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MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA: THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC SITUATIONAL AND STRUCTURAL FACTORS ON MILITARY CAPABILITY AND STRATEGY

RYO HINATA YAMAGUCHI

A thesis submitted to the University of New South Wales in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2012

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’

Name: Ryo Hinata Yamaguchi

Date: 13 November 2012

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) military capability management. Specifically, the study focuses on how and to what extent the DPRK’s domestic situational and structural factors determine the capabilities of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and mould national defence strategy. The thesis shows how the DPRK’s military capability management and its military industrial complex have been subject to intense centralization and politicization by the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and the National Defence Commission (NDC). These processes have led to the diversified asymmetric capabilities of the KPA.

Since the mid-1960s, the DPRK has pursued the dangui gunsa roseon (Military Lines of the Party) as the fundamental doctrine of its military capability management. The doctrine aimed to make the state’s military capability conform to Kim Il-sung’s juche (self-reliance) ideology. Soon afterwards, the DPRK established the Second Economic Committee (SEC) to oversee the development of the KPA’s capabilities. However, as the economy went into steady decline, the KPA’s capabilities were inevitably affected. Further politicization of the military strengthened from 1999 through songun (military-led) politics, also raised questions over the policy’s effectives in the defence planning context. Moreover, with the death of Kim Jong-il and continuing economic failures, there is now greater uncertainty regarding the future of this military policy given the advent of the third generation DPRK leadership under Kim Jong-un.

Given domestic circumstances, it is often assumed that the DPRK does not have sufficient capacity or flexibility to reconfigure its military capability. This dissertation examines these assumptions in greater depth by posing the following questions: What is the essential function of DPRK defence planning? What is the nature of the DPRK’s military capability development? How are the KPA’s capabilities reflected in the DPRK’s military strategy? This thesis applies methods used in defence planning such as the input-conversion-output model to the DPRK’s political-economic structure and situation to uncover the dynamics and objectives of the DPRK’s military capability management process. The thesis finds that Pyongyang faces numerous planning dilemmas, which not only have had decisive implications for the KPA’s mobilization capabilities, but also explain many aspects of the DPRK’s military behaviour to date.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In writing this thesis, I am indebted to many people who gave me much support. Without them, this thesis would not have been possible. First and foremost, I thank my supervisor Professor James Cotton. I am forever deeply indebted to his guidance, mentorship, and patient encouragement to write this thesis. Special thanks also to my co-supervisor Professor Aurelia George Mulgan for her valuable suggestions.

I am very grateful to Professor Andrei Lankov, Kookmin University, who has mentored me since my undergraduate days and inspired me to study about the two Koreas. Without him, I would not be where I am today.

I am honoured to have studied at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales Canberra – the Australian Defence Force Academy. The research environment was truly ideal. I truly thank the Head of School, Professor David Lovell, Dr. Craig Stockings, Ms. Fiona Cotton, and Mr. Geoff Millar. I thank the administration staff, in particular Ms. Marilyn Anderson-Smith, Ms. Christa Cordes, Ms. Elvira Berra, Ms. Shirley Ramsey, Ms. Danica Robinson, Ms. Patsy Sheather, the library staff, and others for all their help. I am especially grateful to Ms. Bernadette McDermott who always provided invaluable support.

I must also thank the Korea Foundation and the Korean Studies Association of Australasia for the Korea Foundation - Korean Studies Association of Australasia Graduate Studies Fellowship, which has generously provided me with financial support during the first three years of my candidature. The Korean Foundation has also supported me in the years 2006 and 2007 when I studied in Korea under the Korean Language Training Fellowship. What I learned during my fellowship has certainly proved to be invaluable to my doctorate research.

To the members of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, School of International, Political and Strategic Studies, the Australian National University, I thank them for inspiring me to start my endeavours in studying about strategic and defence studies. In particular, I express my sincere gratitude to Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb, Professor Ron Huisken, Professor Robert Ayson, Professor Hugh White, Dr. Chris Chung, Professor Desmond Ball, Mr. Alan Hinge, Professor Brendan Taylor, Mr. Ross Thomas, and Ms. Meredith Thatcher, who all taught me a lot during my Master of Arts (Strategic Studies) candidature in the years 2005 and 2006.

To my colleagues and at the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, I

iii thank them for their professional support. I am indebted to the mentorship and guidance from Mr. Ralph A. Cossa, Mr. Brad Glosserman, and Mr. Carl Baker. I sincerely thank Ms. Ellise Akazawa, Mr. Sam Kim, and Mr. Christopher Charles Iwao Ota for proofreading my drafts, and also Mr. Justin Goldman and Dr. David Santoro for their comments and feedback. I also thank Ms. Georgette Almeida, Ms. Christina Failma, Ms. Nikki Forrester, Mr. Kerry Gershaneck, Ms. Christina Hatfield, Ms. Cristin Orr Shiffer, Mr. Radford Sagarang, Ms. Brooke Mizuno, Ms. Mari Skudlarick, Ms. Adrian Yi as well as the fellows and interns for their support.

During my candidature, many experts and scholars have shared their precious time and invaluable expertise. In particular, I thank Professor Tsuneo Akaha, Mr. Peter Beck, Mr. David F. Day, Professor Shunji Hiraiwa, Ms. Ok-hee Jin, Mr. In-bum Kang, Professor In-duk Kang, Mr. James A. Kelly, Professor Su-hoon Lee, Associate Professor Narushige Michishita, Professor Md. Nasrudin Md. Hj Akhir, Dr. Sang-hyun Park, Ms. Se-young Park, Professor C. Kenneth Quinones, Dr. Kevin Shepard, Ms. Ji-yeon Seong, Dr. Yu-gyeong Shin, Professor Chung-sok Suh, Mr. David Jonathan Wolff, ret. Rear Admiral Lloyd "Joe" Vasey, ret. General Noboru Yamaguchi, as well as many other Australian, Chinese, Egyptian, Indonesian, Japanese, New Zealand, ROK, Singaporean, Taiwanese, US analysts, scholars and government officials. I am especially grateful to my long time mentor, Mr. Christopher Maitland Thomas, who kindly dedicated his precious time to critically proofread my drafts throughout my candidature.

The research itself would not have been possible but for the following institutions, programs and universities where I conducted a significant portion of my research and other related activities: Akita International University, the Australian National University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, German Marshal Fund Young Strategists Forum, the National Library of Australia, Institute for East Asian Studies, Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University, International Studies Association, Kansai-kan of the National Diet Library, Korea University, Korean Studies Association of Australasia, National Library Singapore, University of Malaya, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Waseda University, and Yonsei University.

To the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. As a Sergeant First Class in the reserves, I am proud to be serving the nation of Japan, to contribute to our role for peace and stability.

I also thank my management, FM BIRD Entertainment Agency, especially to Ms. Makiko Nagakura-Stapf, Mr. Yasunori Watahiki, and Mr. Yusuke Kakuta for their encouragement and support. iv

To my brothers, sisters, friends and colleagues, I sincerely thank them for all their moral support and prayers. I am deeply indebted to my precious family for their love, patience and standing by me during my candidature. Finally, deep from my heart I thank my dearest partner and soul-mate “N” for her loving encouragement, smiles and support that gave me the energy to keep going even during the most challenging times.

CONTENTS

ORIGINALITY STATEMENT ...... i ABSTRACT ...... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii CONTENTS ...... vi LIST OF FIGURES ...... x LIST OF TABLES ...... xi NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION ...... xii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...... xiii SELECTED GLOSSARY ...... xv THE DPRK’S MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK ...... xvi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1. THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT ...... 1 2. “DPRK 3.0” ...... 3 3. WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CHANGED FOR THE DPRK? ...... 8 4. OBJECTIVE AND RATIONALE OF THIS STUDY ...... 11 CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ...... 16 1. EXISTING HYPOTHESIS ...... 16 2. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT ...... 17 2.1. CAPABILITY AND STRATEGY ...... 17 2.2. THE DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS ...... 19 3. EXTERNAL FACTORS – THE SURROUNDING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ...... 27 4. INTERNAL FACTORS ...... 40 4.1. STRATEGIC CULTURE ...... 42 4.2. POLITICS AND MILITARY POWER ...... 47 4.3. MILITARY ECONOMICS ...... 67 5. SUMMARY ...... 86 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGIES OF ASSESSMENT ...... 88 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 88 2. CHALLENGES IN ANALYZING THE DPRK ...... 89 3. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS ...... 95 4. INPUTS: CONSTANTS AND VARIABLES ...... 101 4.1. EXTERNAL BALANCE OF POWER ...... 102 4.2. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES ...... 104 vi

4.3. POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES ...... 107 4.4. FEEDBACK FACTORS ...... 109 5. CONVERSION PHASE – FRAMEWORK OF DEFENSE PLANNING ...... 110 5.1. STRATEGIC CULTURE ...... 112 5.2. DIRECTION: POLITICAL SYSTEM AND IDEOLOGY ...... 114 5.3. CAPACITY: ECONOMIC/INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE ...... 123 6. OUTPUT: CHANGE IN STRATEGY AND EFFECT ON MILITARY CAPABILITY . 127 6.1. CONCEPTUALIZING “STRATEGY” ...... 128 6.2. MEASURING MILITARY CAPABILITY ...... 132 6.2.1. FORCE STRUCTURE ...... 133 6.2.2. OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS ...... 137 7. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 140 CHAPTER 4: THE DPRK’S POLITICAL DIRECTION AND IMPACT ON THE KPA ...... 144 1. UNDERSTANDING THE DPRK’S POLITICAL SYSTEM ...... 144 2. THE DPRK’S POLITICAL SYSTEM – THE INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION ...... 145 2.1 THE RISE OF THE WPK ...... 146 2.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE WPK’S IDEOLOGICAL IDENTITY ...... 147 2.3 CENTRALIZATION OF THE DPRK LEADERSHIP ...... 149 3. THE DPRK “SOFTWARE” – JUCHE AND SONGUN ...... 156 3.1 JUCHE – THE NEW BRAND OF SOCIALISM ...... 157 3.2 SONGUN AND KANGSONG TAEGUK ...... 163 3.3 THE NEXUS BETWEEN JUCHE AND SONGUN ...... 168 3.4 THE DPRK’S IDEOLOGY AND THE SYSTEM ...... 176 4. POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY– PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS ...... 177 5. IMPACT ON ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ...... 184 5.1 THE CMCWPK ...... 187 5.2 THE NDC ...... 191 5.3 THE MPAF ...... 196 5.4 TRILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CMCWPK, NDC AND MPAF 199 6. EMERGING PATTERNS IN THE DPRK’S POLITICAL SYSTEM ...... 201 6.1 NEW TRENDS ...... 202 6.2 POTENTIAL FACTIONALIZATION IN THE KPA ...... 205 7. SUMMARY ...... 208 CHAPTER 5: THE DPRK’S ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY ...... 210 1. INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS ON DEFENCE ...... 210 2. THE DPRK ECONOMIC SYSTEM ...... 211

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2.1 THE ENDS – THE DPRK’S ECONOMIC OUTLOOK ...... 211 2.2 THE MEANS – THE DPRK’S ECONOMIC PLANS ...... 214 3. THE DPRK’S MILITARY INDUSTRY COMPLEX ...... 227 4. MEASURING THE DPRK’S MILITARY EXPENDITURE ...... 233 5. THE DPRK’S INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT ...... 239 5.1 STRUCTURAL CAPACITY ...... 240 5.2 RESOURCE CAPACITY ...... 246 5.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY ...... 249 6. COST-EFFETIVENESS OF THE DPRK’S MILITARY INDUSTRY ...... 254 6.1 THE “JUCHE MILITARY INDUSTRY” ...... 255 6.2 ISSUES IN FORCE STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS ...... 257 6.3 THE SECOND ECONOMY AS A SOURCE OF INCOME ...... 260 7. SUMMARY: IMPACT ON THE DPRK’S DEFENCE PLANNING ...... 262 CHAPTER 6: THE DPRK’S DEFENCE PLANNING FRAMEWORK ...... 264 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 264 2. STRATEGIC PERCEPTION PARADIGM: INTERPRETING THE INPUT FACTORS ...... 265 2.1 THE DPRK’S PLACE IN THE WORLD ...... 267 2.1.1 FACING THE FOE ...... 268 2.1.2 BECOMING A POWER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER ...... 274 2.2 THE DPRK’S VIEWS VIS-À-VIS ITS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ...... 279 3. DECISION-MAKING PARADIGM: MULTI-TIERED ZERO-SUM DILEMMAS ...... 287 3.1 “TRADITIONAL” DECISION-MAKING DILEMMAS ...... 287 3.2 THE DPRK’S MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT DILEMMAS ...... 290 3.2.1 CADRE ARMY: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE ...... 291 3.2.2 MODERNIZING THE ARMY: STRUCTURAL FOCUS OF ARMAMENT ...... 294 3.2.3 ARMING THE POPULACE: POLITICAL-MILITARY MOBILIZATION ...... 300 3.2.4 FORTIFICATION OF THE STATE: DETERRENCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY .... 305 3.3 MACRO-LEVEL DEFENCE PLANNING DILEMMAS: FUNCTION OF THE KPA ...... 308 4. DIRECTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND CAPACITY ...... 312 5. IMPACT ON THE KPA’S FORCE STRUCTURE ...... 318 5.1 KOREAN PEOPLE’S ARMY GROUND FORCES ...... 319 5.2 KOREAN PEOPLE’S AIR FORCE ...... 323 5.3 KOREAN PEOPLE’S NAVY ...... 327 5.4 STRATEGIC WEAPONS CAPABILITY ...... 329 viii

5.5 ISSUES IN THE KPA’S FORCE STRUCTURE ...... 336 6. DIVERSIFIED ACTUALIZATION OF THE DPRK’S MILITARY CAPABILITY ...... 339 6.1 MILITARY PROVOCATIONS SINCE 2010 ...... 339 6.2 PATTERNS IN THE DPRK’S “NEW” MILITARY STRATEGY ...... 347 6.3 2012 AND BEYOND ...... 350 7. SUMMARY: PATTERNS IN BUILDING THE NEW KPA ...... 357 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ...... 360 1. NEW PERSPECTIVE TOWARDS MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT ...... 360 2. THE DPRK’S DYSFUNCTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT ...... 361 2.1 ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF THE DPRK’S DEFENCE PLANNING ...... 361 2.2 DIVERSIFICATION OF THE KPA’S CAPABILITIES ...... 366 2.3 THE DPRK’S ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY ...... 369 3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: CONCEPTUALIZING NEW STRATEGIES ...... 371 3.1 THE SITUATION IN THE DPRK ...... 372 3.2 MILITARY LEVERAGE VIS-À-VIS THE DPRK ...... 376 3.3 ECONOMIC LEVERAGE VIS-À-VIS THE DPRK ...... 379 3.4 A GRAND BARGAIN WITH A DIFFERENCE ...... 380 4. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: DEVELOPING GREATER UNDERSTANDING ...... 381 5. THE FUTURE OF THE DPRK ...... 384 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 387

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 The DPRK’s Military Policy System…………………………………..…...... …64 Figure 2.2 The Structure of the DPRK’s Security-Defence Policy Decision-Making……….…65 Figure 3.1 The Military Capability Balance……………………………………….….…….....133 Figure 3.2 A Simplistic Illustration of the input-conversion-output Framework ….……….....141 Figure 3.3 The Domestic Factor Matrix….……….…………………………………………...142 Figure 6.1 Personnel Composition of the DPRK’s Military Readiness...……………...……...303

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Key Events in the DPRK Since 2009……………………………………...... 5 Table 4.1 Key Figures Purged/Exiled in Years 1950~1959…………………………………...153 Table 4.2 CMCWPK (As of September 2010)…………………………………………...…...190 Table 4.3 NDC 2009 – 2014………………………………………………………………...... 194 Table 5.1 The DPRK’s Economic Plans……………………………………………………....214 Table 5.2 The Second Economic Committee…………………………………………………228 Table 6.1 The DPRK’s Decision Dilemmas…………………………………………………..289 Table 6.2 The DPRK’s Decision Making Dilemmas From the dangui gunsa roseon……...….291 Table 6.3 The DPRK’s Tactical/Strategic Missiles…………………………………………...333 Table 6.4 Key Military Provocations by the KPA Since 2010………………………………..341 Table 7.1 The DPRK’s Decision Making Dilemmas From the dangui gunsa roseon…………364

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Providing accurate transliteration for Korean names and words is a challenge, given that various regimes in styles exist. In general, this thesis uses the former ROK Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s “New Romanization System” (July 2000).

To save confusion, names of Korean persons are represented by their last name, then with hyphenated first names to avoid confusion (e.g. Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un). However, this thesis spells the names of individuals and locations according to the style most commonly or officially used in the DPRK and the ROK. For the DPRK, I have spelled names of locations and persons according to those used by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Additionally, names of policies have also been adjusted according to those that are most commonly used (e.g. kangsong taeguk, songun). As for individuals from the ROK, I have used the forms employed used by those persons, or those most commonly used in publications (e.g. Lee Myung-bak, Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-hee). Locations in the ROK conform to those used by the Ministry of Culture Sports And Tourism. The special exceptions outlined above are reflected in the titles of books, journals, newspaper articles (e.g. Kim, Jong-il. Widaehan suryeong Kim Il-Sung tongji neun uri inmin gwa minjok ui maeum sok e yeongsaeng hal keossida. Pyongyang: Choson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 2003).

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A2AD Anti-Access/Area Denial ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia ASB Air-Sea Battle ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations C2ISR Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear CCWPK Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (DPRK) CMCWPK Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea (DPRK) COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) GPB General Political Bureau (DPRK) GSOMIA General Security of Military Information Agreement GRSD General Rear Services Bureau (DPRK) GSD General Staff Department (DPRK) HEU Highly Enriched Uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICT Information and Communication Technology IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance JASDF Japan Air Self-Defense Force JGSDF Japan Ground Self-Defense Force JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force JSDF Japan Self-Defense Force KCNA Korea Central News Agency (DPRK) KPA Korean People’s Army (DPRK) KPAF Korean People’s Air Force (DPRK) KPAGF Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (DPRK) KPW DPRK Won LCPL Landing Craft Personnel Large LCM Landing Craft Medium

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LCVP Landing Craft Vehicles and Personnel LDC Less Developed Countries LSM Landing Ship Medium MPAF Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (DPRK) MDL Military Demarcation Line MGB Missile Guidance Bureau (DPRK) MOR Military Operations Research MRBM Medium Range Ballistic Missile NDC National Defence Commission (DPRK) NLL Northern Limit Line NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty OGB Organization and Guidance Department (DPRK) O&M Operation and Maintenance PC Pacification Corps (DPRK) PLA People’s Liberation Army PRC People’s Republic of China PSI Proliferation Security Initiative R&D Research and Development RMA Revolution in Military Affairs ROK Republic of Korea (ROK) ROKA Republic of Korea Army (ROK) ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force (ROK) ROKMC Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROK) ROKN Republic of Korea Navy (ROK) SEC Second Economic Committee (DPRK) SRFC Strategic Rocket Forces Command (DPRK) TASCFORM Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle US United States of America USFJ United States Forces Japan USFK United States Forces Korea USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WPK Workers’ Party of Korea (DPRK) WPRG Worker/Peasant Red Guard (DPRK) YRG Youth Red Guard (DPRK) xiv

SELECTED GLOSSARY dangui gunsa roseon “Military Lines of the Party”. Principal doctrine of the WPK’s defence planning. Consists of four objectives: establishment of a cadre army; modernization of the entire army; arming of the populace; and fortification of the whole country. Also known as sa dae gunsa roson “Four Grand Military Lines” in the ROK. force structure Physical entities in the military. These include, but are not limited to: infrastructure; platforms; organs; and units. juche “main body” (literal meaning), but interpreted as “self reliance” in the DPRK. The primary ideology in the DPRK state gradually systemized by Kim Il-sung from the mid 1950s. The juche idea is made up of: jawi – self-defence (in military capability); jaju – independence (in politics); and jarip – self-sustainance (in economics). kangsong taeguk “strong and prosperous state”. Slogan for the DPRK to advance itself to a status where the military is powerful and the country enjoys a rich economy. military capability management The process where the governing regime oversees and handles, administrative, economic, political, and security affairs to maximize the military’s capability and function. (also referred to as defence planning) operational preparedness Level of readiness of a particular component, or the whole military to operate its capacity and function. songun “military-led” or “military-first”. Ideology issued by Kim Jong-il in the late 1990s to ensure the KPA’s key role in political-economic affairs.

THE DPRK’S MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

INPUT CONVERSION

Political Direction vs. Economic Capacity

Political Economic Changes in Grand Structure Structure Security Strategy State Circumstances Management

Dilemmas Political Economic Situation Situation

OUTPUT

Political Economic Military Strategy Direction Direction

Military Capability Military Capability Dilemmas

Operational Capability

Tactical Capability Political Interests Existing Capabilities xvi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT

Military capability management is a pivotal process for any state or non-state actor to achieve its strategic objectives.1 Defence planning is the quest to attain the maximum balance of military capability – operational preparedness (consumption, readiness and sustainability); and structural preparedness (investment, force structure). Competence or incompetence in defence planning not only determines the state’s military capability, but also the positive or negative impacts on the state’s political economy. The aim of defence planning, therefore, is maximize the military’s effectiveness, through the most efficient means. Intuitive as this notion may seem, conforming to logical processes in managing military capability is easier said than done.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is an interesting case.

Since the founding of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) on 8 February 1948, the DPRK leadership has demonstrated perhaps one of the most centralized and rigid forms of defence planning that often finds itself wedged between various dilemmas.2 In April 1955, Kim Il-sung described his philosophy of military capability.

Modern armies need to find an optimum balance between technology, doctrine and

organisational methods at all levels of war. Without adequate doctrine and organisation to

meet the demands of information systems, war fighting methods risk becoming narrowly

1 This thesis interchangeably uses the terms “military capability management” and “defense planning”. 2 In 1978, the founding date of the KPA was changed from 8 February 1948 to 25 April 1932, when Kim Il-sung formed his anti-Japanese guerilla partisan group.

delimited by new weapons technology.3

Kim Il-sung’s statement well summarizes the system he constructed. The KPA is not the military of the state, but belongs to the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and its leadership. In essence, the DPRK’s defence planning is essentially about politicization, where modernization isn’t so much about technological innovation, but innovation in the way technologies are used.

At the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea

(CCWPK) in December 1962, Kim Il-sung issued the dangui gunsaroseon (military lines of the party), which called for the: establishment of a cadre army; modernization of the entire army, arming of the populace; and fortification of the whole country.4

For the DPRK, the dangui gunsa roseon symbolized the advancement of the juche ideology in military affairs. Yet at the same time, the juche military doctrine imposed huge demands on the

DPRK economy, which led to the policy of “carrying on economic construction in parallel with defence building.” Soon after, the monstrous military industry complex known as the Second

Economic Committee (SEC) was established to feed the force structure needs of the KPA. By the end of the 1960s, the fundamental format of DPRK defence planning was set.

Despite the continuing decline of the economy and the death of Kim Il-sung, the DPRK political system remained consistent. Kim Jong-il took steps to bolster the system he had inherited from

3 Il-sung Kim, "dangwondeulsogeseo gyegeupgyoyangsaeobeul deouk ganghwahalde daehayeo [On Intensifying Class Education for Party Members] (1 April 1955)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 9 [Kim Il Sung Works 9] (9 July 1954-December 1955) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1980). p.75. 4 The DPRK officially uses the term dangui gunsaroseon (military lines of the party). However the ROK media and writings generally refer to it as the dangui gunsa roseon (Four Grand Military Lines).

2 his father by strengthening the role of the National Defence Commission (NDC) and supplementing juche with the songun jeongchi (military-led politics) ideology. Yet in economic terms, the state had failed, which consequently stagnated the KPA’s capabilities.

More than anything else, we must strengthen the people’s army. The strength of songun

politics is military strength. Ideologically and technologically strengthening the military will

reveal the power and supremacy of songun politics.5

While the DPRK system may have produced a series of failures, its defence planning process continues to function in its original framework. In fact, the true dynamics of the DPRK’s defence planning system were revealed as the state began to prepare itself for the new age – kangsong taeguk (strong prosperous state) under Kim Jong-un.

2. “DPRK 3.0”

For the DPRK, 2009, 2010, and 2011 were seminal years that set the scene for the construction of kangsong taeguk (Table 1.1). Notably, the ongoing succession of power from Kim Jong-il to his third son - Kim Jong-un, combined with the series of military provocations by the KPA stirred debates on what would prevail in the future.

5 Jong-il Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]," in Kim Jong Il seonjip 15 [Kim Jong-il Selected Works 15] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 2003). p.368.

Key Events in the DPRK Since 2009 2009 5 April Test launch of taepodong-2 5 April First Session of the Twelfth Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) 25 May Second underground nuclear test 30 November Denomination of the DPRK Won 2010 January “Combined Manoeuvres” Cross-branch military exercises 27 January KPA holds artillery drills near Baengnyeong Island and Daecheong Island 28 January KPA holds artillery drills near Yeonpyeong Island 23 March Sinking of the Cheonan (PC-772) 3 May Kim Jong-il visits China 7 June Third Session of Twelfth SPA 9 August KPA holds artillery drills near Baengyong Island and Yeonpyeong Island 26 August Kim Jong-il visits China 27 September Kim Jong-un promoted to “General” 28 September WPK Conference 28 September CCWPK Conference (Kim Jong-un appointed Vice-Chairman of CMCWPK) 23 November Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island 2011 20 May Kim Jong-il visits China 11 August KPA holds artillery drills near Yeonpyeong Island 20 August Kim Jong-il visits Russia 7 September Joint exercises by the KPA’s air, ground and naval forces 17 December Kim Jong-il dies 30 December Kim Jong-un declared the Supreme Commander of the KPA 2012 18 February Announcement by the Political Bureau of the CCWPK to convene a WPK Conference in mid-April 2012 14 March Kim Jong-un guides the KPA’s air, ground and naval combined strike drill 16 March DPRK announces plans to launch kwangmyongsong-3 in mid-April 2012 11 April 4th CCWPK Conference – Kim Jong-un appointed 1st Secretary of WPK and Chairman of the CMCWPK 13 April Launch of unha-3 13 April Fifth Session of Twelfth SPA – Kim Jong-un appointed 1st Chairman of

NDC 15 April Military parade commemorating the 100th birth of Kim Il-sung 15 July Ri Yong-ho relieved of all posts 18 July Kim Jong-un promoted to Marshal 18 July Hyong Yong-chol recognized as KPA Chief of General Staff

Table 1.1 – Key Events in the DPRK Since 2009

On the political front, there has been significant change. After his alleged stroke in 2008, debates over who will succeed Kim Jong-il surfaced. By 2010, prospects of Kim Jong-un as the next leader changed from speculation to confirmation. At the CCWPK Conference in September

2010, Kim Jong-un was named the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the

WPK (CMCWPK), while in the military he began to be addressed with the prefix – gyeongae haneun daejang dongji (Respected Comrade General). 6 Since his appointment to the

CMCWPK, Kim Jong-un’s influence in the DPRK has rapidly grown. He has been active in the

KPA as well as forcing generational changes in the WPK.7 Thus re-politicization to bolster the smooth succession process was well underway.

The death of Kim Jong-il on 17 December 2011 sparked a torrent of speculation over the future holds for the DPRK. In the meantime, despite the enormous stress the current leadership faces in maintaining integrity and managing the KPA, the Kim Jong-un regime is forcefully upholding the three traditions: “politicization”, “centralization” and “inheritance”. In particular,

6 Joon-hyung Park and Jae-sung Jung, "hugyeja Kim Jong-un e 'gyeongaehaneun' hoching eonjebuteo? [from when was the successor Kim Jong-un given the title "Respected"?]," Daily NK(2 December 2011), http://www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?cataId=nk04500&num=93222. 7 Bom-gi Lee and Song-min Choi, "Kim Jong-un nobyeongeun tteonara? 'myeongye dangwon jeung' gyobu [Kim Jong-un - old soldiers fade away? "honourary party memberships" issued]," Daily NK(5 December 2011), http://www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?cataId=nk04500&num=93241.

5 the centre of political gravity seems to have been aligned more towards the CMCWPK to legitimize Kim Jong-un’s control over the WPK, KPA and the society.8

In terms of the economy, the DPRK has embarked on numerous projects under the banner of juche giseul (self-reliant technology). The emphasis on the pivotal role of military industry remains unchanged. However, while there is still strong emphasis on the military and heavy industry, Pyongyang seems to have increased attention on the light industry sector.9 Notable changes are also evident in terms of infrastructure, where new buildings in Pyongyang have been constructed in part to prepare for the development of kangsong taeguk. At least ostensibly, the DPRK seems to be making some effort to address its economic problems.

However, the dire economic problems in the DPRK are very real. There are no signs of improvement in the welfare of the populace. Rather, economic privations are steadily emerging not only amongst soldiers, but also in KPA cadres.10 Moreover, the denomination of the DPRK

Won in November 2009 caused damaging effects to the state’s economy. Thus, with the exception of top state/WPK cadres, there is a growing gap between those who have successfully discovered capitalism and those who remain soaked in the “original” DPRK system.

8 Jang Song-thaek, the brother-in-law and speculated key regent of Kim Jong-un was seen wearing a KPA uniform. 9 The emphasis on the development of light industry was stated in the 2011 New Year Editorial. "Bring about a Decisive Turn in the Improvement of the People's Standard of Living and the Building of a Great, Prosperous and Powerful Country by Accelerating the Development of Light Industry Once Again This Year," Rodong Sinmun 1 January 2011. 10 Seok-young Lee, "Officer Families Just Like the Rest," Daily NK(2 December 2011), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=8475.

Amid the political and economic circumstances, the DPRK continues to make efforts to strengthen its military capability. Especially after the returns from its nuclear ambitions proved to be slower coming than desired, Pyongyang increasingly relied on alternatives to actualize its military leverage. The DPRK began to look more at the Republic of Korea (ROK or South

Korea) as a target to practice its military ambitions. In January 2010, “Combined Manoeuvres” military exercise took place, which involved the air, ground and naval branches of the KPA.

Exercises of this nature are almost unprecedented (at least officially), and hinted at the future realignment of the KPA’s capabilities. Similar exercises also took place in 7 September 2011 and 14 March 2012, but this time with the presence of Kim Jong-un.11

The sinking of the ROK Navy (ROKN) corvette Cheonan on 26 March 2010 and the shelling of

Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010 epitomized the changing nature of the DPRK’s military threat. Moreover, evidence suggests that both Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un were involved with the attacks.12 The increasing reliance on conventional platforms, combined with

Kim Jong-un’s rise in the KPA command hierarchy, paints an alarming picture of the threat posed by the DPRK.

In spite of its efforts to achieve its kangsong taeguk status, developments in the DPRK point to greater uncertainties. Against this backdrop, there are few options available to realign the DPRK economy on a positive trajectory unless Pyongyang executes reform. In fact, one would assume

11 KCNA Television network broadcast a 16 minute documentary regarding the combined maneuvers exercises on 29 December 2011, but the exercises were claimed to have taken place on 7 September 2011. 12 Yoo-shik Choi, "Kim Jong-un, cheonanham pokchim dudal 'nambukjeongse maeu ginjangdoel geot'," Chosun Ilbo(3 August 2011), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/08/03/2011080300222.html.

7 that there are more challenges today than before.13 Yet even though collapse seems imminent, the dynamics of the DPRK’s political system makes it not-so-easy for implosion to take place.14

Rather, the leadership is advancing the politicization process as part of its strenuous effort to keep the regime at any cost, which only adds to the uncertainties surrounding the DPRK’s future.

3. WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CHANGED FOR THE DPRK?

By looking at the nature of “DPRK 3.0”, one would ask – what circumstances have changed for

Pyongyang? At first sight Pyongyang seems to be making efforts to modify its state system for the construction of kangsong taeguk. Yet there exists equal amount of evidence to prove that on the inside much of the DPRK system has remained the same.

One of the key characteristics of the DPRK’s politics is “inheritance”. Despite the increase in activities in the DPRK, shifts in their threat perception are not evident. Pyongyang is locked into a combative balance of power perception of the world. Kim Jong-il stated that:

The showdown between us and imperialism is a confrontation of power; the anti-imperialist

military front constituted the major front line, the first lifeline of our revolution, on which the

13 On numerous occasions, the DPRK faced major problems where instability seemed only a matter of time. See: James Cotton, "North Korea Trouble Ahead," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 28, no. 1 (2002). 14 Andrei N. Lankov, "Conditions Unripe for North Korea Revolt," Asia Times Online(17 November 2011).

destiny of the country, the nation and socialism would be decided.15

The view of Kim Jong-il is rich in ideological rhetoric. Particularly since the dawn of the Kim

Jong-il era, the DPRK leadership stressed the role of the KPA in state affairs.

Upholding the banner of Songun under the leadership of the great Party, our army and people

have traversed a glorious road of victory, pushing their way through raging storms and

creating miracles in history. The Songun-based revolutionary line of our Party is a great

revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution. In the

Songun-based revolution lie the building of a great, prosperous and powerful nation, national

reunification and the victory of the revolutionary cause of Juche. Now that the situation is

very complicated and tense at home and abroad, we must hold the banner of Songun higher.

The whole Party, the entire army and all the people must advance more resolutely towards a

new great victory of our revolution in support of the Party’s Songun-based leadership.16

Although Kim Jong-il’s songun politics may seem “new”, the DPRK has been set on a military-led system since the early Kim Il-sung era. However, the fact that ideological branding is needed to legitimize and smooth the state’s management process indicates that the impact of politicization in the DPRK is so powerful that the political software (ideology and policies) determines the nature of the hardware (political structure). That is, the DPRK’s capacity to facilitate change or reform shrinks in congruence with the advancement of politicization. This

15 Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." p.355. 16 Ibid. p.352.

9 trend is likely to continue in the Kim Jong-un era.

Even as the DPRK’s economic circumstances point to the likelihood of the state collapsing into, the Orwellian state has survived because of robust political system. Simply put, the DPRK’s political system has been designed to withstand economic challenges. Hence no matter how challenging the political-economic circumstances, the last thing the DPRK will do is to revise the system it has constructed.

Considering the DPRK’s political direction and economic capacity, logic tells us that

Pyongyang’s defence planning is extremely limited in its range of options. However, the DPRK also feels the pressure to reconfigure its military leverage to counter the modernization of the regional military balance. In other words, the DPRK’s defence planning is in a dilemma to deal with both the internal and external security concerns which over-stretches its capacity.

Simply put, the quantitative strengths of the KPA are also its qualitative weaknesses. The KPA faces problems in power projection capabilities – especially in the air and naval forces.

Operational preparedness issues such as shortages of fuel, poor infrastructure and logistics systems, as well as health/education of soldiers undermine the DPRK’s military capabilities.

Considering the size of the KPA, the problems the DPRK faces are enormous. Still, the DPRK has taken steps to develop the KPA’s capabilities. Pyongyang’s efforts are not only characterized by development of strategic weapons, but also by massed asymmetric capabilities that utilize existing conventional platforms.

The military provocations in 2010 were a preview of the DPRK’s military capability that is

10 under further development. Even when the DPRK’s options to successfully advance its military leverage seemed negative-sum, Pyongyang searched for ways to strengthen both its force structure and operational preparedness with minimal “switching” costs. Questions are then raised over how the DPRK has managed these changes.

4. OBJECTIVE AND RATIONALE OF THIS STUDY

The framework of the DPRK’s military capability management is set by the WPK’s dangui gunsa roseon. Like most states, DPRK defence planning is largely determined by endogenous dynamics. In defence planning, internal and external factors have a “yin-yang” relationship – external factors specify the objective and target, while internal factors reveal how the state constructs its strategies. While there are a number of studies concerning why and what the

DPRK has done, little has been written on how Pyongyang has managed its military capability.17

The major circumstantial changes underway in the DPRK are a prime opportunity to test the

Pyongyang’s defence planning.

The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of the DPRK’s military capability management process. Specifically, the thesis focuses on the domestic dimensions, analyzing how the DPRK’s political-economic factors impact the KPA’s military capability. To achieve the thesis’s objective, three key questions are asked: What is the contextual function of

17 Notable studies that have looked at the DPRK’s military behavior include: Narushige Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008 (London, UK; New York, NY: Routledge, 2010).; Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces And The Forces Of Key Neighboring States," (Washington, DC2011).

11 the DPRK’s defence planning? What is the nature of the development of KPA capabilities?

How are KPA capabilities reflected in the DPRK’s military strategy? The thesis emphasizes that development trends in the KPA’s capabilities are accurately reflected by the DPRK’s domestic political-economic dynamics.

Investigating the domestic dimensions of the DPRK’s defence planning process raises numerous challenges. The crux of the problem lies not only in the lack of data, but the lack of conceptual connections among the information. To overcome this problem, the thesis relies on the systems analysis’s input-conversion-output model. Input refers to changes in the internal/external security environment. In the conversion phase the governing regime processes its military capability management according to domestic structural and situational factors. The output is the product of the conversion phase – adjustments in military capability and strategy. The framework of analysis is reinforced with John Boyd’s authoritative OODA (Observe, Orient,

Decide, and Action) loop model, which a valuable tool for conceptualizing the DPRK’s defence planning process. The core of this thesis focuses on the Conversion phase, where the dynamics of the DPRK’s interpretation and decision-making process are revealed.

The study contains seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides the overview of the thesis and introduces the core questions that will be examined. Chapter 2 is a review of literature, covering the key studies and monographs that are useful in our understanding of military capability management.

Theoretical materials ranging from those concerning political economy to military studies are reviewed, to understand the myriad of relevant factors in a state’s defence planning. The chapter also finds that while there is an array of studies relating to the topic of defence planning or strategy making, analyses of the DPRK’s defence planning are few and far between. In Chapter

2, we shall see how the imbalance between logical defence planning processes and country-specifics is the missing link.

Chapter 3 then capitalizes on the niches identified in Chapter 2, rationalizing how the input-conversion-output framework is useful in conceptualizing the DPRK’s defence planning process. The chapter argues that the domestic political-economic structure and situation shapes a state’s approach to the management of military capability. In particular, considering the political rigidity and diminishing economic capacity, focusing on constraints and limitations renders a clearer picture of how the DPRK’s defence planning functions.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on both the political and economic aspects of the DPRK, and how they influence Pyongyang’s management of the KPA. Chapter 4 looks at political aspects, looking at how the direction of the DPRK’s defence planning framework has been shaped by both ideology and political hardware. The chapter confirms the notion that the strongest characteristic of the DPRK’s political system is not so much juche itself, but the inheritance of the juche-ist ideals for the purpose of legitimization.18 The succession process inevitably involves strong politicization, which presses the KPA’s functions to be centred more on politics than the conventional military role (i.e., songun). Pyongyang’s efforts to maintain consistency has consequently reduced the number of options, making readjustment increasingly difficult.

The chapter also finds that the Kim Jong-un leadership is on a sharp trajectory to advance its predecessor’s policies and could be more militarist and hard-line.

18 James Cotton, "Ideology and the Legitimation Crisis in North Korea," in Communism and Reform in East Asia, ed. David S. G. Goodman (London, UK; Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1988).

Chapter 5 then looks at how the DPRK’s economic circumstances and structure impact the state’s capacity for armament. Despite high military expenditures and establishment of the SEC, returns on the KPA in military capability are far from proportionate. The negative results were caused not only by poor economic planning, but also by the dangui gunsa roseon. After the

DPRK’s economy failed, Pyongyang confirmed the view that maintaining a quantitatively strong military is less cost ineffective than undertaking a qualitative shake-up. Moreover, considering that the economic system is bounded by politicization, opportunities for innovation are inevitably reduced, diminishing the economic capacity for qualitative modernization in the military sector.

Chapter 6 examines how the political direction and economic capacity manifests itself in the framework of the DPRK’s military capability management. The chapter discusses how the dangui gunsa roseon has become the source of the DPRK’s defence planning dilemmas. The costs associated with platform acquisitions/upgrades, construction of infrastructure, training, supply of resources, and reconfiguration of tactics are simply beyond the DPRK’s fiscal and political capacity. In other words, Pyongyang’s decisions vis-à-vis its many dilemmas are epitomized by developments in the KPA’s force structure. The chapter also argues that given few options available, the only way for Pyongyang to qualitatively strengthen its military leverage was by diversifying KPA capabilities. In particular, the realignment of the KPA was centred on the concept of “innovation” in the use of existing platforms, and advancing its mobilization of asymmetric capabilities.

Chapter 7 sums up the analyses and develops the policy implications of the findings. The chapter makes three conclusions regarding DPRK defence planning. First, Pyongyang’s

14 management of the KPA centres itself on politicization to the extent that political concerns are prioritized over conventional military matters, particularly during times of leadership succession.

Second, given the political and economic constraints, the only way in which the KPA can be strengthened is through diversification of existing capabilities. Third, the military provocations in 2010 assured the DPRK that the diversification of KPA conventional capabilities is indeed effective, indicating that Pyongyang is likely to continue pursuing its asymmetric edge to penetrate the United States of America (US) alliance deterrence strategy.

The chapter concludes that the DPRK’s military capability management has policy implications for the region. Above all, the reconceptualization of policies vis-à-vis the DPRK which encompasses both diversifying trends but also ramifications from future instability are needed.

Given the diversifying nature of the KPA threat, regional powers must also diversify how they in deal with the DPRK. The conclusions of this thesis not only shed light on the dynamics of the

DPRK’s military capability management, but also the pressing security problems on the Korean peninsula and East Asia. When these problems are addressed, then we can bring true peace to the Korean peninsula, and eventual unification of the two Koreas.

CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

1. EXISTING HYPOTHESIS

How does a state formulate its strategic policies vis-à-vis the changing security balance? What are the key considerations, and do they differ between states according to the nature of the political and economic regimes?

Logic might suggest that a state will seek to devise a strategic or military policy to redress unfavourable changes in the surrounding security balance in the most efficient and effective way possible. After all, a state’s aim in its strategic policy making is ensure effective and efficient management of its military capability and resources to maximize its prospects of success and minimizes its risk of failure.

Such intuitive conclusions, however, leave much unexplained. The dynamics of the whole strategy-making process is more complex than is often thought, and invariably involves a combination of endogenous and exogenous influences.

This chapter reviews thinking and research, which has sought to explain the national strategy-making process. First, the chapter will examine the concept of strategic planning and military capability management. Then, the chapter will look at how external factors influence a state’s management of the military. The next section will look at the how internal factors such as strategic culture, politics and military economics moulds a state’s defence planning framework.

It will be seen, first that studies in strategic policy making tend to be deficient because of a failure to appreciate properly important political-economic theories and country-specific issues; second, that many papers on state strategy or state armament fail to find the right balance between endogenous and exogenous determinants; and third, that many scholars who have pursued a country-specific approach have ignored some important concepts in strategic policy making, resulting in an array of defective or incomplete conclusions.

2. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT

Studies that assess the concept of military capability management have increased over the years.

Scholars such as Gray have examined the dilemmas that exist in the defence planning process.1

However, as a topic, the conceptualization of military capability management still seems to be in its developing stages.

2.1. CAPABILITY AND STRATEGY

Many analysts and scholars have sought to deepen understanding of the concept, strategy.

Fearon argues that a state’s decision to arm or prepare for war is complex and depends on its strategic values, tradition and other variables.2 Howard contends that in the nuclear age, there

1 Colin S. Gray, "Coping With Uncertainty: Dilemmas of Defense Planning," Comparative Strategy 27, no. 4 (2008). 2 James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995).

17 has been too much focus on technological aspects of strategy and too little focus on important social dimensions.3 Many have also looked at that the importance of economics and how it plays a pivotal role in conflict.4

Hitch and McKean offer an overarching view:

Strategy, technology, and economy are not three independent “considerations”…but

interdependent elements of the same problem. Strategies are ways of using budgets or

resources to achieve military objectives. Technology defines the possible strategies…the

economic problem is to choose that strategy which is most efficient…or economical.5

Despite the various concepts of strategy, still, we remain lost on how it is tied in with a state’s capability or power. The nature of power is extremely complex and pervasive.6 Power, can also vary in the way it is exerted – “actualised” or “putative”.

One interpretation equates power with actual influence. Power then exists only as

influence is achieved, and is measurable only in terms of visible changes in behaviour

patterns. We will call this actualised power. According to the second interpretation,

3 Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," Foreign Affairs 57, no. 5 (1979). 4 Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 5 Charles Johnston Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). cited in: Martin C McGuire, "Defense Economics and International Security," in Handbook of Defense Economics, ed. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (Amsterdam ; New York: Elsevier, 1995). p.17. 6 Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia-Pacific Security and the Current Balance of Power," Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 3 (2004).

power is the ability to coerce to exercise influence. In this meaning, power is only the

potential cause of behavioural changes; it pre-exists the actual achievement of influence.

We will call this putative power. Actualised power is generated in the influence process

and exists only within a specific relationship between states. Putative power is something

which pertains to particular states; it is something they possess, and which they may use

or not use. Putative power is a means; actualised power is an effect. Henceforth, when

we simply refer to military power, we mean putative power which, however, is a

capacity for taking or defending objects forcibly as well as a means to exercise coercion.7

We could, simply argue that capabilities or power is the capacity to advance strategy, or, that strategy guides capabilities or power.

Even from the brief examples offered above, it is apparent that the concept of capability and strategy is extremely broad and involves a range of factors. Yet, despite the development of the discipline, and although we are gaining a clearer understanding of what capability and strategy is, we understand much less of the process by which it is made – that is, how stimuli (inputs) are processed into capability/strategy (output).

2.2. THE DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS

Aware of the gap that exists between stimuli and strategy, many analysts have developed a

“spin-off” area of study, known as “military capability management” or “defence planning”.

7 Klaus Knorr, Military Power and Potential (Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books, 1970). p.3.

This relatively new discipline seeks to develop and apply a systematic method of analysis to strategic policy making. Quade defines the objective of the discipline as “[placing] each element in its proper context so that in the end the system as a whole may achieve its aims with a minimal expenditure of resources.”8

Layne elaborates on this. He sees grand strategy making as:

A three-step process: determining a state’s vital security interests; identifying the threats to

those interests; and deciding how best to employ the state’s political, military, and

economic resources to protect those interests. The outcome of the process, however, is

indeterminate: the specific grand strategy that emerges will reflect policymaker’s views of

how the world works.9

Like many other works in this field, Layne’s study is a broad commentary on US strategic policy-making practice. Nevertheless, we could assume that his schema will be operative in any state.

Hence, the approach calls for identifying the “input-process-output” connections in the strategic policy-making schema. Many papers that employ this approach seem to draw from an eclectic mixture of disciplines, such as management, economics, military science, policy administration and, of course, strategic studies. Liotta and Lloyd’s framework for systematic approach, offers a

8 E. S. Quade, "Introduction," in Analysis for Military Decisions, ed. E. S. Quade, Rand lectures on systems analysis (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1964). p.4. 9 Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," International Security 22, no. 1 (1997).

20 simple but comprehensive guide to the questions and connections present in the strategic policy-making process.10

Drew and Snow argues that the process of strategy making involves two levels: “broad and long-term issues of national strategy – issues that transcend current levels” and “time-sensitive contingencies”.11 Further, Drew and Snow’s illustration of “the strategy process”, lists a rich variety of stimuli that affects a state’s formulation of military strategy.12 However, while the authors’ provides a sound framework of the defence planning process, there is a significant level of vagueness concerning the specific influences each of the stimuli has on military capability or strategy.

Some scholars have also looked at how the various stimuli influence a state’s military effectiveness.13 In the book Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness,

Brooks argues that the “causal chain of military effectiveness” begins with the “independent variables”, which includes “culture, social structure, political institutions, civil-military relations, interstate competition, global norms, international organizations”14

10 P. H. Liotta and Richmond M. Lloyd, "From Here to There: the Strategy and Force Planning Framework (Military Strategy)," Naval War College Review 58, no. 2 (2005). 11 Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy : an Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2006). p.14. 12 Ibid. p.25. 13 For the concept of military effectiveness, see: Allan R. Millett, Murray Williamson, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," International Security 11, no. 1 (1986). 14 Risa A. Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions and International Forces on Military Effectiveness," in Creating Military Power: the Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). p.9

As we can see, a constellation of factors influences a state’s defence planning. Dillon well summarizes the caveats in understanding the defence planning process:

First, no defense policy community operates in a vacuum; each is located in its own

particular historical time and national political space. Secondly, defense decision making

does not operate like a voiceless mechanism and neither does international conflict. Quite

the contrary, national decision making and international relations are both filled with the

noise of competing voices: individuals, groups, state organizations and global ideologies.15

While Dillon’s argument is sound, we may question what is meant by political interests. Snyder argues that “‘decision making’ will be a process of rationalization rather than that of rationality.”

He describes strategic planning as a unitary process where rationalist choices based on national aims, technological and geographical constraints, and military balance are made or, at least, influenced by factors such as incentives, motivational biases and doctrinal oversimplifications16.

Although Snyder’s assessment focused largely on European powers during the First World War, this pattern is still relevant today.

Snyder’s assessment does, however, seem somewhat incomplete. First, Snyder’s model for the

“determinants of strategy” merely looks at the interaction of biases and preferences in policy making; the model needs to be modified to accommodate factors that are either burdens or

15 G. M. Dillon, Defence Policy Making: a Comparative Analysis, ed. G. M. Dillon (Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1988). p.2 16 Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914, Cornell studies in security affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). pp.18-19, 32.

22 constraints. Second, although economics plays a significant role in the interactive process, it is seldom mentioned in Snyder’s book. Third, we need to test whether the model is consistent across all states; in particular, would it be the same or different in failing states or totalitarian states?

Knorr’s seminal book, Military Power and Potential, looked at the political and economic influences on strategic planning. Here, Knorr commented on economic and political aspects of military power:

The proportion of economic, technological, and administrative resources which a nation

will actually allocate to producing military capabilities and the readiness with which it will

support the international use of its military power depend upon a motivation represented in

its leadership and, to the extent it is politically effective, also in the rest of the population –

which competes and sometimes conflicts with motivations to expend resources for other

purposes, for instance consumption.17

Knorr’s work is conceptually impressive. It extensively explains the pivotal role in a state’s military potential played by politics and economics, both as positive inputs and as constraints.

There is, however, a significant deficiency in that Knorr looks primarily at questions which all states face, but blurs out country-specific considerations. Nevertheless, Knorr’s arguments are plausible, and will be referred to throughout this paper.

There are, of course, shortcomings in the “strategic planning” method of analysis. First, there

17 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.27.

23 seem to be difficulties in defining output. Scholars have used various terms, including “military potential”, “military effectiveness”, “military capability” and, most crude, “state power”. Indeed, the terms overlap, and although they may simply be the result of individual preferences in terminology, the inconsistency of terms inevitably cause confusion.

Second, the majority of studies on defence planning have focused on strengthening a state’s military capability or strategy. For instance, Davis, Gompert and Kugler composed what looks like a manual for better and more efficient defence planning.18 Others look more closely at defence contracting and budgeting aspects, focusing primarily on the link between politics and defence contracting in the US.19

Indeed, there is little wrong in studying the defence planning process to strengthen a state’s military leverage. Yet one would question why the framework of defence planning or strategy making has not been utilized to advance our understanding of another state’s capabilities or strategies.

Third, many studies in this field of “strategic planning” seldom employ well-established theories. More specifically, many leave the internal-external balance ambiguous. While they may demonstrate the pervasiveness and diversity of the stimulants to strategic planning, ultimately they do no more than identify “a little bit of this and a little bit of that”.

18 Paul K. Davis, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler, "Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996). 19 Karl Derouen, Jr. and Uk Heo, "Defense Contracting and Domestic Politics," Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2000).; Davis, Gompert, and Kugler, "Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework."

Quade argues that the discipline is still relatively young and has not yet developed a theoretical basis.20 Quade argues that the “systems analysis” framework is particularly useful:

A characteristic of systems analysis is that the solutions are often found in a set of

compromises which seek to balance and, where possible, to reconcile conflicting objectives

and questions of value. It is more important to choose the “right” objective than it is to

make the “right” choice between alternatives. The wrong objective means that the wrong

problem is being solved. The choice of the wrong alternative may merely mean that

something less than the “best system is being chosen.21

Indeed, assessments in the framework of “strategic planning” or “systems analysis” seem to do little more than find algorithmic connections between the input and output elements. Yet until a sound theoretical foundation for the analytical methodology is laid, the discipline may fail to gain scholarly respect.

Despite these weaknesses (viz. inadequate theory), the arguments and models developed in strategic planning studies are valuable in charting the basic skeletal structures of the strategic policy making process. In short, it is incomplete without supplementing it with the other important “meat” or “parts” of a particular state. The “macro” appearance varies according to states because of their respective ways to which they trace these routes to formulate their strategic policies. If we take a differing perspective, it is fair to argue that there is much

20 Quade, "Methods and Procedures." p.149. 21 Ibid., p.160.

25 conceptual space in this field, and could be developed further by somehow piecing together the essential aspects such as political-economical theories, but also country-specific studies.

The most problematic task is to find the correct balance between the realist and the country-specific approach. Russett extensively reviewed the debates between “external” and

“internal” theorists. He noted the complexity of the debates, and emphasized the importance of balance:

We find patterns of behavior that are complex, interactive, and heavily conditioned;

nevertheless they do yield generalizations and regularities. It is not the ideographic extreme

of ‘every country so different that no general regularities can be derived’22

Russett’s argument is persuasive. However, more often than not, many analysts have underappreciated this balance between theories and country-specifics, and consequently, most studies have been unbalanced.

Studies thus far have certainly made the case that regional complexities have extremely important military ramifications in a state’s strategic planning, although it is not the crucial or absolute factor. Rather, they play differing roles. Goldman argues that exogenous factors, when clearly defined, “smooth the military organizational process”, optimizing a state’s military

22 Bruce Russett, "International Interactions and Processes: The Internal vs. External Debate Revisited," in Political Science: the State of the Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter and American Political Science Association (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983). p.561.

26 effectiveness.23 Therefore, these scholars seek not so much to deny the significance of external factors, but to understand the relationship between the internal and external stimuli to a state’s strategic policy making schema.

Another school of thought that could better reconcile the endogenous versus exogenous debate is the studies on neo-classical realism. Literature by scholars such as Schweller, Taliaferro and

Zakaria takes the traditional concept of realism to a new level by closely examining how states’ strategic policies are significantly influenced by domestic structural factors.24 However, works on neo-classical realism have seldom looked at how a state’s internal institutions and perceptions impacts management of capacity or capability. Filling this gap, will significantly help to better understand the dynamics of the external versus internal determinants of a state’s capability management.

3. EXTERNAL FACTORS – THE SURROUNDING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

23 Emily O. Goldman, "International Competition and Military Effectiveness: Naval Air Power, 1919-1945," in Creating Military Power: the Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 24 See: Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009).; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Neoclassical Realism and the Study of Regional Order," in International relations theory and regional transformation, ed. T. V. Paul (Cambridge: UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America's World Role, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).; Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

A significant portion of state-centric studies on state armament or strategy making processes rely on the presence of an adversary. There is undoubtedly a clear positive relationship between external stimuli and strategic planning. As Payne correctly puts it, a state is provoked when another state in its security environment “possesses unusually large military forces or rapidly increases its forces.25 Hence, it would be sensible to expect the weight of exogenous factors to surge when there are changes or shifts in a state’s security milieu.

External factors are important to a state not only in identifying its target, but also in clarifying and completing its strategic planning process. Knorr puts this well:

Motives for state’s military effort depends, first, on foreign policy goals; second, on stimuli

received from the outside world, that is, on the perception of threats which may be warded

off or of opportunities to press foreign-policy goals by military means; third, on means-end

calculations, that is, on decisions about the magnitude or structure of military forces, on the

international uses of military capabilities, which are required by foreign-policy goals in the

perceived situations; and fourth, on the government’s estimated ability to extract the

necessary resources for the military sector – or in the case of the international use of force,

the government’s domestic ability to secure the commitment to such employment.26

Many of the papers that analyzes the balance of power have, not surprisingly, put greater emphasis on external stimulants - in other words, what states will react to and why they will react. However, while these papers may be useful in understanding the overall picture, caution

25 James L. Payne, Why Nations Arm (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: B. Blackwell, 1989). p.17. 26 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.138.

28 is needed, given that a regional security balance can be extremely fluid.

The dynamics and nature of states and their international relations have become more complex and sophisticated since the Second World War, particularly so during and after the Cold War.

Change has perhaps been greater than past theorists would have expected, as argued by Kahn who assessed paradigm shifts during the nuclear age (to 1971).27

Freedman summarized the change in military activities, arguing, “[In a] post-colonial world characterized by economic interdependence, there are fewer reasons to pursue the old mercantilist agenda of conquering and occupying productive territory, trade routes and gaining influence by planting the national flag on foreign shores.”28

Van Creveld makes a more provocative argument. He claims that the number of inter-state conflicts has decreased, but the frequency of intra-state conflicts has increased. This, he says, has caused a surge in “low intensity” warfare, which requires militaries to play a policing role, rather than its traditional one.29

Other studies have found that the nature of conflict itself is changing. Schelling noted that conflict occurs whenever the interests of two or more actors are opposed, and does not necessarily implicate war.30 Intriligator and Brito concur with Schelling’s view. They argue that

27 Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable, Discus book (New York, NY: Avon, 1971). 28 Lawrence Freedman, "War," Foreign Policy, no. 137 (2003). p16. 29 Creveld Martin van, "Through a Glass, Darkly: Some Reflections on the Future of War," Naval War College Review 53, no. 4 (2000). pp.41-42. 30 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York, NY: OUP, 1963). p.4

29 although arms races can end up in war, they can also avoid war.31 This provokes greater uncertainties about the external environment, and states may find themselves facing more dilemmas about what it should attune to, and how they should deal with it.

Oversensitivity to the security environment may put an actor in a dilemma, in which it faces greater uncertainty and incurs unnecessary costs. Schelling explained this dilemma well, arguing:

….it might seem that we could always be on the safe side by assuming that the enemy

will just do his worst to us. But the worst that he can do to us is not necessarily the best

that he can do for himself… but even in the cases where our interests and those of the

enemy are strictly opposed, we still cannot pin down the enemy’s behaviour by just

assuming that he will do his worst. The reasons are that he is in much the same position

as we. While the best choice for us depends on what he is going to do, his best choice

depends on what we are going to do.32

In short, Schelling sees a cycle of guesswork, with each actor guessing the other’s expectations and incentives.33 Although Schelling explains the process of calculating (or guessing) an adversary’s intentions, his study is far from complete. It is based on classic game theory, and it neglects a state’s unique country-specific strategic policy making dimensions – that is, the

31 Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 1 (1984). 32 Thomas C. Schelling, "Assumptions About Enemy Behavior," in Analysis for Military Decisions, ed. E. S. Quade, Rand lectures on systems analysis (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1964). p.199. 33 Ibid. p.216.

30 elements peculiar to a state and its situation.

The weaknesses in the theoretical works on external stimuli raises numerous questions concerning country-specific or region-specific analyses. Against this backdrop, examining the external determinants of the DPRK’s strategy is an extremely difficult exercise. Intuition might suggest that the basis of the DPRK’s strategy lies in its continuing antagonistic relations with the US alliance. This was highlighted by Hodge, who noted that several analysts believe that the

DPRK may execute a preemptive attack against the US.34

Be that as it may, the objective of our study is to determine how the DPRK sees the changes and shifts in its region. We need, therefore, to try to see how the DPRK sees the surrounding security environment. For this purpose, let us first survey the overall picture.

One of the glaring challenges in analyzing the DPRK’s external stimuli is the complexity and fluidity of the Asia-Pacific region. As Dibb well notes:

The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by

the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union…..Asia’s security is at a crossroads:

the region could go in the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into

confrontation and military conflict.35

While Dibb’s assessment has some force, for some, his analysis may seem confusing, perhaps

34 Homer T. Hodge, "North Korea's Military Strategy," Parameters 33, no. 1 (2003). p.70. 35Paul Dibb, "Strategic Trends (Military and Political in Asia)," Naval War College Review 54, no. 1 (2001). p.1.

31 even indecisive. This, however, is typical of studies of security in East Asia. Such confusion is pointed out by Berger, who argues that realist and liberalist paradigms tend to suggest stability in East Asia while constructivist paradigms (ideology and culture) tend to suggest instability.36

This was evident in the debate between Kang and Archaya, when they exchanged their conflicting views on how to interpret Asia.37 It is true to say that different perceptions of the region are apt to lead to different conclusions.

The fluidity of the region is a crucial factor. Often, scholars have anticipated that certain events would change the regional security order, but the expected outcomes have not come to pass. For example, Ellison asserts that with the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) and the end of the Cold War, all communist powers (except the DPRK, which resists reform) are diverging from their traditional forms of communist ideology, joining the world economy and implementing privatization, thereby bringing in a new and more prosperous better era in East Asia.38 Scholars like Dittmer have looked at the effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and concluded that the impact in East Asia has not been as great as anticipated.39

Growing number of scholars have attempted to assess the prospects for Asian states to equip

36 Thomas Berger, "Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia," Review of International Studies 26, no. 03 (2000). 37Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?," International Security 28, no. 3 (2004)., David C. Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," International Security 28, no. 3 (2004). 38 Herbert J. Ellison, East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order, ed. Robert S. Ross and Studies Institute of Southeast Asian (Singapore, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995). 39 Lowell Dittmer, "East Asia in the "New Era" in World Politics," World Politics 55, no. 1 (2002).

32 themselves with information-age technologies. Dibb argued that without technology in systems integration skills and without profound cultural change, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in East Asia will be slow and piecemeal.40 While these assessments should not be dismissed, whether these regional military developments have lived up to the states’ expectations are dubious.

Yet one of the aspects that is difficult to grasp, is the “rises” or “shifts” of particular states.

Numerous scholars have conjectured as to how certain states in East Asia will rise and affect the regional security dynamics. In Dibb’s paper, he predicts that in the near future, a multi-polar balance of power involving China, India, Japan, Russia and the US will emerge in East Asia. 41

Among these papers, a favoured subject is the “rise of China”. Scholars like Shambaugh have argued that China’s rise is strong enough to bring about a destabilizing change in the regional order.42 Kang, on the other hand, while acknowledging China’s strength, contends that a strong

China will bring greater stability, as opposed to the more pessimistic realist view that it will engender an arms race.43 At the same time, Jakobson and Knox provide the complex aspects of the internal dynamics of the new China in the 21st century.44

40 Paul Dibb, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian security," Survival 39, no. 4 (1997). p.112. 41 ———, The Future Balance of Power in East Asia : What are the Geopolitical Risks? , Working paper (Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre) ; no. 406. (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 2008). 42 David L. Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security 29, no. 3 (2004). 43David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security 27, no. 4 (2003).. 44 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, "New Foreign Policy Actors in China," in SIPRI Policy Paper, ed. SIPRI (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 2010).

Many have reviewed Japan’s new role in East Asia.45 The debate over whether Japan will return to a “normal” state by revising its “Peace Constitution” has been a heated topic.46 Some have also argued that Japan is using more than non-military and economic leverage to achieve its security objectives.47 However, after the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 2011, analysts such as Auslin have witnessed the shift in the Japanese public’s perception of security and in particular, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF).48

The ROK’s shift towards “self-reliance” is a contentious issue. Hamm offers a good summary of the ROK’s move towards military self-reliance.49 Quinones points to the lack of coherence in the ROK-US alliance, and argues that Seoul’s drift towards self-reliance is motivated by a diminished trust in its US alliance and a growing confidence in its own forces.50 The US-ROK alliance remains firmly in place despite the ups-and-downs caused by protests against the negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement activated on 15 March 2012. Yet, there are also debates over how the ROK’s security policies may be influenced by the National Assembly and

Presidential elections in 2012.51

45 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism," International Security 26, no. 3 (2001). 46 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's remilitarisation, ed. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi papers ; no. 403. (Oxon, UK:: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009). 47Edward J. Lincoln, "Japan: Using Power Narrowly," The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2003).. 48 Michael R. Auslin, "Japan Learns to Accept the Military," The Wall Street Journal Online(15 April 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703983104576262362763256644.html. 49Taik-young Hamm, "The ROK Towards Defence Self-reliance," Military technology 31, no. 1 (2007). 50 C. Kenneth Quinones, "The Real Problem in the Koreas," Far Eastern Economic Review 167, no. 43 (2004). 51 International Crisis Group, "South Korea: The Shifting Sands of Security Policy," in Asia Briefing No.13 (Seoul, ROK; Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 1 December 2011).

Measuring the nature of the changes or shifts in the regional security balance also depends on the US presence in East Asia. There is little doubt that the US-Japan, US-ROK alliances remain strong in East Asia. Yet, interesting debates exists over the nature and credibility of the US’s extended deterrence and/or extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia.52 One could also question how the US’ Air-Sea Battle (ASB) will impact the regional security dynamics in East Asia.53

The major problem with such assessments is that they can readily become outdated. The regional security environment can be extremely fluid, due to the states’ policies and regional developments (or incidents). Furthermore, it may still be premature to expect to identify with clarity and certainty changes occurring in the regional security balance. For example, Johnson argues that it is too early yet to judge whether China is a status-quo or revisionist power.54 Even today, it is still hard to conceptualize how China’s development of the Varyag aircraft carrier and the J-20 stealth fighter, or its Anti-Access/Anti-Denial (A2AD) strategy will impact the regional security dynamics. The same can be said of other changes under way (or expected) in other states. Therefore, a genuine analysis may only be possible when the changes or events are complete.

Moreover, latent and just relying on subtle movements towards conflict can make conclusive analysis difficult. For instance, even during seemingly tranquil times, strong undercurrents of

52 Andrew O'Neil, "Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent?," International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011). 53 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle? , ed. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Studies (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010). 54 Johnson argues that China favors the status quo on the Korean peninsula, see: Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?," International Security 27, no. 4 (2003).

35 hostility can erupt, escalate and endanger the status quo.55 Even when such episodes appear to have passed, further unexpected changes can suddenly develop. In short, it would be imprudent to analyze a state’s strategic planning based solely on external factors, because they merely reflect a given situation at a given time. It is vitally important to identify the key changes and events that influence a state’s strategic decisions.

Let us return to the DPRK. Many papers have attempted to assess the DPRK’s strategy vis-à-vis its region. This subject drew keen attention when the nuclear issue came to the fore. While these papers demonstrate an understanding of the DPRK’s strategy towards the US-Japan-ROK alliance, they seem to focus more on how to bait or coerce the DPRK out of its current behaviour.56 Indeed, these papers demonstrate the efficacy of Pyongyang’s strategy. However, they are limited in their usefulness when it comes to discerning the strategic policy-making process in the DPRK.

