SUPPLEMENT TO THE IAEA BULLETIN, VOL. 41, NO. 4/DECEMBER 1999

THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM MOVES INTO THE 21ST CENTURY BY PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT

or more than three still persist -- in verifying the decades the IAEA initial report submitted by the Fsafeguards system has Democratic People’s Republic of applied technical measures to Korea (DPRK) on its nuclear assure the international material subject to safeguards. community that the non- During the early 1990s, the nuclear-weapon States party Agency also gained invaluable to the Treaty on the experience in verifying the initial Non-Proliferation of Nuclear report on nuclear material Weapons (NPT) or similar subject to safeguards submitted agreements are honoring their by South Africa and, at the commitments not to proliferate Government’s request, in nuclear weapons. assessing the termination of its The very essence of these nuclear weapons programme. commitments -- and their South Africa is the first -- and independent verification by the so far the only -- State that has Agency -- is that they demonstrate changed from a de facto nuclear- Under 223 safeguards agreements in transparency with respect to those weapon State to a non-nuclear- force with 139 States, the IAEA verifies States' exclusively peaceful nuclear weapon State party to the NPT. that safeguarded nuclear material and S-1 activities. They thus promote trust These events prompted the facilities are being used exclusively for among States, regions and the Agency and its Member States peaceful purposes. More than 900 world as a whole. to examine how the safeguards facilities are under safeguards and the Today -- as it has for some 30 system in operation at that time Agency carried out just over 2200 years -- the Agency is able to could become more effective, inspections in 1999. provide assurance that declared particularly for detecting any nuclear material and other items undeclared nuclear material and conclusion of comprehensive placed under safeguards have activities that should have been safeguards agreements with remained in peaceful nuclear declared by a State under its Argentina and Brazil and with a activities or were otherwise safeguards agreement. large number of the newly adequately accounted for in This examination, begun in independent States of the former States that have safeguards 1991, also covered improvements Soviet Union, many of which agreements in force. for more cost-efficient safeguards, have substantial nuclear The Agency has also been able given the resource constraints of programmes. Then too, to identify -- and to alert the successive near zero-real growth technology advances rapidly international community -- to budgets for the IAEA and the taking place offered possibilities the two known cases where Department of Safeguards dating for more effective verification States have not met their back to the late 1980s. These while keeping the costs of safeguards obligations. In 1991, constraints were occurring at a safeguards at bay. soon after the end of what was time of considerable growth in known as the Gulf War, IAEA the number of comprehensive Mr. Goldschmidt is the IAEA inspectors discovered Iraq’s safeguards agreements and in the Deputy Director General, Head of extensive clandestine programme amount of nuclear material and Safeguards. Contributions made by for producing nuclear weapons. the number of facilities to be staff of the Department of One year later, IAEA inspectors safeguarded. These increases Safeguards to this report are encountered difficulties -- that were due largely to the gratefully acknowledged. IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 The results of this examination been incorporated into routine political challenges. But the have found expression in the steps safeguards implementation. All achievements thus far and the that the Agency and its Member told, as of mid-December 1999, momentum building for the States have taken to forge a more the Board has approved 46 widespread adoption of the Model rigorous safeguards system. Additional Protocols. They cover Additional Protocol bode well for Since the early 1990s, the IAEA 41 non-nuclear-weapon States the work ahead. The Board of Governors has adopted which have comprehensive accomplishments have also or encouraged strengthening safeguards agreements in force or instilled increasing recognition that measures in order to provide the awaiting ratification, one State the IAEA’s extensive verification Agency with more information with an INFCIRC/66-type experience and expertise can than hitherto available about the safeguards agreement, and four support initiatives in the field of nuclear programmes of States, nuclear-weapon States, each of nuclear arms control. greater access by IAEA inspectors which has a voluntary offer IAEA To better understand how to locations relevant for safeguards agreement in force. the Agency’s safeguards system verification, and more powerful Of these approved Protocols, has come to play -- and why verification tools. eight have entered into force, it will continue to play -- The process of strengthening and one is being implemented a fundamental role in the IAEA safeguards achieved a provisionally pending its formal international non-proliferation milestone in 1997. In May that entry into force. In two States, regime, this report examines year, the Board approved the the implementation of the the major elements of the Model Additional Protocol to Additional Protocols has IAEA safeguards system. It Safeguards Agreements which included complementary access also looks briefly at provides the legal basis for the to contribute to confirming the opportunities for the Agency significantly strengthened IAEA exclusively peaceful use of all to support initiatives in the safeguards system. nuclear material in these States. field of nuclear arms control. By late 1999, most of the The full implementation of a Finally, it provides an historical S-2 strengthening measures pursuant strengthened safeguards system will perspective on the evolution of to safeguards agreements have present technical, financial and safeguards.

ELEMENTS OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

The elements of IAEA Traditional Measures. One set authority conferred by existing safeguards are described from of measures relates to the nuclear safeguards agreements. The the perspective of how material verification activities second category comprises the system has operated through performed at facilities or other measures to be implemented 1999 and how it is changing locations where States have under the complementary legal and likely to change over declared the presence of nuclear authority conferred by the near term as all safeguards material subject to safeguards. Additional Protocols concluded measures are integrated to These measures are also referred on the basis of the Model gain maximum effectiveness to as “traditional safeguards”. Additional Protocol. and efficiency within available (See box, page S-4.) When fully implemented in a resources. Strengthening Measures. State, the strengthening measures What are Safeguards? By Another set relates to the measures provided by a comprehensive definition, the safeguards system endorsed or encouraged by the safeguards agreement together comprises an extensive set of IAEA Board since 1992 for with an Additional Protocol will technical measures by which the strengthening the safeguards allow the Agency to draw IAEA Secretariat independently system. (See box, page S-5.) safeguards conclusions both about verifies the correctness and the These measures fall into two the non-diversion of declared completeness of the declarations categories. The first category nuclear material and the absence of made by States about their comprises those measures to be undeclared nuclear material and IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 nuclear material and activities. implemented under the legal activities in that State. TRADITIONAL SAFEGUARDS: DETECTING DIVERSION OF DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL Traditional safeguards are based covering all of its nuclear material on the concept of nuclear subject to safeguards. There are material accountancy verification, practical reasons for this restriction, complemented by containment since under comprehensive (e.g., seals) and surveillance (e.g., safeguards agreements IAEA cameras and monitors). These inspector access during routine activities are applied to nuclear inspections is limited to specified material once it has been points (“strategic points”) in the processed to a stage suitable for facility for material accountancy IAEA safeguards seals are examined at the Agency’s headquarters enrichment or for introduction verification purposes. With this to ensure that there has been no unauthorized access to or into a reactor. limited access, the Agency’s ability interference with nuclear material or safeguards equipment. Nuclear material accountancy to detect an undeclared nuclear cornerstone of the safeguards focuses primarily on the activity that makes no use system, particularly for confirming “correctness” of a State’s of safeguarded material is the absence of unreported declarations about its nuclear circumscribed. This was essentially production or separation of direct- material present at facilities -- the the situation that came to light in use material (for example, aim being to independently verify Iraq and that has been plutonium and highly enriched that the inventories and flows of subsequently addressed in the uranium) in safeguarded facilities. nuclear material are as declared or, provisions of the Model The incorporation of certain in other words, that there has been Additional Protocol. strengthening measures, such as no material mis-statement. At this point, it is important to environmental sampling, is Traditional safeguards have underscore that nuclear material enhancing traditional safeguards S-3 tacitly assumed that the State has verification activities have been -- implementation, as described in provided complete information and will continue to be -- the the following section.

STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS: a different set of “indicators” that DETECTING UNDECLARED can be used for assessing both the correctness and completeness NUCLEAR MATERIAL & ACTIVITIES of a State’s declarations and whether there is a possibility of The second set of safeguards Traditional nuclear material undeclared nuclear activities in measures relates to the verification activities are designed that State. strengthening measures to be to provide a set of “indicators” of The conceptual basis for such applied pursuant to safeguards diversion or of circumstances an assessment derives from the agreements and Additional where the possibility of diversion fact that a State’s nuclear Protocols. These activities focus cannot be excluded. These programme (past, present and primarily on the “completeness” indicators (such as a statistically future) involves an interrelated of a State’s declarations -- the significant amount of “material- set of nuclear and nuclear-related aim being to verify the presence unaccounted-for”) are used for activities that require, and/or are of nuclear material as declared assessing the correctness of a State’s indicated by, the presence of and to confirm that there is no declarations regarding its nuclear certain equipment, a specific indication of any undeclared material inventories, material flows infrastructure, observable tell- nuclear material and activities in and facility operations. tale traces in the environment, that State which should have Safeguards strengthening and a predictable use of nuclear been declared. measures, when supported by material. The picture presented Conceptual Approach: The the provisions of the Model by these features provides the State’s Nuclear Programme. Additional Protocol, provide for basis for an assessment of, first, IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY: CORNERSTONE OF TRADITIONAL SAFEGUARDS

Traditional safeguards are based on nuclear material Three types of inspections may be carried out: ad accountancy, complemented by containment (e.g., hoc inspections, routine inspections and special seals) and surveillance (e.g., cameras). These activities inspections. Ad hoc inspections are made to verify a are analogous to those of financial accounting. Nuclear State’s initial report on its nuclear material or the report material accountancy records are maintained by facility on changes thereto, and to verify the nuclear material operators for each facility under safeguards. The involved in international transfers. Ad hoc inspections information on the nuclear material inventory – may also be carried out until a State’s Facility comparable to financial statements – is reported to Attachment (a part of its Subsidiary Arrangement) is the Agency through State authorities. These State legally in force. Routine inspections are most declarations on nuclear material are the primary frequently used; they may be carried out according to information source for the Agency’s independent a defined schedule or they may be of an unannounced, verification of the “correctness” of these declarations short-notice character. Special inspections are carried regarding nuclear material inventories, material flows out unusually, and may be prompted by the State itself and facility operations. or by the Agency if it believes that the State concerned Technical Objectives, Safeguards Approaches & was not providing all the required information about its Safeguards Criteria. The technical objectives of these nuclear material or that it needed more information to verification activities are to detect, within specified fulfil its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement. time-frames, the diversion of significant quantities of Visits may be made to declared facilities at nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture appropriate times during the lifecycle for verifying of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices the safeguards relevant design information. For or for purposes unknown; and to deter such diversion example, such visits may be carried out during by the risk of early detection. These objectives are based construction to determine the completeness of the on the principle that a certain quantity of nuclear declared design information; during routine facility S-4 material, a significant quantity, is needed to operations and following maintenance, to confirm manufacture a nuclear explosive device and that a that no modification was made that would allow certain length of time is needed to convert that material unreported activities to take place; and during a into weapon usable form. facility decommissioning, to confirm that sensitive The approach for verifying a State ‘s declaration of its equipment was rendered unusable. nuclear material takes into account all technically Verification activities IAEA inspectors perform possible diversion paths at a certain type of facility, during and in connection with on-site inspections or including the diversion of material for the unreported visits at facilities may include auditing the facility’s production or separation of direct-use material (e.g., accounting and operating records and comparing plutonium and highly enriched uranium) at that these records with the State’s accounting reports to facility. Among the factors considered in developing the the agency; verifying the nuclear material inventory safeguards approach are the design features of the and inventory changes; and applying containment facility, the form and accessibility of the nuclear and surveillance measures (e.g., seal application, material, and the measurement and analytical methods installation of surveillance equipment). available to the Agency. Technical safeguards criteria are Evaluating & Reporting on Safeguards established for each type of facility under safeguards and Implementation. Technical parameters are used specify the scope, the normal frequency and the extent to evaluate whether the inspection activities at of the verification activities needed to achieve the facilities have met the technical objectives of technical objectives of detection and deterrence. detection and deterrence. These largely quantitative On-Site Inspections & Design Information findings are brought together with more qualitative Verification. On-site inspections are the chief information in order to derive safeguards mechanisms for verifying that the inventory and conclusions about the non-diversion of declared flow of nuclear material present in the facility (or at nuclear material. The results of implementing these a strategic point in the facility) are as declared and verification activities are reported annually to that there is no unreported production or separation the Board of Governors in the Safeguards of direct-use material at the facility. Implementation Report. IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 SAFEGUARDS STRENGTHENING MEASURES

Measures under I Agency enhanced analysis of information Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements derived from State declarations under safeguards I State provision of design information on new agreements, Agency verification activities and from facilities or changes in existing facilities handling a wide range of open sources. safeguarded nuclear material, as soon as the State authorities decide to construct, authorize Measures under Model Additional Protocol construction or modify a facility; and the Agency’s I State provision of information about, and IAEA right to verify the design information over the inspector access to, all aspects of a State’s nuclear fuel facility lifecycle, including decommissioning. cycle, from uranium mines to nuclear waste and I State voluntary reports on imports and exports of any other location where nuclear material intended nuclear material and exports of specified equipment and for non-nuclear uses is present. non-nuclear material. (Components of this scheme I State provision of information on, and IAEA are incorporated in the Model Additional Protocol.) short-notice inspection access to, all buildings on a I Agency collection of environmental samples in nuclear site. facilities and at locations where, under existing I State provision of information about, and IAEA safeguards agreements, inspectors have access inspection mechanisms for, a State’s nuclear fuel during inspections and design information visits; cycle related research and development. and analysis at the IAEA Clean Laboratory and/or I State provision of information on the manufacture at certified laboratories in Member States. and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies, I Agency use of unattended and remote monitoring and IAEA inspection mechanisms for of movements of declared nuclear material in facilities manufacturing and import locations in the State. and the transmission of authenticated and encrypted I Agency collection of environmental samples to safeguards-relevant data to the Agency. locations beyond those provided under safeguards I Agency use, to a greater extent than previously, agreements, when deemed necessary by the S-5 of unannounced inspections within the routine Agency. inspection regime. I State acceptance of IAEA inspector designations I Provision of enhanced training of IAEA inspectors and issuance of multiple entry visas for IAEA and safeguards staff and of Member State personnel inspectors covering at least one year. responsible for safeguards implementation. I Agency right to make use of internationally I Closer cooperation between the Agency and the established communications systems, including State (and regional) systems for accounting and satellite systems and other forms of control of nuclear material in Member States. telecommunication. the internal consistency of the activities, the more comprehensive information than previously State’s declarations to the Agency the safeguards assessment, and the available about a State’s nuclear and, secondly, a point-by-point better able it is to provide credible and nuclear-related activities and comparison of what the State assurance of non-diversion of its use of nuclear material; says it is doing or plans to do declared nuclear material and of I Increased IAEA inspector access within the scope of its nuclear the absence of undeclared nuclear to relevant locations in the State programme and of the material and activities in that State. and the associated mechanism of corresponding information complementary access to available to the Agency from its KEY COMPONENTS contribute to confirming the own verification activities and OF STRENGTHENED exclusively peaceful intent of a from other sources. SAFEGUARDS State’s nuclear programme; Clearly, information is crucial The strengthened safeguards I Use of advanced verification for a safeguards State assessment: system comprises the following technology; and the more the Agency is aware of key components: I Enhanced effectiveness and the nature and location of a State’s I Agency access to, and efficiency of resource use, for nuclear and nuclear-related evaluation of, substantially more example, through enhanced IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 training of safeguards staff and information than previously to facilities handling safeguarded Member State personnel, and available to support the material. The availability of this closer cooperation with State and safeguards evaluation and review information, and the Agency’s regional systems for accounting of State’s nuclear programmes exercise of its right to verify this and control of nuclear material. -- information submitted by information throughout the These strengthening measures States pursuant to their facility lifecycle, are contributing to are discussed below, showing reporting obligations and the assurance that safeguarded what has been done under the voluntary reports; information facilities are not being used for any legal authority of IAEA generated by its own verification unreported activities, especially for safeguards agreements and, activities at facilities and its the production or separation of where appropriate, what is being activities under Additional direct-use materials. done or is planned under the Protocols; and information As of late 1999, a total of 52 legal authority conferred by the available from a wide range of Member States, including the Model Additional Protocol. open sources. major nuclear suppliers, have I Enhanced Information For example, States are now participated in the voluntary Access & Evaluation. As a result submitting, in a more timely scheme for reporting their of the strengthening measures manner, design information about imports and exports of nuclear being applied, the Agency now new facilities and safeguards- material, specialized equipment has at its disposal more relevant modifications or changes and non-nuclear material. To

SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY & EQUIPMENT I Non-Destructive & Destructive Assay I Containment & Surveillance Techniques. IAEA Techniques. Nuclear material verification activities inspectors also apply containment and surveillance at safeguarded facilities include independent (C/S) techniques to nuclear and other material, S-6 measurements to verify quantitatively the amount of devices and samples at safeguarded facilities. C/S nuclear material declared by a State. techniques are used for many reasons, including IAEA inspectors count items (e.g., fuel assemblies) verifying that nuclear material follows and measure the content, element or isotopic predetermined routes, that there is no unauthorized concentration or other attributes of these items using access to safeguards equipment or relevant non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques which do not information and that the material or other physically or chemically change the item. These safeguards items are accounted for at the correct measurement findings are compared with the facility measurement points. operator’s records and the State declared figures in A variety of C/S techniques is used, primarily sealing order to detect missing items or whether a large systems and optical surveillance systems. A sealing amount of declared material is missing (“gross defect system typically comprises the containment enclosing testing”). Also, IAEA inspectors may weight the items the nuclear material to be safeguarded, the means for and measure them using NDA techniques, such as applying the seal (e.g., a metal wire) and the seal which neutron counting or gamma ray spectrometry, in order may be metallic, fibre optic or electronic by design. to detect whether a fraction of a declared amount of All components are examined to verify that the sealing material is missing (“partial defect testing”). system has ensured the continuity of knowledge on For detecting the diversion of small amounts of the nuclear material concerned. material over a protracted period, destructive analysis The optical surveillance systems are usually (DA) techniques are used to achieve the highest applied in storage areas (such as spent fuel storage possible accuracy (“bias defect testing”). This involves ponds) and generally consist of two or more cameras the independent sampling of some items and chemical positioned to completely cover the area. The field of analyses which may destroy the physical form of the view is such that any movement of items can be sample. Samples are analyzed at the IAEA Safeguards easily identified and the images can be recorded Analytical Laboratory located in Seibersdorf near during movement. Vienna and/or or at certified laboratories in Member I Unattended & Remote Monitoring Systems. States. Optical surveillance systems, for example, are IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 date, the Agency has received information supplied by States submitted such expanded approximately 2600 reports on pursuant to their Additional declarations pursuant to their the production of nuclear Protocols. To assist States in Additional Protocols. material and the export of preparing their declarations These guidelines for the certain nuclear materials and pursuant to their Additional submission of such expanded approximately 450 reports on Protocols, the Agency has declarations were designed exported equipment and non- developed a system, known as mainly for States having nuclear materials. the PDIS Reporter. Several substantial nuclear fuel cycles. Additional Protocol-Related States are now making trial use However, many States with Information. Both for the of this system, after which it will comprehensive safeguards Agency and for States that be made available to all States agreements have little or no accept the provisions of the with Additional Protocols in declared nuclear material and/or Model Additional Protocol, the force. In addition, in late 1997 nuclear activities. Such States preparation and handling of the the Agency issued guidelines for have usually concluded a "Small related information is a new assisting States in preparing and Quantities Protocol" which endeavor. For the Agency, the submitting the information holds in abeyance most of the computerized Protocol Data pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of detailed provisions of the second Information System (PDIS) is the Model Additional Protocol. part of a comprehensive being used to properly treat all As of late 1999, six States have safeguards agreement. The

States, images and data were transmitted to IAEA headquarters via communication satellite and ultra- small aperture terminal satellite transceivers. The data were then stored in computers at IAEA headquarters; periodically, they were transferred to a local area network for review, upon demand, by S-7 authorized persons. I Environmental Sampling & Analysis. The collection of environmental samples at or near a nuclear site, combined with ultrasensitive analytical techniques, such as mass spectrometry, particle analysis and low level unattended systems since their prime function is to radiometric techniques, can reveal indicators of past survey an area for safeguards relevant activities over and current activities in locations handling nuclear extended time periods. Contemporary unattended materials. Environmental sampling was introduced in monitoring systems employing radiation detection 1996 as a strengthening safeguards measure which can sensors are increasingly being used to detect nuclear be applied under safeguards agreements and, under material flows past key points in the facility process Additional Protocols, more broadly at other locations. area. For complex nuclear facilities where the plant Samples are received, screened, and analyzed at the is automated, unattended assay and monitoring IAEA Clean Laboratory located at Seibersorf near techniques are an integral part of practicable Vienna; they may also be analyzed in laboratories safeguards implementation, resulting in improved belonging to the network of certified laboratories in verification coverage and accuracy. Member States. Unattended and remote monitoring is a special mode of applying NDA or C/S measures, or a Photos: Safeguards inspectors are being supported by a combination of these, that operates for extended range of advanced verification techniques. At the time periods without the presence of the IAEA IAEA Clean Laboratory, environmental samples are inspector. Remote monitoring in the safeguards analyzed. For more information, see the IAEA booklet, context is generally considered to mean the real- Safeguards Techniques and Equipment, published in the time or near-real-time transmission off-site of data International Nuclear Verification Series and available on nuclear material movements. During field tests of from the IAEA Division of Conference and Document remote monitoring systems in several Member Services or Division of Public Information. IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 conclusion of Additional identifies indicators for each States submit their expanded Protocols by such States is process in terms of equipment, declarations, these baseline important and, in April 1999, nuclear material and non- evaluations will enable the Agency the Agency issued simplified nuclear material. to identify areas where further guidelines for use by States Software programmes for amplification or clarification of whose comprehensive safeguards sorting and examination of the information submitted may agreements includes a Small information are being used to be needed or where there are Quantities Protocol. retrieve and examine open questions or inconsistencies to be Information Confidentiality. source information. These tools resolved through discussion with The confidentiality of sensitive include a set of “topic trees” for the State and/or through information supplied by States all steps of the nuclear fuel cycle complementary access to a State, pursuant to their safeguards developed on the basis of the as described below. agreements and Additional “physical model”; a search I Increased IAEA Inspector Protocols is maintained under software programme for Access. Several elements are the Agency’s stringent regime for accessing information stored at involved. the protection of confidential remote sites on the Internet; and Complementary Access. The information. In endorsing this a software programme that Model Additional Protocol regime, in 1997 the Board of supports the visualization of provides the authority for Governors emphasized the information. increased IAEA inspector access importance of confidentiality IAEA safeguards staff regularly to relevant locations in a State and decided to periodically evaluate the information and to confirm the exclusively review the regime. The most their findings are independently peaceful intent of that State’s recent review occurred in June reviewed by senior officials of the nuclear programme. This legal 1999. IAEA Secretariat, who may make instrument also provides the Evaluation & Review. New recommendations to the Deputy mechanism for the Agency to procedures, analytic methods, Director General of Safeguards, exercise that authority -- i.e., S-8 software tools and the associated where appropriate, for follow-up complementary access. As of staff capabilities are being put in action. Information evaluation late 1999, complementary access place for the evaluation and and review are integral to the has taken place in two States -- review of information about overall process of safeguards namely, Australia and State’s nuclear and nuclear- assessments whereby the Agency Uzbekistan. In addition, hands- related activities, within the draws safeguards conclusions on experience in performing context of State’s declarations. about the non-diversion of complementary access to For the safeguards analyst, the declared nuclear material and complex nuclear sites is being problem is one of recognizing about the absence of undeclared gained through the Additional what information is important nuclear activities in States having Protocol implementation trials and synthesizing the comprehensive safeguards that are under way in a number information into a coherent agreements with Additional of States. picture. Methods are available to Protocols in force. (See box, For a State with an Additional support -- but not supplant -- page S-9.) Protocol in force, the Agency the analyst. A key methodology To provide a comparative may request complementary for analyzing the information on baseline for such safeguards State access to any nuclear site or place a State’s nuclear programme assessments that include the in that State which has or is builds on a “physical model” of expanded declarations submitted producing or is storing nuclear the nuclear fuel cycle, which was under Additional Protocols, the material, the purpose being to developed collaboratively by the nuclear programmes of States assure the absence of undeclared Agency and experts from several with comprehensive safeguards nuclear material and activities. Member States. The physical agreements in force are now Complementary access may also model identifies, describes and being evaluated and the findings be requested to resolve a characterizes every known are being reviewed. As of late question relating to the technical process for converting 1999, baseline evaluations of the correctness and completeness of nuclear source material to nuclear programmes of 25 States the information submitted or to IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 weapons usable material and have been reviewed. As more resolve an inconsistency relating DERIVING SAFEGUARDS CONCLUSIONS

