to raise ex-ante contributions in This also implies that the possibility of a accordance with a precise funding path. target level reduction in accordance with This also implies that the possibility of a Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is target level reduction in accordance with no longer available if the DGS wants to Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a no longer available if the DGS wants to pay-out event or where its funds are used benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a in resolution, a national DGS should bear a pay-out event or where its funds are used fair share of the loss themselves. It should in resolution, a national DGS should bear a therefore be required to collect ex-post fair share of the loss themselves. It should contributions from its members to therefore be required to repay EDIS to the replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to extent that the initially received funding the extent that the initially received exceeds the share of loss to be borne by funding exceeds the share of loss to be EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay-out event, borne by EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay- the national DGS should maximise the out event, the national DGS should proceeds from the insolvency estate and maximise the proceeds from the insolvency repay the Board and the Board should have estate and repay the Board and the Board sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. should have sufficient powers to Fourthly, the Board should have the safeguards its rights. Fourthly, the Board powers to recover all or part of funding in should have the powers to recover all or case of a participating DGS did not comply part of funding in case of a participating with key obligations. DGS did not comply with key obligations.

Or. en

Amendment 214 Markus Ferber

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 22

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(22) Safeguards should be built into (22) Safeguards should be built into the EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk and European deposit reinsurance scheme so to ensure that the coverage by EDIS is as to limit moral hazard risk and to ensure only provided where nationals DGSs act in that the coverage by the European deposit a prudent manner. Firstly, national DGSs reinsurance scheme is only provided should comply with their obligations under where nationals DGSs act in a prudent this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU manner. Firstly, national DGSs should and other relevant EU law, in particular comply with their obligations under this their obligation to build up their funds in Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU and accordance with Article 10 of Directive other relevant EU law, in particular their 2014/49/EU as further specified in this obligation to build up their funds in Regulation. In order to benefit from accordance with Article 10 of Directive coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs 2014/49/EU as further specified in this need to raise ex-ante contributions in Regulation. In order to benefit from accordance with a precise funding path. coverage by the European deposit This also implies that the possibility of a reinsurance scheme, participating DGSs target level reduction in accordance with need to raise ex-ante contributions in Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is accordance with a precise funding path. no longer available if the DGS wants to This also implies that the possibility of a benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a target level reduction in accordance with pay-out event or where its funds are used Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is in resolution, a national DGS should bear a no longer available if the DGS wants to fair share of the loss themselves. It should benefit from the European deposit therefore be required to collect ex-post reinsurance scheme. Secondly, in case of contributions from its members to a pay-out event or where its funds are used replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to the in resolution, a national DGS should bear a extent that the initially received funding fair share of the loss themselves. It should exceeds the share of loss to be borne by therefore be required to collect ex-post EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay-out event, contributions from its members to the national DGS should maximise the replenish its fund and to repay the proceeds from the insolvency estate and European deposit reinsurance scheme to repay the Board and the Board should have the extent that the initially received sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. - funding exceeds the share of loss to be Fourthly, the Board should have the borne by the European deposit powers to recover all or part of funding in reinsurance scheme. Thirdly, following a case of a participating DGS did not comply pay-out event, the national DGS should with key obligations. maximise the proceeds from the insolvency estate and repay the Board and the Board should have sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. - Fourthly, the Board should have the powers to recover all or part of funding in case of a participating DGS did not comply with key obligations.

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Or. de

Amendment 215 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(22a) The implementation and enforcement of EU banking legislation is crucial to achieve a truly full-fledged Banking Union that reinforces financial stability, benefits financial end-users and protects taxpayers' money from being used in banking crises. Correlation tables are an important safeguard to understand whether, when and how relevant European legislation is transposed and applied across all Member States. As an instrument to foster the EU single rulebook, correlation tables should therefore, as a rule, be provided by the European Commission in cooperation with the relevant European Supervisory Authorities.

Or. en

Amendment 216 Paul Tang, Pervenche Berès

Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(22a) The current reform of the financial services regulatory framework should lead to a strengthening of the overall financial position of European banks, and requires banks to prioritize bolstering capital requirement over their banks' revenue distribution, including

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employee bonuses and shareholder dividends. This can be attained, inter alia, via retained earnings.

Or. en

Amendment 217 Andrea Cozzolino

Proposal for a regulation Recital 22 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(22a) The Board may use the available financial means of the Deposit Insurance Fund for the purposes of Article 11(3) and 11(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU.

Or. en

Amendment 218 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(23) The Deposit Insurance Fund is an deleted essential element without which the progressive establishment of EDIS could not be achieved. Different national systems of funding would not provide for homogenous deposit insurance across the Banking Union. Throughout the three stages, the Deposit Insurance Fund should help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, a uniform high level of protection to all depositors in a harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to different

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levels of protection at national level.

Or. de

Amendment 219 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 220 Jonás Fernández, Costas Mavrides, Jakob von Weizsäcker, Cătălin Sorin Ivan, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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of funding would not provide for of funding would not provide for homogenous deposit insurance across the homogenous deposit insurance across the Banking Union. Throughout the three Banking Union. Throughout the three stages, the Deposit Insurance Fund should stages, the Deposit Insurance Fund should help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, a uniform high level of protection to all a uniform high level of protection to all depositors in a harmonised framework depositors in a harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles for the exercise of creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to competition in the internal market due to different levels of protection at national different levels of protection at national level. level, since savers have the right to open a bank account in any Member State irrespective of their legal domicile.

Or. en

Amendment 221 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(23) The Deposit Insurance Fund is an (23) The Deposit Insurance Fund is an essential element without which the essential element without which the progressive establishment of EDIS could establishment of EDIS could not be not be achieved. Different national systems achieved. Different national systems of of funding would not provide for funding would not provide for homogenous homogenous deposit insurance across the deposit insurance across the Banking Banking Union. Throughout the three Union. The Deposit Insurance Fund should stages, the Deposit Insurance Fund should help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, a uniform high level of protection to all a uniform high level of protection to all depositors in a harmonised framework depositors in a harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles for the exercise of creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to competition in the internal market due to different levels of protection at national different levels of protection at national level. level.

Or. it

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Amendment 222 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(23) The Deposit Insurance Fund is an (23) The Deposit Insurance Fund is an essential element without which the essential element without which the progressive establishment of EDIS could establishment of EDIS could not be not be achieved. Different national systems achieved. Different national systems of of funding would not provide for funding alone would not provide for homogenous deposit insurance across the homogenous deposit insurance across the Banking Union. Throughout the three Banking Union. Throughout the different stages, the Deposit Insurance Fund should stages, the Deposit Insurance Fund should help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, a uniform high level of protection to all a uniform high level of protection to all depositors in a harmonised framework depositors in a harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles for the exercise of creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to competition in the internal market due to different levels of protection at national different levels of protection at national level. level.

Or. en

Amendment 223 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 23

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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depositors in a harmonised framework depositors in a harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles for the exercise of creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to competition in the internal market due to different levels of protection at national different levels of protection at national level. level.

Or. en

Amendment 224 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should (24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should be financed by direct contributions from be financed by direct contributions from banks. Decisions taken within the EDIS, banks in order to reduce the sovereign requiring the use of the Deposit Insurance bank link, the risk and the moral hazard. Fund or of a national deposit guarantee Decisions taken within the EDIS, requiring scheme should not impinge on the fiscal the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund or of responsibilities of the Member States. In a national deposit guarantee scheme should that regard, only extraordinary public not impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of financial support should be considered to the Member States. In that regard, only be an impingement on the budgetary extraordinary public financial support sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of should be considered to be an impingement the Member States. on the budgetary sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of the Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 225 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(24) The Deposit Insurance Fund (24) The deposit reinsurance fund should be financed by direct contributions should be financed by direct contributions from banks. Decisions taken within the from participating DGSs. Decisions taken

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EDIS, requiring the use of the Deposit within the European deposit reinsurance Insurance Fund or of a national deposit scheme, requiring the use of the deposit guarantee scheme should not impinge on reinsurance fund or of a national deposit the fiscal responsibilities of the Member guarantee scheme should not impinge on States. In that regard, only extraordinary the fiscal responsibilities of the Member public financial support should be States. In that regard, only extraordinary considered to be an impingement on the public financial support should be budgetary sovereignty and fiscal considered to be an impingement on the responsibilities of the Member States. budgetary sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of the Member States.

