SUPPLEMENT TO THE IAEA BULLETIN, VOL. 41, NO. 4/DECEMBER 1999 THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM MOVES INTO THE 21ST CENTURY BY PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT or more than three still persist -- in verifying the decades the IAEA initial report submitted by the Fsafeguards system has Democratic People’s Republic of applied technical measures to Korea (DPRK) on its nuclear assure the international material subject to safeguards. community that the non- During the early 1990s, the nuclear-weapon States party Agency also gained invaluable to the Treaty on the experience in verifying the initial Non-Proliferation of Nuclear report on nuclear material Weapons (NPT) or similar subject to safeguards submitted agreements are honoring their by South Africa and, at the commitments not to proliferate Government’s request, in nuclear weapons. assessing the termination of its The very essence of these nuclear weapons programme. commitments -- and their South Africa is the first -- and independent verification by the so far the only -- State that has Agency -- is that they demonstrate changed from a de facto nuclear- Under 223 safeguards agreements in transparency with respect to those weapon State to a non-nuclear- force with 139 States, the IAEA verifies States' exclusively peaceful nuclear weapon State party to the NPT. that safeguarded nuclear material and S-1 activities. They thus promote trust These events prompted the facilities are being used exclusively for among States, regions and the Agency and its Member States peaceful purposes. More than 900 world as a whole. to examine how the safeguards facilities are under safeguards and the Today -- as it has for some 30 system in operation at that time Agency carried out just over 2200 years -- the Agency is able to could become more effective, inspections in 1999. provide assurance that declared particularly for detecting any nuclear material and other items undeclared nuclear material and conclusion of comprehensive placed under safeguards have activities that should have been safeguards agreements with remained in peaceful nuclear declared by a State under its Argentina and Brazil and with a activities or were otherwise safeguards agreement. large number of the newly adequately accounted for in This examination, begun in independent States of the former States that have safeguards 1991, also covered improvements Soviet Union, many of which agreements in force. for more cost-efficient safeguards, have substantial nuclear The Agency has also been able given the resource constraints of programmes. Then too, to identify -- and to alert the successive near zero-real growth technology advances rapidly international community -- to budgets for the IAEA and the taking place offered possibilities the two known cases where Department of Safeguards dating for more effective verification States have not met their back to the late 1980s. These while keeping the costs of safeguards obligations. In 1991, constraints were occurring at a safeguards at bay. soon after the end of what was time of considerable growth in known as the Gulf War, IAEA the number of comprehensive Mr. Goldschmidt is the IAEA inspectors discovered Iraq’s safeguards agreements and in the Deputy Director General, Head of extensive clandestine programme amount of nuclear material and Safeguards. Contributions made by for producing nuclear weapons. the number of facilities to be staff of the Department of One year later, IAEA inspectors safeguarded. These increases Safeguards to this report are encountered difficulties -- that were due largely to the gratefully acknowledged. IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 The results of this examination been incorporated into routine political challenges. But the have found expression in the steps safeguards implementation. All achievements thus far and the that the Agency and its Member told, as of mid-December 1999, momentum building for the States have taken to forge a more the Board has approved 46 widespread adoption of the Model rigorous safeguards system. Additional Protocols. They cover Additional Protocol bode well for Since the early 1990s, the IAEA 41 non-nuclear-weapon States the work ahead. The Board of Governors has adopted which have comprehensive accomplishments have also or encouraged strengthening safeguards agreements in force or instilled increasing recognition that measures in order to provide the awaiting ratification, one State the IAEA’s extensive verification Agency with more information with an INFCIRC/66-type experience and expertise can than hitherto available about the safeguards agreement, and four support initiatives in the field of nuclear programmes of States, nuclear-weapon States, each of nuclear arms control. greater access by IAEA inspectors which has a voluntary offer IAEA To better understand how to locations relevant for safeguards agreement in force. the Agency’s safeguards system verification, and more powerful Of these approved Protocols, has come to play -- and why verification tools. eight have entered into force, it will continue to play -- The process of strengthening and one is being implemented a fundamental role in the IAEA safeguards achieved a provisionally pending its formal international non-proliferation milestone in 1997. In May that entry into force. In two States, regime, this report examines year, the Board approved the the implementation of the the major elements of the Model Additional Protocol to Additional Protocols has IAEA safeguards system. It Safeguards Agreements which included complementary access also looks briefly at provides the legal basis for the to contribute to confirming the opportunities for the Agency significantly strengthened IAEA exclusively peaceful use of all to support initiatives in the safeguards system. nuclear material in these States. field of nuclear arms control. By late 1999, most of the The full implementation of a Finally, it provides an historical S-2 strengthening measures pursuant strengthened safeguards system will perspective on the evolution of to safeguards agreements have present technical, financial and safeguards. ELEMENTS OF THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM The elements of IAEA Traditional Measures. One set authority conferred by existing safeguards are described from of measures relates to the nuclear safeguards agreements. The the perspective of how material verification activities second category comprises the system has operated through performed at facilities or other measures to be implemented 1999 and how it is changing locations where States have under the complementary legal and likely to change over declared the presence of nuclear authority conferred by the near term as all safeguards material subject to safeguards. Additional Protocols concluded measures are integrated to These measures are also referred on the basis of the Model gain maximum effectiveness to as “traditional safeguards”. Additional Protocol. and efficiency within available (See box, page S-4.) When fully implemented in a resources. Strengthening Measures. State, the strengthening measures What are Safeguards? By Another set relates to the measures provided by a comprehensive definition, the safeguards system endorsed or encouraged by the safeguards agreement together comprises an extensive set of IAEA Board since 1992 for with an Additional Protocol will technical measures by which the strengthening the safeguards allow the Agency to draw IAEA Secretariat independently system. (See box, page S-5.) safeguards conclusions both about verifies the correctness and the These measures fall into two the non-diversion of declared completeness of the declarations categories. The first category nuclear material and the absence of made by States about their comprises those measures to be undeclared nuclear material and IAEA BULLETIN, 41/4/1999 nuclear material and activities. implemented under the legal activities in that State. TRADITIONAL SAFEGUARDS: DETECTING DIVERSION OF DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL Traditional safeguards are based covering all of its nuclear material on the concept of nuclear subject to safeguards. There are material accountancy verification, practical reasons for this restriction, complemented by containment since under comprehensive (e.g., seals) and surveillance (e.g., safeguards agreements IAEA cameras and monitors). These inspector access during routine activities are applied to nuclear inspections is limited to specified material once it has been points (“strategic points”) in the processed to a stage suitable for facility for material accountancy IAEA safeguards seals are examined at the Agency’s headquarters enrichment or for introduction verification purposes. With this to ensure that there has been no unauthorized access to or into a reactor. limited access, the Agency’s ability interference with nuclear material or safeguards equipment. Nuclear material accountancy to detect an undeclared nuclear cornerstone of the safeguards focuses primarily on the activity that makes no use system, particularly for confirming “correctness” of a State’s of safeguarded material is the absence of unreported declarations about its nuclear circumscribed. This was essentially production or separation of direct- material present at facilities -- the the situation that came to light in use material (for example, aim being to independently verify Iraq and that has been plutonium and highly enriched that the inventories and flows of subsequently addressed in the uranium) in safeguarded facilities. nuclear material are as declared or, provisions