The Agency’s safeguards conclusions for a State are Further, the Secretariat assesses the more derived from the IAEA Secretariat’s independent qualitative information available, including the assessment of information — information provided facility design features, the continuing knowledge of by the State pursuant to its reporting obligations, facility operations and information on the State’s information generated by the Agency from its nuclear fuel cycle. Finally, it brings together the verification activities and information from other, quantitative and qualitative assessment results in open sources. If after such an assessment the order to determine whether there is any indication Secretariat were unable to conclude that there has of diversion. Where there is no evidence to the been no diversion of nuclear material and/or that contrary, the conclusion is drawn that all of the there are no undeclared nuclear material and nuclear material declared and placed under activities in that State, the Board of Governors safeguards has remained in peaceful nuclear activities would be promptly informed. or was adequately accounted for. I For a State having a comprehensive safeguards I For a State having a comprehensive safeguards agreement but not yet an Additional Protocol in agreement with an Additional Protocol in force, the force, the conclusion covers only the non-diversion Agency is able to draw broader conclusions that of declared nuclear material. The quantitative and provide for greater nuclear transparency for a State. qualitative results of safeguards implementation These conclusions cover both the non-diversion of in that State are assessed. The quantitative results declared nuclear material and the absence of relate to the nuclear material verification activities undeclared nuclear material and activities in the carried out at facilities across the State, as prescribed State. To draw the conclusion about the non-diversion by the Safeguards Criteria, and the degree to of declared nuclear material, the Secretariat uses a which the performance of these activities has met process similar to that described above. To draw the the quantity and timeliness components of the conclusion about the absence of undeclared material “inspection goal”. When all criteria relative to the and activities, it assesses the information about that S-9 nuclear material present have been satisfied and State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities, within all anomalies involving a significant quantity of the context of the State’s declarations. In order to be nuclear material have been resolved, the goal is able to draw a conclusion, the Secretariat must have regarded as attained. However, the non-attainment available all of the information generated by the of either or both of these components does not, Agency’s verification activities in that State. From this in itself, constitute evidence of diversion. In such a base, it determines whether there is any indication of case, the Secretariat reviews the reason(s) for the the presence of undeclared nuclear material and situation and takes corrective action to the extent activities. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, possible, which may include consultations with the conclusion is drawn that there are no undeclared the facility operators and State officials. nuclear materials and activities in the State. to that information; or to seals and other identifying and material. For locations other confirm, for safeguards purposes, tamper-indicating devices. than sites and decommissioned the State's declaration of the Agency guidelines are being facilities and which are declared decommissioned status of a developed, for internal use, to as having no nuclear material, facility or of a location outside of ensure that complementary access will be on a case-by-case a facility where nuclear material access is carried out in an basis and, under most was used. The activities carried efficient, technically effective circumstances, will be preceded out during complementary and non-discriminatory manner. by consultations with the State. access may include visual Guidelines for sites are now in Inspector Designations & observation, environmental use, and guidelines are being Visas. Lifting restrictions on sampling beyond declared prepared for complementary inspector designations and locations, utilization of radiation access to decommissioned granting inspectors long-term detection and measurement facilities and to other locations (i.e., at least one year) multiple- devices, and the application of declared as having nuclear entry visas would facilitate IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 States and organizations After successful field trials in representing groups of States have eleven IAEA Member States, played an indispensable role in environmental sampling is now allowing the Agency to keep pace routinely applied at facilities with technological progress and covered by comprehensive its suitability for safeguards safeguards agreements. In 1996, purposes. (See box, page S-11.) the IAEA brought into full Recent technology advances operation a Clean Laboratory, in environmental sampling and located in Seibersdorf near analysis and in remote Vienna, which is receiving, monitoring are providing the handling, and analyzing samples Agency with more powerful yet as well as distributing samples unobtrusive means of verifying for analysis at laboratories States’ declarations. Both belonging to the expanded measures can be applied under network of certified analytical Environmental sampling and the comprehensive safeguards laboratories. By late 1999, this subsequent highly sensitive laboratory agreements. international network has analysis of samples provide a powerful yet In addition, the Model included laboratories in three unobtrusive means of contributing to Additional Protocol adds to the Member States and within the assurance of the absence of any undeclared impact of environmental European Atomic Energy nuclear activities. (Credit: Hosoya/IAEA) sampling and analysis through Community (Euratom). the provision that samples can Environmental sampling be collected beyond the strategic concentrates currently on the physical access and thus enable points defined in facilities, when collection and analysis of swipe more effective verification and the Agency deems it necessary samples in enrichment plants more efficient use of the to confirm the absence of and installations with hot cells. S-10 Agency’s inspection resources. undeclared nuclear material and This is being done in order to Administrative arrangements activities. Further, several detect the enrichment of provided in the Model Member States are technically uranium above declared levels Additional Protocol support advising the Agency on the and to confirm that hot cell these goals. In addition, these potential benefits and related facilities are not being used for arrangements also ensure that costs of using commercial undeclared activities such as the Agency has access to modern satellite imagery for providing plutonium production or means of communication (i.e., safeguards-relevant information separation. Under safeguards satellite) in a State or, if that can complement other agreements, sampling may be satisfactory means do not exist, information sources available to extended to other types of that the State would consult the Agency relative to State’s nuclear facilities. with the Agency regarding other nuclear and nuclear-related By late 1999, baseline samples ways of meeting the latter’s activities. Over the next two have been collected in 12 communication needs. years, no less than six enrichment facilities in 7 States I Advanced Verification commercial satellites are planned and 77 hot cell complexes in 40 Technology. The Agency has for launch, which among other States and Taiwan, China. always relied on technology and benefits would improve the Remote Monitoring. The real- equipment to complement resolution of optical, infrared or near-real-time transmission of nuclear material verification and radar images. authenticated and encrypted data activities at safeguarded facilities. Environmental Sampling. on the movements of nuclear Those capabilities have seen The collection of environmental material recorded by Agency marked improvements over the samples at or near a nuclear site, approved remote monitoring years, reflecting the efforts of combined with ultrasensitive systems could reduce the technical specialists in many analytical techniques, can reveal frequency of inspector visits to States. Indeed, assistance from the indicators of past and current the facility, increase the capability formal support programmes for activities in locations handling for data review and evaluation, IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 safeguards set up by Member nuclear materials. and facilitate the remote MEMBER STATE SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Agency safeguards implementation is strongly assisted by the funding and expertise made available through the formal safeguards support programmes established by Member States and organizations representing groups of States. As of late 1999, the following States and organizations had formal support programmes: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Euratom, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Other States (Austria, Latvia, and Pakistan) have contributed through research and development agreements and test programmes. During the year, 250 tasks were under way to address measurement methods and techniques; training; system studies; information The IAEA’s Safeguards Analytical Laboratory processing; containment, surveillance and monitoring systems; and provides key services to the Agency’s Department of safeguards evaluation. In 1999, approximately US $22 million was Safeguards, including analysis of nuclear material allocated by these support programmes to finance task activities. samples. detection and rapid response to proliferation pathways (nine has found that its security, a safeguards-significant event. For courses), information evaluation economic and safeguards interests the facility and State, remote (three courses), enhanced design are best served by having an monitoring for safeguards information review (three courses), effective SSAC. In the case of the purposes could be less intrusive and the electronic transmission of European Union the safeguards on facility operations. Following encrypted data (12 courses). system of Euratom fulfils this successful field tests of remote Training modules of the function, and in the case of S-11 monitoring systems at several Agency’s Introductory Course on Argentina and Brazil it is fulfilled types of nuclear facilities in nearly Safeguards for new inspectors have by ABACC (the Brazilian- a dozen Member States, the been modified to reflect these Argentine Agency for Accounting Agency is preparing to strengthening measures. Staff of and Control of Nuclear incorporate remote monitoring the IAEA Department of Materials). into its safeguards applications, Safeguards regularly receive Safeguards strengthening within available budgetary training on safeguards information measures place an even greater resources and on a case-by-case security requirements and are kept emphasis on working closely basis. abreast of safeguards developments with State and regional I More Effective & Efficient Use through seminars and authorities so as to increase of Resources. A number of international conferences. Since verification effectiveness and initiatives have been taken. 1996, training courses for help reduce the costs or the Enhanced Safeguards Training. Member State safeguards extent of these activities. The IAEA inspectors, safeguards personnel have been held in Asia, Agency is exploring with specialists and Member State Europe, USA, and Latin America. Member States how such joint safeguards personnel are being Closer Cooperation with State and shared activities can be more provided with the skills and and Regional Systems. A State widely performed while knowledge to apply the with a comprehensive safeguards preserving the IAEA’s capability strengthening measures. Since the agreement is obliged to establish to draw independent safeguards measures were introduced in the and maintain a State (or regional) conclusions. early 1990s, safeguards staff have system of accounting for and The “new partnership approach” been trained in the following control (SSAC) of all nuclear that the Agency and Euratom areas: environmental sampling (14 materials within its territory, or agreed to in 1992 exemplifies close courses), enhanced observation under its jurisdiction or control. cooperation with an experienced (10 courses), understanding Over the years, nearly every State and well-equipped regional nuclear fuel cycles and their with a large nuclear programme safeguards system in order to IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 achieve a more effective and These activities may involve joint performance of non-destructive efficiency application of inspections using Agency assay and destructive assay safeguards. Similar close procedures to meet IAEA measurements of nuclear material cooperation is being developed safeguards criteria; joint use of using common equipment; joint with ABACC. containment and surveillance training programmes, joint Greater cooperation can take techniques; joint development of research and development work; the form of joint and shared safeguards approaches, sampling and the shared use of State or activities that can be performed plans and measurements regional analytical laboratories, by the IAEA inspectorate and procedures to meet IAEA for example, to support analysis of State or regional authorities. technical criteria; joint environmental sampling.

