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European Union Training Mission Somalia European Union Training Mission Somalia PRESS SUMMARY 29th May 2018 “In ‘Media’ stat virtus” EUTM - SOMALIA 29/05/2018 Somalia’s Supreme Court chief refused to leave the office after president Farmajo sacked him on Sunday May 28, 2018 234 Views Mogadishu-KNN-Supreme Court chief of Somalia Ibrahim Idle Suleiman declined a presidential degree from Somali president Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, which is stated that he is sacked by the President and Bashe Yusuf will be his successor. Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo sacked the chief of Justice Ibrahim Iidle Saleban and appointed Bashe Yusuf Ahmed as chairman of the Supreme Court, as president rebuilds the judiciary system the country. Ibrahim Iidle told BBC on Monday that he is not accepting his dismissal, citing that the presidential degree is illegitimate. He said president must flow the legitimate way and he refused to leave the office. Farmajo fired Ibrahim Idle Suleiman, saying he took the step after a public outcry over several judicial decisions and allegations of corruption in the judiciary, according to a presidential decree published on Facebook account of Villa Somalia Farmajo asked lawmakers to expedite the nomination of a new judicial services commission, to replace one that was dissolved by former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed before presidential elections in 2017, it said. Somalia’s judiciary system has been on ground since 1991, but President Farmajo wants to restructure the justice. http://radiokulmiye.net/2018/05/28/somalias-supreme-court-chief-refused-to-leave-the- office-after-president-farmajo-sacked-him-on-sunday/ EUTM - SOMALIA 1 EUTM - SOMALIA 29/05/2018 Here to stay, fired CJ vows, terms sacking illegal May 28, 2018 Fired Chief Justice Ibrahim Idle Suleiman. Immediate former Chief Justice Ibrahim Idle Suleiman has dismissed his sacking as unconstitutional vowing to stay put as the judiciary top man even as President Mohamed Farmaajo has settled for former Waddani party chief executive Mohamed Bashe. In an interview with VOA Somali Sunday, Suleiman said the president erred in relieving him of his duties adding he had not received any complaints contrary to what the president said Sunday. In sacking Suleiman who came to office mid- 2016, President Farmaajo said he arrived at the decision based on concerns from members of the public about the functioning of the judiciary and need for judicial reforms. “Responding to the pledge to establish a transparent and fair judicial system, I have appointed Chairman of the Supreme Court of Somalia Mr. Baashe Yusuf Ahmed. I hope the new Chief Justice will fulfill his duties,” President Farmaajo said. RELATED COVERAGE: CJ Suleiman fired, replaced by Somaliland’s Waddani party chief executive But Suleiman added besides other reasons which could have been used as reason for his sacking, he had not attained the legally set age of 65. “The Chief Justice and other Judges of the High Court leave office when they reach 65 years,” Suleiman noted. Asked about EUTM - SOMALIA 2 EUTM - SOMALIA 29/05/2018 complaints regarding performance of duty, the now embattled judge said he had not received any complaints. “I submitted recommendations for reform of the judiciary on 25th of this month to the President, Prime Minister and the Federal Parliament. What has happened is illegal.” Suleiman said he will remain put adding the move by the President amounts to interference of the Judiciary. “This is an independent arm of government.” The Provisional Constitution mandates the Judicial Service Commission to hire and make recommendations for firing of judicial officers. However that body has not been formed giving the President leeway to unilaterally take up the task. http://goobjoog.com/english/here-to-stay-fired-cj-vows-terms-sacking-illegal/ EUTM - SOMALIA 3 EUTM - SOMALIA 29/05/2018 Does President Farmaajo’s pick for CJ meet the threshold for office? May 28, 2018 His longest continued service is from 2014 to 2017 as a lecturer at Hargeisa University Newly appointed Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf Ahmed. President Mohamed Farmaajo’s pick for the post of Chief Justice Bashe Yusuf Ahmed will not only be one of the youngest CJs in the region but also with very little experience required of such office holders in most jurisdictions. According to bio available on his LinkeIn account, Ahmed graduated from Hargeisa University in 2008 and served as a consultant with various organisations among them UNDP, MerCorps and Somaliland parliament for a maximum of two year contracts. He was born in 1982. His longest continued service is from 2014 to 2017 as a lecturer at Hargeisa University. Prior to his appointment by President Farmaajo, Ahmed was the chief executive officer of the opposition Waddani party in Somaliland. He earned a master’s degree in Commercial and Maritime Degree