Or. de

Amendment 226 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should (24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should be financed by direct contributions from be financed by contributions from banks. Decisions taken within the EDIS, participating DGSs. Decisions taken requiring the use of the Deposit Insurance within the EDIS, requiring the use of the Fund or of a national deposit guarantee Deposit Insurance Fund or of a national scheme should not impinge on the fiscal deposit guarantee scheme should not responsibilities of the Member States. In impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the that regard, only extraordinary public Member States. In that regard, only financial support should be considered to extraordinary public financial support be an impingement on the budgetary should be considered to be an impingement sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of on the budgetary sovereignty and fiscal the Member States. responsibilities of the Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 227 Tom Vandenkendelaere

Proposal for a regulation Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should (24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should

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be financed by direct contributions from be financed by contributions from banks. Decisions taken within the EDIS, participating DGSs. Decisions taken requiring the use of the Deposit Insurance within EDIS, requiring the use of the Fund or of a national deposit guarantee Deposit Insurance Fund or of a national scheme should not impinge on the fiscal deposit guarantee scheme should not responsibilities of the Member States. In impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the that regard, only extraordinary public Member States. In that regard, only financial support should be considered to extraordinary public financial support be an impingement on the budgetary should be considered to be an impingement sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of on the budgetary sovereignty and fiscal the Member States. responsibilities of the Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 228 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 24

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should (24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should be financed by direct contributions from be financed by direct contributions from banks. Decisions taken within the EDIS, banks and IPSs. Decisions taken within the requiring the use of the Deposit Insurance EDIS, requiring the use of the Deposit Fund or of a national deposit guarantee Insurance Fund or of a national deposit scheme should not impinge on the fiscal guarantee scheme should not impinge on responsibilities of the Member States. In the fiscal responsibilities of the Member that regard, only extraordinary public States. In that regard, only extraordinary financial support should be considered to public financial support should be be an impingement on the budgetary considered to be an impingement on the sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of budgetary sovereignty and fiscal the Member States. responsibilities of the Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 229 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 24

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should (24) The Deposit Insurance Fund should be financed by direct contributions from be financed by contributions from banks. Decisions taken within the EDIS, participating DGSs. Decisions taken requiring the use of the Deposit Insurance within EDIS, requiring the use of the Fund or of a national deposit guarantee Deposit Insurance Fund or of a national scheme should not impinge on the fiscal deposit guarantee scheme should not responsibilities of the Member States. In impinge on the fiscal responsibilities of the that regard, only extraordinary public Member States. In that regard, only financial support should be considered to extraordinary public financial support be an impingement on the budgetary should be considered to be an impingement sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of on the budgetary sovereignty and fiscal the Member States. responsibilities of the Member States.

Or. en

Amendment 230 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 25

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(25) This Regulation establishes the (25) This Regulation establishes the modalities for the use of the Deposit modalities for the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the general criteria to Insurance Fund and the general criteria to determine the fixing and calculation of ex determine the fixing and calculation of ex ante and ex post contributions and lays ante contributions and lays down the down the powers of the Board for using powers of the Board for using and and managing the Deposit Insurance Fund. managing the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 231 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(26) Contributions would be directly (26) Contributions would be directly

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levied on banks to finance the Deposit levied on banks to finance the Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect Insurance Fund. The Board would collect the contributions and administer the the contributions and administer the Deposit Insurance Fund, while national Deposit Insurance Fund, while national DGSs would continue to collect national DGSs would continue to collect national contributions and administer national contributions and administer national funds. In order to ensure fair and funds. In order to ensure fair and harmonised contributions for participating harmonised contributions for participating banks and provide incentives to operate banks and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, under a model which presents less risk, both contributions to EDIS and to national both contributions to EDIS and to national DGS should be calculated on the basis of DGS should be calculated on the basis of covered deposits and a risk-adjustment covered deposits and a risk-adjustment factor per bank. During the re-insurance factor per bank. period the risk-adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks affiliated to the same participating DGS. Once the stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks established in the participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. it

Amendment 232 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(26) Contributions would be directly (26) Contributions would be levied on levied on banks to finance the Deposit participating DGSs to finance the deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect reinsurance fund. The Board would the contributions and administer the calculate the contributions and administer Deposit Insurance Fund, while national the deposit reinsurance fund, while DGSs would continue to collect national national DGSs would continue to collect contributions and administer national national contributions and administer funds. In order to ensure fair and national funds according to their own

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harmonised contributions for participating methods. In order to ensure fair and banks and provide incentives to operate harmonised contributions for participating under a model which presents less risk, national DGS and provide incentives to both contributions to EDIS and to national operate under a model which presents less DGS should be calculated on the basis of risk, both contributions to the European covered deposits and a risk-adjustment deposit reinsurance scheme and to factor per bank. During the re-insurance national DGS should be calculated on the period the risk-adjustment factor should basis of covered deposits and a risk- consider the degree of risk incurred by a adjustment factor per bank. bank relative to all other banks affiliated to the same participating DGS. Once the stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks established in the participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. de

Amendment 233 Peter Simon

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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period the risk-adjustment factor should participating DGS. Furthermore, risk- consider the degree of risk incurred by a based contributions for each participating bank relative to all other banks affiliated DGS should be calculated in accordance to the same participating DGS. Once the with the provisions in Article 13(2) of stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- Directive 2014/49/EU and the EBA adjustment factor should consider the “Guidelines on methods for calculating degree of risk incurred by a bank relative contributions to deposit guarantee to all other banks established in the schemes”. During both stages, the risk- participating Member States. This would adjustment factor should consider the ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral degree of risk incurred by a participating for banks and national DGSs and avoid any DGS and its affiliated credit institutions redistribution of contributions during the relative to all other participating DGSs and build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance their affiliated credit institutions Fund. established in the participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. de

Amendment 234 Fulvio Martusciello

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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bank relative to all other banks affiliated to amount of its contribution to the SRF and the same participating DGS. Once the stage the participation to a cooperative of co-insurance is reached, the risk- solidarity mechanism as a risk minimizer. adjustment factor should consider the During the re-insurance period the risk- degree of risk incurred by a bank relative adjustment factor should consider the to all other banks established in the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative participating Member States. This would to all other banks affiliated to the same ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral participating DGS. Once the stage of co- for banks and national DGSs and avoid any insurance is reached, the risk-adjustment redistribution of contributions during the factor should consider the degree of risk build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance incurred by a bank relative to all other Fund. banks established in the participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 235 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- States. This would ensure that, overall, adjustment factor should consider the EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national degree of risk incurred by a bank relative DGSs and avoid any redistribution of to all other banks established in the contributions during the build-up phase of participating Member States. This would the Deposit Insurance Fund. ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. es

Amendment 236 Fabio De Masi

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(26) Contributions would be directly (26) Contributions would be directly levied on banks to finance the Deposit levied on banks to finance the Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect Insurance Fund. The Board would collect the contributions and administer the the contributions and administer the Deposit Insurance Fund, while national Deposit Insurance Fund, while national DGSs would continue to collect national DGSs would continue to collect national contributions and administer national contributions and administer national funds. In order to ensure fair and funds. In order to ensure fair and harmonised contributions for participating harmonised contributions for participating banks and provide incentives to operate banks and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, under a model which presents less risk, both contributions to EDIS and to national both contributions to EDIS and to national DGS should be calculated on the basis of DGS should be calculated on the basis of covered deposits and a risk-adjustment covered deposits and a risk-adjustment factor per bank. During the re-insurance factor per bank. During the re-insurance period the risk-adjustment factor should period the risk-adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks affiliated to bank relative to all other banks affiliated to the same participating DGS. Once the stage the same participating DGS. Once the stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- of co-insurance is reached, the risk- adjustment factor should consider the adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks established in the to all other banks established in the participating Member States. This would participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any for banks and national DGSs and avoid any

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redistribution of contributions during the redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Fund. When calculating contributions, the risk-reducing effects of "alternative measures" to avoid a bank failure, particularly participation in Institutional Protection Schemes, should be properly accounted for.