THE EVOLVING PICTURE: by a comprehensive safeguards agreement with an Additional INTEGRATED SAFEGUARDS Protocol will allow the IAEA to draw safeguards conclusions In 1998, the Agency’s Implementation (SAGSI) and and provide credible assurance Department of Safeguards outside technical experts. of the non-diversion of embarked upon a programme The concept being developed declared nuclear material and for the development and involves a generic State-level of the absence of undeclared implementation of “integrated approach, which would be nuclear material and activities safeguards”. The term refers to adapted for application in a in that State. the optimum combination of State, taking into account that With the further integration all safeguards measures available State’s nuclear fuel cycle and its of safeguards, the Agency’s to the Agency, including those nuclear-related activities. The ability to provide such S-12 from the Additional Protocol, process of defining the assurance may lead to the in order to achieve maximum optimum combination of relaxation of certain traditional effectiveness and efficiency safeguards measures would be nuclear material verification within the available resources. done on a non-discriminatory measures on less sensitive A consultants’ meeting and basis for all States that have nuclear material (for example, two technical expert meetings comprehensive safeguards natural and low-enriched held on this subject have agreements with Additional uranium and irradiated fuel) facilitated the work of a group Protocols in force. and thus to a reduction in the of safeguards specialists within When fully implemented in costs associated with such the IAEA Secretariat who are a State, the measures provided verification activities. developing the concept, plan and approach for integrated safeguards. The work is proceeding with the assistance of a number of Member State’s Support Programmes for Safeguards and with the technical advice of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards

SAGSI, an international group of experts, provides technical advice to the IAEA Director General on matters related to safeguards. The group’s members recently marked SAGSI’s 50th IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 series of meetings. FURTHER SUPPORTING THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME Beyond the internal strengthening the Russian Federation, the for safeguards would also be of safeguards, the Agency’s United States and the Agency applicable under the new system. experience has extended to began work to establish a Work is progressing to develop verifying the elimination of South prototype verification system for the verification arrangements for Africa’s former nuclear weapons weapon-origin and other fissile specific facilities identified by programme, verifying and serving material declared to be excess to the Russian Federation and the as a mechanism for implementing defense purposes. This action is United States where the new the nuclear component of UN linked to Article VI of the NPT agreements would apply. In the Security Council resolutions to that addresses the cessation of the United States, discussions destroy, remove or render nuclear arms race and the between US and IAEA experts harmless Iraq’s nuclear weapon reduction of nuclear weapons and are well advanced on specific programme, and verifying other nuclear explosive devices. methods to be applied. In the inventories of plutonium and Future IAEA verification under Russian Federation, preparatory highly enriched uranium declared this initiative should promote arrangements have been by the United States as no longer international confidence that the completed and discussions are required for its defense purposes. material submitted by either of taking place between Russian These experiences have instilled the two States to such verification and IAEA experts on verification confidence that IAEA verification remains irrevocably removed from methods. expertise could further support nuclear weapon programmes. Further, discussions are the non-proliferation regime, As decades will be required to continuing aimed at the adoption particularly the recent initiatives use or dispose of the excess of the basic technical measures for international verification of materials, the prototype associated with the verification of nuclear arms reductions. verification system is being fissile material covered by the S-13 At present, seven States (of designed to allow the States to initiative and the approval of an which five are party to the NPT) submit fissile materials with appropriate model verification are known to possess nuclear classified characteristics (including agreement by the IAEA Board weapons and an eighth State is nuclear weapon components from of Governors. Once such a presumed to possess such dismantled warheads) in order to verification scheme is established, weapons. As long as those accelerate the implementation of it is hoped that other States weapons exist, the possibility of verification. In such cases, the possessing nuclear weapons their use remains, whether verification system must ensure would enter into similar intentional or inadvertent. that IAEA inspectors would not agreements. In the year 2000, the International security today is gain access to information relating US Secretary of Energy, the largely built upon the relationships to the design or manufacture of Russian Minister of Atomic of these States, and their nuclear such weapons. Energy and the IAEA Director arsenals are fundamental to those The verification arrangements General are scheduled to meet in relationships. Any change must would be in conformity with the order to plan the implementation be managed with extreme care to obligations of the two States of this verification system. ensure that evolutionary under Article 1 of the NPT. The Banning the Production of arrangements foster peace and verification requirements and Fissile Material for Use in security, and that they encourage procedures would necessarily differ Nuclear Weapons or Other further steps towards the ultimate from those used for Agency Nuclear Explosive Devices. The elimination of existing arsenals. safeguards, which are intended for second initiative for controlling Currently, two means are seen non-proliferation purposes and are the proliferation of nuclear through which the IAEA may applied in non-nuclear-weapon weapons involves the negotiation contribute to such undertakings. States under the provisions of a treaty to ban the production Verifying Weapon-Origin and of Article III of the NPT. of fissile material for use Other Excess Fissile Material. Nevertheless, many of the in nuclear weapons or other In an initiative taken in 1996, methods and techniques applied nuclear explosive devices. Such IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 a treaty would require activities in those States which do the IAEA to provide assistance, establishment of appropriate not already have comprehensive if requested by the Conference, verification arrangements in those safeguards agreements with and the IAEA Director General States party to it. Its provisions the IAEA. has conveyed to the President remain to be defined. However, it The responsibility for of the Conference the readiness could, inter alia, bring under negotiating this treaty lies with the of the Agency to respond to verification all production facilities Conference on Disarmament, any such request. as well as facilities for storing, based in Geneva. In 1998, the The IAEA Secretariat continues processing, using and disposing of Conference established an “Ad to participate in seminars and to fissile materials produced after the Hoc Committee” to pursue this respond to requests from States treaty entered into force. This goal. The United Nations to exchange views on the could mean additional verification General Assembly has requested verification of such a treaty.

