U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY National Nuclear Security Administration 2
The purpose of this booklet is to provide background information on how and why International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards play a central role in international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
IAEA safeguards provide assurances to the international community that nuclear material and facilities are not being used for the illicit manufacture of nuclear weapons. Under Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), each non-nuclear weapon State (NNWS)1 Party is required to conclude with the IAEA a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA). The State’s primary obligation under the CSA is “to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities… for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Contents The NPT has near-universal global adherence; 190 countries have joined the Treaty.2 What are International Safeguards?...... 1 The application of IAEA safeguards promotes international confidence that States Why are Safeguards Necessary?...... 1 are using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, deters and provides Historical Overview...... 2 early warning of incipient nuclear weapon programs, and establishes a basis for States to make judgments regarding compliance with Article III of the NPT. Under Structure of the IAEA...... 4 the IAEA’s Statute, the IAEA Board of Governors (see page 5) is authorized to Legal Context...... 6 report noncompliance with a safeguards agreement—a judgment that alerts the international community to possible undeclared nuclear weapons programs—to the Strengthening Safeguards: United Nations (UN) Security Council. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations charter, The Model Additional Protocol...... 6 the UN Security Council has the authority to impose punitive economic and political Noncompliance...... 7 sanctions on States that are violating their safeguards agreements with the IAEA as
Implementation: Tools, part of the Council’s responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Methods, and Sources...... 8 1 The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, defines nuclear-weapon States as those that “manufactured and Challenges...... 10 exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967”: The United States (1945); the Soviet Union, now Russia (1949); the United Kingdom (1952); France (1960); and China (1964). The State-Level Concept...... 10 All other parties to the NPT are non-nuclear weapon States. 2 India, Israel, and Pakistan have never joined the NPT. North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, and Office of International Nuclear Safeguards announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative...... 12 1
What are International Safeguards? International safeguards are the set of technical measures applied by the IAEA to independently and objectively verify that a State’s nuclear material is accounted for and not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, safeguards also provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, in accordance with the terms of the State’s bilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The objective of IAEA safeguards is to deter the spread of nuclear These technical measures include, for example, on-site inspections, weapons by early detection of nuclear material accountancy, physical measurements, facility design misuse of nuclear material or information verification, containment using tamper-indicating tags and seals, technology, thereby providing surveillance, and environmental sampling. credible assurances that States are honoring their legal obligations.
Basics of IAEA Safeguards. Retrieved from https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/ Why are basics-of-iaea-safeguards Safeguards Necessary? The peaceful uses of nuclear technology include such applications as electricity generation, seawater desalination, the mapping of underground aquifers to improve groundwater management and investigate contamination events, the diagnosis of and treatment for cancer, and the control and eradication of disease-bearing insects. However, the nuclear materials employed for some of these applications—and the facilities used to produce and process those materials—also can be used for the production of nuclear weapons.
With its access to nuclear expertise, facilities, and information, the IAEA is uniquely positioned to reassure the international community that an NNWS is not diverting nuclear material from peaceful purposes to a nuclear weapon program. A robust IAEA capability to verify peaceful activities and to detect and investigate indications of clandestine programs can reduce States’ incentives to develop nuclear weapons or latent nuclear weapon capabilities. By the same token, confidence in the IAEA safeguards system can help to facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, thereby helping to address global energy, environment, and human health challenges. 2
Historical Overview
In his “Atoms for Peace” speech of December 1953, U.S. President Seeking a binding mechanism to limit the spread of nuclear Eisenhower proposed to the United Nations General Assembly “an weapons without precluding access to peaceful uses of nuclear acceptable solution” that would place all nuclear materials capable energy, a number of countries negotiated the text of the NPT in of sustaining a chain reaction under the control of an international the late 1960s. The NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and atomic energy agency. This agency would be responsible for entered into force in 1970. Balanced on three mutually reinforcing holding the materials in “special safe conditions,” making them pillars designed to limit weapons proliferation, encourage nuclear “immune to surprise seizure.” The more important responsibility, disarmament, and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the President Eisenhower emphasized, would be to “allocate [these NPT has become a cornerstone of international peace and security. materials] to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind.” Stemming from these lofty objectives, the IAEA subsequently was established in 1957 with the dual objectives of facilitating access by all States to the benefits of peaceful uses of atomic energy while also ensuring, through a system of safeguards, that such assistance would not be misused for military purposes.