Determining the motives that drive the DPRK’s strategy has proved to be as puzzling as the strategy itself. Consider this analysis by Bae, who sees Pyongyang’s strategy as multi-tiered:

North Korean policy toward the West, including Japan, appears to be changing but it is

difficult to judge whether it is completely altering its fundamental strategy toward

South Korea. In other words, the peaceful gesture toward the South may be tactics to

55 See: International Crisis Group, "North East Asia's Undercurrents of Conflict," in Asia Report No. 108 (Seoul, ROK: International Crisis Group, 2005). 56 Michael Horowitz, "Who is Behind That Curtain? Unveiling Potential Leverage over Pyongyang," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2004). Victor D. Cha, "Can North Korea be Engaged?," Survival 46, no. 2 (2004). Michael E. O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, "Toward a Grand Bargain with North Korea," The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2003).

improve its relationship with the Western countries supporting the South Korean

government. By doing so, North Korea is trying to move out of diplomatic isolation and

economic sanctions from the Western countries, including the USA. As a result, most

EU countries are attempting to restore or have already formed diplomatic relationships

with North Korea with the agreement of South Korea. Nevertheless, as long as North

Korea does not relinquish its primary goal to ‘communise’ the South, the military

tension cannot easily be removed between these two countries and the North will

remain a major security threat to the South in spite of a series of peace talks.57

Indeed, the DPRK probably seeks to assess its regional uncertainties from a broad perspective, by taking into account events beyond its immediate region. To assess this, given that Asian regions are intertwined diplomatically, economically and politically, we need to take into account the other regions that affect the DPRK’s strategy (i.e. South East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East). First of all, the effects of the rise and fall of states (and other events) upon a regional security environment are so pervasive and complex that analyzing them is bound to be extremely demanding. For example, if Pyongyang is concerned with the increasing influence of

Japan, it also has to devote attention to other factors such as the attitudes of ASEAN states,

China and, of course, the US.

Even in the case of the China-DPRK relationship, care must be taken. Scobell argues that despite Beijing and Pyongyang’s wariness of each other, they both acknowledge that they need each other for the sake of their national security and interests. Given current circumstances and

57 Jun-Sik Bae, "Country Survey XVIII: The Two Koreas; Defence Economy," Defence and Peace Economics 14, no. 1 (2003). p.62.

37 trends, this situation is likely to continue and to have the fewest disadvantages for both.58

In addition, we should not underestimate the significance of the ASEAN states. In fact, there are signs of a peculiar relationship between some ASEAN states and the DPRK in arms trade and economic agreements. Yet studies on the relationship between South East Asian states and the

DPRK have been patchy at best. Moreover, the rising influence of the states in the South East

Asia region, especially in regional forums, has the potential to directly or indirectly affect the changing security balance in East Asia.59 In short, assessing the external determinants of the

DPRK’s strategy requires an assessment of the pervasive complexities in the region’s security dynamics.

However, perhaps one of the most glaring problems is how Pyongyang’s defence planning would fare in the regional security architecture. Regardless of the developments in the DPRK, we must take into account the cost-gain factor and even the affordability factor. As the states in the region now compete with each other in qualitative arms modernization, it is dubious whether the DPRK has the capacity to compete in an arms race, simply because of the severe economic problems it faces. That is, even if the DPRK finds the revenue to modernize its military forces, it may be too late. Eberstadt explains:

North Korea’s ‘military burden’ is determined not only by government priorities, but by

58Andrew Scobell and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute., China and North Korea from Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm's Length (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004). pp.28-29. 59 Ronald Huisken, Southeast Asia: major power playground or finishing school? , Working paper; no. 408. (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 2008).

the specifics of the contest into which it has entered. In all likelihood, North Korea’s

defense industries have been locked into a competition on highly disadvantageous terms.

Confronting the US-ROK alliance in a high-tech (and rapidly innovating) military

adversary, North Korean defense industries presumably have embarked upon projects

where their rates of return upon capital expenditures were extremely low; if so, it is

possible that the resource requirements of the North Korean defense effort could have

escalated suddenly and steeply, even after manpower build-up had been long under

way…One may observe, however, attempts at military modernization may be especially

costly in an economy where technological innovation lags and international avenues of

technology transfer are marginal. Thus, even if the ratio of armed forces to total

population had declined somewhat in recent years, it would not necessarily follow that

the country’s ‘military burden’ had abated as well.60

Eberstadt’s explanation gives rise to an important question: how would the DPRK balance military modernization and its poor economic status? We can agree with Minnich that

Pyongyang will find ways to “increase its military capabilities through minimal fund expenditures.”61 Be that as it may, this still leaves the how question unanswered. It is clear that internal constraints are a major factor in the DPRK’s strategy making. This is not to say that external determinants should be disregarded. In fact, the external stimulants give us clues as to what intimidates the DPRK and what it will attune its strategies to meet. Nonetheless, the

60 Nicholas Eberstadt, "Development, Structure and Performance of the DPRK Economy: Empirical Hints," in North Korea in Transition: Prospects for Economic and Social Reform, ed. Lawrence J. Lau and Chang-Ho Yoon (London, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001). p.42 61 James M. Minnich, The North Korean People's Army: Origins and Current Tactics (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005). p.71.

DPRK’s internal problems will have a very significant bearing on its military strategy.

4. INTERNAL FACTORS

Let us now turn to the internal stimulants to a state’s strategic policy making. Bathurst summarized the connection, arguing that a nation’s military strategy or war policies are reflected from its cultural, political and social structures, mores, systems and institutions, and unique perceptions derived from them.62

Knorr offered another descriptive explanation. He contended that military potential is mainly determined by economic, administrative and political factors, where it is apparent that:

….a given military effort may be based on different combinations of these determinants.

Within some range, an inferiority in one can be compensated with superiority in

another…a poor country may produce strong forces, compared with nations of similar

size, because it excels in administrative skill and/or because it is willing to pay for

military power by reducing consumption.63

Brooks makes a plea for greater attention to internal determinants, claiming that it is essential to look outside the traditionalist method of military analysis, and pay attention to a state’s

62 Robert B. Bathurst, Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy (Oslo, Norway; London, UK: International Peace Research Institute ; Sage Publications, 1993). cited in: Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999). p.137. 63Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.30.

“underlying social, cultural, and institutional fabric, as well as the pressures of its international environment.” 64 Brooks continues:

Military effectiveness is measured according to the degree to which a military exhibits

four crucial attributes: the integration of military activity within and across different

levels; responsiveness to internal constraints and to the external environment; high skill,

as measured in the motivation and basic competencies of personnel; and high quality, as

indicated by the caliber of a state’s weapons and equipment.65

While it is tempting to agree with Brooks’s statement, it does seem less than comprehensive.

First, one may question whether there are other internal variables that might be determinants of military effectiveness. Second, Brooks does not elaborate on the coefficients of these individual elements on state armament. This is important, when looking at the dynamics of the strategic policy making process as a whole.

In the same book, Biddle maintains that nonmaterial causal variables, such as skill, are important in analyzing effective military outcomes. Here, Biddle criticizes material-centric analysis that excludes non-material causatives:

Policy decisions informed by such models are thus likely to overspend on materiel and

under-spend on the readiness and training needed for skilled force employment.

Similarly, threat assessments based on the numbers and types of hostile weapons are

64Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." p.9. 65Ibid. p.10.

likely to overestimate the real capabilities of enemies with modern equipment but limited

skills, and underestimate militaries with modern equipment but high skills.66

Biddle points to an important aspect that is often overlooked. Skill and administrative competence are generated internally, not externally. Undoubtedly, skill and professionalism would be weighty factors in developing sound strategies, and it would be instructive to conduct comparative country-by-country analyses of this aspect. The issue here is that gauging the level of skill will be an uphill struggle when assessing countries that provides relevant sources.

A contrasting variant to the study of internal determinants has been the causative nexus between internal conflict and dissatisfaction on the one hand and to external conflict behaviours. This issue will be very relevant when analyzing the strategic policy making of failing states or totalitarian regimes like the DPRK.

4.1. STRATEGIC CULTURE

Over the years, an increasing number of analysts and scholars have tried to determine whether actors or states “naturally” behave in a certain way.67 One could point to geography, which would function as a constant. However, in the military context, geographical factors seem to

66 Stephen Biddle, "Explaining Military Outcomes," in Creating Military Power : the Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). p.218. 67 Thomas C. Schelling, "Altruism, Meanness, and Other Potentially Strategic Behaviors," The American Economic Review 68, no. 2 (1978).

42 matter in logistical and tactical terms.68 There is inevitably something – an internal determinant constant flowing from a nation’s geography, its historical experience and its traditional values, deep-rooted in the culture of the state or its region. An early work on the “natural behaviour” of states was by Richardson, who made the following statement:

Why are so many nations reluctantly but steadily increasing their armaments as if they

were mechanically compelled to do so? Because, I say, they follow their traditions,

which are fixtures, and their instincts, which are mechanical and because they have not

yet made a sufficiently strenuous intellectual and moral effort to control the situation…it

is what would occur if instinct and tradition were allowed to act uncontrolled.69

While Richardson does not elaborate on what these “traditions” and “instincts” are, we can assume that he has in mind the cultural aspects or inherited behaviours of states.

Debates over this multi-disciplinary field (involving psychology, culture, sociology and strategy) gained increasing attention in the second half of the twentieth century. Gray reflected on the

Cold War, arguing that “there was a notably Soviet-Russian dimension to the Cold War foe; we were not competing with some abstract superpower A or B that was beyond culture.” 70 The importance of identifying the “unique” nature of actors was most sorely felt by those involved in military campaigns that were let down by intelligence failures.

68 See: Douglas R. Caldwell, Judy Ehlen, and R. S. Harmon, Studies in Military Geography and Geology (Dordrecht; Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Pub., 2004). 69 Lewis Fry Richardson, Nicolas Rashevsky, and Ernesto Trucco, Arms and Insecurity: a Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War (Ann Arbor, MI: reprinted for Boxwood Press by University Microfilms International, 1978). pp.12-13. 70Gray, Modern Strategy. p.134.

Hughes-Wilson highlighted the problem of understanding the difference between a potential adversary’s capability and his intentions. He claimed that capability is merely a measure of the potential threat, while intentions determine whether the threat is actually credible. 71 In attempting to divine an adversary’s intentions, too many analysts have relied only on factors such as ideology and repeated actualized behaviours.

The importance of culture has been debated by many theorists. These debates were reviewed by

Desch, who concluded:

The new cultural theories in security studies show some promise of supplementing realist

theories by explaining lags between structural change and state behavior, accounting for

deviant state behavior, and explaining behavior in structurally indeterminate

environments.72

Desch’s argument is plausible, but testing it would be extremely difficult, given the vagueness inherent in defining culture in the context of security or strategy.73

Murray and Grimsley identify politics, ideology and geography as the core components of a state’s strategic culture, which they say “may make it difficult for a state to evolve sensible and

71 John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-ups, Rev. and updated ed. (New York, NY: Carroll & Graf, 2004). pp.5-7. 72 Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security 23, no. 1 (1998). 73 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security 19, no. 4 (1995). pp.37.

44 realistic approaches to the strategic problems that confront it.”74

Thakur offers another explanation. He argues that strategic culture is what compels a state to opt for a strategic choice derived from its own political culture that is distinctive from strategic choices made by other states, even when they are facing the same issues.75

Scobell took the definition a step further, defining strategic culture as the “fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and military elites in a country.”76

The definitions offered by Scobell and Thakur, though different, point in an essentially similar direction. Their definitions amount, in effect, to a set of elements that gives a state a unique character in its decision making.

Johnson offers a more refined definition. He sees strategic culture as the “predominant strategic references that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.”77

74 Williamson Murray, Grimsley Mark, "Introduction," in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin H. Bernstein (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994). pp.3. 75 Ramesh Thakur, "New Zealand: the Security and Tyranny of Isolation," in Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. Ken Booth and Russell B. Trood (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999). p.314. 76Andrew Scobell and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute., China and Strategic Culture (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002). p.2. 77 Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture." p.34.

Johnson’s study is unique in that he divorces ideology from strategic culture, arguing that the two differ in nature. Strategic culture is more instinctive, as opposed to ideology which is more voluntary. Ideology has its significance albeit to a limited extent – functioning mainly to exploit symbols for regime survival, as well as pretexts for implementing and sustaining a system of

“in-group solidarity”.78 Thus, ideology serves only as a decorative supplement for domestic political ends.

In the same study, Johnson contends that the most consistent and powerful elements of strategic culture are those that remain congruent over a long period.79 That is to say, it would be most appropriate to determine the nature of a state’s strategic culture by examining it in the historical context.

A that remains unexplored is whether a new form of strategic culture has developed in the

DPRK. Studies by analysts such as Baird, seems to have focused on the visible aspects of the

DPRK’s diplomatic/political behaviour, as opposed to the core cultural underpinnings.80 Given the relatively short history of the state itself, and the closed nature of the regime, indeed one may encounter difficulties in unearthing the DPRK’s strategic culture. However, Pyongyang’s strategic culture could be better understood, by identifying how the regime has dealt with its domestic affairs, rather than merely focusing on the nature of its dealings with the regional

78 Ibid. pp.57-59. 79 Ibid. p.49. 80 Merrily Baird, "Kim Chong-il's Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea's Strategic Culture," in Know Thy Enemy:Profiles of Adversary Leadersand Their Strategic Cultures, ed. Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2003).

46 powers.

Insights into the DPRK’s strategic culture can be found in its sense of monoculture with the

ROK - banmannyeon ui ryeoksa. (5000-year history). To Korean people, this term signifies their five millenniums of common history and shared cultural values, language, social values and traditional ideology. Moreover, Moon argues, the Korean peninsula has been the theatre of over nine hundred invasions, and as a result, loss of sovereignty and then division have shaped the “realist metastructure” of the Korean strategic mindset.81

Cha concludes that it is the “time’s cycle” paradigm of Korean strategic thought (in which one fears the recurrence of historical ordeals) that influence strategic decisions by the ROK government. 82 Certainly, Cha’s assessment focuses more on the ROK and its military modernization. Nevertheless, his view sheds valuable light on factors likely to be mirrored in the DPRK. A crucial question for further assessment could be whether the division of the

Korean peninsula has caused the strategic culture of the two Koreas to go their separate ways.

4.2. POLITICS AND MILITARY POWER

81 Chung-in Moon, "South Korea: Recasting Security Paradigms," in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). Cited in: Victor D. Cha, "Strategic Culture and the Military Modernization of South Korea," Armed Forces and Society 28, no. 1 (2001). p.110. 82 See: ———, "Strategic Culture and the Military Modernization of South Korea." p.110.

“Mobilization of military potential is also political mobilization.”83 Like many others who adopt von Clausewitz’s philosophy, Hammond argues that military leverage is an instrument with which a state may realize its political objectives. Indeed, even to this day, the relationship between a state’s politics and armament has remained consistent.

Realists and statists have found various ways to restate this dictum of von Clausewitz: “War is the continuation of policy by other means.”84 Yet in the broad context of politics, interpretation of the relationship between politics and military capability management, or defence planning can be puzzling. Knorr argued:

Unlike economic and technological capacity, and administrative skill, which are readily

understood and whose contribution to national military potential is immediately apparent,

the political bases of military strength are less obvious and more difficult to identity and

describe. Moreover, care must be taken in distinguishing between the determinants of

potential military power and those factors which determine the mobilization of this

potential; that is, antecedent conditions must be separated from situational factors.85

One way in which politics influences the strategic planning process is bias - that is, preferences by groups within the political or military elite. Snyder argues that:

Generally speaking, we can divide sources of bias in decision making into two groups:

83 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.137. Referring to: Paul Y. Hammond, "The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations," World Politics 19, no. 3 (1967). pp.443-449. 84 Carl von Clausewitz et al., On war (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). p.69. 85 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.27.

the first, biases rooted in the motivations of the decision makers, especially in their

parochial interests; and the second, biases that result from decision makers’ attempts to

simplify and impose a structure on their complex analytical tasks. Both groups of bias

can be viewed as cognitive phenomena, skewing the perceptions and choices of

individual decision makers; they can also be considered organizational phenomena,

shaping the structure, ideology, and standard operating procedures of institutions.86

Snyder also correctly argues that military elites tend to resort to offensive strategies to secure their autonomous position in the state (economically and socially), labelling their interests as the

“most pervasive source of motivational bias”. 87 If this is the case, it raises the question whether the nature and magnitude of the bias differs in different types of political regimes. One would expect that bias of military elites will be greater in militarist states than in democratic states.

Despite the apparent plausibility of the “biasing” factor in the strategic policy making cycle, there are major difficulties standing in the way of any adequate analysis. One such difficulty is how to differentiate between ideology and militarism. Refinement of the role of politics in strategic planning requires assessment of the influence of ideology – does ideology serve for the better, or further complicate and retard the process? Knorr extensively explained the significance of ideology with the following:

Ideology is a set of interrelated beliefs generalizing about relevant parts and properties of

86 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914. p.18. 87 Ibid. pp.200-211.

the environment. Such beliefs are apt to enter the decision-making process whether they

are loose or rigid, fragmentary or comprehensive, formal or informal, and regardless of

whether or not the actors are conscious of the fact that they subscribe to an ideology in

this sense. Administrators and politicians anywhere are more or less subject to such

beliefs which may concern the nature of their own state, and its political and economic

system. They may also concern the nature and value of science and

technology…ideology does not take the place of analysis but provides it with a degree of

guidance… it follows that, in affecting decisions on military forces and their use, the

weight of ideological assumptions will be the greater, the more commonly and rigidly

they are held, and the more comprehensive they are about the relevant environment.88

One may then question whether a unique form of ideology within a military institution exists.

Snyder noted that military ideology functions to provide greater efficiency and integration in the military, but also to legitimize the ends of the military institution. He summarizes as follows:

In France and Germany, the military developed an organizational ideology – a coherent

set of shared beliefs about the nature of war, the keys to success in combat, and the

prerequisites for healthy military institutions.89

This military ideology, however, may be embraced by a whole society. Consider the DPRK’s songun. This ideology is spread throughout the DPRK’s political and social life to mobilize the population for a cause or even a raison d’état. In the military context, it is used almost as a force

88 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. pp.132-133. 89 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914. p.210.

50 multiplier. According to Jeon Duk-sung, a North Korean academic, ideology is the single most important factor in the DPRK’s military power, an element more powerful than weapons.90

The significance of ideology in the strategy making process is uncertain. It is plausible to argue that a common ideology can unite soldiers and civilians. However whether it has direct implications for a state’s military strength is uncertain. During the Pacific War, Japan employed a similar ideological campaign, but the campaign did not really help in their war efforts. This is not to say that military ideology was the direct cause of the failure, but neither did it help the

Japanese forces in any significant way.

It seems reasonable to assume that ideology affects strategic policy making in some way. Yet one important question remains unanswered. Do ideologies act as fixtures or as variables?

Knorr suggests the latter. He argues that ideologies are prone to revision, especially in the face of situational problems. Such pragmatic revision can give rise to divisions within a state and perhaps undermine social control.91

However, despite such internal dangers, Marxist states are capable of prodigious ideological shifts. A notable example is the Soviet Union, which moved away from its traditional ideology to thaw its relations with the US. A similar development was seen when the DPRK partially moderated its Cold War policy vis-à-vis the ROK in 2000. 92

90 Deok-sung Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2004). pp. 66-67. 91 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. pp.133-144. 92 Norman D. Levin, "What if North Korea survives?," Survival 39, no. 4 (1997). pp.166-167.

Another related aspect that bears consideration is nationalism. Nationalism often contains as much ideological features as political beliefs. Yet nationalism is rich in loyalty towards national identity, traditions, or ethnic values. In the context of military effectiveness, Posen explains that nationalism can induce troops to participate in a cause willingly, even to the extent of self-sacrifice; it can strengthen a sense of camaraderie in a society; and it can inspire a population to mobilize.93

Reiter, on the other hand, views nationalism from a broader perspective. He maintains that leaders exploit nationalism to forge national identity, to bolster their power base and to win a population to a collective cause, even to the extent of exploiting myths. Further, Reiter argues that when a state’s military is technologically or logistically disadvantaged, a climate of nationalism can enable a regime to suicide tactics.94

The arguments offered by the two authors are quite intuitive, and fit well with the characteristics of the DPRK’s military behaviour. However, in terms of strategic policy making, it may not be so relevant given that nationalism in the form characterized by Posen and Reiter is more effective at the operational and tactical level.

While we have a sound understanding of how politics influences strategy, this is not matched by our understanding of the relationship between types of political regimes and military capability.

93 Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (1993). p.81. 94 Dan Reiter, "Nationalism and Military Effectiveness: Post-Meiji Japan," in Creating Military Power : the Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). pp.28-29.

Too often scholars have lost themselves in indefinite (and often overlapping) terms such as

“militarism”, “military strength”, “ideology”, “socialism”, ”communism”, “totalitarianism” and even “democracy”.

The first step would be to address what seems to be a blurred relationship between militarism and socialism. History has proved to us that while militarism may not be exclusive only to communist and socialist ideologies, almost all communist revolutions have been the result of armed conflict or exploitation of the military; the soviet revolution in Russia in 1917, Mongolia in 1921, China from 1928 to 1949 and Vietnam. While the DPRK case differs somewhat, the military dimensions of the “revolution” were clear, when Kim Il-sung aggressively made efforts to gain control over the KPA. These patterns fit nicely with by Mao’s famous quote, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.”

Payne contends that the communist struggle is invoked to justify the “creation of a highly centralized, dictatorial regime.”95 It also justifies “the totalitarian intrusion by the government into all fields – art, religion, sports, and the family.”96 At the same time, however, Payne labels these regimes as dangerous, on the ground that militarism is a measure of a government’s efforts to forge its state’s ideological identity, justifying the central role of the military in the state’s cause to combat its adversaries (capitalists).97

Dye and Zeigler supported Payne’s somewhat bald view in the course of their argument that

95Payne, Why Nations Arm. p.105. 96Ibid. pg.105. 97Ibid. pp.115-225.

53 socialist states are inherently militarist and dangerous.98 Their view provoked some fierce criticism, most notably from Parenti and later Kinnucan.99 The seed of the disagreement seems to lie in the conceptualization of militarism.

First, it is important to clarify what is meant by the terms militarization, militarism and militarist state. Albrecht defines militarization simply as the “process of enlargement of the military establishment within a society”.100 This can be achieved by any state. Japan during the early half of the twentieth century was under a militarist dictatorship, but was far from Marxist.

If we are talking about militarism in socialist states, we must treat it in its own right.

Albrecht surveyed debates within socialist states about militarism. While recognizing that the debates are still at an early stage, Albrecht nevertheless sees that militarism is controversial issue within socialist circles (and is even treated as taboo by some).101

The second problem regarding the term militarization is that participants in this debate have used different methods of measuring the connection between militarism and military power, thereby weakening their arguments somewhat weak. Payne, Dye and Zeigler have all sought to

98 Thomas R. Dye and Zeigler Harmon, "Socialism and Militarism," PS: Political Science and Politics 22, no. 4 (1989). 99Michael Parenti, "Socialism, Capitalism, and Militarism: A Reply to Dye and Zeigler," PS: Political Science and Politics 23, no. 4 (1990)., Michael J. Kinnucan, "Political Economy and Militarism," PS: Political Science and Politics 25, no. 3 (1992). 100 Albrecht cited in: Saadet Deger and Somnath Sen, "Military Expenditure and Developing Countries," in Handbook of Defense Economics, ed. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (Amsterdam ; New York: Elsevier, 1995). p.300. 101 Ulrich Albrecht, "Red Militarism," Journal of Peace Research 17, no. 2 (1980).

54 gauge militarism based on quantitative measures,102 such as numbers of tanks or percentage of

GNP committed to military expenditure. The problem is that these measures may often be the result of poor force structure management.

Parenti, on the other hand, asks this rhetorical question:

Why is not militarism also measured by the number of overseas bases, new weapons

systems, advances in military technology and firepower, willingness to escalate or

maintain the arms race, unwillingness to accept arms limitations proposals,

unwillingness to respond positively to unilateral arms cutbacks by the opposing side,

unwillingness to agree to a “no first-use” policy on nuclear arms, and unwillingness to

join in a bilateral freeze on arms testing and weapons research and development? 103

The problem with Parenti’s question is that he argues as if militarism can be gauged by the level of military strength.104 That may be taking things too far, as the purpose of militarism in militarist states may not be to maximize their military capabilities. This was noted by Knorr, who argued:

Nor is it necessary for a strong authoritarian government to have a strong disposition to

seek military solutions of international disputes, or to be aggressive in the use of military

102 Thomas R. Dye and Zeigler Harmon, "Socialism and Militarism: Confronting Ideology with Evidence," PS: Political Science and Politics 23, no. 4 (1990). 103 Parenti, "Socialism, Capitalism, and Militarism: A Reply to Dye and Zeigler." p.579. 104 Ibid. p.579.

strength for acquisitive ends…Authoritarian governments have often been weak.105

This hints at a very important possibility – that the role of the military in highly centralized states may be chiefly a policing function, intended to consolidate the power base of the regime.

Socialist regimes often place enormous emphasis on the party’s control of the military. Hence we can assume that military institutions in socialist states often have dual roles – political and military functions.

If militarism is utilized for political means in socialist states, one would question their actual military behavior. Often there are misconceptions with the notion that socialist, militarist states are dangerous because it is their raison d’état to be antagonistic or to destabilize their region.

First of all, documents and propaganda communications in socialist states are often poorly understood abroad, either because of naivety or meanings “lost in translation”. This is understandable, as most communist regimes place strong emphasis on the role of the military, and their literature is replete with combat-oriented language. 106 However, such language must be interpreted with much caution. Sloganistic communications and publications that propagate struggle, wars or revolution are used to legitimize the actions or decisions of the state.

Second, there is little adequate evidence that Marxist regimes are naturally aggressive in practice. Freedman rejects any suggestion of a correlation between types of political systems and war readiness. He points out that “stable, liberal democracies have shown themselves to be

105 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.147. 106 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 2nd ed., Pergamon international library of science, technology, engineering and social studies (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1984). p.33.

56 quite warlike when convinced of a just cause.”107 Rather, Levy argues, wars may simply be due to “human nature, biological instincts, frustration, fear and greed, the existence of weapons, and similar factors.”108

Generally, as the authors of the Small Arms Survey 2006 points to an interesting aspect:

Starting with the guerrilla traditions for revolutionary warfare, and adapting them to the

defence of the state, people’s war stresses mobilisation of massive numbers of lightly

armed infantry. Inspired – directly or indirectly – by Maoist notions of resistance and

conquest, this strategy relies on infantry and partisans armed primarily with small

arms.109

That said, we must also keep in mind that militarism in communist/socialist states also differs in nature. Assumptions that communist states and militarist states are “out of the same box” are apt to lead to shallow, misconceived conclusions. We must keep in mind that communist states come in “different shapes and sizes”. Moreover, although their ideological foundations may be virtually indistinguishable, their respective conditions and even their respective shifts towards pragmatism have made them unique and quite distinct in character from each other. This was demonstrated by Boswell and Chase-Dunn, who commented on the contrasts between communist states in East Asia. They argued that the DPRK differs significantly from Vietnam

107 Freedman, "War." p.16. 108 Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War and The Conditions of Peace," Annual Review of Political Science 1, no. 1 (1998). p. 141. 109 Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva Switzerland), Small Arms Survey 2006 : Unfinished Business (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006). p.47.

57 or China, as it remain committed to its communist monarchy, with its own unique ideological identity. 110

Another observation is relevant. When it comes to an actual war, there is no real congruency with ideology or political system. Even in totalitarian states, evidence of any correlation between militarism and bellicosity is equally weak. For instance, both Turkmenistan and the

DPRK practice extreme forms of totalitarianism. However unlike the DPRK, Turkmenistan does not vaunt itself as a military state, much less arm itself heavily. Rather, their common trait is that they have both implemented strict policing systems, which is wholly a matter of internal policy. The only obvious difference may be that democratic states tend to be more committed to international agreements and organizations, so that it is more difficult for them to legitimize and rationalize engaging in a full-scale war.

Therefore, although one would not unquestioningly accept stereotyped arguments for a triangular connection between communism, militarism and totalitarianism, there does seem to be an undeniable, but unexplainable, correlation between them. However, there is inadequate evidence for an automatic uniform relationship. We would be prudent to treat states on a case-by-case basis, looking at how each state with its own unique ideological and political traits, formulates its strategies.

So how unique is the DPRK political system? Some experts like Victor Cha have successfully

110 Terry Boswell and Christopher K. Chase-Dunn, The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism : Toward Global Democracy, Power and social change--studies in political sociology. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). pp.3,108.

58 described the characteristics of the totalitarian regime.111 However, to understand the structure of the DPRK system, we need to examine its roots.

Just like its ideology, the DPRK model was a fusion, as Armstrong argues:

This [North Korean] militarization combined the key elements that contributed to the

North Korean system as a whole: the militarization of North Korean society was built on

the Japanese colonial legacy of wartime mobilization, led by veterans of the guerrilla

wars in Manchuria and China, and equipped and advised by the Soviet Union112

The formation of the DPRK regime was far from simple. Suh outlined how Korean communist movements struggled not only in seizing power, but also in establishing integrity in its organization.113 Moreover, Suh also states that the bulk of the “original” Korean communist movements prior to 1945 were separate from Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns.114

The multifaceted nature of communism in Korea is also well described by Armstrong:

In the end, North Korea communism would not only be quite distinctive from its Soviet

111 See: Victor D. Cha, The Impossible state: North Korea, Past and Future, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Ecco, 2012). 112 Charles K. Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950, Studies of the East Asian Institute (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). p.217. 113 Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948, Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). 114 See: ibid.

model, it would in some respects turn Marxism-Leninism up-side-down. The typical

North Korean emphasis on ideology over material circumstances, for example, was a

complete reversal of Marxist orthodoxy. The “cult” of the Supreme Leader, though

partly inspired by Stalin, developed a unique vocabulary of familial images in North

Korea and became far more stable and long-lasting than its counterparts in USSR and

China. The organicist imagery of DPRK ideology displaced the language of class

struggle with the language of national unity and independence. The rigid social

hierarchies that became apparent in DPRK after the Korean War belied the egalitarian

ethos of socialism but were quite understandable in the context of a deep-seated pattern

of social construction and stable hierarchy that had long distinguished Korea from its

East Asian neighbors.115

Initially, the DPRK regime proved to have incredible potential. Earlier works on the DPRK during the Cold War saw a state with the potential to rise to an autonomous position in the

Communist world.116 Scholars were impressed by Pyongyang’s skilful exploitation of the deteriorating relations between China and the Soviet Union.117 The Soviet policy of restraining the DPRK failed in the late 1960s, when Pyongyang carried out a series of attacks on the ROK and the US.118 Some predicted that the DPRK would continue to improve its international position, to broaden its network and to stay independent of other communist powers.119

115 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. pp.243-244. 116 B.C. Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs 38, no. 3 (1965). 117 ———, "North Korea and the Sino-Soviet Schism," The Western Political Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1969).; Another paper that looks at the same issue is: John Bradbury, "Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea," The China Quarterly, no. 6 (1961). 118 Kim Joungwon Alexander, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," World Politics 22, no. 2 (1970). 119 M. T. Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," Asian Survey 5, no. 8 (1965).

Today, these predictions sound implausible, even naive, but when these papers were written, the

DPRK was a highly industrialized state which enjoyed a respected economic status in East Asia, and posed a credible military threat. Yet after the economic decline, and succession to the Kim

Jong-il regime, many raised questions over what would happen when the regime’s control over the state declines. For instance, during the early 1990s, Foster-Carter stated, “Once he [Kim

Il-sung] is gone, almost anything might happen – despite his strenuous efforts to tie up the succession in advance.”120

Still, the regime survived through various struggles. Rather, the political system was strengthened military without a coup d’état taking place. Yi concludes that while the KPA does have a privileged status in socio-political terms, both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il made preemptive efforts in controlling the military by giving extraordinary amount of strength to the

GPB.121 Even after the introduction of songun, Yi points out that “While the role of the military strengthened, there was no increase in independent influence by the military or supremacy of the military.”122 Okonogi makes a similar argument, claiming that while the KPA gained more power after the death of Kim Il-sung, this symbolized Kim Jong-il’s exploitation of the KPA to measures to establish his own authority as opposed to the KPA’s unchallenged rise in the DPRK

120 Aidan Foster-Carter, "North Korea, The End of the Beginning," in Communism and Reform in East Asia, ed. David S. G. Goodman (London, UK; Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass, 1988). 121 Dae-keun Yi, bukhangun eun wae kudetareul haji ana [why don't the Korean People's Army make a coup] (Paju, ROK: Hanul Academy, 2003). 122 Ibid. p.87.

61 political system.123

With the rise of a military-centred politics in the DPRK, one would then question how its strategic behaviour is affected. Since the 1990s, scholars have flocked to study the DPRK’s strategy, and its context. Many of the studies on the DPRK’s strategy report mixed findings. For instance, Cha evaluates the DPRK’s strategy by reference to three hypotheses: badges, shields and swords. He argues that if existential deterrent or prestige-based hypothesis is confirmed, the threat is resolvable, but if it is denial strategy, it poses a serious threat.124 Other studies, such as

Huisken’s, have adequately analyzed what the DPRK is doing, or did, but these have not been backed up by an assessment of how, or why.125

Many researchers and scholars in research institutes affiliated to the military assert that the

DPRK’s strategy is offensive. Takesada contends that the DPRK’s ultimate strategic objective was and is to bring revolution to the whole Korean peninsula.126 Hodge makes a similar argument; that the DPRK sees an offensive strategy as a “viable option for ensuring regime survival and realizing reunification on North Korean terms.”127

123 Masao Okonogi, "kiki no nakano kyoujinna seiji taisei [the tenacious political system in crisis]," in kitachousen: sono jitsuzou to kiseki [North Korea: the real image and its path] (Tokyo, Japan: Kobunken, 1998). p.13. 124 Victor D. Cha, "North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?," Political Science Quarterly 117(2002). 125 Ronald Huisken, North Korea: Power Play or Buying Butter with Guns? (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2004). 126Hideshi Takesada, "chosen hantou de okiteiru koto [the things really happening on the Korean Peninsula]," shin kokusaku [new national policy] 72, no. 19 (2005). pp.7-9. 127 Hodge, "North Korea's Military Strategy." p.72.

To the contrary, analysts such as Coe contend that the DPRK’s military objectives are more defensive. Coe claims that since the Kim Il-Sung era, the DPRK has developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as an independent deterrent, because of their fear of losing influence or affiliation with Beijing and Moscow.128 Arguments for the defensive strategy view are also plausible, considering that the DPRK is now in a desperate plight, and has to pursue all possible options to protect itself. The problem here is that many of these scholars tend to understate the importance of The DPRK’s conventional military capabilities.

In his historical survey of the DPRK’s consistent but thematic military behaviour, Michishita

Narushige demonstrated how Pyongyang’s “calculated adventurism” continues to successfully evolve from one crisis to the next.129 Michishita’s argument is certainly convincing, and consistent, and we can see how he was able to foresee the likelihood of raised tensions in the

DMZ and the NLL.130 However, the issue here with Michishita’s analyses, is that there was no in-depth analysis of how Pyongyang may find itself faced with increasingly more difficulties in managing the KPA as its domestic political-economic circumstances worsen.

The arguments forwarded by the various scholars are convincing. Yet while most analysts agree that the DPRK pursues a Clausewitzian strategy, the conflicting interpretations of Pyongyang’s strategy puzzles us. One of the common problems in the analyses of the DPRK’s strategy is the lack of focus on the domestic factors.

128 Andrew J. Coe, "North Korea's New Cash Crop," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 3 (2005). p.74. 129 Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008. 130 ———, "Playing the Same Game: North Korea's Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation," The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009). p.143.

These politics-oriented assessments sit comfortably with Snyder’s strategic decision-making model, introduced earlier in this chapter. However, we also saw that strategic policy-making processes often find themselves complicated by other factors, such as economic and technological constraints. This is true of the DPRK. Policy making is more complex than Kim and Snyder suggest; we therefore need to find an alternative model to explain the input-process-output in the DPRK’s strategic policy-making schema.

Surprisingly, in-depth analyses of the DPRK’s defence planning, or strategy making is still largely uncharted. The book bukhanhak (North Korean Studies), published by the Korea

Military Academy (in the ROK) in 2006, sheds some light on the question.

National Objectives

Military Policy

Military- Time- Defense Diplomacy Preparation Policy Policy Policy

Sa Dae Gunsa Roson

Figure 2.1: The DPRK’s Military Policy System131

131 Korea Military Academy, "bukhan ui gunsa jeongchaek [North Korea's military policy]," in bukhan Hak [North Korean Studies], ed. Yuk-kun Sakwan Hakkyo (Seoul, ROK: Hwanggeumal, 2006). p. 211.

In a different chapter, another model is offered, focusing on the hierarchical make-up of the

DPRK’s strategy.

Means/Ends Policy

National Objectives Socialist revolution of the WPK Memorandum

Korean peninsula Constitution Article 9

Security strategy kangsong taeguk Kim Jong-il’s grand strategic slogan

songun Construction of a military-centred state

Defence Strategy jawi - self Defence juche defence policy

dangui gunsa roseon

Figure 2.2: The Structure of the DPRK’s Security-Defence Policy Decision-Making132

These models are somewhat simplistic and incomplete. Not only do they exclude economic constraints, but the national objective is sandwiched awkwardly between military ideology and military tactics. In fact, a large volume of papers seem to focus on the military or on Kim

Jong-il’s influence in the strategic decision- making process. Kim Chin-moo specifically looks at the role of the military in the strategic policy-making process and finds friction within the

DPRK between bureaucrats and hard-line military elites. Kim concludes that the totalitarian regime is so highly centralized that the “Dear Leader” has absolute power, outweighing even the

132 ———, "Bukhan ui anbojeongchaekgwa jeollyak [North Korea's security policies and strategy]," in bukhan Hak [North Korean Studies], ed. Yuk-kun Sakwan Hakkyo (Seoul, ROK: Hwanggeumal, 2006). p.348.

65 military’s influence.133 Although his findings are essentially sound, they are also rather intuitive and less than comprehensive.

That said, we are able to understand that the framework of the DPRK’s political system is extremely rigid. Hodge contends:

Initiation of a campaign to reunify Korea by force is a political decision that may never be

made. However, the KPA has had decades to develop a campaign plan with a small

number of military objectives that is probably extensively scripted and war-gamed and

would require limited flexibility and modification.134

Indeed, we can agree with Hodge that the KPA has been ingrained with the state’s military doctrines. However, for the DPRK, flexibility and modification may not be an option. That is, given the extent of the politicization in the DPRK, one would question whether Pyongyang really has the capacity to fully accommodate both its domestic and regional security concerns

(especially circumstantial changes).

The next question concerns the strength of the regime itself, especially during times of domestic challenges. The death of Kim Jong-il and the ascension of Kim Jong-un certainly provokes further debates to this topic. To a large extent, the structure of the DPRK political system renders some possible scenarios that may follow, when integration is slowly or quickly

133 Chin-moo Kim, "bukhan ui jeongchek gyeoljeong eso gunbu ui yeonghyang [the military's influence in North Korea's policy decisions]," in bukhan ui gunsa [North Korean military affairs], ed. Bukhan yeongu hakhoe (Seoul, ROK: Gyeongin Munhwasa, 2006). 134 Hodge, "North Korea's Military Strategy." p.78.

66 undermined. Lankov correctly argues that there are certain conditions for regime decline in the

DPRK. 135

Moreover, we also need to keep in mind that changes to the current format of the DPRK regime may not necessarily implicate dissipation. Rather, we could expect the emergence of “political innovation” that may propel the regime to advance its idealist ends through different means. As

Knorr states:

Questioning dose not, however, means necessarily that public support declines. A

questioning public may give support but, in that case, support originates in considerations

of the pros and cons and will be strongly affected by the perceptions of situational

conditions.136

If so, we may question how changes of this nature will affect the DPRK’s defence planning.

That is, we need to investigate how much innovative planning can take place, and how the regime will react to changing domestic circumstances.

4.3. MILITARY ECONOMICS

A state’s economy is another aspect of strategic planning that needs extensive attention. Hartley and Sandler defines defense economics as the, “study of resource allocation, income distribution,

135 Lankov, "Conditions Unripe for North Korea Revolt". 136 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.144.

67 economic growth and stabilization applied to defense-related topics.”137 The pivotal importance of defense economic is outlined by Knorr, who states, “In peace or war, the economic strength of nations, i.e. their capacity to produce, depends on the magnitude, composition, and quality of their economic resources.” 138 Knorr’s argument confirms that military expenditures stays consistent with the quantity of economic resources. 139 Hence economics will play a pivotal role in strategy policy making, it would enter the planning cycle as a burden that constrains them from giving them the unlimited capacity for military expenditures.140

Hartley and Sandler offer a broad but comprehensive definition of military economics:

The study of resource allocation, income distribution, economic growth and stabilization

applied to defence-related topics…as such, defence economics involves an investigation

of the impact of defence expenditures, both domestically and internationally, on

macroeconomic variables such as employment, output and growth.141

Studies produced from this discipline could provide valuable assistance in understanding the

137 Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, "Introduction," in Handbook of Defense Economics, ed. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (Amsterdam ; New York: Elsevier, 1995). p.6. 138 Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956). p.163. 139 ———, Military Power and Potential. p.45. 140 Richardson’s interpretations referred to in: Russett, "International Interactions and Processes: The Internal vs. External Debate Revisited." p.547. 141 Hartley and Sandler, "Introduction." p.6.

68 nature of this burden.142 For instance, we could explore whether a certain measure of burden from military outlays influences a state to manage its military capability in a particular way.143

One of the major challenges is the difficulty in conceptualizing military expenditure. The term covers a wide variety of expenditure items that go far beyond mere military hardware. Huisken outlined the elements of military expenditure: pay and allowances of military personnel, pay of civilian personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, Research and Development

(R&D), construction, pensions to retired military personnel, military aid, civil defence, paramilitary forces, military aspects of activities that are acknowledged as having a joint civil/military function (e.g. space or atomic energy).144 Moreover, Huisken points out that some expenditure items go well outside the defence sector, such as exploitation of the private sector and manipulating an adversary’s military potential by restricting exports.145

There are further complexities relating to weapons systems, where expenditure can be divided into “non-recurring” (e.g. R&D, initial investment) and “recurring” (e.g. annual operations) cost elements.146 Hence, given all the complexities involved, quantitative gauging often proves

142 For military economics studies from a historical viewpoint, see: Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, NY:: Random House, 1987). 143 Seiglie investigated whether economic constraints effects a state’s conflict behaviour. See: Carlos Seiglie, "International Conflict and Military Expenditures: An Externality Approach," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 32, no. 1 (1988). 144 Ronald Huisken and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditure, SIPRI research report; no. 10 (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 1973). p.7. 145 Ibid. pp.7-9. 146 N. V. Breckner, Noah, J. W, "Costing of Systems," in Defense Management, ed. Stephen Enke (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1967). p.49.

69 extremely difficult.

Numerous scholars have proposed ways to measure the volume of military expenditure. Payne offers a simple and digestible formula; he argues that military expenditure as against national output can only be determined by dividing the amount of resources devoted to the military by the total of the state’s resources. 147 Moreover, Payne also argues that “In general, the capital/labor ratio of the armed forces will simply parallel that of the general economy, because military planners face the same factor costs as everyone else.”148 Although this may seem both straightforward and comprehensive, there are numerous problems in application; measuring military expenditure is no easy task.

A major problem is how to interpret available data. Data may be dubious, because there is no universal agreement or convention on what defines or characterizes military expenditure. As

Brzoska argues:

Governments are basically free to define military expenditure according to their own

wishes and purposes. The chosen definition is reflected in the national budget or

statement of expenditure. Sometimes the liberty to define is used for purposes of

deception, or because of specific tradition. But there are serious issues where differing

definitions can be justified149

147 Payne, Why Nations Arm. p. 19. 148 Ibid. p.26. 149 Michael Brzoska, "World Military Expenditures," in Handbook of Defense Economics, ed. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (Amsterdam ; New York: Elsevier, 1995). p.48.

Noland offers a prime example of this, involving the DPRK:

It is difficult to quantitatively assess the military’s role in the economy. In general,

militaries are difficult to evaluate economically, since many of their transactions occur

on non-market terms. In the case of North Korea, this general difficulty is compounded

by the distorted nature of the non-military economy and the regime’s secrecy. Moreover,

the military is outside the control of the central planners, and appears to have been

omitted from the figures provided to the IMF by the North Korean government. In

addition, it engages in activities that would be performed in the civilian sector elsewhere.

The conventional wisdom (as represented by the US Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency.….is that the military accounts for roughly a quarter of national income, though

the derivation and interpretation of this figure is problematic.150

Gauging military expenditure is also difficult when there is ambiguity with how the government makes its acquisitions. Payne notes:

Furthermore, figures can be misleading because of the way a state conducts its

transactions with the military industry. In particular, this would be the case in a nation

where the ratio between voluntary transactions and forced transactions is vague.151

Even when data is available, comparing military expenditures in different states can lead to

150 Marcus Noland, "North Korea in Global Perspective," in North Korea in Transition: Prospects for Economic and Social Reform, ed. Lawrence J. Lau and Chang-Ho Yoon (London, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001). p.70. 151 Payne, Why Nations Arm. p.20.

71 confusion. This was noted by Holzman in his comparative analysis of military expenditure between the US and the USSR, in which he explained how data produced misleading results, due to exchange rates. 152

Despite the difficulties in obtaining accurate and properly comparable figures for military expenditure, many still see military expenditure as an important index. Hamm, for instance, even argues that military expenditure is the “single most important indicator of arms build-up and military capabilities”. 153 Yet, military expenditure only indicates effort; it does not necessarily reflect the quality or quantity of output. As Huisken points out, it is simplistic to argue that military expenditure accurately reflects military strength; factors such as the limited definition of currency exchange, the slow acquisition nature of “highly capital intensive” modern military forces, and, in particular, military strength are not directly reflected in military expenditure. 154 Payne makes the following observation:

[The] raison d’être of a military intelligence service is collecting what is called “order

of battle” information on other countries: their personnel, military formations, and

equipment. Determining these physical military resources receives much more attention

than estimating defense spending. Military budgets, after all, are a rather academic issue

152See: Franklyn D. Holzman, "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?," International Security 4, no. 4 (1980); ———, "Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers Game," International Security 6, no. 4 (1982). 153 Taik-Young Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power, Politics in Asia series (London, UK; New York, NY: Routledge, 1999). p.163. 154Huisken and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditure. pp. 15-17.

since, in the final analysis, wars are fought by soldiers, not by dinars, francs or pesos.155

Military expenditures tend to under or over-reflect (or to give rise to over or under-estimates of) military capability. According to Brooks, this is because the non-monetary factors involved in a transaction are seldom acknowledged:

Assessments of military power have been often based on untested intuitions rather than a

solid understanding of how states actually create power on the battlefield; measures of

military power are often limited to rough data on raw resources such as gross national

product (GNP), personnel, and technological and industrial resources…actual military

ability to translate resources into fighting power – military effectiveness – is

neglected.156

Another caveat arises from the fact that a state’s military expenditure may not reflect its military capability, because a portion of the expenditure is devoted to achieving the state’s economic ends. For instance, Takesada claims that the DPRK has earned as much as two billion US dollars by selling military platforms to states like Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Cuba, Zimbabwe and

Myanmar. 157 It is possible that the DPRK may be committing to high military expenditure as an investment for higher returns, rather than as a campaign to boost its military capabilities.

155 Payne, Why Nations Arm. p 24. 156 Brooks, "Conclusion." p.234. 157 Hideshi Takesada, "kitachousen no gunjiryoku wo saguru [investigating North Korea's military capability]," in kitachousen: sono jitsuzou to kiseki [North Korea: the real image and its path] (Tokyo, Japan: Kobunken, 1998). p.54.

The relationship between defence outlay and policy has been extensively studied by various scholars. Goldsmith asks the fundamental question: why do some states spend more than others on defence, and what factors influence a state’s defence spending.158 Many, however, have examined how states have used military expenditure to alleviate problems in a domestic economy. This may be plausible. As Garfinkel argues, military spending is largely determined endogenously, resulting from fluctuation in aggregate economic activity.159

A study by Starr et al examined the link between defence expenditures and inflation, and found that in the years 1956 to 1979, the relationship between military expenditure and inflation was negative in the US and the UK, but positive in Germany and France.160 Szymanski’s study focused on the peculiar collateral effects of military expenditure on stagnation.161 Russett even looked into the existence of a trade-off relationship between military expenditure and social welfare expenditure.162 These studies, however, are incomplete and far from conclusive. The chief reason for this is that most of these studies tended to base their analysis on the US and capitalist states in Europe.163 Consequently, there is little to suggest that the link between economic situations and military expenditures (or vice versa) is similar in states with differing

158 Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 5 (2003). p.551. 159 Michelle R. Garfinkel, "Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium," The American Economic Review 80, no. 1 (1990). p.50. 160 Harvey Starr et al., "The Relationship Between Defense Spending and Inflation," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 1 (1984). 161 Albert Szymanski, "Military Spending and Economic Stagnation," The American Journal of Sociology 79, no. 1 (1973). pp.12-13. 162 Bruce Russett, "Defense Expenditures and National Well-being," The American Political Science Review 76, no. 4 (1982). 163 Another example is: Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," International Organization 30, no. 1 (1976).

74 economic systems, such as command economy.

Some papers have attempted to explain how military expenditure reacts to politics. Nincic and

Cusack’s study demonstrates the relationship between politics and defence spending. They found that military expenditure reacts positively to the political electoral cycle, whereby the administration invests in the military industry to stimulate the perception of macro-economic prosperity.164

The limits of Nincic and Cusack’s study were pointed out by Russett, who argued that while their approach has some merit, it cannot be applied to authoritarian states. Russett, referring to

Nincic’s other work on the link between military expenditure and economic plans in the USSR, argues that such a link is plausible.165 The problem, however, is that what applies in the USSR may not apply (or may not apply in the same way) in other socialist authoritarian states. For instance, we would wonder whether, in such states that are less developed, there might not be other crucial influences of a political or economic nature.

Patterns of defence spending in Less Developed Countries (LDC) have been broadly discussed by various scholars. Deger and Smith found that the net effect of military expenditure on growth rate was negative, although there were some signs of a positive impact in terms of modernization.166 Biswas and Ram sampled 50 LDCs and found that military expenditure has

164 Miroslav Nincic and Thomas R. Cusack, "The Political Economy of US Military Spending," Journal of Peace Research 16, no. 2 (1979). 165 Russett, "International Interactions and Processes: The Internal vs. External Debate Revisited." p.548. 166Saadet Deger and Smith Ron, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (1983).

75 no significant effect on economic growth (based on growth of total income or output).167

Heo Uk’s work on defence spending in the ROK confirms these results, but Heo argues that the indirect effects of military expenditure on economic growth remain unclear.168 These studies, however, neglect the important political aspects that motivate defence outlays, and we cannot simply assume that all LDCs will spend on the military in the same way.

LDCs face certain limits in military expenditures. Knorr argued:

Economically under-developed countries have, as a class, only an extremely small, if any,

economic and technological potential for developing sophisticated military capabilities,

even excepting nuclear forces. This inferior status is the direct result of small GNPs,

weak industrial capacities and usually the absence of any significant capacity for

scientific and technological advance.169

Knorr’s comment seems logical, but we must acknowledge that these states are likely to seek ways to circumvent or compensate for their fiscal constraints. Exactly how these states will attempt to improve their situation or maximize their military potential under financially straitened conditions will need further study.

167 Basudeb Biswas and Rati Ram, "Military Expenditures and Economic Growth in Less Developed Countries: An Augmented Model and Further Evidence," Economic Development and Cultural Change 34, no. 2 (1986). 168 Uk Heo, "The Political Economy of Defense Spending in South Korea," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 4 (1996). 169 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.93.

Some studies have addressed the economic behaviour of militarist states. In 1940, Spiegel wrote an extensive commentary on economics in militarist states. He concluded that in such a state, the state does not divorce war from peace; instead, war takes over the economy as a whole, and every corner of commerce and industry is mobilized for war.170 Interestingly, the United

Kingdom mobilized for total war by 1940, while Germany did not do so (at least to the equal extent) until 1942. Hence we may question, whether militarist states do in fact have a higher propensity to mobilize for total war.

One would assume from this that militarist states spend more. Deger and Sen, however, disagree:

It is not necessarily true that military governments or militarized society spend more on

the military...but the question remain pertinent…Mixed empirical results indicate that it

is possible that militarization leads to a propensity towards higher defense spending but

which can be moderated or changed by economic constraints. Even dictatorships need to

have popular support and often have produced populist governments. Therefore, it is not

possible to ignore developmental failures which will tend to circumscribe excessive

defense budgets.171

Deger and Sen found a relationship between political legitimacy and military expenditure. They argue that military expenditures can vary, depending on the threat that the state faces:

170 Henry William Spiegel, "Wehrwirtschaft: Economics of the Military State," The American Economic Review 30, no. 4 (1940). 171 Deger and Sen, "Military Expenditure and Developing Countries." pp.301-302.

Defense spending will obviously be related to various types of threats – both internal and

external – and direct losses in security that arise from such threats. External threats

leading to inter-state conflict are generally more costly in terms or armaments while

internal threats, requiring more policing than the use of the military, will require less

spending…A pattern arises: the more legitimate a government is, the less it spends on

the military; the greater the external threat, the higher the defense budget relative to total

central government expenditure”172

These conclusions may be not so reliable if we are seeking answers as to how military expenditure affects strategic policy making. So we need to look at the problem in terms of burden. The situation in the DPRK is a case in point, where poor economic management and high military expenditures are imposing a significant amount of burden both on the economy and the political system.

Thus far, we have found that a state’s strategic planning is affected significantly by political preferences and economic constraints. As regards to the DPRK, many analysts have found that the internal economic and political hardship in the country is becoming increasingly serious, especially in recent years. Snyder best summarizes the situation. He questions how much longer

Pyongyang can “defy gravity”. He argues that poor crisis management and the effects of rigid totalitarian political control on the economy are pushing the regime beyond sustainable limits.173

Even in relation to the DPRK’s military capability, some analysts express critical views.

172Ibid. p.302. 173 Scott Snyder, "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future," Pacific Affairs 73, no. 4 (2000). p.533.

Atkeson gives a good summary of the weaknesses of the DPRK’s military capability: “With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and shaky relations with China, Pyongyang’s ability to maintain a conventional military edge over the South is eroding.”174 Atkeson argues:

Pyongyang has built a large domestic arms industry, but the industry lacks technology

for production of many modern weapons. Particularly, it produces no combat aircraft. On

the other hand, it is a leader in the Third World for adaptation of older models of tactical

missiles. But even here its inability thus far to provide accuracy to its weaponry inhibits

its capacity for providing missiles of practical military value. This will, of course, be

overcome in time.175

While Atkenson is right in saying that the DPRK’s deteriorating economy and lagging technological innovation are undermining its military capability, he makes a simplistic assumption about the future. It is one thing for Pyongyang to recognize its own weaknesses; it is another for it to remedy its economic, industrial and technological troubles.

Understanding the nature of the DPRK’s military economy is far from simple. While the

DPRK’s military expenditure remains extremely high, and the SEC occupies a great share of the state economy, such factors are not enough to conclude the DPRK’s economic failure. Eberstadt sheds light on the complex relationship between the DPRK’s military expenditures and the civilian economy by arguing:

174 Edward B. Atkeson and Institute of Land Warfare (Association of the United States Army), The North Korean Military Threat in Perspective, Land warfare papers ; no. 21 (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 1995). p.15. 175Ibid. p.5.

In a market-economy framework, North Korea’s actual ratio of military expenditures to

national output would be determined not only by its ratio of military to total manpower,

but also by the pattern of output consumption by its defence force, the capital-output

ratios of its military industries, and marginal rates of transformation (price relations)

between military and civilian sectors.176

The DPRK has long seen its heavy industry as the keystone of its military capability. However, many analysts now conclude that the zero-sum relationship between the DPRK’s military economy and its civilian economy has ended.177 Jeong Hyun-soo elaborates on this. He argues that the DPRK’s concentrated investment in the military industry has retarded the whole macro-economy to the point that, ironically, it is having negative returns in the military sector.178

The fiscal problem faced by Pyongyang is severe. Poverty, starvation and other privations are widespread. This is compounded by a series of natural disasters. Noland asserts, however, that the DPRK’s natural disasters notwithstanding, the chief cause of its troubles is poor economic management.179 That is to say, the DPRK’s options for remedying its economic problems seem to be essentially non-existent, unless it moderates its policies that prioritize the military.

176 Eberstadt, "Development, Structure and Performance of the DPRK Economy: Empirical Hints." p.41. 177 Ibid. pp.38-39. 178 Hyeon-su Jung, Young-hwan Kim, and Wae-sul Kim, bukhan jeongchigyeongjeron [political-economic concepts of North Korea] (Seoul, ROK: Sinyeongsa, 1995). p.238. 179 Noland, "North Korea in Global Perspective." p.69.

Some, however, offer a more optimistic view. Lee Jong-hwa claims that the DPRK’s relatively low cost of labour and its natural and human resources give it the potential to catch up with the

ROK and other East Asian countries.180

Implications Status quo policy • Short-term political stability • Increasing economic decline in mid-long term • Dissatisfaction amongst population, leading to eventual political and social collapse Timid economic adjustments • Continued isolation of population from external influence (Noland 1997) • Not viable long-term, given severity of economy Reform • Fundamental reforms of institutions and economic policies • Strong military opposition

Table 2.1 Thee Possible Scenarios for Economic Reform181

Lee Jong-hwa’s analysis is convincing. However, Lee also notes, “Recent cross–country evidence suggests that high growth performance requires greater openness to international trade, good quality of institutions, high government saving, and well-educated human resources.”182

180 Jong-Wha Lee, "Policy Reforms and the Prospects of Economic Growth in North Korea," in North Korea in Transition: Prospects for Economic and Social Reform, ed. Lawrence J. Lau and Chang-Ho Yoon (London, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001). pp.105-112. 181 Ibid. p.109. 182 Ibid. p.94.

Moreover, Noland warns against Lee’s observations on two grounds:

Economic revitalisation will require considerable institutional change, and experience

has shown that it has been more difficult to reform relatively industrialised economies

such as North Korea than it is relatively agrarian economies such as China and Vietnam.

Moreover, given the degree of implicit distortion in the DPRK economy, liberalisation

would result in enormous shifts in the composition of output.183

Both Lee and Noland concentrate on economic considerations. These, however, are only one side of the problem.

The major concern in the DPRK is that the insecure totalitarian regime, well aware of its vulnerability, is unlikely to accept anything that might endanger its political control. Lankov argues that reform would compromise the DPRK’s isolation, thereby increasing the regime’s vulnerability; consequently, the DPRK will continue to prefer the status quo for the foreseeable future.184 That is, in the eyes of the regime, political survival far outweighs economic prospects.

Another critique of economic reform, by Jeon Jei-Guk, maintains that the DPRK’s political leadership is too rigid to make political-economic changes. Jeon says that the current divide-and-rule strategy brings only short-term stability, but the most pressing task is to alleviate “competition” amongst the DPRK’s power elites by “cooperation” to improve policy

183 Noland, "North Korea in Global Perspective." p.69. 184 Lankov argues that such poor state of the economy has diverted the population from enlisting in the military to seek better opportunities in the underground market. See: Andrei N. Lankov, "Staying Alive: Why North Korea Will Not Change," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008).

82 effectiveness and foster the long-term survival of the regime. 185 Jeon thinks that the

“effectiveness of the balancing act might have passed the point of increasing return and entered the phase of diminishing return.”186 The issue here is that the “balancing act” may no longer be viable.

By now, we can agree with the forecasts offered by scholars like Cotton that the DPRK’s current economic and political trajectory points to an ever-worsening scenario with minimal prospects of improvement or relief.187 Nevertheless, these forecasts must be treated with caution, as the outlook may not be as bleak as many predict. Most analysts now conclude that the DPRK will continue to “muddle through”.188 Among them is Levin, who believes that the

DPRK will get by somehow, and with minimal reform. He argues:

While North Korea's production capabilities have undoubtedly declined in the face of

severe energy shortages, it is important to remember that its economy is a military

economy. Absolute priority has always been placed on producing goods for the military.

This remains true today, making it impossible to equate the decline in the export of basic

manufactured goods with a comparable decline in the production of goods for the

military. The sharp export fall may reflect at least in part a leadership effort to preserve

as much as possible of production for the military and to rely on international assistance

185 Jei-guk Jeon, "North Korean Leadership: Kim Jong Il's Balancing Act in the Ruling Circle," Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000). p.777. 186 Ibid. 187 Cotton, "North Korea Trouble Ahead." 188 Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, "North Korea between Collapse and Reform," Asian Survey 39, no. 2 (1999).

- rather than exports - to pay for food and other imports required by the North Korean

masses. A focus on the highest priority items may also attenuate the short-term impact of

declining production on the North Korean military. As for production in what passes for

the 'civilian' economy, much of this is useless by international standards. Ceasing

production at these factories frees up resources for higher priority purposes. Over time,

continued decline will pinch both sectors. But as long as the military's most important

needs are met, gradual economic erosion is unlikely to cause the system to collapse.189

Levin’s argument leaves the internal problems in the DPRK blurred. However, this is to be expected, as there are so many uncertainties that veil the fate of the DPRK’s politics and economy. The question is “whether the glass is half empty or half full”. For the purposes of the

DPRK’s strategic policy making, we could suggest half full. Previous studies offer sufficient evidence of the strengths and weaknesses in the DPRK’s politics and economics, to suggest that its future trajectory will be upwards.

Until now, we have not found a satisfactory explanation of how military expenditure functions in or affects the strategic policy making process. Nevertheless, we have gained some valuable insights.

First, studies have shown that we need to analyze economic constraints case by case. Studies of military expenditure in LDCs or socialist states have proved to be too general.

Second, given the often puzzling nature of data on military expenditure, we should keep in mind

189 Levin, "What if North Korea survives?." p.166.

84 that military expenditure serves only as a crude guide to a state’s commitment, but it is not a reliable indicator of military capability.

Third, the nature of our study may not require us to make the effort to find definitive fiscal statistics. Approximate indicators of growth trends may be sufficient, especially if we are dealing with a state where reliable data is rarely available.

Fourth, the purpose of the research is to determine how policy makers and other elites in a state manage or decide on its defence expenditures. To do this, we could return to the basics, as suggested by Knorr: “Whatever the structure of the economy, every society faces the same basic questions in regard to production, distribution, budgeting and management of technology.”190

Knorr also says::

When military outlays, which are part of public expenditures, rise – as they may in the

event of a severe and prolonged international crisis, or arms race, or war – other

expenditures are necessarily affected, regardless of the type of economic system.191

Furthermore, as Baumohl claims, the quantity of orders for military goods depends on preparations for national defence and implementation of foreign policy.192 It would, therefore, seem more appropriate to focus on the politics underlying decisions on its military outlays, or the political ramifications of economic dilemmas caused by defence expenditures.

190 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.114. 191Ibid. p.47. 192 Bernard Baumohl, The Secrets of Economic Indicators: Hidden Clues to Future Economic Trends and Investment Opportunities (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Pub., 2005). p.119.

5. SUMMARY

Empirical studies show that many areas have yet to be explored in the study of a state’s management of military capability and strategy. In particular, there is a clear shortage of studies that satisfactorily balances inter-relate strategic policy-making concepts and country-specific characteristics. That is, many assessments on strategic policy making focus too heavily on theories and neglect country-specific circumstances and considerations. 193 Similarly, a significant portion of country-specific studies overlook core concepts in strategic policy making.

In short, many studies have failed to “connect the dots”.

The various hypotheses can be summarized into two points that proves to be useful in advancing our understanding of the DPRK’s military capability management. First, a state’s grand strategy making is influenced by a mix of internal and external stimuli. External factors give hints as to what a state will react to, whereas internal factors shed light on how they will react.

Second, regarding the studies on the DPRK’s strategic decision making, there is a consensus that Pyongyang gives priority to the military, because it is the only institution that gives it real leverage. Yet we have found that many studies overlook the sophisticated nature of the strategic policy-making process itself. In other words, they focus more on what happens in the DPRK, as

193 Russet called for assessment of LDCs, Russett, "International Interactions and Processes: The Internal vs. External Debate Revisited." Brooks admitted that assessments on aspects like single party systems and strategic planning is yet to be done: Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, Creating Military Power: the Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). p.232.

86 distinct from interactions between the economic, political and social processes in Pyongyang’s strategic policy making.

Chapter 3 will examine and elaborate on the merits and demerits of the approaches taken to date.

We will gauge how these hypotheses test against the DPRK’s strategic policy making.

Specifically, the purpose of the chapter will be to determine the most suitable methodology to assess the strategic policy-making process of a state facing a changing balance of power in its region.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGIES OF ASSESSMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

Assessing the framework of a state’s military capability management process is challenging.

Analyses involves not only identifying the various stimuli, but also identifying how these factors manifest itself in the whole defence planning process. Moreover, we must also take into account the state’s unique characteristics and values, as they play a pivotal role in forming the framework of the planning process.

Since 1962, the fundamental doctrine of the DPRK’s defence planning is the dangui gunsa roseon. Yet the process to achieve the dangui gunsa roson is far from simple. Rather, the

DPRK’s defence planning process is often treated as a black box. While assessments concerning the DPRK’s decision making and military policies may have identified the relevant stimuli, they have failed to conceptualize the framework of the actual management process. In other words, while there are credible assessments on the input and output of the defence planning schema, there is little on how the inputs are processed into output.

This chapter will identify the problems in the existing studies on the DPRK’s decision making process, and then find more plausible methodologies. The chapter reveals how assessments of the DPRK’s defence planning process can be made easier by rearranging the various situational and structural factors according to their respective context.

2. CHALLENGES IN ANALYZING THE DPRK

For over sixty years, the DPRK has kept itself very heavily armed. As at 2011, the KPA has approximately 1.19 million personnel.1 In recent years, the KPA has become increasingly bellicose. In defiance of international opinion, the DPRK has conducted two underground nuclear tests, numerous missile test launches, cyber attacks and military provocations using conventional platforms such as the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong

Island. These actions lend weight to the view that Pyongyang sees its military as the only remaining instrument to realize its national goal.2

There is plausibility in the assessment that the DPRK’s provocative actions and domestic uncertainties constitutes a threat to the national security of Japan, the ROK, the US, and perhaps even China. Yet, many analyses of the DPRK’s strategy and the military threat it poses are somewhat misleading and unbalanced. Because of its confrontational behaviour, the DPRK has attracted various epithets, including unpredictable, irrational, rogue, isolated, secretive and simply dangerous. These conclusions come mostly from assessments that are unwittingly or intentionally distorted by notions of political correctness, ideological bias, xenophobia or even naked demonization.3

1 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, vol. 111 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012). p.256. 2 Hodge, "North Korea's Military Strategy." p.78. 3 John Merrill, "Reading and Misreading North Korea," in Security Environment in the 21st Century and Korea's Strategic Options/The KAIS International Conference Series ; no. 8, ed. Yong Soon Yim, Studies Korean Association of International, and Affairs Research Institute for International (Seoul, ROK: Research Institute for International Affairs ; Korean Association of International Studies, 1997).