Or. en

Amendment 237 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(26) Contributions would be directly (26) Contributions would be levied on levied on banks to finance the Deposit participating DGSs to finance the Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect Insurance Fund. The Board would collect the contributions and administer the the contributions and administer the Deposit Insurance Fund, while national Deposit Insurance Fund, while national DGSs would continue to collect national DGSs would continue to collect national contributions and administer national contributions and administer national funds funds. In order to ensure fair and using their own methodology. In order to harmonised contributions for participating ensure fair and harmonised contributions banks and provide incentives to operate for participating DGSs and provide under a model which presents less risk, incentives to operate under a model which both contributions to EDIS and to national presents less risk, both contributions to DGS should be calculated on the basis of EDIS and to national DGS should be covered deposits and a risk-adjustment calculated on the basis of covered deposits factor per bank. During the re-insurance and a risk-adjustment factor per period the risk-adjustment factor should participating DGS. The risk-adjustment consider the degree of risk incurred by a factor should consider the degree of risk bank relative to all other banks affiliated incurred by a participating DGS and its to the same participating DGS. Once the affiliated credit institutions relative to all stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- other participating DGSs and their adjustment factor should consider the affiliated credit institutions established in degree of risk incurred by a bank relative the participating Member States. This to all other banks established in the would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost- participating Member States. This would neutral for banks and national DGSs and ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral avoid any redistribution of contributions for banks and national DGSs and avoid any during the build-up phase of the Deposit redistribution of contributions during the Insurance Fund. build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance

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Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 238 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(26) Contributions would be directly (26) Contributions would be levied on levied on banks to finance the Deposit participating DGSs to finance the Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect Insurance Fund. The Board would collect the contributions and administer the the contributions and administer the Deposit Insurance Fund, while national Deposit Insurance Fund, while national DGSs would continue to collect national DGSs would continue to collect national contributions and administer national contributions and administer national funds. In order to ensure fair and funds. In order to ensure fair and harmonised contributions for participating harmonised contributions for participating banks and provide incentives to operate DGSs and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, under a model which presents less risk, both contributions to EDIS and to national both contributions to EDIS and to national DGS should be calculated on the basis of DGS should be calculated on the basis of covered deposits and a risk-adjustment covered deposits and a risk-adjustment factor per bank. During the re-insurance factor per participating DGS. During the period the risk-adjustment factor should different stages of EDIS, the risk- consider the degree of risk incurred by a adjustment factor should consider the bank relative to all other banks affiliated degree of risk incurred by a participating to the same participating DGS. Once the DGS and its affiliated credit institutions stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- relative to all other participating DGSs adjustment factor should consider the and their affiliated credit institutions degree of risk incurred by a bank relative established in the participating Member to all other banks established in the States. This would ensure that, overall, participating Member States. This would EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral DGSs and avoid any redistribution of for banks and national DGSs and avoid any contributions during the build-up phase of redistribution of contributions during the the Deposit Insurance Fund. build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. en

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Amendment 239 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 26

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(26) Contributions would be directly (26) Contributions would be directly levied on banks to finance the Deposit levied on banks to finance the Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect Insurance Fund. The Board would collect the contributions and administer the the contributions and administer the Deposit Insurance Fund, while national Deposit Insurance Fund, while national DGSs would continue to collect national DGSs would continue to collect national contributions and administer national contributions and administer national funds. In order to ensure fair and funds. In order to ensure fair and harmonised contributions for participating harmonised contributions for participating banks and provide incentives to operate banks and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, under a model which presents less risk, both contributions to EDIS and to national both contributions to EDIS and to national DGS should be calculated on the basis of DGS should be calculated on the basis of covered deposits and a risk-adjustment covered deposits and a risk-adjustment factor per bank. During the re-insurance factor per bank. During the limited re- period the risk-adjustment factor should insurance period the risk-adjustment factor consider the degree of risk incurred by a should consider the degree of risk incurred bank relative to all other banks affiliated to by a bank or IPS relative to all other banks the same participating DGS. Once the stage affiliated to the same participating DGS. of co-insurance is reached, the risk- Once the stage of co-insurance is reached, adjustment factor should consider the the risk-adjustment factor should consider degree of risk incurred by a bank relative the degree of risk incurred by a bank to all other banks established in the relative to all other banks established in the participating Member States. This would participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 240 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(27) In principle, contributions should (27) Contributions should be collected be collected from the industry prior to, and from the industry prior to, and independently of, any deposit insurance independently of, any deposit reinsurance action. When prior funding is insufficient action. to cover the losses or costs incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, additional contributions should be collected to bear the additional cost or loss. Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund should be able to contract borrowings or other forms of support from credit institutions, financial institutions or other third parties in the event that the ex-ante and ex post contributions are not immediately accessible or do not cover the expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions.

Or. de

Amendment 241 Michael Theurer

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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contributions are not immediately accessible or do not cover the expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions.

Or. en

Amendment 242 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 243 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(27) In principle, contributions should (27) In principle, contributions should be collected from the industry prior to, and be collected from the industry prior to, and independently of, any deposit insurance independently of, any deposit insurance action. When prior funding is insufficient action. When prior funding is insufficient to cover the losses or costs incurred by the to cover the losses or costs incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, the additional contributions should be Board should be able to contract collected to bear the additional cost or borrowings or other forms of support from loss. Moreover, the Deposit Insurance credit institutions, financial institutions or Fund should be able to contract other third parties in the event that the ex- borrowings or other forms of support from ante contributions are not immediately credit institutions, financial institutions or accessible or do not cover the expenses other third parties in the event that the ex- incurred by the use of the Deposit ante and ex post contributions are not Insurance Fund in relation to deposit immediately accessible or do not cover the insurance actions. expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions.

Or. en

Amendment 244 Jakob von Weizsäcker

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(27) In principle, contributions should (27) In principle, contributions should be collected from the industry prior to, and be collected from the industry prior to, and independently of, any deposit insurance independently of, any deposit insurance action. When prior funding is insufficient action. When prior funding is insufficient to cover the losses or costs incurred by the to cover the losses or costs incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, additional contributions should be additional contributions should be collected to bear the additional cost or loss. collected to bear the additional cost or loss. Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund should be able to contract borrowings or should be able to request funding from the other forms of support from credit European Stability Mechanism in the institutions, financial institutions or other event that the ex-ante and ex post third parties in the event that the ex-ante contributions are not immediately and ex post contributions are not accessible or do not cover the expenses immediately accessible or do not cover the incurred by the use of the Deposit

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expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions. insurance actions.

Or. en

Amendment 245 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(27) In principle, contributions should (27) In principle, contributions should be collected from the industry prior to, and be collected from the industry prior to, and independently of, any deposit insurance independently of, any deposit insurance action. When prior funding is insufficient action. When prior funding of the to cover the losses or costs incurred by the participating DGS is insufficient to cover use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, the liquidity shortfall, additional additional contributions should be contributions should be collected. collected to bear the additional cost or Moreover, the Board should, to a certain loss. Moreover, the Deposit Insurance extent, be able to contract borrowings or Fund should be able to contract other forms of support from credit borrowings or other forms of support from institutions, financial institutions or other credit institutions, financial institutions or third parties in the event that the ex-ante other third parties in the event that the ex- and ex post contributions are not ante and ex post contributions are not immediately accessible or do not cover the immediately accessible or do not cover the expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions in accordance with this insurance actions. Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 246 Jonás Fernández, Jakob von Weizsäcker, Costas Mavrides, Cătălin Sorin Ivan, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(27) In principle, contributions should (27) In principle, contributions should

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be collected from the industry prior to, and be collected from banks prior to, and independently of, any deposit insurance independently of, any deposit insurance action. When prior funding is insufficient action. When prior funding is insufficient to cover the losses or costs incurred by the to cover the losses or costs incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, additional contributions should be additional contributions should be collected to bear the additional cost or loss. collected to bear the additional cost or loss. Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund should be able to contract borrowings or should be able to contract borrowings or other forms of support from credit other forms of support from credit institutions, financial institutions or other institutions, financial institutions or other third parties in the event that the ex-ante third parties in the event that the ex-ante and ex post contributions are not and ex post contributions are not immediately accessible or do not cover the immediately accessible or do not cover the expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions. insurance actions.

Or. en

Amendment 247 Brian Hayes

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(27a) The risk-based method for the calculation of contributions payable to participating DGSs for the reinsurance period only, to be specified through a Delegated Act, should be based on clear risk factors which should not negatively affect certain banking sectors over others in the Union.

Or. en

Amendment 248 Jakob von Weizsäcker

Proposal for a regulation Recital 27 a (new)

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(27a) The Board of EDIS should be able to make a request to borrow for the DIF from the European Stability Mechanism. A credit line from the European Stability Mechanism should be pre-approved by Member States and approved by the Board of Governors when EDIS has issued a request.