SUSTAINING THE MOMENTUM No one can predict what lies ahead activities present in States that in the 21st century. Since the early have comprehensive safeguards 1960s, international safeguards agreements with Additional have evolved -- and continue to Protocols in force with the evolve -- stimulated by technical Agency. progress and developments in This is the promise underlying international security. The the steps taken for the newly important role of IAEA safeguards strengthened safeguards system is reflected, for example, in the that can address nuclear 1995 decision to make the Treaty proliferation under any guise. -14 on the Non-Proliferation of Ultimately, this promise can only Nuclear Weapons -- and be fulfilled where States comply comprehensive IAEA safeguards -- engender complacency. If we are with their obligations under a permanent feature of the to sustain the momentum that safeguards agreements and international landscape. has been built up for nuclear Additional Protocols and where The IAEA safeguards system, non-proliferation and nuclear the international community underpinning the international arms control, greater solidarity demonstrates that it has the will non-proliferation regime, has and continuing vigilance are to take meaningful action against allowed the civil nuclear industry needed to halt the spread of a State that does not comply to bring many of the benefits of weapons of mass destruction. with its non-proliferation nuclear science and technology Above all, progress is needed commitment. to mankind. to extend the legal provisions of In April 2000, the Review Among other achievements, the Model Additional Protocol Conference of the NPT will today nuclear energy accounts for to include all States. Only then be carried out for the first 16% of the world’s total electricity can the international time under the provisions consumption. With the public community reap the full agreed upon in 1995 when perception of the verification benefits of the strengthened the Treaty was extended on effectiveness of international safeguards system -- a system an indefinite basis. The world safeguards, nuclear power will be capable of providing credible has seen many changes over able to continue meeting these assurance that declared nuclear the past five years, and the energy demands and, in so doing, material has not been diverted, 6th NPT Review Conference help States to honor their that specified facilities and other will engage the international commitments made in Kyoto in safeguarded items are not being community in examining 1997 to reduce future emissions misused for any military how the Agency safeguards of greenhouse gases. purposes or purposes unknown system can continue to While these accomplishments and that there are no support the goal of nuclear non- IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 are noteworthy, they should not undeclared nuclear material and proliferation. ❐ HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE EVOLUTION OF SAFEGUARDS

THE CALL FOR requiring that safeguards be applied to civilian INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS nuclear technology transfers. As international commerce in nuclear commodities expanded, The evolution of the Agency safeguards system safeguards became increasingly the customary and, began in the late 1950s and continues as the 21st after the 1960s, the obligatory condition for nuclear century opens. The initial call for international trade. safeguards can be traced to fear about the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons technology. THE EARLY SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM This led the United States, the United Kingdom While States welcomed the newly created Agency, and Canada to declare, in 1945, that safeguards there was some initial resistance to the and inspections would be a pre-condition for access implementation of IAEA safeguards. The early to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In 1946, the safeguards system (set forth in IAEA document United States launched the first broad scheme to INFCIRC/26) covered only the research and prevent nuclear weapons by proposing to assign experimental reactors of that time. The IAEA Board responsibility for promoting nuclear energy to the of Governors approved the system only after divisive United Nations. The scheme, known as the Baruch debate and with severe constraints on Agency Plan from the name of the US delegate who safeguards implementation. From 1965-67, the presented it to the United Nations, was considered Agency was able to reach agreement for the first set too visionary and was abandoned soon thereafter. of safeguards measures for reactors of all sizes and, In 1953, US President Eisenhower put forward to subsequently, for reprocessing plants and for fuel the United Nations General Assembly less radical fabrication plants. These safeguards measures are proposals for achieving nuclear disarmament and set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This experience in safeguards implementation S-15 Collectively named “Atoms for Peace”, the proposals proved to be invaluable, and the international were the basis for the IAEA Statute of 1957. community became increasingly determined to take Created in 1957 as an autonomous more comprehensive initiatives for nuclear non- intergovernmental organization in the United proliferation. Nations family, the IAEA was assigned dual responsibilities. The twin role called for THE TREATY ON THE promoting the safe and peaceful use of nuclear NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR energy and for providing assurances that nuclear WEAPONS (NPT) & IAEA SAFEGUARDS energy is not being misused for non-peaceful purposes. The IAEA was mandated to “establish Until the late 1960s, it had been at the discretion of and administer safeguards designed to ensure that any State to accept or apply Agency safeguards on special fissionable and other materials, services, any nuclear transaction or activity, or to proceed equipment, facilities and information made without safeguards. In 1967, the nations of Latin available by the Agency or at its request, or under its America and the Caribbean agreed on the first treaty supervision or control, are not used in such a way as outlawing nuclear weapons in a region (the Treaty to further any military purpose, and to apply for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any America, or the “Tlatelolco Treaty”, reproduced in bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the IAEA document GOV/INF/179). The approval of request of a State, to any of that State’s activities the Tlatelolco Treaty required its parties to not only in the field of atomic energy.” abjure nuclear weapons but also accept Agency The early applications of safeguards resulted safeguards on all their nuclear activities. from the concern that, without strict monitoring, In 1968, the arm of the United Nations that international nuclear trade could lead to nuclear negotiates treaties on arms control and disarmament proliferation. This concern was implicit in a (then known as the eighteen-nation Disarmament number of agreements of the early 1950s Committee and today as the sixty-nation IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 Conference on Disarmament) agreed on the list”would eventually serve as a basis for the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of information on nuclear exports that major Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That year, the United exporting States agreed, in 1993, to report Nations General Assembly commended the voluntarily to the Agency and for the reports Treaty to the United Nations Member States, and required from States that accept the Model in 1970 the NPT entered into force. Additional Protocol. The NPT is the only global nuclear non- In addition, in 1977 the Nuclear proliferation treaty that, inter alia, obliges each Suppliers'’Group (NSG) developed guidelines non-nuclear-weapon State party to renounce that incorporate the “trigger list” but go further to nuclear weapons and conclude agreements with require that safeguards be imposed on exported the Agency for the application of safeguards to all nuclear technology and that its members practice source material and special fissionable material restraint in exporting sensitive technologies (e.g., in that State’s peaceful nuclear activities, within six fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment). months of its adherence to the Treaty. The Treaty Subsequently, the NSG added the requirement also obliges the five nuclear-weapon States that comprehensive safeguards be applied as a recognized by the NPT (China, France, the condition for the supply of any “trigger list” item Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and to a non-nuclear-weapon State. the United States) to undertake negotiations in Following the disclosure in 1991 of the role good faith towards nuclear disarmament. played by “dual-use” items in the evolution of Subsequently, the IAEA Board of Governors’ Iraq’s nuclear weapon programme, the NSG Safeguards Committee specified in detail what guidelines were amplified to include a separate safeguards should be applied pursuant to the list of more than 60 dual-use items. (Dual-use Agency’s comprehensive safeguards agreements items are items that can be used for either a with the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the nuclear purpose or for another purpose or for a NPT. This document, published as variety of non-nuclear purposes.) Agreement was INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) and approved by the reached among NSG members on means to Board in 1971, has served as the basis for all ensure that the export of such items would be S-16 comprehensive safeguards agreements that States subject to effective controls and licensing. As of have concluded with the Agency. late 1999, there were 35 Member States of the The document has also provided the technical NSG, representing practically all of the major elements of the voluntary offer safeguards nuclear exporters. agreements which the Agency has concluded, in Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. time, with each of the five nuclear-weapon States Physical protection of nuclear material is also party to the NPT. Under such agreements, each regarded as a fundamental element of the non- State has voluntarily offered all or certain civilian proliferation regime. While international nuclear material and/or facilities from which the safeguards are designed to detect and deter certain Agency may select for the application of actions by States, “physical protection” comprises safeguards. those measures that the States themselves apply to prevent or deter illegal actions taken against SUPPORTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME particularly when such materials are transported Controlling Nuclear Exports. A supportive across national frontiers. element of the non-proliferation regime is the The Convention on the Physical Protection of restraint that many States apply to their exports, Nuclear Material, which opened for signature by to non-nuclear-weapon States, of nuclear States in 1980, establishes international standards commodities which could be used to produce for the protection of nuclear material in nuclear weapons. For example, in the early 1970s international transit. With increased awareness the international committee chaired by Claude of the need to protect nuclear material from Zangger of Switzerland developed guidelines that unauthorized acts, the international community list those nuclear items whose export would is working to strengthen the physical protection trigger the application of Agency safeguards. The regime. Discussions are under way regarding the “Zangger Committee”, as it became known, is possible broadening of the scope of the not a committee of the Agency, but its “trigger Convention. Upon request, the Agency has IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 provided assistance to States to enhance their efforts to prevent nuclear material and other radioactive sources from being used illegally and to detect and respond to trafficking cases, should they occur. These activities have included international assessments of State’s physical protection systems and training for staff involved in physical protection at nuclear facilities and at the State level.