Indeed, sound micro-analyses of the DPRK’s military capability have been done by several notable experts.4 However, while these assessments are persuasive with their insights into the micro-aspects of the KPA, they do have major shortcomings. Analyses of the KPA often tend to overlook the background causes of a state’s decisions to manage the military. Moreover, the data provided in the assessments of the KPA’s force structure should only be accepted as approximated figures, given that they rely on assumptions and unauthoritative or unreliable sources.

Some scholars have challenged previous studies of the DPRK’s armament patterns, using a more scientific methodology. A convincing analysis is set out by Hamm in his book, Arming the

Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. Hamm extensively examines the arms race between the DPRK and the ROK, arguing that the competition between them was in military spending, rather than in acquiring and enlarging military platforms.5

Several other papers using an economics-based approach demonstrate the significance of the economic aspects of the DPRK’s armaments, successfully interpreting the meagre statistical data available.6 These methods are convincing, and their conclusions are fairly consistent with

4 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea, Armed forces of Asia (St Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2001).; Andrew Scobell, John M. Sanford, and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute., North Korea's Military Threat: Pyongyang's Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, Demystifying North Korea ; 4 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007).; Atkeson and Institute of Land Warfare (Association of the United States Army), The North Korean Military Threat in Perspective.; Minnich, The North Korean People's Army: Origins and Current Tactics. 5 Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. 6 See: Chae-gi Sung, "Bukhan gunsaryeogui gyeongjejeok gicho: 'gunsagyeongje' silchee daehan yeoksajeok/siljeungjeok bukseok [the basis of North Korea's military capability: historical/empirical

Pyongyang’s behaviour. However, the weakness is that coverage of other important considerations, such as the DPRK’s strategic culture, politics and domestic circumstances, is somewhat lacking.

Yet it is often easy to get carried away with the overwhelming stock of information. Simply put, we need greater assessment concerning how to connect the dots. When put into the context of military capability management, we need to identify the changing trends, and the political-economic motives behind the developments in the KPA.

The most pressing problem in many studies on the DPRK is a failure to balance crucial concepts in defence planning and in country-specific considerations. 7 Others successfully analyze specific aspects of the DPRK, but fail to demonstrate their significance in its strategic policy-making. Much of the difficulty in undertaking a “full” analysis may be due to the fact that the DPRK is a “black hole”, where obtaining relevant and adequate information is extremely difficult or impossible.

analysis on the actual state of the military economy]," in bukhangunsamunjeui jaejomyeong [The Military of North Korea A New Look] (Paju, ROK: Hanul Academy, 2006).; ———, bukhan gyeongjewigi 10nyeongwa gunbijeunggang neungnyeok [North Korea's 10 years of economic crisis and capability for strengthing armament] (Seoul, ROK: KIDA Press, 2003). Taik-young Hamm and Jae-jung Seo, "bukhanui gunsaryeok mit nambukhan gunsaryeok gyunhyang [North Korea's military capability and the North-South military power balance]," in bukhangunsamunjeui jaejomyeong [The Military of North Korea: A New Look], ed. Kyungnam University North Korea Studies University (Paju, ROK: Hanul Academy, 2006). 7 For example, Russet called for improved assessment of LDCs: Russett, "International Interactions and Processes: The Internal vs. External Debate Revisited."; Brooks admitted that assessment on aspects like single party systems and strategic planning is yet to be done: Brooks, "Conclusion." p.232.

Whether for the reasons suggested above or simply from narrowness of scope, many assessments to date have failed to acknowledge the complexities underlying the DPRK’s national security strategy. There are major disparities in studies on the DPRK’s strategy and even in studies on the DPRK itself. Merrill attempts to “straighten out” these disparities. He maintains that a significant portion of writings on the DPRK have relied on incorrect methods and are inaccurate and misleading.8 However, he does not propose a satisfactory methodology for better assessing the DPRK, though one is certainly needed.

In 2004, the North Korean Studies University in Seoul published an award-winning book,

Methodology of North Korean Studies. In it, various authors suggest ways to “read” the DPRK.

These range from how to interpret statements and literature released by Pyongyang, to ways to treat statistical data.9 The rich variety of methods offered in the book is quite instructive.

Unfortunately, most papers in the book do not go beyond “how to make sense of the DPRK”, as distinct from how to develop methodologies to do so. Methodologies in “North Korean studies” are still at an early stage, and there remains great scope for further development.

Indeed, developing well-balanced methodologies is impeded by a scarcity of primary sources.

In particular, objective, credible statistics that might provide a dependable measure for analyzing economic and military expenditure are extremely rare. There is a similar problem regarding the DPRK’s military industry. Although the SEC is very active in producing the

KPA’s platforms, data is virtually non-existent.

8 Merrill, "Reading and Misreading North Korea." p.45. 9 Kyungnam University - University of North Korean Studies, bukan yeonggu pangbeopron [Methodology of North Korean Studies], ed. Kyungnam University - University of North Korean Studies (Paju, ROK: Hanul Academy, 2004).

Many scholars have made efforts to circumvent these problems. Hamm has laid a foundation for such efforts by remodelling methodologies to measure the DPRK’s GNP and military expenditure. 10 Although Hamm assiduously examined both the internal and the external dimensions of the DPRK’s “state power”, his work focused mainly on economic aspects of the arms race between the DPRK and the ROK, and did not give due attention to important political and social processes.11 Moreover, statistics-based methodologies are only helpful to a certain extent. In the context of this research, statistics may only indicate directions or trends; we need further investigation of how the DPRK’s political decisions influence its military expenditure.

The drawbacks of many of these statistics-based empirical tests are obvious. Seong Chae-gi extensively analyzed the DPRK’s military economics statistics from 1953 to 2003 and reports that the DPRK began to conceal statistical information on its military expenditure after 1971.12

Even the scarce statistics available are rarely, if ever, definitive. For instance, figures for military personnel do not show the complete picture, because they omit information on intelligence services, internal security services, public security personnel, and paramilitary personnel.13 However, these statistical omissions may not be altogether intentional. As Noland explains, “Even if the data are not subject to intentional fabrication, they may be unreliable for

10 Taik-young Hamm, "bukhan tongkye jaryo bunseok mit chujeong: gyeongje cheongryang mit gunsa-bi reul chungshim euro," in bukhan yeonggu pangbeopron [Methodology of North Korean Studies], ed. Kyungnam University - University of North Korean Studies (Paju, ROK: Hanul Academy, 2004). p.170 11 ———, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.160. 12 Chae-gi Sung, "Bukhan gongpyogunsabi silche e daehan jeongmil jaebunseok," in bukhan ui gunsa [North Korean military affairs], ed. bukhan yeongu hakhoe (Seoul, ROK: Gyeongin Munhwasa, 2006). 13 Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva Switzerland), Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005). pp. 83,101.

93 reasons as prosaic as the difficulty of translating the schema of a centrally planned economy into market terms, and poor sampling methodologies.”14

Other limits to the effectiveness of these statistics-based approaches are apparent. As Bae points out, “the coefficients obtained through the empirical tests are very different depending on the set of data and thus the results must be discussed with care. Moreover, the statistical results do not reflect all the features of the arms race between South and North Korea.”15 Hence, the gap between bilateral approaches and the multilateral reality cries out for a broadened approach, consonant with the multilateral dynamics of the arms competition in East Asia.

Another problem in many analyses is the failure to properly weigh internal and external factors in the DPRK’s strategic policy-making. Disregarding or undervaluing internal factors might well give the impression that the strategic behaviour of all states is uniform. Conversely, confining analysis to internal factors would lead to a disregard of common or universal policy-making concepts and processes.

There are also problems in country-specific studies which shy away from internationally applicable principles. Many studies tend to treat the DPRK as “too special” for theory-based analysis. For instance, we rarely find studies that adequately consider the politico-economic aspects of the DPRK’s armament. 16 Certainly, country-specific studies have their value,

14Noland, "North Korea in Global Perspective." p.70. 15 Jun-Sik Bae, "An Empirical Analysis of the Arms Race Between South and North Korea," Defence and Peace Economics 15, no. 4 (2004). p.391. 16Oya S. Erdogdu, "Political Decisions, Defense and Growth," Defence and Peace Economics 19, no. 1 (2008).

94 particularly in giving in-depth insights into a state’s circumstances and dynamics (such as politics, economics, culture, military science, and country-specific issues). However, many country-specific studies tend to detach these elements from each other, focusing too much on one element without appreciating others. We need to find a “macro” approach that addresses all factors and examines how they interrelate in a state’s defence planning.

We need, therefore, to take a realistic and balanced approach in analyzing the DPRK’s strategy-making. It is one thing to recognize that a comprehensive analysis is difficult; it is another to suggest that it is impossible, or that there is no way to conduct one.

3. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

A central method in strategic planning studies is systems analysis. This interdisciplinary approach has proved particularly useful in understanding how states manage their strategic policies. Specifically, the systems hypothesis model, otherwise known as the input-conversion-output model, provides a method for categorizing stimuli. The “Second-Image

Reversed” model presented by Wilson and Forest is a helpful framework, but it is somewhat simplistic.17 In this model, only exogenous factors are treated as input, and endogenous factors are seen as conversion factors. However, input is sensitive to changes not only in the external environment, but also in the internal politico-economic environment. Furthermore, while it is true that conversion factors mostly involve endogenous considerations, it is doubtful whether

17 Isaiah Wilson III and James J. F. Forest, Handbook of Defence Politics: International and Comparative Perspectives (London, UK; New York, NY: Routledge, 2009). p.3 Similar models are also offered by Drew and Snow, Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy : an Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems. p.25.

95 they are confined to political processes. Other factors such as strategic culture and economic capacity are also involved.

In brief, economics and politics can both affect strategy in two ways. One is that changes in a political situation function more as an input element. The other is that political dynamics and structure function more as a constant, or even as a restraint on the system. In other words, situational factors act as inputs, whereas structural stimuli act as conversion factors. How various endogenous and exogenous factors affect strategic policy-making, and how this applies to the DPRK, will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Another useful methodology in strategic planning is the decision-making aspect of systems analysis. This looks at “choice of objectives” and “choice of strategy” problems.18 While our research focuses on the DPRK’s strategy vis-à-vis the East Asian balance of power, the decision-making aspects are vital. As Knorr stressed, the “amount and kind of military strength which will be generated depends importantly on the quality of administrative decisions within that [military] sector.”19 The approach is particularly useful as it focuses on “criteria”, where, as

McKean states, “the most suitable criterion form in most problems is to maximize the achievement of the objective for a given cost, or to minimize the cost of achieving a specified objective.”20 Quade posited seven criteria; he said that systems analysis must give adequate consideration to:

18 For comparison of Systems analysis and operations research, see: Quade, "Introduction." p.7. 19 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.119. 20 Roland N. McKean, "Criteria," in Analysis for Military Decisions, ed. E. S. Quade, Rand lectures on systems analysis (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1964). p.86.

1. The objectives of the nation itself and the objectives of its forces

2. The military capabilities needed to attain those objectives

3. The enemy’s capabilities and objectives

4. The technological possibilities

5. The effectiveness of each option (i.e. each posture, system or plan considered)

6. The cost and resources implications of each option

7. The uncertainties in the above.21

These concepts seem self-evident, and many authors probably have them in mind when writing papers on military capabilities. Quade’s reductionist analysis provides an easily understood descriptive outline of security, facilitating discussion of systems analysis. However, the main problem lies in how these criteria are interpreted. The perception that the DPRK is unpredictable is partly due to inadequate consideration of crucial elements. Quade further argued:

The uncertainty of the future means that many factors which can be taken as “given” in a

study of current operations become “parameters” in a study of the future. Hence, there is

a vast increase in the number of questions to be investigated and explicitly treated. This

applies not only to such matters as enemy reaction, technological progress, and the

political and economic environment, but also to the quasi-scientific, semi-philosophical

selection of over-all objectives and rules for choosing between alternatives.

Technological considerations, in particular the rapid rate of change in weapons as the

traditional political, economic and military factors…Needless to say, these

21 Quade, "Methods and Procedures." p.174.

considerations, especially when weighed in light of the existence of an enemy whose

actions are kept secret, make extremely hazardous any prediction of the environment in

which the weapons or strategies are to be used, and of the effect of their introduction on

that environment.22

The requirements set out above seem confusing and somewhat unpractical, having regard to the

DPRK’s secretiveness. However, this does not imply that Quade’s approach has no utility. The systems analysis approach are a guide in examining the DPRK. If one has a sound knowledge of the structure of the DPRK, as well as its circumstances, one can apply the systems analysis or defence planning framework of analysis.

Categorizing the various stimuli in the DPRK’s policy-making system will require us to first evaluate them individually. Are the constants and variables of equal or different values, and do they function with differing “weights”? In fact, earlier works on strategic planning emphasized the importance of the influence of each individual stimulus. Knorr argued:

Different uses of military power make demands for different kinds of military forces

and, hence indirectly, make different demands on the military potential of states.

Deploying a nuclear capability for deterrence, preparing for conventional war, near the

state’s boundaries or in distant places, possessing capabilities for fighting guerrillas in

foreign countries, require different amounts and combinations of economic and

technological resources, administrative skills, and also put different burdens on a

22 ———, "Introduction." pp.6-7.

nation’s political foundations of military power.23

In our survey of literature on the DPRK’s military and strategy, we saw that many factors and stimuli are over-simplified. That is, they are glossed over, neglected or ignored, which leads to misinterpretations of the DPRK’s strategic policy-making. Although many factors influencing the DPRK’s policy-making overlap with each other, we also need to distinguish the individual factors and how they interrelate.

We need, therefore, to keep in mind that different factors influence systems accordingly. That is, economic, environmental, military, political and social factors are all very important for national security.24 At the same time, we need to understand how factors function differently from state to state, as cultural and ideological backgrounds give rise to different perceptions of the military.

Until its collapse in 1991, the USSR placed significant emphasis on military doctrine, military science and military art, whereas the US focused on quantitative and scientific aspects of defence.25 In the DPRK’s case, it is obvious that they have been significantly influenced by both China and the Soviet Union. In particular, there are clear parallels between the challenges and constraints faced by the DPRK and China during the Mao Zedong era. To an extent, the

DPRK has adopted a style akin to those of China and the USSR, but adapted it to accommodate

23 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.32. 24 The importance of these five factors is outlined by Barry Buzan. Cited in: Muthiah Alagappa, "Rethinking Security: A Critical Review and Appraisal of the Debate," in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). p.27. 25 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, "Soviet Strategic Thought," in National Security Affairs : Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues, ed. B. Thomas Trout and James E. Harf (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982). pp.99-112.

99 its own “Korean” values.26

There are, of course, caveats in applying the defence planning approach to an analysis of the

DPRK’s strategic policy-making. In particular, the central purpose of defence planning is to find ways for a state to better manage its military.27 This is especially so with Military Operations

Research (MOR). Brooks argued that for MOR, the “most important objective has been the development of a set of systems characteristics to be used as performance requirements for developers to design the next generation of weapons systems”.28 One could argue that much of the analysis on certain countries, for instance the US, has had the benefit of access to much larger and better research resources than for other countries, mainly because they were created by bureaucratic bodies concerned, such as the US Department of Defense. Hence, some may question whether models from this discipline are applicable to a study of the DPRK’s strategic planning. Nevertheless, despite differences in applicability, we can use the essential elements of the systems analysis or strategic planning assessment method in our analysis, though with discretion and for different purposes.

In short, the strategic planning method and the systems analysis method are both useful in analyzing the DPRK’s strategic policy-making. The input-conversion-output model are a useful tool, in categorizing stimuli and in describing how they interrelate. Much of the remainder of this paper focuses on how the various stimuli to the DPRK’s defence planning should be categorized in the input-conversion-output model.

26 See: Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. 27 For more on how it is used in the conventional sense, see: Quade, "Methods and Procedures.". p.153. 28 Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." p.6.

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This requires us to develop a taxonomy of the various factors involved. We need to classify each component according to its context. Although this may seem axiomatic, we need to heed certain caveats. Specifically, we need to be aware that domestic input factors can often shape conversion factors. That is, situational factors can cause economic or political structures to be readjusted or even reshaped.

4. INPUTS: CONSTANTS AND VARIABLES

Essentially, there are two circumstances in which states formulate or re-formulate their defence policies or strategies. One is when shifts or changes in a state’s circumstances or its environment somehow jeopardize its national security. The other is when current strategies or policies prove to be no longer effective or efficient. Hence, the purpose of strategic policy-making for a state is to configure itself to meet the changing security challenges it faces, remedy disadvantages and increase effectiveness.

In the end, it comes down to the DPRK ensuring that the regime’s security’s is not put at risk.

Pyongyang will be sensitive to any changes in its external and internal circumstances, especially during periods of political transition or transformation. We must, therefore, first identify the factors that function as input. However, there are caveats in doing so, and it is not simply a matter of collating factors relevant to the state’s grand strategy. Rather, we need to identify factors that indicate situational changes – both external and internal.

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Due to its domestic security concerns, the DPRK is ever mindful of two balance of power shifts

– external and internal. In fact, as David’s “omni-balancing” concept correctly explains, developing states tend to utilize external security issues to legitimize their domestic political control. 29 Hence in a nutshell, simultaneously dealing with both external and internal dimensions of national security poses problems.

4.1. EXTERNAL BALANCE OF POWER

Changes and shifts within the surrounding security environment are certainly powerful influences on the DPRK’s armament and adjustments to its strategic policies. But the actual effects a change or shift will bring about have more often than not led to misleading analyses.

Too often, analyses have focused on what has happened, or is unfolding, in the regional security environment and then sought to forecast what the DPRK will do in response. While this may be informative as to what the DPRK is doing or will do, many analysts do not give due attention to how a state generates its policy or strategy.

One of the conceptual problems lies in defining the DPRK’s strategy. As noted in the preceding chapter, there is no consensus as to whether the DPRK’s strategy is offensive or defensive.30

There are disparate readings of the DPRK’s strategy because of confusion over its domestic circumstances or capacity. Many scholars believe that the DPRK simply does not have the economic or military capacity to achieve its ultimate objective of unification, and instead concentrates on the regime’s survival.

29 Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 02 (1991). 30Cha, "North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?."

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This does not suggest that changes in the regional security balance have no bearing on the

DPRK’s strategic planning. However, for the DPRK, the major problem lies in its failure or inability to configure itself to a region that is epitomized by military modernization. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that changes in the regional balance of power can be extremely fluid and unforeseeable.

The DPRK’s problems are compounded by ongoing arms modernization programs in the region.

The US, Japan, the ROK, China, Russia, Taiwan and even some ASEAN states are all conducting qualitative arms modernization programs to increase their military effectiveness.

However, given the DPRK’s economic and technical woes, Pyongyang could not, and would not try to, compete with all of those states; its domestic constraints severely limit its capacity. It would nevertheless feel intimidated.

The action-reaction between the DPRK and surrounding states is only one of the exogenous factors that influence Pyongyang’s strategy making. We also need to pay careful attention to the

DPRK’s options; what opportunities and loopholes in the regional balance can the DPRK exploit to pursue its objectives?

In a nutshell, given the DPRK’s political and economic constraints, it is doubtful whether it can effectively keep pace with modernization developments in the region. It is one thing for a state to identify what it wants to do; whether it can do it is another. The DPRK’s military policy vis-à-vis East Asia is strongly influenced by its internal political, economic and defence planning constraints. The DPRK’s actual behaviour is the net result of not only Pyongyang’s

103 view of the East Asian balance of power, but also its view of internal situational factors.

Domestic factors have a more exigent and immediate influence and, consequently, have a greater propensity to put the regime at risk. These points to the hypothesis – Analysis of a state’s strategic planning, therefore, needs close attention to its domestic factors. Focusing on the internal stimuli sheds light on a state’s unique characteristics and how it formulates its policy; by contrast, a focus on external stimuli sheds light mainly on the targets the state will seek to achieve.

If domestic influences somehow take the state’s circumstances beyond a sustainable threshold, they could bring about total dysfunction for the state. Hence, domestic factors have a powerful bearing on a state’s policy making. To identify the domestic forms of input, we need to decipher changes occurring in the DPRK’s domestic environment. Here, we focus on two particularly powerful variables - domestic economic factors and domestic political factors.

4.2. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES

The preceding chapter canvassed the pivotal role of economic statecraft in a state’s strategic planning. One could say that a state’s economy has an influence on its defence planning, and this in turn has an effect on its economy. The size and circumstances of a state’s economy, and the constraints upon it, inevitably affect its strategic planning. For a state, military expenditure enters the strategic planning process as a burden, and its capacity to arm is proportional to the state’s military economic potential.31 One could say that the impact of the economy upon

31 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.42.

104 defence planning depends on the state’s economic situation and size. The effects of a state’s economy on its defence planning can be positive or negative, depending on its economic health.

For instance, a wealthy nation’s economy would enable it to fund greater military spending, whereas a poorer nation (especially one facing economic crises) is bound to constrain its military spending. Hence, the influence of an economy functions either as a positive or a negative input.

When analyzing the DPRK’s economic factors, we need to keep in mind that this is a state whose economic privations have undermined its overall economic structure. As is well known, due to poor economic management, the DPRK now suffers from a severe shortage of capital.

The situation is worsening by the year, with little prospect for improvement. In particular, the condition of the civilian economy is becoming increasingly serious because of the DPRK’s military-centric economic policy. Hence it does not come as a surprise that there is a consensus that the relationship between its military and civil economies is now zero-sum.32

Yet ironically, the DPRK’s economic policy may not benefit its military as much as many perceive. In the DPRK’s military economy, there is continuing demand for high expenditure, not only because of its growing security uncertainties and military-centric politics, but also because of pressing needs to ensure operational preparedness (e.g. maintenance and supplies for platforms and infrastructure). As a result, the DPRK pursues a strategy which Minnich describes as to seek an “(increasing) its military capabilities through minimal fund expenditures.”33

32 Eberstadt, "Development, Structure and Performance of the DPRK Economy: Empirical Hints." pp.38,39. 33 Minnich, The North Korean People's Army: Origins and Current Tactics. pp.71-77.

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The zero-sum situation between the military and civilian economies poses a dilemma: steps taken to alleviate the civilian economy will have negative ramifications for the military economy, by decreasing purchasing power for investment and consumption; but continuing to devote resources heavily to the military will hinder development of the civilian economy and fuel increasing dissatisfaction in the population. Given this dilemma, it is likely that economic factors constitute a negative input to the DPRK’s strategic planning.

In analyzing economic effects on the DPRK’s strategic policy making, we need to avoid making the simplistic assumption that reforms or other improvement measures could change economic factors into positive inputs. There are two reasons for this.

First, the situation in the DPRK is so dire that there is probably no immediate or short-term remedy. Moreover, a boost in revenue is not a solution; rather, it may well cause inertia, which the DPRK would need to devote its resources to addressing. Further, given that the DPRK has to somehow balance its civilian and military industries, it is questionable whether Pyongyang has the “stamina” to endure the whole recovery process.

Second, the DPRK’s military industry is directly controlled by the central party.34 Given that the military industry is the only sector of the economy showing positive growth,35 it is highly influential and likely to continue to enjoy the regime’s favour indefinitely and almost unconditionally.

34 Hyeon-soo; Kim Jeong, Yong-hwan; Kim, Oe-sul, Buk-Han jeongchi gyeongje-ron (Seoul: Shinyeongsa, 1995). p.245. 35 Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. p.45.

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So what factors should we focus on? As a starting point, we should pay particular attention to factors that deepen the negative economic impact upon the DPRK’s strategic planning.

Specifically, we should look for signs of significant loss in the DPRK’s military economy. This, however, does not necessarily involve measuring the quality or the quantity of resources devoted to the military.

One of the signs is how the changing economic situation in the DPRK affects its economic and industrial capacity. Adjustments in strategic policy vis-à-vis the East Asian balance of power would need capital. Hence, we need to consider the implications for the productivity of the

DPRK’s military industry and for its military capability management. Also, we need to focus on the DPRK’s economic policies. Given that the poor state of the DPRK’s economy is the result of administrative and political incompetence, we need to see how politics and economics affect each other.

4.3. POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Changes in a state’s political environment undoubtedly have a powerful influence on the state’s strategic planning. For a totalitarian state like the DPRK, such changes can lead to regime instability, or worse, even collapse. Under risky circumstances, Pyongyang is apt to pursue domestic-centred measures, even resorting to the use of the military as an instrument to achieve political objectives.

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The DPRK’s political circumstances experienced significant change after Kim Jong-il collapsed due to a stroke in 2008. By the end of 2010, Kim Jong-un was confirmed as the heir to the throne after being appointed to key positions within the WPK. Soon after Kim Jong-il died in

December 2011, the DPRK aggressively propagated Kim Jong-un’s presence as the new leader.

Then in April 2012, Kim Jong-un was appointed as the First Secretary of the WPK and First

Chairman of the NDC. While many analysts now conjecture that the DPRK has accelerated towards collapse, the crucial question is how the Kim Jong-un regime will act until it finds its feet.

Broadly, we can speculate three patterns from the Kim Jong-un regime. First, Pyongyang is will continue to intensify the politicization of the political system, society and the KPA to shore up unconditional support for the new leader. Politicization could take place in various forms, ranging from reinforcement of ideological education, personnel changes, disciplinary measures

(in terms of political crime), and increase in propaganda to legitimize the “new era”.

Second, one would question whether Kim Jong-un is the sole power driving the current regime.

That is, while the process and the structure of the decision making system remains centralized under the leader, veteran figures such as Jang Song-thaek, Kim Kyong-hee, and perhaps even

Choe Ryong-hae and Kim Jong-gak are likely to be influential as regents to Kim Jong-un.

Third, we can expect more hard-line attitudes from the DPRK. Initially, the DPRK is likely to be inward-looking, to focus on perfecting the foundations of their new regime. Yet eventually, the various groups will forward their interests. Sources in the past have reported tensions

108 between the “soft” bureaucrats and the “hard-line” military elite.36 These hard-line attitudes can emerge both from top-down and bottom-up influences. That is, the KPA is likely to find ways to consolidate its influence in the strategic policy-making process, whilst the leadership will take advantage of the military’s posture for political ends.

In all, there is little doubt that the Kim Jong-un regime will continue to forward the juche and songun policies formulated by the previous leaderships. While the KPA will play a significant role in the political system, one questions whether this can be translated into the strengthening of the KPA’s capabilities. Indeed, there is good cause to suggest that the military has become more assertive (such as the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeongpyeong Island in

2010). However, we need to search further for evidence to show how domestic politics influences strategy making, and what implications it has for military capability.

4.4. FEEDBACK FACTORS

So far, we have looked at both the exogenous and endogenous sources of input. However, there is another factor that is essential to the whole planning system – feedback. This element plays a key part in the review and revision of policy and strategy.

An example of feedback is seen when a policy or strategy proves to be ineffective in maintaining or strengthening the DPRK’s position in the regional security balance. In that

36 See: Kim, "bukhan ui jeongchek gyeoljeong eso gunbu ui yeonghyang [the military's influence in North Korea's policy decisions]." pp.84-85.

109 circumstance, the policy or strategy may be revised or readjusted to produce a better outcome.

The diversification of the KPA’s capabilities is a case in point. The decision to improve the

KPA’s asymmetric edge reflects Pyongyang’s efforts to fix the ineffectiveness of its own military capability.

Another example of feedback is seen when a policy or strategy is deemed inconsistent, or no longer consistent, with the state’s political or economic standards. While the DPRK ostensibly sticks by its political traditions, situational factors have in fact caused the state’s political-economic capacity to diminish. In such case, a realignment of policies is required. In the defence planning context, examples of this would be the DPRK’s decision to pursue less resource-intensive options in managing the KPA’s force structure.

The use of feedback input is not confined to cases of failed policy or strategy; it is part of a constant process of review. Even deliberate, proactive actions could play a part in this process.

Actions might be taken to provoke reactions from states in the region. For instance, Pyongyang may well have embarked on its provocative testing of nuclear devices and missiles in 2006 and

2009 to “test” reactions from the US, the ROK, Japan and China, and also to use those reactions in determining its next strategy.

5. CONVERSION PHASE – FRAMEWORK OF DEFENSE PLANNING

The conversion phase can be considered the heart of the strategic policy-making process; it is where domestic and “country-specific” factors are most potent. In this phase of the process, the

110 state recognizes and takes account of developments in its security environment and then shapes its policies and objectives in conformity with the state’s ideological, structural and “native” values.

The importance and complexity of the conversion phase is often underappreciated. Some of the literature on defence politics theory treats the conversion phase simply as “domestic (policy) response(s)”.37 Domestic political factors certainly have a powerful impact, but the description is too broad. Other elements also come into play. The conversion phase is more complicated than is often realized, and we need to investigate it further.

Our primary task would be to identify the various contexts associated with different conversion factors. Some are controlled (i.e. politically managed), while others are more inherited and

“natural”. We can simplify our task by focusing on two particular types of conversion factors – constant and semi-constant factors. Constant factors are the traditional constants such as strategic culture, geography and history. Semi-constant factors involve economic, political and ideological considerations. They are termed semi-constants because they can be altered or tailored gradually, in line with a state’s changing values or policies. Despite their different natures, constant and semi-constant factors both restrain or narrow a state’s options in making decisions or in following a chosen path.

Therefore, analyzing the conversion phase will entail deciphering a number of constraint factors that are “native” or country-specific biases.38 We need to understand the DPRK’s strategic and

37Wilson III and Forest, Handbook of Defence Politics: International and Comparative Perspectives. p.3. 38 For the importance of biases, see: Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914.

111 environmental culture, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of its economic and political systems, and study their influences on Pyongyang’s strategic planning. In this part, we look at three main factors: strategic culture, politics, and economics.

5.1. STRATEGIC CULTURE

Strategic culture is a constant factor that is “native” to a state; it is culturally, geographically and historically formed. It is treated as a constant because it cannot be manipulated by the state.

It involves values and characteristics that are inherited, rather than politically created.

Over the years, a growing number of studies have recognized the importance of strategic culture.

Yet conceptualizing the cultural dimensions of policy and strategy making has proved to be extremely difficult. Johnson describes the identity of strategic culture as the “ideational milieu which limits behavioral choices…from these limits one ought to be able to derive specific predictions about strategic choice.”39 The term strategic culture is quite broad in scope and is prone to be used by different scholars to mean different things.

The broad interpretation of strategic culture is clearly evident in case studies of East Asian states.40 Much of the literature on the DPRK’s strategic culture has been limited to profiling the

39 Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture." 40 See: Tiejun Zhang, "Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features," Comparative Strategy 21, no. 2 (2002).;Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New "Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security 20, no. 3 (1995)., Scobell and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute., China and Strategic Culture.

112 regime’s ideology and its covert and guerrilla operations.41 This implies a view that the regime’s ideology and the military’s key tactics shape the DPRK’s strategic culture. However, this makes little sense because strategic culture is culturally or historically formed. As ideology and combat tactics are more the results of policies set by the state’s regime, it is not plausible to contend that they are “native” to the state per se.

We therefore need to further refine the definition of the DPRK’s “strategic culture”. There are three ways to do this. The first is to investigate whether decisions made are derived from a voluntary or an instinctive bias. If the decision is based on inherited values, they are essentially instinctive, rather than intentional. We should, therefore, focus on the influence cultural and historical legacies have on the DPRK’s strategic perceptions. Moreover, strategic culture may make the DPRK particularly sensitive to some factors that other states might disregard. As Cha argues, “Korean” strategic culture grew from a strong sense of monoculture, and experience of past invasions.42 This casts helpful light on the Koreas’ sense of inferiority towards larger powers, but it is still a grossly simplistic hypothesis.

Second, we must keep in mind that strategic culture is in part shaped by a state’s natural environment (i.e. geography and topography). It is commonly argued that the geographical location of the Korean peninsula makes the Koreas very wary of being “wedged”, compounding their sense of wariness and inferiority vis-à-vis China and Japan.43 This owes more to natural,

41Baird, "Kim Chong-il's Erratic Decision-Making and North Korea's Strategic Culture." 42 Cha, "Strategic Culture and the Military Modernization of South Korea." p.99. 43 The old Korean saying, “Shrimp amongst whales” is often used to describe the Koreas’ wedged position between China and Japan. See: Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006). p.1.

113 geographical factors than to cultural or political perspectives.

Third, we must heed geographical differences within the Korean peninsula between the Koreas.

As Armstrong correctly argues, “the northern part of the peninsula had been an economically, politically, and socially marginal part of Korea for centuries.”44

Together, these three factors give the DPRK certain perspectives and incline it towards certain decisions. Although the three factors may not be as obvious as political and economic factors, they are nevertheless deep-seated and they function as powerful, instinctive factors in the

DPRK’s decision making. Thus, considering the constant influences in the DPRK’s defence planning, we should focus purely on “native” factors. Study of instinctive stimuli will reveal the elements that have played a significant part in the construction not only of the DPRK’s political structure, but also of the state itself.

5.2. DIRECTION: POLITICAL SYSTEM AND IDEOLOGY

Politics plays a central role in a state’s strategy making. As a conversion factor, politics functions both as a bias factor and as a constraint on capacity. Analyzing the political aspects calls for close attention to how a state’s unique political dimensions tend to direct its strategy making along a certain path. Simply put, political structure and ideology would often restrain states from decisions that may seem rational, and instead, forge paths that are programmed according to the state’s perceptions. In particular, the over-politicization of the KPA and the

44 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. p.13.

114 excessive growth of the military-industrial complex has led to a gross imbalance between force structure and operational preparedness – epitomizing an ugly case of – path dependence.45

Most analysts and scholars acknowledge the ideological and political role of the KPA in the

DPRK’s strategic policy making. Yet often, the issue is misinterpreted. During the course of the twentieth century, many studies in the field of political science have tended to categorize the behaviour and processes of states according solely to the type of regime. This tendency is evident in many analyses on the DPRK, which stereotype the regime simply as Stalinist, communist/socialist, or totalitarian.

Indeed, the DPRK system is strongly characterized by its juche and songun ideologies which have endorsed a military-centered state. Further assessment regarding the characteristics of the

DPRK’s militarism is required. Hence although there is little doubt that the KPA plays a significant role in state affairs, we need to carefully assess how the DPRK’s ideologies influences the KPA’s overall functions, and the decisions in the decision making process.

While recognizing the relevance of communist, democratic and fascist characteristics, we must find more definitive ways to describe a state’s unique political identity, and how it influences its strategy making. Too much focus on a singular ideological format (such as communist, fascist or democratic) is simplistic; it risks overlooking crucial considerations and is potentially misleading. For example, there are some key similarities between the DPRK and autocratic non-communist regimes, such as Nazi Germany and Japan before 1945. The Second World War

45 For more on the concept of path dependence and historical institutionalism, see: Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ:: Princeton University Press, 2004).

115 made it clear that mass armament and commitment to a total war economy are not peculiar to any one form of government.

Instead, greater focus is needed on how a state’s ideology is installed into their political system.

In the post-World War II era, new states have often resorted to militarism as a way to consolidate power and meet external and internal threats. At the same time, the national security strategies of these newly developed states have varied considerably. In contrast to leaders like

Suharto or U Ne Win, who assumed their positions well after the state’s establishment, both

Kim Il-sung and Mao Zedong made audacious and ruthless efforts to take political control of the military during the state’s formative years. Indeed, many communist leaders utilized armed struggle or the military institution as the means to accomplish their revolution. Yet even communist states vary greatly not only in their political natures, but also in their strategies.46

Given that ideological nuances differ between groups and states; we therefore need to focus on how ideology is utilized, rather than what it is. The first issue is whether ideology should be seen as a constant or a semi-constant. The DPRK’s writings and slogans confirm that its ideology is unchallengeable and immutable. On the other hand, scholars argue that ideologies are designed, modified and redesigned to suit a regime’s convenience.47 For instance, in China, the USSR and the former East European states, radical revisions of ideology have taken place to remedy economic and political challenges. The DPRK, however, has continuously defied change. On the contrary, it continues to hold staunchly to its core juche ideology, even to the extent of

“bending” fundamental Marxist-Leninist theories. Moreover, by the turn of the millennium, the

46 Volker R. Berghahn, Militarism: the History of an International Debate 1861-1979 (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg, 1981). pp.67-69. 47 For examples, see: Knorr, Military Power and Potential.

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DPRK systemized songun, another dominant ideology which purported to increase the regime’s use of the military for political security. To better understand this issue, let us look at the environment in which the DPRK’s political system functions.

Autocracy exercised by leaders of totalitarian regimes differs according to the religious, cultural and ethnic make-up of their respective states. For autocratic leaders, how to handle religion within their states is problematic, often becoming an irritant. In the USSR and China, however, leaders like Stalin and Mao have taken ruthless measures to suppress religion and its political influence. In many cases, the relationship between religion and political leadership is zero-sum.

That is, in a state where religion is strongly established, there are limits to how far the cult of personality can be implemented or sustained. In a state like Indonesia, for instance, leaders are constrained from assuming a divine status, which would offend Islamic sensibilities. Perhaps the only exception where strong personality cult and religion coexists is Turkmenistan, where despite the presence of Turkmenbashi leadership, the Islamic establishment is largely unmolested.

In the DPRK, Kim Il-sung is recognized not only as the eternal president, but also the divine father of Korea. Given that the DPRK was homogenous in terms of culture and ethnicity, for

Kim Il-sung, there were fewer obstacles and more opportunities to establish his absolute autonomy. In particular, Kim Il-sung took advantage of the vague conceptualization of “Korea”.

In other words, this niche in the definition of “modern Korea” ostensibly gave the DPRK its edge in advancing communism/socialism. The cultural uniqueness of the DPRK’s “Korean” elements are well described by Armstrong:

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In the area of ideology, one of the most distinctively Korean elements of communism

in North Korea was its emphasis on ideas over material conditions. Koreans shared

this Marxist heresy with their counterparts in China and Vietnam, but this humanistic

and voluntaristic emphasis was even more pronounced in Korea than in the other two

East Asian communist revolutions, which may reflect the fact that Korea had long

been more orthodox in its Confucianism than Vietnam or China.48

While the exploitation of culture proved to be useful for the DPRK leadership, at the same time, this effectively keeps political life very rigid, constraining reform and preventing any reversal of the state’s ideologies. For the DPRK regime, revision of ideology would be tantamount to blasphemy and political suicide. Indeed, there are some analysts and scholars are skeptical about the significance of the DPRK’s ideologies in the actual administrative and decision-making context.49 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Pyongyang’s ideologies have significantly legitimized the regime’s very nature and state management. Juche and songun are more than mere political dogma. Together, they constitute a quasi-religious ethic that is interwoven into every corner of the nation’s economic and social life. Hence the DPRK has gone past the point where ideological revision is a viable option.

However, the DPRK’s ideology has in fact undergone change and revision, though in a cunningly gradual manner. For years, juche was the DPRK’s core ideology, but in the years

48 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. p.4. 49 For skeptics of the DPRK’s ideologies, see: Bruce Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).; ———, North Korea: Another Country (New York, NY: New Press: Distributed by W.W. Norton, 2003).; Brian R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves--and Why it Matters (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2010).

118 following the death of Kim Il-sung, songun became the dominant ideology.50 In effect, an ideological transition took place, though it hardly amounted to a revision. As we will discuss in

Chapter 4, juche, and songun are both seen as the primary means to achieve “Korean Socialism”.

This all seems confusing, if not contradictory. However, it can be said that the DPRK imposed an evolution of its dominant ideology, as distinct from a shift. And even if it were seen as a shift, the DPRK has skilfully evaded any negative or zero-sum result. That is, the status and value of the dominant ideology remains unchanged, and Pyongyang achieved this by ensuring that it did not compromise either the juche or the songun ideologies.

The DPRK might well have learned from the experiences of states such as Indonesia and

Romania. In Indonesia, Suharto’s measures to reduce the political role of the ABRI (Angkatan

Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, i.e. Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) yet prevent a coup resulted in a situation where the military became “incapable of decisive action either to save Suharto or to overthrow him.”51 The succeeding government then introduced a doctrine to unwind the military’s role in politics, thereby bringing about a series of transitional problems.52

Given that Pyongyang has a very strong grip on political doctrine and ideology, should Kim

Jong-il opt for reform, it would be in defiance of the state system itself and could even cost the regime its totalitarian power base.

50 Moo-jin Yang, "juche sasang gwa songun sasang: jibae ideology ui byeonhwa kaneungseong [Juche and Military-First Ideology: Possibility of Change in the Dominant Ideology]," hangukgwa kukje jeongchi [Korea & World Politics] 24, no. 3 (2008). pp.84-86. 51 Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Miltiary Elite: January 1, 1998-January 31, 1999," Indonesia 67(1999). p.138 cited in: Mary P. Callahan, "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond," (Monterey, CA: The Center for CivilMilitary Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, 1999).p.16. 52 ———, "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond." pp.8-9.

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We now move onto a consideration of how ideology affects the state’s strategy making and armament. Needless to say, in a militarist state like the DPRK, political bias inevitably favours the military.53 At the same time, we should avoid jumping to the conclusion that states with a militarist structure favour a strong military or are more eager for war. We would question whether songun actually integrates or benefits the DPRK’s strategic planning and meets the interests of the KPA.

We must first assess how military-centric ideology manifests itself politically. Rationales for the

DPRK’s persistence with songun are manifold, and somewhat similar to ABRI’s rationale for its dwi fungsi doctrine in Indonesia. In the DPRK, the military is the primary instrument for legitimizing the leadership and achieving kangsong taeguk (powerful and prosperous state).

Indeed, one of the stated objectives of songun is to achieve the dangui gunsa roseon.54

However, songun fails to specify how the military is to function in political life and does not go beyond quasi-religious dogma. Although it calls for the imposition of stricter political discipline down the ranks, we need further investigation into whether this has had any direct influence on the military’s overall competence and effectiveness, especially in “integration”,

“responsiveness”, “skill”, and “quality”.55

The impact of ideology is clearly evident in the DPRK’s force structure management. The

53 For the DPRK’s emphasis on importance of the military, see: Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics].(in Korean) 54 Korea Military Academy, "bukhan ui gunsa jeongchaek [North Korea's military policy]."pp.204-246. 55 Details in: Brooks, "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions and International Forces on Military Effectiveness." pp.10-15. In terms of “skill”, some scholars have in fact, looked at this problem. See: Miles D. Wolpin, "Sociopolitical Radicalism and Military Professionalism in the Third World," Comparative Politics 15, no. 2 (1983).

120 regime’s emphasis on “people’s war” - often a slogan for communist states - would imply that it favours quantitative armament or arming the masses, rather than qualitative armament.56

Moreover, songun claims that ideology is more powerful than weapons, and criticizes past commanders who relied purely on military equipment.57 In other words, ideology is seen as a force multiplier for the DPRK. Although the “people’s war” slogan may be used to justify the supremacy of the military sector over the civilian sector, this does not show us the connections between ideology and the DPRK’s military capability. In other words, ideology is not useful in a direct sense, as it does no more than indicate the DPRK’s militarist ethos.

In exploring the effect of ideology on the DPRK’s “readiness for war”, we have to sift through a great volume of rhetoric from Pyongyang. The term “war” is one of the most abused words in the DPRK. This is not surprising, of course; communist states often employ war-related terms.

Songun and other campaigns often use the term “war” or “struggle” to mobilize the population, industries and society for total war.58 This might appear alarming, but if we look at the narratives on songun, they do not go beyond asserting that the state’s objective is to counter the threats from the US, the ROK and Japan. But they only say why, not how.

Another important aspect we need to assess is how the DPRK’s ideologies have altered the state’s political structure. Given the strength of ideology in state affairs, we can assume that the

DPRK leadership has altered certain aspects of the political system to smooth the decision making process and bolster regime security. Of course, we can point to the dominating presence

56 Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva Switzerland), Small Arms Survey 2006 : Unfinished Business. p.47. 57 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. pp.66-67. 58 For the DPRK’s emphasis on importance of the military, see: ibid.

121 of the CCWPK and the NDC. However, we also need to look for the smaller organs that monitor the command and control hierarchy of the KPA.

After identifying the actors in the defence planning process, the next step is to assess the relationships between these actors. One would certainly question whether the CMCWPK and

NDC take on different roles in the management of the military. No doubt, the DPRK political architecture is designed according to the leadership’s aspirations. Yet there are also bound to be weaknesses, especially in the military capability context. Hence we would need to investigate the key characteristics of the DPRK’s political structure, and how processes take place.

In sum, political conversion factors in the DPRK’s defence planning process function as restraints. There is little doubt, given the DPRK’s insistence on ideology and its highly centralized political structure, that “politics” has a strong influence. Although the DPRK often toys with the idea of war and gives itself a hostile image, analyses to date have seldom offered convincing evidence as to how politics in the DPRK makes its military seem more powerful or

“dangerous”. The DPRK’s failure to realize its ideological aspirations is attributable not only to its internal constraints, but also to its use of ideology for internal political ends. Ironically, while the DPRK’s heavy reliance on ideology may “smooth” the planning process, as rigid framework may militate against Pyongyang’s national security aspirations by limiting the available decision-making options.

Specifically, we question how the DPRK’s politics directs the functions of the KPA. That is, we need to investigate whether the DPRK leadership places greater emphasis on the KPA’s political role, or the conventional military role. To achieve this, four particular political issues

122 need to be considered: the DPRK’s political/ideological identity, the regime’s “unique” sensitivities to internal and external issues, the relationship between the military and the regime, and the influence of ideology on armament and policy making. Yet ideology and the political system alone do not determine the function of the KPA. By considering politics together with economic constraints, we can gain a fuller picture of how the DPRK’s conversion factors function.

5.3. CAPACITY: ECONOMIC/INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE

In the previous part of this chapter, we discussed economics as input. It was discussed as a situational factor in the context of “changes”, or flow. Here, we shall look at how economics functions as a conversion factor. This concerns the capacity and structural architecture of the

DPRK’s economy and industry. In particular, we will focus on the DPRK’s economic and industrial capacity, and their constraints and limitations. This will allow us to speculate on strategic options available to Pyongyang.

Before discussing economic conversion factors, we will look at the characteristics of the

DPRK’s economy. Since the 1950s, the DPRK has focused on developing its economy through heavy industrialization rather than through an agriculture/light industry-based approach. This was and is seen as the most effective way to rebuild both the national economy and the military economy from the ruins of the Korean War by taking advantage of the factories left behind by the Japanese. The DPRK aimed to “kill two birds with one stone”: to rebuild its economy through industrialization and to establish a strong military industry. However, the nature of the

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DPRK economy and military industry raises several conceptual issues.

First, we need to keep in mind that the DPRK’s military industry is fully integrated into its political system. Across the world, advances in technology have influenced defence planning, especially in mobilization plans; strategic stockpiling; development of industry, science and technology; and total war.59 However, in the DPRK, the economy and industries are closely structured on ideological lines.60 This is most evident with the SEC (primary military industry) which is under the direct political control of the WPK. It is strictly bound by political standards rather than objective cost-benefit considerations. As a result, production and technological innovation is “delayed”, especially when political standards carry any implications for industry, the economy or the acquisition process.61

Second, the image of the DPRK as a “military-centric industrial state” has engendered disillusionment concerning its military. Statistics on the DPRK’s high military budget vary significantly; estimates on military expenditure range from as low as 14 percent to as high as 50

59 Dillon, Defence Policy Making: a Comparative Analysis. p.3. 60 Examples of the ideological rhetoric in economic affairs are seen in North Korean economic journals, where the conceptualization of economics is replete with the term songun, arguing how the economy must strive to meet its ideological ends. See: Mun-soo Yang, "bukhan munheon, ottoke ilgul goshinga, kyeongje yeongu ui sarye [how to read North Korean literature - case study of 'Economic Research']," bukhan yeonggu [North Korean Studies Review] 12, no. 2 (2009).

61 For general conceptual analysis regarding issues associated with inefficiencies caused by politicization of economic/industrial institutions, see: Douglass Cecil North, Structure and Change in Economic

History (New York, NY:: Norton, 1981).

124 percent of the total government budget.62 Whatever the true figure, this range vividly illustrates the DPRK’s commitment to its military industry, and the burden it imposes on the national economy. However, given military expenditure as a percentage of the actual size of the the

DPRK economy, figures may not be as high as we expect. Thus, we need to carefully analyze the DPRK military industry’s capacity and limitations.

Third, given that the DPRK has a command economy, some may doubt the relative significance of cost. While cost in terms of currency may vary from state to state, depending on differences in the price of goods and foreign exchange rates, the cost in terms of burden is nevertheless significant not only for production, but also for military capability.

The composition of the DPRK’s force structure is attributable not only to its insistence on a land-based strategy, but also to its limited fiscal and technological capacity. The vast majority of the DPRK’s conventional military platforms and technologies have been imported from

China, the USSR or Russia, or other East European powers from the Soviet bloc, mostly in the form of aid and concessions.63 At best, the DPRK has made crude alterations to imported models, and domestic production of weapons is limited to small arms.64 As a rule of thumb, strategic weapons and naval and air platforms are larger than the land vehicle platform.65 Over

62 ROK Ministry of Unification, bukhan ihae [understanding North Korea] (Seoul, ROK: ROK Ministry of Unification, 2011). pp.138-139. 63 This is often seen in states where economic/industrial capacity is limited. See: Hartley and Sandler, "Introduction." p.7. 64 According to the Small Arms Survey, the DPRK is ranked third behind China and Russia, producing somewhere in the vicinity of nine to sixteen million firearms. Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva Switzerland), Small Arms Survey 2006 : Unfinished Business. p.57. 65 Payne, Why Nations Arm. p.27.

125 the past decade, the DPRK’s acquisition of air and naval units has seldom kept pace with its strategic need to project power. Hence, we could say that on a cost-benefit basis, the DPRK’s decision to develop strategic weapons was its only affordable way to acquire power projection capabilities.

It is doubtful how much raw material the DPRK can devote to the production and maintenance of its military platforms. It is instructive to consider the experience of Japan in the years

1941~1945. Even though Japan had a command economy, its military industry was exhausted towards the end of the War and it was forced to take desperate makeshift measures. Scrap metal and wood were forcibly collected to produce military platforms, such as aircraft and tanks.

Women and children were mobilized as farmers, factory workers, and even soldiers armed with bombs and bamboos. What this teaches us is that military-based command economies are not without the problem of “costs”; there are still limits to their capacity to produce. Worse, a short burst in military production comes at the cost of the state’s overall economic health.

In a nutshell, the KPA’s force structure and operational preparedness seems attributable more to its industrial capacity than to its strategic preferences. To better understand the connections between the DPRK’s economic/industrial capacity and its military management rationale, we need to address the following questions: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the DPRK’s economy in terms of military management? In its defence planning, how does the DPRK balance its force structure and its operational readiness? What effects does the DPRK’s current armament trend have on its economy and military capability?

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6. OUTPUT: CHANGE IN STRATEGY AND EFFECT ON MILITARY CAPABILITY

Our next step would be to seek the best indicator of output, the final phase of the strategy-making process. In simple terms, output involves producing a military stance, strategy, policy or power. Yet the nature of output is always fully visible. In the book military power and potential, Knorr interpreted power into two forms – actualized and putative power.66 To understand the DPRK’s true output, we should focus not only on the means by which it attempts to influence its regional security environment, but also how those means are processed.

However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the nature of power is extremely complex and pervasive. This is especially so in the case of the DPRK, This is especially so in the case of the

DPRK. Its output is often misinterpreted because of Pyongyang’s practice of assuming a more threatening demeanour than it can live up to. Consequently, it is all too possible to confuse the

DPRK’s putative power with its real power. In examining the DPRK’s power, therefore, we need to be mindful of divergences and shortfalls between what it “says”, and what it is capable of militarily.

As will be made clear in this part, the most consistent indicator of output is not its military behaviour (such as nuclear tests), but rather its military capability management. The DPRK’s defence planning not only shows consistent connections with its domestic circumstances and policies, but it also its strategic ends.

66 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.3.

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6.1. CONCEPTUALIZING “STRATEGY”

Analysts have often found themselves bewildered by the DPRK’s “strategy”. There are inconsistencies between the DPRK’s policy and its military capability. Its constitution states that the ultimate objective of the regime is unification; however, given its actual capability, the feasibility of reunification is very doubtful. The same applies to dangui gunsa roseon, which call for personnel cadre-based army, military modernization, arming the citizenry, and garrisoning the whole state. However the DPRK’s military doctrine seldom keeps pace with reality due to economic constraints.

One of the universal problems in security related studies is refining the term “strategy”. A state’s strategy can vary, ranging from coercion, deterrence, intervention, as well as stabilizing internal instability.67 Looking at the DPRK’s behaviour, there is little doubt that the WPK’s dangui gunsa roseon is designed to boost the KPA’s military capability for coercion, deterrence.

While Pyongyang’s policy has remained pretty much consistent, both the external and internal security environment has been fluid. However, unless we determine what exactly has been actualized in the DPRK’s defence planning, we would only have abstract understanding of the

DPRK’s strategy.

In significant part, difficulties in defining Pyongyang’s strategy are partly due to misinterpretations of the DPRK’s policy statements. These statements have been made consistently (with each other), but it is questionable how successfully the DPRK has achieved

67Jeremy Black, "Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective," The Journal of Military History 62, no. 4 (1998).

128 objectives stated in them. Government statements and even academic journals published in the

DPRK are replete with ideology, propaganda and utopian dogma. At best, they reflect the

DPRK’s attitude and its inclination to fuel tension within the regional environment.

Nevertheless, statements released by Pyongyang have not always been reflected in its strategic actions.

Consequently, the best course is to seek to read the implicit messages in the DPRK’s policies and statements, and try to assess their military implications. The question is not whether the

DPRK has strengthened or weakened its military leverage, so much as whether its policy-making process has developed its armament with particular purposes in mind (such as arming for internal or external security and to serve an offensive or a defensive strategy).

First, we must try to assess whether the DPRK’s policies are directed towards its internal or external security environment. The line is blurred. The government frequently utters rhetoric with hostile overtones when facing diplomatic pressure, but it also does so at times of domestic instability. In some ways, this gives weight to the hypothesis that states suffering from internal distress often opt for inter-state violence for the sake of internal stability.68 Given its distressed political and economic circumstances, this hypothesis applies a fortiori to the DPRK.

Nevertheless, we should not assume that all of the DPRK’s policies are designed to foster internal stability. We need to test how far Pyongyang has tried to coordinate and reconcile its policy statements with its defence planning. Even though the DPRK’s eccentric statements and actions may be said and done with internal security in mind, they will nonetheless have an effect on its defence planning and capability.

68 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.141.

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Second, we need to determine whether the DPRK’s strategy is offensive or defensive. Many studies have found that the difference between offensive and defensive military stances is unclear.69 One way to approach this problem is to test whether the DPRK’s strategy is offensive or defensive depending on its domestic circumstances. We could argue that the DPRK’s strategy was offensive from the 1950s until the late 1980s, but it adopted a defensive strategy from then on. With its introduction of songun as its dominant doctrine in 1998, the DPRK seemed to become more assertive, maintaining that the doctrine is a vehicle that can achieve kangsong taeguk and peaceful unification.

Notwithstanding its rather hostile behaviour, the DPRK’s strategy based on songun has been two-sided. At the domestic level, it has been aggressive; it has called for the mobilization of the civilian population to overcome the hardships they face.70 On the other hand, despite its hostile attitude externally, its military behaviour has been more provocative than menacing – in effect,

“more taunt than threat”. We cannot help but suspect that Pyongyang makes its strategy appear aggressive to help remedy its domestic concerns.

Be that as it may, we still need to measure the extent to which the DPRK’s words have been matched by action. This is essential if we are to assess whether the DPRK’s real motive in

69 Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," The Journal of Politics 63, no. 3 (2001). 70 See: Seong-il Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2002); Ki-hwan Choi, minjokgwa songun jeongchi [the people and songun] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2003); Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]; Cho-bong Go, songun sidae hyeokmyeong ui juche [juche in the songun era revolution] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2005).

130 seeking to rearrange the balance of power in East Asia is offensive or defensive. Over the past decade, the DPRK has justified its development of missiles and WMD as a “deterrent” against the threat posed by the US, the ROK and Japan. While “deterrent” has a strong defence-oriented nuance, Pyongyang uses it very broadly. On the one hand, we might think that the DPRK is simply trying to shield its vulnerable state from any possible external threat. On the other hand, we might suspect that the DPRK’s armament of WMD is intended to keep the US and Japan at bay to open up a way to attack the ROK.71

The other method used to examine the DPRK’s strategy is the action-reaction framework. This focuses on the impact of the DPRK’s actions. However, we find that the reaction from states in the region has varied and fluctuated not only because of politics, but also because of the more serious threat that the USSR posed during the Cold War. Moreover, the action-reaction framework does not give due credit to underlying developments and efforts at the domestic level. For these reasons, the action-reaction framework reveals only half of the picture.

Even combining these two methods to determine the DPRK’s strategy is insufficient to explain its output. The DPRK has skilfully exploited its ideologies and strategy to portray a grossly exaggerated picture of its state power. Also, the DPRK’s strategy has sheds light on the direction it wants to follow; however, given that our focus is on the DPRK’s output, we need to see the connections between its policies and changes in its military capability.

71 Takesada, "chosen hantou de okiteiru koto [the things really happening on the Korean Peninsula]." p.7.

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6.2. MEASURING MILITARY CAPABILITY

The term military capability is one of the most abstract terms in defence studies. There are various measures of military capability, including manpower, military expenditure, firepower, tactics and technological innovation. While these measures have their uses, we need to focus on determining the military’s actual ability and capacity to achieve the state’s strategic objectives, as well as actualized mobilization. In this context, we can divide military capability into two categories: force structure and operational preparedness.

For any state, the balance between its force structure and its operational preparedness is crucial in developing effective leverage against its adversaries. We should not be concerned solely with technical functions and specifications of individual units, or the quantity of platforms; we also need to consider the state’s ability to maintain and operate its units. As shown in the X-Y axis diagram below, a state has a high level of military capability when it has high levels both of force structure and of operational preparedness. A low level of either, or both, would call for asymmetrical measures (such as guerrilla tactics) to compensate for their weaknesses.

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Force High Structural Preparedness 1 2 Operational Preparedness

Low High 3 4

Low

Figure 3.1: The Military Capability Balance

This framework will be useful in deciphering where the DPRK’s military capability stands. This will need careful assessment not only of the DPRK’s military (in both force structure and operational preparedness), but also of the causal nexus between domestic constraints and military capacity. That is, we must investigate how the circumstantial changes in the DPRK’s domestic political-economic environment impact the KPA’s military capability and strategy.

6.2.1. FORCE STRUCTURE

Studies on the DPRK’s military capability often comment first about the size of the KPA.

Viewed broadly, the KPA’s substantial increase in the number of personnel and platforms in the past two to three decades indeed supports the argument that quantitatively, the KPA’s military capability is strong. Analysts like Atkenson claims that analytical techniques such as

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TASCFORM (Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization), “provides indices of qualitative as well as quantitative factors”.72 Such models are certainly useful in quantifying the KPA’s force structure.

Still, quantification of the KPA’s capabilities has numerous shortfalls. If we base our analysis purely on statistical details, we can endorse Hamm’s four main criticisms of “bean counting” methodologies (viz. a disregard of: the “entire quantitative components”; the quality of equipment/platforms; organizational effectiveness; and deployment capabilities in combat).73

Moreover, if we are concerned with military capability management, then we also need be attentive to increases and/or decreases in certain types of platforms. This is not to say that figures relating to the KPA should be rejected outright. Rather, the shortfalls of statistical analyses are a reminder to be extra cautious of how figures and statistics are treated in our analysis of the KPA’s force structure.

Above all, we need careful attention to how the DPRK is developing its armed forces. Its drive towards military modernization is apt to differ from that of other states such as the US, the ROK,

Japan or even China. The DPRK’s armament shows that Pyongyang sees maintaining a quantitatively strong military as more cost-effective than a qualitative shake-up. Ironically, the quantitative strengths of its military carry a serious qualitative weakness; most conventional platforms in the DPRK military are outdated and poorly maintained. This not only indicates the military’s poor maintenance, but also implies that economic factors significantly impact the force structure of the KPA. Hence the nature of the DPRK’s military industry also deserves

72 Atkeson and Institute of Land Warfare (Association of the United States Army), The North Korean Military Threat in Perspective. p.2. 73 Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. pp.39-61.

134 close attention.

We also have to question the nature of the KPA’s force structure. Often it can be hard to determine a state’s strategy by merely looking at the composition of a state’s military. Payne asserts, “…another error embodied in the war destructiveness fallacy is the failure to realize that countermeasures and defences always represent a large share of military developments.”74

While convincing in some ways, it is hard to judge whether or not Payne’s hypothesis fits with the KPA. By looking at the formation of the KPA, it is evident that the DPRK’s defence planning has focused on “deterrence through first strike capabilities”. For example, the KPA’s artillery units, air units and strategic weapons, could be utilized both for deterrence and first-strike, but whether they possess second-strike or counter-strike capabilities, deserves further discussion.

What complicates our analysis of the DPRK’s military capability management is deducing the significance of its development of strategic weapons. Since 1993, the DPRK has on numerous occasions resorted to provocative testing of its missiles and nuclear devices. Much of the concern about the DPRK’s WMD program seems to involve proliferation, a possible outbreak of an arms race, a boost in the DPRK’s military leverage (in the context of diplomacy) and the use of nuclear weapons in attack and/or conflict. While this issue has attracted much attention, it has also given rise to some misconceptions concerning the DPRK’s military capability and policy. In particular, its conventional force structure has been treated as insignificant by comparison with its arsenal of WMD and missiles.

74 Payne, Why Nations Arm. p.11.

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We can reduce the DPRK’s nuclear strategy to two possible scenarios: exploiting the threat that nuclear weapons pose, or developing them for use or sale. If it is the former (i.e. threat), then we can argue that the DPRK’s strategic weapons armament is intended as a deterrent against the

ROK, Japan and the US, which reflects the classic arms race theory. However, if it is the latter

(i.e. use or sale), then the DPRK will need not only to “complete” its development of strategic weapons, but also to successfully integrate them into its military management.

The DPRK sees its strategic weapons as part of its military leverage. Yet the deterioration of its conventional platforms weakens the strategic weapons’ effectiveness. Strong conventional platforms are indispensible in maintaining credible military leverage – even with the possession of nuclear weapons. For example, in the final moments of the Pacific War, the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were used more as a final blow to Japan, which was already on its knees because of the air and sea dominance of US forces.

In broad terms, strategic weapons are designed to supplement a state’s military capability. Yet often in military force management, there is a zero-sum relationship between nuclear weapons and conventional forces.75 While there is no exact figure on the amount of resources devoted to the DPRK’s nuclear program, we can assume that it was enough to come at a cost to proper upgrading and maintaining of the KPA’s conventional weapons. Viewed broadly, the DPRK is simply throwing a blanket over the problems in its conventional force structure.

On this hypothesis, it is questionable whether the DPRK’s acquisition of WMD and missiles automatically puts it on a higher rung of the military capability ladder. It would seem axiomatic

75 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. p.33.

136 to argue that nuclear weapons and other WMD will replace the DPRK’s conventional military platforms. Indeed, in terms of destructiveness, WMD will boost its military strength, and missiles will greatly increase its power projection capability. But it is questionable whether

WMD are more than a tool of deterrence. In the years following the Second World War, many scholars and strategists began to doubt the effectiveness and role of nuclear weapons, effectiveness and role of nuclear weapons, because there was no effective strategy for their use and because provoking collateral death and destruction is rarely an end in itself in war.76

Moreover, we question whether the DPRK, given its novice status as a nuclear power, has yet developed the administrative skills necessary to make and operate nuclear weapons. 77

Notwithstanding that, the DPRK has proved itself adept at managing its conventional forces, questionable though their quality may be. The KPA’s asymmetric tactics that utilizes conventional platforms, and the environment in which they are to be actualized, have been drilled into the DPRK military doctrine long before the start of its nuclear program. Before

Pyongyang took steps to put its nuclear ambitions into practice, its actions were more coercive, if not more offensive (for example, the assassination attempts on Park Chung-hee, the KAL bombing, the Rangoon bombing, and the abduction of Japanese and ROK nationals. The attacks on the ROK in 2010, further highlights the DPRK’s offensive tactics.

6.2.2. OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

76 Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D Intriligator, "Arms races and proliferation," in Handbook of Defense Economics, ed. Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (Amsterdam ; New York: Elsevier, 1995). p.144. 77 Knorr, Military Power and Potential. pp.33-52.

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Despite its importance, the operational preparedness aspects of the KPA are often under-appreciated. Needless to say, military platforms alone cannot function without sufficient fuel, supplies, skilled personnel and infrastructure. Hence operational unpreparedness would consequently make its platforms a white elephant and render the DPRK incapable of sustaining itself during prolonged armed conflict.

As to technological aspects, it is widely believed that since the end of the Cold War, the DPRK has begun to lose its accustomed military edge over the ROK.78 However, this is ascribed not only to the state of its hardware, but also to poor maintenance. Because of its failing economy and shrinking industrial capacity, problems in the DPRK’s operational preparedness have become increasingly apparent. Military readiness and the efficiency of military operations depend heavily on the quality of infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, airfields, ports and railways, food supply, water supply, and fuel and energy supply. In simple terms, the DPRK’s operational preparedness cannot keep pace with the size of its military. Given that the KPA’s quantitative size grew considerably since the 1970s, problems in the shortage of supplies would inevitably have a strong impact on the DPRK’s overall military capability of its units.

The operational preparedness aspects also reveal a great deal about the DPRK’s military strategy. Even under the circumstances where the state faces shortages in supplies, this does not mean that the problems affect the KPA in an even manner. That is, Pyongyang may devote a larger share of the limited resources on particular groups or units in the KPA. The coefficients of Pyongyang’s commitments for the KPA’s operational preparedness, provides hints to

78 Atkeson and Institute of Land Warfare (Association of the United States Army), The North Korean Military Threat in Perspective. p.15.

138 measuring both the DPRK’s military capability and strategy.

One factor that needs attention is the welfare and morale of KPA personnel. In recent years, humanitarian problems have become increasingly evident even in the KPA. Such problems would obviously have significant effects on the DPRK’s military capability not only in terms of mobility and functionality, but may also eventually undermine the command and control structure. Thus we need to closely examine how the domestic political-economic circumstances manifest itself in the personnel aspects of the KPA.

We must also take into account the role of the military and note the ratio of its traditional and non-traditional activities. Although the DPRK continues to maintain high military expenditure, we question whether it is devoted purely to strengthening military capability. Particularly since the start of Kim Jong-il’s songun era, there seems to be a significant increase in civilian activities by soldiers, such as farm work, construction of non-military infrastructure, and distribution of aid. Such incidental, non-core activities need to be “subtracted” from total output, as they are not directly relevant to the DPRK’s external military policies vis-à-vis the East

Asian security balance.