Or. en

Amendment 249 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 28

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(28) In order to reach a critical mass and (28) In order to reach a critical mass and to avoid pro-cyclical effects which would to avoid pro-cyclical effects which would arise if the Deposit Insurance Fund had to arise if the Deposit Insurance Fund had to rely solely on ex post contributions in a rely on ex post contributions in a systemic systemic crisis, it is indispensable that the crisis, it is indispensable that the ex-ante ex-ante available financial means of the available financial means of the Deposit Deposit Insurance Fund amount at least to Insurance Fund amount at least to a certain a certain minimum target level. minimum target level.

Or. en

Amendment 250 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 28

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(28) In order to reach a critical mass and (28) In order to reach a critical mass and to avoid pro-cyclical effects which would to avoid procyclical effects which would arise if the Deposit Insurance Fund had to arise if the deposit reinsurance fund had to rely solely on ex post contributions in a rely on ex post contributions in a systemic

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systemic crisis, it is indispensable that the crisis, it is indispensable that the ex-ante ex-ante available financial means of the available financial means of the Deposit Deposit Insurance Fund amount at least to Insurance Fund amount at least to a certain a certain minimum target level. minimum target level.

Or. de

Amendment 251 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 29

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(29) The initial and final target level of (29) The target level of the deposit the Deposit Insurance Fund should be reinsurance fund should be established as established as a percentage of the total a percentage of the total minimum target minimum target levels of participating levels of participating DGSs. It should DGS. It should progressively reach 20% of reach 25% of the minimum target levels, four ninth of the total minimum target i.e. 0.2% of the deposits covered. levels by the end of the reinsurance period and the sum of all minimum target levels by the end of the co-insurance period. The possibility to apply for approval to authorise a lower target level in accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU should not be considered when setting the initial or final target levels of the Deposit Insurance Fund. An appropriate time frame should be set to reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. de

Amendment 252 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Recital 29

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(29) The initial and final target level of (29) The initial and final target level of

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the Deposit Insurance Fund should be the Deposit Insurance Fund should be established as a percentage of the total established as a percentage of the total minimum target levels of participating minimum target levels of participating DGS. It should progressively reach 20% of DGS. It should progressively reach the sum four ninth of the total minimum target of all minimum target levels by the end of levels by the end of the reinsurance period the co-insurance period. The possibility to and the sum of all minimum target levels apply for approval to authorise a lower by the end of the co-insurance period. The target level in accordance with Article possibility to apply for approval to 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU should not authorise a lower target level in accordance be considered when setting the initial or with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU final target levels of the Deposit Insurance should not be considered when setting the Fund. An appropriate time frame should be initial or final target levels of the Deposit set to reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund. An appropriate time frame Insurance Fund. should be set to reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. es

Amendment 253 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 29

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(29) The initial and final target level of (29) The initial and final target level of the Deposit Insurance Fund should be the Deposit Insurance Fund should be established as a percentage of the total established as a percentage of the total minimum target levels of participating minimum target levels of participating DGS. It should progressively reach 20% of DGS. It should progressively reach 25 % four ninth of the total minimum target of the aggregated minimum target level levels by the end of the reinsurance period that participating DGSs shall reach in and the sum of all minimum target levels accordance with the first subparagraph of by the end of the co-insurance period. The Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU. possibility to apply for approval to The possibility to apply for approval to authorise a lower target level in accordance authorise a lower target level in accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU should not be considered when setting the should not be considered when setting the initial or final target levels of the Deposit initial or final target levels of the Deposit Insurance Fund. An appropriate time Insurance Fund. frame should be set to reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. en

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Amendment 254 Marco Zanni, Marco Valli

Proposal for a regulation Recital 29

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(29) The initial and final target level of (29) The initial and final target level of the Deposit Insurance Fund should be the Deposit Insurance Fund should be established as a percentage of the total established as a percentage of the total minimum target levels of participating minimum target levels of participating DGS. It should progressively reach 20% of DGS. It should progressively reach 20% of four ninth of the total minimum target four ninth of the total minimum target levels by the end of the reinsurance levels by three years from the entry into period and the sum of all minimum target force of this Regulation and the sum of all levels by the end of the co-insurance minimum target levels starting from the period. The possibility to apply for fourth year and by the seventh year from approval to authorise a lower target level in the entry into force of this Regulation. accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive The possibility to apply for approval to 2014/49/EU should not be considered authorise a lower target level in accordance when setting the initial or final target levels with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU of the Deposit Insurance Fund. An should not be considered when setting the appropriate time frame should be set to initial or final target levels of the Deposit reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund. An appropriate time frame Insurance Fund. should be set to reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. it

Amendment 255 Peter Simon

Proposal for a regulation Recital 29

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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and the sum of all minimum target levels to reach in accordance with the first by the end of the co-insurance period. The subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive possibility to apply for approval to 2014/49/EU. The possibility to apply for authorise a lower target level in accordance approval to authorise a lower target level in with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive should not be considered when setting the 2014/49/EU should not be considered initial or final target levels of the Deposit when setting the initial or final target levels Insurance Fund. An appropriate time frame of the Deposit Insurance Fund. An should be set to reach the target level for appropriate time frame should be set to the Deposit Insurance Fund. reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. de

Amendment 256 Brian Hayes

Proposal for a regulation Recital 29

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(29) The initial and final target level of (29) The target level of the Deposit the Deposit Insurance Fund should be Insurance Fund should be established as a established as a percentage of the total percentage of the total minimum target minimum target levels of participating levels of participating DGSs. The target DGS. It should progressively reach 20% level of the Deposit Insurance Fund of four ninth of the total minimum target should reach 62.5 % of the total minimum levels by the end of the reinsurance period target levels that participating DGSs are and the sum of all minimum target levels to reach in accordance with the first by the end of the co-insurance period. The subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive possibility to apply for approval to 2014/49/EU. The possibility to apply for authorise a lower target level in accordance approval to authorise a lower target level in with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive should not be considered when setting the 2014/49/EU should not be considered initial or final target levels of the Deposit when setting the initial or final target levels Insurance Fund. An appropriate time frame of the Deposit Insurance Fund. An should be set to reach the target level for appropriate time frame should be set to the Deposit Insurance Fund. reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 257 Tom Vandenkendelaere

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 29

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(29) The initial and final target level of (29) The target level of the Deposit the Deposit Insurance Fund should be Insurance Fund should be established as a established as a percentage of the total percentage of the total minimum target minimum target levels of participating levels of participating DGSs. The target DGS. It should progressively reach 20% level of the Deposit Insurance Fund of four ninth of the total minimum target should reach 62,5 % of the total minimum levels by the end of the reinsurance period target levels that participating DGSs are and the sum of all minimum target levels to reach in accordance with the first by the end of the co-insurance period. The subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive possibility to apply for approval to 2014/49/EU. The possibility to apply for authorise a lower target level in accordance approval to authorise a lower target level in with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive should not be considered when setting the 2014/49/EU should not be considered initial or final target levels of the Deposit when setting the initial or final target levels Insurance Fund. An appropriate time frame of the Deposit Insurance Fund. An should be set to reach the target level for appropriate time frame should be set to the Deposit Insurance Fund. reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 258 Jakob von Weizsäcker

Proposal for a regulation Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(30) Ensuring effective and sufficient deleted financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund is of paramount importance to the credibility of EDIS. The capacity of the Board to contract alternative funding means for the Deposit Insurance Fund should be enhanced in a manner that optimises the cost of funding and preserves the creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Immediately after the entry into force of this Regulation, the necessary steps should be

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taken by the Board in cooperation with the participating Member States to develop the appropriate methods and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 259 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(30) Ensuring effective and sufficient (30) Ensuring effective and sufficient financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund financing of the deposit reinsurance fund is of paramount importance to the is of paramount importance to the credibility of EDIS. The capacity of the credibility of the European deposit Board to contract alternative funding reinsurance scheme. means for the Deposit Insurance Fund should be enhanced in a manner that optimises the cost of funding and preserves the creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Immediately after the entry into force of this Regulation, the necessary steps should be taken by the Board in cooperation with the participating Member States to develop the appropriate methods and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation.