CHALLENGES TO NPT SAFEGUARDS The closing decade of the 20th century brought a number of challenges for international safeguards. The Clandestine Nuclear Programme in Iraq. In 1991, soon after the end of the Gulf War, IAEA inspectors discovered that Iraq had carried out an extensive clandestine programme for producing enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons. The Government of Iraq had also progressed in secretly designing and constructing prototypes of such weapons. In doing so, Iraq violated its NPT commitment and safeguards obligations to place all of its nuclear material under safeguards. Under responsibilities entrusted to the IAEA in 1991 by the Since then, the Agency’s safeguards obligations UN Security Council , the Agency carried out nuclear in Iraq have been subsumed in the mandate inspections in Iraq to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq’s assigned to it by resolutions of the United Nations ability to produce nuclear weapons. (Credit: Mouchkin/IAEA) Security Council, in particular Resolution 687. Under that Resolution, the IAEA Director General plan and therefore to provide assurance about Iraq’s S-17 was asked to remove, destroy or render harmless compliance with its obligations under the Security Iraq’s ability to produce nuclear weapons. This work Council resolutions. Nevertheless, the Agency has been carried out by a specially constituted continues to be ready to resume its activities in Iraq. Action Team reporting directly to the IAEA The DPRK and the Issue of “Completeness”. Director General. The United Nations Special One year after the discovery of Iraq’s undeclared Commission (UNSCOM) was also created to nuclear programme, the safeguards system was again address biological and chemical weapons and long- challenged when IAEA inspectors sought to verify range missiles. the DPRK’s initial report on its nuclear material By mid-1998, the Agency had pieced together a subject to safeguards. The DPRK had acceded to coherent picture of Iraq’s nuclear weapons the NPT in 1985, but it was seven years later that programme; having removed, destroyed or rendered the Government finally concluded a comprehensive harmless the elements of that programme, it was safeguards agreement with the Agency and prepared to shift emphasis to the ongoing but submitted the required initial report. limited monitoring and verification plan for When IAEA inspectors sought to verify the providing assurance that the relevant capabilities presence of the nuclear material listed in the initial were not re-established. report and the completeness of the information On 31 October 1998, Iraq ceased all with respect to all of the material subject cooperation with UNSCOM. Although the to safeguards, they identified inconsistencies Government of Iraq placed no additional between the Government’s declaration and their restrictions on the Agency’s work, the IAEA own findings on the characteristics and amount of Director General decided, on 16 December 1998, plutonium reprocessed at a large radiochemical to withdraw Agency personnel from Iraq out of laboratory in the DPRK. These inconsistencies concern for the security and safety of the suggested that the Government may not have personnel. Under these circumstances, the Agency provided complete information about the quantity has not been in a position to resume the full of plutonium it actually possessed. In addition, implementation of its verification and monitoring information made available to and assessed by the IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 Agency indicated that two undeclared facilities had been made subject to safeguards at the time of the type normally used for storing nuclear the agreement entered into force and that the waste were located near the officially notified material was declared as such in the initial report. In nuclear facilities. addition to such verification activities, the Agency The DPRK rejected the Agency’s request for was requested by the South African Government physical access to these two facilities, whereupon to assess the termination of its former nuclear the IAEA Director General, with the backing of weapons programme. the Board of Governors, called upon the DPRK to These activities were greatly facilitated by the full accept a “special inspection” which the Agency was cooperation and openness of the South African authorized to conduct under the safeguards authorities with respect to access to information in agreement. Again the Government refused, and the historical operating records and physical access to Board concluded that the DPRK was in violation of locations, including defunct facilities. Based on its its safeguards agreement and reported the violation extensive activities in South Africa to verify the to the United Nations Security Council. Government’s initial report and to assess the status Subsequent bilateral negotiations between the of the former nuclear weapons programme, in 1995 United States and the DPRK resulted, in 1994, in the Agency concluded that the information an “Agreed Framework” under which the DPRK provided on the nuclear material was complete and would “freeze” further development and operation that the nuclear weapons programme was of its key nuclear facilities.* terminated and dismantled. These activities At the request of the Security Council, the represented the first international undertakings to Agency has been monitoring this “freeze”. Despite ascertain that all the fissile material produced by a numerous rounds of technical discussions, as of late State that had made nuclear weapons had been 1999, the Agency is still not able to verify the satisfactorily accounted for. As requested by the correctness and the completeness of the South African Government, the Agency continues Government’s initial report and to conclude that to monitor those facilities associated with the former there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the nuclear weapons programme. DPRK. South Africa: Nuclear Transparency Exemplified. PAVING THE WAY FOR A S-18 The verification of the completeness of an initial STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM report is particularly challenging in the case of a Iraq’s violations of its comprehensive safeguards State that concludes a comprehensive safeguards agreement vividly demonstrated that, although agreement after it has already produced (or is the safeguards system was effective with regard to suspected as having produced) significant quantities declared nuclear material, it was not sufficiently of nuclear weapon-usable material. Such a situation equipped to detect the presence of undeclared arose in 1991, when South Africa acceded to the nuclear material and activities. To do so, the NPT, concluded its comprehensive safeguards Agency would need substantially stronger agreement with the Agency and submitted an initial safeguards measures and the expanded legal report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. authority to apply these measures beyond that Four days after South Africa concluded its provided under comprehensive safeguards safeguards agreement, the IAEA General Conference agreements. Starting in 1990, the Agency and formally requested the IAEA Director General to its Members States took actions that paved the verify the completeness of the Government’s initial way for the strengthened safeguard system. report on its nuclear material and facilities subject to (See page S-20.) safeguards. South Africa’s extensive nuclear fuel For example, following language agreed upon by cycle made the verification task complex, requiring members of Committee II of the 4th NPT Review considerable inspection resources. Review Conference, the Agency studied the The verification task was further complicated procedures for special inspections in States with when, in 1993, the President of South Africa openly comprehensive safeguards agreements, where disclosed that, between 1979 and 1989, South uncertainty existed about whether a State had Africa had made and subsequently dismantled a declared all of its nuclear material subject to Agency “limited nuclear deterrent capability” involving a safeguards. The outcome of this examination was number of nuclear weapons. Agency assurances reported to the Board, which in 1992 endorsed a would have to be given that all of the substantial more vigorous use of the Agency’s right under quantity of highly enriched uranium formerly