INFCIRC/26/Add.1 expanded The IAEA publishes coverage to all reactors model for CSAs and for small quantities 1964 protocols; India detonates a nuclear President INFCIRC/66/Rev.1 explosive device, Eisenhower’s Atoms IAEA expanded coverage to NPT enters said to be for for Peace Speech created reprocessing plants into force peaceful purposes 1953 1957 1965-1966 1970 1974
1965 1968 INFCIRC/66 NPT opened established a set for signature; 1961 of procedures INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 1971 The IAEA Board of Governors that are expanded safeguards With INCIRC/153 (Corr.), approves the Agency’s safeguards incorporated coverage to nuclear the IAEA approves “The system, which initially describes into item-specific material in conversion Structure and Content of how safeguards will be applied safeguards and fuel fabrication Agreements Between the only at research reactors plants Agency and States Required (INFCIRC/26) in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” 3
The IAEA has 164 Member States and more than 180 countries have entered into safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
NPT Article III Serves as the primary legal basis for the application of international NPT Article IV safeguards in NNWSs party to the Recognizes the “inalienable right” NPT. Under Article III, NNWSs of States “to develop research, NPT Article VI agree to accept safeguards, as set production and use of nuclear Requires States to “pursue negotiations in forth in an agreement with the energy for peaceful purposes” and good faith on effective measures relating to IAEA, on all nuclear material in encourages the “fullest possible cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early all peaceful uses for the purpose exchange of equipment, materials, date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a of verification of the fulfillment of and scientific and technological treaty on general and complete disarmament their NPT obligations “to prevent information.” under strict and effective international diversion of nuclear energy from c ont ro l .” peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
Iran’s undeclared enrichment plant at The IAEA Board finds Syria The IAEA Board Natanz is revealed to public, setting in non-compliance with its Iraq found to have nuclear reaffirms the stage for the IAEA to investigate President Bush safeguards agreement and weapons program; comprehensive and reveal extensive undeclared announces reports matter to the UN the IAEA reports Iraq’s safeguards system activities and safeguards violations the A.Q. Khan Security Council; the IAEA non-compliance to the should be designed 2002 network sold Director General provides UN Security Council; to verify both centrifuge detailed report to the South Africa accedes to correctness and Pakistan and India technology to Board on Possible Military NPT after dismantling its completeness of detonate nuclear Iran, Libya, and Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear weapons program declarations explosive devices the DPRK nuclear program 1991 1995 1998 2004 2011
1993 1997 2003 2006 The IAEA Board concludes the The IAEA Board DPRK withdraws from NPT The IAEA reports Iran DPRK is in non-compliance approves Model and the IAEA Board reports case to the UN Security with its safeguards agreement Additional Protocol, matter to the UN Security Council; DPRK detonates and reports matter to the UN under which States Council; Libya agrees to a nuclear explosive Security Council; the IAEA voluntarily bring into disclose and permit verified device and subsequently initiates a two-year program force an obligation elimination of a secret announced a 2nd and 3rd (“Programme 93+2”) to develop to provide the nuclear program test in 2009 and 2013 measures to strengthen IAEA with more safeguards information and more access 4
Structure of the IAEA
As established in the IAEA’s Statute, the Agency functions through the operation of its administrative/operational arm (the Secretariat) as well as two policymaking bodies (the Board of Governors and the General Conference)
The IAEA Department The Department of Safeguards is the IAEA’s of Safeguards largest department, with about 850 staff.