Or. de

Amendment 260 Michael Theurer

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 261 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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cooperation with the participating Member States to develop the appropriate methods and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 262 Jonás Fernández, Dimitrios Papadimoulis, Philippe Lamberts

Proposal for a regulation Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(30) Ensuring effective and sufficient (30) Ensuring effective and sufficient financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund is financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund is of paramount importance to the credibility of paramount importance to the credibility of EDIS. The capacity of the Board to and efficiency of EDIS. The capacity of contract alternative funding means for the the Board to contract alternative funding Deposit Insurance Fund should be means for the Deposit Insurance Fund enhanced in a manner that optimises the should be enhanced in a manner that cost of funding and preserves the optimises the cost of funding and preserves creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance the creditworthiness of the Deposit Fund. Immediately after the entry into Insurance Fund. Immediately after the force of this Regulation, the necessary entry into force of this Regulation, the steps should be taken by the Board in necessary steps should be taken by the cooperation with the participating Member Board in cooperation with the participating States to develop the appropriate methods Member States to develop the appropriate and modalities permitting the enhancement methods and modalities permitting the of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit enhancement of the borrowing capacity of Insurance Fund that should be in place by the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be the date of application of this Regulation. in place by the date of application of this Regulation. It is essential also to create a mutualised credit line via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and an effective common fiscal backstop for the Banking Union to be used as a last resort.

Or. en

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Amendment 263 Jonás Fernández, Pervenche Berès, Jakob von Weizsäcker, Andrea Cozzolino, Cătălin Sorin Ivan, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(30) Ensuring effective and sufficient (30) Ensuring effective and sufficient financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund is financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund is of paramount importance to the credibility of paramount importance to the credibility of EDIS. The capacity of the Board to and efficiency of EDIS. The capacity of contract alternative funding means for the the Board to contract alternative funding Deposit Insurance Fund should be means for the Deposit Insurance Fund enhanced in a manner that optimises the should be enhanced in a manner that cost of funding and preserves the optimises the cost of funding and preserves creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance the creditworthiness of the Deposit Fund. Immediately after the entry into Insurance Fund. Immediately after the force of this Regulation, the necessary entry into force of this Regulation, the steps should be taken by the Board in necessary steps should be taken by the cooperation with the participating Member Board in cooperation with the participating States to develop the appropriate methods Member States to develop the appropriate and modalities permitting the enhancement methods and modalities permitting the of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit enhancement of the borrowing capacity of Insurance Fund that should be in place by the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be the date of application of this Regulation. in place by the date of application of this Regulation. It is essential also to create a mutualised credit line via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as an effective common fiscal backstop for the Banking Union to be used as a last resort.

Or. en

Amendment 264 Costas Mavrides

Proposal for a regulation Recital 30

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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contract alternative funding means for the contract alternative funding means for the Deposit Insurance Fund should be Deposit Insurance Fund should be enhanced in a manner that optimises the enhanced in a manner that optimises the cost of funding and preserves the cost of funding and preserves the creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Immediately after the entry into Fund. Immediately after the entry into force of this Regulation, the necessary force of this Regulation, the necessary steps should be taken by the Board in steps should be taken by the Board in cooperation with the participating Member cooperation with the participating Member States to develop the appropriate methods States to develop the appropriate methods and modalities permitting the enhancement and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be in place by Insurance Fund that should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. the date of application of this Regulation. A mutualised credit line via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and an effective common fiscal backstop are necessary as a last resort for ensuring the credibility of EDIS.

Or. en

Amendment 265 Andrea Cozzolino

Proposal for a regulation Recital 30 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(30a) The borrowing capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund would be greatly enhanced by the establishment of a Common Fiscal Backstop which should act as a mechanism of last resort in case the resources of the Deposit Insurance Fund are exhausted as result of one or multiple failures. It should be funded by Member States participating in the Banking Union in accordance with the tools and mechanism that will be established for the fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund.

Or. en

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Amendment 266 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. de

Justification

Preventive measures to stabilise DGSs are often more cost effective than simply settling damage cases. It should therefore be possible for the EDIS to finance preventive measures to stabilise the DGSs and not simply function as a paybox.

Amendment 267 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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for the efficient implementation of deposit for the efficient implementation of deposit guarantee requirements and actions. guarantee requirements and actions. Furthermore, it should be used only in Furthermore, it should be used only in accordance with the applicable deposit accordance with the applicable deposit guarantee objectives and principles. Under guarantee objectives and principles. Under certain conditions, the Deposit Insurance certain conditions, the Deposit Insurance Fund could also provide funding where the Fund could also provide funding where available financial means of a DGS are alternative measures are implemented, used in resolution in accordance with recalling that Article 11(3) of the Article 79 of this Regulation. Directive 2014/49/EU provides for strict prerequisites for a national DGS to be able to finance alternative measures, and these prerequisites should be taken into account when the DIF is used to fund alternative measures; or where the available financial means of a DGS are used in resolution in accordance with Article 79 of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 268 Jonás Fernández, Pervenche Berès, Andrea Cozzolino, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(31) It is necessary to ensure that the (31) It is necessary to ensure that the Deposit Insurance Fund is fully available Deposit Insurance Fund is fully available for the purpose of ensuring the guarantee for the purpose of ensuring the guarantee of deposits. Therefore, the Deposit of deposits. Therefore, the Deposit Insurance Fund should primarily be used Insurance Fund should primarily be used for the efficient implementation of deposit for the efficient implementation of deposit guarantee requirements and actions. guarantee requirements and actions. Furthermore, it should be used only in Furthermore, it should be used only in accordance with the applicable deposit accordance with the applicable deposit guarantee objectives and principles. Under guarantee objectives and principles. Under certain conditions, the Deposit Insurance certain conditions, the Deposit Insurance Fund could also provide funding where the Fund could also provide funding where the available financial means of a DGS are available financial means of a DGS are used in resolution in accordance with used in resolution in accordance with Article 79 of this Regulation. Article 79 of this Regulation. Furthermore, the Deposit Insurance Fund could be used for the implementation of alternative measures,

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as established in Article 77a of this Regulation, under a strict supervision framework.

Or. en

Amendment 269 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 31

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(31) It is necessary to ensure that the (31) It is necessary to ensure that the Deposit Insurance Fund is fully available Deposit Insurance Fund is fully available for the purpose of ensuring the guarantee for the purpose of ensuring the guarantee of deposits. Therefore, the Deposit of deposits. Therefore, the Deposit Insurance Fund should primarily be used Insurance Fund should primarily be used for the efficient implementation of deposit for the efficient implementation of deposit guarantee requirements and actions. guarantee requirements and actions. Furthermore, it should be used only in Furthermore, it should be used only in accordance with the applicable deposit accordance with the applicable deposit guarantee objectives and principles. Under guarantee objectives and principles. Under certain conditions, the Deposit Insurance certain conditions, the Deposit Insurance Fund could also provide funding where the Fund could also provide funding where available financial means of a DGS are alternative measures are implemented in used in resolution in accordance with accordance with Article 41ja of this Article 79 of this Regulation. Regulation or where the available financial means of a DGS are used in resolution in accordance with Article 79 of this Regulation.

Or. en

Amendment 270 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 31 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(31a) DGSs participating in the EDIS

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should work to prevent reinsurance cases wherever possible. Preventive stabilising measures are often a cost-efficient way to prevent damage cases. It should therefore also be possible for the EDIS to finance preventive measures to stabilise the DGSs.

Or. de

Justification

Amendment 271 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 34

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(34) In order to guarantee its full (34) In order to guarantee its full autonomy and independence when autonomy and independence when acting undertaking deposit insurance actions under this Regulation, the Board should under this Regulation, the Board should have an autonomous budget with revenues have an autonomous budget with revenues from obligatory contributions from the from obligatory contributions from the institutions in the participating Member institutions in the participating Member States. This Regulation should be without States. This Regulation should be without prejudice to the ability of Member States to prejudice to the ability of Member States to levy fees to cover the administrative levy fees to cover the administrative expenses of their national DGSs or expenses of their national DGSs or designated authorities. designated authorities.

Or. en

Amendment 272 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 35

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(35) The Board, where all the criteria (35) The Board, where all the criteria relating to the use of the Deposit relating to the use of the deposit Insurance Fund are met, should provide reinsurance fund are met, should provide the relevant funding and loss cover to the the relevant funding and loss cover to the national DGS. national DGS.