from Hertfordshire University in the UK in 2104. In most jurisdictions, a judge of a superior court and for this case the Chief Justice will always have accumulated a considerable number of years either as a judicial officer, distinguished academic or legal practitioner. From this understanding, it appears President Farmaajo’s pick does not come close to any of the qualifications expected of the head of the Judiciary who shall be looked upon not only to develop the institutions of the judiciary but also actively EUTM - SOMALIA 4 EUTM - SOMALIA 29/05/2018 nurture and build jurisprudence. The Chief Justice will also be expected to render rulings grounded in solid understanding and experience in legal practice. A look at neighbouring countries in the region could shed light on tough competencies for the office of the Chief Justice. In Uganda, the chief justice is appointed from persons who have served as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Uganda or of a court having similar jurisdiction or has practiced as an advocate for a period not less than 20 years before court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil; criminal matters. To be a Judge of the High Court on the other hand, one must have been Judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from any such court or has practiced as an advocate for a period not less than 10 years before a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. To become a Chief Justice in Kenya, one needs at least 15 years’ experience as a superior court judge; or at least 15 years’ experience as a distinguished academic, judicial officer, legal practitioner or such experience in other relevant legal field. A high court candidate on the hand other must have at least 10 years’ experience as a superior court judge or professionally qualified magistrate; or at least ten years’ experience as a distinguished academic or legal practitioner or such experience in other relevant legal field http://goobjoog.com/english/does-president-farmaajos-pick-for-cj-meet-the-threshold- for-office/ EUTM - SOMALIA 5 EUTM - SOMALIA 29/05/2018 Prof. Samatar blasts Farmajo's Chief Justice appointment Monday May 28, 2018 - Mogadishu (HOL) - One of Somalia’s leading intellectuals Prof. Abdi Ismail Samatar blasted President Farmajo’s decision to appoint a legal novice as Somalia’s top judge, calling his decision a disaster to the justice system. President Farmajo dismissed Hassan Ibrahim Idle Suleiman who served as the Chief Justice for two years on Sunday replacing him with a relatively unknown and inexperienced 36-year- old lecturer, Bashe Yusuf Ahmed. The decision was made in the name of judicial reforms but has received a strong rebuke from Somalia’s legal and intellectual community. In a Somali-language interview on Monday, Prof. Abdi Ismail Samatar - who also was the head of the election commission to oversee the integrity of last year’s Somalia presidential elections - said that it was unfathomable that an individual who never sat as a judge to be appointed as the nation’s Chief Justice. “This (Chief Justice appointment) is something that I have never heard about in my life. This man who was named as the Chief Justice never sat as a judge. How can he render legal judgements with no experience?” said Prof. Samatar. He added that “for a man who never sat as a judge to be elevated as the top justice in Somalia is a major problem for our country and if the President insists on his appointment than his credibility as a leader should be called into question.” Furthermore, Abdi Ismail Samatar charged that the Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia and Bashe Yusuf Ahmed are maternal cousins, which leads to more nefarious speculations surrounding the controversial appointment. EUTM - SOMALIA 6 EUTM - SOMALIA 29/05/2018 Prof. Samatar said that to be a functioning democracy, the three arms of government must be separated. “The executive branch should be separated from the legislative branch which should be separated from the judiciary.” Prof. Samatar also said that Somalia has barely healed from the scars of the last political conflict that pitted the legislative branch and the executive branch and came within whiskers of open conflict. That protracted political tussle eventually led to the ouster of former Speaker Jawari. Samatar lays blame with the executive arm of government for that political crisis. Many analysts have said that Jawari’s ouster was in direct response to fears from Villa Somalia that he was growing too powerful in the Parliament. The recent election of former Defense Minister Mohamed Mursal Sheikh Abdurahman as the new speaker in late April was seen by many as Villa Somalia ’s consolidation of power within the legislature. Farmajo’s latest appointment has only compounded those fears. Prof. Samatar likened Farmajo’s decision to appoint a legal novice as Somalia’s Chief Justice as someone who just obtains their Ph.D.
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