Division of Concepts and Planning Division of Technical Support (SGTS) Operations Divisions (SGCP) SGTS provides scientific and technical Three Operations Divisions Among its many responsibilities, SGCP support to the Operations Divisions for are responsible for safeguards “develops concepts, approaches, and the implementation of safeguards. Its implementation in different geographical methods for safeguarding nuclear responsibilities include “the design, areas: Operations A in Australia and East material, facilities, and activities; development, testing, calibration, Asia; Operations B in the Middle East, prepares safeguards policy and installation, and maintenance of South Asia, Africa, some non-EU European guidance documentation; conducts safeguards equipment; performance and States, and the Americas; and Operations strategic planning and coordination and contamination monitoring of equipment; C in Europe, the Russian Federation, and management of Member State Support and inspection logistics.” Central Asia. Programmes and related extra-budgetary funds.” 5
IAEA Secretariat Board of Governors General Conference The IAEA Secretariat consists The Board of Governors is The General Conference (GC) is of a professional staff of about composed of representatives of composed of representatives of all 2,550, including approximately 35 IAEA Member States. The 164 IAEA Member States. The GC 220 inspectors. Headquartered in Board of Governors consists of 13 meets annually in Vienna, Austria, Vienna, Austria, the Secretariat Member States that are deemed to to consider issues brought before implements the Agency’s be the most advanced in nuclear it by the Board of Governors, the mission through five operational technology. The remaining 22 DG, and Member States. These departments: Safeguards; Safety Member States are elected by the issues include approving the and Security; Nuclear Applications; General Conference (GC) and Agency’s program and budget, Nuclear Energy; and Technical represent eight geographical regions considering recommendations Cooperation. It is headed by a to ensure that there is equitable by the Board of Governors on Director General (DG), who is representation on the Board. The membership applications and elected by the Board of Governors Board usually meets five times election of members to the Board and serves a four-year term. each year to decide or deliberate on of Governors, and voting on a wide range of issues, including amendments to the Statute. With the IAEA budget, applications for regard to safeguards, the GC technical cooperation projects, may adopt resolutions requesting applications for membership, reports from the Secretariat on implementation of and compliance the status of various safeguards with safeguards agreements, and issues. For example, one recurring recommendations made to it by the GC resolution requires the DG to General Conference. The Board of report annually on the status of Governors also is responsible for “strengthening the effectiveness electing the IAEA’s DG, although and improving the efficiency of the the appointment is subject to safeguards system and application the approval of the General of the Model Additional Protocol.” Conference. In addition to addressing such broad issues, the GC has requested the DG to report on the status of the implementation of safeguards agreements in particular countries, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Office of the Deputy Director General.The Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards supervises the Department and oversees the implementation of IAEA safeguards.
Division of Information Management Office of Analytical Services (SGAS) Office of Information and (SGIM) Communication Systems (SGIS) SGAS “analyzes nuclear material and SGIM is responsible for “data processing, environmental swipe samples; provides SGIS has responsibility for the production secure information distribution, associated sampling and quality control and maintenance of information and information analysis, and knowledge materials; coordinates sample shipment communication technology (ICT) systems generation,” for the purpose of planning logistics; and coordinates work of the and for the management of all ICT safeguards activities and drawing Network of Analytical Laboratories infrastructure and services to support safeguards conclusions. (NWAL).” The office also includes the safeguards. In partnership with other Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) at organizational units, SGIS is responsible Seibersdorf. for planning and implementing an ICT strategy, as well as enforcing ICT standards. 6 Legal Context Safeguards agreements reflect the rights and legally binding obligations of both the State and the IAEA with regard to the implementation of safeguards.