comprehensive safeguards agreements to carry out associated with the nuclear weapons programme a special inspection to any location within the IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 territory of a State or under its control, if the Agency judges that the State has not provided all the required information about its nuclear material or, more generally, when the Agency requires more information to fulfil its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement. Further, in 1992, the Board affirmed that the scope of a comprehensive safeguards agreement is not limited to the nuclear material declared by a State but includes all of the State’s nuclear material that should have been declared. The Board also reaffirmed the Agency’s right of access to the United Nations Security Council, which is the sole international authority to enforce safeguards agreements. The cases of Iraq and the DPRK each had elicited responses from the Security Council. The Board also stipulated that States supply, in a more timely manner, safeguards relevant design information for new facilities and for changes or modifications to existing facilities, and it confirmed the Agency’s right to verify the validity of the design information over the lifecycle of a facility. The Board also endorsed the reporting scheme by which major At the 1999 IAEA General Conference, States reaffirmed nuclear suppliers would voluntarily provide the Agency their support for the development of an integrated with information (not required under comprehensive safeguards system. (Credit: D. Calma/IAEA) safeguards agreements) about their exports and imports of nuclear material, specialized nuclear equipment and Negotiation & Approval of the Model Additional S-19 non-nuclear material of nuclear interest. Protocol. The Board also set itself the task of The strengthening process received further impetus securing the legal basis for applying other in 1993 when, at the request of the IAEA Director strengthening measures aimed at providing the General, SAGSI (the group of international experts Agency with substantially more information than providing advice on safeguards implementation) made hitherto available about the nuclear programmes of a series of recommendations, particularly for providing States, and with the right of IAEA inspectors to assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear have access to relevant locations in a State in order to confirm the exclusively peaceful nature of that activities in States having comprehensive safeguards State’s nuclear programme. agreements. As requested by the Board, the IAEA In June 1996, the Agency, the Board and its Secretariat systematically studied the technical, legal “Committee 24” (with representatives from some 70 and financial implications of these recommendations, Member States and two regional inspectorates) drew up launching a development programme that became the model text of a protocol additional to safeguards known as “Programme 93+2”. A number of Member agreements. The final product, known as the Model States provided assistance, for example, by conducting Additional Protocol, was approved by the Board on field tests of environmental sampling and other 15 May 1997; it was published as IAEA document proposed strengthening measures as they were INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). To promote widespread developed by the Secretariat. adherence, the Board requested the IAEA Director In June 1995, the Board approved the Secretariat’s General to negotiate and conclude Additional Protocols proposals for strengthening the effectiveness and or other legally binding agreements with all States that improving the efficiency of safeguards. The Board are prepared to accept measures provided for in the agreed to the IAEA Director General’s plan to Model Additional Protocol. Thereafter, the Agency began preparations for the proceed with the implementation of those measures implementation of the strengthening measures to deemed to be within the legal authority provided by be applied under the legal authority conferred by comprehensive safeguards agreements. Work in this Additional Protocols concluded on the basis of the direction began in early 1996. Model Additional Protocol. ❐ IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 PAVING THE WAY FOR THE STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1990 Director General, makes recommendations for strengthening safeguards, particularly for providing IThe 4th NPT Review Conference (Committee II) assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear agreed to language welcoming an IAEA study of activities in States. procedures for special inspections in States with I The IAEA Board requests the IAEA Secretariat to comprehensive safeguards agreements where study the technical, legal and financial implications uncertainty existed about whether a State had of SAGSI recommendations and to make proposals for declared all nuclear material subject to Agency more effective and efficient safeguards. safeguards. Subsequently, the IAEA Secretariat I The IAEA Secretariat begins work on developing undertakes such an examination and reports to the possible strengthening measures, assisted by a IAEA Board of Governors on the outcome. number of Member States. 1991 1995 I The IAEA General Conference confirms the I The 5th NPT Review and Extension Conference Agency’s obligation to provide assurances regarding reiterates its support for a strengthened safeguards the completeness of South Africa’s initial report on its system as an fundamental element of the nuclear material and facilities subject to safeguards international nuclear non-proliferation regime. under its IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement. I The IAEA Board, and then the General Conference, 1992 approve the IAEA Secretariat’s proposals for a more effective and efficient safeguards system. The Board I The IAEA Board affirms the scope of agrees to the Director General’s plan to proceed with comprehensive safeguards agreements is not limited implementation of strengthening measures deemed to to the nuclear material declared by a State but be within the legal authority provided by includes all nuclear material subject to safeguards. I comprehensive safeguards agreements. S-20 The IAEA Board confirms the Agency’s right under comprehensive safeguards agreements to 1996 carry out a special inspection to any location within I The IAEA starts implementing the strengthening the territory of a State or under its control, when it measures provided under comprehensive safeguards judges that the State concerned is not providing all agreements. the required information about its nuclear material I The IAEA Board’s “Committee 24” begins or, more generally, when the IAEA needs more developing the legal instrument for implementing the information to fulfil its responsibilities under the strengthening measures that are not provided for under safeguards agreement. safeguards agreements. I The IAEA Board reaffirms the Agency’s right of access to the UN Security Council, which is the sole 1997 international authority to enforce safeguards I The IAEA Board, in May, approves the text of the agreements. Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards I The IAEA Board approves measures related to State’s Agreements, subsequently published as early provision of design information for facilities INFCIRC/540 (Corrected); it requests the Director handling safeguarded material and confirms the General to negotiate and conclude Additional Agency’s right to verify the design information over Protocols or other legally binding agreements with the facility lifecycle, including decommissioning. all States that are prepared to accept measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol. 1993 I The IAEA Secretariat begins implementing the I The IAEA Board endorses the scheme for strengthening measures provided under the Model voluntary reporting by States on their imports and Additional Protocol. exports of nuclear material and exports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material DECEMBER 1999 I The Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards I The IAEA Board has approved 46 Additional Implementation (SAGSI), as earlier requested by IAEA Protocols; eight of these have entered into force. IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 21

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