Finally, military capability depends not only on tangible military assets and the order of operations, but also on laws and policies of the state. For example, in May 2003, the strength of

Japan’s military leverage significantly increased as a result of amendments to its laws which had previously constrained the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Indeed, the Japanese government is acquiring new state-of-the-art platforms, but since its establishment in 1954, the

JSDF has always been quite well armed. Although the situation is very different in the DPRK,

139 we should nevertheless look for any signs of legal changes in the DPRK which might have a bearing on its military capability management.

Considering the totalitarian nature of the DPRK, indeed we may question whether the role and value of law in the Orwellian state. However, given the politicized nature of the military chain of command in the DPRK, there are bound to be laws or orders that constrain the KPA’s behaviour. For example, we could question how the rules of engagement are determined, or how communication is carried out in the KPA. The given that the KPA’s hierarchy is extremely centralized and rigid, we may assume that the conveyance of orders are apt to be slow. Indeed, orders from the leadership are likely to be transmitted with great speed. Yet, we question whether decision making concerning sudden situational changes can be carried out in a seamless manner.

7. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Thus far we have discussed the alternative methods available in analyzing the DPRK’s strategy making. We have found that a systems analysis approach using the input-conversion-output model is useful as a framework for examining the DPRK’s decision-making process. Systems analysis enables us to arrange in order the components of the strategic policy making process.

However, as contended earlier in this chapter, the models available to strategic planning scholars are either too simplistic or too confusing to apply to the DPRK.79 If we take the

79 Wilson III and Forest, Handbook of Defence Politics: International and Comparative Perspectives. p.3; Dillon, Defence Policy Making: a Comparative Analysis. p.2; Drew and Snow, Making

140 simplistic approach to illustrating the DPRK’s defence planning process, we will end up with a model that resembles Figure 3.2.

Input (Changes) • Internal situation • External situation

Conversion (Process) • Political/Economic Structure

Output (Strategy) • Strategic adjustments • Force structural realignment

Figure 3.2: A Simplistic Illustration of the input-conversion-output Framework

Obviously, the model abbreviates the differing nature of the stimuli that affects the defence planning process. In particular, we need to differentiate between the internal and external stimuli. One of the key takeaways of this chapter was the specific importance of the domestic stimuli. The chapter reemphasizes the point that for states like the DPRK which face numerous pressing domestic challenges, domestic factors play a pivotal role. In a state’s strategic planning, as shown in Figure 3.3, the influence of its domestic factors is proportional to its domestic equilibrium, especially its economic stability and political stability. In other words, the domestic situational factors gain increasing influence, more or less flanking the structural factors.

Twenty-First-Century Strategy : an Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems. p.25.

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Figure 3.3: The Domestic Factor Matrix

Given that this thesis focuses on the conversion phase, a thorough assessment of the domestic factors is required. Understanding these domestic dimensions entails tracing back to the roots of individual stimuli to discern the essential nature of the DPRK’s ideology, political system, economic/industrial system and strategic culture. These domestic factors interact in the formation of strategies and the application of military leverage. While questioning how individual elements affect policy-making may be easy, formulating and applying principles of analysis is far from simple. There are numerous methodological caveats, especially as to how to find relevant and reliable data and sources and how to use them.

We can reconceptualize the DPRK’s military capability management by looking at both the

142 situational and structural aspects of the state’s political economy. In the following chapters, we will use the framework discussed in this chapter to assess in greater depth how the DPRK’s military capability management process takes place.

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CHAPTER 4: THE DPRK’S POLITICAL DIRECTION AND IMPACT ON THE KPA

1. UNDERSTANDING THE DPRK’S POLITICAL SYSTEM

The direction of a state’s military capability management is mainly determined by the governing institution’s political preferences and system. Rationality is often outweighed by the leadership’s political agendas and biases, which determines the overall discourse of the state’s defence planning. However, in many cases, politics tends to meddle with the state’s military capability, especially when the military is subject to politicization.

According to the DPRK’s 2009 Socialist Constitution, the state’s political system runs on two ideologies – juche (self-reliance), and songun (military first politics). Both ideologies are regarded as the means to achieve “Korean Socialism” or kangsong taeguk (strong, prosperous state). The development of such an ideologically saturated system is a result of the leadership’s practice of “centralization” and “inheritance”. Since the formative days of the DPRK, Kim

Il-sung made efforts to use the military as the means to construct a “self-reliant, Korea-based” monolithic system. The policy has been inherited more intensively by Kim Jong-il, and it is highly likely that the third-generation leader, Kim Jong-un will work to perfect the tradition. In short, the successive leaders in the DPRK have advanced the political system beyond the point of no return, illustrating a prime example of path dependence.1

This chapter aims to assess how the DPRK’s political system influences its defence planning.

1 For a comprehensive study regarding the concept of path dependence, see: Jorg Sydow, Georg Schreyogg, and Jochen Koch, "Organizational Path Dependence: Opening the Black Box," Academy of Management Review 34, no. 4 (2009).

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The chapter will examine both the “hardware” and “software” of the DPRK political system, by looking at how the autonomous regime developed over the years. The chapter starts with a historical overview of the DPRK political system. Then, we will look at how the juche and songun ideologies became the most pervasive items of software in the DPRK’s political system.

The following two sections will look at how the DPRK’s ideology has reshaped the party-military relations, and the state’s command and control structure. Finally, the implications of politics on the KPA’s capability management will be discussed.

2. THE DPRK’S POLITICAL SYSTEM – THE INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION

While the DPRK officially established itself as an official state on 9 September 1948, the state-building process started as early as 1945.2 Moreover, the KPA was established on 8

February 1948. Hence the military was founded before the state, hinting to the military-centric nature of the political system of the DPRK.

To this day, North Korean official accounts claim that Kim Il-sung solely paved the way for the

“Korean revolution”, from the anti-Japanese guerrilla forces to Korea’s liberation in August

1945, and the founding of DPRK in 1948. Obviously, Pyongyang’s version of history is tailored for the purpose of solidifying Kim Il-sung’s personality cult. Although Kim Il-sung was active in the state building process, his role falls short of being recognized as the sole founder of Korea.

If Pyongyang’s accounts of history are true, the DPRK regime may have followed a fate

2 Renamed in June 1949 as the choguk tongil minjujui jeonseon (Democratic Fatherland United Front). See: Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950.

145 different from what we know today.

2.1 THE RISE OF THE WPK

During the formative period, state development in the DPRK was multipartite, and the state’s political system seemed to function in line with its name – “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”. Although functioning somewhat as a facade, a democratic, multi-party system was indeed in place, with representatives not only from the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK, joson rodongdang), but also the Christian Korean Democratic Party (KDP, joson minjudang), and the

Chondogyo-based Young Friend’s Party (YFP, chongudang).3 On 22 July 1946, these three parties formed a coalition named as the North Korean Democratic National United Front (Puk joson minjujuui minjok tongil jeonseon), which nominally exists to this day.4 The formation of this tripartite system indicates that there existed a certain level of mutual dependency between the three political parties to maintain their political buoyancy.5 In other words, the three parties placed cooperative state-building at the forefront, instead of furthering their own individual political ideologies.

Initially, both the KDP and YFP were, at least in size, more or less on equal footing with the

3 The transition process that took place in the DPRK closely mirrored the Chinese doctrine of “new democracy”. For more commentary on the KDP and YFP, see: Andrei N. Lankov, "The Demise of Non-Communist Parties in North Korea (1945–1960)," Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 1 (2001). 4 According to Scalapino and Lee, it seems, that both the Soviets and Korean Workers Party wanted a multi-party system, but for the opposite reasons. The Soviets wanted it to give North Korea the image as a multi-party, democratic state: Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972). p.350, 696. 5 The coalition closely mirrored the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s United Front Work Department (zhōng gòng zhōng yāng tŏng zhàn bù).

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WPK.6 However, the strong support from the USSR allowed the WPK to eclipse the two other parties in terms of organizational management, especially in instilling control over the military and proletariat. Additionally, the cleavage between the KDP and YFP served as a niche for the

WPK to increase their influence.7 By 1948, both the KDP and the YFP became subordinates to the WPK.8 The “transmission belt” was a standard practice in many socialist states. Hence it is not surprising that the WPK emulated such strategy. The loopholes in the DPRK political system, and the coalition itself, were later exploited by the WPK and Kim Il-sung in their rise to autonomy.

2.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE WPK’S IDEOLOGICAL IDENTITY

The main theme of the DPRK’s political system is “uri-sik” (our style). Many of the contemporary political writings from the DPRK argue that its political system is fundamentally different and more advanced than that of other socialist states because it is built on the concept of “humanism”.9 Hence the question of whether the DPRK is an “authentic” Marxist-Leninist state or not is perhaps beside the point. Rather, given that the DPRK’s political system is a fusion of communism, Korean cultural elements and religion, focus is needed on the bearing of these “native” values.

6 See: Lankov, "The Demise of Non-Communist Parties in North Korea (1945–1960)."; Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. 7 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. p.695. 8 See: Lankov, "The Demise of Non-Communist Parties in North Korea (1945–1960)." 9 See: Myung-hyun Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2004). pp.22-25.

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Little needs to be said regarding the way that the DPRK emulated various administrative and ideological features from China and the USSR. However, although the DPRK is based on a socialist regime, its political identity is rather complex and unique. Armstrong correctly describes the DPRK political system’s development process as, “the ‘Koreanization’ of Soviet communism, not the ‘Sovietization’ of North Korea”.10 Hence the DPRK regime should not be treated as a simple ideological protégé of the USSR or China.

It is hard to know what constitutes Pyongyang’s over-propagated concept of “Korean” values, especially when the nexus between culture and politics is often saturated with ideology. North

Korean official records assert that the DPRK and the WPK’s roots are the Korean People’s

Revolutionary Army led by Kim Il-sung.11 Pyongyang does not recognize the other communist movements that were present in Korea before 1948. However, in spite of Pyongyang’s claims, the pre-1945 Korean communist movement was far from singular. In fact, numerous Korean communist movements both in and outside of Korea had appeared and gained significant momentum during the early decades of the twentieth century.12 It was not until the 10th of

October 1945 that the surviving Korean communists unified as the Korean Communist Party

10 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. p.241. 11See: Ang-cheon Ha, hangil mujang tujaeng shigi e iruk dwen uri dang ui hyeokmyeong jeontong [our party's revolutionary tradition created in the anti-Japanese struggle era] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1962).; Jong-il Kim, hang-il hyeokmyeong seonryeoldeul ui chungshimseong eul ddara beuja [let us follow and learn from the loyal guidance of the anti-Japanese revolution] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1980).; Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, joson rodongdang ryaksa [brief history of the Worker's Party of Korea] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1979). 12 See: Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948.; Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea.

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Northern Korea Bureau.13

Combined with the backing from the Soviets, the merger of the Korean communist groups certainly strengthened their political power within Korea. However, the extent of the communists’ integrity was questionable. Within the WPK, there were five factions from differing geographic origins: The Manchurian guerrilla faction led by Kim Il-sung; the Soviet

Korean faction made up of Koreans born in the Soviet Union (or Russia); the Yanan faction from the Shanxi province in China; the South Korean/Domestic faction which comprised of communist activists in the Korean peninsula; and the Kapsan faction who fought guerrilla wars against Japan in the northern regions of the Korean peninsula.

Interestingly, when the first WPK Conference was held in the formative year of August 1946,

Kim Il-sung’s Manchurian guerrilla faction represented a relatively small number. With the different factions present in the WPK, we can see why the party absorbed scattered influences.

As we shall see in the next section, it is precisely this situation that led to intra-party tensions during the 1950s.

2.3 CENTRALIZATION OF THE DPRK LEADERSHIP

By 1950, the WPK enjoyed its autonomy in the DPRK’s political system. For Kim Il-sung, the next step was to consolidate his own position within the party. Contradicting the DPRK’s

13 The DPRK’s official records claim that KDP and YFP were formed after the WPK. (KDP was founded on 3 November 1945, and the YFP on 8 February 1946). Sahoe Gwahakwon Ryeoksa Yeonguso, ryeoksa sajeon 1 [dictionary of history 1] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Sahoe Gwahak Chulpansa, 1971)., pp.338-339.

149 official historical accounts, Kim Il-sung was a latecomer, and was not present when Korea gained its independence in August 1945. At the end of the Pacific War, Kim Il-sung was the commander of the Soviet 88th Special Brigade 1st Division, and only returned to Pyongyang on

19 of September 1945, just in time to join in on the state-building process. Moreover, Kim

Il-sung did not make his first public appearance until 14 October 1945, when a mass rally welcoming the Soviet army was held in Pyongyang.

While Kim Il-sung did become the first Prime Minister of the DPRK, he was in a fairly tenuous position at least up to the late 1950s. Despite his key role in establishing the KPA, Kim

Il-sung’s political profile did not seem to eclipse other prominent figures such as Pak

Heon-yong, the CCWPK Deputy Chairman from the South Korean faction, or Cho Man-sik, a non-communist, Christian political activist. However, from the 1950s, Kim Il-sung manoeuvred himself up the political ladder and collectivised control over the regime by exploiting various opportunities. Consequently the DPRK’s political system goes through a series of transformations, moulds itself into a totalitarian state under Kim Il-sung, and later becomes the socialist monarch that exists today.14

The first opportunity for Kim Il-sung was the institutionalization and politicization of the KPA under his control. Given his background as a guerrilla soldier, it is not surprising that Kim

Il-sung’s political outlook was more military-oriented with strong colours of realpolitik.15 Kim

14 For the most comprehensive analysis and commentary regarding the creation of the “Kim Il-sung system”, see: Andrei N. Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Song: the Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960 (London, UK: C. Hurst, 2001). 15 Armstrong correctly notes that Kim Il-sung’s experience as an anti-Japanese guerrilla soldier served as the bedrock of the DPRK’s strategic perception. See: Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. p.9.

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Il-sung started his groundwork for creating the national army immediately after the liberation of the Korean Peninsula. In a speech given on 20 August 1945, Kim Il-sung argued that building a national army as one of three main agendas for Korea.16 During the formative period, there was no organ within the DPRK that manages the military, which served as a prime niche for Kim

Il-sung to exploit. Taking advantage of the premature political environment in the DPRK, Kim

Il-sung quickly moved to shape the party-military relations.17

In 1946, the boan kanbu hullyeon daedae bonbu (Public Security Officers’ Training Battalion

Headquaters) was established.18 Then in October 1946, pseudo-military officer schools, such as the Pyongyang hakwon (Pyongyang Academy), and jungang boan kanbu hakkyo (Central

Security Officer School) were founded. These key institutions created by Kim Il-sung and his close allies would not only physically develop the national armed forces, but also allow Kim

Il-sung to shore up his legitimacy within the military.19 Finally on 8 February 1948, the KPA was officially established.

The second opportunity for Kim Il-sung to gain his dominance within the WPK was the Korean

16 Il-sung Kim, "haebangdoen jogugeseoui dang, gukga mit muryeok geonseore daehayeo [On Building the Party, State and Armed Forces in the Liberated Homeland] (20 August 1945)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 1 [Kim Il Sung Works 1] (June 1930-December 1945) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1979). pp.250-268. 17 Yi also argues that this was because Tongil jeonseon’s focus on state building Yi, bukhangun eun wae kudetareul haji ana [why don't the Korean People's Army make a coup]. pp.46-47. 18 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. pp.923-924. 19 Kim Il-sung’s dominance in the KPA was epitomized by his speech on 8 February 1958, where stressed that the KPA is the successor of the anti-Japanese guerrilla partisan movement. See: Il-sung Kim, "josoninminguneun hangilmujangtujaengui gyeseungjaida [The Korean People's Army has Inherited the Anti-Japanese Armed Struggle] (8 February 1958)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 12 [Kim Il Sung Works 12] (January-December 1958) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1981).

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War. While it was the DPRK that first attacked the ROK on 25 June 1950, the war was propagated as a defensive crusade against the US and the occupied south. Under such circumstances, the KPA became the only institution which can fulfil state’s raison d’état and ensure its well-being. Soon after the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953, purges took place.

Kim Il-sung banished key figures such as Park Heon-yong, Mu jeong and Kim Chaek either on counts of treason or to apportion blame for the failed military campaign (i.e. invasion of the

ROK). Hence for Kim Il-sung, the Korean War bolstered his credibility not only within the

KPA, but also the DPRK.

The third opportunity came when instability emerged in the WPK during the 1950s when the five main factions within the party – Soviet, Yanan, South Korean, Manchurian and Kapsan factions – began disputes over the way in which the “revolution” should be carried out. The cleavages became increasingly apparent when figures from these factions held senior bureaucratic or party posts in the DPRK government. Members of the South Korean faction were banished soon after armistice. However, from the mid-1950s, the Soviet and Yanan factions became increasingly vocal against Kim Il-sung’s economic and political viewpoints.20

At the CCWPK Plenum in August 1956, Kim Il-sung purged senior higher-ranking figures from the Soviet and Yanan factions. Known as the “August Incident”, the purges took place so ruthlessly that both Anastas Mikoyan and Peng De-huai rushed to Pyongyang to calm the situation.21 By 1959, most of the prominent figures from the Soviet, Yanan and the South

Korean factions were removed (see Table 4.1). The purges not only reflect the extent of political

20 For a thorough analysis of the purges in the 1950s, see: Andrei N. Lankov, Crisis in North Korea : the Failure of De-stalinization, 1956, Hawaiʻi studies on Korea (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2005). 21 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. pp.514-515.

152 instability in the DPRK, but also clearly shows the WPK was being refined and integrated under

Kim Il-sung.

Key Figures Purged/Exiled in Years 1950~1959 Last Position Held Year Purged Soviet Alexei Ivanovich Hegay Deputy Prime Minister 1953 (Suicide) Kim Seung-hwa CCWPK August 1956 Pak Chang-ok WPK General Secretary August 1956 Choi Jong-hak DPRK-USSR Friendship Association Chair 1959 Yanan Choe Chang-ik CCWPK September 1956 Kim Du-bong SPA March 1958 Kim Mu-jong KPA 1950 Yu Gong-heum CCWPK August 1957 South Korea/Domestic Pak Heon-yeong WPK Military Committee December 1955 Lee Seung-yeop National Inspection Minister August 1953 Ju Yeon-ha Ambassador to USSR August 1953 Ho Seong-taek Minister for Coal Industry 1959

Table 4.1: Key Figures Purged/Exiled in Years 1950~195922

Interestingly, the Kapsanists remained, as they stayed relatively loyal to Kim Il-sung during the

1950s and held key WPK Secretariat positions. However, these prominent figures began to oppose Kim Il-sung in the mid 1960s. The climax came at the Second WPK Conference in 1966, when Kim Il-sung announced his plans to develop the DPRK’s military capabilities and

22 See: ibid.; ROK Ministry of Unification, "bukhan jaryo centre [Information Centre on North Korea]," http://unibook.unikorea.go.kr.; Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Song: the Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960.

153 economy in parallel to finance the dangui gunsa roseon.23 The Kapsanists opposed the military-centric plan, arguing instead for a more moderate economic policy.24 Consequently, senior members from the Kapsan faction such as Pak Kum-chul, Yu Hyo-soon, and Kim

Do-man were systematically removed after the Fifteenth Plenary session of the Fourth CCWPK in March 1967.

Now that his political rivals had been removed from the political scene, Kim Il-sung was able to bolster his absolute autonomy over the DPRK. For Kim Il-sung, stability and gaining absolute autonomy was now achieved. By 1967, Kim Il-sung affirmed juche as the sole ideological principle of the DPRK.25 Then at the Fifth SPA on 25 December 1972, the juche ideology was constitutionally systemized, bringing at least two irreversible changes to the DPRK political system.26

First, the new position of gukga jusok (President) was introduced in Chapter 6 of the 1972

Socialist Constitution. For Kim Il-sung, the position would have been the best way to collectivize authority over the WPK, SPA and the Presidium. It is likely that this new post was inspired by China, a position that Mao Zedong enjoyed until his death in 1976. However, the creation of this new role carries as much ideological meaning as administrative. The post sent a

23 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. pp.610-611. 24 Ibid. pp.611,730. 25See: Il-sung Kim, "gukgahwaldongui modeun bunyaeseo jaju, jarip, jawiui hyeongmyeongjeongsineul deo uk cheoljeohi guhyeonhaja [Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance and Self-Defence More Thoroughly in All Branches of State Activity] (16 December 1967)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 21 [Kim Il Sung Works 21] (January-December 1967) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1983). 26 In 1972, Pyongyang was officially designated as the capital. (prior to that, the capital was claimed to be Seoul)

154 message to the masses that the DPRK is reborn under the Kim Il-sung who is both a supreme political leader and a divine figure. Consequently Kim Il-sung’s cult of personality gained significant momentum to further bolster his absolute power.

Second, by the same token, the WPK’s dominance in politics was constitutionally confirmed.

Chapter 1 Article 4 of the 1972 Constitution clearly states, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” This meant that the memorandum of the WPK is essentially hyperlinked to the Socialist Constitution, inevitably becoming the second constitutional element of the DPRK. However, there is a difference. The Socialist Constitution provides a broad outline of the state’s agendas, laws, structure and sovereign identity. While on the other hand, the WPK memorandum gives more specific directions on how the DPRK shall be managed. At the Sixth Congress of the WPK in

October 1980, the WPK memorandum was amended with stricter content, giving the CCWPK and the Secretariat greater authority in political affairs. Consequently, the WPK leadership now has the legal authority to drive the DPRK in any direction they wish.

The rise of Kim Jong-il in the 1970s played an important role in sealing the centralization of the

DPRK’s political system. In April 1974, Kim Jong-il issued the “Ten Principles for the

Establishment of the One-Ideology System”.27 The ten-point program enacts absolute loyalty of the WPK, KPA and the DPRK society to the central leadership. Now, the political system in the

DPRK was so rigid and concrete, that it could not be reversed, even by the leadership. Moreover, the ten-point guidelines also allowed Kim Jong-il to establish his position in the regime. His

27 For an English translation of the ten-point program, see: "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System," Daily NK, http://www.dailynk.com/english/keys/2001/6/06.php.

155 unchallenged ascension was undoubtedly backed by the centralization efforts during the 1970s.

By the time Kim Il-sung died on 8 July 1994, Kim Jong-il was already a pivotal figure in the

DPRK.

It remains unknown as to what extent Kim Il-sung anticipated and planned his rise to absolute rule. Nevertheless, it is obvious that he had successfully exploited and manipulated every opportunity and vulnerability that existed in the DPRK. While the DPRK’s state building date back to the 1940s, arguably the state’s “coming of age” took place between the mid 1950s and

1972. If the period between 1945 and 1949 was the “Korean revolution”, the period between

1949 and 1972 was the “Kim Il-sung revolution”. Kim Il-sung essentially reestablished the

DPRK’s political system by redefining socialism/communism in accordance with his own ideology – juche. By doing so, Kim Il-sung had constructed a socialist monarchy which has been either passed down to the current Kim Jong-un regime.

3. THE DPRK “SOFTWARE” – JUCHE AND SONGUN

In the DPRK, three pillar ideologies exist: socialism, juche and songun. While these three ideologies seem to carry on distinctive purposes, there a great deal of continuity, and the juche and songun ideologies functions as the vehicles to establish the full systemization of “Korean socialism”. The concept of “Korean socialism” stems from Kim Il-sung’s pursuit of consolidating his autonomy and centralizing the DPRK’s political system. The process was dubbed “the revolution”, which was to take place through juche and later songun.

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However, in reality, Korea’s own brand of socialism is merely a result of Kim Il-sung’s sense of insecurity. The fundamental aim of both juche and songun are designed to not only legitimize the Kim dynasty’s regime, but also to preempt any alien ideas that may ignite potential instability. To legitimize and systemize its ideology, the DPRK regime began an aggressive campaign to discipline the society. However, its far-reaching efforts have only resulted in the

DPRK cornering itself, significantly increasing rigidity in Pyongyang’s strategic decision making. Consequently this narrows Pyongyang’s options as it requires all policies to be consistent with its dogma, and any revisions only implicate contradictions in the regime. In other words, it forces the DPRK to make decisions to serve its ideology, as opposed to genuine national interests.

3.1 JUCHE – THE NEW BRAND OF SOCIALISM

Kim Il-sung’s efforts to systemize juche as the DPRK’s principle ideology started in April 1955, when he gave a series of reports and speeches that addressed his concerns regarding the WPK’s ideological characteristics. 28 Then at the WPK Propaganda and Agitation Congress in

December 1955, Kim Il-sung’s concept of juche made its debut during his lengthy speech titled

28 See: Kim, "modeun himeul jogugui tongildongnipgwa gonghwagukbukbanbueseoui sahoejuuigeonseoreul wihayeo [Every Effort for the Country's Reunification and Independence and for Socialist Construction in the Northern Half of Korea] (April 1955)."; ———, "dangwondeulsogeseo gyegeupgyoyangsaeobeul deouk ganghwahalde daehayeo [On Intensifying Class Education for Party Members] (1 April 1955)."; ———, "gwallyojuuireul toechihalde daehayeo [On Eliminating Bureaucracy] (1 April 1955)."; ———, "sahoejuuihyeongmyeongui hyeongyedane isseoseo dang mit gukga saeobui myeotgaji munjedeure daehayeo [On Some Questions Concerning Party and State Work at the Present Stage of the Socialist Revolution] (4 April 1955)."

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“On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche in ideological work”.29

However, the concept of juche was still somewhat vague. Other than forwarding the argument that Korea needs to develop its self-branded “socialist revolution”, the juche concept was neither embodied nor systemized into the DPRK’s political system.

The juche concept gained significant momentum during the mid-1950s when Kim Il-sung found himself facing an indirect security threat from unexpected quarters – the USSR. In particular, the Sino-Soviet split triggered by the Khrushchev Report of February 1956 had strong impact on the DPRK. Kim Il-sung was specifically cautious of the emerging “dogmatist” and

“revisionist” movements, after witnessing the shifts in some of the East European states and the

USSR. Against this backdrop, during the mid-1950s and 1960s, writings criticizing dogmatism and revisionism were published in mass quantities.30 While the DPRK still gave credit to the

Soviet Union for their achievements and role in assisting the liberation of Korea, from the 1960s, those views were began to be replaced by Pyongyang’s juche-ist identity.

The systemization of juche took place slowly, but steadily, refurnishing the length and breadth of the DPRK’s political, economic and societal landscape. Kim Il-sung’s strong emphasis on the

“Korean” dimensions of state identity certainly made the DPRK political system unique. In essence, the concept of juche is based on the three ideas of: Self-reliance; marriage of

Marx-Leninism and international revolutionary movement to Korea’s historic conditions and

29 ———, "sasangsaeobeseo gyojojuuiwa hyeongsikjuuireul toechihago juchereul hwangnipalde daehayeo [On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work] (28 December 1955]." 30 Il-sung Choe, hyondae sujongjuui reul bandae hayo [opposing today's revisionists] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 1959).

158 ethnic characteristics; and protecting the state (i.e. Korea) from revisionism, dogmatism and flunkeyism.31 Of course, there are big contradictions between these idealist principles and actual intentions. In reality, motives for systemizing the juche ideology are based on collectivizing political control over the DPRK by ironing out the differences between factions and deflecting factors that could potentially destabilize the regime.

The juche concept was officially embodied as an ideology at the Fifteenth Full Congress of the

Fourth CCWPK in May 1967. Then in a speech given to the SPA in December 1967, Kim

Il-sung outlined the three pillars of the juche ideology: jaju jeongchi (political independence), jarip gyeongje (economic self-sustenance), and jawi gukbang (self-defence).32 These three overlapping components of juche became the fundamentals of the DPRK’s political system and by 1972 juche was featured in the new Socialist Constitution as the principle ideology of the

DPRK.

While the juche ideology was propagated to install a political system based on “Korean conditions and values”, the primary function was to legitimize the WPK and Kim Il-sung’s absolute leadership in the DPRK. Yet the process of systemizing the juche ideology was far from simple. Kim Il-sung had to find ways in which he could craft a political system that could be universally accepted (within the DPRK). Hence the juche political system had to be flexible

31 Il-sung Kim, "joson minjujuui inmin konghwaguk sahoejuuigeonseolgwa namjosonhyeongmyeonge daehayeo [On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (14 April 1965)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 19 [Kim Il Sung Works 19] (January-October 1965) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1982). pp.50-52. 32 ———, "gukgahwaldongui modeun bunyaeseo jaju, jarip, jawiui hyeongmyeongjeongsineul deo uk cheoljeohi guhyeonhaja [Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Sustenance and Self-Defence More Thoroughly in All Branches of State Activity] (16 December 1967)."

159 and inclusive to some extent, which resulted in the merging of politics, philosophy, and religion.

The DPRK claims that the juche ideology is centred on Kim Il-sung’s philosophy and experiences. However, the WPK absorbed the advantageous characteristics of other actors it has had contact with in the past. As Armstrong noted, “The Kim cult combined images of

Confucian familism with Stalinism, elements of Japanese emperor worship, and overtones of

Christianity.”33 Moreover, the WPK also adapted elements of rival parties after subduing them.

For example, juche also echoes the three principles of the Young Friends Party during the

DPRK’s formative years – “minjokchuui” (ethnic-centric nationalism), “minjok chaju” (national independence), and “chisang chonguk” (heaven on earth).34 Furthermore, the ideology is not only political, but also philosophical, developing the notion of, “Man as the master of all things”

– juche cheolhak (juche philosophy).

By advancing its juche identity, the DPRK was attempting to legitimize itself as a power in its own right.35 However, the DPRK’s interpretation of “self-reliance” raises questions, especially given the reality that Pyongyang never relinquished its dependence on Beijing and Moscow.36

Indeed Pyongyang did distance itself from the political adjustments that were taking place in

China and the USSR. In terms of external political influence, while juche opposed the emulation

33 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. p.223. 34 YFP journal Tangji cited in ibid. p.129. 35 For instance, in the early 1960s, Pyongyang had even tried to portray itself as the “middleman”, calling for unity between all socialist states, starting with China and USSR. See: Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, joson jungang nyeongam 1963 [Korea central yearbook 1963] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, 1963). p.159. 36 Pyongyang’s dependence on Beijing and Moscow is most evident in economic terms, which will be further discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.

160 of other states, Kim Il-sung encouraged the DPRK to be selective about the experiences of other states. That is, accepting (through matching it to Korean standards) good experiences, but rejecting the bad and unnecessary ones.37

Even in terms of foreign aid, Pyongyang watered down Chinese and Soviet support and exaggerated its own achievements in state building. For example, while admitting that the

DPRK received 500 million roubles in financial aid from “brother states” after the Korean War,

Kim Il-sung argued that it was the combination of the Korean people’s strength and domestic resources that achieved the state’s post-war reconstruction. 38 In other words, while acknowledging the material support from the USSR, the DPRK argues that it is how the aid was used, that matters most.39

In terms of national defence, juche put forward the idea of jawi (self defence). By the 1960s, military affairs became a critical issue for the DPRK due to the fluid changes in its security environment. At the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth CCWPK in December 1962, Kim

Il-sung called for the: armament of the masses; strengthening the KPA’s military capability like an “iron wall”; “Invulnerable fortification of the state”; and training military personnel as cadres.40 These four objectives would later become the fundamental principles of the WPK’s

37 Kim, "joson minjujuui inmin konghwaguk sahoejuuigeonseolgwa namjosonhyeongmyeonge daehayeo [On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (14 April 1965)." p.51. 38 Ibid. p.53. 39 A similar argument existed earlier, with the notion that “The Russians liberated us from the Japanese…but we did the rest.” See: Anna Louise Strong, "First Report from North Korea," Soviet Russia Today 1947. p.8. Cited in: Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. p.57. 40 Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, joson jungang nyeongam 1963 [Korea central yearbook 1963].p.184.

161 defence planning, later to be known as dangui gunsa roseon (Four Grand Military Lines).

According to Kim Il-sung, the dangui gunsa roseon was motivated by three points: the strengthening US military presence in the ROK; “anti-imperialist struggles” in Asia, Africa and

Latin America (also mentions revisionists); and Japan’s “rearmament”.41 Indeed, these three points are nothing new, and they have been the focal point of the DPRK’s security concerns since the armistice in 1953 or even before the Korean War. However, given that the Sino-Soviet confrontation was reaching crisis levels, the DPRK had come to terms with the reality that both

China and the USSR may not be fully reliable. Moreover, the brinkmanship between the US and

USSR over Cuba added to Kim Il-sung’s concerns. The combination of the four factors above, undoubtedly served as a catalyst for the DPRK’s move towards establishing an independent defence doctrine that complies with the principles of juche.

Politically, the dangui gunsa roseon proved to be effective, especially in giving a stamp of approval for establishing a society that prioritizes the military. The 1963 Korea Central

Yearbook reported, “The mass meeting pointed out that even if the civilian (people’s) economy is partially limited, military capability must first be strengthened.”42 The statement suggests that the WPK sees the dangui gunsa roseon as a way to legitimize its leadership both militarily and politically. However, almost all of the reports on the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth

CCWPK or the dangui gunsa roseon provide very little detail on the operational or technical aspects of the new military doctrine. Hence the dangui gunsa roseon was more effective in accelerating the WPK’s politicization of the KPA and the militarization of the DPRK’s society.

41 Ibid. p.158. 42 Ibid. p.159.

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The political significance of the KPA was further exploited in the Kim Jong-il era, when he had included the dangui gunsa roseon into the 1992 Socialist Constitution.

3.2 SONGUN AND KANGSONG TAEGUK

By the 1990s, the DPRK’s economy was in sharp decline, and the concept of juche which ostensibly aimed to advance the “Korean revolution” proved to be a failure. During the 1990s, a series of problems unfolded in the DPRK, including the collapse of the USSR in December

1991, death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, as well as the series of floods and famine in 1995 and

1996. Consequently, the DPRK regime’s survivability was put to the real test and Kim Jong-il was forced to take extra measures to strengthen the political system. However, the DPRK leadership did not reverse juche, but instead constructed new mechanisms to strengthen the regime’s autonomy.

While Kim Jong-il did not officially assume his role as the leader of the DPRK until after Kim

Il-sung’s death, he slowly worked his way up the political hierarchy over the course of two decades. Kim Jong-il had already been appointed as Kim Il-sung’s successor in February 1974, became the Supreme Commander of the KPA at the Plenary Session of the WPK Congress in

December 1991, the Head of the National Defence Commission (NDC) in April 1993, and the

General Secretary of the WPK in October 1997. However, given the myriad challenges he faced,

Kim Jong-il had to find ways in which he could consolidate his position as the new head of state without risking regime collapse. Against this backdrop, the only way for Kim Jong-il to bolster the regime’s security, was by declaring a “new era” – the songun era that aims for the

163 establishment of kangsong taeguk (strong, prosperous state).

The concept of kangsong taeguk made its official debut as the state’s new strategic objective in the rodong sinmun on 22 August 1998.43 However, the definition of kangsong taeguk described in the editorial was rather vague, and merely emphasized that the concept inherits the legacies and efforts of Kim Il-sung.44 More details of kangsong taeguk were announced on 1 January

1999, in the Joint Editorial titled “Let this year mark a turning-point in building a powerful nation”. The editorial argued for the WPK, KPA and the citizenry to unite politically (i.e. ideologically), militarily and economically to strengthen the state.45 Moreover, the editorial stated that kangsong taeguk is to be carried out according to the juche-style of self-reliance, indicating that kangsong taeguk is an extension or the next phase in the DPRK’s political

“revolution”.46

Yet the DPRK’s definition of “powerful nation” is somewhat puzzling. In much of the DPRK’s political literature, kangsong taeguk is interpreted as a “political superpower” that is both militarily invincible and economically prosperous.47 For example, a book called “Kim Jong-il

43 The term kangsong taeguk first appeared in the rodong sinmun on the 22 July 1997. However, the details of the concept were unclear. See: "widaehan dangui ryeongdottara sahoejuui geonseoreseo ildae angyangeul ireukija," Rodong Sinmun 1997. 44 "kangsong taeguk [kangsong taeguk]," Rodong Sinmun 1998. 45 "olhaereul kangsong taeguk geonseol ui widaehan jeonhwanui haero bitnaeija [Let Us Push Ahead With General March In New Year Under Great Party's Leadership]," Rodong Sinmun 1 January 1999. 46 Ibid. 47 Both the name and nuance of kangsong taeguk mirrors that of Meiji Japan’s fukoku kyohei (Rich state, strong military), where the state aims to become gain a superpower status through strengthening its military and industrial status. However, the DPRK’s concept of kangsong taeguk places more emphasis on the state’s “political power”.

164 kangsong taeguk konseol” (Strategy for constructing Kim Jong-il’s kangsong taeguk), argues that while western capitalist states and Japan are economic superpowers, they are not “political superpowers” like the DPRK.48 Pyongyang’s bravado stems from the idea that the state can discipline itself to overcome its challenges and achieve its grand strategic objectives. 49

Obviously, the “where there is a will, there is a way” rhetoric is often used in the DPRK to justify its ideology-clad regime, excusing it from the realities of the state’s tattered economy.

By looking at the concept of kangsong taeguk, we can see that it is more a political slogan than an ideology. Moreover, the content of kangsong taeguk differs little from the “Korean socialism” forwarded by Kim Il-sung. While kangsong taeguk seems to address the political, military and economic concerns in the DPRK, the means to achieve this strategic objective was military-centric – songun – the state’s second ideology.

During a visit to one of the KPA divisions in January 1995, Kim Jong-il argued that the military has a central role in forwarding the WPK’s main principle is to protect socialism and “complete” the juche ideology.50 While this served as the background to the development of songun, the concept of military-led politics loomed in the DPRK’s atmosphere for several years without conceptual or theoretical embodiment. It was not until around 2003, when the DPRK leadership began to propagate the details of songun. However, the concept of songun was put into practice before theory. As one report from the Korean Institute of National Unification correctly states,

48 For an example, see: Jae-ho Kim, Kim Jong-il kangsong taeguk keonseol jeonryak [strategy for constructing Kim Jong-il's kangsong taeguk] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2000). pp.8-11. 49 Ibid. p.13. 50 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.16.

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Kim Jong-il utilized the KPA as a “tool for risk management” after the death of Kim Il-sung in

1994.51

The theoretical development of songun was more or less complete by 2002. In the 2002 Joint

New Year editorial, the DPRK leadership introduced sa dae jeil juui, (four number-one principles), which is a slogan that emphasizes the importance of, “our leader, our ideology, our military, and our political system”.52 As we can see, the slogan omits the term “economy”, which suggests the regime’s focus is on political discipline as the means to manage the state.

Given its simplicity, it is doubtful that the sa dae jeil juui slogan was the decisive driving force in propagating songun. Rather, it is the development of the sa dae jeil juui slogan, that reflects the completion of both the conceptual and political embodiment of songun in the DPRK political system.

In a speech to senior officials of the CCWPK on 29 January 2003, Kim Jong-il gave a lengthy description of songun:

“The essential characteristic of Songun politics is that it safeguards the security of the

country and defends the revolutionary gains by developing the People’s Army into

invincible revolutionary armed forces, and that it builds up the driving force of the

revolution and deals with all affairs of socialist construction in a revolutionary and militant

51 Hyun-joon Chon et al., "North Korea's Regime Maintenance Policy since the Kim Jong-il Regime and Prospects for Change," in Study Series, ed. Korea Institute for National Unification (Seoul, ROK: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2009). p.15. 52 "widaehan suryeongnim tansaeng 90dolseul matneun olhaereul kangsong taeguk geonseorui saeroun biyagui haero bitnaeija [Glorify this year that greets the 90th birthday of President Kim Il Sung as a year of a new surge in the building of a powerful nation]," Rodong Sinmun 1 January 2002.

166

way with the People’s Army as the core and driving force.”53

Following Kim Jong-il’s speech, the DPRK media and scholars published massive amounts of articles and literature on songun. From these articles, we can see the overarching concepts of

Kim Jong-il’s new ideology. On the surface, the fundamental principle of songun lies in the concept of a military-led society to protect the state and its development. One DPRK literature argues that the military protects the development of the state’s economy and culture.54 Another

North Korean author states that the future of the DPRK is dependent on the military, arguing that the regimes in the USSR and Yugoslavia fell because they turned their backs on military-centric politics.55 As we can see, the rationale for the military-centric politics is based on external threats. However, much like juche, songun developed from the regime sense of internal insecurity.

In essence, songun was a mechanism to legitimize the regime’s favouring of the KPA to curb a coup d’état or regime collapse. While songun gives the impression that it was developed as an emergency measure during the so-called “gonan ui haenggun (arduous march)”, the political structure that prioritizes the military (i.e. CMCWPK and NDC) was already well in place. In particular, the NDC constitutionally became an independent administrative organ in 1992. Thus, it is highly likely that songun was designed during the early 1990s or earlier.

53 Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." p.353. 54 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.20. 55 Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era]. pp.93-94; Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.67.

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In spite of the economic circumstances, the primary objective of songun is to boost political discipline and mobilization of the society with the military at the forefront.. North Korean political writings argue that the only way in which socialist kangsong taeguk can be achieved is by: strengthening the WPK and the leadership’s role; strengthening the administrative/political function of the masses; strengthening the workers’ organizations to fulfil its duties for the leadership; and to embody the military first/revolutionary ideology and style.56 Hence the primary objective behind kangsong taeguk is about instilling strict discipline on the DPRK’s society to ensure ideological integrity, rather than reform for economic development.

In the end, songun aligns the society to the regime’s military-centred political system. North

Korean political literature calls on the society to learn from the KPA’s revolutionary spirit, structure, and unity.57 However, in reality, songun was more than a mobilization method to

“complement the risk management” by the WPK, but rather, an embodied theorization of the

DPRK’s political system that was developed over years, or even decades.58

3.3 THE NEXUS BETWEEN JUCHE AND SONGUN

By now, it is evident that there is a great deal of consistency in juche and songun. Given that the

DPRK’s economic, political and security circumstances have experienced numerous changes

56 Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. pp.238-240. 57 For an example, see: Go, songun sidae hyeokmyeong ui juche [juche in the songun era revolution]. p.101. 58 For the argument concerning songun as a mobilization method of the WPK’s risk management, see: Chon et al., "North Korea's Regime Maintenance Policy since the Kim Jong-il Regime and Prospects for Change." pp.15-17.

168 since 1945, we could fall into the trap of assuming that its ideology is adjusted accordingly to these situational factors. While the DPRK intensively propagates songun to the point it somewhat eclipses juche, it is premature to simply conclude that juche simply evolved into, or was replaced by, songun. Instead, both juche and songun are interdependent, and stripped to its core fundamentals, both ideologies circle around similar ideas. Even the concept of kangsong taeguk is as old as the DPRK state itself – the only difference is that Kim Jong-il had given it a specific name to mark his own era.

Both juche and songun are more about emphasizing the leadership’s ideology, rather than finding innovative ways to achieve the state’s goals. That is, songun is the embodied means of juche, and juche is the means to achieve kangsong taeguk, or the idealist “Korean-style socialist state”. Hence the nature of the relationship between songun, juche, and socialist kangsong taeguk is more vertical, as opposed to being a horizontal one.

Just like the leadership, the DPRK’s ideologies are primarily about inheritance. Kim Jong-il’s personality cult heavily relies on the presence and prophecies of Kim Il-sung.59 Fearing political instability, Kim Jong-il had to compensate for his lack of military experience and charisma by tagging his ideologies with his father’s name and ideologies. Hence even though songun was created as Kim Jong-il’s ideology, it is crafted as the next evolutionary form of juche. While the inheritance of ideas leaves the successor with very narrow avenues for

59 See: Jong-il Kim, widaehan suryeong Kim Il-sung tongji neun uri inmin gwa minjok ui maeum sok e yeongsaeng hal keossida [the great leader comrade Kim Il-sung will live forever in the souls of the people] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 2003).; Chung-hui Kang and Sung-il Ryu, yeongweonhi inmin gwa hamkke [with the people for eternity] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2007).

169 innovation, it is a necessary step to shore up legitimacy.

Even after his death in 1994, Kim Il-sung was named as the “Eternal President of the Republic”.

Then in 1998, the constitutional amendment abolished the position of the President, meaning that Kim Jong-il will always be constrained to a position below the “Eternal President” Kim

Il-sung. Consequently, ideologies or slogans crafted by Kim Jong-il have to be based on the fundamental concepts introduced by Kim Il-sung. Similarly, Kim Jong-un also has to forge a similar pattern, basing his leadership on his predecessors’ ideologies and politics.

Kim Jong-il’s songun is also closely linked to the state’s politicized history. The DPRK’s persistent reference to Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla partisan movement and resistance against the so-called “imperialists” is a prime example. For the DPRK, its history starts and ends with the KPA playing a leading role. To give an example, Kim Jong-il argues that,

“Although in this world there are many countries and armies, there is no military force (other than ours) that has directly established a revolutionary force which serves the leadership of Kim

Il-sung and has a 60 year old history.”60 Furthermore, DPRK official documents argue that the

KPA was established in the forests of Mount Paekdu led by Kim Il-sung, which led to the liberation and protection of Korean sovereignty.61

While Kim Jong-il’s songun emerged in the latter half of the 1990s during the so-called

60 Jong-il Kim, "inmingundaereul ganghwahamyeo gunsareul jungsihaneun sahoejeokgipungeul seulde daehayeo [on strenghtening the People's Army and establishing military centred socialist spirit]," in Kim Jong Il seonjip 13 [Kim Jong-il Selected Works 13] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1998). p.1. 61 Ibid. p.1.

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“arduous march” , North Korean literature often emphasizes that the ideology has deep historical roots. Even to this day, the DPRK argues that it was Kim Il-sung’s military-led movement that defeated the Japanese, guided Korea’s liberation, and founded the

DPRK. 62 According to Kim Jong-il, the origins of songun date back to Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla partisan movement, and was built on the foundation of Kim Il-sung’s songun sasang (military-first ideology).63 After becoming the de facto head of state, Kim

Jong-il claimed that the best way to show loyalty to Kim Il-sung is by conforming to the songun ideology, as that is “his will”.64

Let us now move on to the puzzling concept of “inheriting Korean values”, which is one of the key underlying themes in the DPRK’s ideologies.65 Juche, songun, and kangsong taeguk have all been claimed as being authentically “Korean”, with the frequent use of the phrase, “matched to the conditions and realities of Korea today”. Obviously, the concept of “Korea” is highly politicized. Both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s interpretation of “Korean values” have been far

62 Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era]. p.17. ; Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." p.353. 63 Pong-ho Kim, songun euro wiryeoktteolchineun gangguk [the strong nation that comes from the power of songun] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2005). pp.19-24; Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era]. p.17. 64 Kang and Ryu, yeongweonhi inmin gwa hamkke [with the people for eternity]. 65 In 1961, Kim Jong-il, who was an university student at the time, called for students to focus on Korean history (specifically the party’s “revolutionary history”) and geography which will allow them to work better for the state and people (policy making perspective). See: Jong-il Kim, uri narauigeoseul deo jal araya handa [we must know our country better] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1961).

171 from consistent, exploiting the concept of ethno-centrism and nationalism to the fullest extent.66

For the DPRK leadership, meddling with the concept of “Korea” was relatively easy because

“modern Korea” had never been properly established until the Koreas’ liberation in 1945. It was precisely this niche that allowed the DPRK leadership to implement a robust ideology that bases itself on “cultural” and “traditional” values.

From the time when the Korean peninsula was liberated from Japanese rule in 1945, the political movements in the northern regions of the Korean peninsula based themselves on the common theme of minjok juui (ethnic-centric). At the time, nationalism dominated the socio-political atmosphere. Such circumstances on the Korean peninsula made the “native” values ripe for exploitation. The DPRK often refers to its history as the history of “struggle”, not only pointing to the time under Japanese occupation, but also the suppression the lower class citizenry suffered during the Lee dynasty. Hence the “victory of the underdog” notion became one of the central themes in Korean nationalism.67 However, in the DPRK, the concept is represented primarily by Kim Il-sung’s guerrilla efforts against the Japanese.

Exploiting the nationalistic atmosphere, the application of “Korean values” to socialism meant that the definition of Marxism-Leninism can be taken into the leadership’s own hands. However, the “Korean” elements of socialism in the DPRK changed over time, when the juche and songun ideologies were implemented. From the time the DPRK started to part from the USSR in the mid-1950s, North Korean political statements called for “matching Korean conditions and

66 Kim, "joson hyeongmyeonggadeureun joson reul jal araya handa [The Korean Revolutionaries Must Know Korea Well] (15 September 1943)." 67 Armstrong also argues that “humanistic and voluntaristic” factors were also one of the key underlying concepts of Korean communism. See: Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950.

172 realities” or “demands of the era and the revolution”.68 Hence, as circumstances and demands change over time, the “Korean” elements were also adjusted accordingly. Cotton accurately describes the changing nature of socialism in the DPRK as follows:

According to longstanding North Korean doctrine this is an adaptation of

Marxism-Leninism to Korean conditions, although over the past two decades the original

foundation of the ideology has at first been obscured, and more recently it has been claimed

that it has supplanted Marxism-Leninism to be the revolutionary theory of the present era.69

The fluid definition of “Korean values” was in fact a niche for Kim Il-sung to manipulate both the concepts of “Korea” and socialism. Yet this also meant that Kim Il-sung and later Kim

Jong-il, had to devote a significant amount of effort in redefining “Korea”. The strong emphasis on “Korean” elements during the implementation of juche and songun meant that the DPRK leadership preferred to stunt the development of socialism so that it does not overpower the leadership’s “Korean” characteristics. For both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, the readjustments that took place in various socialist regimes hinted the need to revise the “native” elements if true

Marx-Leninism was to be pursued. Such a move presented too many risks for Pyongyang’s autonomy. In other words, the DPRK leadership is more sensitive to reversing “Korean” values, as opposed to socialist ones.

The DPRK’s ideologies based on its mythological history, and its attempt to merge politics and

68 Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." p.354. 69 James Cotton, "Signs of Change in North Korea," The Pacific Review 7, no. 2 (1994). p.227.

173 religion, has also brought about the widespread use of specific language – the DPRK’s version of newspeak. The DPRK is the home of propaganda that often employs eccentric, hostile and utopian expressions.70 Indeed, such language is the lingua franca in many other socialist or totalitarian states. However in the case of the DPRK, the most unique characteristic of its political language is its minimization of scientific and technical terms.

To give some examples, the DPRK frequently uses the term “peace” (pyeonghwa), as opposed to “security” (anjeon bojang). Regarding state power, North Korean political literature argues that the “greatness” of a nation and its peoples are measured not by its geographic size or population, but by the strength of the political leadership.71 Additionally, there also exists the notion that, “a state’s independence and people’s dignity is guaranteed by state power.”72

Even in terms of military capability, the definition is more political than technical, where the military strength is measured primarily by political loyalty. For example, Kim Jong-il argued,

“the military can only be strong if it is loyal to Kim Il-sung and the WPK.”73 The basis for this opinion is that military technology has its limits while ideology does not.74 Even regarding the dangui gunsa roseon, Kim Il-sung argued that it, “accomplished the party’s military guidelines, strengthening the army to become the powerful revolutionary force (il-dang-bek hyeokmyeong

70 For example, one North Korean literature stated: “In the past, it was said that ‘all roads lead to Rome’…but now, all roads lead to Pyongyang”. See: Choi, minjokgwa songun jeongchi [the people and songun]. p.73. 71 Ibid. p.72. 72 Kim, Kim Jong-il kangsong taeguk keonseol jeonryak [strategy for constructing Kim Jong-il's kangsong taeguk]. p.44. 73 Kim, "inmingundaereul ganghwahamyeo gunsareul jungsihaneun sahoejeokgipungeul seulde daehayeo [on strenghtening the People's Army and establishing military centred socialist spirit]." p.5. 74 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.66.

174 muryok) and made the state into an invincible fortress (nangongbulrak).”75

The use of such language, which Armstrong described as “mind over materialism”76 was essential to discipline and integrate the society for mobilization, but also to legitimize the leadership’s authoritative power. However, the downside is that it lacks depth and specifics. For example, DPRK commentaries often declare “victory” in its diplomatic and military activities without elaborating on the actual results.77 In the end, the use of ideological language is little more than self-deception.

The application of “Korean” values to Marxism–Leninism allowed the DPRK to “evolutionize” socialism. For example, while acknowledging Marxism, Kim Jong-il argued that it does not match the realities of today, due to the advancement of science and technology, which has strengthened the bourgeoisie.78 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European communist states also gave the DPRK confidence in its own socialist system, to shore up legitimacy as the “last bastion of socialism in the world”.79

75 Il-sung Kim, "juchesasangui gichireul nopi deulgo sahoejuuigeonseoreul deouk dageuchija [Let Us Step Up Socialist Construction Under The Banner of the Juche Idea] (9 September 1978)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 33 [Kim Il Sung Works 33] (January-December 1978) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1987). p.7. 76 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. p.167. 77 Hyeon-chul Yun, gonan ui haenggun eul ragwon ui haenggun euro [from the arduous march to the paradise march] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2002). pp.87-108. 78 Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." pp.356-357. 79 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.7.

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There is little doubt that Pyongyang’s reliance on the so-called “native Korean” elements gained increasing significance. In March 2009, DPRK’s constitution was amended, which could be interpreted as efforts to mould the basis for the next generation leadership (i.e. Kim Jong-un).

One of the key changes was the revision of Article 3, which declares juche and songun as its pillar ideologies, reaffirming the ambivalence of the Kim dynasty’s domestic security concerns.

Although this further locked the DPRK’s identify, it nevertheless bolstered the regime’s autonomy – at least for the short-term.

3.4 THE DPRK’S IDEOLOGY AND THE SYSTEM

Both juche and songun were propagated to be the fundamental ideologies to establish “Korean socialism”. Yet in reality, they were designed to function as the software to centralize the DPRK political system. Indeed, many will cavil at how Pyongyang is so tenacious in its political development during a time of economic hardship. Nevertheless, the forceful systemization of these ideologies were measures to curb threats to the regime’s autonomy.

While the notion that the DPRK is a self-reliant power is no more than propagandistic rhetoric, there is little doubt that the juche and songun ideologies have kept the regime afloat, at least politically. Both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s ideologies place strong emphasis on three factors: history; ethnic identity, and philosophical idealism. However, the leadership’s obsession with these three aspects directed the DPRK into structural rigidity. As the famous French philosopher Emile Chartier once said, “Nothing is more dangerous than an idea when it’s the only one you have.” This phrase is completely applicable to the DPRK. Due to the risks of

176 political instability, the leadership has to install a political hardware that can accurately process its narrowed ideological vision.

Simply put, the DPRK has pushed itself into what we could call an “ideological quicksand”.

The more Pyongyang emphasizes and elaborates on their ideological values; their political system becomes less flexible, shutting out opportunities for any kind of reform. Yet at the same time, any step outside of the ideological lines equates to denying the regime’s very purpose, and even its very existence. In short, the rigid nature of the DPRK’s political software, created numerous dilemmas for the regime.

Given the political dilemmas the DPRK faces, it does not come as a surprise that the regime relies so heavily on the military. As we saw earlier, Kim Il-sung practiced the military-centric approach to politics since the DPRK’s formative years, and Kim Jong-il’s songun further emphasized his father’s methods. The Kim Jong-un regime has also practised the same technique to maintain their power. However, while both juche and songun were useful in keeping the military loyal to the leadership, there are still a number of ramifications on the

WPK-KPA relations.

4. POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY– PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS

Given the pivotal role of juche and songun in the political system, ideological bias is definitely powerful in its impact on the DPRK’s defence planning. In simple terms, the far-reaching objectives of Pyongyang’s political ideologies require a strict, highly-centralized command and

177 control system to ensure that policies are processed with minimal ramifications (i.e. political instability). Therefore, we need to examine how Pyongyang has constructed a defence planning system that syncs with the regime’s political system. As we shall see in this section, militarism in the DPRK is more about the politicization of the military, rather than the militarization of the state.

The juche and songun ideologies have dominated the DPRK’s society to the point it has reshaped the structure of its political system. However, the military has also become a subject of intense politicization. For most of its history, the KPA has been moulded to become the most effective means to the leadership’s security.80 In the context of defence planning, Pyongyang’s militarism leaves many question marks over how the KPA can be so centralized.

Considering the military-centric nature of the regime and its high military personnel to population ratio, it is easy to assume that the DPRK is a militarist state. While true to some extent, the nature of the DPRK’s militarism leaves us puzzled. The regime is neither a military dictatorship like that of Libya (pre-2011), nor is the KPA simply a giant puppet of the regime.81

The DPRK has established a political system where the position of the military is somewhat ambiguous. Thus it is hard to precisely interpret how the KPA is influential in the defence planning context.

80 Some North Korean literature argues that the military as the means not ends of revolution. Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era]. p.21-22. 81 The DPRK is in fact critical of “past” theories on communist revolution, claiming that the military was perceived to be a tool to achieve dictatorship by the proletariat, as opposed to loyalty to the leader. Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.70.

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Interestingly, in spite of the strong presence of the military in the DPRK, Pyongyang denies that it is a militarist state. North Korean political literature and media are often critical of “gunsajui”

(militarist regimes), arguing that they suppress the populace and exploit opportunities for the aggressive intentions. Pyongyang argues that its military-centric songun as the means to

“protect and lead the populace, guaranteeing a self-reliant lifestyle (jaju-jok senghwal), and successful revolution.”82

North Korean literature and media also often reiterates the phrase, “union of the people and the military under the party”.83 Obviously, there is little denying that the WPK is compromising the populace’s well-being for the sake of the military, turning the traditional communist hierarchical architecture upside down.84 While the relationship between the military and the proletariat is propagated to be horizontal, in reality it is vertical.

At the WPK Conference in October 1966, Kim Il-sung called for party members and workers to devote themselves to the military.85 The vertical relationship between the KPA and the populace is further bolstered by songun. For instance, one North Korean literature calls for the people to support and learn (ideological discipline) from the military.86 Hence the KPA has

82 Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era]. p.22. 83 Example: Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." p.363; Go, songun sidae hyeokmyeong ui juche [juche in the songun era revolution]. p.18. 84 For example, even the gunmin ilchi undong which ostensibly aimed to unite the military and the citizenry hardly remedied the imbalance in the civil-military relations at the social level. 85 Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, joson jungang nyeongam 1966-1967 [Korea central yearbook 1966-1967] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, 1966). p.156. 86 Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. p.192-194

179 essentially become a group that represents the DPRK’s society.87 However, the relationship between the KPA, WPK and the society is more intimate, sophisticated, and interdependent. On the one hand, there is the notion that the KPA cannot strengthen without absolute loyalty to the leadership.88 But on the other, it is argued that the state’s development is only possible with the presence of the KPA and the WPK.89

While it is clear that the WPK leadership uses the KPA to exercise its control over the masses, the role of the military within the decision making process is complex. Since the founding of the

DPRK, Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have sought measures to ensure that the

KPA works well within the leadership’s interests. Kim Jong-il described the party-military relations as one of “mutual devotion”.90 However, the relationship is far from horizontal, and the KPA has been subject to strict control of the WPK leadership.

From the late 1950s, the DPRK began to shift away from bureaucracy and established a more

“people-based” system that gives the WPK greater centralized authority.91 Consequently, the

KPA was increasingly politicized. That is, political officers in the General Political Bureau

(GPB), as opposed to bureaucrats and professional officers, vested greater power. The GPB is

87 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.75. 88 Ibid. p.68. 89 Kim, "inmingundaereul ganghwahamyeo gunsareul jungsihaneun sahoejeokgipungeul seulde daehayeo [on strenghtening the People's Army and establishing military centred socialist spirit]." p.4. 90 ———, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." pp.361-362. 91 Kim, "joson minjujuui inmin konghwaguk sahoejuuigeonseolgwa namjosonhyeongmyeonge daehayeo [On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (14 April 1965)." p.54.

180 directly connected to the WPK, surveying and controlling the political aspects of the KPA from the Chief of General Staff to the company level.92 For a recent example, the ousting of Ri

Yong-ho from all positions in July 2012, illustrated the underlying conflict between GPB officers and practitioners in the KPA.

The WPK’s political control over the KPA date back to the 1950s. During this period, Kim

Il-sung officially labelled the KPA as the military institution of the WPK (as opposed to the state), and intensified the ideological education of soldiers.93 Political cleansing in the KPA took place regularly. In 1958, at least two sets of purges took place in the KPA. General Chang

Pyeong-san was arrested on charges of planning a coup d’état, and General Kim Il-jeong and

Kim Il-gyu, for debating in military colleges that the KPA belonged to the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland rather than emphasizing the WPK.94 Even GPB officers, like

Choi Jong-hak (Vice Minister of Defence and Director of the GPB) was arrested in 1959 for being a “dogmatist”. 95 The removal of these officers reflects Kim Il-sung’s aggressive centralization and politicization of the KPA.

After the purges in the 1950s, Kim Il-sung further systemized the WPK’s control over the

92 For more on the General Political Bureau, see: Yi, bukhangun eun wae kudetareul haji ana [why don't the Korean People's Army make a coup]. 93 Ibid. pp.57-59. 94 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. pp.497-499. 95 See: Il-sung Kim, "inmin gundae nae dang jeongchisaeop eseo gyojojuui reul bandaehago juche reul seulde daehayeo [On Opposing Dogmatism and Establishing Juche in Party Political Work in the People's Army] (16 May 1959)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 13 [Kim Il Sung Works 13] (January-December 1959) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1981).

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KPA.96 In a speech to KPA officers in 1959, Kim Il-sung argued that the GPB must be strengthened to successfully carry out the juche revolution. Kim Il-sung set out five rationales for the extensive politicization of the KPA: eradicate remnants of dogmatism and flunkeyism; teach the realities of the inter-Korean relations; strengthen communist education; enrich the lives of military personnel by linking political activities with literary arts; and correct the

WPK’s means of conducting political activities within the KPA.97 These points of course, were designed to bolster Kim Il-sung’s autonomy, as opposed to addressing technical problems in the

KPA.

Given that the DPRK went through its juche-nization during the period between the mid-1950s and the 1970s, it would not come as a surprise that the GPB gained greater authority. During the

1960s, KPA officers were purged not only for their political viewpoints, but also on military-related issues. In 1969, Minister of People’s Armed Forces Kim Chang-bong, GPB

Director Ho Bong-hak, and Chief of General Staff Choe Kwang were arrested and banished for the failed guerrilla attack on the Blue House in 1968, and also for their pursuit of acquiring high-tech military platforms that Kim Il-sung did not favour.98 These purges were undertaken

96 ———, "gunin deul sok eseo gongsanjuuikyoyanggwa hyeokmyeong jeontongkyoyangeul kanghwa halde daehayeo [On Strengthening the Education of Communism and Revolutionary Traditions in the People's Army] (30 October 1958)." pp.560-580. 97 ———, "inmin gundae nae dang jeongchisaeop eseo gyojojuui reul bandaehago juche reul seulde daehayeo [On Opposing Dogmatism and Establishing Juche in Party Political Work in the People's Army] (16 May 1959)." pp.301-306. 98 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. pp.969-973. Also see: Kim Il-sung’s speech to the KPA in January 1969, cited in: Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.144. Korean version of the same speech by Kim Il-sung can be found in: Min-ryong Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army] (Seoul, ROK: Hwanggeumal, 2004). p.48.

182 by Kim Il-sung’s closest aide – Four Star General Oh Chin-u. By the 1970s, the KPA and the

MPAF were fully centralized to function only within Kim Il-sung’s political and strategic outlook.

After the military purges, the key positions in the KPA and the Ministry of the People’s Armed

Forces (MPAF) concentrated on those who were politically loyal to Kim Il-sung – most notably,

Oh Chin-u and Choi Hyeon. From the 1970s, the top-echelons of the KPA were refined to meet

Kim Il-sung’s (and later, Kim Jong-il’s) political and strategic outlook. As a result, the management of the KPA was driven solely by the WPK leadership (exercised by the GPB), as opposed to bureaucrats and professional officers.

The leadership’s political control over the KPA was further strengthened in the 1990s through

Kim Jong-il’s songun, and the leadership’s relations with the military became more intimate.

Propagandistic literature from the DPRK argues that Kim Jong-il’s frequent inspection visits to military divisions were an integral part of songun, to: Check the military’s political ideological preparedness and unity; check and acknowledge the military’s strength and capability; and to intimidate the US by displaying the strong bond between Kim Jong-il and the military.99

Furthermore, Kim Jong-il claimed that he reads the Chosun inmingun newspaper (a newspaper read by KPA officers as well as secretary and division heads of the CCWPK) to grasp the situation in the KPA, where “the state’s ideology is most strongly practiced”.100

99 Kim, songun euro wiryeoktteolchineun gangguk [the strong nation that comes from the power of songun]. pp.66-73. 100Kim, "inmingundaereul ganghwahamyeo gunsareul jungsihaneun sahoejeokgipungeul seulde daehayeo [on strenghtening the People's Army and establishing military centred socialist spirit]." p. 9.

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From its outset, the Kim Jong-un regime is furthering Kim Jong-il’s technique of keeping the

KPA close to the leadership to shore up legitimacy and to ensure integrity. For Kim Jong-un, maintaining strong relations between the leadership and the KPA is essential risk management measure to ensure regime security. Since his ascension, Kim Jong-un has made frequent visits to the KPA. However, like Kim Jong-il, the true purpose of Kim Jong-un’s visits is to affirm mutual commitment and loyalty between the leadership and the military. The relationship between the leadership and the military relations in the DPRK is reminiscent of Sun Tzu’s classic quote, “Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer”. By keeping the KPA close, not only does the does the regime increase its capacity to exert greater influence across the state, but also curbs the military being influenced by other parties or factions, and possible coup d’état.

After all, it is the military, not the citizens that pose as a credible threat to the DPRK leadership.

5. IMPACT ON ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

From the way in which the relationship between the KPA and WPK has been managed, it is clear that regime security is the first objective of the DPRK leadership. As we witnessed so far in this chapter, it was the loopholes in the DPRK’s political system that allowed Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to establish their autonomous leadership. However, it takes more than purges and ideologies to achieve regime security. What made the DPRK regime so robust is the political hardware that was put in place – the CMCWPK and the NDC. The DPRK’s command and control structure implemented by the regime is completely centralized and top-down in its nature. The hierarchy is cleverly designed to give full authority to the leadership (i.e. Kim

Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un), while avoiding inter-institutional conflicts or

184 factionalism. In essence, the organizational structure is designed so that the KPA is the leadership’s military, not the state, nor the WPK.

The CMCWPK and the NDC plays pivotal roles in the DPRK’s command and control system.