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) The objective of safeguards, as described in CSAs, is “the timely detection of diversion of significant Strengthening quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes Safeguards: unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.” Under a CSA, the State is The Model Additional Protocol required to provide the IAEA with information on all imports, exports, inventories, and flows of nuclear Between 1991 and 1993, the IAEA was confronted with unique challenges material and on the design of nuclear facilities, and the in Iraq and the DPRK. Following the 1991 Gulf War, the UN Security IAEA is charged with not only verifying that nuclear Council empowered the IAEA to conduct intrusive inspections, including material declarations made by the State are correct (i.e., short-notice access to suspect undeclared locations, that resulted in the confirming that they accurately describe the types, revelation of an extensive undeclared nuclear weapon program in Iraq. In quantities, and locations of nuclear material in a State’s 1992, discrepancies between the initial nuclear material declarations and the declared nuclear inventory), but also that they are IAEA’s inspection findings led to a conclusion that the DPRK was concealing complete (i.e., determining that all nuclear material an unknown quantity of undeclared plutonium in violation of its safeguards that is required to be safeguarded has actually been agreement. As a result of these undeclared activities, the Board of Governors declared). found Iraq and the DPRK to be in noncompliance with their respective safeguards agreements. Voluntary Offer Agreements Under a Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement, These circumstances demonstrated the need for new safeguards tools and a nuclear weapon State (NWS) voluntarily offers methods, expanded access, and expanded information in order for the IAEA nuclear material and/or facilities for inspection. By to fulfill its verification responsibilities more effectively, in particular with applying safeguards in an NWS, the IAEA can test respect to detecting and deterring undeclared nuclear activities. new safeguards approaches or gain experience in using advanced equipment and technology. In some In 1993, the IAEA and Member States began an intensive effort to identify situations, the IAEA can enhance cost efficiency by and evaluate measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. The applying safeguards in the exporting State to nuclear target date for finishing this work was the 1995 NPT Review and Extension materials that will be shipped to States with CSAs in Conference, which led to the name “Programme 93+2.” force. When the results and recommendations of Programme 93+2 were INFCIRC/66 Agreements3 reported to the Board of Governors, several Member States expressed INFCIRC/66 Agreements specify the nuclear material, concern that the proposed measures went beyond the requirements of a non-nuclear material, facilities, and/or equipment to be CSA and would require complementary legal authority. In response, the safeguarded and prohibit the use of specified items from Secretariat presented a revised version of its proposals, calling for “Part I” furthering any military purpose. The IAEA implements measures that could be implemented under existing authority and “Part this type of agreement in India, Pakistan, and Israel– II” measures that would require new authority. The Board took note of the States that have not acceded to the NPT. DG’s intention to begin implementing Part I measures (e.g., environmental sampling, unannounced inspections, and improved analysis of information) 3 Information circulars are published from time to time under the symbol INFCIRC/ for the purpose of bringing matters of general in cooperation with States. To achieve the new legal authorities needed interest to the attention of all Members of the Agency. INFCIRC/1/ to implement Part II measures (enhanced access to locations where Rev.14, May 2002 7 Noncompliance
To maintain the credibility and The Board has determined noncompliance • In 2005, the Board found Iran to be effectiveness of the international nuclear to have occurred in a number of cases and in noncompliance based on its past nonproliferation regime, the world must be has reported that noncompliance to the concealed nuclear program, as the DG confident that non-nuclear weapon States UN Security Council. For example: had reported to it in 2003.10 are meeting their legal obligations. • In 1991, the Board found Iraq in The Board delayed reporting its noncompliance for its extensive noncompliance finding to the UN If a State fails to meet its obligations, the undeclared nuclear program and its Security Council until 2006. State can be found in noncompliance with misuse of declared nuclear materials • In a 2011 report on Syria presenting Strengthening its safeguards agreement. To reach such a 5 and facilities. the Secretariat’s conclusions finding, the IAEA Secretariat, through the • In 1993, after the DPRK refused concerning an alleged nuclear reactor DG, reports any cases of noncompliance to to address anomalies in its initial destroyed in a 2007 air strike, the the IAEA Board of Governors. The Board Safeguards: declaration of nuclear material that DG stated that ‘the [IAEA] concludes is empowered to report any noncompliance were discovered by the IAEA6, the that the destroyed building was very it finds to have occurred to Member States, Board found the DPRK to be in likely a nuclear reactor and should the UN General Assembly, and the UN noncompliance with its safeguards have been declared by Syria pursuant Security Council. agreement.7 Ten years later, after the to…its Safeguards Agreement and… DPRK unilaterally removed IAEA Subsidiary Arrangements.’11 The Board The types of actions4 that could constitute seals and surveillance equipment subsequently determined that Syria noncompliance under a State’s legally and expelled inspectors, the IAEA was in noncompliance with its binding CSA include diversion of declared determined