Or. de

Amendment 273 Jakob von Weizsäcker

Proposal for a regulation Recital 36

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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Or. en

Amendment 274 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Recital 36

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(36) The Board should operate in joint- (36) The Board should operate in joint- plenary, plenary and executive sessions. plenary, plenary and executive sessions. The Board, in its executive session, should The Board, in its executive session, should prepare all decisions concerning pay-out prepare all decisions concerning pay-out procedures and, to the fullest extent procedures and, to the fullest extent possible, adopt those decisions. Regarding possible, adopt those decisions. Regarding the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, it is the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, it is important that there is no first-mover important that there is no first-mover advantage and that the outflows of the advantage and that the outflows of the Deposit Insurance Fund are monitored. Deposit Insurance Fund are monitored. For Once the net accumulated use of the this reason, the plenary session should Deposit Insurance Fund in the previous evaluate, on an annual basis, the consecutive 12 months reaches the application of the deposit insurance actions threshold of 25% of the final target level, or the participations in resolution actions the plenary session should evaluate the and the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund. application of the deposit insurance actions It should also provide guidance which the or the participations in resolution actions executive session should follow in and the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, subsequent decisions. Guidance to the and should provide guidance which the executive session should, in particular, executive session should follow in focus on ensuring the non-discriminatory subsequent decisions. Guidance to the application of deposit insurance actions or executive session should, in particular, participation in resolution actions, on focus on ensuring the non-discriminatory measures to be taken to avoid a depletion application of deposit insurance actions or of the Deposit Insurance Fund. participation in resolution actions, on measures to be taken to avoid a depletion of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 275 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

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Proposal for a regulation Recital 36

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(36) The Board should operate in joint- (36) The Board should operate in joint- plenary, plenary and executive sessions. plenary, plenary and executive sessions. The Board, in its executive session, should The Board, in its executive session, should prepare all decisions concerning pay-out prepare all decisions concerning pay-out procedures and, to the fullest extent procedures and, to the fullest extent possible, adopt those decisions. Regarding possible, adopt those decisions. Regarding the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, it is the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, it is important that there is no first-mover important that there is no first-mover advantage and that the outflows of the advantage and that the outflows of the Deposit Insurance Fund are monitored. Deposit Insurance Fund are monitored. Once the net accumulated use of the Once the net accumulated use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in the previous Deposit Insurance Fund in the previous consecutive 12 months reaches the consecutive 12 months reaches the threshold of 25% of the final target level, threshold of 20% of the final target level, the plenary session should evaluate the the plenary session should evaluate the application of the deposit insurance actions application of the deposit insurance actions or the participations in resolution actions or the participations in resolution actions and the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, and the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, and should provide guidance which the and should provide guidance which the executive session should follow in executive session should follow in subsequent decisions. Guidance to the subsequent decisions. Guidance to the executive session should, in particular, executive session should, in particular, focus on ensuring the non-discriminatory focus on ensuring the non-discriminatory application of deposit insurance actions or application of deposit insurance actions or participation in resolution actions, on participation in resolution actions, on measures to be taken to avoid a depletion measures to be taken to avoid a depletion of the Deposit Insurance Fund. of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

Or. en

Amendment 276 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 44

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(44) Since the objectives of this (44) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely setting up a more Regulation, namely setting up a more efficient and effective deposit guarantee efficient, effective and timely implemented framework and ensuring the consistent deposit guarantee framework and ensuring

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application of deposit guarantee rules, the consistent application of deposit cannot be sufficiently achieved by the guarantee rules, cannot be sufficiently Member States but can rather be better achieved by the Member States but can achieved at the Union level, the Union may rather be better achieved at the Union adopt measures, in accordance with the level, the Union may adopt measures, in principle of subsidiarity as set out in accordance with the principle of Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the In accordance with the principle of Treaty on European Union. In accordance proportionality, as set out in that Article, with the principle of proportionality, as set this Regulation does not go beyond what is out in that Article, this Regulation does not necessary in order to achieve those go beyond what is necessary in order to objectives. achieve those objectives.

Or. en

Amendment 277 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 45

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(45) The Commission should review the (45) The Commission should review the application of this Regulation in order to application of this Regulation in order to assess its impact on the internal market and assess its impact on the internal market and to determine whether any modifications or to determine whether any modifications or further developments are needed in order further developments are needed in order to improve the efficiency and the to improve the efficiency, effectiveness effectiveness of the EDIS. and timely implementation of the EDIS.

Or. en

Amendment 278 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 46

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(46) In order for EDIS to function in an (46) In order for the European deposit effective manner as of [….], the provisions reinsurance scheme to function in an concerning the payment of contributions to effective manner, the provisions the Deposit Insurance Fund, the concerning the payment of contributions to

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establishment of all the relevant procedures the Deposit Insurance Fund, the and any other operational and institutional establishment of all the relevant procedures aspects should apply from XX. and any other operational and institutional aspects should only apply if all necessary risk-reduction preconditions have been fulfilled;

Or. de

Amendment 279 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Recital 46

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(46) In order for EDIS to function in an (46) In order to enable EDIS to function effective manner as of [….], the provisions in an effective manner as of 1 January concerning the payment of contributions to 2021, the provisions concerning the the Deposit Insurance Fund, the payment of contributions to the Deposit establishment of all the relevant procedures Insurance Fund, the establishment of all the and any other operational and institutional relevant procedures and any other aspects should apply from XX. operational and institutional aspects should apply from 3 July 2019.

Or. en

Amendment 280 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Recital 46

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(46) In order for EDIS to function in an (46) In order for EDIS to function in an effective manner as of [….], the provisions effective manner as of 1 January 2019, the concerning the payment of contributions to provisions concerning the payment of the Deposit Insurance Fund, the contributions to the Deposit Insurance establishment of all the relevant procedures Fund, the establishment of all the relevant and any other operational and institutional procedures and any other operational and aspects should apply from XX. institutional aspects should apply from 3 July 2017.

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Or. en

Amendment 281 Dimitrios Papadimoulis

Proposal for a regulation Recital 46

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(46) In order for EDIS to function in an (46) In order for EDIS to function in an effective manner as of [….], the provisions effective manner as of 2024, the provisions concerning the payment of contributions to concerning the payment of contributions to the Deposit Insurance Fund, the the Deposit Insurance Fund, the establishment of all the relevant procedures establishment of all the relevant procedures and any other operational and institutional and any other operational and institutional aspects should apply from XX. aspects should apply from January 2017.

Or. en

Amendment 282 Brian Hayes

Proposal for a regulation Recital 46

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(46) In order for EDIS to function in an (46) In order for EDIS to function in an effective manner as of [….], the provisions effective manner as of 1 January 2018, the concerning the payment of contributions to provisions concerning the payment of the Deposit Insurance Fund, the contributions to the Deposit Insurance establishment of all the relevant procedures Fund, the establishment of all the relevant and any other operational and institutional procedures and any other operational and aspects should apply from XX. institutional aspects should apply from XX.

Or. en

Amendment 283 Tom Vandenkendelaere

Proposal for a regulation Recital 46

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 284 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 46

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(46) In order for EDIS to function in an (46) In order for EDIS to function in an effective manner as of [….], the provisions effective manner as of [....], the provisions concerning the payment of contributions to concerning the payment of contributions to the Deposit Insurance Fund, the the Deposit Insurance Fund, the establishment of all the relevant procedures establishment of all the relevant procedures and any other operational and institutional and any other operational and institutional aspects should apply from XX. aspects should apply from January 2017.

Or. en

Amendment 285 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Recital 47

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(47) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (47) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and should be amended to incorporate and Directive 2014/49/EU should be amended respectively take into account the to incorporate and respectively take into

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establishment of EDIS, account the establishment of EDIS,

Or. en

Amendment 286 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Recital 47

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(47) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (47) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 should be amended to incorporate and should be amended to incorporate and respectively take into account the respectively take into account the establishment of EDIS, establishment of the European deposit reinsurance scheme,

Or. de

Amendment 287 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

2. In addition, this Regulation 2. In addition, this Regulation establishes a European Deposit Insurance establishes a European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') in three successive Scheme ('EDIS') that provides a gradually stages: increasing level of liquidity support for participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41a. The establishment shall be contingent upon the fulfilment of the conditions set out in paragraph 2a of this article.

Or. en

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Amendment 288 Jonás Fernández, Pervenche Berès, Costas Mavrides, Andrea Cozzolino, Neena Gill, Olle Ludvigsson

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

2. In addition, this Regulation 2. In addition, in order to ensure that establishes a European Deposit Insurance all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy Scheme ('EDIS') in three successive stages: an equal level of protection, this Regulation establishes a fully mutualised European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') by 2022 in three successive stages:

Or. en

Amendment 289 Jonás Fernández, Dimitrios Papadimoulis, Philippe Lamberts

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

2. In addition, this Regulation 2. In addition, in order to ensure that establishes a European Deposit Insurance all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy Scheme ('EDIS') in three successive an equal level of protection, this stages: Regulation establishes a fully mutualised European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') by 2024 at the latest in successive stages.