When Kim Il-sung died in 1994, Kim Jong-il exerted his control over the DPRK through the

NDC. In 1998, the DPRK amended the constitution abolishing the Presidium, and allowed greater power to be vested in the Chairman of the NDC. As the “Supreme Leader”, Kim Jong-il held four positions: Chairman of the NDC, Supreme Commander of the KPA, General Secretary of the WPK, Chairman of the CMCWPK.101 Kim Jong-il’s four-dimensional authority not only allowed his absolute control of the state, but also epitomizes the KPA’s growing influence in the political system. Kim Jong-un’s authority forges a similar pattern, although his position in the

WPK and the NDC is ostensibly junior to that of his father’s.102

Still, the political system built by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il came under test when preparations were made for the leadership under Kim Jong-un. Soon after Kim Jong-il died on

17 December 2011, the DPRK made aggressive efforts in propping up Kim Jong-un’s authority.

After the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death on 19 December 2011, the Korea Central News

Agency declared, “All the party members, servicepersons and people should remain loyal to the guidance of respected Kim Jong Un and firmly protect and further cement the single-minded

101 Until the Plenary Meeting of the CCWPK in September 2010, the position of CMCWPK Chairman was officially vacant due to the death of Kim Il-sung. Similarly, Chairman of the current CMCWPK is also left vacant after the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011 (Kim Jong-un is the Acting Chairman) 102 Kim Jong-il remains as the Eternal General Secretary of the WPK and also as the Eternal Chairman of the NDC (since April 2012).

185 unity of the party, the army and the people”.103

Kim Jong-un’s ascension after Kim Jong-il’s death was quite rapid. On 24 December 2011, Kim

Jong-un became the Supreme Commander of the KPA. Two days later on 26 December 2011, the KCNA made gestures that Kim Jong-un has assumed his role as the acting head of the

CMCWPK, CCWPK and the General Secretary of the WPK.104 Kim Jong-un’s position was officiated in April 2012, when he was appointed as the First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of

Korea at the Fourth WPK Conference and also as the First Chairman of the National Defence

Commission at the Fifth Session of the Twelfth Supreme People’s Assembly.

April 2012 was dedicated to the centennial anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birth. However, the events that unfolded during that month revealed the true colours of the Kim Jong-un leadership.

The highlight was not so much the propagandistic ceremonies and massive military parades, but the first-ever public speech by Kim Jong-un. The bulk of the speech delivered by the nervous-looking Kim was filled with bravado about the might of the KPA and the political system. Economic issues got some mention, though in no way proportionate to the seriousness of the socio-economic privations in the country. In sum, the fundamental structure of the state remains unchanged, and it is clear that Kim Jong-un is focused on fine-tuning the DPRK’s centralized and hard-line system.

103 "Notice to All Party Members, Servicepersons and People," Korea Central News Agency(19 December 2011). 104 "N. Korean Newspaper Refers to Successor Son as Head of Key Party Organ," Yonhap News(26 December 2011), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/topics/2011/12/26/81/4603000000AEN20111226003700315F.HTML.

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5.1 THE CMCWPK

According to Article 27 of the WPK memorandum, the CMCWPK “discusses and decides the

WPK’s military policies, directs projects relating to the strengthening of the KPA’s military capability and development of the military industry, and commands the military.”105 In other words, the CMCWPK is the central authority that approves matters concerning both the force structure and operational preparedness of the KPA.

The CMCWPK gained its absolute power over the KPA after the SPA issued an Extraordinary

Decree on 26 June 1950 (i.e. one day after the DPRK attacked the ROK), and its range of authority significantly grew after the dangui gunsa roseon was systemized.106 Hence the

CMCWPK was the institution that gave the leadership its momentum to achieve the dangui gunsa roseon. Furthermore, the CMCWPK has regional branches at the province, city and county levels. However, the presence of these regional branches does not mean that the

CMCWPK’s command system is decentralized. Rather, these local organs merely enforce the orders from the central body.

The CMCWPK has two roles. The primary function of the CMCWPK is obviously to make decisions regarding the DPRK’s defence planning. Its secondary function, as Scalapino and Lee accurately describes, is ensuring the integration of the KPA under the WPK.107 However, it

105 WPK Memorandum. See: "joson rodongdang gyuyak [the Workers' Party memorandum]," in bukhan hak [North Korean Studies] (Seoul, ROK: Hwanggeumal, 2006). p.573. 106 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. pp.730, 934. 107 Ibid. p.936.

187 must be noted that the two operations of the CMCWPK are forwarded by the Organization and

Guidance Department of the CCWPK Secretariat. In particular, Division Thirteen of the OGD has linkages with the CMCWPK and the GPB.108 Additionally, the Propaganda and Agitation

Department of the CCWPK Secretariat has indirect, but nevertheless some substantial authority on the political aspects of the DPRK’s defence planning.109

The CMCWPK mainly contains the elders of the KPA. In the early years of the Kim Jong-il era, the CMCWPK had fifteen members: Kim Jong-il; Marshal Ri Ul-sol (Director of the Guard

Command); Vice-Marshal Cho Myong-rok (Chief of the General Political Bureau); VM Kim

Yong-chun (Chief of Gen St); Paek Hak-rim (Ministry of Public Security); VM Kim Ik-hyon

(Chief of People Defense); VM Kim Il-chol (Minister of People’s Armed Forces); VM Ri Ha-il;

VM Pak Ki-so (Commander of Pyongyang Defense Command); VM Ri Du-ik; Gen. Oh

Ryong-bang (Vice Minister of People’s Armed Forces); Col Gen. Yo Chung-sok (Vice Minister of People’s Armed Forces); Gen. Kim Myong-guk; Gen Kim Du-nam; and Ri Yong-chol.110

However, the WPK meeting that selects the members – Plenary Meeting of the CCWPK – was not held since December 1993, meaning that the CMCWPK either kept its aged lineup, or made personnel changes without publically announcing them.

For the first time in almost 17 years, the Plenary Meeting of the CCWPK was held on 28

108 Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. pp.25-26. 109 There are rumours regarding a possible feud between the Organization and Guidance Department, and the Propaganda and Agitation Department, indicating that there exists some level of competition over who possesses greater authority. Sung-hwee Moon, "What Happened to the Secretary of Propaganda and Agitation Department, Jeong Ha Choel?," Daily NK(24 October 2007), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=2823. 110 Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. p.25.

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September 2010, directly after the Third WPK Conference which was held for the first time since 1966. The conference was primarily designed to bolster Kim Jong-il’s autonomy whilst preparing for the next generation Kim Jong-un leadership. During the Plenary Meeting, the new

CMCWPK was named. With the exception of Kim Jong-il being appointed as Chairman, there were significant changes to the lineup.111 Among the changes, the most notable was the appointment of Kim Jong-un and Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho (Chief of General Staff) as

Vice-Chairman, which suggested that these two men will play leading roles in the DPRK’s management of the KPA. After Kim Jong-il’s death Kim Jong-un’s rise to power, several changes took place. Most notably, Ri Yong-ho was removed from all party posts, and Choe

Ryong-hae and Hyun Yong-chol were appointed as Vice Chairman of the CMCWPK. The

CMCWPK selected at the Fourth Conference of the WPK in April 2012, are as follows:

111 Much of the changes were perhaps inevitable, considering the age of the members in the previous CMCWPK.

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Central Military Commission of the WPK– Fourth Conference of the WPK April 2012 Chairman Kim Jong-un Supreme Commander of the KPA Vice-Chairmen Choe Ryong-hae CCWPK Secretary Ri Yong-ho112 Chief of General Staff Hyon Yong-chol113 Four Star General Members Kim Yong-chun Minister of People’s Armed Forces Kim Jong-gak First Vice Director of GPB Kim Myong-guk General Staff Department Operations Bureau Kim Kyong-ok First Vice Director OGB Kim Won-hong KPA Guard Commander Jong Myong-do KPN Commander Ri Pyong-chul KPAF Commander Choi Pu-il Chairman of the People’s Army Physical Centre and Sports Guidance Committee Kim Yong-chul KPA Reconnaissance Bureau Chief Yun Jong-rin KPA Security Commander Ju Kyu-chang WPK Machinery Factories Director Choe Sang-ryo114 KPA Three Star General Choe Kyong-song KPA Three Star General U Tong-chuk115 Deputy Chief of the Secret Police Jang Song-thaek Chief of the Central Administrative Department of WPK Hyon Chol-hae First Vice Director of MPAF Ri Myong-su Minister of People’s Security Kim Rak-gyom

112 Ri Yong-ho was removed from all WPK posts in July 2012. 113 Hyon Yong-chul was appointed as Vice Chairman of the CMCWPK in July 2012. 114 Choe Sang-ryo is speculated to been removed from the CMCWPK in April 2012. 115 U Tong-chuk is speculated to been removed from the CMCWPK in April 2012.

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Table 4.2: CMCWPK (As of August 2012)116

The reshuffling of the CMCWPK clearly indicates the recentralization of the KPA.

Centralization and politization was inevitable, given that one of the key purposes of the WPK

Conference in April 2012 was to reinforce Kim Jong-un’s rule. The CMCWPK certainly served well as the origins of Kim Jong-un’s authority in the DPRK. However, on the flip-side, the new

CMCWPK reveals some serious potential problems in the context of managing the KPA.

5.2 THE NDC

The National Defence Commission (NDC) was established in 1972. Originally part of the

Central People’s Committee, the NDC became an independent organ in 1992 when the North

Korean constitution was amended. The move was primarily political, constitutionally guaranteeing Kim Jong-il’s control over the KPA, and readying the DPRK for the new era.

According to Article 106 of the North Korean constitution, “The National Defence Commission is the highest military leadership body of State power and the organ of overall administration of national defence.” The details of the NDC’s functions are described in Article 109 and 110:

Article 109:

The National Defence Commission has the following duties and authority to:

116 rodong sinmun, ROK Ministry of Unification, "bukhan jaryo centre [Information Centre on North Korea]".

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1. Map out important policies of the State for carrying out the Songun-based

revolutionary line;

2. Direct the whole armed forces and defence building of the State;

3. Exercise supervision over the fulfilment of the orders of the Chairman of the

National Defence Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

and the decisions and directives of the National Defence Commission, and take

measures for their fulfilment;

4. Abrogate decisions and directives of State organs which run counter to the orders

of the Chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea and the decisions and directives of the National

Defence Commission;

5. Establish or abolish central bodies in the field of national defence;

6. Enact military ranks and confer the ranks of major general and above.

Article 110: The National Defence Commission issues decisions and directives.

From the constitution, we can see that the NDC plays the most powerful role in the DPRK’s command and control system. Technically, the NDC works under the SPA. However, because of the overriding authority vested in the NDC (Article 109 of the constitution), the songun ideology, and Kim Jong-il’s position as Chairman, the NDC essentially holds the upper hand in the state’s decision making.

After Kim Jong-il assumed his position as chairman of the NDC, the KPA was subject to greater leadership of the NDC, as opposed to the CMCWPK. However, this does not mean that the

WPK’s political control over the KPA weakened. Rather, the establishment of the NDC as an

192 independent body created an extra channel for the WPK leadership to manage the KPA. Despite the robust relationship between the WPK and the KPA, the party’s control over the military was tested during the transfer of power from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il. Therefore, the leadership’s dual-track approach to managing the KPA was a way of smoothing the succession process.

The NDC is flanked by the KPA and several administrative/bureaucratic bodies, making a solid pyramid-like structure. However, the NDC has inevitably made the command and control structure of the KPA more rigid and centralized. Inflexibility in the command and control system has serious ramifications in terms of military effectiveness as inefficiencies in rational decision making increases.117 In fact, the NDC-based command and control system is far from risk-free, as weaknesses in any of the lower level, could splinter the whole structure, leading to uncontrolled decentralization. Hence given the highly politicized nature of the KPA, at the event of any political change within the DPRK, the NDC could well be the first organ to be affected, or worse, fall under its own weight.

The current NDC was organized at the First Session of the Twelfth SPA in April 2009.

However, due to deaths and retirements (including removals), several changes took place until the Fifth session of the Twelfth SPA in 2012. The current NDC is as follows:

117 Atkeson and Institute of Land Warfare (Association of the United States Army), The North Korean Military Threat in Perspective.

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National Defence Commission 2009 ~ 2014 Chairman (Eternal) Kim Jong-il Continued First Chairman Kim Jong-un Supreme Commander of the KPA, First Secretary of WPK First Vice-Chairman Jo Myong-rok118 Director of the People's Army GPB Vice-Chairman Kim Yong-chun Minister of People's Armed Forces Ri Yong-mu Vice Marshal of the KPA O Kuk-ryol* Chief of the Operational Department of the WPK Jang Song-thaek119 Director of Administrative Department of the WPK Members Jon Pyong-ho120 Secretary of Military Industry Pak To-chun121* SEC Kim Il-chol122 First Vice Director of MPAF Paek Se-bong Chairman of SEC Ju Sang-song123* Minister of Public Security U Tong-chuk124* Deputy Chief of the Secret Police Ju Kyu-chang* First Vice Director of Ministry of Defence Industry Kim Jong-gak* First Vice Director of GPD of the KPA Kim Won-hong KPA Guard Commander Ri Myong-su Minister of People’s Security

118 Jo Myong-rok died on 6 November 2010. 119 Jang Song-thaek was appointed as Vice-Chairman at the Third Session of the Twelfth SPA in June 2010. 120 Jon Pyong-ho retired as a member of the NDC at the Fourth Session of the Twelfth SPA in April 2011. 121 Pak To-chun was appointed as a NDC member at the Third Session of the Twelfth SPA in June 2010. 122 Kim Il-chol was retired (or dismissed) in May 2010. 123 Ju Sang-song was dismissed at the Fourth Session of the Twelfth SPA in April 2011. 124 U Tong-chuk is speculated to been removed from the NDC in April 2012.

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Table 4.3: NDC 2009 - 2014125

Note: * indicates new appointments

The new NDC revealed some interesting patterns hinting to generational changes. Most of all, with the exception of Kim Jong-il, Jo Myong-rok and Kim Il-chul, only four of the members were re-elected, those being: Kim Yong-chun , Ri Yong-mu, Jon Pyong-ho and Paek Se-bong.

At the same time, the NDC has lost some its members due to death and dismissals. The dismissal of Ju Sang-song raises interests because of his extremely short-lived career in the

NDC. The removal of Kim Il-chol in May 2010 is another mystery. Previously, he was demoted from the minister of the MPAF in 2003, and was not given any posts at the WPK Conference

(as well as the Plenary Meeting of the CCWPK) in September 2010. Given the way he has virtually disappeared from the regime, it is possible that Kim Il-chol had some problems with the leadership.126

Following the death of Jo Myong-rok in November 2010, there were speculations that Kim

Jong-un might be appointed as the First Vice-Chairman of the NDC.127 However, Kim Jong-un

125 rodong sinmun, ROK Ministry of Unification, "bukhan jaryo centre [Information Centre on North Korea]". 126 Du-hwan Kim, "Kim Il-chol kukbangwiwon `modeun jingmu' haeim [NDC member Kim Il-chol removed from "all positions"]," Yonhap News(14 May 2010), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2010/05/14/0200000000AKR20100514042300014.HTML. 127 Cheol-hwan Kang, "han pyeon dongsaeng Kim Jong-un eun... 'seoyeol 2wi' kukbangui buuiwonjang euro [younger brother Kim Jong-un becomes "second in hierarchy" appointed NDC vice chairman]," Chosun Ilbo(16 February 2011), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/16/2011021600167.html.; So-yeol Kim, "Kim Jong

195 did not join the NDC leadership until April 2012, when he became the First Chairman. While

Kim Jong-un’s position makes him somewhat junior to that of Kim Jong-il’s, the move is largely ostensive, to ensure a smooth transition process.

5.3 THE MPAF

The MPAF is the highest bureaucratic organ handling military affairs in the DPRK.128 However, with the CMCWPK and the NDC holding exclusive authority in the decision making process, the MPAF more or less obliges and carries out the leadership’s orders. Generally, the minister of the MPAF also serves in the NDC and the CMCWPK. Until 1995, the political loyalty of the

MPAF was guaranteed by Choe Hyeon and Oh Chin-u, who were both first generation partisan veterans along with Kim Il-sung. After the death of Oh Chin-u in 1995, “elders” of the KPA such as; Choi Kwang (1995~1997), Kim Il-chul (1997~2009), and Kim Yong-chun (2009 ~

2012) served as ministers of the MPAF. However, on 10 April 2012, Kim Jong-gak was appointed as the new minister of the MPAF, indicating his rising role in the Kim Jong-un regime.

Eun Already in Cho Hot Seat," Daily NK(8 November 2010), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01800&num=6987. 128 The MPAF has been renamed several times over the years. While the changes were minor, they hint some of the adjustments in North Korea’s management of the KPA. From 1946 – inminjipdangun chong saryongbu (General Commanding Department of People’s Army; from 1948 – minjok bowisang (Ministry of People’s Security); from 1972 - inmin muryokbu (Ministry of People’s Armed Forces); from 1998 – inmin muryok seong (Ministry of People’s Armed Forces); and from 2000 - inmin muryok bu (Ministry of People’s Armed Forces).

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The MPAF contains several organs that serves key operations for the KPA, these include: Cadre

Bureau, GPB, General Rear Services Bureau (GRSB), General Staff Department (GSD), Guard

Command, Representative Mission at Panmunjom, Military Justice Bureau, Military

Prosecution Bureau and Security Command.129 Among these bureaus, there are three bureaus that play a significant political role – the GPB, GSD, and the GRSD.

The GPB closely monitors the KPA and the MPAF’s political activities. While the GPB is subordinated to the MPAF, the GPB is directly linked to the WPK’s OGB. Because of this direct relationship with the WPK, the GPB is more authoritative than the MPAF at least in political aspects.130 The Security Command also surveys the KPA, but plays more of a policing role, arresting personnel suspected of committing conspiracies.

The GSD is directly affiliated to the MPAF and carries out the operational command and control of the KPA. Prior to Hyon Yong-chol’s appointment in July 2012, the Chief of General

Staff was Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho. While the GSD is a subordinate to the MPAF, due to the appointment of Ri Yong-ho as the Vice Chairman of the CMCWPK, his role may have eclipsed the MPAF much in the similar way to the GPD. In other words, Vice Marshal Ri had become the pipeline between the WPK leadership and the KPA, which also means that the KPA is under greater influence of the party. However Ri Yong-ho’s position may have caused challenges for

Kim Jong-un’s WPK-based leadership, which provides hints to why a more junior Hyon

Yong-chol was assigned to the Chief of General Staff.

129 Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. p.27. 130 See: Katsuichi Tsukamoto, kitachosengun to seiji [North Korean army and politics] (Tokyo, Japan: Hara Shobo, 2000).

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As we can see, the MPAF is an organ that focuses exclusively on the bureaucratic management of the KPA as opposed to command and control. That is, the MPAF plays a crucial role in carrying out the plans and tasks handed down by the CMCWPK and the NDC. The vertical relationship is not only reflected by the authoritative presence of the CMCWPK and the NDC, but also by the position of the MPAF’s minister in the regime. In August 2011, the Yonhap

News Agency reported that Kim Yong-chun has lost his influence as a result of intergenerational frictions in the KPA.131 Another article also notes that the weakening presence of Kim Yong-chun is also reflected in Ri Yong-ho’s rise to a high-ranking status in the

CMCWPK.132 The friction between Kim Yong-chun and Ri Yong-ho may have been part of the reason why they were phased out of their positions. In the end, Kim Jong-un would have wanted to ensure that there are minimal disruptions to the leadership. While the relationship between

Kim Jong-gak and Hyon Yong-chol is unknown, it is likely clear that they are loyal to Kim

Jong-un (at least for now).

Indeed, the frictions may not implicate bleak factionalism in the KPA or the regime – at least for now. Given that the MPAF has no authority over personnel changes or command and control, Kim Yong-chun’s weakening political influence would not affect the MPAF per se.

Nevertheless, there are strong signs that the CMCWPK, or more specifically, Kim Jong-un and

131 Ji-hong Shin, "buk inminmuryeokbujang muryeokhwa... Kim Jong-un seryeok deukse [North Korea - Minister for People's Armed Forces loses his power... Kim Jong-un's forces dominate]," Yonhap News(11 August 2011), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2011/08/11/0502000000AKR20110811053900001.HTML. 132 Chul-un Jang, "Kim Yong-chun wisang yakhwa... Buk gunbu sedaegyoche ilhwan [Kim Yong-chun's position weakening... thorough generational changes in the North Korean military ]," Yonhap News(11 August 2011), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2011/08/11/0505000000AKR20110811091700014.HTML.

198 also Jang Song-thaek, Choe Ryong-hae and Kim Jong-gak are gaining greater influence in the management of the KPA. Generally, the head of the MPAF concurrently serves as the Vice

Chairman of the NDC and also as a member of the CMCWPK. However, Kim Jong-gak’s position both in the CMCWPK and the NDC indicates that the leadership is attempting to tighten its control of the KPA and the MPAF.

5.4 TRILATERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CMCWPK, NDC AND MPAF

The ongoing succession process in the DPRK is having significant impact on the leadership’s management of the KPA. The current cast of the CMCWPK and the NDC reveals an interesting pattern. At present, eight of the twelve individuals in the NDC also serve in the CMCWPK – a

8:4 ratio. The eight figures include: Kim Jong-un, Kim Yong-chun, Jang Song-thatk, Kim

Jong-gak, Ju Kyu-chang, Choe Ryong-hae, Kim Won-hong and Ri Myong-su. This indicates a significant increase in the personnel overlap. Until Kim Jong-il’s death, the ratio in the 2009

NDC was 6:3.. Previously, the ratio was somewhat lower in the NDC, with the, 2003 NDC having a ratio of 4:5, and in the 1998 NDC, it was 6:4133 While the difference may seem small, the increment in the number of “dual-serving” personnel reflects to some extent further centralization of the regime’s leadership over the KPA.

The “dual-serving” figures play crucial roles in the DPRK, as they serve as the main pipeline

133 Given that very little is known about the changes in the CMCWPK during 1993 and 2010, the ratios for these years are only rough estimates. However, the ratio of “dual-serving” figures in the CMCWPK for 1998 was 6:9, and in 2003, it was 4:11. Also note that both Ri Ul-sol and Paek Hak-rim were not reappointed as members of the NDC in 2003.

199 between the CMCWPK and the NDC. In previous years, all “dual-serving” figures were from the KPA. However, currently, two of them (excluding Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un) are civilians – Jang Song-thaek (Director of WPK Administrative Department) and Ju Kyu-chang

(First Vice-Director of Ministry of Defence Industry). In particular, Jang Song-thaek was seen wearing a general’s uniform on 25 December 2011. Jang Song-thaek’s role as the leading regent to Kim Jong-un, combined with his rising status in the KPA suggests that the WPK has profound influence on the state’s military capability management..

Despite the CMCWPK and NDC’s presence, some may doubt whether the WPK has the power to manipulate the KPA in any way it wishes. Indeed, the high percentage of military officers in the upper leadership does suggest that there is some degree of bottom-up influence from the

KPA. However, the vast majority of these officers serving in the CMCWPK and the NDC are those that possess high political credentials, having spent some time in the GPB or other WPK secretarial departments. Moreover, the GPB works within the General Chief of Staff, and closely monitors the activities of the KPA. Hence the overwhelming number of military officers in the top tiers of the leadership indicates not so much the increasing influence of the KPA in the WPK, but the growing influence of politically credible officers in the KPA.

Until recently, the role of the CMCWPK and its links with the NDC were not definitive.

However, since the rise of Kim Jong-un, the functional relationship between the CMCWPK,

NDC and the MPAF has become clearer. The leadership’s dual-track approach to managing the

KPA means that both the CMCWPK and the NDC holds different roles in defence planning.

Most of the members of the CMCWPK appointed in 2010 are senior officers from various branches and commands in the KPA. The NDC, on the other hand, largely consists of executive

200 members from various administrative departments and organs in the DPRK and the WPK.

Taking the above into consideration, we can argue that the CMCWPK focuses on formulating the military’s plans and strategies, while the NDC is the administrative command and control organ, which executes the plans formulated by the CMCWPK.

Since Kim Jong-un’s presence became official in September 2010, the CMCWPK has gained a greater role in the DPRK. Especially since the death of Kim Jong-il, the DPRK leadership developed itself from the CMCWPK as opposed to the NDC. In other words, the WPK served as the primary vehicle for the power transition. This does not go to say, that the NDC has disappeared into insignificance. In fact, the NDC focuses on an administrative role to give authorization and official statements. Now that Kim Jong-un has assumed his role in the NDC, we can anticipate his own style of dual-track leadership in the DPRK.

By looking at the trilateral relationship between the CMCWPK, NDC and the MPAF, there is good reason to believe that the leadership enjoys an uncontested position in the DPRK’s management of the KPA. For Kim Jong-un and his cronies, centralization and politicization of the military remains to be most crucial agenda. However, the implications from the politicized management of the KPA, indicates various ramifications in the military capability management context, with some critical long-term consequences.

6. EMERGING PATTERNS IN THE DPRK’S POLITICAL SYSTEM

What patterns can we expect under the Kim Jong-un regime? In recent years, both the NDC and

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CMCWPK did not seem to introduce any significant adjustments in terms of military policy.

Given that the succession process underway centres on Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un’s cronies, political reform in the DPRK seems distant at least in the short-to medium-term. Instead, personnel changes both in the NDC and the CMCWPK indicate further politicization of the

KPA’s command and control structure. Hence, while we can see some adjustments in the

DPRK’s defence planning framework, the overall command and control structure remains to be extremely rigid.

6.1 NEW TRENDS

Throughout its history, the DPRK leadership has utilized the military for political survival through centralization and politicization. Pyongyang has attempted to legitimize such approach through the systemization of ideologies such as juche and songun. The Kim Jong-un regime is likely to inherit the “traditions” of the DPRK. Even under the critical economic circumstances, the DPRK is unlikely to undertake any major reform at least for the time being. Rather, given that the origins of the third-generation leadership comes the CMCWPK, the DPRK’s defence planning will stay fixated on the dangui gunsa roseon and could even pursue more militarist and hard-line policies.

Kim Jong-un was groomed as the military leader of the DPRK, which fits with the songun ideology. A day prior to the WPK Conference on 27 September 2010, Kim Jong-il issued Order

Number 0051, which promoted 40 individuals to the rank of “General”.134 Among the six Four

134 These included: six Four Star Generals; one Three Star General; six Two Star Generals; and

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Star Generals were Kim Jong-un and Kim Kyung-hee (Director of the Light Industry

Department of the Central Committee). As one analyst notes, the promotion of these six individuals, particularly Kim Jong-un, is “significant as it uses the opportunity presented by the

Delegates’ Conference [WPK Conference] to announce Kim Jong Eun (Kim Jong-un) as the successor across the country.”135 In addition to Kim Jong-un, three other newly promoted Four

Star Generals – Choi Pu-il, Choi Ryong-hae (Former Hwanghae Province WPK Secretary), and

Kim Kyong-ok (First Vice-Director of WPK Organization and Guidance Department) – were also named in the CMCWPK, indicating that the promotion to the Four Star General is somewhat of a prerequisite to “qualify” for the CMCWPK.

Kim Jong-un’s limited credibility, cult of personality and experience definitely are disadvantages in his management of the KPA or the state. However, thus far he has demonstrated himself as a leader who not only inherits the ideological and political legacies of his forefathers, but also takes a more intimate, “hands on” approach with the military and the society.136 Kim Jong-un’s exposure to the media, direct interaction with policy makers and strategists hints to a new style that extends on Kim Il-sung’s approach to leadership.

twenty-seven One Star Generals. See: Seong-guk Park, "Kim Jong-un, Kim Kyung-hee, Hyun Yong-chul, Choi Pu-il, Choi Ryong-hae, Kim Kyong-ok - 'daejang' ching-ho ["Four Star General" rank awarded to Kim Jong-un, Kim Kyung-hee, Hyun Yong-chul, Choi Pu-il, Choi Ryong-hae, Kim Kyong-ok]," Daily NK(28 September 2010), http://www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?num=86845&cataId=nk06500. 135 Park Young-ho quoted in: Joo-hyun Shin, "Kim Jong Eun Officially 'General'," Daily NK(28 September 2010), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01800&num=6839. 136 Kim Jong-un is reported to have studied military studies at the Kim Il-sung University, with particular interests in artillery warfare. See: Yong-hyeon Ahn, "buk '3dae sesup' gongshikhwa - 'Kim Jong-un shidae' gun choigo shilse Ri Yong-ho [North Korea - Officiates "the third-generation succession" - Ri Yong-ho as the highest military influence of the "Kim Jong-un" era]," Choson Ilbo(29 September 2010), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/09/29/2010092900113.html.

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In terms of policy, centralization and politicization is essential for Kim Jong-un’s political credibility. Kim Jong-un’s three-dimensional leadership of the KPA fully reflects the recentralization of the KPA and WPK. After Kim Jong-un assumed his leadership in the DPRK, there have been numerous “generational changes” in the WPK.137 To mould the foundation of the Kim Jong-un regime, the most “senior” personnel have been refined to those who will serve as Kim Jong-un’s closest cronies. In particular, figures such as Jang Song-thaek, Kim

Kyung-hee, Choe Ryong-hae and Kim Jong-gak will serve as Kim Jong-un’s core policy advisors. Other veterans such as Kim Yong-chun, RiYong-mu, O Kuk-ryeol, and Hyun

Yong-chol will likely serve as “wingmen” to ensure that policies are effectively carried out.

Hence the fate of the current regime depends not only on Kim Jong-un’s leadership, but the competence and teamwork among his regents.

As the first year towards kangsong taeguk and also his rule, 2012 is a crucial year for Kim

Jong-un. At the end of February 2012, the DPRK agreed to suspend its Uranium Enrichment

Program and nuclear tests in exchange for 240,000 tonnes of food aid from the US. Even though the DPRK completely undermined the deal by launching the unha-3 on 13 April 2012, the agreement revealed just how much the DPRK is desperate to ensure that the food distribution takes place to legitimize the Kim Jong-un leadership in the eyes of the KPA and the populace whilst continuing with its military provocations. Thus for the current leadership, regime security is the first priority.

137 Lee and Choi, "Kim Jong-un nobyeongeun tteonara? 'myeongye dangwon jeung' gyobu [Kim Jong-un - old soldiers fade away? "honourary party memberships" issued]".

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Still, the KPA is the only institution in the DPRK that functions as an effective leverage against both its domestic and external security concerns. As the regime faces increasing domestic political concerns, the KPA’s internal security role will also increase. For example, in August

2011, the DPRK mobilized the SOF’s pokpung (“storm”) units in the northern provinces to deal with defections along the DPRK-China border.138 Consequently, the broad approach makes the focus of the DPRK’s defence planning zero-sum – too much focus on internal security forces it to compromise focus on external security. The multilateral focus, combined with the economic problems, and generational changes in the KPA could instigate factionalism within the military institution.

6.2 POTENTIAL FACTIONALIZATION IN THE KPA

Aggressive centralization and politicization of the KPA has certainly saved the DPRK regime from losing its autonomy. Empirically, the DPRK leadership has taken thorough measures to preempt any factionalism in the KPA. The “revival” of the CMCWPK at the 2010 WPK

Conference was most likely aimed at strengthening the party’s control of the KPA. Against this backdrop, there is good reason to argue that the centralized structure of the KPA nevertheless remains strong. However, at the same time, the DPRK’s current trajectory tests the regime’s capacity. That is, the DPRK’s defence planning system is so narrow and rigid, that one slight splinter or imbalance could decentralize the command and control structure.

138 Seok-young Lee and Kang Mi-jin, "Special Forces Deployed along Border," Chosun Ilbo(10 August 2011), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=8041.

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Further centralization and politicization means that the WPK will re-grip its political control of the military. Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have all purged both the revisionists and hardliners within the KPA. However, circumstances for both the DPRK leadership and the

KPA have reached unprecedented levels, largely because of the dire economic circumstances.

Today, there are serious concerns regarding the widespread deterioration in soldiers’ health, crimes committed by soldiers, and surging increase in the number of defections by military personnel. The emergence of such issues suggests that the WPK’s control of the KPA is not as strong as it once was during the previous eras.

Indeed, the myriad problems arising in the KPA are precisely some of the main reasons why the

DPRK leadership has strengthened its control over the military. However, political control alone cannot solve economic issues. The serious decline in the military personnel’s’ welfare standards is proof that songun has failed to provide material support to the officers and soldiers. Due to these circumstances, there is bound to be growing dissent against the regime. While discontent may not necessarily mount to an organized revolt, there is the likelihood of an increase in small scale rebellions or abuse of power by officers and soldiers. In other words, within the lower ranks of the KPA, desperation may outweigh political loyalty.

Frustrations boiling up from the worsening economic situation could also be exacerbated by generational struggles within the KPA. As previously mentioned, intergenerational frictions between the younger officers who support Kim Jong-un and the KPA’s eldership seems to be emerging. As Lee Min-ryung points out, most of the younger generation in the KPA received

206 their education domestically.139 Given that the younger generation has experienced (or at least witnessed) the state’s economic hardship for most of their lives, it is possible that they may lean towards a more hard-line stance to either vent their frustration or simply out of ambitious adventurism. Hence there may be some frictions between the senior generation who follows the usual protocol and the more hard-line generation led by Kim Jong-un.140 Given that many of the elders in the KPA serves in the GPB, emergence of any organized factions will be preempted to maintain integrity. However, factionalism in the KPA could take place implicitly, as the younger generation outnumbers the senior generation in the following years. Consequently, these could lead to debates/slow coordination in operations/tactics, or glitches in intra-military communications.

In the past, there have been several plots by elements within the KPA, such as the “Frunze

Incident” of 1992 and the “6th Army Corps Incident” in 1995.141 In all cases, the Security

Command conducted a brutal crackdown before the movements mounted to direct attacks on the leadership. Given the intensity of the current centralization and politicization process, it will be an uphill struggle for conspiring groups in the KPA to stage any coups or revolts that goes further than previous incidents. Specifically, the strength of the GPB and the Security Command closely monitors any “horizontal” communication, making it difficult to organize factions or groups within the KPA.

139 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. p.235. 140 See: Shin, "buk inminmuryeokbujang muryeokhwa... Kim Jong-un seryeok deukse [North Korea - Minister for People's Armed Forces loses his power... Kim Jong-un's forces dominate]". 141 Joo-hyun Shin and Yeong-jin Han, "buk, '6gundan kudeta moui sageon' asinayo? [North Korea - do you know about the Sixth Corps' planned coup detat incident?]," Daily NK(21 January 2005), http://www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1337.

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The biggest concern is what would happen if either the regime collapses, or significantly weakens to the extent that niches appear in the political system. In such case, the KPA may split into multiple groups that forms according to their interests. These “interests” could vary, depending on loyalty/disloyalty to: the regime; the “state”; the citizenry; or individual economic benefits (bandits).142 If groups do begin to form according to the dispersant interests mentioned above, the situation in the DPRK could head towards the worst case scenario where there multifaceted civil-unrest breaks out.

The leadership has caught itself in a vicious cycle. Kim Jong-un now faces the dilemma of either furthering the current centralization and politicization process, or to begin dealing with the economic situation in the DPRK. Hence the Kim Jong-un leadership has to address both issues to contain dissent or frictions within the KPA. However in reality, fulfilling both the political and economic concerns would be difficult, given the size of the KPA.143 Facing such situation, the DPRK leadership would opt for the alternative with minimal ramifications – political integrity and security.

7. SUMMARY

From our analysis on the political aspects of the DPRK’s military capability management, it is clear that the whole decision making process is heavily saturated with the ideologies that feed

142 By “state” we mean the DPRK as a nation. Groups based on the “state” may attempt to take hold of the DPRK leadership to install a new regime. 143 For example, agendas and thoughts among groups in the KPA may differ according to regions.

208 the so-called “Korean socialism”. The DPRK’s political system represents a prime example of path dependence. As Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il developed the monolithic regime,

Pyongyang’s decision making system inevitably went through several “lock-in” phases, reshaped the management hardware beyond the point of no return. The Kim Jong-un leadership therefore, has few options available. Consequently, reform or significant improvement is difficult without risking regime collapse.

However, while the DPRK’s ideologies and policies are designed to facilitate Pyongyang’s defence planning, whether this works in favour of the KPA’s military capability is questionable.

As we shall see in the next chapter, the dire economic problems in the DPRK heavily constrains

Pyongyang’s military capability management from achieving its desired output.

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CHAPTER 5: THE DPRK’S ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

1. INFLUENCE OF ECONOMICS ON DEFENCE

For any state, its economy plays a pivotal role in defence planning in terms of consumption and investment. The concepts of cost and benefit frame the thinking of decision makers. While it is the latter that allures decision makers, in almost all cases it is the former that constrains their desire for the “best” investment options available. The size of the gap between preferences and actual decisions is dependent on a variety of factors. However, the most decisive factor is the state’s economic capacity.

Despite its relatively successful industrial growth up to the 1970s, the DPRK economy has dwindled into failure. As it was demonstrated in Chapter 3, the DPRK has what we could call a

“planned total war economy”. Since the 1960s, the DPRK continues to pursue economic development that bases itself on the state’s military industrial complex – the SEC. While

Pyongyang’s economic plans were configured to the WPK’s militarist economic ends, they failed to produce positive results for both the civilian economy and the KPA’s capabilities.

This chapter will examine the impact of the DPRK’s economic policies on its military capability management. Specifically, the chapter focuses on how the DPRK’s economic realities constrain it from achieving its strategic objectives. The chapter begins with two sections that will provide an overview of the DPRK’s economy, discussing the structure and the means implemented by

Pyongyang in pursuit of its economic goals. Then, the structure and function of the DPRK’s so-called “military economy” will be discussed. The final section will examine how the

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DPRK’s defence economy influences its military capability management, applying the approach introduced in Chapter 3.

2. THE DPRK ECONOMIC SYSTEM

The impact of economics on a state’s military capability varies depending on its economic structure. Marxist economic theory focuses on the concept of mass production, in order for the state to provide plentiful goods to its people. While it is easy to determine whether the state runs on a capitalist or communist economic system, what matters most is how the economy functions.

In most cases, communist/socialist states have established their economic models by emphasizing two aspects: development of the heavy industry and economic development plans.

Planned industrialization, however, has only led ultimately to mismanagement.

2.1 THE ENDS – THE DPRK’S ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Viewed broadly, three aspects highlight the DPRK’s economic model – planned economy, strict ideology and war communism. In essence, the DPRK’s economic plans were essentially a fusion of the Soviet and Chinese models. As outlined in Chapter 4, the DPRK’s state-building involved a significant level of assistance and guidance from Moscow. Hence, it is not surprising that the DPRK adapted Stalin’s economic model as a template, where the economy is centralized for political-military interests as opposed to socio-economic ones. At the same time, the DPRK also found China’s ideological approach to economic management extremely useful,

211 which led to the adoption of campaigns that mirrored the great leap forward.

Up to the late 1950s, Pyongyang argued that the state was based on a people’s democracy, ruled by a working class proletariat.1 The notion was highly politicized and was used to legitimize the WPK as the only party that can guide the DPRK to communism.2 However, the DPRK’s military-political interests became the fundamental principle of the state economy when Kim

Il-sung called for the parallel execution of economic construction and defence building at the

Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth CCWPK in December 1962. The concept was based on the

“1955 People’s Economy Plan” which purported to revive the war-torn DPRK economy by prioritizing the heavy industry and simultaneously developing the light industry and agriculture sector. The DPRK leadership was able to implement the military-centric economic model not only because the military’s strong political influence, but due to the uncertain security environment (i.e., the war with the ROK and the US had concluded only in an armistice).

Initially, the DPRK economic model showed impressive results, giving Pyongyang some level of bravado.3 The DPRK’s initial economic success was sufficient to legitimize not only the state’s economic policies, but also Kim Il-sung’s leadership. As Kim Il-sung further bolstered his autonomy from the mid-late 1950s, the DPRK began to develop its very own economic

1See: Do-su Pak, Inmin minjujuui dokjaeran mueosinga [the meaning of a people's dictatorship] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1958). 2 See: Chul-ja Son and Kwan-je Hong, gongsanjuuineun illyuui choego risangida [communism is the most ideal] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1963). 3 In the 1960s, Pyongyang argued that its economic status was on par with the USSR and eastern European states. Kim Il-sung quoted in: Kye-soo Rim, sahoejuuirobuteo gongsanjuuieroui jeomchajeok ihaeng [the gradual transition from socialism to communism] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1960). p.1.

212 model – the jarip economy – which led to total centralization and politicization of the state’s economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the DPRK’s economic management became more saturated with ideology. Consequently this caused a shift away from technocratic-bureaucrats, towards a highly-centralized economy dictated by the WPK and the KPA.

The DPRK’s jarip economic model resulted in failure. Pyongyang’s poor planning combined with its isolationist policies consequently stunted its economic growth. Today, the economic situation in the DPRK is so severe that starvation and poverty are widespread, and the civilian economy thrives on illegal markets which have proliferated throughout the country.4 While black market activities are prohibited, officials turn a blind eye, simply because it has become an essential remedy for the economic hardship suffered by many citizens.5 The so-called

“sahoejuui kangsong taeguk” (strong prosperous socialist nation) that Pyongyang aims to begin building from 2012 is far beyond the state’s economic capacity unless some sort of reform takes place. The precise cause of the limited capacity is none other than the poorly managed economic plans that were driven by the WPK’s political-military ambitions.

The DPRK’s economy is structured in a way where economic reform is virtually impossible without reversing the regime’s political structure. Even after many of the socialist states disappeared at the end of the Cold War, Pyongyang claims that its socialist economy has advanced beyond the limits of the Marxist-Leninist models, constructing a “peoples’-based” system aligned to “Korean conditions and realities”.6 However, we must note that the precise

4 For insight on daily life in the DPRK, see: Andrei N. Lankov, North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc, 2007). 5 ———, "Welcome to Capitalism, North Korean Comrades," Asia Times Online(14 December 2004). 6 Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. pp.23-24.

213 cause of the DPRK economy is not simply the authoritarian leadership and its ideational economic outlook, but because of the way in which the economic plans were executed (i.e., plans-reality mismatches).

2.2 THE MEANS – THE DPRK’S ECONOMIC PLANS

Historically, much of the DPRK’s economic plans have primarily focused on developing the heavy industry sector. 7 Initially, the DPRK’s economic plans were initially effective in mobilizing the society for rapid industrialization. However, as the leadership further centralized and politicized the DPRK system, the national economy was divided into two spheres – the civilian and military sector. Due to the regime’s political-military interests, the significant portion of the civilian economy was virtually absorbed by the military economy, causing disproportionate development and growth. Moreover, an imbalance in demand and supply also emerged as the DPRK aggressively advanced its economic plans.

The DPRK’s Economic Plans 1947 One Year Plan 1948 One Year Plan 1949-1950 Two Year Plan 1954-1956 Three Year Plan 1957-1960 Five Year Plan 1961-1970 First Seven Year Plan (Extended by three years)

7 Even when the agriculture sector was facing severe trouble, there was the notion that the problems can be remedied by “the industrialization of agriculture” See: Jung-geuk Choi, sahoejuuigyeongje wa gyunhyeong [socialist economy and balance] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Gwahak Baekgwa Sajeon Jonghap Chulpansa, 1990). p.47.

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1971-1977 Six Year Plan (Extended by one year) 1978-1984 Second Seven Year Plan 1987-1993 Third Seven Year Plan (Extended until 1996) 2010-2019 Ten Year Plan

Table 5.1: The DPRK’s Economic Plans

Following its liberation from Japanese colonial rule, state planners in northern Korea were aggressive in developing its economy. In particular, there was significant momentum to develop the state’s industrial and material base.8 The first economic plan – “National Economic

Rehabilitation and Development Plan” – was introduced in 1947, the centralization of industries and railways, as well as land reforms were well underway. However, the process was not at all smooth. As Scalapino and Lee point out, the industrialization process immediately following the

Koreas’ liberation were slow coming, due to various reasons including: the USSR dismantled various industrial facilities; lacked raw materials; and had a shortage of skilled labourers.9

The first multi-year economic plan announced at the Second Session of the SPA in February

1949 – the Two Year Plan. According to Kim Il-sung, the plan aimed to revive and expand the industries so that industrial production is restored to levels before Koreas’ liberation (in the.

1945).10 The Two Year Plan was a success in terms of further industrializing the DPRK.

However, following the announcement of the Two Year Plan, Kim Il-sung visited Moscow to

8 For further, read: Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. pp.136-165. 9 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. pp.1197-1198. 10 Il-sung Kim, "2gaenyeon inmin gyeongjegyehoegui suhaengeun joguk toirui muljiljeok dambo [the execution of the two-year national economic plan is a material guarantee for national unification] (13 February 1949)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 5 [Kim Il Sung Works 5] (January 1949-June 1950) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1980). p.32.

215 sign the Korea-Soviet Culture and Economy Cooperation Agreement on 17 March 1949. The economic agreement between Pyongyang and Moscow indicated that the Two Year Plan depended heavily on material and monetary aid from the USSR.

More importantly, during his visit to Moscow, Kim Il-sung’s discussed with Stalin the objective of strengthening the KPA.11 Given that the DPRK’s planned attack on the ROK came in June

1950, it is apparent that the Two Year Plan was geared to advance the KPA’s preparedness for war. The military dimensions of the Two Year Plan are also evident in the fifth volume of Kim

Il-sung Works, which contains speeches by Kim Il-sung between January 1949 and June 1950.

Among these speeches, almost a quarter of them concerns issues regarding operational readiness in the KPA.12 While a significant portion of the DPRK’s economic plans between 1947 and

1950 were devoted to its military readiness, the achievements were obviously reversed by the devastations of the Korean War.

Following the armistice on 27 July 1953, the WPK held the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the

CCWPK in August 1953. Here, Kim Il-sung presented the “Three Stage Plan for Post-War

Reconstruction” that was scheduled to take place over nine years. The first stage was scheduled to be six months to one year long, focused on preparing the reconstruction of the war-torn

DPRK economy. The second stage was a three year plan to rehabilitate and redevelop all sectors of the economy to pre-war levels. Then, in the third and final stage, a five year plan was to take

11 Masao Okonogi, "kyousangawa no sensou jyunbi [the communist side's preparation for war]," in kitachousen handobukku [North Korea handbook], ed. Masao Okonogi (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha, 1997). p.126. 12 Il-sung Kim, Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 5 [Kim Il Sung Works 5] (January 1949-June 1950) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1980).

216 place to lay the foundations of the DPRK’s industrialization.13

The three-stage plan began in 1954, after Kim Il-sung’s tour of China, the USSR, and eastern

European states to secure significant amounts of aid. However, while the lack of resources was indeed a major problem in the DPRK, it was not the only issue that concerned Pyongyang. In

March 1954, Kim Il-sung pointed to the lack of coherence between the WPK and the bureaucrats.14 Kim Il-sung’s frustration towards the bureaucrats were largely political, as he was concerned about the intra-party struggles within the WPK. These political problems led to the introduction of the chollima undong (chollima movement) and the taean saeop chegye

(taean work system) in the early 1960s, which bolstered Kim Il-sung’s political control over the state’s economic development.

The Three Year Plan was announced to be “complete” in April 1956. However, the Five Year

Plan did not start until the Third session of the Second SPA in June 1958. Two political factors explain the two year gap between the Three Year Plan and the Five Year Plan. First, Kim

Il-sung’s mass purging of rival factions within the WPK caused various readjustments in the political system to take place. Second, the Sino-Soviet rift which started after Khrushchev’s famous speech in February 1956 had caused some level of unease in Pyongyang’s relations with

13 ———, "modeungeoseul jeonhu inmingyeongje bokgu baljeoneul wihayeo [Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy] (5 August 1953)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 8 [Kim Il Sung Works 8] (August 1953-June 1954) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1980). pp.15-27. 14———, "3gaenyeon inmingyeongjegyehoegui cheothaein 1954nyeondo gyehoegeul seonggwajeogeuro suhaenghalde daehayeo [On the Successfully Carrying out of the Plan for 1954, the First Year of the Three-Year National Economic Plan] (11 March 1954)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 8 [Kim Il Sung Works 8] (August 1953-June 1954) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1980).pp.245-249.

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China and the USSR. Hence, due to the change in the political climate, ideology was further reinforced, and the DPRK’s economic policies became increasingly politicized and lost its economic rationality.

The Five Year Plan aimed for the “Technological reconstruction…and further development of industrial and agricultural production.”15 The plan was ideologically disciplined, epitomized by the introduction of the chollima movement, which was more or less a copy of China’s great leap forward. The chollima movement essentially became a nation-wide campaign to mobilize the masses for a production increase in all industrial sectors and “to put an end to socialism, and move on to achieve communism in Korea.”16

Obviously, one of the main aims of the chollima movement was to compensate for the two year gap between the Three Year Plan and the Five Year Plan. In addition to the chollima movement, the WPK also introduced the cheongsanri bangsik (cheongsanri method). The campaign was a way of collectivizing the agriculture industry, by establishing interactive coordination between the WPK and the farmers. Both the chollima movement and the cheongsanri method were had a powerful impact, and Pyongyang reported the completion of the Five Year Plan at the SPA in

November 1960, meaning that the plan finished a year ahead of schedule. However, this period possibly marked the peak of the DPRK’s economic development.

15 ———, "jeonhu inmingyeongjebokgugeonseolsaeobeul seonggwajeogeuro jinhaenghalde daehayeo [On Successfully Carrying out the Post-War Reconstruction of the National Economy] (8 December 1953)." p.145. 16 Rim, sahoejuuirobuteo gongsanjuuieroui jeomchajeok ihaeng [the gradual transition from socialism to communism]. p.46.

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In July 1961, the DPRK signed economic agreements with China and the USSR, hinting that

Pyongyang was gearing itself for a large-scale economic plan. The First Seven Year Plan was introduced at the Fourth Congress of the WPK in September 1961. The main strategy of the plan was to shape its socialist economy to the juche ideology. However, the First Seven Year

Plan was the turning point for the DPRK economy, as it was during this period when

Pyongyang embarked on its new military doctrine – dangui gunsa roseon. To achieve the dangui gunsa roseon, the DPRK needed to realign the state economy. At the Fifth Plenary

Meeting of the Fourth CCWPK in 1962, the WPK proposed the concept of “parallel development of economy and national defence capability” which divided the state’s economy into two entities – inmin gyeongje (people’s economy) and gunsa gyeongje (military economy).17 Also around this time, the DPRK also established its own military industry complex – the SEC.

The First Seven Year Plan caused some drastic changes in the DPRK’s heavy industry sector. In

December 1961, the WPK introduced the taean work system. The system, mirrored the cheongsanri method, and its purpose was to strengthen the interactions between the WPK cadres and workers in the industrial sector. Yet the economic regime involved the ousting of technocrats from factories and replacing them with WPK members, to avoid “bureaucratism” and “formalism”. Consequently, the industries’ production and management were forced to follow the WPK’s political ends, rather than rational industrial goals. Simply put, the DPRK’s industrial production was hijacked by the WPK.

17The concept of “parallel development of defence and economy” was reeemphasized as the state’s economic development guideline at the Second Conference of the WPK in October 1966.

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By this time, production in the DPRK’s heavy industry was aligned to feed the WPK’s military interests.18 Yet the mobilization of the DPRK’s industrial sector towards a military-centred economy did not cause immediate ramifications. Rather, the growth in the heavy industry sector had some positive outcomes in the civilian economy. In August 1961, the DPRK put its first domestically manufactured electric locomotive into service – pulgungi 1 (Red Flag 1).

Furthermore, in 1968, the DPRK started its construction of a subway system in Pyongyang.

Kim Il reported the results of the First Seven Year Plan at the Fifth Congress of the WPK in

November 1970, calling the plan a “great victory.”19 Given that the First Seven Year Plan was extended by three years, the establishment of the military-centred economy had a profound impact on the overall progress of the plan itself. One of the chief reasons for the extension was the sudden jump in military expenditures from 19% to 30.4% in 1967, which came in line with the DPRK’s doctrine for building a self-reliant military. From this time, the DPRK’s economy started to significantly slow down, revealing the problems in the state’s planning mechanisms.

The First Seven Year Plan revealed that the DPRK’s economy was already exhausted from the regime’s military-centred interests.

The Six Year Plan was introduced at the same Fifth Congress of the WPK on 12 November

18See: Il-sung Kim, "sahoejuui geonseol ui uidaehan chudongryeokin chollima jakeopbanundongeul deouk shimhwa baljeon sikija [Let Us Further Develop the Chollima Workteam Movement, a Great Spur to Socialist Construction] (11 May 1968)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 22 [Kim Il Sung Works 22] (January-September 1968) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1983). 19 Il Kim, "Joson Minjujuui Inmin Gonghwaguk inmin gyeongje baljeon 6genyeon (1971~1976) gyehoek e daehayeo [on the Six Year Plan to develop the DPRK's people's economy]," in joson rodongdang daehoe jaryojip 3 [WPK congress material collection 3] (Seoul, ROK: Gukdotongirwon, 1988). pp.114-115.

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1970. The plan focused on “perfecting” the developments from the previous Seven Year Plan, suggesting that the Seven Year Plan fell well short of its target. Given that the Seven Year Plan had focused heavily on the military industry, the Six Year Plan proposed to compensate by developing the “people’s economy”. From the second year of the Six Year Plan, military outlays dropped significantly (at least according to DPRK data provided in the Korea Central

Yearbook), which reflects the leadership’s appeal to the populace that efforts are being made to balance the unevenness created by the previous plan.

The Six Year Plan indicated the DPRK’s ambitions to qualitatively develop its industries, and to some extent, to economically compete with the ROK.20 The Six Year Plan was characterized by the “Speed Campaigns”, an over-ambitious way to compensate for the economic failures from the previous plan. The Six Year Plan was announced to be accomplished in September 1975, more than a year earlier than the completion date initially set by Pyongyang. The speedy execution of the plan was due to the two “Speed Battle Campaigns” – “100 Day Campaign” in

January 1971 and “70 Day Campaign” in October 1974. The two campaigns were certainly effective in mobilizing workers to speed up production. However, given that the DPRK already formatted its military-centric economy, Pyongyang’s alternatives to actually remedy the problems in the civilian economy were limited.

The Second Seven Year Plan was introduced at the First Session of the Sixth SPA in December

1977. The plan, aimed to “further strengthen the economic foundations of socialism and to raise the people’s standard of living of the people.”21 However, the transition between the Six Year

20 Teruo Komaki, "rokkanen keizai keikaku no jisshi [the execution of the six year plan] " in kitachousen handobukku [North Korea handbook] (Tokyo, Japan: Kodansha, 1997). pp.234-236. 21 Il-sung Kim, "joson minjujuui inmin gonghwaguk inmingyeongje baljeon je2cha7gaenyeon

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Plan and the Second Seven Year Plan were far from smooth. Now, the DPRK’s economic and industrial capacity was significantly smaller, given that the economy was showing clear signs of exhaustion, and Pyongyang had already started to repay its debt to the USSR from 1976.22

Consequently, the DPRK’s economic plans started to show a deadly pattern. Pyongyang had no other option but to compromise its annual target output, because failures from preceding plans rolled over to the next.

The DPRK leadership still pushed forth with its ambitious economic plans. The Second Seven

Year Plan was politicized almost to the extreme, largely due to Kim Jong-il’s efforts to further the state’s ideological identity. With the slogan “Three revolutions of ideology, technology, and culture”, Pyongyang began a campaign to construct monstrous monuments and structures such as the Juche Tower, West Sea Barrage (Nampho Dam), Arch of Triumph, and the Grand

People’s Study House. While these structures are propagated to be the hallmark of the DPRK’s economic development, they failed to remedy the economic problems, and proved that the leadership’s ideological ambitions ignored the state’s economic needs.

Even the “technological revolution” was carried out for political ends. The so-called

“mechanization and automation (of the DPRK)”23 aimed to improve the communications and

(1978-1984) gyehoge daehayeo [On the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978~1984) for the Development of the National Economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (17 December 1977)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 32 [Kim Il Sung Works 32] (January-December 1977) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1986). p.519. 22 See: Hiroko Imamura, Kita Chousen "kyokou no keizai" [North Korea - 'the panic-striken economy'] (Tokyo, Japan: Shuueisya, 2005). p.125. 23 Kim, "joson minjujuui inmin gonghwaguk inmingyeongje baljeon je2cha7gaenyeon (1978-1984) gyehoge daehayeo [On the Second Seven-Year Plan (1978~1984) for the Development of the National Economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (17 December 1977)." p.519.

222 transport sectors by expanding the electricity lines and implementing a nationwide television system. Yet this was either to benefit the KPA’s logistics, or to improve the medium to strengthen Pyongyang’s delivery of propaganda to the populace.

Just like in the Six Year Plan, three “campaigns” were carried out during the Second Seven

Year Plan: “70 Day Campaign” in May 1978, and two “100 Day Campaign(s)” in September

1978 and July 1980. While the campaigns allowed the DPRK to complete the Second Seven

Year Plan ahead of schedule, there was a two year “blank” period until the Third Seven Year

Plan. The interval suggests that just like the preceding plan, Pyongyang needed to compensate for the plan’s anticipated failures and readjust its economic system.

The Third Seven Year Plan was introduced at the Seventh Session of the Fifth SPA in April

1987. The plan was rushed from the onset with two consecutive “200 Day Campaigns” in

February and August 1988. However, by 1989 the DPRK’s economy finally started to show negative economic growth. While prospects for the Third Seven Year Plan were already grim due to the failures of the three preceding plans, there were also external factors – the collapse of the USSR on 26 December 1991.

By the 1990s, low industrial and agricultural output, and severe energy shortage started to become a widespread problem in the DPRK. Pyongyang did what it could within its political capacity to address the economic problems, but they did not bring positive results. One of the efforts was the DPRK’s timid attempt at attracting foreign capital in Special Economic Zones in

Rajin-Sonbong and Cheongjin. However, Pyongyang’s fear of the political ramifications inevitably attracted insufficient amount of capital, which only severed the DPRK’s trade deficit.

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At the Twenty-First Plenary Meeting of the Sixth CCWPK held on 8 December 1993, Kim

Jong-il reported little on its economic achievements, suggesting that the Third Seven Year Plan failed even in Pyongyang’s eyes. The death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, and the series of natural disasters in the mid-1990s that followed, sent the DPRK economy further backwards to the point that economic plans could not be launched. In the DPRK, this period of struggle in the

1990s was dubbed gonan ui haengun (the arduous march). Even under these conditions, the

DPRK maintained its centralized economy, choosing to fulfil the leadership’s political and military objectives.

Instead of introducing an economic plan, Kim Jong-il resorted to the raw fundamentals of state survival with the introduction of songun and kangsong taeguk. The kangsong taeguk slogan promised to improve both the standards of living and the KPA’s military capability. Although the slogan is ostensibly egalitarian, the DPRK adhered to its military-centric approach to economics, evident from the phrase, “We can live without sugar, but not without bullets.”24

Considering Pyongyang’s efforts to build strategic weapons and cyber-electronic warfare technology, technological modernization was directed towards the regime’s objective of strengthening KPA capabilities. Therefore, it is not surprising that the production output between the civilian and military sectors were grossly disproportionate. For example, one book claims the building of the gwangmyeongseong-1 satellite (the supposed satellite mounted on the taepodong-1 missile) and the creation of ostrich farms as achievements during the “arduous march”.25

24 Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. p.245. 25 Yun, gonan ui haenggun eul ragwon ui haenggun euro [from the arduous march to the paradise march]. pp.124-158.

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Due to the ever-worsening economic situation, civilians started to operate illicit street markets for income. Pyongyang did take measures in an attempt to take control over these illegal stalls through the 7.1 gyeongje gwalli gaeseon jochi (7.1 economic management reform measures) in

2002, approving certain levels of individual trade. On the downside of the policy, it abolished the fixed price of goods and halted state rations, triggering hyperinflation. A more recent case was the redenomination of the DPRK Won in 2009 that triggered further inflation.

In January 2011, the DPRK finally announced its first economic plan in almost two decades –

“Ten Year State Strategy Plan for Economic Development”. Few details regarding the Ten Year

Plan were announced, except that the plan focuses on “building infrastructure and developing agriculture and basic industries including electric power, coal, oil and metal industries and regional development.”26 The plan reflects a more realistic economic outlook with its greater attention on the agricultural and the light-industry sector.

Under Kim Jong-un, the regime is showing some moves towards economic improvement. In

June 2012, the DPRK announced the “6.28 policy”.27 Reports suggest that the “6.28 Policy” will be implemented on 1 October 2012.28 Although, the true nature and the implications of the

26"N. Korea Draws Up a 10-year Economic Development Plan: State Media," Yonhap News(15 Jan 2011), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/01/15/60/0401000000AEN20110115002000315F.HTM L. See also: "gukga gyeongje gaebal 10gaenyeon jeollyak gyehoek chaetaek [Ten Year State Strategy Plan for Economic Development adopted]," Korea Central News Agency(15 January 2011). 27 Song-min Choi, "6.28 Policy Sparking Debate," Daily NK(12 July 2012), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk09002&num=9545. 28 Kwang-jin Kim, "New Economic Policy to Start October 1st," Daily NK(10 September 2012), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk09002&num=9774.

225 economic policy are still unclear, we can assume that the regime will make an effort to show that the economic measures are not merely about ideological discipline. For example, in recent years, Pyongyang has made apparent efforts to modernize urban infrastructures such as the

Ryugyong Hotel, Sunan International Airport and various leisure facilities in Pyongyang. These developments, along with the numerous calls for economic improvement, reflect the Kim

Jong-un regime’s attempts to appeal to the public that there is substance to kansong taeguk and that economic issues are taken seriously.

Nevertheless, the DPRK’s Ten Year Plan came far too late to make any smooth economic recovery. As Lankov correctly argues, Kim Jong-un “hopes to transform his destitute country into a “developmental dictatorship,” more or less similar to present-day China, where a market economy coexists with an authoritarian political system.”29 Given that the DPRK’s concerns are directed at the leadership’s survival whilst maintaining its military leverage, it is trite to believe that Pyongyang has completely relinquished, or is able to reverse its military-centred economic system.

At least two factors are responsible for the DPRK’s failed economic plans. First, Pyongyang’s unbalanced management between the heavy industry, light industry, and agriculture sectors took its toll on the overall state economy. Indeed, the DPRK enjoyed relatively stable economic growth at least until the First Seven Year Plan, even when there was strong emphasis on the development of the military. However, the establishment of the SEC to achieve the dangui gunsa roseon over-stretched the DPRK’s economic capacity. Therefore, the DPRK’s limited

29 Andrei N. Lankov, "The Risk in Reforming North Korea," The Washington Post(4 September 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/envy-could-destabilize-north-korea/2012/09/04/f898fdaa-ef9d- 11e1-adc6-87dfa8eff430_story.html.

226 resource base was quickly exhausted by the heavy industry to the point that Pyongyang could not adequately invest in the light industry and agricultural sectors.

Second, there were problems in how Pyongyang dealt with the zero-sum nature of the economic plans. The over-politicization of the economy and relevant industries contributed to the DPRK’s economic decline. As we saw earlier, ideology and military interests hijacked all spheres of economic management from around the time of the First Seven Year Plan. As a result, not only did supply grossly outweigh the demands, but caused severe inefficiencies. Moreover, instead of addressing the problems the plans left behind, Pyongyang focused on pushing forward with its industrial ideals. Hence the problems caused by the DPRK’s economic plans snowballed, and by the 1980s, it became too late to reverse those disastrous outcomes.

The DPRK’s economic failure precisely comes from poor political-economic management. The outlook and momentum of Pyongyang’s economic plans were far beyond its economic and industrial capacity, which caused disproportionate development. Ironically, the DPRK’s economic management caused the “parallel deterioration of the economy and military capability”. While the Kim Jong-un regime seems to be making efforts to revive the distribution system and construct new items of infrastructure to create a positive image for the kangsong taeguk era, the state’s capacity is nonetheless limited. Hence, as long as regime survival is on the top of the leadership’s agenda, the jarip economic system is likely to keep its form.

3. THE DPRK’S MILITARY INDUSTRY COMPLEX

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The main driving factor behind the establishment of the SEC was to integrate the military factories to improve the leadership’s management of military acquisitions. The SEC manages eight bureaus and three additional institutions that are in charge of DPRK’s arms trade and

R&D. There are approximately 200 factories affiliated to the seven engineering bureaus, and most of the plants are built underground.30 In addition, there are approximately 110 civilian factories capable of switching to produce military goods in war-time.31

The Second Economic Committee Bureaus/Institutions Role/Function General bureau Overall planning, budgeting, management 1st Machinery Engineering Bureau Small arms, ammunitions 2nd Machinery Engineering Bureau Tanks, Armoured vehicles 3rd Machinery Engineering Bureau Artillery, Anti-Air guns 4th Machinery Engineering Bureau Missiles systems 5th Machinery Engineering Bureau Nuclear, C&B weapons 6th Machinery Engineering Bureau Navy vessels 7th Machinery Engineering Bureau Air units, Communications equipment External Economic Bureau32 Import and export of military goods Second Academy of Natural Sciences R&D in military-related technologies National Defence Research Centre National Defence University

30 Korea Institute for National Unification, bukhan gaeyo [outline of North Korea] (Seoul, ROK: KINU Korea Institute for National Unification 2009). p.108. 31 Ibid., p.108. 32 For a comprehensive list of the trading companies, see: United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) S/2010/571," (UN Security Council, 5 November 2010). p.43; Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. p.55.

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Table 5.2: The Second Economic Committee33

The DPRK’s vision to build its own military industrial complex came not from the leadership’s military or political ambitions, but also from the state’s “natural” setting. As already discussed, since the formative years, the WPK’s centrally planned industrialization exploited the infrastructural remnants of the colonial years.34 By the time the Korean peninsula had liberated, the northern half of Korea had most of the peninsula’s heavy industrial factories, power stations and mining facilities.35 Hence the growth of the DPRK’s military industry also owes to geographic factors.

Kim Il-sung’s ambitions to establish a domestic defence industry date back to the late 1940s.

While admitting that it is cheaper to buy arms “off-the-shelf” from foreign countries, Kim

Il-sung argued that it is “not safe from the standpoint of national defence. Foreign countries may fail to continue their export of weapons to us or even refuse to give them to us.”36 By this time, the DPRK had built some factories in charge of produced military goods and small arms, such as Factory No.65 (presently the 2.8 Factory). However, in spite of Kim Il-sung’s advocacy for self-sustenance, the DPRK’s military industry was limited to light weapons, and remained heavily reliant on China and the USSR for heavy-duty weapons.

33 Adapted from: Gang-taek Im, "bukhan ui gunsusaneop jeongchaek [North Korea's military industry policies]," in bukhan ui gunsa [North Korean military affairs], ed. Bukhan yeongu hakhoe (Seoul, ROK: Gyeongin Munhwasa, 2006).; Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. 34 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. pp.13, 243. 35 Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). p.48. 36 Kim, "urineun jacheui himeuro mugireul mandeureo mujanghayeoya handa [We Must Make Weapons by Our Own Efforts to Arm Ourselves] (31 October 1949)." pp.297-299.

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The DPRK’s steady economic growth until the 1960s certainly strengthened the state’s industrial base to modernize the KPA. Just like the other sectors in the DPRK, both the KPA and the military industry became subject to political control by the WPK. In May 1961, Kim

Il-sung argued that the DPRK’s military industry must work in accordance with the CCWPK, and possess strong ideological discipline to fight dogmatism.37 Hence the establishment of the

SEC was essentially a way for the WPK leadership to centralize the military industry.