that it was still not in a safeguards agreement and reported nuclear material, failure to declare nuclear position to verify the non-diversion the matter to the UN Security Council. material that is required to be placed of nuclear material and the Board under safeguards, undeclared production 4 found the DPRK to be in “further See below examples and GOV/2011/30, or processing of nuclear material at GOV/2003/75, GOV/2005/77 and Safeguards noncompliance” before referring the Glossary: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/ declared facilities, undeclared nuclear 8 matter to the UN Security Council. publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf, material or activities within the State, section 2.1 obstruction of the activities of IAEA • In 2004, the Board found Libya in 5 GOV/2531, July 1991; GC (XXXV)/978/add.1, inspectors, interference with the operation noncompliance based on its past September 1991 pursuit of an extensive undeclared 6 INFCIRC/419 of safeguards equipment, prevention of 7 nuclear program that it recently had GOV/2645 the IAEA from carrying out its verification 8 IAEA Media Advisory 2003/48 activities, or starting the construction or disclosed and had agreed to verifiably 9 Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, “IAEA modifying the design of a nuclear facility eliminate. Libya’s noncompliance was Director General Briefs Board on Iran, Libya, Other Topics,” 8 March 2004. without informing the IAEA. reported to the UN Security Council 10 9 GOV/2003/75 for information purposes. 11 GOV/2011/30 Challenges
nuclear material might not be present, such as centrifuge rotor not involving nuclear material; the use and contents of buildings manufacturing plants) and provide more credible assurance of the on a site surrounding nuclear facilities; certain nuclear fuel absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities anywhere in cycle-related manufacturing and assembly activities; uranium a State, the Secretariat drafted a new protocol additional to States’ mining and ore concentration activities; and exports of certain existing safeguards agreements. The Model Additional Protocol nuclear-related equipment. Second, the AP provides the IAEA (AP), published as INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), was adopted by the with “complementary access” (in addition to routine and ad hoc Board of Governors in 1997. inspections) in order to, inter alia, provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities, including the The AP includes two important elements to strengthen the IAEA’s resolution of questions and inconsistencies about the completeness authorities. First, it provides for additional information through or correctness of a State’s declaration. The AP identifies activities an expanded State declaration. The expanded declaration includes that the IAEA may conduct during such complementary access, information on, for example, nuclear fuel cycle R&D activities and the basis upon which the State can manage that access. 8
Implementation: Tools, Methods, and Sources
Safeguards implementation involves complemented by containment and the use of advanced technologies and surveillance measures (see below) to equipment in ways that are cost effective independently verify the correctness of and efficient for both inspectors and the the accounting information provided State. Trained personnel are required by the State, so as to detect and deter to ensure these measures are applied the diversion of nuclear materials according to international standards and and provide assurance that nuclear best practices. Common tools and methods materials are present in their declared employed for the implementation of locations. safeguards include the following: • Containment and Surveillance (C/S) • Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) methods are designed to detect methods to establish the quantities undeclared activities, such as attempts of nuclear material present within to alter the composition or quantities defined areas and the changes in of nuclear material. Tools such as those quantities within defined cameras, tags, seals, and other sensors periods. The IAEA applies NMA, provide “continuity of knowledge
The U.S. Support Program (USSP) to IAEA Safeguards
The USSP provides the IAEA with extra-budgetary assistance for targeted projects to make international safeguards more effective and efficient and to address specific technical safeguards issues. In recent years, the USSP has sponsored projects to assist the IAEA across a broad spectrum of activities, including nondestructive analysis of nuclear material, containment/surveillance capabilities, environmental sampling and analysis techniques, remote monitoring, information collection, processing, analysis, training, and development of expertise. The USSP receives funding from the Department of State through the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), established in 1977. Representatives from the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Defense provide program coordination. 9
There are 1 Item facilities are 2 Bulk facilities are facilities where nuclear material is two types of facilities where nuclear in loose form, such as powder, liquid, or fuel pellets, material is contained in individual, or in large numbers of non-identifiable units. Examples of nuclear fuel cycle identifiable items, such as fuel bulk facilities include plants for conversion, fuel fabrication, facilities that are assemblies. Examples of item reprocessing, or enrichment. Implementing safeguards at bulk placed under facilities include power reactors facilities can be significantly more complicated, expensive, and safeguards: item (e.g., light water reactors), time consuming than at item facilities because the material research reactors, critical does not exist exclusively as discrete items and quantitative facilities and assemblies, and separate spent measurement—not just verification of the presence of an item bulk facilities. fuel storage facilities. with the proper identification and attributes—is required.