Or. en

Amendment 290 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

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Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(2) In addition, this Regulation (2) In addition, this Regulation establishes a European Deposit Insurance establishes a European deposit Scheme ('EDIS') in three successive reinsurance scheme (’EDIS’). stages:

Or. de

Amendment 291 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 292 Marco Zanni, Marco Valli

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. it

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Justification

EDIS should be established in a single stage, as from the entry into force of this Regulation, and should provide for full coverage of the liquidity shortfall and losses of the participating DGSs. Liquidity support guaranteed on an unlimited and unconditional basis by the ECB makes it possible to follow the path for financing the fund that has been laid down by the Commission, and thus to avoid burdening or putting pressure on the various participating DGSs. The whole text should be amended consistently to take this change into account.

Amendment 293 Brian Hayes

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 294 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

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Amendment 295 Marco Zanni, Marco Valli

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a reinsurance scheme that, to a deleted certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41a;

Or. it

Amendment 296 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a reinsurance scheme that, to a deleted certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41a;

Or. es

Amendment 297 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a reinsurance scheme that, to a deleted certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41a;

Or. de

Amendment 298 Sander Loones, Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a reinsurance scheme that, to a deleted certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41a;

Or. en

Amendment 299 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a reinsurance scheme that, to a - a limited reinsurance scheme that certain extent, provides funding and provides a gradually increasing level of covers a share of the losses of participating funding and to a certain extent covers a deposit guarantee schemes in accordance share of the losses of participating deposit with Article 41a; guarantee schemes in accordance with

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Article 41a;

Or. en

Amendment 300 Marco Zanni, Marco Valli

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a co-insurance scheme that, to a deleted gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41c;

Or. it

Amendment 301 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a co-insurance scheme that, to a deleted gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41c;

Or. de

Amendment 302 Siegfried Mureşan

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Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a co-insurance scheme that, to a deleted gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41c;

Or. en

Amendment 303 Sander Loones, Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a co-insurance scheme that, to a deleted gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41c;

Or. en

Amendment 304 Brian Hayes

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a co-insurance scheme that, to a deleted gradually increasing extent, provides

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funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41c;

Or. en

Amendment 305 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a co-insurance scheme that, to a - a mutualised reinsurance scheme gradually increasing extent, provides that, to a gradually increasing extent, funding and covers losses of participating provides funding and covers losses of deposit guarantee schemes in accordance participating deposit guarantee schemes in with Article 41c; accordance with Article 41da;

Or. en

Amendment 306 Markus Ferber

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a full insurance scheme that deleted provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41e.

Or. de

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Amendment 307 Siegfried Mureşan

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a full insurance scheme that deleted provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41e.

Or. en

Amendment 308 Sander Loones, Bernd Lucke

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a full insurance scheme that deleted provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41e.

Or. en

Amendment 309 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a full insurance scheme that deleted provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41e.

Or. en

Amendment 310 Brian Hayes

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a full insurance scheme that - an insurance scheme that provides provides the funding and covers the losses the funding and covers the losses of of participating deposit guarantee schemes participating deposit guarantee schemes in in accordance with Article 41e. accordance with Article 41e.

Or. en

Amendment 311 Marco Zanni, Marco Valli

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a full insurance scheme that - a full insurance scheme that provides the funding and covers the losses provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41e. in accordance with Article 41.

Or. it

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Amendment 312 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

- a public backstop system guaranteed by the ECB, in line with the aim of maintaining the stability of the financial system.

Or. it

Amendment 313 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

2a. Part IIa and Section 1a and 2 of Chapter 2 of Title V of Part III of this Regulation shall apply from no earlier than the fulfilment of the following conditions: (a) the application, immediately or where relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, of the international standard for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), and of revised rules in relation to a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), for all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs; (b) the application, immediately or where relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, of an insolvency

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ranking for credit institutions, harmonised at Union level, in relation to subordinated debt; (c) the application, immediately or where relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, of a Union framework for business insolvency in relation to the early restructuring of companies in order to prevent and better handle the pressing issue of non- performing loans; (d) the application, immediately or where relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, of an act amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU, resulting in a binding leverage ratio requirement with additional requirements for G-SIBs; (e) the application of legislation introducing moratorium powers for supervisors and resolution authorities in respect of credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs; (f) the application of legislation introducing non-zero risk weights for sovereign exposures or measures to address concentration risks, such as large exposure limits; (g) adherence by all credit institutions to the minimum capital requirements in the baseline scenario of an Asset Quality Review (AQR) for all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGSs, to be conducted between 1 January 2020 and 31 December in 2022. Without prejudice to subparagraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council shall, on the basis of verification by the Commission of compliance with the conditions in subparagraph 1, to be conducted no earlier than 1 January 2023, adopt a legislative act in order to establish the exact date of application of Part IIa and Section 1a and 2 of Chapter 2 of Title V of Part III of this Regulation.

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Or. en

Amendment 314 Gabriel Mato

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(a) credit institutions established in a (a) credit institutions and unions participating Member State; established in a participating Member State;

Or. es

Amendment 315 Sander Loones

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(b) credit institutions affiliated to (b) credit institutions affiliated to participating deposit-guarantee schemes. participating deposit-guarantee schemes, excluding the entities referred to in Article 2(5) of Directive 2013/36/EU and branches of credit institutions established in third countries referred to in Article 15 of Directive 2014/49/EU.

Or. en

Amendment 316 Burkhard Balz

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

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Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(b) credit institutions affiliated to (b) credit institutions affiliated to participating deposit-guarantee schemes. participating deposit-guarantee schemes, not including the entities excluded from the application of Directive 2013/36/EU according to Article 2 of that Directive.

Or. en

Amendment 317 Alain Cadec

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(b) credit institutions affiliated to (b) credit institutions affiliated to participating deposit-guarantee schemes. participating deposit-guarantee schemes and subject to consolidated supervision under the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) (Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013).

Or. en

Amendment 318 Pervenche Berès

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(b) credit institutions affiliated to (b) credit institutions affiliated to participating deposit-guarantee schemes. participating deposit-guarantee schemes and compliant with Regulation (EU) No

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575/2013 1a as regards consolidated supervision. ______1a Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)

Or. en

Amendment 319 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(b) credit institutions affiliated to (b) credit institutions affiliated to participating deposit-guarantee schemes. participating deposit-guarantee schemes and subject to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR) and Directive No 2013/36/EU (CRDIV).

Or. en

Amendment 320 Danuta Maria Hübner

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(b) credit institutions affiliated to (b) credit institutions established in the participating deposit-guarantee schemes. Union and affiliated to participating deposit-guarantee schemes.

Or. en

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Amendment 321 Danuta Maria Hübner

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(ba) branches of third country credit institutions established in the EU for which protection has been assessed as not being equivalent and which have been affiliated to a participating DGS as a result of the procedure outlined in Article 2a.

Or. en

Amendment 322 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 – paragraph 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

2a. Unless the Commission decides that the third country protection scheme has a level strictly equivalent to the EU framework, branches of credit institutions established in third countries must join a DGS in operation in the participating Member State in which they operate.

Or. en

Amendment 323 Danuta Maria Hübner

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

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Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 2 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

3a. The following Article 2a is inserted ‘Article 2a Equivalence procedure for branches of credit institutions established in third countries 1. For the purpose of EDIS, the Commission shall check that branches established in a participating Member State by a credit institution which has its head office outside the Union have protection equivalent to that prescribed in Directive 2014/49/EU, as set out in Article 15(1), first subparagraph, of Directive 2014/49/EU. This check shall also include assessment of the available funds of the deposit guarantee scheme. 2. Should the check performed by the Commission result in the finding that the protection offered to the branch is not equivalent to this provided under Directive 2014/49/EU, the branch shall be required to join a DGS in operation within the territory of the Member State concerned. 3. For the purpose of the check referred to in the previous subparagraph, each branch established in a participating Member State by a credit institution which has its head office outside the Union and which is not a member of a participating DGS shall provide the Commission with all relevant information concerning the guarantee arrangements for the deposits of actual and intending depositors at that branch. 4. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 93 to supplement this Regulation by specifying the method and conditions for the performance of the equivalence check referred to in this

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article.’