The political atmosphere in which the SEC was created made it inevitable for the military industry to function in conformity with the WPK leadership. Today, the SEC is under strict authority of both the WPK and the NDC. The Military Industry Secretariat of the WPK determines the SEC’s acquisition patterns, while the NDC has control over the supplies to and from the SEC. At the First session of the Twelfth SPA in April 2009, three individuals in the

SEC or the WPK’s military industry offices were appointed as members of the NDC: Paek

Se-bong (Chairman of SEC); Chun Byung-ho (Secretary of Military Industry); and Ju

Kyu-chang (First Vice-Director of the Ministry of Defence Industry). Additionally, Ju

Kyu-chang was also selected as a member of the CMCWPK in September 2010.38

Obviously, the SEC is tied to the concept of juche. To make its military industry self-sustainable, the DPRK had to maximize the SEC’s resource base, forcing Pyongyang to create an economic system whereby the military industry gained a considerably authoritative position above the

37 ———, "byeonggigongeobeul deouk baljeonsikigi wihayeo [For Further Development of the Ordinance Industry] (28 May 1961)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 15 [Kim Il Sung Works 15] (January-December 1961) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1981). 38 Unknown, "dang jungang gunsa wiwonhoe [the CMCWPK]," Rodong Sinmun 29 September 2010.

230 other sectors. While there is little doubt that the military economy occupies a significant portion of the DPRK economy, it is hard to quantify the portion of the economy it occupies. Difficulties in measuring the size of the military industry largely owes to the fact that a grey area exists between the civilian and the military economy.39 That is, many of the civilian industries

(especially light industries) provide the military industry sector with goods, creating a clear zero-sum imbalance between the two sectors.40 For example, Kim Il-sung once stated:

Every ordnance factory must set a target of training cadres adequate for a prompt emergency

switchover of one or two civilian factories to ordnance production and struggle to achieve the

target. Civilian factories, too, must arrange tools and jigs and make other necessary

preparations for an emergency switchover to wartime production.41

From the time when the SEC was established, the connection between heavy industry and military industry seems to have changed over time. During the Kim Il-sung era, the military industry was treated as a part of the heavy industry. However, in the Kim Jong-il era, the military industry became more authoritative, especially after the introduction of songun. The military industry’s leading position is evident from Kim Jong-il’s statement made in 2003:

39 Analysis on the different sectors of the DPRK economy can be found in: Sung, bukhan gyeongjewigi 10nyeongwa gunbijeunggang neungnyeok [North Korea's 10 years of economic crisis and capability for strengthing armament]. pp.25-31. 40 In many cases, civilian factories in the DPRK are in fact weapons manufacturers. See: "How N.Korea Goes About Exporting Arms," Chosun Ilbo(10 March 2010), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/03/10/2010031000953.html. 41 Kim, "byeonggigongeobeul deouk baljeonsikigi wihayeo [For Further Development of the Ordinance Industry] (28 May 1961)." p. 120.

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The work of consolidating the defence capabilities of the country is an undertaking shared by

the entire Party, the whole country and all the people. Our officials and working masses must

organize and conduct all work on the principle of giving precedence to military affairs, and

make energetic efforts to build up the military might of the country. In addition, the

paramilitary forces must be strengthened and the whole country turned into a solid fortress. It

is imperative to expedite overall economic construction while giving precedence to the

defence industry, as required by the Songun era, so as to support the Party’s Songun politics

both materially and technologically, and radically improve the people’s living standards in a

short period of time.42

The concept of juche has remained the bedrock of the DPRK’s state governance. However, the means by which the DPRK leadership attempted to achieve self-reliance has proved to be counterproductive for the SEC. The DPRK’s military industry experienced rapid development since the 1960s largely because it was the sector that benefitted from the leadership’s military-centred interests. Yet after the economy began to slow down, the military industry became the only sector that has successfully grown, especially from the 1980s.43 Rather, the

DPRK remains motivated in advancing its military technologies. As recent examples, in 2012,

Kim Jong-un has inspected the 26th Exhibition of Military Science and Technology and also the

Museum of Arms and Equipment of the KPA. While the visits are mainly political in nature, nevertheless they indicate the regime’s vision on advancing the technological standards in the

42 Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." p.369; Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. p.5-8. 43 Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. p.45.

232 military industry.

There is little doubt that the SEC remains the pillar of the DPRK economy. Consequently this also means that that the military economy is the sector that is most dependent on the state’s economic capacity. That is, under the current circumstances where the state’s resource base continues to shrink, the highly-capital intensive SEC and its production capacity diminishes in congruence.

4. MEASURING THE DPRK’S MILITARY EXPENDITURE

So how much of its resources does Pyongyang devote to the SEC? Given the size of the military industrial complex, one would guess that the DPRK’s military outlays are extremely high.

However, quantifying the DPRK’s military spending is difficult if not almost impossible due to the lack of consistent, reliable data.

There are at least two problems in determining the DPRK’s military expenditures. First, figures released by Pyongyang have always been problematic. Both from reluctance and incapability, the DPRK seldom releases detailed statistics or elaborate on the data it provides. Pyongyang reports its state budget, only in terms of income and spending, but crucial figures such as GDP,

GNI or GNP are more or less non-existent in media reports, government sources, or academic journals. At most, the DPRK provides extremely brief commentaries on figures such as industrial output or percentage of Total Government Expenditures devoted to the gunsa yeosan

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(military budget), and inmin yeosan (people’s budget).44

Second, the DPRK’s defence expenditures give contradictory indications if we measure it in terms of percentage. Indeed, Pyongyang is devoting a significant amount of its economy to the military. Estimates on the DPRK’s military expenditure range from 16~50% of the state’s budget.45 However, we also need to keep note that the actual size of the DPRK’s state budget is actually quite small in comparison to other states. Thus given the size of KPA, Pyongyang’s fiscal capacity to make capital procurements or even paying the bills to sustain its forces would be severely limited.

Given that Pyongyang releases most of its economic statistics in percentage terms, it is extremely difficult to gauge Pyongyang’s military outlays in terms of currency units such as the

US dollar or the DPRK Won (KPW). Due to the DPRK’s limited economic dealings with other states, keeping track of its economic activities and determining the accurate conversion rate of the fluctuating KPW to other currencies is extremely difficult. As Moon and Lee correctly points out if we look at the Pyongyang’s military expenditures in terms of the KPW, it increased from 3.3 billion KPW in 2002 to 50.7 billion KPW in 2003 largely due to Pyongyang’s “change in accounting units that reflected a new monetary and foreign exchange rate policy in July

2002.”46

From the two problems discussed above, we can understand how difficult it would be to

44 Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.92. 45 ROK Ministry of Unification, bukhan ihae [understanding North Korea]. pp.138-139. 46 Chung-in Moon and Sang-keun Lee, "Military Spending and the Arms Race on the Korean Peninsula," Asian Perspective 33, no. 4 (2009). p.80.

234 precisely quantify the DPRK’s military budget. However, we are able to gain a different understanding of the DPRK’s military outlays by spotting some of the contradictions and trends.

If we take a look at the DPRK’s official statistics, we can see that Pyongyang’s military expenditure experienced quite significant changes since 1948. Yet at the same time, the spending patterns are puzzling, especially between the early 1960s and 1970s. According to

North Korean official statements, the increase in military outlays in the 1960s was to modernize its self-reliant military forces so that it can adjust to the changing security environment, such as tensions with the ROK and the US, Japan’s military modernization and so on.47 Yet, the mentioning of the need to build a “self-reliant” military, suggests that the Sino-Soviet clash had a strong bearing on the DPRK’s jump in military spending. While the DPRK was able to utilize their economic growth and industrial capacity for the military, some aspects were left unexplained.

After Kim Il-sung introduced the dangui gunsa roseon and the concept of “parallel development of the economy and defence”, Pyongyang’s definition of military expenditures changed quite significantly. From 1966, the DPRK replaced the term minjok bowibi (people’s security expenditure) with gukbangbi (defence expenditure), which somewhat reflects the promotion of military affairs. At the same time, the DPRK’s military build-up was reflected in its official statistics, reaching 31.4% of government outlays. While this may seem like a significant jump, the increase took place gradually from the early 1960s. In a speech to the WPK congress in

1970, Kim Il reported that the DPRK’s military outlays during the 1960s totalled 8billion KPW, or 19% of government expenditures, and had achieved one of the aims of the First Seven Year

47 Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, joson jungang nyeongam 1971 [Korea central yearbook 1971] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, 1971).

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Plan – to build a modernized, independent and strong military.48

The DPRK claims that the military budget dropped to 17% of the total government expenditures in 1972. However, it is unlikely that the DPRK’s military expenditure decreased, considering that the KPA grew in size and the SEC gained a significant amount of power during the 1960s and 1970s. In particular, it is from the 1970s when the SEC’s mass production of conventional platforms gained significant momentum, most notably in its production of tanks, armoured vehicles, submarines, artillery and of course strategic weapons.49 Hence it is likely, that

Pyongyang merely restructured the way in which it accounts the amount of resources devoted to the military industry.50

The establishment of the SEC allowed Pyongyang to blur the definition of “military expenditures”. For example, investment into the SEC’s affiliate bureaus such as the External

Economic Bureau, Second Science Institution, or the National Defence Research Centre could be treated as categories outside the military (such as “trade”, “scientific R&D”, etc).

Furthermore, investment into factories that produce “dual-use” goods could also have been excluded from military spending figures. Therefore, it is highly possible that after 1972, the

DPRK started to define military spending as direct investments into the KPA, rather than the

SEC.

48 ———, joson jungang nyeongam 1966-1967 [Korea central yearbook 1966-1967]. pp.114-115. 49 Korea Military Academy, "bukhan ui gunsa jeongchaek [North Korea's military policy]." pp.243-244 50 Also see: Sung, "Bukhan gunsaryeogui gyeongjejeok gicho: 'gunsagyeongje' silchee daehan yeoksajeok/siljeungjeok bukseok [the basis of North Korea's military capability: historical/empirical analysis on the actual state of the military economy]."; ———, "Bukhan gongpyogunsabi silche e daehan jeongmil jaebunseok."

236

The biggest mystery concerning Pyongyang’s defence budget is the songun period under Kim

Jong-il. The DPRK’s official figures for its military outlays during the Kim Jong-il era have stayed within 14.4% and 16% of its total government spending.51 Based on these figures, if the

DPRK is “matching” its military outlays to its shrinking economy, then the actual amount of resources devoted to the military sector will be decreasing congruently. Under songun, where the military industry has a central role in the state’s economy, the proportion of resources devoted to the defence sector should have increased to some level, especially given the development of strategic weapons and cyber-electronic warfare capabilities.

From the songun era, Pyongyang aimed to scientifically and technologically modernize the

KPA (and also the state, to some extent). Hence the DPRK’s military expenditures should have increased, given the high amount of resources required for R&D. In particular, the development of strategic weapons and cyber-electronic warfare capabilities are quite costly. Without increasing its military outlays, the development of such weapons would have major ramifications on its conventional force management, causing a zero-sum balance between the development projects and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs. In other words, the development of new technologies would not be possible unless Pyongyang executes force reduction or increase the overall military budget.

Although technological modernization was directed to further developing the KPA’s capabilities, the trend is not reflected in the DPRK’s official military expenditures. As we saw in the previous section, all of the bureaus within the SEC are exclusively in charge of procurements and sales. Hence as Sung correctly points out, Pyongyang’s military expenditures

51 Josun Jungang Nyeongam [Korea Central Yearbook] Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, various issues

237 are limited to O&M costs, but the investments in the SEC, such as R&D and the production costs for platforms are included in the “People’s Economy Expenditures” category.52 For example, it is likely that the costs associated with R&D in “dual-use” technologies such as ICT, space and nuclear technology is treated as costs associated with “scientific innovation”.

With little hints provided, it is difficult to calculate the DPRK’s military expenditures in terms of currency or percentage. The contradictory nature of Pyongyang’s official statistics reveals its trifle definition of what constitutes defence expenditures in the Stalinist state. Hamm argues that the DPRK spends less (in comparison to the ROK) in O&M costs.53 Indeed, by looking at the poor state of platforms, facilities, and soldiers, we could assume that the DPRK’s O&M costs may be relatively low. However, there are limits to Hamm’s argument. Unlike force structure investments, O&M costs are not avoidable. Simply ignoring O&M costs leads to negative ramifications for the KPA’s overall military capability. Hence for the DPRK, sustaining combat-readiness would be quite high given the sheer size of the KPA and the amount of dated platforms.

One may question whether Pyongyang has the fiscal capacity to finance the KPA. Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible to know the “price tag” of each and individual platforms and other costs associated with managing the KPA. Nevertheless, regardless of the economic model employed, the common logic regarding the cost of systems remains constant. Certain platforms cost more than others (such as air, naval and ground platforms), and the only significant difference

52 Sung, "Bukhan gunsaryeogui gyeongjejeok gicho: 'gunsagyeongje' silchee daehan yeoksajeok/siljeungjeok bukseok [the basis of North Korea's military capability: historical/empirical analysis on the actual state of the military economy]." pp.307-311. 53 Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.104.

238 between states is how the procurements take place. Hence by looking at the nature of the KPA, we are able to gain some hints on understanding the way in which the DPRK’s military industry is managed.

There is little doubt that Pyongyang’s defence spending places an enormous burden on the state’s economy. Statistics regarding the DPRK’s military spending merely provide a vague explanation. The vague definition of military expenditure and absence of reliable data raises the question of whether we should rely purely on fiscal statistics to measure the performance of the

DPRK’s military industry or defence planning. Indeed, figures do matter, and to a great deal.

However, if we are questioning the impact of the DPRK economy on its military capability management, approximate indicators of burden and capacity may be sufficient.

5. THE DPRK’S INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT

By focusing on the implicit strengths and weaknesses of the economy and military industry, it is possible to speculate on how the DPRK’s military capability and policies are affected. The measure of burden arising from military outlays depends on the economy’s structural and situational capacity. While the DPRK devotes an extremely high proportion of its resources on the military industry, it is dubious as to whether this guarantees positive returns for the KPA.

Due to the scarcity of resources and lagging technological innovation, high military outlays may in fact exacerbate the inefficiencies in the DPRK’s military industry, as well as distorting the cost-effective calculations in Pyongyang’s military capability management.

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The fact that Pyongyang continues to devote a significant portion of its resources on the military despite the failing economy, indicates that its industrial capacity is shrinking, while the economic burden is growing. For instance, even if the DPRK’s military expenditure is 40% of its national budget, depending on the state’s technological capacity and economic structure, it may be affordable as its system is so well structured that it benefits the overall national economy. Of course, the reverse may also be true. That is, if technological capacity is low, and the economic system is not well established, even military outlays that account for 5% of total government spending may be unbearable.

Measuring the burden-capacity balance requires us to look closely at the DPRK’s economic-industrial capacity in three interrelating areas: political-economic structure, resource base, and technology. For Pyongyang, poor management of the economy’s structure and plans inevitably pushed the state into a vicious spiral, where structural constraints caused resource constraints, which consequently lead to technological constraints.

5.1 STRUCTURAL CAPACITY

The fundamental structure of the DPRK economy is rigidly aligned to the leadership’s juche and songun ideals. Although the leadership was able to gain absolute control over the state’s industries, the economic ramifications have been devastating. The jarip economy which started in the 1960s isolated the DPRK, avoiding intimate trade with the international community and

240 furthering itself from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).54 Still,

Pyongyang relied heavily on other countries for material aid and concessions, in particular,

Beijing and Moscow. Not surprisingly, the DPRK’s one-sided attitude towards the outside world significantly limited its economic capacity, to which Noland described as “the world’s most autarkic economy”.55 At the same time, the nature of the jarip economic system has forced the DPRK to face an “identity crisis”, where Pyongyang behaves as a self-reliant industrial power even when its capacity is on par with LDCs.

If a state struggles to be self-sustainable, then resource shortages must be compensated via imports or aggressively export its materials and products to shore up funds. However, in the

DPRK’s case, imports are defined as foreign aid or major concessions that are labelled as

“economic cooperation”. Despite its jarip economic ideals, the contradictory nature of

Pyongyang’s “self-sustenance” revealed itself after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. After

Moscow cut its aid to Pyongyang, the DPRK economy experienced sharp decline. Facing such circumstances, the DPRK had to increase its reliance on China, Japan, the ROK, Russia, and the

US for foreign aid. In particular, the significant increase in economic support from Beijing and

Seoul reflects the two neighbouring governments’ efforts to curb the DPRK’s sudden collapse.56

54 The DPRK was never a member of COMECON. However, they sent observers to COMECON meetings until the early 1960s. 55 Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: the Future of the Two Koreas (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000). p.61. 56 Cooperation between the DPRK and the ROK gained some momentum just before the collapse of the USSR. On 13 December 1991, Pyongyang and Seoul signed “The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North (Korea)”. While it was not until Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy” when trade between the two Koreas significantly increased, the signing of the agreement in December 1991 certainly served as an important step.

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Even in terms of foreign investment and trade, there are restrictions reflected by the DPRK’s fear of the ramifications on its sovereignty and regime security. In other words, Pyongyang welcomes foreign investments and trade on the condition that funds and materials are the only things entering their territory. The DPRK has imposed strict rules on how investments take place in the Special Economic Zones such as the Rajin-Sonbong Economic Special Zone (later renamed as Rason), Kaesong Industrial Complex, and the currently developing

Hwanggumpyong Islet. Consequently such restrictions have a negative impact on the volume of investments into the DPRK, impacting its overall productivity. The jarip economy was designed to maximize the DPRK’s revenue while minimizing the economic expenditures and political risks. Yet it is far from self-reliant in terms of receiving aid and revenue.

Pyongyang’s model to construct its idealistic economy and advance its industrial modernization failed to bring any positive returns for the state’s economy or the KPA’s capabilities. In the defence planning context, the foremost problem with the DPRK’s jarip economic model is the misconception of the nexus between the civilian and the military economy. Kim Il-sung’s concept of constructing defence capabilities and the state’s economy in parallel, was essentially designed to marry the jarip economy and jawi national defence concepts. The means to achieve this marriage, however, triggered an excessive zero-sum balance between the civilian and the military economy. In fact, Kim Il-sung admits that high military spending has in fact come at the expense of the civilian economy. In a report to the Fifth Congress of the WPK on 2

November 1970, Kim Il-sung stated:

It is true to say that our expenditure on national defence has been too heavy a burden for us,

in the light of the small size of our country and its population. Had we been able to divert

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even a part of our nation’s defence expenditure to economic construction, our national

economy would have developed more rapidly and the standard of living of our people

would have been raised markedly. But the situation never allowed us to do so. We could

not throw the fundamental interests of the revolution to the winds in seeking temporary

comfort, nor did we want to become a people without a country once more. Therefore, we

devoted our great efforts to increasing our defence capacity to perfect the defences of our

homeland even though this meant delaying our economic development and the raising of

our people’s standard of living.57

The fact that the civilian economy had to sacrificially supply the demands of the military economy clearly indicates the zero-sum relationship between the two economic entities. While the DPRK separates the two economic components, the Second Economy (i.e., military economy) has unilaterally integrated itself with the civilian economy to absorb the necessary resources. With the exception of R&D, trade, and other administrative organs, the SEC comprises of heavy industrial factories. Other commodities required in the military, (such as clothing, food, light tools, etc) are bound to be secured through the light industry and agricultural sector. Hence we could argue that a significant portion of the civilian industries are indirectly affiliated to the military industry complex. To this, some analysts argue that the

DPRK’s Second Economy accounts for 60% of the state’s total economy.58

57 Il-sung Kim, "joson rodongdang je5cha dae hoe eseo han jungang uiwonhoe saeop chonghwabogo [Concluding Speech at the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea] (12 November 1970)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 25 [Kim Il Sung Works 25] (January-December 1970) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1983). p.219. 58 See: Sung, bukhan gyeongjewigi 10nyeongwa gunbijeunggang neungnyeok [North Korea's 10 years of economic crisis and capability for strengthing armament].

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Despite the clear zero-sum nature of the economy, the DPRK claims that the development of the heavy industry not only guarantees development of the military industry, but also stimulates growth in the light industry and agriculture sectors. 59 Indeed, we could argue that the development of the military economy also stimulates the civilian economy. However, collateral benefits are only achieved when the military industry meets the demands of the civilian economy. In the DPRK’s case, the problem is not so much about the heavy investments in the military industry, but about the nature of the output produced.

Broadly, there are two preconditions for the civilian economy to benefit from the military industry. First, output from military-focused development must also serve the civilian economy

– the production of “dual-use” technologies either from “leftovers” and “spin-offs”. While both

“leftovers” and “spin-offs” can benefit the civilian economy to some extent, in most cases, defence spending still outweighs the civilian benefits.60 In the DPRK’s case, that cost-benefit margin would be much higher than other states, especially given the large portion of the civilian economy exploited for military ends.

The DPRK makes various claims to the dual-use aspects of its technological innovations.

Regarding “spin-offs”, we can assume that bureaus such as the 2nd Machinery Engineering

Bureau or the 6th Machinery Engineering Bureau produces vehicles and heavy-duty machinery that can be used for civilian purposes. As for “leftovers”, the best example is the 8.3 inmin sobipum undong (August Third People’s Consumer Goods Production Movement). The movement was launched in 1984 to remedy the scarcity of civilian necessities in the DPRK by

59 Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. p.244. 60 C. R. Neu, Rand Corporation., and Pew Charitable Trusts., Defense Spending and the Civilian Economy, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990). pp.3,20-26.

244 producing recycled by-products from factories, enterprises and the military. Despite

Pyongyang’s efforts, however, the DPRK populace continues to suffer from severe shortages of basic commodities such as food, energy and welfare facilities. Hence, despite partial efforts to benefit civilians, the “leftovers” and “spin-offs” are unlikely to produce any significant results in the civilian economy.

Second, we could argue that the military-centred economy increases employment especially after the establishment of the SEC and more so since the start of the songun era. While the size of the military economy and the high demands in the defence sector would insinuate increases in manpower, there is no guarantee that this leads to overall growth of the civilian economy. In recent years, there has been a significant jump in the number of people, including families of military cadres involving themselves with the black market.61 This indicates that with the exception of a small group of elites (WPK, KPA or technocrats), the large portion of workers are underpaid. Thus we could argue that employment in the military-related industries, and production of goods from those industries has failed to fulfil the needs of the civilian sector.

Rather, we could even argue that the military-centred industrial development has ironically stimulated growth of the black market economy, which has little returns for the DPRK regime.

One cannot doubt that the military industry occupies the large chunk of the DPRK economy.

Combined with the DPRK’s propensity to mass produce goods, it is therefore not surprising that the military industry is the only sector that has shown positive growth. However, Kim Il-sung’s military-centric economic model which aimed to simultaneously develop the jarip economy and jawi military capability obviously backfired. If the relationship between the civilian economy

61 See: Lee, "Officer Families Just Like the Rest".

245 and military economy were not zero-sum in nature, the military industry would have contributed to the development of the overall DPRK economy. Moreover, logic suggests that the size of the military economy also makes the SEC and the KPA increasingly vulnerable to the state’s financial difficulties. As the economy fell into decline, so too did the quantity and quality of commodities for the military, consequently having ramifications on the KPA’s capabilities.

5.2 RESOURCE CAPACITY

While the DPRK leadership calls for the prioritized supply of resources to the modernization of the KPA, there are obviously limits. The DPRK’s resource base is far too small for the economy to run self-sufficiently, especially given the skewed distribution of resources to the civilian and military sectors. Since the end of the Cold War, aid from abroad comes in spurts, and the amount of aid also depends on the circumstances in the external environment, as well as the

DPRK’s relations with the countries it deals with.62 Even Pyongyang manages to secure sufficient amounts of aid, it is far from the amount needed to run the various industries at full capacity. As we shall see, the resource shortages in the DPRK are interlinked, and alternatives to remedy the problem are few and far between.

The most critical resource problem in the DPRK is the severe shortage of energy and fuel. In terms of electricity, the majority of the DPRK’s power is generated from its coal, hydro, and fossil fuel power plants. However, due to the sharp decrease in oil and coal production since the

62 Even China’s provisions are not always unconditionally generous. For example, to gain aid and procurements (with concessions) from China, the DPRK would need to satisfy China’s strategic interests, which are not always beneficial for the DPRK.

246 early 1990s, combined with the series of natural disasters in the mid-1990s, many of the power plants went out of operation. Inevitably, the closure of these power plants caused a sharp fall in output from the heavy and light industries.

However, shortage of energy may not be the only problem for the DPRK. That is, due to the length of time the DPRK has suffered energy shortages, other problems now persist. Generally, military industries are energy-intensive, and unless the DPRK’s munitions factories are highly energy efficient, consumption rates are apt to rise almost exponentially. Even if a significant amount of energy is secured, considering the decrepit hardware, and the possible changes in demands, it is hard to imagine whether the munitions factories can seamlessly resume their production. Hence, the DPRK’s military industry is likely to face a situation where supply no longer meets the demands of the KPA.

A similar argument also applies to issues concerning fuel. Since the fall of the USSR, the

DPRK’s access to fuel and oil dropped significantly. While modest amounts are secured from

China, it is not enough for the DPRK’s factories or the KPA.63 Considering that the vast majority of vehicles in the DPRK were those produced during the Cold War, again, there is the problem of high consumption rates and efficiency. Furthermore, even if the DPRK gains enough fuel to mobilize all the vehicles in the KPA and keep sufficient amount of reserves, one would question whether the capabilities of these platforms can be fully revived.

Another key resource just as important as energy and material is manpower, which is the

63 The DPRK occasionally receives fuel aid from Russia and sometimes the US. However, the amount has largely depended on the DPRK’s attitude towards the Six Party Talks.

247 puzzling feature of the DPRK’s militarism. The number of personnel in the KPA significantly increased from the 1970s. According to estimates by the IISS in 1971, the KPA only had

400,000 personnel.64 Yet by 1980, the total number of personnel in the KPA was approximately

782,000,65 and by 1990 that figure reached 1.1 million.66 Given that approximately 5% of the total population is in the military, the DPRK’s force ratio is extremely high. Indeed, manpower aspects do not always provide an accurate reflection of the defence burden, but given

Pyongyang’s limited energy and material base, the manpower factor has some alarming implications on both the civilian and military economy.67 Due to the DPRK’s mismanagement and the poor state of the environment, output from the agriculture, fisheries and forestry sector has never been high.68 Hence as the KPA grew in size, supply of food became an increasing issue, causing starvation and a sharp decrease in the ration distribution in the KPA.69

Finally, we also need to keep in mind that investment and consumption must take into account

64 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1971, vol. 71 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971). 65 ———, The Military Balance 1981, vol. 81 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). p.82. 66 ———, The Military Balance 1991, vol. 91 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991). p.167. 67 Payne argues that force ratio merely “measures the fraction of national population devoted to the military instead of the fraction of national wealth devoted to the military.” See: Payne, Why Nations Arm. pp.24-29. 68 The output from the agriculture remains low, even when approximately 36% of the total labor force (9.6 million) is in the agriculture sector. See: Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea through the looking glass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). For an outline of the environmental issues in North Korea, see: United Nations Environment Programme, "DPR Korea: State Of The Environment 2003," in State of the Environment Reports (Pathumthan, Thailand2003). 69 Seok-young Lee, "AWOL and Hungry Soldiers Making Trouble," Daily NK(21 September 2011), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=8197.

248 the “time” factor – one of the pivotal resources in military capability management. Outcomes of military investments are never immediate. Many years if not even decades are required to carry out plans, trials, production and distribution. In the case of the DPRK, poor conceptualization of time has caused problems in its defence planning. Generally, Pyongyang’s long-term economic plans are pegged to its combative short-term political-military goals. The contradictory approach compels Pyongyang to make rushed acquisitions and plans causing inefficiencies in the defence planning process. Ironically, Pyongyang’s inefficiencies lead to slow returns, undermining the overall effectiveness of the KPA.

5.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY

The combination of structural limitations and shrinking resource capacity inevitably caused major setbacks for the DPRK to advance in the area of technological innovation. Indeed, the economic plans up until the First Seven Year Plan were successful in industrializing the DPRK, but a large portion of that momentum owes to the factories that were already in place, or the significant amounts of aid secured from China and the Soviet Union. In other words, Pyongyang was successful merely in terms of production, using second hand facilities and technologies, as opposed to innovating new industrial technologies.

On the surface, the demands from Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il for military modernization suggest that the DPRK has been serious about advancing its juche technology. Ever since

Pyongyang constructed its ideological stronghold on the Korean Peninsula, “modernization” took place in conformity with the principle of mass mobilization for mass production. However,

249 in terms of technological innovation, R&D in the areas of science and technology have been limited due to the dire economic circumstances.

Since the 1960s, the DPRK’s efforts in advancing its technologies have been spotty at best. One area, where this phenomenon was most evident, was the railway industry.70 By the mid-1970s, an underground metro system was constructed in Pyongyang, and the majority of railroads were electric. Beginning in the 1990s, the DPRK’s railway industry experienced a “reverse evolution” by reverted diesel locomotives due to electricity shortages. While the use of diesel locomotives does not necessarily lead to a decline in the DPRK’s industrial performance, the fact that

Pyongyang had no choice but to forfeit electric rail networks reveals the severity of the electricity shortages. Similar problems can also be spotted in the production of military goods in the light industry, where Pyongyang’s “new technologies” were low in quality due to shortages in cotton. A prime example of this is the February 8 Vinalon Complex in the city of Hamhung, where fabric was produced from coal and limestone.

From the 1990s, the DPRK’s economic focus turned more towards advancement in science and technology to construct its idealist kangsong taeguk. In particular, three areas became the focus of the DPRK’s technological innovation – space technology, nuclear technology, and

Information and Communication Technology (ICT).71 Technological advancement in these three categories however, had strong military motives to strengthen the KPA’s future

70 In terms of vehicles, the DPRK has also built its own automobiles, most notably, the hwiparam. However, most, if not all of the DPRK-produced cars are assembled from imported parts with foreign technologies. 71 The DPRK’s development of missile and nuclear technology began in the 1960s, but gained significant momentum from the late 1980s. More details on the DPRK’s missile and nuclear technology will be discussed in Chapter 6.

250 capabilities.

One area which has shown significant growth in the DPRK is ICT, one of the focal areas of the

Five Year Plans for the Development of Science and Technology. Since the mid-1990s, Kim

Jong-il has stressed the importance of modernization through the development of knowledge-based technologies. In the early 1990s, the DPRK built two facilities, the Korea

Computer Centre and the Pyongyang Program Centre which became the central icons of the state’s indigenous ICT industry. Then in June 1997, jungang gwahakkisul tongshinsa (Central

Communication Technology Agency) embarked on introducing high-technology communication lines, and a nation-wide intranet system known as gwangmyeong, linking

WPK/government offices, factories, major media agencies, research institutes, and enterprises.72

By 2008, the DPRK started to distribute its own Operating System known as pulgunbyol (red star). Then from August 2010, the DPRK started to propagate the creation of Computer

Numerical Control (CNC) technology, an automated gadget that was invented in the US back in the 1950s.

The DPRK often proclaims its achievements in developing its own ICT industry, often reporting on the widespread use of computers by students and workers. However, the DPRK’s efforts in establishing its own ICT industry are guided primarily by military interests to improve

72 See: Hee-jin Lee and Jae-ho Hwang, "ICT Development in North Korea: Changes and Challenges," Information Technologies & International Development 2, no. 1 (2004).

251 command and control, and cyber-electronic warfare capabilities.73 Given that the DPRK seems to have focused more on software engineering than producing hardware for exports, further underlines Pyongyang’s intentions on exploiting ICT for military purposes. Since 2009,

Pyongyang is suspected of conducting several cyber-attacks on ROK and US government institutions and financial firms. While the DPRK has never released official statements regarding the military use of ICT, we can assume that the developments since the 1990s significantly contributed the KPA’s cyber-electronic warfare capabilities.

One may question whether the DPRK’s ICT is beneficial or useful for the KPA other than for cyber-electronic warfare. In recent years, information-based RMA has greatly impacted various militaries around the globe in the area of command and control, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (C2ISR) or command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). In this context, one of the key aspects of advanced knowledge-based systems is interoperability.

For the KPA, there are two challenges to fully implement knowledge-based systems. At the economic level, developing sophisticated C4ISR capabilities is a hurdle, considering the immense costs associated with implementing such systems. While it would not be a surprise if the DPRK designs and plans cheaper alternatives to develop its own variant of C4ISR capabilities, the extent to which it can be systemized across the whole KPA is questionable.

The DPRK’s advancement of knowledge-based technologies in the KPA are also unlikely to

73 Seon-guk Nam, bukhanui it saneop baljeonjeollyakgwa kangsong taeguk geonseol [the development strategy of the North Korean IT industry and the construction of kangsong taeguk] (Paju, ROK: Hanul Academy, 2002). pp.166-170.

252 advance beyond a certain level due to political reasons. Given Pyongyang’s empirical efforts to limit horizontal communication in the society and the KPA, the leadership would be extremely cautious to any developments that could potentially decentralize the command and control hierarchy. The DPRK’s communication sector is growing in recent years after Koryolink and

Orascom installed a 3G network, leading to the proliferation of mobile phones.74 However, communication lines in the DPRK are often subject to tight control, especially following the death of Kim Jong-il.75 Thus, considering the leadership’s concerns, technological innovation would focus on ways to bolster the regime’s security, and further development of knowledge-based systems in the KPA are only likely to take place if the centralized command and control regime is maintained.

Mastering technology is not just about the capacity to innovate new technologies. Rather, it is the capacity to produce a variety of models and sustaining these technologies that leads to the creation of next generational models. For a state with a dwindling economy, the DPRK’s juche-ist technological innovation does deserve some credit. The DPRK’s technological modernization went through several paradigm shifts. Up until the 1960s, Pyongyang’s concept of modernization was based on mass production to expand its industrial base. Yet, from the

1960s, the concept became ideological, focusing on the uniqueness of the DPRK’s innovation.

To date, most of the DPRK’s efforts in technological innovation have been “one step forward and two steps back”. The only exception has been in the area of ICT, missile and CBRN

74 See: "N. Korean Imports of Mobile Phones Jumped 6 Times From 2009-2010: RFA," Yonhap News(11 January 2012). 75 "N. Korea Cracks Down on Defections and Mobile Phones Following Kim's Death," Yonhap News(25 January 2012), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/01/25/57/0401000000AEN20120125008900315F.HTM L.

253 technology, although the real capabilities of these technologies are still unknown.

Since the economic circumstances in the DPRK began to decline, Pyongyang’s modernization ostensibly centred itself on acquiring technologies to improve the “People’s Economy”.

However, in recent years, Pyongyang has ventured towards combining both industrial and information-age technologies to strengthen the KPA. In other words, the DPRK is attempting to combine both industrial-age modernization and information-age modernization to compensate for the shortfalls in the two areas. However, Pyongyang’s “double-dipping” approach is likely to slow down, or even falter further down the track, given the state’s severe resource shortages and constrained political capacity.

6. COST-EFFETIVENESS OF THE DPRK’S MILITARY INDUSTRY

Let us now examine the overall cost-effectiveness of the DPRK’s military industry and how it affects Pyongyang’s military capability management. Given the serious problems in the

DPRK’s economic and industrial capacity, one would question whether the SEC brings any benefits to the DPRK or the KPA. As we shall see, the biggest problem in the DPRK’s military industry is not so much about the quantity of production, but poor management in developing new technologies and conceptualizing how acquisitions/productions are integrated into the

KPA’s overall capabilities.

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6.1 THE “JUCHE MILITARY INDUSTRY”

Was the DPRK successful in establishing a military industry that fulfils both its military and economic goals? The reality is that the DPRK’s economic circumstances are at odds with its juche-ist principles. The problem is further exacerbated by the DPRK’s poor economic performance, which undermined the military industry. In simple terms, the SEC was far beyond the DPRK economy’s capacity. To remedy the shortfalls, Pyongyang continued to rely on China and the USSR during the 1960s and 1970s to acquire military technologies.

During the Cold War, the DPRK enjoyed imports on generous terms from China and the USSR.

However, after the collapse of the USSR, the nature of support from Moscow changed significantly, where “further support would increasingly be decided by commercial considerations, not ideological or political sympathies.”76 The fall in military aid from Moscow was no doubt a big blow for Pyongyang, as the USSR’s defence planning doctrine served as a model for the KPA. Losing Moscow as its reliable source of military supplies, Pyongyang increasingly relied on Beijing. However, even though China maintains its close relationship with the DPRK, Beijing’s military aid to Pyongyang has never been unconditional.77 The decline in acquisition of military platforms and technologies from China and the USSR (and also Russia) obviously had major ramifications on the KPA’s capabilities.

76 International Crisis Group, "North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendship," in Asia Briefing No.71 (Seoul, ROK; Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 4 December 2007). p.5. 77 The most recent example was seen in May 2010, when Hu Jintao declined Kim Jong-il’s requests for the acquisition of Chengdu J-10 multi-role jets. Cheol-hwan Kang and Yong-hyun An, "Kim Jong-il: Chungguk e choesinye jeontugi jiwon yocheong [Kim Jong-il: requests provision of modern fighter jets from China]," Chosun Ilbo(17 June 2010), http://nk.chosun.com/news/news.html?ACT=detail&res_id=126058.

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Of course, we should not completely deny the DPRK military industry’s self-reliance (or self-sustainance). Indeed, the various bureaus and factories affiliated to the SEC produced a significant amount of platforms and infrastructure for the KPA. In particular, the SEC has been relatively self-reliant regarding the production of KPAGF such as MBTs (chonma-ho and pokpung-ho) and artillery batteries. Nevertheless, the bulk of the resources and technological know-how to produce these platforms came from Pyongyang’s communist comrades. Hence the vast majority of the KPA’s platforms today are duplicates or modified models of Chinese and

Soviet hardware.

Pyongyang remains to be heavily reliant on China and Russia when it comes to “heavy-duty” inventories such as air and naval platforms. Particularly in the KPAF, where almost all the platforms are Soviet MiG, Ilyushin, Sukhoi, Antonov aircraft (there are also a number of

Shenyang and Chengdu aircraft that are essentially Chinese variants of Soviet platforms). As for the KPAN, the SEC has yet to produce sophisticated naval platforms such as blue-water naval vessels. Instead, Pyongyang has focused on producing platforms for covert operations, such as spy vessels and submarines.

Clearly, the SEC has failed to be as self-reliant as the regime propagates it to be. While the

DPRK has indeed made efforts to make interesting modifications on existing platforms, the

SEC has not produced its own next generation platforms and technologies (at least in terms of conventional units). The DPRK’s limited capacity in structure, resources and technology, inevitably constrains Pyongyang from acquiring new technologies. Consequently, such limitations make the DPRK more reliant on its neighbours. For example, if Pyongyang is

256 interested in acquiring fighter aircraft equipped with stealth technologies, Pyongyang will need to procure the Chinese J-20s or the Russian T-50s.

Indeed, we could argue that the DPRK does not necessarily need to produce its own state-of-the-art conventional military platforms. Pyongyang focuses on the possession of platforms that meets its defence planning ends, rather than becoming a game-changing competitor in the international military market. However, the crux of the problem is not so much about the DPRK’s intentions, but its capacity. Regardless of the high volume of resources devoted to the SEC, the DPRK has failed to plan its military acquisitions and conceptualize them into their military capabilities.

6.2 ISSUES IN FORCE STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

The force structure of the KPA accurately reflects the failures of the SEC. While the DPRK increased its military outlays and rapidly developed the SEC, Pyongyang has struggled to effectively accomplish its target (i.e. the dangui gunsa roseon). With the exception of the fourth objective which aims to make the KPA a “cadre-based army”, the dangui gunsa roseon was perhaps more resource-demanding than Kim Il-sung expected. Hence, despite its efforts, the

DPRK’s military capability management has major pitfalls, bringing more problems than achievements in strengthening the KPA.

First, as a result of the exhausted and overstretched DPRK economy, the KPA’s force structure became grossly imbalanced. The imbalance in the KPA’s force structure is a result of the way

257 in which the bureaus within the SEC produces platforms in an inconsistent and uneven manner.

A significant proportion of the units in the KPA are platforms that are relatively low-capital intensive. Despite Pyongyang’s development of strategic weapons, high-capital intensive units, such as fighter aircraft or blue-water naval platforms are quantitatively small in comparison.

The disproportionate nature of the KPA’s force structure reveals the zero-sum nature of the

DPRK’s defence planning. That is, Pyongyang’s investment in producing ground-based platforms or strategic weapons left little room for acquisition of air/naval units with power projection capabilities. Overall, we can see that the DPRK chose the “more economic” alternative, in pursuit of compensating its qualitative weaknesses with quantity. Indeed, Kim

Il-sung in the 1960s personally opposed the acquisition of platforms with power projection capabilities and instead opted for “’howitzers or mortars’ and ‘low-speed, low-flying airplanes’”.78 Still, there is no denying that the DPRK stockpiled low-intensity capabilities to the point that supply has grossly overtaken demand, causing long-term implications on the

KPA.

Second, the disproportionate nature of the KPA’s force structure creates major problems in managing the investment and consumption costs.79 In particular, given that the majority of the

KPA’s conventional platforms are outdated, there is the issue of rising maintenance costs. As a rule of thumb, older the platforms, the costs for maintenance will increase over time. Moreover, the DPRK does not seem to replace its old platforms with new ones, largely because of the

“give them all we got” strategy that has been withheld since the Korean War. At most, the

78 Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.144. 79 For further reading on costs in military platforms, read: Breckner, "Costing of Systems." p.49.

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DPRK deploys newer platforms in combat ready positions and mobilizes the older platforms in supportive roles behind the front lines. Because of the way in which Pyongyang stockpiles their military platforms, the O&M costs inevitably increases, further stretching its military spending.

Costs associated with operational preparedness are generally recurring in nature, occupying a significant share of the DPRK’s military outlays. Consequently, overall modernization of the

KPA’s conventional platforms is not an economically practical solution for Pyongyang. The acquisition of modern platforms would implicate extremely high investment costs but also new

O&M costs. Overhauling the KPA with modern platforms, would implicate extremely high

“switching” costs to implement the adjustments in areas such as training, reconfiguration of tactics, and acquisition of sufficient amount of maintenance resources.

From the dilemma discussed above, we can see why Pyongyang has struggled to “fully” modernize the KPA in conformity with the dangui gunsa roseon. The DPRK’s military modernization to date has been patchy. Because of the total war nature of the DPRK’s economy,

Pyongyang has made efforts to overcome economic problems by enforcing ideological discipline. However, costs nonetheless matters a lot in the management of the KPA. The crux of the problem, therefore, is how the DPRK handles its military economy. Due to the highly-politicized nature of the SEC, purchases in the military sector will also be distorted according to ideological and political bias that warps cost-effectiveness calculations in the

DPRK’s defence planning. While Pyongyang may have asked the right questions in strengthening the KPA’s military capability, it certainly has not found the right answers.

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6.3 THE SECOND ECONOMY AS A SOURCE OF INCOME

So far, we have looked at the DPRK’s military economy as an edifice that absorbs the length and breadth of the state’s economic resources to strengthen the KPA. However, over the years, the SEC has become active in shoring up revenue from abroad. According to sources, it is estimated that the DPRK earns approximately 100 million USD per year in illicit arms deals, that include the export of conventional weapons and WMD technology.80 While this suggests that arms exports plays a vital role in funding the DPRK economy, quantifying Pyongyang’s arms exports, and determining whether it is a stable source of income is questionable. Hence, we need to carefully examine both the nature of the arms trade that takes place.

The External Trade Bureau is affiliated to the SEC that controls the key trading companies in the DPRK. As the DPRK economy started to experience decline from the 1970s, the military industry became the only stable (and growing) sector that can provide consistent level of exports. With the exception of cheap goods sold to China and the ROK, export of other goods declined sharply, not only because of decreased agricultural and industrial output, but also due to the sanctions put on the DPRK. Even regarding the Kaesong Industrial Complex, the volume of trade and investment from Seoul depends on the political climate in the inter-Korean relations. Hence the DPRK’s inability to attract a sufficient level of foreign investment, gave

Pyongyang the motive to increase its reliance on its arms sales as a means of compensating its revenue shortages.

80 United Nations, "Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) S/2010/571." p.27.

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Although the trade dimension to the DPRK’s defence industry remains vital in keeping its economy afloat, there some constricting aspects. First, Pyongyang’s arms export market is fairly limited. The acquirers of DPRK military platforms have been countries or non-state actors that are either economically or legally restricted from making acquisitions from other states. Some of the countries known to be recipients of Pyongyang’s military products include Cuba, the

Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Iraq (before 2003), Myanmar, Syria, and Zimbabwe.81

Therefore, with the financial difficulties suffered by most of the states listed above, the DPRK’s arms exports are limited in terms of trade volume.

Second, the quality of Pyongyang’s arms exports also comes under question. While buyers of

DPRK military equipment may have chosen their counterpart because it is the easy alternative, the deals would only continue if Pyongyang can export weapons of decent quality. However, given that the SEC is suffering from various economic constraints, Pyongyang’s capacity to ensure quality of its export products may eventually wane. Consequently, the degrading quality of military goods may lead to a decline in Pyongyang’s arms exports, especially in terms of state-to-state trade.

Third, the DPRK’s arms exports come under stronger surveillance as a result of its military provocations. Above all, under the current UN sanctions (UNSCR1718, UNSCR1874), the

DPRK’s arms exports are under strict surveillance.82 The UNSC has targeted a variety of entities in the DPRK, such as the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation; Korea

81 Takesada, "kitachousen no gunjiryoku wo saguru [investigating North Korea's military capability]." p.54. 82 See: United Nations, "Resolution 1718 (2006)," (UN Security Council, 14 October 2006).; ———, "Resolution 1874 (2009)," (UN Security Council, 12 June 2009).

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Ryonbong General Corporation and Tanchon Commercial Bank; Namchongang Trading

Corporation; Hong Kong Electronics; Korea Hyoksin Trading Corporation; General Bureau of

Atomic Energy (GBAE); and Korean Tangun Trading Corporation.83

As international pressure grew, the DPRK was compelled to conduct its arms trade through indirect methods by employing various brokers and cargo companies to ship their military goods. However, Pyongyang’s illicit arms trade have been probed by an increasing number of countries. For example, states such as Singapore and Thailand, as well as the United Arab

Emirates have taken tough measures in recent years. Consequently, the DPRK’s options are limited, further diminishing its revenue from arms trade.

Overall, we can see that the DPRK’s military industry has been active in gaining the state’s much needed capital. While arms exports are a crucial source of income for Pyongyang, whether it is sufficient to correct the DPRK’s defence planning, or let alone the state’s economy is dubious. Moreover, now that international efforts to contain the DPRK’s arms exports have stepped up, not only has Pyongyang’s source of revenue shrunk, but may also lose its credibility in the illicit arms market.

7. SUMMARY: IMPACT ON THE DPRK’S DEFENCE PLANNING

From the analysis thus far, we can see that the DPRK’s military economy and industry has its

83 ———, "Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) S/2010/571." p.43.

262 back against the wall. Despite its limited capacity in terms of structure, resources and technology, Pyongyang has pushed forward with its ambitions to create a massive army. As a result, the SEC and the military economy grossly out-sized the DPRK’s economic capacity, creating a zero-sum balance at two levels.

First, there obviously exists a zero-sum balance between civilian economy and military economy. When the DPRK embarked on building its self-reliant defence industry in the 1960s,

Pyongyang made the fundamental mistake of detaching the military industry from its state economy. Indeed, isolating the military industry may have allowed Pyongyang to undertake the intensive development of the military sector. However, as the military economy became the centre of the DPRK’s economic gravity, it also became increasingly vulnerable to the state’s economic circumstances.

Second, there is a severe imbalance in the DPRK’s military capability management. Due to poor planning and coordination, the SEC not only failed to modernize the KPA to fully achieve the dangui gunsa roseon, but did not seem to take into account the importance of balancing the force structure and operational preparedness of the KPA. Rather, Pyongyang focused on quantitative armament, as opposed to qualitative modernization, causing a sharp increase in

O&M costs.

In the next chapter, we shall see how the DPRK’s political direction and economic capacity have had an impact on Pyongyang’s military capability management. It will become clear, that the DPRK’s defence planning has caused severe plans-reality mismatches that have led to the dangui gunsa roseon becoming a source of numerous dilemmas.

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CHAPTER 6: THE DPRK’S DEFENCE PLANNING FRAMEWORK

1. INTRODUCTION

Essentially, military capability management involves balancing the structure of a state’s armed forces and their operational preparedness. However, the process is far from straightforward, because of the variety and complexity of stimuli affecting the state, ranging from political and economic factors to inherited, traditional elements specific to the state. The process of military capability management is fraught with dilemmas, especially those arising from tensions between political direction and economic capacity.

The DPRK’s defence planning framework developed together with the juche-based state system.

Even to this day, the fundamentals of Pyongyang’s defence planning are based largely on the original Kim Il-sung system, the dangui gunsa roseon. However, from the two previous chapters, it can be seen that the DPRK’s defence planning system functions within a rigid framework. Politically, Pyongyang’s decision making, its ends and its means are focused solely on the leadership’s survival. Yet economically, the country’s shrinking fiscal and industrial capacity over the last two decades is having a severely adverse effect on the KPA’s military capability, both in force structure and in operational preparedness. We may, therefore, question whether the DPRK can sustain its military capability management, especially under the Kim

Jong-un leadership.

This chapter will examine how the DPRK’s military capability management functions in the prevailing circumstances. As we shall see, the zero-sum relationship between the WPK’s

264 desired political objectives and the state’s economic capacity generates myriad decision-making dilemmas. Essentially, the DPRK leadership places greater emphasis on the KPA’s political functions than on its conventional military functions. Although the politicized nature of

Pyongyang’s defence planning has obstructed the KPA’s qualitative modernization, it has also led to the diversification of the military’s mobilization capabilities.

2. STRATEGIC PERCEPTION PARADIGM: INTERPRETING THE INPUT FACTORS

The defence planning of a state seeks innovation to meet the need to adjust to the changing security environment, or when current policies are failing to produce the desired results. Given the differing nature of states, the direction of a state’s defence planning is determined primarily by its strategic perception. However, in defence planning, there are often gulfs between original perceptions and actual output. This can cause severe mismatches between plans and reality. In such cases, the output or the strategy produced may not actually address the original issues that influenced the state’s policy adjustment in the first place. Plans-reality mismatches are not unique to the DPRK and are a common problem in many states.1 Nevertheless, the fundamental problem in the DPRK’s case lies in Pyongyang’s skewed, over-ambitious perceptions which have driven its defence planning in a generally counterproductive direction.

While the DPRK’s strategic perceptions are largely based on Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s ideology, their roots lie in the distant past, long before the state’s establishment in 1948. For

1 See: Franklin C. Spinney and James Clay Thompson, Defense Facts of Life: the Plans/Reality Mismatch (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

265 centuries, perhaps even millennia, the Korean peninsula has been the stage of numerous conflicts. Given this background, the political atmosphere that emerged after the liberation of the Koreas was rife with nationalism and calls for the strengthening of an independent Korea.2

Indeed, there is a certain level of consensus between the two Koreas that the “Korean people” should guard their freedom and autonomy from external influence.3

While legacies of the colonial past have impelled both Koreas to prevent a repetition of history, views diverged on the means to achieve the Koreas’ sovereignty. The most striking feature of the DPRK’s view is the way in which idealist ideology has functioned as the basis of its security perceptions. Since the state’s inception, Pyongyang has displayed combative intentions and put itself at the forefront of conflict to legitimize its sovereignty, and the level of its aggressiveness has escalated as juche and songun were systematized.

Although the systematization of ideology helped Pyongyang to clarify its strategic direction, the results have been counterproductive. The crux of the problem in the DPRK’s defence planning lies in the mismanagement of the relationship between internal political and economic issues.

The mismanagement has been largely due to the idealist, isolationist world view moulded by juche and songun. Implementing these two ideologies in the DPRK’s political system was intended to bolster Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il’s leadership, while strengthening the KPA’s military leverage. Yet, while short-term political benefits were attained, the long-term defence planning ramifications have been devastating. In short, the systematization of extremist ideologies has undermined effectiveness and efficiency in the DPRK’s military capability

2 See: Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. 3 See: Cha, "Strategic Culture and the Military Modernization of South Korea."

266 management.

What drove the DPRK leadership to manage their defence planning in such a fashion? There were several factors, but the most decisive was the paradigm of distorted perceptions.

Specifically, the combination of pressing security circumstances and ideological fundamentalism forced the WPK to pursue rigid, far-reaching strategic ends – dangui gunsa roseon. However, despite the thorough indoctrination of the populace with military-centric policies, successfully accomplishing the dangui gunsa roseon was far beyond Pyongyang’s capacity. The development of a rigid, sophisticated political system caused Pyongyang to lose focus in its decision making, causing chronic plans-reality mismatches. While both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il repeatedly called for measures that “match today’s realities and conditions”, the way in which Pyongyang viewed and assessed the changing security environment only further complicated its defence planning.

2.1 THE DPRK’S PLACE IN THE WORLD

Since the early 1990s, the combined effect of economic growth and changing security perspectives has triggered rapid military modernization programs in China, Japan and the ROK.

Moreover, arms modernization programs have extended to other parts of Asia like Singapore,

Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. As security dynamics in the East Asia region have become ever more complex since the Cold War, there has been an increase in the number of indirect variables that affect the DPRK, such as the global economic climate and regional conflicts. In the face of the changes in the regional environment, the DPRK’s position has become

267 increasingly disadvantageous.

2.1.1 FACING THE FOE

At first glance, assessing the DPRK’s threat perceptions seems relatively simple, given that recognition of the US, the ROK, and Japan as Pyongyang’s adversaries has remained consistent since the division of the peninsula. Yet how the DPRK views its adversaries has changed with fluid changes in East Asia

In terms of military threat perceptions, the DPRK is particularly concerned about the regional trend since the end of the Cold War. This concern lies behind its shift towards self-reliant military modernization. The DPRK was extremely concerned about its security during the Cold

War. However, as Beijing and Moscow are both less generous to Pyongyang with economic aid in the post-Cold War era, Pyongyang is more vulnerable to negative impacts from changing security dynamics. Hence, whereas the DPRK had a “safety net” in the past, the new security environment, with a stronger, expansive US alliance, and a more assertive China has deepened security uncertainties for Pyongyang.

The US is perceived as the DPRK’s prime adversary. The DPRK’s combative attitude towards the US is seen in almost all corners of its society. For Pyongyang, the US is viewed as a threat because it is hostile to the DPRK and responsible for the division of the Koreas, it obstructs

268 unification and it is suspected of having intentions of invading and occupying the DPRK.4

Setting aside its ideological rhetoric, Pyongyang is genuinely concerned about the US because it is the only state that consistently and effectively denies the DPRK’s military leverage. This is most evident in Pyongyang’s persistent requests for bilateral talks with Washington over a permanent peace treaty on the Korean peninsula.

Another explanation for Pyongyang’s concerns vis-à-vis the US is the limited viability of the

DPRK’s military industry. The DPRK’s pursuit of power projection capabilities is designed mainly to deter the US. However, acquiring these capabilities inevitably has a heavy impact on the DPRK economy. Well aware of the collapse of the USSR, the DPRK fears the damage that arms races do to state economies. Consequently, Pyongyang’s stated concerns about the US may also be due in part to the fact that friction and tensions could overburden the DPRK military industry and economy.

The second security concern for the DPRK is the ROK. While the Korean War and the series of attacks against the ROK certainly evidence Pyongyang’s hostility towards Seoul, the two

Koreas are engaged in a complex adversarial relationship. Historically, tensions between the two Koreas have been far from consistent. Although the two Koreas do not recognize each other as legitimate states, special sentiments exist nevertheless. The DPRK’s policies towards the

ROK have shifted on occasions. After Rhee Sung-man went into exile in 1960, the DPRK took a softer stance towards the ROK, but then reverted to a combative stance after Park Chung-hee’s ascension. The KPA carried out a series of attacks on the ROK and US forces, such as the

4 Kim, songun euro wiryeoktteolchineun gangguk [the strong nation that comes from the power of songun]. pp.148-150.

269 attempted raid on the Blue House in 1968, the Pueblo incident, and other small-scale attacks along the DMZ. By November 1970, Kim Il-sung declared for just war against anti-revolutionary powers, and this posture was maintained until a joint statement was issued by the two Koreas in July 1972. From that time, the DPRK has harboured the idea of forming a

Democratic Confederate Republic of Koryo.

As for the ROK, before the rapprochement initiated by the Kim Dae-jung administration, Seoul reacted strongly against any acts or signs of aggression by Pyongyang, but it stopped short of any major armed conflict. Although the DPRK’s hostility towards the ROK abated somewhat during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun era, inter-Korean relations deteriorated rapidly when the Lee Myung-bak administration came to power in 2008, as seen in the two military attacks in 2010.

The third security concern for the DPRK is Japan. The DPRK’s deep-seated hostility towards

Japan stems from the Japanese occupation of the peninsula between 1910 and 1945, and Kim

Il-sung’s role in the anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns from the 1920s to 1945. Not surprisingly,

North Korean literature spares little in demonizing Japan, arguing that the Japanese are

“vampires that enjoy blood, barbaric beasts that ignore any laws for the sake of feeding on prey.”5

However, relations between Japan and the DPRK were not always hostile. In fact, Tokyo and

Pyongyang were often close to normalizing ties in the early 1990s. Furthermore, there is even a

5 Cheong-nam Ri, pie jeoreun joeak ui ryeoksa [the sinful history soaked with blood] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Kemseong Cheongnyon Chulpansa, 2009). pp .142-143.

270 certain level of sympathy towards Japan from the DPRK, to the extent that Kim Il-sung contended that Japan had been swindled by the US, that the DPRK is sympathetic to the former communist party in Japan, and that the Japanese people are suppressed by militarists.6

For Japan, the “the DPRK threat” was eclipsed by that of the USSR until the early 1990s.

Tensions between Japan and the DPRK only intensified after the missile tests in 1993 and 1998, and again after the revelation in 2002 of the DPRK’s abductions of Japanese nationals. As Japan shifted its focus more directly onto the DPRK as a perceived threat during the 1990s,

Pyongyang intensified its antagonism towards Tokyo. For example, when the debate over constitutional reform resurfaced, the DPRK linked the Koizumi administration with the Tojo

Hideki administration, and argued that Japan is merely hiding behind Article 9 of its constitution and that its secret objective is to repeat history.7

From the way in which the DPRK directs its hostility towards the US, the ROK and Japan, several key themes become apparent. Viewed broadly, the DPRK’s hostile attitude vis-à-vis the

US, the ROK and Japan may seem eccentric, especially as many of its statements towards the three powers are rife with ideological rhetoric. Nevertheless, the DPRK’s actions towards the

US, the ROK and Japan reveal the core, underlying elements of its threat perceptions.8

First, the DPRK’s perceptions of threat from the US, the ROK and Japan are often directed

6 See: Myeong-il An, mi-il kwangye ui heukmak [the dark power broker of the US-Japan relations] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Sahoe Gwahak Chulpansa, 2004). p.9. 7Ri, pie jeoreun joeak ui ryeoksa [the sinful history soaked with blood]. pp.109-110. 8For a comprehensive analysis of the DPRK’s military provocations, see: Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008.

271 against the US alliance, as opposed to its individual members. Pyongyang is extremely sensitive to any signs of cooperation between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo.9 For example, the

DPRK portrays Japan’s normalization of relations with the ROK in 1965 as part of a conspiracy by the US.10 While Pyongyang understands that the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo will not become too close because of sovereignty issues,11 its public assessments of regional security threats identifies the US-led alliance as cornering it. The second, related issue is

Pyongyang’s apparent preference for maintaining a certain level of conflict. Given that the use of military leverage has been a pivotal part of the DPRK’s external policies, its liking for conflict may be what Michishita called “calculated adventurism”.12 The DPRK’s consistent use of conflict situations is not merely ideological. Rather, it has proved to be a most effective option for the DPRK to achieve its strategic ends.

Given that the DPRK’s nodong-1 and taepodong-2 launches in 1993 and 1998 came with little warning, there is good reason to believe that the launches were part of Pyongyang’s strategy to stress its adversarial relations with the US, the ROK and Japan. Underlining the US and Japan as its enemy enables the DPRK to claim that it is feared, and further legitimizes its songun policies. This may seem like gratuitous and irrational provocation, but we should bear in mind that Pyongyang’s actions are driven in large part by its pursuit of domestic political support.

9 An, mi-il kwangye ui heukmak [the dark power broker of the US-Japan relations]. 10 Sahoe Gwahagwon Beophag Yeonguso, beomjoejeogiin 'han-il joyak' gwa 'han-il hyeopjeong' ui chimryakseong gwa maegukseong [the invasive and treasonous nature of the criminal 'Japan-ROK cooperation' (Pyongyang, DPRK: Sahoegwahagwon Chulpansa, 1974). 11 See: Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism : the United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 12 Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008.

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While it is clear that the DPRK pursues a standoff with the US, the ROK and Japan, it only pursues it to a certain extent. Being at odds is one thing; fighting a war is another. The DPRK tries to “control” its conflict with its three adversaries without precipitating an all-out war. In the light of the DPRK’s actions, there is little doubt that its policies and, to some extent, its strategic culture firmly designate the US, the ROK and Japan as its enemies. At the same time, the DPRK endeavours to create divisions between the US, the ROK and Japan (and even between China and Russia) to avoid confronting a unified front. We should ask, therefore, whether the DPRK seeks to exert influence to rearrange the dynamics of the security balance, or whether it is simply trying to protect itself from the ramifications of a changing balance of power.

Centred on the concept of minjok (“ethnicity/people”) and anti-US framework, the DPRK’s rationale for its hostile stance towards the US, the ROK and Japan has remained unchanged.13

Even if the US, the ROK and Japan’s policies do not go beyond those of containment, the

DPRK continues to see strong military leverage as necessary to ensure its national security.

Moreover, there is a strong element of spiritualism in the DPRK’s mindset concerning the US, the ROK and Japan. For example, Kim Jong-il argued that the nation’s military must be strong so that it can fight a liberation war against invasion by the US alliance, and sustain revolutionary violence (resistance) against anti-revolutionary aggression, and thereby secure the state’s economic and political independence.14

13 See: Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. pp.30-32. 14 Ibid. p.210.

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The nature and extent of the DPRK’s combative stance towards the US alliance closely reflects its realist strategic outlook. However, we may question why the DPRK commits to the balance of power framework as a lone actor. While Pyongyang has relied on Beijing and Moscow, it gives them little credit for their assistance. Instead, since Kim Il-sung released his thesis, Every

Effort for the Country’s Reunification and Independence and for Socialist Construction in the

Northern Half of Korea in 1955, the DPRK has centred itself on the principle of self-reliance.15

Accordingly,, dependence on Beijing and Moscow was kept to a minimum, and Pyongyang began to forge its own way as an autonomous power.

2.1.2 BECOMING A POWER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Given the wretched state of the DPRK’s economy, its desire to become a taeguk (strong country; strong power) may seem like mere rhetoric. The systematization of juche has allowed the DPRK to live in a virtual world, to bluff its way and to arrogate a place in the world order. For decades, the DPRK saw itself as a member of the communist bloc. But when the USSR collapsed, the

DPRK sought to become a leading power amongst communist/socialist states and amongst some developing non-aligned states. Pyongyang used the demise of the Soviet bloc as an opportunity to place itself at the forefront of the struggle against imperialism and capitalism.

However, the struggles in the new world order involved not only the democracy-versus-socialism and East-versus-West divides of the Cold War, but also justice-versus-injustice, progressives-versus-reactionaries, “the righteous”-versus–“infidels”,

15 See: Kim, "modeun himeul jogugui tongildongnipgwa gonghwagukbukbanbueseoui sahoejuuigeonseoreul wihayeo [Every Effort for the Country's Reunification and Independence and for Socialist Construction in the Northern Half of Korea] (April 1955)."

274 and “pacifists”-versus-“war mongers”.16

The rationale behind the place the DPRK sought for itself in the new world order nicely matched juche-ist ideals. However, it is important to understand that the DPRK’s ambitions to entrench itself as a self-reliant power have developed since the 1950s. Soon after the Korean

War, Kim Il-sung found himself facing an unexpected problem – the Sino-Soviet split.

Consequently, for most of the Cold War, the DPRK had to take account not only of the

East-West standoff, but also of the Sino-Soviet rift.

The DPRK’s stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict is revealing. In July 1961, the DPRK signed defence agreements with both China and the USSR.17 After the Cuban Missile Crisis in October

1962, Pyongyang’s relations with Moscow cooled, and it relied more heavily on Beijing.18

However, from 1966 until the early 1970s, the DPRK took a more pro-Soviet stance and its relations with China soured somewhat in response to the Cultural Revolution. Then, from the

1970s until the demise of the USSR, the DPRK became part of the “Great Northern Triangle”.19

That is, during the period of the Sino-Soviet rift, Pyongyang opportunistically sided with whichever power offered it greater aid and concessions, with minimal ramifications.

While taking advantage of the standoff between Beijing and Moscow, Kim Il-sung developed

16 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.15. 17 Kim Il-sung first signed an agreement with Moscow on 6 July 1961, and then with Beijing on 11 July 1961. 18 The USSR’s military aid to the DPRK was briefly suspended until Kosygin’s visit to Pyongyang in February 1965 improved USSR - DPRK relations. See: Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. p.635. 19 See: Chin-o Chung, Pyongyang between Peking and Moscow: North Korea's Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1975 (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1978).

275 ways in which juche could be systematized. Given the intensity of the conflict between China and the Soviet Union, the DPRK had good reason indeed to develop its own power and independence because of sensitivities flowing from the domestic political instability from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s. Because of the instability within the WPK, compounded by the state of affairs between Beijing and Moscow, Pyongyang felt extremely vulnerable – this situation was a prime reason why the dangui gunsa roseon was hastily devised during the

1960s.

By the time relations between Beijing and Moscow returned to normality, Pyongyang was essentially living in its own world. The DPRK’s reluctance to boast about its relations with

China and the USSR may be partly due to the fact that it had become something of a embarrassment amongst communist states (especially China and the USSR) when Kim Jong-il was appointed as successor in February 1974. Instead, between the late 1960s and 1980s, the

DPRK adopted a role of “mentor” to smaller Non-Aligned Movement states, especially in

Africa.20 By this means, the DPRK established a level of understanding with countries with concerns about their own domestic stability, although the results were very little.

When the Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union and communist regimes in Eastern

Europe, the power equilibrium in East Asia changed significantly. For the DPRK, the balance of power was no longer between Washington and Moscow, but between Washington and

Pyongyang.21 The loss of aid from the former Soviet Union irked the DPRK. One North Korean writer openly blamed Moscow for the DPRK’s economic woes, arguing that the Soviet Union

20 See: Charles K. Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations," in NKIDP Working Papers (Washington, DC2009). 21 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.15.