between inspections by preventing traces of materials that can reveal • Unattended and Remote Monitoring undetected access to, movement of, information about nuclear processes (URM) refers to non-destructive or interference with nuclear or other conducted in the vicinity. assay and/or C/S measures that 12 materials.” • Nondestructive Assay (NDA) refers to operate for extended periods without »» Tags and Seals also help to the process of measuring the nuclear inspector presence. The data collected “ensure continuity of knowledge material content or the elemental by remote monitoring systems may of the identity and integrity of the or isotopic concentration of an item be transmitted off-site via secure material” in facilities, containers, without producing significant physical communication networks for and equipment by making “access or chemical changes in the item. review and evaluation by the IAEA. to their contents without opening Unattended monitoring systems can • Destructive Analysis (DA) refers to 14 13 store data on-site. the seal difficult.” the process of measuring the nuclear • Environmental Sampling (ES) refers material content or the elemental or 12 Safeguards Glossary: http://www-pub.iaea. org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/ to the collection and analysis of isotopic concentration of a sample NVS3_prn.pdf, section 8.1 samples from inside the facility or the through methods that alter the 13 Safeguards Glossary: http://www-pub.iaea. local environment in order to detect physical or chemical form of the org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/ sample. NVS3_prn.pdf, section 12.20 14 Safeguards Glossary: http://www-pub.iaea. org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/ NVS3_prn.pdf, section 8.15
Special Nuclear Material Timeliness Goals The goal of safeguards under CSAs is to provide “timely to nuclear explosives, the shorter the time window for detecting detection” of diversion of “significant quantities” of nuclear diversion. Direct-usability is influenced by enrichment levels for material from peaceful nuclear activities and the deterrence uranium and by isotopic purity levels in the case of plutonium. of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The required A Significant Quantity (SQ) is the approximate amount of nuclear “timeliness” of diversion detection is dependent on material material required to manufacture a nuclear weapon. “attractiveness.” The more directly a material could be applied
Special Nuclear Material Significant Quantities in kg Timeliness Plutonium (<80% Pu-238) 8 kg total Pu Irradiated = 3 months Unirradiated = 1 month Highly Enriched Uranium (>20% U-235) 25 kg U-235 Irradiated = 3 months Unirradiated = 1 month Low Enriched Uranium (<20% U-235) – including 75 kg U-235 (or 10 t NU or 20 t DU) 12 months natural uranium (NU) and depleted uranium (DU) 10
The amount of nuclear material to be safeguarded also has risen by nearly 14 percent in the same period. Challenges • High-profile investigations in Iran, DPRK, Iraq, and Syria have strained Since the international safeguards skills to meet the expanding safeguards the IAEA’s resources. system is a central pillar of the nuclear challenges of the 21st century. However, in • The number of States with APs in nonproliferation regime, it is critical to recent years, a convergence of factors has force has increased to more than 125, ensure its effectiveness. As the peaceful use challenged the IAEA’s ability to carry out thereby strengthening the international of nuclear technology continues to play in its safeguards mission effectively. safeguards regime but increasing the important role in international economic • The number of nuclear facilities number and scope of State declarations and social development, the IAEA will coming under IAEA safeguards the IAEA must verify. need more financial resources, political continues to grow steadily–by 12 support, and personnel with specialized percent in the past five years alone.