Or. en

Amendment 324 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 57

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(57) 'available financial means of the (57) 'available financial means of the DIF' means cash, deposits and low-risk DIF' means cash, deposits, irrevocable assets which can be liquidated within a payment commitments collateralized with period not exceeding that referred to in sovereign securities and payable at any Article 8(1) of the Directive 2014/49/EU.; rate within 48 hours upon the request of the Board or within 24 hours if early intervention or crisis management measures are applied to the credit institution by the competent or resolution authority, as well as low-risk assets which can be liquidated within a period not exceeding that referred to in Article 8(1) of the Directive 2014/49/EU.;

Or. en

Amendment 325 Othmar Karas

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 57

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

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Article 8(1) of the Directive 2014/49/EU.; means provided for in Article 113/7 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and low- risk assets which can be liquidated within a period not exceeding that referred to in Article 8(1) of the Directive 2014/49/EU.;

Or. en

Justification

Since IPS already have ex-ante funds on national level and their contributions are channelled only in liquid and secure assets, these commitments should therefore also eligible to be treated as irrevocable payment commitments.

Amendment 326 Danuta Maria Hübner

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 57

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(57) 'available financial means of the (57) 'available financial means of the DIF' means cash, deposits and low-risk DIF' means cash, deposits and low-risk assets which can be liquidated within a assets which can be liquidated within a period not exceeding that referred to in period not exceeding that referred to in Article 8(1) of the Directive 2014/49/EU.; Article 8(1) of the Directive 2014/49/EU and payment commitments up to the limit set out paragraph 2a of Article 74c;

Or. en

Amendment 327 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 57

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

Or. en

Amendment 328 Peter Simon

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 57 a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

57a. “Measures to preserve the access of depositors to covered deposits in the context of national insolvency proceedings” all measures to preserve access to covered deposits, including the transfer of assets and liabilities and deposit book transfer in the context of national insolvency proceedings under Article 11(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU.

Or. de

Amendment 329 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 a (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 5 – title

Present text Amendment

5a. The title of Article 5 is replaced as

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follows: Relation to Directive 2014/59/EU and 'Relation to Directive 2014/49/EU, applicable national law Directive 2014/59/EU and applicable national law'

Or. en

Amendment 330 Sylvie Goulard Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 a (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 5 – title

Present text Amendment

5a. The title of Article 5 is replaced as follows: Relation to Directive 2014/59/EU and ‘Relation to Directives 2014/49/EU and applicable national law 2014/59/EU and applicable national law’

Or. en

Justification

As suggested by the ECB in its opinion of 20 April 2016

Amendment 331 Jonás Fernández, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 a (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 5 – title

Present text Amendment

5a. The title of Article 5 is replaced as follows: Relation to Directive 2014/59/EU and ‘Relation to Directives 2014/49/EU and applicable national law 2014/59/EU and applicable national law’

Or. en

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Amendment 332 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 b (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph -1 (new)

Present text Amendment

5b. In Article 5(1), the following new subparagraph -1 is added: ‘-1. Where, pursuant to this Regulation, the Board decides to exercise the recovery rights, which, pursuant to Directive 2014/49/EU are exercised by the DGS, the Board shall, for the application of this Regulation and of Directive 2014/49/EU, be considered to be the relevant DGS in national insolvency proceedings.’

Or. en

Justification

As suggested by the ECB in its opinion of 20 April 2016

Amendment 333 Jonás Fernández, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 b (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph -1 (new)

Present text Amendment

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proceedings.’

Or. en

Justification

As suggested by the ECB in its opinion of 20 April 2016

Amendment 334 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 b (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 5 – paragraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

5b. In Article 5(1), the following new subparagraph -1 is added: ‘Where, pursuant to this Regulation, the Board decides to exercise the recovery rights, which, pursuant to Directive 2014/49/EU are exercised by the DGS, the Board shall, for the application of this Regulation and of Directive 2014/49/EU, be considered to be the relevant DGS in national insolvency proceedings.’

Or. en

Amendment 335 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 6 – paragraph 2

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

2. Every action, proposal or policy of 2. Every action, proposal or policy of

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the Board, the Council, the Commission, a the Board, the Council, the Commission, a national resolution authority or a national resolution authority, or a participating DGS in the framework of the participating DGS in the framework of the SRM or of EDIS shall be undertaken with SRM or of EDIS shall be undertaken with full regard and duty of care for the unity full regard and duty of care for the unity and integrity of the internal market.; and integrity of the internal market with the purpose of ensuring the highest possible level of depositor protection across the Member States of the Banking Union and of reducing the overall level of risk within the banking sector and to minimize systemic risks.

Or. en

Amendment 336 Marco Valli, Marco Zanni

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 19 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

(a) in paragraph 3, the first deleted subparagraph is replaced by the following: To the extent that the resolution action as proposed by the Board involves the use of the Fund, the Board shall notify the Commission of the proposed use of the Fund. The Board's notification shall include all of the information necessary to enable the Commission to make its assessments pursuant to this paragraph. ’

Or. it

Amendment 337 Jonás Fernández, Jakob von Weizsäcker, Costas Mavrides, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)

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Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 34 – paragraph 5

Present text Amendment

9a. in Article 34, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: 5. The Board, the ECB, the national ‘5. The Board, the ECB, the national competent authorities and the national competent authorities, the national resolution authorities may draw up resolution authorities and the national memoranda of understanding with a designated authorities may draw up procedure concerning the exchange of memoranda of understanding with a information. The exchange of information procedure concerning the exchange of between the Board, the ECB, the national information. The exchange of information competent authorities and the national between the Board, the ECB, the national resolution authorities shall not be deemed competent authorities, and the national to infringe the requirements of professional resolution authorities and the national secrecy. designated authorities shall not be deemed to infringe the requirements of professional secrecy.’

Or. en

Amendment 338 Philippe Lamberts on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 34 – paragraph 5

Present text Amendment

9a. in Article 34, paragraph 5 is replaced as follows: 5. The Board, the ECB, the national ‘5. The Board, the ECB, the national competent authorities and the national competent authorities and the national resolution authorities may draw up resolution authorities and the designated memoranda of understanding with a authorities may draw up memoranda of procedure concerning the exchange of understanding with a procedure concerning information. The exchange of information the exchange of information. The exchange between the Board, the ECB, the national of information between the Board, the competent authorities and the national ECB, the national competent authorities resolution authorities shall not be deemed and the national resolution authorities and to infringe the requirements of professional the designated authorities shall not be

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secrecy. deemed to infringe the requirements of professional secrecy.’

Or. en

Amendment 339 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 34 – paragraph 5

Present text Amendment

9a. in Article 34, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: 5. The Board, the ECB, the national ‘5. The Board, the ECB, the national competent authorities and the national competent authorities, the national resolution authorities may draw up resolution authorities and the national memoranda of understanding with a designated authorities may draw up procedure concerning the exchange of memoranda of understanding for a information. The exchange of information procedure concerning the exchange of between the Board, the ECB, the national information. The exchange of information competent authorities and the national between the Board, the ECB, the national resolution authorities shall not be deemed competent authorities, and the national to infringe the requirements of professional resolution authorities and the national secrecy. designated authorities shall not be deemed to infringe the requirements of professional secrecy.’

Or. en

Justification

As suggested by the ECB in its opinion of 20 April 2016

Amendment 340 Jonás Fernández, Jakob von Weizsäcker, Olle Ludvigsson, Neena Gill

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 b (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 38 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

9b. In Article 38(2), the following point (ca) is added: ‘(ca) where they intentionally or negligently fail to comply with decisions of the DGS to which they are affiliated, including a failure associated with the invoices on contributions, in accordance with Article 74e.’;'

Or. en

Amendment 341 Danuta Maria Hübner

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 38 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)

Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

9a. in Article 38(2), the following point (ca) is added: ‘(ca) where they intentionally or negligently fail to comply with decisions of the DGS to which they are affiliated, including a failure associated with the invoices on contributions, in accordance with Article 74e.’

Or. en

Amendment 342 Sylvie Goulard

Proposal for a regulation Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 b (new) Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 Article 38 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)

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Text proposed by the Commission Amendment

9b. in Article 38(2), the following point (ca) is added: ‘(ca) where they intentionally or negligently fail to comply with decisions of the DGS to which they are affiliated, including a failure associated with the invoices on contributions, in accordance with Article 74e.’

Or. en

Justification

As suggested by the ECB in its opinion of 20 April 2016

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