276 and Eastern Europe had given in to the capitalists, become complicit with the US in containing the DPRK and causing sharp declines in the supply of fuel, materials and energy.22

In this new geopolitical setting, the DPRK attempted to position itself as a seminal force in the socialist world. For instance, one North Korean publication strongly criticized the USSR’s failures, and argued that the fate of socialism depends on whether the characteristics of socialism are protected.23 While the DPRK was right in recognizing that it was “playing a new game” and the new “rules” were far from simple. The complexity and fluidity of the regional security environment since the 1990s were perhaps beyond the DPRK’s capacity.

Of course, the DPRK’s adopted new role in the post-Cold War world order was intended as a means to re-boost bravado amongst its people. Since the dawn of the Kim Jong-il era,

Pyongyang has become increasingly self-justificatory, with official writings citing critics of songun. Throughout this era, Pyongyang has continued to publish laudatory comments regarding the DPRK’s new ideology under Kim Jong-il.24 For example, one North Korean book argues that countries (including capitalist states) are establishing relations with the DPRK because of its friendliness and that this vindicates the principles of jaju (self-reliance).25

Since the Cold War, China has been the DPRK’s chief ally, both politically and economically.

Yet the “rise of China” is not seen by the DPRK as wholly advantageous to Pyongyang.

22 Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era]. pp.7-8. 23 Kim, Kim Jong-il kangsong taeguk keonseol jeonryak [strategy for constructing Kim Jong-il's kangsong taeguk]. p.5. 24 Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era]. pp.82-83. 25 Seong-gil Oh, songun jeongchi: juche sahoejuui saengmyeongseon [songun politics: lifeline of juche socialism] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Pyongyang Chulpansa, 2003). pp.102-103.

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Beijing’s irritation over Pyongyang’s military provocations and China’s increasing economic influence in the DPRK made China more patronizing in the eyes of Kim Jong-il. Nevertheless, due to pressing economic circumstances, the DPRK has had little choice but to rely on China.

This was epitomized in 2010 and 2011 by Kim Jong-il’s three visits to China (May 2010,

August 2010 and May 2011) for talks with Hu Jintao. However, despite frequent talks between

China and the DPRK, Beijing has become less generous in recent years, because of its frustration over Pyongyang’s military provocations. In May 2010, Hu Jintao denied Kim

Jong-il’s requests to acquire China’s modern J-10 multi-role aircraft.26 Moreover, in early 2011,

Beijing refused to hold joint-military exercises with the DPRK.27

For Kim Jong-il, Beijing’s attitude was a great disappointment. This might well have prompted his visit in August 2011 to Russia where he met with Dmitri Medvedev. Their talks brought three results: Pyongyang’s willingness to return to the Six Party Talks; relief of the DPRK’s debt to Russia; and acceptance of Russia’s construction of natural gas pipelines to the ROK via the DPRK.28 Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia seems to have had a military purpose also. Kim

Jong-il’s entourage included KPAF Commander Ri Pyong-chol, and together, they visited

Russia’s military aircraft factory in Ulan-Ude.29 It is probable that Kim Jong-il attempted to acquire modern air platforms from Russia.

26 Kang and An, "Kim Jong-il: Chungguk e choesinye jeontugi jiwon yocheong [Kim Jong-il: requests provision of modern fighter jets from China]". 27 So-yeol Kim, "China Ducks Joint Exercises Proposal," Daily NK(8 August 2011), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=8033. 28 Yong-jae Mok, "Soviet-era Debt Set to Be Forgiven," Daily NK(15 September 2011), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=8176. 29 Yong-won Yu and Yong-su Lee, "jung e toejja matdeoni...buk, ibeonen Russia e jeontugi dallago haetna [N.Korea Desperately Seeking Cutting-Edge Weaponry]," Chosun Ilbo(29 August 2011), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/08/29/2011082900092.html.

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Regardless of its outcomes, Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia would have been a slap in the face for

Beijing, especially if requests for military platforms were made. Kim Jong-il’s diplomatic ploys vis-à-vis China and Russia are somewhat reminiscent of Kim Il-sung’s exploitation of them in the 1960s. The ploys notwithstanding, Pyongyang relies primarily on Beijing. Kim Jong-il’s moves towards Russia not only had economic aims; they were also designed to keep Moscow

“on its side” against the US alliance.

2.2 THE DPRK’S VIEWS VIS-À-VIS ITS SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The two previous sub-sections illustrate how the DPRK views its security environment in terms of its adversaries and its friends. The DPRK’s view of the world is primarily about legitimizing itself, domestically and internationally, and protecting its sovereignty. While these objectives are not unique to the DPRK, the way in which its security perceptions have manifested themselves in Pyongyang’s defence planning certainly is.

In essence, a state’s security perceptions determine its approach to managing its military.

Various forms of scenario planning approaches exist.30 Pyongyang’s hybrid planning approach seems to have both threat-based elements and top-down elements. While Pyongyang has certainly indoctrinated the KPA concerning specific targets (viz. the US, the ROK, and Japan)

30 For a comparative overview of the different types of planning approaches, see: Alan Hinge, Australian Defence Preparedness: Principles, Problems and Prospects: Introducing Repertoire of Missions (ROMINS) a Practical Path to Australian Defence Preparedness (Canberra, Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 2000). pp.86-95.

279 and exerted tight control over the armed forces, the current state of affairs reveals that the planning process itself has failed to produce the desired outcome.

Regardless of how bellicose the DPRK’s military behaviour gets, it is questionable whether

Pyongyang has the capacity to turn its words into action. While there is little doubt that exogenous factors have shaped Pyongyang’s strategic policy making, they have been less than decisive. With the balance-of-power environment which Pyongyang created for itself, it can behave in almost any way it wishes.31

At the Second Congress of WPK Representatives in October 1966, Kim Il-sung voiced his alarm at the DPRKs changing security environment. In particular, he pointed to the Vietnam

War, Japan under the Satoh Eisaku administration (probably because of the signing of the

Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in June 1965), the defeat of the communist movement in Indonesia, and the rise of revisionism in Yugoslavia. 32

Furthermore, the student protests in the ROK in April 1960 had made the DPRK increasingly sensitive about internal security.

During the 1990s and into the new millennium, the extensive military modernization programs in East Asia have definitely influenced power plays in the regional balance of power, and continue to do so. No doubt changes in the regional security environment have proved

31 Although, of course, one would question how successful the DPRK could be against much stronger powers. 32 Il-sung Kim, "hyeonjeongsewa uri dangui gwaeop [The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party] (5 October 1966)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 20 [Kim Il Sung Works 20] (20 November 1965-December 1966) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1982). p. 63.

280 somewhat disadvantageous for the DPRK, given its fiscal constraints. Also, the DPRK is apt to be further constrained by deterrence measures such as the US and Japan’s completion of the anti-missile defence system, and international efforts foreshadowed in the Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI).33

The changes in the security environment that have influenced The DPRK are those that have significantly disadvantaged it. Given its domestic economic constraints, the DPRK can only act against threats by asymmetric strategies or by joining multilateral security alliances. The DPRK has opted for the former and attempted to nullify its disadvantages by asymmetric means.

Furthermore, while The DPRK remains loyal to China, the series of provocations by the KPA indicates Pyongyang’s preference for maintaining its own autonomy and its determination to become a power, even if only a virtual one. The DPRK’s defence planning, therefore, is designed to prevent erosions of its sovereignty, both internationally and domestically.

The DPRK leadership’s anxiety over possible factionalism within the KPA and the WPK resulted in the systematization of a strictly top-down hierarchy in the military. While this gave

Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un greater control over the KPA, the defence planning process has become susceptible to distraction by domestic constraints. Such distractions are not uncommon. Moreover, a state where the government faces severe internal political problems and struggles, rational decision making does not always prevail in strategic policy-making.

In the DPRK’s case, internal problems are so severe that they blur the real objectives in defence

33 For a review of the PSI framework, see: James Cotton, "The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea: Legality and Limitations of a Coalition Strategy," Security Dialogue 36, no. 2 (2005).

281 planning. When Pyongyang started to strengthen its ideological control over the DPRK’s political-economic system, there was a fundamental shift away from technocratic bureaucracy to party-military bureaucracy. Even with the development of the autonomous “military economy”,

Pyongyang was more concerned about strengthening the KPA politically, than improving it technologically. Simply put, the DPRK’s defence planning became directed primarily to meeting the WPK’s domestic political ends.

As long as the DPRK continues with its quixotic ideology, its defence planning will be driven largely by the leadership’s concern for regime survival, rather than by principles of sound military management. Inevitably, distractions in defence planning will only create obstacles in pursuing the WPK’s dangui gunsa roseon. If political and economic instability is severe, the

DPRK leadership will concentrate more on addressing these domestic problems through politicization than on addressing their external security concerns. As illustrated in Figure 3.3. in

Chapter 3, as internal problems in the DPRK escalate, internal considerations gain increasing weight in Pyongyang’s strategic planning.

The DPRK political system is so rigid that avenues for innovation in management are virtually non-existent, because any significant change would reverse the justification for the leadership’s policies, even potentially leading to the regime’s fragmentation. Hence, the defence planning process is concentrated on legitimizing the state’s political system and sovereignty, rather than on pragmatic defence planning. The biggest problem, however, is that Pyongyang’s over-emphasis on internal concerns has gone so far that the defence planning process relies on negative circumstances.

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An interesting aspect is how the DPRK exploits its security environment to legitimize itself.

Given that there is tight control over the media, the DPRK can interpret its security environment largely as it wishes. In particular, it has continuously vaunted songun as a success. One item in the official literature admits to the nodong-1 missile tests in May 1993, arguing that it was a way to prove that the DPRK’s hard-line stance towards the US and Japan was not merely rhetoric.34 A similar argument was made about the taepodong-1 missile launch in 1998.

Pyongyang argued that Japan and the US fabricated the launch of the gwangmyeongseong-1satellite as missile test because of their fear of the DPRK’s military might.35 The same book even argues that Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in 2002 was a vindication of songun because the DPRK’s military might coerced Tokyo into dialogue with

Pyongyang.36

As with the political system, the DPRK’s defence planning process, in essence, feeds on negative circumstances. In our review of the DPRK’s threat perceptions, we saw a pattern whereby Pyongyang continuously exploited negative developments to legitimize political autonomy, particularly in the 1960s and 1990s. Pyongyang has on many occasions purposely chosen disadvantageous situations to bolster its power and strengthen its military capabilities, as it had done in the early 1960s and the 1990s.

The most obvious example of the DPRK’s attempt at redeeming the losses from the various

34 For example, the DPRK criticizes nuclear weapons as offensive weapons, and calls for global denuclearization. See: Kim, songun euro wiryeoktteolchineun gangguk [the strong nation that comes from the power of songun]. p.161. 35 Choi, minjokgwa songun jeongchi [the people and songun]. p.86. 36 Ibid. pp.85-86.

283 domestic problems are seen with juche and songun. Both these ideologies were created at a time when the DPRK regime anticipated potential instability. As discussed earlier, DPRK political discourse emphasizes the country’s historical sufferings – the colonization of Korea, Kim

Il-sung’s guerrilla activities, the Korean War, isolation in the international community, the death of Kim Il-sung and a series of natural disasters and famines. The DPRK describes its history as

“the Korean people’s struggle”. The WPK even describes the KPA’s origins thus: “[Despite] the hard conditions where there was no support of a regular army, Korea was liberated as the

Korean People’s Revolutionary Army defeated the one-million-strong Japanese imperialist forces.”37

Yet it is precisely this “struggle” that allows Pyongyang to escape blame for its economic and political mismanagement. Certainly, the series of negative events in Korea has been a burden on

Pyongyang. Nevertheless, by strengthening its enforcement of ideology in all corners of society in the name of “protecting the revolution”, the regime seeks to bolster its own security.38

As the DPRK entered the songun era in the mid-1990s, the concept of redemption played a bigger role. North Korea now sees the 1990s as a catastrophic era. Its plight became so severe that by 2002, North Korea literature admitted to domestic problems such as food and electricity shortages.39 Yet the economic woes allowed the DPRK to take an “all or nothing” approach.

37 The WPK statement goes on to argue that “after becoming a regular army, the KPA defeated the invading US forces with ideological supremacy and juche strategic might.” Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, joson jungang nyeongam 1979 [Korea central yearbook 1979] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, 1979). p. 201. 38 Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. pp.1-5. 39 Yun, gonan ui haenggun eul ragwon ui haenggun euro [from the arduous march to the paradise march]. p.110.

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For example, one North Korean book argued that the DPRK stands at the crossroads where it either lives-on or becomes slaves of the US, and the only way to “win” is to protect socialism.40

Kim Jong-il’s songun became the primary means to survive the struggle. The slogan was linked to historical experience. As one North Korean scholar argued, “In the five thousand years of

Korean history, Korea has never had such a high international status. This high status enjoyed by the Korean people is due to our songun.”41 The emphasis on historical struggle is important because it enables Pyongyang to escape responsibility for domestic woes and legitimize its ideology on the ground that it enabled the state to survive.

As in the creation of juche, songun came as a result of Pyongyang’s sense of insecurity. In other words, both songun and juche are designed to foster the DPRK’s central objective – regime security. In 2003, Kim Jong-il proclaimed:

The Party’s leadership is the lifeblood of the People’s Army. Our People’s Army should be

strengthened as the first defender of the Party, as the revolutionary armed unit that fights to

the death in support of the Party’s idea and leadership, so that it can inherit and add lustre to

its glorious history and tradition as the army of the Party and the leader. The more complex

and tense the situation, the more efforts should be made to intensify politico-ideological

education and military training within the People’s Army, so that all servicepersons trust and

follow only our Party in all circumstances and conditions, heighten their revolutionary

vigilance and maintain their preparedness. The People’s Army should be fully ready to

40 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.15. 41 Callahan, "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond." p.195.

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mercilessly annihilate imperialist aggressors whenever and wherever they attack.42

Kim Jong-il’s proclamation was reminiscent of his father’s repeated calls for “mobilization”.

But Kim Jong-il’s proclamation was vaguer, and it failed to clarify the meaning of “situation” or specify what exactly the KPA must be prepared for. Given that the DPRK had not announced any detailed economic targets since 1993, it is clear that Pyongyang attempted to manage all affairs politically.43 However, while the acceleration of ideological indoctrination benefited

Kim Jong-il’s regime politically and clarified its strategic ends, the means were somewhat contradictory. Ultimately, this took Pyongyang’s strategic policy making beyond any semblance of flexibility.

There is little doubt that Pyongyang’s purpose in maintaining a certain level of ideological conflict is to bolster the regime’s security. For years, it has relied on ideology to legitimize its militaristic policies. The regime’s strategy allows it not only to legitimize itself, but also to claim that it is not an antagonistic power. For example, the DPRK criticizes the US’s nuclear weapons offensive weapons, and calls for global denuclearization.44 Needless to say, the

DPRK’s addiction to negative circumstances brings no benefits to its defence planning, or to its economy. Indeed, we could argue that the DPRK’s “virtual war” allows the leadership to persuade the masses that economic hardship is itself a just cause and to maintain high military

42 Kim, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." p.369 43 One book acknowledges that times and circumstances have changed, “now we have a strong party and nation”, and now has to confront the adversaries. Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. pp.16-17. 44 Won-chul Kim, "bikini ui gyohun (the lessons of Bikini Atoll)," Chollima (March 2009). p.86-87.

286 expenditure, all in the name of protecting “Korean socialism”. Conversely, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, Pyongyang’s grossly inflated sense of its place in the world and its exploitation of external threats create numerous misjudgements in its decision making, further complicating the whole defence planning process.

3. DECISION-MAKING PARADIGM: MULTI-TIERED ZERO-SUM DILEMMAS

We now face the salient question: What is the DPRK’s decision-making paradigm? According to Boyd, strategic decisions are based on the options put forward in the orient phase.45

Pyongyang orients itself to the strategic environment within the framework of juche-ist ideals.

However, the DPRK’s highly centralized political system, compounded by economic realities, has had a profoundly counterproductive effect on its military capability management. While defence planning failures caused by chronic plans-reality mismatches are commonly seen in almost all states, the situation in the DPRK is extreme. Pyongyang’s failure to achieve the ideals of dangui gunsa roseon, is primarily due to dilemmas caused by tensions between political objectives and inexorable economic limitations.

3.1 “TRADITIONAL” DECISION-MAKING DILEMMAS

Perhaps the most pivotal factor in military capability management is how a state deals with its planning dilemmas. While some regimes may approach defence planning more efficiently and

45 John R. Boyd, "The Essence of Winning and Losing," (1995).

287 effectively, all states are apt to face fundamental management dilemmas. The crucial question is whether a state can avoid exacerbating the complexities that emanate from these dilemmas.

Defence planning dilemmas, however, cannot be universally categorized, nor can they be readily written into a defence planning protocol. Some analysts have attempted to outline some planning dilemmas faced by states, but the concept remains somewhat general. Such dilemmas tend to involve preparing the military “for whom, when and what”.46

A more specific, but nevertheless general, model of defence planning dilemmas is demonstrated by Hinge’s “seven preparedness dilemmas” (Guns or butter; Consume or invest; Hot or Cold;

Technology Mix; Defend or Deter; Sooner or Later; and Use it or Lose it).47 As shown in Table

6.1, Pyongyang’s answers to the seven dilemmas have, broadly speaking, beset the DPRK since the 1960s. Given the way in which Pyongyang has dealt with its society, it has clearly chosen

“guns” over “butter”. As to the “invest or consume” dilemma, the previous chapter dealt with how the DPRK’s over-investment was the catalyst for its economic demise. Yet Pyongyang’s answers to the other five “preparedness dilemmas” have been somewhat ambiguous, and it is difficult to precisely identify the DPRK’s decisions, much less analyse its decision making.

46 Drew and Snow, Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy : an Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems. pp.221-248. Also see: Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness : Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995). 47 Hinge, Australian Defence Preparedness: Principles, Problems and Prospects: Introducing Repertoire of Missions (ROMINS) a Practical Path to Australian Defence Preparedness. pp.6-7.

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Dilemma The DPRK Evidence (a) Guns or butter ‘Guns’ Autonomous presence of military economy (b) Consume or invest ‘Invest’ Concentrated investment on SEC (c) Hot or Cold ‘Hot’ Forward-deployed military (d) Technology Mix ‘Mixed’ Low-tech conventional forces, high-tech WMD (e) Defend or Deter ‘Deter’ Geographic proximity automatic deterrence (f) Sooner or Later ‘Sooner’ Ambiguous/irregular development plans (g) Use it or Lose it ‘Ambiguous’ Stockpile of obsolete platforms for multiple purposes

Table 6.1: The DPRK’s Decision Dilemmas

The enigmatic nature of the DPRK’s decisions is seen in dilemmas (c) and (e). The forward-deployment of units aligns the KPA for “hot” conflict. Yet the way in which obsolete platforms have been stockpiled raises questions about the KPA’s actual preparedness for war.

By the same token, the geographic proximity of these forward-deployed units ipso facto gives the KPA significant deterrence capabilities. However, given the asymmetric nature of the

KPA’s activities in the past, the answer is not so clear-cut. The DPRK’s ambiguous defence planning is also seen in dilemmas (d), (f) and (g), where Pyongyang’s decisions became increasingly unclear as the domestic economy started to fail. Hence, while Hinge’s identification of defence planning dilemmas is helpful to an extent, it falls short of fully explaining the DPRK’s defence planning.

It is important to note, however, that generalized defence planning dilemmas still have some value. Generalized dilemmas give clues as to the more specific dilemmas faced by a state.

Whether the state has a democratic or socialist regime, its defence planning dilemmas revolve around two issues – structural factors and situational factors. In other words, Pyongyang faces other types of dilemmas that obstruct it in answering fundamental questions in defence planning

289 that causes the major dissonances between plans and realities.

3.2 THE DPRK’S MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT DILEMMAS

Despite Pyongyang’s intensive efforts to beef up the KPA’s capabilities, the interrelating decision-making dilemmas faced by both the WPK and the MPAF are numerous and complex.

Specifically, the contradictory, overambitious nature of the dangui gunsa roseon propagated by

Kim Il-sung since the 1960s, has complicated the DPRK’s defence planning dilemmas beyond control The dangui gunsa roseon doctrine was politically motivated. It was developed more or less concurrently with juche, and its promulgation coincided with the “over-militarization” of the KPA.48 Hence, the doctrine was not only designed to strengthen the KPA’s military capability, but it reflected the tenets of the WPK’s ideology.

Yet the WPK’s defence planning doctrine was far from mere ideological cant. In the past five decades, Pyongyang has consistently propagated the dangui gunsa roseon, albeit with less than the desired results. The crux of the problem lies in the dangui gunsa roseon’s broad nature, which stretches the qualitative, quantitative and functional limits of the KPA. As the dangui gunsa roseon is deeply embedded in Pyongyang’s defence planning process, along with juche and songun, it is not surprising that it has itself become a catalyst for myriad planning dilemmas.

As illustrated in Table 6.2, the individual tenets of the dangui gunsa roseon creates dilemmas of

48 Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.142.

290 different categories that Pyongyang is compelled to face. Consequently, the dilemmas are grouped into one central dilemma concerning Pyongyang’s preferences over the KPA’s functions – political (option 1) or military (option 2).

Dilemma Options option 1 option 2 (a) Cadre-based army Structural purpose Political Military (b) Modernizing the KPA Focus of armament Quantity Quality (c) Arming the citizenry Purpose of readiness Political Economic (d) Fortifying the state Efficiency and mobility Decrease Increase

Table 6.2: The DPRK’s Decision Making Dilemmas From the dangui gunsa roseon

3.2.1 CADRE ARMY: ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

The fundamental rationale behind the “cadre-based army” is to raise the capability and readiness of all personnel in the KPA, enabling them to take on tasks above their current rank. The concept of a “cadre-based” army first appeared in June 1954, three months before China withdrew its troops from the DPRK in September.49 As this was during the period of post-war reconstruction in the DPRK, a “cadre-based army” was seen as the most economic way to strengthen the KPA qualitatively.

The rationale for the “cadre-based army” is based on its personnel’s competiveness in combat and “political thought” (viz. ideological discipline). According to Lee, the “cadre-based army”

49 See: Kim, "inmingun eul jiljok ganghwa kanbugundae ro mandeulja [let us strengthen the quality of the People's Army and create a cadre army] (27 May 1954)."

291 guideline stipulates the “all-in” readiness of the KPA.50 A “cadre-based army” would indeed seem a feasible way to raise the DPRK’s military capability. However, as the dangui gunsa roseon is mostly political in nature, questions about their military efficacy arise.

While practical military skills are certainly important, personnel are constantly vetted on their ideological discipline. Military personnel’s political credentials have been important since the

1950s, when Kim Il-sung began to ideologically indoctrinate the KPA, dubbing it the “School of communism”.51 In the Kim Jong-il era, ideological soundness and party loyalty seem to have gained greater importance in military capability terms; Kim Jong-il claimed that the KPA was superior because of its “ideological discipline and revolutionary spirit”.52 One former KPA officer who defected to the ROK claims that all soldiers are indoctrinated in “political thought” for two hours a day from Monday to Saturday.53 Even the 38th Airborne Brigade (special operations units) in the 1990s spent more than 25% of their training time on “political science”. 54 Furthermore, ideological discipline plays a crucial part in rank promotions,

50 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. pp.46-47. 51 Il-sung Kim, "inmingundaeneun gongsanjuui hakgyoida [the People's Army is a school for communism] (25 August 1960)," in Kim Il Sung jeojakjip 14 [Kim Il Sung Works 14] (January-December 1960) (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1981). pp.428-465. 52 Kim, "inmingundaereul ganghwahamyeo gunsareul jungsihaneun sahoejeokgipungeul seulde daehayeo [on strenghtening the People's Army and establishing military centred socialist spirit]." p.6; ———, "songun hyeongmyeong roseoneun uri sidaeui widaehan hyeongmyeongnoseonimyeo uri hyeongmyeongui baekjeonbaekseungui gichiida [the songun-based revolutionary line is a great revolutionary line of our era and an ever-victorious banner of our revolution]." p.360. 53 Jung-yeon Lee, bukhangun eneun geonbbang i opda [no dry biscuits in the North Korean army] (Seoul, ROK: Flash Media, 2007). p.151. 54 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, North Korean Special Forces, 2nd ed ed., Naval Institute special warfare series (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998). p.235.

292 especially at officer level. Clearly, qualitative strengthening of the KPA inextricably involves ideological discipline.

However, problems arise when the balance between ideological discipline and practical combat skills is skewed. The perils of an over-emphasis on ideology in the military were seen with the demise of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in the Second World War. In the DPRK, the application of ideology is not much different, where political indoctrination of military personnel by the autocratic party is absolute. Scalapino and Lee note that the conflict of interests and conflict of duties between professional officers/NCOs and General Political

Bureau officers are so intense that the latter enjoys higher authority within the KPA.55 It is reasonable to conclude that political ideology is given such importance in the KPA that it muffles innovative input from professional officers concerned about the KPA’s combat capabilities.

In the DPRK, professionalism is assessed more on ideological correctness than on technical military aptitude. The “cadre-based army” guideline aims to bolster ideological discipline and integrity in the KPA. Pyongyang’s reasons for building a cadre-based army may have been genuine, given the intra-party struggles in the mid-1950s. Nevertheless, the prioritization of ideological discipline in the KPA not only compromises the professional and innovative skills of KPA personnel, but also affects the overall functional efficacy of the KPA.

55 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. pp.963-965.

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3.2.2 MODERNIZING THE ARMY: STRUCTURAL FOCUS OF ARMAMENT

The “modernization of the armed forces” guideline concerns the KPA’s force structure. After the Korean War, Kim Il-sung reiterated the importance of modernization in military capability, stating: “All soldiers must adapt to weapons and equipment, and become masters of modern warfare.”56 Rapid industrialization, boosted by significant technological aid from Beijing and

Moscow, served as the foundation of the DPRK’s military modernization, and the establishment of the SEC. By 1979, the DPRK claimed that the KPA was “armed with the latest military technology and armaments to match [today’s] modern warfare.”57 However, we must keep in mind that the military modernization process in the DPRK ran in parallel with Kim Il-sung’s intensive propagation of juche ideology. Consequently, the term “modernization” in North

Korea is subject to ideological interpretations.

Even in the realm of military modernization, Kim Il-sung’s own political interests were given priority over objective, rational planning. For example, Kim Il-sung asserted in his speech at the

Second Conference of the WPK in 1966 that military modernization must conform to “our circumstance of numerous mountains and long coastlines”.58 In fact, during the late 1960s, Kim

Il-sung had purged the Minister for the MPAF, Kim Chang-bong, and KPA General Political

56 Kim, "jogukhaebangjeonjaengui seungnireul gonggohihamyeo inmingundaeui jeonturyeogeul deouk ganghwahalde daehayeo [On Strengthening the People's Army and Consolidating the Victorty of the Fatherland Liberation War] (28 August 1953)." 57 Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, joson jungang nyeongam 1979 [Korea central yearbook 1979]. p.201 58 Kim, "hyeonjeongsewa uri dangui gwaeop [The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party] (5 October 1966)."

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Bureau Director, Ho Bong-hak, for acquiring supersonic aircraft and direct-firing artillery.59

During the Kim Jong-il era, the concept of military modernization was further politicized, and almost all statements on military affairs concentrated largely on ideological issues, with very little attention to technological matters.60

The DPRK’s concept of modernization is indeed unique. Due to the economic problems in the

DPRK, juche-style military modernization creates more economic challenges than political ones.

Most of the DPRK’s military procurements were from the Soviet Union and China during the

Cold War era. Moreover, the definition of modernization in North Koera is replete with ideological rhetoric. However, the DPRK’s heavy use of ideology in pronouncements on military modernization was intended not only to foster the politicization of the military, but also to entrench the “uri-sik” defence management framework. This concept evolved from juche ideology. It puts the proposition that the DPRK’s economic development and technological superiority were achieved through the state’s cadres, skills and resources.61 As one North

Korean political publication puts it:

The most important thing in modernizing the KPA’s armament is to develop unique, powerful

59 Kim Il-sung’s speech to the KPA in January 1969, cited in: Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.144. Korean version of the same speech by Kim Il-sung can be found in: Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. p.48. 60 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. pp.70,74, notes that Kim Jong-il strengthens the military to match the wars of today, and that the military’s arms are at world standard: Kang, songun sidae ui choguk eul gada [going with the homeland of the songun era]. pp.81-85 61 See: Kim, "joson minjujuui inmin konghwaguk sahoejuuigeonseolgwa namjosonhyeongmyeonge daehayeo [On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (14 April 1965)." p.53.

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weapons that meet our realities and conditions with our own strength, own technology, own

resources, so that one of our weapons will defeat one hundred, or one thousand of our

adversaries’ (weapons).62

From this statement, we can see that the DPRK’s concept of military modernization does not necessarily involve developing state-of-the-art platforms and weapons, but taking measures that in some way upgrade the KPA’s military capabilities. In other words, modernization proceeds by exploiting the strengths, and taking account of the weaknesses of the DPRK’s industrial capacity and geographical conditions.

So what is the nature of the DPRK’s military modernization program? The underlying theme in the DPRK’s military modernization is innovation in the use of platforms, as opposed to innovation in technology. The DPRK’s production of military platforms conforms to its asymmetric strategies, rather than to any objective of acquiring state-of-the-art technologies

(such as aircraft carriers and long-range aircraft with precision-strike capabilities) that would require major economic and tactical adjustments. Both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il sought to gain a military edge over the US alliance by exploiting unique characteristics of the DPRK such as its geographic conditions and asymmetric strategies.63

The DPRK’s focus on maintaining a quantitative force structure is a case in point. Currently, the KPA has many outdated platforms that date back to the early Cold War years. This is a result of Pyongyang’s mismanagement of the SEC and various economic problems. Yet the

62 Jeon, songun jeongchi e daehan rihae [understanding songun politics]. p.74. 63 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. pp.49-50.

296 nature of the KPA’s force structure may be intentional for two reasons. First, the DPRK refrained from qualitatively overhauling the KPA so that quantitative needs could be met.

Second, the DPRK pursued asymmetric use of platforms which do not necessitate the latest technology, to compensate for its technological shortfalls. The huge number of old and obsolete platforms should, therefore, not be directly interpreted as a failure by the DPRK to modernize the KPA.

The DPRK’s “modern” use of old platforms is evident in various areas of the KPA. For example, the KPA possesses approximately 200 DPRK variants of the Y-5 (the Chinese variant of the

Soviet An-2).64 The Y-5’s low-flying capacity is believed to be used to transport Special

Operations Forces troops. Furthermore it is reported that the Y-5 has been refitted with stealth capabilities, and can even mount and launch KN-01 Silkworm ASHM missiles.65 In sum, the

DPRK has sought ways to adapt and exploit its old platforms to advance its asymmetric military capability.

We can agree with Minnich that the DPRK’s development of asymmetric weapons reflects

Pyongyang’s efforts to strengthen its military capability with minimal expenditure.66 The development of ballistic missiles and strategic weapons had enormous impact on the DPRK’s military budget. However, it is important to note that developing strategic weapons did not involve the displacement of obsolete conventional platforms. In other words, Pyongyang’s

64 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. p.258. 65 Kwi-geun Kim, "buk, seohae sanggon AN-2gi seo misail 2 bal balsa [North Korea - airborne AN-2 fires 2 missiles in the West Sea]," Yonhap News(9 October 2008), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2008/10/09/0200000000AKR20081009046500043.HTML. 66 Minnich, The North Korean People's Army: Origins and Current Tactics. p.71.

297 acquisition of strategic weapons was a short cut in expanding the KPA’s force structure and strengthening power projection capabilities.

The quantitative structure of the KPA clearly epitomizes the socialist “peoples’ army” doctrine, which favours “supply over demand” and “arming the masses”. The collective approach to armament was pursued by other socialist countries’ forces, such as the USSR’s Red Army and

China’s People’s Liberation Army. However, because of Pyongyang’s paranoia over potential political instability, coupled with the DPRK’s technological inferiority to the US, the ROK and

Japan, the concept of mass armament was implemented on a much greater scale. In other words, maintaining an overwhelmingly large military was a way for the DPRK not only to compensate for its qualitative weaknesses, but also in effect to politicize the military and control society by means of militarization.

The size of the KPA, together with its asymmetric tactics, gave the DPRK an edge over the US, the ROK and Japan. One North Korean source claims that the “simultaneous development of economy and defence has allowed them to acquire strong offensive and defensive capabilities.” 67 Indeed, we could argue that mass armament with cheaper platforms is economical, in the sense that it is a cheaper alternative to an overall qualitative modernization of the KPA, and allows sufficient resources for investment in strategic weapons. However, the

DPRK leadership’s handling of modernization has given rise to at least three problems.

First, Pyongyang’s asymmetric management of the KPA created a chronic imbalance between the two components of military capability – force structure (investment) and operational

67 Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. p.210.

298 readiness (consumption). Because of the sheer size of the KPA, balancing the two components is beyond Pyongyang’s economic capacity. Indeed, the DPRK has refrained from acquiring new technologies partly to avoid extremely high investment costs, so that it can devote greater resources to operational readiness. Yet, ironically, the DPRK’s asymmetric modernization is equally uneconomical, in that costs for maintenance, supplies and conversion of units (for example, the Y-5 aircraft) are apt to be high. The DPRK’s approach to mass-asymmetric armament thus creates further complexities in military capability management that lead inevitably to higher costs.

Second, except for strategic weapons, the KPA’s power projection capabilities have, empirically, been underdeveloped. From the time of the Korean War, the KPA’s air and naval capabilities have been weak in comparison to those of the US and the ROK. To this day, the DPRK remains the only state in the East Asia region without blue-water naval capabilities or significant air power. The DPRK’s failure to acquire conventional platforms with adequate power projection capacity is largely due to economic constraints. To remedy this problem and the KPA’s lack of deterrence and power projection capabilities, the DPRK has been developing its own strategic weapons since the 1960s. Developing strategic weapons has certainly increased the DPRK’s military capability. However, despite the deterrence and power projection benefits, strategic weapons come at a cost to investment in conventional units, which are essential in any armed conflict.

Third, the DPRK’s mass armament policy runs the risk of increasing inefficiencies in the KPA.

The low level of technology in the DPRK and deficiencies in supplies and maintenance come at a cost to the KPA’s overall performance. It is one thing to innovatively use old platforms for

299 asymmetric purposes, but quite another to compromise the welfare of personnel and infrastructure. As discussed in Chapter 5, there are problems relating to the condition of military facilities in the DPRK. Furthermore, the declining health and morale of personnel must be considered. KPA personnel are well accustomed to these disadvantages, but their combined effect on facilities and welfare diminishes the KPA’s capacity to carry out operations effectively and efficiently.

The DPRK has pursued its asymmetric modernization of the KPA for both political and economic reasons. Although the KPA’s asymmetric capabilities have proved to be an effective means of advancing its military capabilities, the problems are evident. Simply put, the DPRK has failed to find a balanced formula for modernizing the KPA. Ironically, quantitative, asymmetric armament of the KPA has increased recurring costs and impaired the KPA’s operational readiness and power projection capabilities. Because of political and economic constraints, the DPRK’s military modernization has passed the point where any effective

“readjustments” would be possible. At best, only partial qualitative modernization, as distinct from a complete overhaul of KPA’s force structure, is possible without compromising the

WPK’s interests and further damaging the state’s economy.

3.2.3 ARMING THE POPULACE: POLITICAL-MILITARY MOBILIZATION

The “arming the populace” guidelines which call for all citizens to take part in the reserve paramilitary forces reveal the militarist nature of the DPRK regime. In the mid-1960s, Kim

Il-sung perceived the “arming the masses” to be more economical than modernizing the KPA’s

300 platforms.68 The rationale for the guidelines originated in Kim Il-sung’s efforts to remedy the weaknesses of the local-level civilian military forces, exposed during the Korean War, and to impose greater political control over the population.69 Pyongyang implemented the “arming the populace” guidelines and the DPRK’s civilian military forces were established by the early

1970s.

The DPRK’s reserve military forces comprise several bodies: the kyododae College/University

Training Units (Pacification Corps, PC), the rodong jeokuidae (Worker/Peasant Red Guard,

WPRG), and the pulgun chongnyong geunuidae (Youth Red Guard, YRG). These three elements number approximately 7.3 million personnel (Figure 6.2).70 Other paramilitary units such as the People’s Public Security (police), Border Guards, and the Guard Command have an additional 400,000 personnel, approximately.71 Given that the population of the DPRK is estimated at 24.19 million, the KPA and reserve-paramilitary units together account for roughly a third of the national population.72

68 Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.143. 69 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. p.39-40. 70 ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2010 (Seoul, ROK: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2010). p.27. 71 Ibid. p.27. 72 Statistics Korea, "bukhan ingu wa ingu census bunseok [census analysis of the North Korean population ]," (Seoul, ROK: Statistics Korea, 2011). p.1.

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Paramilitary KPA Personnel troops 14% 5%

Pacification Corps 7%

Youth Red Guard Worker/ 11% Peasant Red Guard 63%

Figure 6.1: Personnel Composition of the DPRK’s Military Readiness73

The size of the DPRK’s reserve-paramilitary forces reflects Pyongyang’s achievements in establishing a strong militia system.74 As Scalapino and Lee claim, “No program more thoroughly unites the political and military objectives of the regime than its militia system.”75

The WPRG was formed in 1959. The YRG was formed in 1970. In both cases, the formation coincided with political developments, such as the Chinese PLA’s withdrawal from the Korean peninsula, the Sino-Soviet rift, and intense implementation of Kim Il-sung’s monolithic ideology.

The roles of both the WPRG and the YRG resemble those of the civilian defence forces of

73 Adopted from: ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2010. 74 Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva Switzerland), Small Arms Survey 2006 : Unfinished Business. p.52. 75 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. p.946.

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Imperial Japan’s kokumin giyuu-tai and Nazi Germany’s volkssturm during the Second World

War.76 First, preparedness planning focuses on homeland security, and is tailored to local needs.

Second, civilian forces are to be mobilized at desperate stages to strengthen a heavily burdened war effort. Third, there is a morale-related purpose: to mobilize the populace to prevent a failure of nationalistic spirit.

Despite the great size of the reserve paramilitary forces, we should keep in mind that in the

DPRK, the word “mujang” (armament) is extremely vague in its definition. That is, “armament” is not simply about actual combat readiness; it also connotes political preparedness. For the

DPRK, the advantages of a large reservist force are purely political. First, by maintaining a large military, Pyongyang can keep its society in check. Second, by arming a vast section of the population (a third), Pyongyang can legitimize the songun policy. For example, Kim Jong-il said that the Korean revolution calls for the people to have “a hammer in one hand, a gun in the other”77 Therefore, the “arming the populace” guideline is intended not so much to turn the citizenry into military personnel, but rather to mobilize factory workers, miners, farmers and even those in the service sector for “revolution” in a military manner.78 In short, “arming the populace” is primarily about militarizing the populace.

For military preparedness purposes, the benefits of having large reserve forces are mixed at best,

76 Although the Kokumin Giyuu-tai and the Volkssturm were voluntary units, the paramilitary/local security roles played were quite similar to that of the DPRK’s reserve units. 77 Kim, "joson rodongdang je5cha dae hoe eseo han jungang uiwonhoe saeop chonghwabogo [Concluding Speech at the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea] (12 November 1970)." 78 See: Dae-keun Yi, "dang-gun gwangye wa songun jeongchi [party-military relations and songun politics]," in bukhangunsamunjeui jaejomyeong [The Military of North Korea A New Look] (Paju, ROK: Hanul Academy, 2006). p.181.

303 especially with health standards and morale declining in the civilian population. First, even if the civilian defence forces are focused on homeland defence, their potential effectiveness in combat is questionable, given the limited training they receive. For example, although the YRG can be readily mobilized, there are doubts about its combat readiness.79 The same applies to the

WPRG, given its personnel’s diversity in age and deteriorating health and morale.

The second relates to the WPRG’s function. In wartime, the WPK calls on the skills of WPRG personnel; “various essential functions are allocated among those having the necessary skills or responsibilities, who are already serving at the level involved.”80 This suggests that the

WPRG’s personnel (virtually the entire working population), is focused on their civilian military duties. The economic consequences of this are detrimental. At a time when the DPRK needs every assistance and advantage to revive its economy, mobilizing industrial and agricultural workers only militates against productivity, especially in peacetime.

Pyongyang, therefore, faces a dilemma concerning the purpose of military preparedness: is it political or economic? If Pyongyang’s rationale for arming its citizens is to strengthen its control over its population, then arming citizens seems plausible. However, the health standards and morale levels in the civilian defence forces would depend heavily on the political and economic situation in the DPRK. The DPRK’s reserve units are counterproductive, both economically and in terms of military capability.

79 Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. p.161. 80 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea. p.948.

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3.2.4 FORTIFICATION OF THE STATE: DETERRENCE VERSUS EFFICIENCY

The fourth guideline of the dangui gunsa roseon is “fortification of the state”. At the Fifth WPK

Congress in November 1970, Kim Il-sung declared that “all defence facilities and key factories have been fortified”. 81 According to estimates, the DPRK has constructed over 10,000 underground facilities and factories.82 Among the underground facilities, there are a number of

SAM and artillery sites.83 Additionally, recent reports reveal the existence of three underground airbases with 6000-foot runways in Jangjin, Onchun and Wonsan84 While these facilities represent significant achievements in pursuing “fortification of the state”, whether they can be called a “success” is debatable.

The rationale behind “fortification of the state” was based on Kim Il-sung’s experiences and on lessons learned in the Second World War and the Korean War.85 Primarily, garrisoning military facilities was intended to protect against bombing by the US and the ROK. Kim Il-sung exploited the DPRK’s mountainous terrain by turning the country into a giant fortress. The other purpose was to enhance the KPA’s counter-strike capabilities against the US alliance.86

81 Kim, "joson rodongdang je5cha dae hoe eseo han jungang uiwonhoe saeop chonghwabogo [Concluding Speech at the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea] (12 November 1970)." 82 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. pp.42-45; Barbara Demick, "N. Korea's Ace in the Hole," Los Angeles Times 14 November 2003. 83 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A 'type' KPAF Fortified SAM Base," KPA Journal 1, no. 3 (2010). pp.10-11. 84 So-yeol Kim, "North Korea Constructs "Underground Runway"," Daily NK(20 April 2008), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=3541. 85 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. p.43. 86 Korea Military Academy, "bukhan ui gunsa jeongchaek [North Korea's military policy]." p.221.

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Without doubt, the fortification of key military facilities and factories significantly strengthens the DPRK’s defence capabilities. Moreover, from the 1980s, the DPRK has built underground missile bases that are likely to be used if a major conflict occurs.87 With the extensive tunnel network, the DPRK has constructed a system that cannot be easily penetrated or tracked by the

US alliance. Hence, as many of the underground facilities house the KPA’s missiles, artillery units, and even aircraft, the DPRK has significantly strengthened both its defence and its deterrence capabilities.

Despite the advantages of the DPRK’s nationwide fortification, a number of pitfalls can be identified. First, the economic impact is devastating. According to CIA estimates, the construction cost of underground military installations is at least three to four times those of standard above-ground facilities. They are also “much more time-consuming”.88 Given that the

DPRK began to undertake “fortification of the state” in the early 1960s, there is little doubt that the enterprise has been one of the main reasons for the country’s economic decline.

Second, there is an impact on the DPRK’s military capability. By locating key military facilities and factories underground, the mobility of units and even personnel is significantly limited. In short, “you can hide, but you can’t run”. The “burying” of units inevitably limits their capacity to reposition themselves quickly during hostilities, and makes them useful only for surprise attack and defence. Moreover, relocating them in wartime would be extremely difficult. As

87 See: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occasional Paper No. 2," (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1999). 88 National Foreign Assessment Center CIA, "Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and the South," (Washington, DC: CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, 1978). p.6, cited in: Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.115.

306 well, the KPA has to ensure that any movement in peacetime is discreet and minimal, to avoid revealing locations of facilities.

Third, as seen in Chapter 5, the DPRK’s factories face serious problems. Factory production is inconsistent and unbalanced. While the management of the SEC is centralized, factories are operated by individual bureaus and decentralized. The danger, therefore, is not to the factories, but to the supply chain. With the poor state of roads and railway networks in the DPRK, the flow of supplies and units to and from the bunkered facilities is inevitably affected.

It might be thought that tunnel links to underground facilities would remedy transport problems.

However, generally the rate of flow in tunnels are inferior to those on roads and railways above ground. Similarly, it might be thought that underground facilities are self-sufficient, given the ample stockpile of supplies and parts. That might indeed have been so in the 1960s and

1970s.However, these reserve resources are equally needed in peace time as well as in war-time, for training, operations and maintenance.89 Furthermore, even in war-time, large stockpiles of reserve resources are only effective if the KPA is still intact and most important of all, if these resources are actually usable by that time.

Fourth, there are problems of overall efficiency, arising from the second and third problems.

While underground military facilities are in keeping with the DPRK’s asymmetric warfare strategy, there are disadvantages in terms of efficiency. Bermudez points out that the underground airbases in the DPRK have longer take-off intervals due to the rapid buildup of

89 Rice supplies in these storage bunkers are now reported to be exhausted : Sung-jin Lee, "North Korea, "Rice Reserves for the Military Come First"," Daily NK(20 October 2008), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=4191.

307 exhaust gases, and that direct landings “were generally deemed as impractical”.90 Such issues cause some practical limitations for the DPRK. We can assume that other types of underground facilities face similar problems. For instance, the rate of production in underground military factories must be constrained by the combined effects of logistical and ventilation problems.

3.3 MACRO-LEVEL DEFENCE PLANNING DILEMMAS: FUNCTION OF THE KPA

How does the DPRK leadership deal with dilemmas arising out of the dangui gunsa roseon?

The DPRK’s defence planning faces one central dilemma that affects the KPA’s overall functioning. As previously illustrated in Table 6.2, two alternatives are available to the DPRK, option 1 and option 2. The WPK’s military guidelines are designed to achieve all of the objectives of option 1 and option 2. Yet given the magnitude of the DPRK’s domestic problems would place more emphasis on regime security. Since the early 1960s, the DPRK has pursued two means of achieving its grand strategic interests: militarizing the economy and politicizing the military – option 1. For the DPRK leadership, option 1 was chosen for the regime’s domestic security. Hence Pyongyang advanced the dangui gunsa roseon in ways that conforms to the leadership’s political interests.

However, the DPRK’s approach to dealing with the dangui gunsa roseon has been far from consistent, particularly in relation to the KPA’s functions. Although it took option 1, the DPRK has never adhered to it consistently. In April 1993, Kim Jong-il announced that the DPRK was

“war-ready”, implying that the dangui gunsa roseon had been accomplished. However, the

90 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "Mig-29 in KPAF Service," KPA Journal 2, no. 4 (2011). p.6.

308 significance of his statement is not so much the “completion” of the DPRK’s readiness for war, but the directional change in Pyongyang’s defence planning. As is widely known, soon after

Kim Jong-il assumed control of the KPA in the early 1990s (Supreme Commander of the KPA in December 1991, Chairman of the NDC in April 1993), the DPRK revealed its progressive development of strategic weapons. Given that the DPRK had had ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons and missiles since the 1970s, Kim Jong-il was not wholly responsible for this development. More significant, however, is the way in which Kim Jong-il enhancedthe military and political strengths of the KPA. The DPRK began to flirt with option 2 while retaining the benefits of option 1.

Somewhat reminiscent of its actions in the 1960s, Pyongyang reintroduced juche into the KPA from the 1990s as a means of strengthening its military capability in a balanced manner. In the

Kim Jong-il era, however, the approach was more radical. As the economy had steadily declined during the 1990s, and as political dissonance grew, zero-sum dilemmas became increasingly starker. The DPRK’s pursuit of a balance between option 1 and option 2 sorely tested its fiscal limits. However, it had little choice, given the changes in the internal political climate and the external security environment.

Oddly, the timing of the DPRK’s over-stretched approach to defence planning makes sense. To curb the ramifications of option 1, Pyongyang had to adopt option 2 – in part. A bleak creation of “option 3” was and is far beyond Pyongyang’s capacity.91 Pyongyang’s reasons for maintaining option 1 and partially adopting option 2 are twofold. First, by taking both options,

91 Adoption of option 3 creates too many dilemmas and further uncertainties in the military capability management process. Simply put, the political-economic risks are too high.

309 the DPRK leadership can not only maintain its hegemony over the KPA, but also reconfigure its new asymmetric military modernization program. Second, new economic policies drawn for kangsong taeguk made the economy ripe for force structure readjustments in the KPA. In the light of these two factors, we can see that Pyongyang is undertaking a parallel adoption of both option 1 and option 2 – in effect, an overlapping transition from one system to another.

However, this parallel adoption does not mean that the DPRK will abandon its continuing politicization of the KPA. Given the fragility of the regime, Pyongyang will do nothing that compromises political stability, even slightly. Hence, while there are other modes of implementing both option 1 and option 2 (such as big-bang or phased-rollout), they carry too many political risks for the regime. Ultimately, the shifts in the DPRK’s defence planning are not designed to phase out irrational elements in its management of the KPA, but rather to diversify and increase its military capabilities, while maintaining political ”soundness” and stability.

However, the parallel adoption of Options 1 and 2 inevitably causes problems. Given that option 1 serves political ends and option 2 serves military ends, the parallel adoption brings a

“twist” into the DPRK’s defence planning. Pyongyang’s rigid political structure and its deteriorating circumstances have together pushed its defence planning system beyond a critical threshold, so much so that any measure brings risks and ramifications of some kind.

The problems caused by the DPRK’s “double-dipping” approach are also evident from the way in which the KPA’s role has expanded. For example, the magazine, People’s Army Pictorial, shows soldiers participating in farm work and construction as part of their role in developing the

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DPRK’s agriculture and industry. 92 From the DPRK perspective (or at least the WPK leadership’s perspective), KPA personnel engaging in non-military activities is evidence that the military is a model member of society, “serving the people”. In reality, however, it strongly suggests that the military is being used to shore up a shrinking workforce in the agriculture and industrial sectors.

Because of this situation, the DPRK’s strategic planning is zero-sum. The KPA’s dilemma – a politically “sound” army (option 1) or a professional military (option 2) – carries serious consequences for Pyongyang either way. Unless the leadership is prepared to forego the benefits from either option 1 or option 2, its opportunities for progress will be scarce.

The biggest dilemma for the DPRK is which of the two consequences it is prepared to face first

– political or economic problems. Currently, domestic problems in the DPRK are so dire, that its political and economic problems go hand in hand. If, on the one hand, Pyongyang opts to solve its defence preparedness problem politically, this will only exacerbate its economic problems, thereby endangering the WPK’s hegemony. If, on the other hand, it chooses the economic alternative, political problems will arise.

In 1978, Kim Il-sung declared that the dangui gunsa roseon “strengthened the KPA as a revolutionary force and made the state into an impregnable fortress.”93 The WPK’s military guidelines did indeed have a powerful impact by creating a template for a modernized KPA.

92 Josun Inmingun Chulpansa, inmingun hwabo [the People's Army pictorial] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Joson Jungang Tongshinsa, 2004). p.6; Also see: Oegukmun Chulpansa, Chosen Jinmin Gun [the Korean People's Army] (Pyongyang, DPRK: Oegukmun Chulpansa, 1968). 93 Kim, "sinnyeonsa [New Year Speech] (1 January 1978)." p.1.

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However, the dangui gunsa roseon was more effective politically than militarily. Moreover, the dangui gunsa roseon ultimately glued the DPRK’s defence planning to a politics-centric approach, and has failed to provide a capacity for growth in the military industry, or for efficiency in defence planning. By promulgating the dangui gunsa roseon and establishing the

SEC, the DPRK essentially systematized juche in the armed forces, making them the most powerful political institution in the country. The approach consequently reflected Pyongyang’s little regard for sound, long-term management of the KPA’s capabilities.

4. DIRECTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND CAPACITY

The DPRK leadership’s strong emphasis on ideologically strengthening the KPA has left it virtually no way of going back. If Pyongyang were to revise its military capability management mechanisms, it would necessitate rearranging the structure it built, such as the trilateral relationship between the CMCWPK, the NDC and the MPAF. Doing so would of course involve an extremely high cost both economically and politically. However, while there has been no “switch” in the general direction of Pyongyang’s defence planning, there has been some

“drift”.

Since its inception in 1948, the DPRK’s defence planning has gone through three “drifts”. The first took place between the early 1960s and the early 1970s, when Kim Il-sung refurbished the

DPRK’s military management by propagating the dangui gunsa roseon, establishing the SEC, and intensely politicizing the KPA. The DPRK established and advanced its asymmetric military strategy, epitomized by numerous military provocations against the Japan and the ROK.

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Although Kim Il-sung did not dismantle or substantially restructure the KPA, he essentially established the DPRK’s military capability management in its present form.

The second drift took place as from 1992, when Kim Jong-il established his position as the head of the NDC. During this period, the key development was the DPRK’s development of ballistic missiles and WMD. It is important to note, however, that the development of strategic weapons did not begin in this period; R&D of these arsenals had begun in the 1970s. The “new” defence planning strategy adopted by Kim Jong-il purportedly tied up some loose ends remaining from the Kim Il-sung era, but the dangui gunsa roseon was left unchanged. In fact, it was incorporated into the constitution in 1998.

The second drift was also implicitly reflected in the DPRK Socialist Constitution. When the

Socialist Constitution was amended in 1992, the order of the dangui gunsa roseon was changed thus:

Original order Order as from 1992

Arming the citizenry Cadre-based army

Fortifying the state Military modernization

Cadre-based army Arming the citizenry

Military modernization Fortifying the state.

Lee Min-ryong argues, very plausibly, that the reshuffle reflected Pyongyang’s view that arming the populace and fortification of the state had been accomplished. 94 Hence, by

94 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. p.39.

313 prioritizing a cadre-based army and military modernization, the DPRK has essentially committed itself to a new emphasis in its defence planning.

However, given that the Third Seven Year Plan failed in the mid-1970s, the DPRK’s capacity to achieve its military modernization plans was inevitably constrained. Following the test launch of the taepodong-1 in 1998, the DPRK’s defence planning became relatively quiescent.

However, during Kim Jong-il’s first decade in power the DPRK conducted conventional military provocations along the DMZ and the NLL. Despite the lukewarm inter-Korean relations, the two Koreas engaged in two naval clashes after the inauguration of the Kim

Dae-jung administration in 1998. Both clashes took place in the Yellow Sea, one on 15 June

1999, the other on 19 June 2002. The DPRK’s military actions between 1993 and 2002 were largely a diplomatic expedient vis-à-vis the US and the ROK, and served as a means to consolidate Kim Jong-il’s regime.95

At first sight, the DPRK’s actions between 1992 and 2002 seem confusing. However, the establishment of the NDC as the most powerful administrative organ in the DPRK, together with the development of strategic weapons, necessitated radical realignments in Pyongyang’s defence planning.

The third drift has taken place as from 2009, when the DPRK began to diversify its military capabilities. In less than two years (until December 2010), the DPRK conducted a nuclear test, a long-range missile test, seven SCUD missile test launches, the covert sinking of a the ROK corvette vessel, the bombardment of the ROK island, Yeonpyeong-do and a series of apparent

95 Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008. pp.138-162.

314 cyber-attacks, and revealed its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in Nyongbyon. During this short period, the DPRK has utilized various capabilities it has developed (though not its

SOF troops, MBTs/APCs or air units). Pyongyang’s tense relations with the ROK’s Lee

Myung-bak administration are a significant factor behind the DPRK’s military behaviour.

However, the fact that the DPRK’s military provocations have extended beyond strategic weapons indicates that its military capabilities have gone beyond mere “developmental” stages.

After inspecting the “Combined Manoeuvres” drill in January 2010, Kim Jong-il attended various other training drills by the KPA. Interestingly, after the Third Conference of the WPK in

September 2010, Kim Jong-il’s entourage were mainly made up of CMCWPK members.

Previously, entourage members were normally either NDC or KPA Generals.

The three drifts in the DPRK’s military capability management since the early 1960s have been thematic in nature: establishment; realignment; reestablishment and diversification. Given the turbulent changes in the regional security environment, it is unlikely that the DPRK planned these three drifts from the outset. However, there is little doubt that Pyongyang adjusted and refined the defence planning modus operandi inherited from the Kim Il-sung era. The DPRK has not revised option 1; rather, it has partially taken option 2 to refine its military capability management.

The series of military provocations since 2009 makes it clear that the DPRK has settled its new, diversified military capability. A balance has been found between the KPA’s military and political functions – that is, between option 1 and option 2. The “double-dipping” may seem incomplete and counterproductive, but it is perhaps as much as the DPRK can do without

315 compromising domestic political harmony and stability. The combined effects of economic failures and the leadership’s failure to handle major defence planning problems effectively have constrained or reduced the capacity for growth and innovation in military capability.

Consequently, pursuing an asymmetric military capability is the only option available to

Pyongyang to strengthen the KPA.

The DPRK’s “new” direction in defence planning is really a double-edged sword. On the one hand, modernizing its asymmetric military capability is the only way Pyongyang can ensure that the KPA performs both its “political” and its military functions. However, Pyongyang cannot reverse its “double-dipping” approach to defence planning, because of its political and economic constraints.

One may argue that the DPRK polity has significant political capacity. In states like the DPRK, politicization is the only way the regime can gain and maintain power. As Tellis puts it, “greater elite cohesion results in greater self-control, which in turn results in an enhanced ability to set goals, which finally results in an increased capacity to augment national power.” 96 The reestablishment of the trilateral relationship between the CMCWPK, the NDC and the MPAF is a case in point. Given that most, if not all, of the leading figures in both the NDC and the

CMCWPK are cronies of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, the DPRK leadership can develop policies in a single, unopposed direction. However, political capacity gained through politicization can be extremely fragile, and it comes at the expense of flexibility and innovation.

Furthermore, the DPRK leadership’s political capacity and defence management is inevitably

96 Ashley J. Tellis, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND/Arroyo Center, 2000). p.110.

316 under constant strain, because of severe economic problems. Moreover, it may yet encounter challenge or instability as a consequence of Kim Jong-un’s accession, particularly if frictions emerge between the party, military and bureaucratic members.

On the economic level, despite the DPRK leadership’s ability to meet troubles with political bluster, the WPK still has to deal with the economic realities faced by the country. While

Pyongyang has certainly shown some ingenuity/innovation in addressing the economic crisis in recent years, its actions have been taken to safeguard the regime, rather than to serve the greater good. As one North Korean publication puts it, songun is the “most effective political vehicle to solve Korea’s problems, protect socialism and complete the revolution.”97 Yet the realities

Pyongyang faces are far beyond any ideological remedy, and it has not yet found the correct formula to concurrently develop the economy and military capability. As a result, the DPRK’s industrial capacity, economy and purchasing power – and, accordingly, its capacity to effectively strengthen the KPA – have all withered significantly.

Even in military management, while songun ideology ostensibly lionizes the KPA, the material treatment of its soldiers has been grossly inadequate. As food shortages worsen in the KPA, its personnel’s dissatisfaction with the regime seems inevitable.98 In these circumstances, the

DPRK must continue to utilize its political capacity for regime survival. This single-purpose

97 Yun, uisik sahoejuui 100mun 100dap [our socialism - 100 questions and 100 answers]. pp.213-214. 98 Reports claim that more than half the KPA’s personnel are malnourished. See: Young-soo Kang, "singnyangnane bumo ireun bukhangun daedaejang jeonggwon jeojuhamyeo gwonchongjasal [North Korean army battalion commander who loses his parents because of food shortages shoots himself cursing the leadership]," Chosun Ilbo(7 February 2011), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/07/2011020701830.html; Lee, "North Korea, "Rice Reserves for the Military Come First"".

317 decision making will, in turn, undermine North Korea’s ability to manage its priorities and tasks.

While the DPRK has not yet relinquished its ultimate strategic objective of unifying the Korean peninsula under WPK’s rule, that objective seems enormously difficult given current circumstances. Pyongyang has now reached a point where it has to focus primarily on regime stability and survival. Given the pressing and persistent nature of this objective, the DPRK’s leadership does not have the capacity to carry out long-term planning. Moreover, the DPRK’s shrinking economic capacity and the regime’s political rigidity permit only minimalist solutions in its defence planning problems. Despite the various structural and situational problems plaguing the DPRK’s military capability management, Pyongyang has continued to strengthen the KPA’s capabilities.

5. IMPACT ON THE KPA’S FORCE STRUCTURE

The general direction of the DPRK’s military capability management significantly affects the

KPA’s force structure. Viewed broadly, the KPA’s hi-tech/low-tech platform mix seems to be compatible with the DPRK’s political preferences. As we saw earlier, Pyongyang’s understanding of “military modernization” is focused more on quantitative, asymmetric force structure than on technological innovation.99

99 At the military parade on 15 April 2012, the KPA displayed what looked like an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), new missiles, and a large mobile launch vehicle. However, whether these platforms are operational or not, remains unknown.

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Identifying the key changes in the KPA’s force structure requires us to look at the different service branches. The aggressive juche-style military modernization program in the 1960s and

1970s resulted in considerable diversity and a gross imbalance in the KPA’s force structure.

Pyongyang’s short-sightedness in its military capability management is most apparent from the way it prioritized short-range asymmetric capabilities over power projection and precision-strike capabilities.

While the KPA’s power projection and precision-strike capabilities have deficiencies, these short-falls are compensated by the development of WMD and asymmetric capabilities.

Nevertheless, developing deterrence capabilities is essentially a band-aid treatment that does nothing to cure the KPA’s unbalanced force structure. Moreover, Pyongyang has created the problems that beset it in finding suitable strategies to best exploit their force structure.

5.1 KOREAN PEOPLE’S ARMY GROUND FORCES

Since its inception, the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces (KPAGF) have served as the centrepiece of the KPA. Currently, the KPAGF has 1,020,000 active personnel, with an additional 600,000 reserves.100 The KPAGF’s biggest advantage comes from its exploitation of the Korean peninsula’s geographic characteristics. Most KPAGF units are forward-deployed along the Korean Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Accordingly, their close proximity to

Seoul serve as a force multiplier, making the KPAGF both a deterrent and a barricade against

US and ROK forces.

100 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. pp.256-257.

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The Special Operations Forces (SOF) pose the most direct and offensive threat to the ROK and, to some extent, Japan. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in March

2004, the USFK Commander, General Laporte said of the SOF:

North Korea's asymmetric capabilities are large and dangerous...They are tough, dedicated,

well trained, and profoundly loyal to the Kim regime. During conflict, these forces would

direct long-range fire against key facilities, attack to disrupt command facilities of the

Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, and seek to destroy force

generation and reinforcement from beyond the peninsula.

Laporte summarizes the SOF’s nature and role well. However, there are two problems in assessing the threat the SOF poses. The first problem lies in the actual number of troops in the

SOF. Estimates of SOF troop numbers vary from 88,000 to 200,000.101 This disparity is another reflection of the problems involved in quantifying the DPRK forces. Nonetheless, there seems to be a consensus that the DPRK has increased personnel numbers in the SOF to an alarming extent. However, there are two caveats we should keep in mind.

Most important, the SOF may not necessarily be an integrated organization like the Russian

Spetsnaz GRU or the ROK Marine Corps (ROKMS). Instead, SOF personnel are members of various branches and bureaus in the DPRK, such as the KPAGF, the KPAF, the KPN, the Light

101 The Institute for Strategic Studies’ “The Military Balance 2012” estimates 88,000, while the ROK Ministry for National Defense estimates 200,000. See: ibid. p.257; ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2010. p.24.

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Infantry Training Guidance Bureau and the Reconnaissance Bureau.102 Lee argues that the SOF might also include operative personnel from departments affiliated to the WPK Secretariat, such as the External Liaison Department, the Society and Culture Department (also known as Bureau

No 35), the Unification Front Department and the Strategy Department (also known as the

Operations Department).103

Therefore, the reorganization of the General Reconnaissance Bureau in 2009-2010 may be only a partial explanation for the sudden boost in SOF personnel.104 But it is still possible that

Pyongyang has recruited and trained a whole new set of troops for the SOF. Moreover, given that the vast majority of SOF personnel and other special agents receive training in various specialized universities, we can assume that the growth of the SOF has been a long-term project, as distinct from a sudden or recent development. Still, there are problems. In particular, given the health problems and economic privations in both the DPRK society and the KPA, it is doubtful whether even the SOF can carry out their specialized duties.105

Second, we must consider the position and role of the SOF in the KPA. In recent years, food shortages, deteriorating discipline and declining morale are becoming problems in the KPA’s lower ranks. The minimum physical requirements for KPA enlisters is said to be 148

102 Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. p.79. 103 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. p.151-152. 104 The reeestablishment of the General Organization Bureau was previously mentioned in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 105 Yong-hun Kim, "buk, gunin, oksusu 300ggwa sogeumeuro haru beotyeo [North Korea - soldier endures a day with 300g of corn and salt]," Daily NK(11 August 2011), http://www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?cataId=nk04500&num=91815.

321 centimetres in height and 43 kilograms in weight. By contrast, requirements for the SOF are 166 centimetres and 55 kilograms.106 We should also take account of the increasing number of soldiers deployed in non-military tasks in agriculture and industry. As Hamm claims, “for economic and political reasons, the principle has been changed from armed workers to working soldiers”.107 From this, we can assume that there is a growing gap in the DPRK between soldiers who are combat-capable and those who are not. For example, it could be argued that

SOF troops represent the number of soldiers deployable for front-line combat, whereas other infantry would be assigned labouring and other ancillary roles.

Aside from SOF troops, the greatest KPAGF presence is the self-propelled, howitzer -ype artillery units strategically ranged along the Korean DMZ line. The bombardment of

Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 served as a painful reminder of the effectiveness of the DPRK’s artillery batteries. Given that these units can also fire chemical agents into the ROK, the

DPRK’s artillery poses the most immediate threat to the ROK. Furthermore, in recent years, the

DPRK’s capacity to bombard the ROK has been strengthened by the deployment of MLR units.

Currently, the DPRK has three types: the 107mm Type-63, the 100mm BM-11, and the 240mm

BM-24.108 While these units are not as powerful or technically advanced as the MLRS units possessed by the ROK, they nevertheless bolster the artillery units positioned along the DMZ.

In terms of vehicles, the KPAGF has approximately 6500 main battle tanks (MBTs), light tanks

106 Min-jung Cho, "buk, Tero-jeonryak, 16man5cheon myeong...bigonggae 3man chujeong [North Korea's 165000-strong terrorist strategy - 300000 estimated to be hidden] ", Yonhap News(27 July 2011), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2011/07/27/0200000000AKR20110727115900014.HTML. 107 Hamm, Arming the two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power. p.146. 108 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. p.257.