The IAEA continuously works to make international safeguards more effective and more efficient. The State- The State-level concept (SLC) continues long-standing efforts and trends in the evolution of safeguards implementation. The SLC is described by the IAEA as an approach to safeguards implementation that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear- Level related activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope of the State’s safeguards agreement, rather than mechanistically carrying out activities according to a rigid checklist of criteria for specific types of nuclear facilities. This approach, which does not Concept require new legal authority, is driven by the IAEA’s need to carry out its safeguards activities more effectively and efficiently and continuously improve its productivity. The SLC is implemented using an ongoing and collaborative State evaluation process and applied to all States with safeguards agreements, including those without Additional Protocols.
State Evaluation Process Information Sources: Since the introduction of strengthened safeguards in the 1990s, the IAEA gradually has been acquiring more information about nuclear and nuclear- Under the State-level concept, various related activities in a State. To capture the expanded focus on information, the information sources, in addition to State IAEA has established a more collaborative State evaluation process—in which declarations and inspections, are used interdisciplinary State Evaluation Groups with representatives from multiple to develop and maintain an extensive offices within the Safeguards Departments collect, synthesize, and analyze picture of the State’s nuclear activities all available information, including inter alia, State declarations, inspectors’ and to support the IAEA’s ability to derive observations, information from open sources, and third-party information. The safeguards conclusions. These other ongoing State evaluation process contributes directly to the formulation of sources include satellite imagery, open State-level approaches tailored to each State and helps the IAEA prioritize the source information, scientific publications, allocation of its limited resources in an Annual Implementation Plan (AIP) for third-party information, and trade and each State. procurement data. 11
At the same time IAEA Safeguards Budget • The IAEA budget has remained relatively static; In 2015, the IAEA’s total Regular Budget amounted • Many proven safeguards technologies are increasingly to €345 million. Of the total Regular Budget, €133 expensive to maintain; and million—or 39%—went to nuclear verification activities. • The community of safeguards professionals is experiencing a high rate of attrition due to retirement.
Without a systematic, concerted effort to reverse these trends, the disparity between the IAEA’s resources and responsibilities will continue to increase.
s D ion eve us lo Through the SLC, the IAEA seeks to cl pi n ng co S complement routine on-site inspection g t n a i Analyze te w - activities with ongoing State-level evaluations a le r proliferation v d e that take advantage of all safeguards-relevant pathways l & s e a f information to plan, conduct and evaluate g e d g e l Establish and u Evaluate States a safeguards activities, and inform the w prioritize technical r o collaboratively d n objectives conclusions about Member States’ compliance s k a
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State. The resulting “State-level” safeguards E and analyze safeguards approach entails planning, conducting, information measures and evaluating safeguards customized to a particular State. Implementation of the SLC ideally will be responsive to changes in Conduct and Plan safeguards evaluate HQ and field activities analysis, thereby ensuring that the assurances safeguards activities provided to the international community P es remain credible and informed by the best la iti nn tiv available information. ing ac , c ds on uar duct feg ing & evaluating sa
State Declared Other Information Information Types Nuclear Material Accounting Data Open Sources Text Descriptions or News Articles Imports/Exports (news, Internet, catalogs, TV/radio Maps transcripts, publications) Facility Design Descriptions Photographs Scientific Literature R&D Projects, People, Locations (tables of authors, organizations, Commercial Satellite Imagery date, abstract, keywords) Diagrams Inspection Information Third-Party Information Formatted Output Tables Trade and Procurement Data Excel Spreadsheets Inspection Reports Internal Databases Project Plans Design Information Verification Trip Reports Budget Tables Environmental Sampling Locations Organizations Consultation Personnel Clarification Letters Presentation Charts 12
Office of International Nuclear Safeguards
Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Concepts and Approaches In 2008, the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Safeguards Policy The NGSI Concepts and Approaches Security Administration subprogram focuses on: (1) identifying The NGSI Safeguards Policy and analyzing safeguards best practices, (DOE/NNSA) established the subprogram, working with other U.S. gaps in current capabilities, and new Next Generation Safeguards agencies and the IAEA, conducts requirements; and (2) demonstrating Initiative (NGSI) to develop activities designed to: and evaluating advanced methods the policies, concepts, • Strengthen and encourage full use to safeguard nuclear material and facilities. These efforts help inform technologies, expertise, and of existing IAEA authorities and examine possible new authorities; investment decisions about future international safeguards safeguards technology research and • Develop policies and strategies that infrastructure necessary to development to support enhanced will help the IAEA plan, evaluate, safeguards concepts and approaches. strengthen and sustain the and report on the implementation international safeguards of safeguards agreements in a Safeguards by Design (SBD) manner that is effective, efficient, system as it evolves to meet NGSI promotes the concept of objective, transparent, and non- new challenges. Safeguards by Design (SBD) in which discriminatory; and international safeguards are fully • Increase public awareness and integrated into the design process of understanding of the role of a new nuclear facility from the initial international safeguards in planning through design, construction, international efforts to prevent the operation, and decommissioning. spread of nuclear weapons. NGSI supports the ongoing IAEA SBD guidance development effort, Policy Studies and engages directly with U.S. nuclear Some recent NGSI policy studies have industry facility designers to assist examined ways to help the IAEA use the U.S. nuclear industry in better all relevant information to customize understanding and implementing safeguards approaches to each State, SBD for specific projects. The NGSI optimize its inspection activities, and series of SBD guidance documents draw conclusions as effectively and are available at www.nnsa.energy.gov/ efficiently as possible. safeguardsbydesign.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY National Nuclear Security Administration 13
International Technology Human Capital Nuclear Safeguards Development Development
Engagement The NGSI Technology Development The Human Capital Development subprogram directs the DOE (HCD) subprogram of NGSI is Through cooperation with more National Laboratories in the developing sustainable academic than 25 international partners, development and testing of and technical programs that support the NGSI International Nuclear tools, technologies, and methods the recruitment, education, training, Safeguards Engagement subprogram that optimize the effectiveness and retention of the next generation conducts activities that are designed and efficiency of safeguards of international safeguards to: implementation. In particular, this professionals to help meet the needs • Prepare the safeguards subprogram focuses on transitioning of both the United States and the infrastructure necessary to advanced and maturing technologies IAEA for decades to come. Focus support the safe, secure, and with near-term safeguards areas include: peaceful uses of nuclear energy; applications from the laboratory into • University engagement through • Enhance the implementation of the field. Focus areas include: curriculum development, IAEA safeguards and strengthen • Advanced nuclear measurement guest lectures, and textbook State accounting and reporting technologies; development; systems through capacity • Field-portable, near-real-time • Internships, post-doctoral building, regulatory development, analysis tools; fellowships, and graduate and technology transfers to assistant positions at DOE reduce the likelihood of theft or • Data integration and National Laboratories; diversion of nuclear material for authentication applications; non-peaceful purposes; and • Improved detector materials; and • Safeguards policy and technology courses to strengthen young • Test and implement new • Strengthened technology and mid-career professional safeguards technologies to meet development infrastructure at the development; future and current safeguards National Laboratories. challenges. • Career opportunities for Advanced Technologies safeguards experts returning to Additional Protocol (AP) The NGSI Technology Development the United States from positions Outreach subprogram has undertaken a at the IAEA; and A number of countries require multi-year effort to develop and test • Ongoing analysis of workforce legislative and technical support in new nondestructive assay (NDA) needs of safeguards-relevant staff order to prepare the infrastructure techniques capable of measuring at DOE National Laboratories. and procedures necessary to provide certain characteristics of spent timely, correct, and complete nuclear fuel. Metrics of Success declarations pursuant to their AP. Of past NGSI students and interns, The NGSI International Nuclear nearly four in ten pursue multiple Safeguards Engagement subprogram NGSI opportunities, one in five currently cooperates with nearly are converted to permanent DOE a dozen partner countries in National Laboratory staff, and nearly strengthening AP implementation. two in ten pursue a nonproliferation or safeguards-focused graduate degree. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY National Nuclear Security Administration