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(LTTKs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs).109 But a significant portion of them are extremely outdated. Most of the KPAGF’s MBTs were imported from the Soviet Union or

China. Even the two domestically produced MBT vehicles, such as the pokpung-ho are modelled on MBTs from China or the USSR. For example, the pokpung-ho combines features of the Chinese T-85 and the Soviet T-62.110

As there is a limited number of corridors into the ROK, containing and countering the KPAGF’s land vehicles would not be unduly challenging for the ROKA and the USFK. However, the infiltration of SOF troops into the ROK and the artillery batteries lined up along the DMZ remains the greatest threat. In particular, SOF units outnumber the ROK’s Special Forces troops by ten to one.111 Although qualitative aspects may reduce the capability differential between the two Koreas’ Special Forces units, the wide quantitative gaps pose a special threat.

5.2 KOREAN PEOPLE’S AIR FORCE

The Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF) has approximately 110,000 personnel, with four air divisions and 70 airbases.112 Despite its size, much of the KPAF’s inventory is outdated, and its combat capability is limited, especially in terms of power projection. As this inevitably

109 Ibid. p.257. 110 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "P'okpoong: The KPA's New Main Battle Tank," KPA Journal 1, no. 4 (2010). p.6. 111 Yong-won Yu, "teuksubudae byeongnyeok, bukhani namhanboda jeoldae use... buk i 10bae [S.Korea's Special Forces 'Vastly Outnumbered' by N.Korea's]," Chosun Ilbo(6 January 2011), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/01/06/2011010600109.html. 112 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. p.258.

323 constrains the KPA’s overall military capability, the KPAF has received strong influence from abroad in personnel training and force structure. For example, many of the KPAF’s elite personnel had been trained outside Korea such as the Manchuria Aviation Academy and the

M.V Frunze Military Academy.113

Most of the platforms’ hardware is imported from the Soviet Union or China.114 Yet the nature of the KPAF’s force structure reflects the DPRK’s economic capacity. The main line of combat-capable tactical fighter (FTR) aircraft are obsolete or obsolescent, such as the MiG-21, the Mig-23, and the Su-25K, which total about 120 units.115 Surprisingly, the DPRK still maintains over 300 fighter aircraft from the early Cold War era, such as the J-5 (a Chinese variant of the Mig-17), the J-6 (a Chinese variant of Mig-19), and the J-7 (a Chinese variant of the Mig-21).116 In terms of fighter ground attack (FGA) aircraft or bombers (BBR), the only known units are the Il-28, the Mig-21 and the Su-7 which were introduced in the 1950s.117

As units like FTRs and FGAs are extremely expensive, it is not surprising that the DPRK has struggled to upgrade the KPAF’s inventory. Currently, the Mig-29 is the most modern platform in the KPAF; it was acquired from the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. The KPAF has approximately 35 Mig-29s.118 Yet given their relatively competitive capability, the Mig-29s

113 Many of the pilots and engineers received training in the Soviet Union and China, and also Japan. For example, Jo Myong-rok was a pilot who graduated from both Manchuria Aviation School and Soviet Air Academy. Notable alumni of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy include O Kuk-ryeol. 114 Most of those imported from China are variants of Soviet models. 115 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. p.258. 116 Ibid. p.258. 117 ———, The Military Balance 2011, vol. 110 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011). p.251. 118 Ibid. p.251.

324 have been dispatched only sparingly and have avoided direct contact with the ROK, US, or

Japanese counterparts. The only encounters with USAF, ROKAF, or JASDF units have taken place when they intercepted and followed unescorted reconnaissance aircraft.119

There are approximately 56 Mig-23s in service. They have been most active in combat air patrol

(CAP) during periods of military friction with the ROK and the US.120 Even though the Mig-23 is technologically inferior to the Mig-29, we can assume that the Mig-23 is the “frontline” FTR, while the Mig-29 is the “ace up the sleeve”. However, as Mig-23s have been retired in many countries, we can assume that the DPRK is concerned about the Achilles heel in the KPAF’s capability.

Taking into account the DPRK’s practice of not retiring aging platforms to keep up its quantitative military capacity, it is likely that Pyongyang will attempt to “expand” the KPAF’s inventory to compensate for its inferiority in the air. Kim Jong-il’s hopes of acquiring modern military aircraft were revealed in his recent visits to China and Russia. However, due to the possibility of further military provocations or exacerbating the regional arms competition, both

Beijing and Moscow are reluctant to encourage the DPRK to strengthen its air power. Moreover, in view of the high costs associated with FGAs and FTRs, the DPRK’s capacity to acquire or develop air units will continue to be limited for some time.

119 For example, on 2 March 2003, two Mig-29s and two Mig-23s from the KPAF followed a USAF RC-135S Cobra in the Sea of Japan. On the same day, a JMSDF EP-3 was intercepted by Mig-29s. In both cases, the KPAF Mig-29s returned without making an attack. See: Bermudez Jr, "Mig-29 in KPAF Service." p.6-11. 120 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. p258.

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Another major problem in the KPAF is its lack of power projection capabilities and coordination. The problem does not so much involve fighters or bombers, but the lack of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) capacity and airborne early warning and control (AEW/AWAC) capabilities. Concerning AEW/AWAC capabilities, Bermudez wrote that by the mid 1990s, the DPRK had installed Mig-29 NO-19E Pulse-Doppler radar on AN-24 turboprop aircraft for

AEW/AWAC purposes.121 As for AAR, there has been no evidence to date of platforms with such capabilities. Acquisition of AAR platforms from abroad is a possibility, but given the

DPRK’s fiscal and technological capacity, this seems unlikely, at least in the short term. It is entirely possible that the DPRK will convert existing platforms into AAR or AEW/AWAC units.

But, again, we have to question the effectiveness and efficiency of such conversions, given the numerous technical problems caused by “mixing and matching”.

As with the other service branches, the biggest strength of the KPAF is its asymmetric use of platforms; this is reflected in the abundance of transport platforms. In this regard, the KPAF has many low-flying, low-speed platforms to transport SOF troops into the ROK for infiltration.

These include the Y-5 (An-2), Mi-2 helicopters and some hang gliders and hot air balloons.122

As KPAF units have not engaged in combat, we cannot be definitive about their capacity, especially units designed to transport SOF troops. Nevertheless, we can be certain that the

KPAF faces numerous force structure problems in air-to-air refueling capabilities. Moreover, in terms of operational preparedness, the KPAF has grave problems both in maintenance and fuel shortages, which severely limit the overall operations of its inventory.

121 Bermudez Jr, "Mig-29 in KPAF Service." p.2. 122 See: ———, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. pp.149-152; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. p.258.

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5.3 KOREAN PEOPLE’S NAVY

The Korean People’s Army Navy (KPN) has approximately 60,000 personnel.123 While the

KPN outnumbers the ROKN in terms of platforms, the quality of its frigates and patrol boats is questionable. At the battle of Yeonpyeong in June 1999, the KPN suffered huge losses.

The origins of the KPN lie in the Susang Boandae (Maritime Guards), established in 1946.

Three years later, the first fleet of the KPN was founded in 1949 in Wonsan, then a major

DPRK port. Compared to the KPAG or the KPAF, the KPN is quite modest in size, in inventory and in personnel. However, given the series of naval clashes along the NLL, the KPN’s capability has gained greater attention in recent years.

The KPN’s inventory largely comprises light vessels with high mobility but low firepower. Its largest naval vessels are three Rajin-class and Soho-class frigates (FFG). It also has 383 coastal patrol vessels.124 However, the real strength of the KPN’s force structure is its large tactical submarine fleet. In total, there are approximately 72 romeo, san-o, yeono and yugo class submarines, which are designed not only to target enemy vessels, but also to transport SOF troops into the ROK or Japan.125

The force structure of the KPN suggests that it sees itself as a green-water navy, with very little

123 ———, The Military Balance 2012, 111. p.257. 124 Ibid. p.257. 125 Ibid. p.257.

327 blue-water capability. That is, it concentrates on speed and mobility, to optimize its coastal warfare capabilities. Despite economic constraints on the DPRK’s maritime power projection capabilities, the coast-oriented force structure reflects the KPA’s focus on land warfare. That is, the KPN’s prime functions are to support the KPAGF and SOF’s operations and to guard the

DPRK coast.126 In particular, attention is needed on the DPRK’s amphibious capabilities.

Currently, the KPAN is reported to have 10 hantae-class landing ships (LSM) and 257 landing crafts (LCPL, LCM, LCVP) capable of transporting troops and vehicles.127 Depending on their degree of operational readiness, these landing ships/craft would significantly strengthen the

DPRK’s amphibious operations against the ROK or even Japan.

Like the other branches of the KPA, the KPN pursues asymmetric strategies. Its most potent threat is posed by the many guerilla-type vessels operated by the KPN and by WPK special intelligence services.128 These units include midget submarines, semi-submersible vessels and fishing boats altered to operate as “mother ships” in infiltrations.129 These three types of vessel have been used mainly for espionage and infiltration operations, but can also be used for guerilla attacks against larger vessels.

However, unlike the KPAGF, geographical factors serve more as a handicap than an advantage for the KPN, given that its fleets and bases are “split” between the east and west coasts of the

126 ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2010. p.25. 127 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. p.258. 128 Bermudez Jr, Shield of the Great Leader: the Armed Forces of North Korea. p.250. 129 For details on North Korea’s “mother ship” fishing boats, see: ———, "Salvage of DPRK "Mother Ship"," KPA Journal 1, no. 1 (2010).; ———, "A look inside a DPRK "Mother Ship"," KPA Journal 1, no. 4 (2010).; ———, "Infiltration Operation Noto-hanto, Japan, 19-25 March 1999," KPA Journal 1, no. 8 (2010).

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Korean peninsula. As a result, each fleet is isolated from the other, and there is virtually no way they can support each other in large-scale naval operations.

5.4 STRATEGIC WEAPONS CAPABILITY

The most salient change in the KPA’s force structure has been its acquisition of ballistic missiles and chemical biological radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Pyongyang’s rationale for acquiring strategic weapons technology is based on its ambition to develop a deterrence capacity and a strong and effective diplomatic “card”, while strengthening the regime’s credibility in the domestic sphere.130 However, in the light of historical developments, we can see that the DPRK’s decision to acquire and develop strategic weapons emanates from its military capability management dilemmas, that is, the tension between its military and political objectives.

The DPRK’s ambition to acquire nuclear technology date back to the late 1950s, when Moscow agreed to provide technical support for the establishment of a nuclear research centre.131

Although the DPRK has several uranium depositories, the construction of nuclear research facilities did not begin until around 1962. This may have been made possible by Soviet assistance under the USSR-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,

130 For debates on the DPRK’s intentions, see: Cha, "North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields, or Swords?."; James Cotton, "North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions," The Adelphi Papers 33, no. 275 (1993). 131 Balazs Szalontai and Sergey Radchenko, "North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives," in Cold War International History Project (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006).

329 signed in 1961. By 1967, the DPRK had its first nuclear research reactor in Nyongbyon. It was not until the 1980s that Pyongyang started its nuclear weapons programs. Since the mid-1980s, the DPRK has faced growing international concern over and opposition to its clandestine program to separate plutonium. In 1985, the DPRK joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT). In 1991, it signed the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula These diplomatic initiatives were effectively nullified by the DPRK’s withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1994 – the first nuclear crisis. Although tensions were alleviated by the Agreed Framework in October 1994, the

DPRK’s nuclear ambitions resurfaced in less than a decade.132

The second nuclear crisis unfolded when the DPRK admitted to its clandestine nuclear weapons program in October 2002. The series of diplomatic rows with the US resulted in the DPRK expelling IAEA inspectors in December 2002, and withdrawing from the NPT in January 2003.

On 10 February 2005, the DPRK government declared that it had built nuclear weapons for self-defence purposes. Later in 2005, six-party talks were held on two occasions, but with little result. On 9 October 2006, the DPRK conducted an underground nuclear test. The series of diplomatic dialogues that followed showed some results, with the DPRK agreeing to shut down the Nyongbyon reactor in July 2007. Nevertheless, Pyongyang’s frustration over Seoul and

Washington’s attitudes, led to a second underground nuclear test, on 25 May 2009.

The DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability remains unclear. However, following Siegfried

Hecker’s (former director Los Alamos National Laboratory) visit to the Nyongbyon facility in

132 For developments between the first and second DPRK nuclear crises, see: James Cotton, "The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 1 (2003).

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November 2010, a number of reports have suggested that the DPRK’s nuclear technology has advanced to a stage where it has significant stocks of enriched uranium and enriched plutonium.133

Looking at the two DPRK nuclear crises, we could infer that Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions were provoked by its sense of insecurity or by its frustration over the slow progress in construction of light water reactors and delivery of heavy oil from the US. While diplomatic breakdowns were an aggravating factor, it is not plausible to argue that the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear weapons was motivated by diplomatic objectives or even by its wish to develop a defensive deterrent. The timing of the DPRK’s commencement of work on nuclear technology, coupled with its development of chemical/biological weapons and missile technology, make it clear that Pyongyang’s decision to go “nuclear” was motivated by objectives stemming from its defence planning.

The DPRK’s development of chemical and biological weapons began in the mid-1950s.134

Although Pyongyang is a signatory to the 1987 Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva

Protocol, it has not yet acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The ROK Defence

White Paper estimated that the DPRK possesses approximately 2500 to 5000 tons of chemical agents, as well as the capacity to produce anthrax, smallpox and cholera agents.135 Despite these estimates, there remains a great deal of uncertainty over the chemical agents’ actual

133 Cordesman, "The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces And The Forces Of Key Neighboring States." p.115. 134 For the history of the DPRK’s chemical and biological weapons programs, see: International Crisis Group, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs," in Asia Report No. 167 (Seoul, ROK: International Crisis Group, 2005).pp.5-6, 10-11. 135 ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2010. p.28.

331 effectiveness. 136 However, as chemical and biological weapons are relatively easy to miniaturize (compared to nuclear weapons), one can assume that they are more readily deliverable (for example, by artillery or by SOF troops).

The acquisition of missiles was perhaps the biggest challenge for the DPRK. Its development of tactical missiles date back to the 1960s, when the Soviet Union provided various surface-to-air

(SAM), free-rockets-over-ground (FROG) and other tactical missile systems.137 By the 1990s, the DPRK had developed a variety of tactical and strategic missiles, ranging from SCUDs to nodong and taepodong-2 missiles. There is little doubt that the DPRK has a well established missile program, which produces at least two types of missile, the SCUD/B (Hwasong-5) and the SCUD/C (hwasong-6). Its SCUD program is believed to be the most successful. One analyst notes that the DPRK can produce approximately 100 SCUD missiles per year.138

Type Range Payload Status KN-02 SRBM 100~200 400~500 Operational SCUD-B SRBM 300~500 700~1000 Operational SCUD-C SRBM 300~500 700~1000 Operational nodong MRBM 1000~1500 700~1000 Operational musudan IRBM 2500~3000 650~1000 Developing/Tested taepodong-1 MRBM 1500~2500 750 Tested taepodong-2 ICBM 4000~8000 500~1000 Developing/Tested

136 Reports claim that chemical weapons have been domestically tested on political prisoners. See: Steve Chao, "N Korea 'tests weapons on children'," Al Jazeera(24 July 2009), http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/07/20097165415127287.html. 137 For a comprehensive overview of the DPRK’s missile development program, see: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occasional paper (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1999). 138 Lee, Kim Jong-il chejeui bukhangundae haebu [anatomy of Kim Jong-il system's North Korean army]. p.131.

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Table 6.3: The DPRK’s Tactical/Strategic Missiles139

The development of missile capability led to the establishment of the DPRK’s Strategic Rocket

Forces Command (SRFC).140 Initially part of the KPGF, the SRFC became a division in its own right in 1999, and in 2004 it attained independent branch status. Despite its short history as an independent branch, the SRFC has showed significant growth throughout the past twenty years with the development of musudan, nodong and taepodong missiles. For the DPRK, the acquisition of missiles has undoubtedly boosted the KPA’s power projection and deterrence capabilities. Yet there are also economic objectives behind the DPRK’s development of tactical and strategic missiles. The DPRK’s SCUDs are “export-quality”, and known to be shipped to a number of states, including the Republic of Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Libya,

Pakistan, Syria, Vietnam and Yemen.141

As to the actual quality of the DPRK’s IRBMs, MRBMs and ICBMs, much remains unknown.

The DPRK has conducted test launches of small-scale missiles and SCUDs since the 1990s. As for the ICBMs, the DPRK conducted four tests in 1998, 2006, 2009 and 2012. However on all four occasions, the DPRK encountered various problems. Although we can assume that

Pyongyang is continuing its efforts to perfect its long-range ballistic missile capabilities and to miniaturize its CBRN warheads, most reports conclude that the crucial issue with the DPRK’s missiles is their accuracy. While one cannot deny that the DPRK’s missiles pose a serious threat

139 Adapted from: Cordesman, "The Korean Military Balance: Comparative Korean Forces And The Forces Of Key Neighboring States." pp.150-151. 140 Previously, the SRFC is also known as the Missile Guidance Bureau (MGB) 141 National Committee on North Korea, "NCNK Issue Brief: An Overview of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program," (2011).

333 to regional security, we question their significance for purposes other than deterrence. The

DPRK’s test launch of another ICBM on 13 April 2012 indicated that Pyongyang’s strategic missiles still suffers from various technical constraints.

As noted, Pyongyang’s development of missiles and WMD date back to the late 1950s and

1960s. This was a period when the DPRK enjoyed relative stability in its economic capacity and military capability. Given that the DPRK’s conventional military capabilities were relatively strong during the 1960s, it is hard to believe that its missile and WMD programs were designed to compensate for the KPA’s force structure weaknesses per se. Rather, the DPRK’s decision to acquire strategic weapons capabilities seems to have been part of a long-term scheme to improve its deterrence capabilities and to establish some means of “insurance” for the regime.

The DPRK’s efforts to develop strategic capabilities accurately reflect the leadership’s long-standing plan to manage the KPA, especially concerning the military’s functional focus.

As already discussed, the DPRK’s defence planning focused from the mid-1950s on the politicization of the KPA. Hence, the development of missiles and WMD was part of the

DPRK’s efforts to strengthen the KPA’s military capabilities while politically indoctrinating its personnel.

Of course, worsening domestic, political and economic circumstances had a significant bearing on the DPRK’s missiles and WMD program. The program would have aggravated the deceleration of the national economy. Yet there is no convincing evidence that the DPRK would not have proceeded to develop missiles and WMD if the economy had remained stable.

Politically, it is doubtful whether the DPRK would have rested the regime’s credibility solely on the development of strategic weapons. Nevertheless, acquiring them would have been an

334 attractive option, enabling it to strengthen its deterrence capabilities against the US, the ROK and Japan. The worsening circumstances were, therefore, additional incentives for the DPRK to accelerate its strategic weapons program.

The DPRK’s efforts to acquire strategic weapons capabilities evolved into a diplomatic “card” that enables it to exploit the international community’s fear of proliferation. Yet this is a more recent phenomenon. In hindsight, the development of strategic weapons capabilities reflects the

DPRK’s decision to deal with its defence planning dilemmas, especially the conflict between political and military objectives in managing the KPA. The DPRK’s acquisition of strategic weapons was not only for deterrence purposes, but also to attain a military advantage in its pursuit of “independent and peaceful unification.”142 Strategic weapons were the only way

Pyongyang could militarily challenge the US.

The DPRK’s campaign to advance its scientific technology, which began in the 1960s, was ostensibly designed to raise its status in the international community. However, the DPRK’s technological ambitions became the main driving force behind the development of CBRN and missile capabilities. Initially, efforts were directed at strengthening the DPRK’s “self-reliant” power-projection and deterrence capabilities. However, as its economic and political credibility began to wane, the DPRK’s strategic weapons capability became increasingly valuable, both as an “insurance policy” and as a potential source of income. There is now little doubt that the

DPRK has the industrial and technological capacity to further develop its missiles and CBRN capabilities. However, whether it has the capacity to effectively integrate strategic weapons capability into its military capability management remains questionable.

142 Takesada, "chosen hantou de okiteiru koto [the things really happening on the Korean Peninsula]."p.7.

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5.5 ISSUES IN THE KPA’S FORCE STRUCTURE

From the way in which the DPRK handles the KPA’s force structure, several points can be made. In terms of strengths, most, if not all KPA units are concerned more with speed than with range. That is, they focus on mobility and speed, operating in close proximity to home territory.

To that extent, we can conclude that KPA’s force structure is designed to perform the

“traditional” tactics of asymmetric warfare.

Of the four branches of the KPA, the SRFC has grown most in force structure. The fact that there has been no significant change in the KPA’s conventional forces indicates that efforts have been directed mainly to developing missiles and operational preparedness. In other words, the DPRK’s defence planning in the last decade or so has been characterized by investment in the SRFC, and to some extent, realignment of the conventional platforms. This sits well with the current hi-tech/low-tech character of the KPA. Despite its asymmetric character, the KPA’s force structure suffers from several constraints.

First, as discussed earlier, the KPAF and KPN lack power projection capabilities. This is a pressing problem in both offensive and deterrent capabilities, but the problem cannot be solved in the short-to medium-term because of economic constraints. The consensus of most analysts is that the development of missiles was the economic alternative to strengthening the KPA’s deterrence capabilities. However, strategic weapons do not relieve a state of the need to strengthen its conventional military deterrence capabilities.

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Second, the outdated nature of many of its units is a serious handicap for the DPRK. Its obsolete force structure raises problems not only in terms of quality, but also in operational readiness terms. Maintaining old platforms entails high costs for maintenance, repairs and spare parts. To date, there is very little evidence of the KPA streamlining its force structure because of the limited industrial capacity to produce the next generation of platforms. The absence of military junkyards in the DPRK, suggests that obsolete platforms are either being recycled, or are still in use. One could, therefore, argue that the DPRK is virtually forced to use whatever it has to strengthen its military capabilities.

Certainly, technology is not everything in warfare. It is empirically established that even low-tech armies with primitive weapons and asymmetric tactics can fight competitively against hi-tech armies. In the DPRK’s case, however, the production of strategic weapons and some modern air/naval units, the KPA has an unbalanced hi-tech/low-tech mix in its force structure.

The low-tech aspects differ from those of other developing states or from insurgencies (such as

Communist armed movements like the Viet Cong), where they relied on small arms and decentralized compact guerilla units. Except for SOF units, the DPRK’s low-tech units are heavy platforms that are simply out of date. Consequently, there are limits to how far the KPA’s hardware can be used for guerilla warfare.

In short, the hi-tech/low-tech character of the KPA’s force structure is not well suited for coordinated operations. While its offensive capabilities lie largely with the SOF, its defensive capabilities are based on heavy-duty platforms that are obsolete and largely containable.

Deterrence capabilities based on strategic weapons and artillery defences along the DMZ give

337 substance and strength to the KPA’s complex force structure. In those circumstances, coordinating the SOF, strategic weapons, artillery, and airpower is far beyond the DPRK’s capacity, because of its numerous material constraints in the KPA.

The nature of the KPA’s force structure reflects the DPRK’s defence planning. The vague, far-reaching nature of the dangui gunsa roseon has caused the KPA’s force structure to develop in four conflicting directions (i.e. cadre-based army, modernizing the KPA, arming the citizenry, fortifying the state). Since the 1960s, the WPK leadership has gone to great lengths to ensure that both the MPAF and the KPA function under the Party’s control. However, there is little doubt that the way in which the WPK interfered politically in the KPA had a deleterious effect on the DPRK’s military capability management.

The KPA’s force structure, therefore, is the end result of the DPRK’s poor domestic management. If the DPRK had had the economic capacity, there is no good reason why it would not have advanced its military industries to produce hi-tech platforms like China. Instead, the

DPRK opted for strengthening the KPA’s asymmetric capabilities with hi-tech and low-tech platforms, largely because this was the only option available to it in its economic circumstances.

The KPA’s cumbersome force structure is a liability for the DPRK in terms of overall military capability. However, the DPRK has expanded its military capability and strategies in recent years. As will be seen in the next section, the way in which the DPRK has brought strategies and tactics to its force structure reveals a rather surprising aspect of its military capability.

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6. DIVERSIFIED ACTUALIZATION OF THE DPRK’S MILITARY CAPABILITY

While the KPA has struggled in its force structure management in recent years, the DPRK has expanded and diversified the use of its military capability. This has been motivated by three factors: frustration at the meagre gains from its nuclear diplomacy; increasing confidence about its asymmetric military capabilities; and, to some extent, a perceived need to give Kim Jong-un military credentials and credibility.

The KPA has not mobilized for full-scale military operations since the armistice in 1953. The

DPRK’s military provocations have in almost all cases involved no more than a few units, with no inter-branch coordination.143 The DPRK’s military behaviour, as Michishita rightly says, has

“changed in conjunction with its changing policy objectives, particularly in terms of their intensity and targeting.”144 However, although there have been no significant changes to the

KPA’s conventional force structure over the last two decades, the DPRK’s military behaviour since 2010 has expanded beyond its customary patterns.

6.1 MILITARY PROVOCATIONS SINCE 2010

Changes in the DPRK’s military strategy were epitomized by Kim Jong-il’s inspection of the

“Combined Manoeuvres”, a joint military exercise by the KPAGF, KPN and KPAF in January

143 “Inter-branch coordination” means coherent, integrated military operations between the KPAGF, KPAF, KPN, and SRFC. 144 Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008. p.188.

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2010.145 The first ever such joint exercise - and the first inspection by Kim Jong-il since he became Chairman of the NDC in 1992 - were significant for two reasons. First, the fact that a joint exercise had never taken place in the DPRK suggests that until 2010, the KPA was working on promoting the coordinated mobilization of conventional forces. The use of ground, naval and air units evidences not only inter-unit collaboration and coordination but also the

KPA’s intention to broaden and enhance its military capability.

Second, the three branches of the KPA would have prepared for the Combined Manoeuvres drill long before Kim Jong-il’s inspection. Kim Jong-il’s entourage at the Combined Manoeuvres is also noteworthy. He was accompanied by Ri Yong-mu (NDC Vice-Chairman); O Kuk-ryol

(NDC Vice-Chairman); Kim Jong-gak (NDC Member and First Deputy Director of the General

Political Bureau); Ri Yong-ho (Chief of General Staff); Choe Thae-bok (CCWPK Secretariat);

Kim Ki-nam (CCWPK Secretariat); “other leading officials of the CCWPK”; and “commanding officers of KPA units and officials, workers and technicians in the field of the defence industry and leading officials of society”.146

Given that key figures, such as Jang Song-thaek Kim Yong-chun and Kim Jong-un, seem to have been absent (unless they were included as “others”), the wide range of professional military officers and defence-related officials from both the KPA and WPK may indicate indicates that the drill was more “military” than “political” in nature. Indeed, this is true to some

145 The joint exercise was reported on 17 January 2010 by rodong sinmun. However, the actual date and location of the drill were not disclosed. North Korean media does not usually reveal technical details of military drills. 146 Unknown, "Kim Jong-il choego saryeonggwan ryukhaegong gunhapdong hullyeon eul sichal [Kim Jong Il Inspects Combined Maneuvers of KPA]," Rodong Sinmun 18 January 2010.

340 extent, and we could conclude that the drill served as an occasion for Kim Jong-il to show his approval of the KPA’s new tactics to execute coordinated military operations.147

Following the Combined Manoeuvres drill, the KPA escalated its conventional military provocations in areas near the NLL (Table 6.3). In particular, the sinking of the ROKN

Pohang-class corvette Cheonan on 26 March 2010, and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010 caused ROK casualties.

Date Type Location 2010 27 January Artillery drills Baengnyeong Island and Daecheong Island 28 January Artillery drills Yeonpyeong Island 26 March Sinking of Cheonan Baengyong Island 9 August Artillery drills Baengyong Island 9 August Artillery drills Yeonpyeong Island 23 November Bombardment Yeonpyeong Island 2011 11 August Artillery drills Yeonpyeong Island

Table 6.4: Key Military Provocations by the KPA Since 2010

147 On 14 April 2010, the North Korean media reported that Kim Jong-il inspected another large-scale military drill by the “Large Combined United 567”. The members of Kim Jong-il’s entourage were largely those in the “Combined Maneuvers” drill in January 2010, but it included Kim Yong-chun (Minister for People’s Armed Forces); Kim Il-chol (NDC Member); and Jon Pyong-ho (NDC). However, the spectators were different, with officials from the SPA, WPK and KPA, as well as figures from “social organizations, ministries and national institutions, field of science, education, culture and arts, public health and media.” See: ———, "Kim Jong-il choego saryeonggwan taeyangjeol je567daeryeonhapbudae jonghapullyeon eul sichal [Kim Jong Il Watches Combined Exercise of KPA Unit 567]," Rodong Sinmun 14 April 2010.

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The KPA’s military provocations all took place near the disputed NLL, which has been a theatre for many naval clashes in the past. Among the KPA’s military provocations, the sinking of the

Cheonan remains a mystery. On 20 May 2010, an international investigation team including members from the ROK, the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Sweden issued a report, which concluded that the sinking was caused by a KPA torpedo.148 The conclusion, published by

Seoul triggered debates not only in the ROK, but also internationally. While the evidence provided by the ROK government was a subject of debate, the way in which the attack was carried out certainly conforms with the DPRK’s military tactics, especially kisup (surprise attack).149 However, problems arise in seeking to deduce the reasons for the attack. Four possibilities can be considered: direct orders from Kim Jong-il; rules of engagement (directive to carry out an attack in specific circumstances); incidental sinking (i.e. an intended warning shot that resulted in a sinking); or the commander of the submarine acted on his or her own initiative.

Following the release of the Joint International Report on the incident, the NDC called an unprecedented press conference with foreign delegates and foreign media on 28 May 2010, at which it flatly denied responsibility for the sinking. The NDC’s denial was odd, because the sinking of the Cheonan would have been a prime opportunity to proclaim a “victory” for the

DPRK. Given that the incident occurred in disputed waters, Pyongyang could have claimed that the ROK vessel had violated DPRK waters and that the KPA response was therefore justified.

It could be suggested that the DPRK leadership wanted to control the situation and prevent a

148 See: ROK Ministry of National Defense, "Joint Investigation Report: On the Attack Against ROK Ship Cheonan," (Seoul, ROK: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2010). 149 See: Michishita, North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008.

342 military response from the ROK. However, Seoul gave no signs of such a response, even after the release of the Joint Investigation Report. The fact that the NDC domestically as well as internationally, denied responsibility for the sinking suggests that the incident could have been more complex than we might assume.

The DPRK government’s enigmatic response hints at the possibility that Kim Jong-il was not in direct control of the sinking. This may seem unlikely, given the KPA’s robustly top-down hierarchy. In the past, however, military incidents have occurred without direct authorization from top leadership. For example, the Axe Murder Incident in 1976 took place on Kim Jong-il’s orders, of which Kim Il-sung was left unaware until after the incident.150 It is possible, therefore, that the DPRK leadership took advantage of the Cheonan incident to shore up Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy in the military.151

Another possibility is a military ploy by a faction within the KPA. That is, the sinking might have been perpetrated by military hardliners, making an appeal for greater political recognition by the leadership. The removal of Kim Il-chol from the NDC in May 2010 raised speculations that he was purged for the sinking of the Cheonan. 152 However, Kim Il-chol was merely a

150 Former veteran WPK official Pak Pyong-yop quoted in ———, "Kim Jong Un, Uranium, and the Artillery Barrage: How to Think Strategically about North Korea," Korea Chair Platform(2010). p.88. 151 Kim Jong-un’s rising role in the military was also propagated when the North Korean media claimed that he was present at the nuclear/missile tests. See: So-yeol Kim, "buk maeche "Kim Jong-un haeksilheom jihwi"...songun haengbo ieoga [North Korean media - "Kim Jong-il commands nuclear test" continues songun path]," Daily NK(21 January 2012), http://www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=93895. 152 See: Sung-jin Kim, "buk, Kim Il-chol haeim..`jungdae gwao' ganeungseong [North Korea - Kim Il-chol removed...possibility of "the military voicing too much"]," Yonhap News(14 May 2010), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2010/05/14/0200000000AKR20100514057300014.HTML.

343 member of the NDC and First Vice-Director of the MPAF. Consequently, if he was involved in the incident, it would imply that the KPA’s command control structure of the KPA is seriously lax.

Motives for the sinking of the Cheonan remain a mystery to this day. Despite Pyongyang’s denial of complicity, the DPRK leadership put a positive spin on the incident. The Chosun Ilbo reported in late May 2010 that six sailors aboard the submarine were awarded “hero” grades.153

Moreover, the sinking of the Cheonan revealed that military provocations using conventional capabilities are just as effective as nuclear or missile tests, if not more so. The incident exposed the ROK’s vulnerability, which has led in turn to more serious provocations by the KPA.

Following the sinking of the Cheonan, military tensions escalated between the two Koreas. On

9 August 2010, KPA units held artillery drills, firing into confined waters near Baengyong

Island and Yeonpyeong Island. On 22 November 2010, the ROK began nine days of live-fire exercises (“Hoguk Hullyeon”) off Baengyong Island and Yeonpyeong Island, involving the

ROKA, ROKAF, ROKMC and ROKN. On the morning of 23 November, the DPRK government issued a warning about the ROK’s military exercises.154 Hours after ROK forces began their live-fire drill, KPA units in Kaemori and Mudo fired on Yeonpyong Island.

153 Jun-ho Ahn, "buk, cheonanham gonggyeokhan teuksuimmujo 6myeonge yeongung chingho [North Korea - hero awards given to 6 members of the special mission unit that attacked the cheonan]," Chosun Ilbo(26 May 2010), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/26/2010052600063.html. 154 Ho-jun Kim, "gun, bukcheuge sagyeokjungji jeontongmun balsong [military sent message to the North to stop firing]," Yonhap News(23 November 2010), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2010/11/23/0200000000AKR20101123166100043.HTML.; Kwi-geun Kim, "bukcheuk jeontongmun dwineutge hwagin nollan [late confirmation of North's message triggers condemnation]," Yonhap News(17 December 2010), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2010/12/17/0200000000AKR20101217207200043.HTML.

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The exchange of fire lasted over an hour and resulted in four ROK deaths and extensive damage to infrastructure on Yeonpyeong Island. Despite the chaos caused by the incident, the DPRK showed considerable restraint. No SOF units were mobilized, no shells containing chemical agents were fired; above all, the conflict did not spill over into other areas along the 38th Parallel.

Even the poor accuracy and the number of “dud” shells were probably intentional, as part of a tactic by the DPRK to obscure the KPA’s actual military capability.155 Taking these factors into consideration, the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island suggests that the DPRK did not intend to start a war, but rather to convey a diplomatic message to Seoul.156

On 10 August 2011, the DPRK conducted what are believed to be artillery drills near the NLL.

The drills were conducted twice, once at 1320 hours, and again at 1946 hours.157 The DPRK denied the claims, arguing that the sound of the explosions had come from a construction site in

Yongmae Island.158 One likely explanation is that the drill was a way of obstructing or deterring

155 Bermudez noted that only 47% of the shells fired by the KPA landed on Yeonpyeong Island, with 25% of them failing to detonate: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "The Yonpyong-do Attack, November 2010, Part II," KPA Journal 1, no. 12 (2010). pp.3-4. 156 From 2009, the DPRK issued several warnings against the ROK concerning military frictions along the Yellow Sea. See: ———, "The Yonpyong-do Attack, November 2010, Part I," KPA Journal 1, no. 11 (2010). p.2. 157 See: Seung-gwan; Lee and Chi-dong Lee, "mi, buk haesang pogyeoke 'jache' chukgu (jonghap) [US requests North Korea to restraint from bombarding the seas]," Yonhap News(11 August 2011), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2011/08/11/0511000000AKR20110811006151071.HTML?audio= Y. 158 Yeon-suk Kim, "buk, 'po sagyeok jujang eun balpa jakeop ohae' jeontongmun [North Korea - sends wire "explosives work misinterpreted as artillery fire"]," Yonhap News(11 August 2011), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2011/08/11/0511000000AKR20110811083351043.HTML?audio= Y.

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US-ROK joint military exercises planned for 16 August. However, on the 10 AUGUST, news broke out of alleged plans by the DPRK to assassinate the ROK’s Defence Chief, Kim

Kwang-jin. Given the DPRK’s propensity to exploit past events, the artillery drill could have been intended to exploit the anxious atmosphere within the ROK. Given that only five shells were fired into the confined waters along the NLL, the drill would have been easy to execute, even at short notice and with little planning.

As well as conventional provocations, the DPRK has also put its cyber-electronic warfare capabilities into practice. Although these capabilities seem to be less than comprehensive, it is quite extensive nevertheless. They include psychological warfare, denial of service (DoS), distributed denial of service (DDoS), hacking and jamming. The DPRK’s electronic warfare capabilities emerged from the 1970s, and by 1998, the sizeable Unit 121 affiliated to the

Reconnaissance Bureau of the General Staff Depratment was established with remote bases in

Shenyang, China.159 Since 2009, the DPRK is alleged to have conducted major DDoS attacks on the ROK and US government, media and financial institutions in July 2009, March 2011 and

April 2011. Moreover, recent reports claim that the DPRK is building GPS jamming facilities in

Haeju and Kaesong, capable of disrupting Seoul, Suwon and Incheon.160

Although little is known of the DPRK’s cyber-electronic warfare units, it is reported that they are directly affiliated to the KPA’s General Staff Department. 161 While the DPRK’s

159 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, 111. pp.258-259. 160 Kyung-un Choi, "buk gyoran geori 100km isang jeonjajeon gonggyeok jangbi gaebaljung [North Korea developing electronic warfare capabilities with a range of more than 100km]," Chosun Ilbo(6 September 2011), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/09/06/2011090600362.html. 161 See: So-yeol Kim, "Defense Systems Hacking on the Increase," Daily NK(17 June 2009), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=5058.

346 cyber-electronic warfare capabilities pose a credible threat, they are not comprehensive. For example, if the DPRK in fact had such capabilities, we could question why it did not attempt to disrupt the US-ROK joint military exercises in December 2010.

6.2 PATTERNS IN THE DPRK’S “NEW” MILITARY STRATEGY

From the series of military provocations by the KPA since 2010, it can be seen that the KPA’s conventional platforms are quite effective if used with diversified, asymmetric tactics. In retrospect, the Combined Manoeuvres exercise in January 2010 was a turning point in the

DPRK’s defence planning. Although the KPA has suffered from chronic deficiencies, both in force structure and in operational preparedness, the exercise showed that the KPA is prepared for coordinated military operations. Since the Combined Manoeuvres exercise in 2010, the

DPRK has conducted two other exercises that have involved all three branches of the KPA, on 7

September 2011, and then on 14 March 2012. The nature of these exercises not only indicates the DPRK leadership’s efforts to improve the KPA’s coordinated readiness, but also their intentions on diversifying the number of options to conduct military operations against the ROK.

The DPRK’s diversified military capability since 2010 has revealed some notable characteristics.

First, a consistent factor in the DPRK’s military behaviour is what Victor Cha calls a

“hit-and-run” strategy.162 At first sight, one could argue that the series of military provocations

162 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Testimony of Dr. Victor D. Cha, 2011. p.5.

347 was not well planned. However, we should not jump to the conclusion that the KPA has no counter-attack capabilities. Empirically, most of the DPRK’s military operations involved targets or theatres where the ROK, United States Forces Korea (USFK)/United States Forces

Japan (USFJ) and Japan cannot easily respond. We can conclude that the KPA’s military provocations were carefully designed to avoid direct, prolonged conflict.

Despite the large KPAF inventory, the DPRK’s airpower is outclassed by the much superior air forces of the ROK, the US and Japan. This inferiority in airpower is compounded by problems in the force structure and operational preparedness of KPAF units. The bombardment of

Yeonpyeong Island is a case in point. The KPAF dispatched only five Mig-23s. Although

Mig-23s are relatively new in the KPAF’s inventory, one would question whether the KPAF was prepared to engage in combat with the ROKAF’s F-15K and KF-16 fighters which were already in the air. The fact that KPAF units have gone little beyond prudent CAP operations during military provocations reflects Pyongyang’s reluctance, and limited ability, to engage in air-to-air combat.

The second characteristic is the improved level of coordination between the various units in the

KPA. 163 Of course, improvements in inter-branch coordination and planning in military operations are not new in the DPRK. However, we should note that since January 2010, the

DPRK has tested most of the KPA’s combat-ready units. The only exception has been SOF troops and units that support guerilla operations (i.e. airborne/amphibious vehicles such as: hovercraft, Y-5 transport aircraft, and helicopters). The DPRK’s plans for coordinated military

163 The greater coherence between KPA branches was epitomized by the deployment of Mig-23s shortly before the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. Bermudez Jr, "The Yonpyong-do Attack, November 2010, Part II." p.2.

348 operations appear ready to be actualized.

The DPRK’s improvements in cyber-electronic warfare capability are particularly noteworthy.

In testimony before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services on 12 April 2011, General

Walter L Sharp voiced his concerns about the DPRK’s GPS jamming capabilities.164 However, the main threat from the DPRK’s cyber-electronic warfare capabilities is more serious, such as the possibility of disruption of communications, navigation and other networks. According to reports, the series of GPM jamming by the DPRK has affected approximately 1,137 aircraft and

265 ships since 2010.165 Disruption of military networks would inevitably handicap ROK, US and Japanese forces, and advantage the KPA’s ground, naval and air units. Cyber-electronic capabilities would prove effective in compensating for the technological deficiencies in the

DPRK’s conventional platforms.

The third characteristic concerns the theatres of the DPRK’s military provocations. Military provocations by the KPA since 2010 have all been carried out in areas close to the NLL. The

DPRK conducted its drills and operations in those areas not only because of territorial disputes, but also because they are convenient targets for Pyongyang both geographically and politically.

To this day, the KPA relies on geographic proximity as a deterrent or force-multiplier. The line of artillery, MLR units and SOF troops deployed along the 38th Parallel are both defensive and

164 United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony on U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2010 and the Future Years Defense Program, 2011. 165 "GPS Jamming from N.Korea Hit 1,137 S.Korean Aircraft," Chosun Ilbo(19 September 2012), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/09/19/2012091900628.html.

349 offensive in nature. The bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island demonstrated that the DPRK can inflict enormous damage with little preparation and limited mobility. For the DPRK, the attacks in 2010 showed that short-range, high-speed warfare would give the KPA an edge over ROK and US forces. In previous years, the KPA has attempted a number of incursions and infiltrations: in the Noto peninsula in March 1999; southwest of Kyushu in December 2001; and in the Sea of Japan in September 2002. However, these attempts failed, because of the increased awareness of Japanese and US authorities. The failed attempts against Japan made the DPRK aware that long-distance operations are ineffective. Accordingly, Pyongyang has utilized its conventional capabilities in areas closer to home.

The military provocations since 2010 have revealed the KPA’s adoption of two techniques: inter-branch coordination; and proximity operations. The DPRK has come to terms with the inherent strengths and weaknesses of its military capability. Historically, the DPRK has studied various wars around the globe, but since the 1990s, it has rarely had the opportunity to conduct a “case study” on the Korean peninsula in coordinated military operations. Therefore, by taking advantage of the escalated tensions with the ROK, the attacks in 2010 gave Pyongyang insights into how the KPA can further diversify and strengthen its military capabilities.

6.3 2012 AND BEYOND

We have seen how the KPA has diversified its capabilities and strengthened the DPRK’s military leverage. We now face the question: how much further will the KPA diversify and strengthen its military capability? Unification of the Korean peninsula under the WPK remains

350 the DPRK’s raison d’état and ultimate objective.166 While the DPRK does not currently have the capacity to achieve this objective, it is unlikely that its leadership will make any major compromises or accommodations with the ROK. As the most pressing objective for Pyongyang is regime survival, the DPRK will undoubtedly continue to strive for a military edge over the

ROK as long as the current regime is in power.

The DPRK’s efforts to strengthen its cyber-electronic warfare capabilities imply a shift towards low-tech, asymmetric strategies using artillery, SOF, midget submarines, Y-5 aircraft and other small-scale airborne/amphibious capabilities. Simply put, the DPRK’s cyber-electronic warfare capabilities support the operation of the KPA’s asymmetric military operations by disrupting and crippling the US, ROK and Japanese defence systems. However, an assessment of how the

KPA might further diversify or strengthen its capabilities must begin by understanding the limits the DPRK faces. So far, we have seen how the KPA’s actions are based on three principles: asymmetry; speed and mobility; and surprise attacks. While the DPRK’s military capability management has embraced these three principles, Pyongyang faces two problems – stamina and power projection. That is, the shortfalls in the DPRK’s defence planning constrain the KPA from operating beyond its immediate periphery, and also from fighting prolonged wars.

First of all, the KPA continues to face major shortfalls in terms of operational preparedness, caused largely by the worsening economic situation. The large stockpile of ammunitions, parts and supplies and the vast network of underground military installations are ancillary to the

DPRK’s strategy of asymmetric warfare and war of attrition. However, we must keep in mind

166 Hodge, "North Korea's Military Strategy." p.78.

351 that asymmetric conflicts have historically tended to last longer than conventional conflicts. As the economic situation in the DPRK has worsened, stored supplies have been subject to theft and decay, implying that the KPA may not be ready for a war of attrition. The KPA therefore continues to experience major problems in operational preparedness, which are likely to continue until the nation’s economic situation improves.

Second, power projection in the KPA’s conventional forces remains a problem. This is one of the main reasons for Pyongyang’s dependence on irregular conflicts and proximity warfare. Its lack of airpower limits the DPRK’s capacity to conduct a second or third wave of attacks against the ROK or Japan. There is, therefore, significant inflexibility in the KPA’s overall strategy. Kim Jong-il’s efforts in 2010 to update the KPAF’s inventory, and the significant increase in flight training hours indicate that Pyongyang recognizes its airpower weaknesses.167

Indeed, the DPRK’s development of strategic weapons was intended to compensate for the

KPA’s deficiencies in power projection capabilities. Still, it is doubtful whether the DPRK’s missiles and WMD would be effective in coordinated military operations. While the DPRK may have devised a strategy that knits together the KPA’s various capabilities, their effectiveness in combat is suspect.

Third, the power transition process currently under way indicates that the DPRK leadership will intensify the politicization of the KPA. In particular, strenuous efforts will be made on centralizing the KPA’s command and control structure under the Kim Jong-un leadership. The

167 For information on the increase in the increase in flight training hours, see: "N.Korea Steps Up Air Force Training Flights," Chosun Ilbo(29 May 2012), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/03/29/2012032901309.html.

352 removal of Ri Yong-ho from all positions and the appointment of Hyung Yong-chol in July

2012 was a prime example of how much the WPK’s values are prioritized over the military role of field generals. Consequently, further strengthening of the KPA can only take place on the condition that the political risks are minimized. Simply put, the DPRK leadership will depend heavily on units that are both politically and tactically reliable, such as the SOF and artillery.

Yet, further centralization of the KPA’s command and control structure will cause some problems for the DPRK leadership, particularly in relation to SOF units. As we have seen, most of the DPRK’s military provocations were kept within manageable limits and well within

Pyongyang’s control, to avoid all-out war. However, in the case of the SOF, the deployment of guerrilla units depends on both political control and tactical coordination. Due to the scale and decentralized nature of its tactics, the deployment of SOF units requires greater authority to be vested in their tactical commanders. Although the SOF is the most reliable component of the

KPA in terms of tactical capability, they present challenges for the DPRK leadership in command and control.

The DPRK’s efforts to diversify and strengthen its asymmetric capabilities were blanket measures to compensate for the KPA’s technical constraints. But unless the DPRK’s economic capacity significantly improves, the avenues available to Pyongyang to further diversify its military capability are inevitably limited. Despite the constraints faced by the KPA, there is little or no evidence that the DPRK poses less of a military threat. It is one thing to suggest that the DPRK does not have sufficient financial resources to remedy its military capability management shortfalls, but it is another to suggest that Pyongyang will not find ways to further diversify its military capabilities.

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Given the new rules of engagement after the provocations in 2010, cross-border firings between the KPA and the ROKA may well increase. However, at this stage, front-on challenges by air units or MBT/APCs are unlikely, given the probability of proportionate response by the allied

ROK and the US. Until the DPRK significantly improves its power projection capability and operational preparedness, we can expect the DPRK to find alternatives to diversify its asymmetric capabilities – artillery provocations, and infiltration by SOF troops.

Regarding artillery provocations, it is likely that the DPRK will refrain from directly attacking

Seoul, because of the grave consequences that would ensue. Instead, any future military provocations using KPAGF artillery are likely to be in areas well away from Seoul. The most likely targets are areas along the NLL, such as Yeonpyeong Island, Baengnyeong Island,

Daecheong/Socheong Island, and perhaps Kyodong Island. However, if the KPA’s capabilities on the west coast are fully denied, the DPRK may shift its focus to areas on the eastern side of the Korean peninsula. Goseong Country and Inje County are areas which could be targets of

KPAGF provocations. As the central areas along the DMZ are heavily fortified by the ROKA and USFK, the KPAGF is likely to refrain from targeting them, for fear of a full-scale backlash.

For the DPRK, SOF units are essentially the ace up its sleeve. Unlike artillery units, which can only operate from relatively fixed positions, SOF operations are flexible. Alarmingly, the DPRK is showing signs that it is escalating the combat readiness of its SOF units. Over the last three years, the DPRK has forward-deployed approximately 50,000 SOF troops along the DMZ.168

168 Kwi-geun Kim and Sang-hyun Lee, "buk, teuksujeonbyeongnyeok 5manyeomyeong choejeonbang baechi [North Korea –approximately 50000 special operations forces units deployed on the frontline],"

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Moreover, only days before the WPK Conference in September 2010, Radio Free Asia reported that large-scale military drills involving SOF units had taken place all over the DPRK.169 While these drills were very likely a ploy to boost awareness of the military and set an atmosphere for the Party conference, it illustrated the SOF’s crucial role in the WPK’s military thinking. Yet the DPRK’s may not be simply bluffing about its SOF. Recently, the DPRK has constructed a new hovercraft base in Goampo, Hwanghae Province, only 50km from the most north-western areas of the ROK.170 Hence we can see efforts from the DPRK to improve the overall readiness of the SOF units, which poses a grave threat to the ROK’s security.

Decisive changes will be made and further diversification of the KPA’s military capability will be achieved if the DPRK manages to strengthen its air power. For this to happen, the KPAF would need not only to augment its force structure with new combat aircraft, but also to acquire refuelling capacity and reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Strengthened air power would not only improve the KPA’s power projection capabilities, but also provide cover for the

KPA’s ground and naval forces, giving them greater flexibility in their operations. However, acquiring technologies for the KPAF would inevitably be highly capital-intensive. Even if they are imported from China or Russia at considerable concessions, access and maintenance of new technologies will lead to a rise in operational preparedness costs which would further constrain the DPRK’s defence planning.

Yonhap News(5 May 2010), http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2010/05/05/0200000000AKR20100505025000043.HTML. 169 Radio Free Asia quoted in: "bukhan, jeonguk gyumo gunsahullyeon jinhaengjung.. siljeon bangbul [North Korea - nationwide scale military drills underway... simulating actual combat]," Chosun Ilbo(17 September 2010), http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/09/17/2010091700997.html. 170 "N.Korea's New Hovercraft Base Near Completion," Chosun Ilbo(30 May 2011), http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/05/30/2011053000933.html.

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The scenarios outlined above presuppose the current DPRK regime remaining in power. What would happen if the current regime were to collapse? Even though the leadership has strengthened its control over the KPA to prepare for the Kim Jong-un era, “over-politicization” and deteriorating welfare of personnel have become increasingly serious issues in the KPA.

Consequently, if there were even a slight weakening in the leadership’s control, it could trigger not just a coup d’etat, but fragmentation of the KPA.

The absence of organized factions within the KPA portends potential chaos, where the military would fragment into insurgent groups with different agendas. These groups could well fall broadly into two camps: WPK loyalists and military professionals. If a military coup d’état were to take place, the current regime is likely to be hard-line, especially if it is headed by military professionals. However, the biggest concern is the possibility of triggering a civil war that might

“spill-over” into the ROK. Such a scenario is horrifying, especially given the possible decentralization of the SOF units as mentioned in Chapter 4.

For the DPRK leadership, fragmentation or factionalism in the KPA is their greatest fear. The

DPRK is constructed that as long as the KPA remains integrated the state will survive regardless of its economic circumstances. To ensure the integrity of the military, the power transition to

Kim Jong-un has involved the recentralization and further politicization of the KPA under the

WPK’s control. At the same time, Kim Jong-un’s influence in the KPA is certainly strong, given the retightening of the party-military relations since his ascension. During the military provocations in 2010, Kim Jong-un proved himself to be a hard-liner in both the political and the military sense. As Kim Jong-un stabilizes his leadership and the state, the DPRK’s military

356 behaviour may become increasingly bellicose.

7. SUMMARY: PATTERNS IN BUILDING THE NEW KPA

This chapter examines the framework of the DPRK’s military capability management, focusing on how Pyongyang’s defence planning is actualized into military capability and strategy. In particular, we have seen myriad decision-making dilemmas in the various echelons of the

DPRK’s defence planning. The DPRK leadership’s mishandling of these dilemmas is reflected in the nature of the KPA today.

The central theme of political security in the DPRK’s defence planning has been consistent; politicization of the KPA has been the principal goal. Thorough politicization of the KPA was the only way the DPRK leadership could bulldoze its way through times of political and economic instability. At the same time, however, obsession with political control led to the emergence of bleak dilemmas at both the macro and micro levels of military capability management. At the micro level, dilemmas in each of the objectives of the dangui gunsa roseon came to the forefront, raising questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the WPK’s military doctrine in enhancing military capability. These dilemmas overlapped. Thus, at the macro level, execution of the dangui gunsa roseon depended on the DPRK’s decisions on the principal function of the KPA – option 1 (political) or option 2 (military).

Both options were essentially counterproductive for the DPRK economy. To some degree, it can be argued that the “military” option would have increased efficiency economically and

357 militarily. Nonetheless, the DPRK leadership chose, and stuck to, the “political” option for the sake of regime security. However, due to turbulent changes, both in internal and external security Pyongyang flirted with option 2 to strengthen the KPA’s military capability. The

DPRK’s struggle to find the right balance between option 1 and option 2 retarded the development of the KPA’s military capability.

The DPRK’s concurrent pursuit of both options took place in three distinctive phases: the 1960s and early 1970s when the dangui gunsa roseon was created and the SEC was established; the early 1990s, when Kim Jong-il shifted the defence planning hierarchy to the NDC and made the

KPA responsible for the development of WMD and missiles; and 2009, when the leadership strengthened the power nexus between the CMCWPK, the NDC and the MPAF. Even though these three phases took place during challenging economic circumstances, the KPA was steadily developing and diversifying its military capability, which was made evident in 2010.

The development of the KPA’s military capability reflects both structural and situational factors in the DPRK’s political economy. With dire domestic circumstances affecting the DPRK’s military capability management, the KPA to this day lacks power projection capabilities and has severe operational preparedness problems. In this plight, Pyongyang pursues the strengthening of the KPA, with particular emphasis on building its asymmetric military capacity. Today, this capacity is a combination of the “traditional” capabilities inherited from the Kim Il-sung era and information-based technologies acquired over the past two decades.

The chapter demonstrates that the KPA has indeed strengthened and diversified its asymmetric capabilities. The military provocations in 2010 were in part an actualization of the KPA’s

358 developing military capability. The combination of strategic weapons and asymmetric capabilities constitutes a significant expansion in the DPRK’s military leverage. Moreover, the

DPRK leadership’s continuing preference for political over military goals suggests that Kim

Jong-un’s hard-line strategic outlook will have a crucial influence on the future development of the KPA’s capability and strategy.

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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

1. NEW PERSPECTIVE TOWARDS MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT

What is the most efficient and effective way of managing military capability? In reality, there is no perfect way. States face dilemmas that are pegged to their domestic circumstances and structures, causing a range of possible problems. In the end, it is not about the amount of resources devoted to the development of the military as it is how those resources are used. That is, a state’s efforts to strengthen its military capability could be counterproductive if correct policies or planning procedures are absent.

Using the input-conversion-output model, this thesis examined how the DPRK’s military capability management is largely influenced by the state’s domestic stimuli. The DPRK’s ambitions to build a self-reliant defence capability gave birth to the dangui gunsa roseon and the SEC. However, the process made the KPA an extremely centralized institution that focuses primarily on political functions. After the death of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il advanced his songun ideology and argued that the fate of the DPRK rests in the hands of the KPA.1 Now with the death of Kim Jong-il, the Kim Jong-un regime is likely to be more hard-line by continuing to diversify its asymmetric military capabilities and utilizing its military leverage against the US, the ROK and Japan. At the same time, the Kim Jong-un leadership is likely to be inward-looking, focusing on bolstering the regime’s security by further centralizing and politicizing the KPA.

1 Kim, "inmingundaereul ganghwahamyeo gunsareul jungsihaneun sahoejeokgipungeul seulde daehayeo [on strenghtening the People's Army and establishing military centred socialist spirit]." pp.1-2.

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2. THE DPRK’S DYSFUNCTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT

This thesis highlighted three aspects of the DPRK’s military capability management: the KPA’s

WPK-centric functions; diversification of the KPA’s mobilization capabilities, and advancement of asymmetric strategies and tactics. Since the mid-1960s, the dangui gunsa roseon remains the bedrock of Pyongyang’s juche-ist defence planning. However, to finance the dangui gunsa roseon, Kim Il-sung carved out a chunk of the state’s economy and established the monstrous military industrial complex – the SEC. Consequently, the restructuring of the state’s economic dynamics came at the expense of technological innovation and rational economic planning. Ironically for the DPRK, due to its limited political-economic capacity, the system designed to bolster the regime’s security and KPA capabilities became the precise cause of defence planning failures.

The DPRK’s military capability is compromised by perennial defence planning dilemmas caused by the dangui gunsa roseon. Pyongyang’s political ambitions exceed its economic capacity, triggering dilemmas for Pyongyang as it allocates capability-building resources to individual components of the KPA. Hence Pyongyang’s rigid political structure and diminishing economic capacity have forced its defence planning system beyond the manageable threshold to the point that the WPK leadership faces a bleak outlook.

2.1 ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF THE DPRK’S DEFENCE PLANNING

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Throughout this thesis, we have witnessed how the WPK leadership’s centralization and politicization process affected the whole political system of the DPRK. In the context of military capability management, the concepts of juche and songun have been the overarching themes. Indeed, the concept of self-reliance in national defence is commonly shared among most, if not all states. Yet in the DPRK’s case, the concept of self-reliance was exploited for the purpose of centralizing the state system under the leadership’s rule. Ever since Kim Il-sung began to construct his monolithic system in the 1950s, the DPRK leadership’s management of the military shifted from the “military-bureaucrat” axis to the “military-party” axis. 2

Consequently, the primary function of the KPA was based on the WPK’s agendas, principally in relation to the legitimacy and survival of the leadership.

Over the course of decades, both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il capitalized on every opportunity to fine tune the KPA’s absolute loyalty to the leadership. The leadership’s control of the KPA was particularly bolstered after the systemization of the Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System in April 1974. As we have witnessed in Chapter 4, members of both the CMCWPK and the NDC are handpicked so that both the strategy making and administrative aspects of the military management process stays within the leadership’s interests.

Consequently the KPA and the MPAF came under the complete personal control of the leader, and became the primary utility to guarantee the leadership’s survival.

2 Ideological discipline was heavily propagated in the KPA from 1954. For examples, see: Kim, "inmingun eul jiljok ganghwa kanbugundae ro mandeulja [let us strengthen the quality of the People's Army and create a cadre army] (27 May 1954)."; ———, "inmingundaeui ganbuhwawa gunjong,byeongjongui baljeonjeonmange daehayeo [On Making the People's Army a Cadre Army and the Prospects of Development of Arms and Devices] (23 December 1954)."

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The Kim Jong-un leadership will further advance the WPK’s control over the KPA. For Kim

Jong-un, politicization and collectivizing power in the KPA and WPK is the only way to secure the regime’s survival. The groundwork for Kim Jong-un’s ascension to the throne largely took place in the WPK, which explains why he was designated the Vice-Chairman (and later

Chairman) of the CMCWPK before officially assuming his leading role in the NDC.

The succession process and intense level of centralization and politicization clearly demonstrated the leadership’s strong focus on restrengthening WPK-KPA relations. However, the centralization and politicization of the KPA and the state system significantly impacts the

DPRK’s military capability management. As discussed in Chapter 6, while the leadership successfully integrated the KPA into the top-down hierarchy, in terms of military capability management, Pyongyang’s persistent emphasis upon the dangui gunsa roseon caused several inter-related zero-sum dilemmas to emerge (Table 7.1). The crux of the dilemma in the DPRK’s defence planning is whether the KPA focuses on its political (option 1) or military (option 2) functions. Moreover, option 1 is suited to regime security, whereas option 2 requires some sort of economic reform (or at least restructuring).

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Dilemma Options option 1 option 2 Objective Regime Security National Defence (a) Cadre-based army Organizational Purpose Political Military (b) Modernizing the KPA Focus of Armament Quantity Quality (c) Arming the citizenry Purpose of Readiness Political Economic (d) Fortifying the state Efficiency and Mobility Decrease Increase Benefits Regime Security Economic Ramifications Economic Regime Security

Table 7.1: The DPRK’s Decision Making Dilemmas From the dangui gunsa roseon

Considering that the leadership has been primarily concerned about its own security, it is not surprising that much of the regime’s focus has been on option 1. However, in recent years, the

DPRK has embarked on an eclectic approach, aiming at gaining benefits of option 2 whilst maintaining option 1. For Pyongyang, the eclectic method of defence planning was the only alternative available to sustain regime security whilst improving the KPA’s capabilities. In any case, option 1, and even the dangui gunsa roseon itself, cannot be reversed not just because of political legitimacy concerns, but more because the whole state system has been rigidly fixated on the regime’s military doctrine. Due to the current fragile circumstances in the DPRK, the

Kim Jong-un leadership will focus on this eclectic version of option 1 for the short-to medium-term.

As a consequence of the leadership’s focus on option 1, coupled with economic constraints, the

DPRK’s capacity for technologically modernizing the KPA is compromised. For example, qualitative overhaul of the KPA neither fits with the leadership’s preference for quantitative strengthening of the military, nor the state’s economic capacity. Instead, the DPRK government

364 has been ingrained with the belief that modernization is not so much about technological innovation, but innovation in the use of existing technology.

Military modernization is also likely to be intentionally limited by the leadership in certain aspects due to political ramifications, particularly in the area of ICT. While the DPRK’s cyber-electronic capabilities have experienced a quantum leap in recent years, improvements in this area are still bound by political restrictions. The DPRK leadership will ensure that the innovation of ICT remains in the “vertical” context. While innovation in ICT has the potential to improve coordination between units and also greater intelligence capabilities, the leadership fears that an increase in horizontal communication and access to information will come at a cost to the regime’s security. For Pyongyang, greater flow of information would not only be difficult to monitor, but also has the potential to decentralize and even degrade the KPA command system. Therefore, until the WPK leadership can produce a form of politicization that can keep up with technological innovation, there are limits to how much the KPA can modernize in terms of technological innovation.

The KPA’s problems in qualitative improvement are also evident in terms of personnel. While the MPAF conducts nation-wide recruitment, a candidate or individual’s position is dependent on his or her political credentials and chulshin seongbun (class system).3 Indeed, this narrowed scope of recruitment may serve the regime’s immediate political priorities. However, as health and morale problems became a growing problem in the KPA, the regime was forced to lower

3 The chulshin seongbun is a class system implemented to ostensibly compensate for the classes that were suppressed in previous years. However in reality, it is a class system determined by a family’s loyalty to the leadership.

365 the physical standards for enlistment.4 Hence the pool of “combat-fit” persons in the KPA is inevitably limited, causing problems in terms of military capability.

Under such circumstances, adjustments in DPRK defence planning will only take place on the precondition that it does not implicate high “switching” costs in terms of economic capacity and political direction. For the DPRK leadership, maintaining consistency is essential to ensure the regime’s survival. Even as the regime increasingly faces political and economic challenges,

Pyongyang is showing no signs of revising its eclectic version of option 1. While there are numerous shortfalls in this approach, there are also benefits in terms of military capability – the diversification of mobilization capabilities using existing platforms.

2.2 DIVERSIFICATION OF THE KPA’S CAPABILITIES

In Chapter 6, we have witnessed how the KPA’s military capabilities have diversified. Signs of the KPA realigning its mobilization capability have been evident for at least two years. The

DPRK’s “Combined Manoeuvres” military exercise in January 2010 hinted that the KPA is reconfiguring its military preparedness on a large scale, improving the coordination of air, ground and naval units. Yet the improvement in military preparedness did not involve any significant changes in the KPA’s force structure. Besides the development of cyber-electronic warfare capabilities, CBRNs and ballistic missiles, technological upgrades in the KPA have been relatively modest. As Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis revealed, economic and political

4 Cho, "buk, Tero-jeonryak, 16man5cheon myeong...bigonggae 3man chujeong [North Korea's 165000-strong terrorist strategy - 300000 estimated to be hidden] ".

366 problems have constrained the DPRK from making qualitative force structure improvements.

Under such circumstances, the only viable option for the DPRK was to change the nature of its military capability by exploiting the advantageous features of its existing platforms and strategic environment. For the DPRK, the diversification of asymmetric capabilities was its own version of RMA.

Both the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 revealed that the DPRK is comprehensively developing its military preparedness. The developments in the

KPA’s capabilities seem diverse in nature and we can broadly interpret them on two levels.

Regarding offensive capabilities, the DPRK has qualitatively diversified its readiness for mobilization by increasing the number of asymmetric options to penetrate the ROK’s defence.

As for defence, we can argue that recent developments are directed at strengthening deterrence capabilities along the DMZ and NLL. Moreover, there is one other key aspect – increased efficiency and effectiveness in the mobilization of SOF troops with developments in hovercrafts, submarines, and transport aircraft. Successful coordination of cyber-electronic attacks with airborne/amphibious capabilities would allow smoother infiltration by the KPA’s guerrilla troops, which is one of the most direct and horrifying threats to the ROK.

The time at which the DPRK diversified its military capability is puzzling. After all, if the diversification process took place much earlier such as in the late 1980s or 1990s, the DPRK could have gained an edge over the ROK. The fact that the DPRK did not capitalize on this opportunity may indicate that the diversification process was an “insurance strategy” for

Pyongyang’s defence planning problems. That is, the diversification of the KPA’s asymmetric capabilities was to compensate for the diminishing returns (or at least slow development) of

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Pyongyang’s strategic weapons program.

Questions are then raised concerning the DPRK’s strategic weapons, and where they are positioned in the spectrum of the KPA’s diversified capabilities. The thesis has argued that the

DPRK strategic capabilities were developed in parallel to the rest of the KPA’s capabilities without being fully integrated. Obvious signs of this incompatibility are evident in the way the development of conventional platforms was inconsistent, especially since the 1980s. At the same time, while the DPRK’s development of strategic weapons steadily took place from the

1960s, the process was slow. Moreover, with the exception of deterrence, they did not seem to be conceptually integrated into the KPA’s strategy, which returns us to the reason why

Pyongyang had to find alternatives (besides strategic capabilities) to penetrate the US alliance’s deterrence capabilities.

The difference in the development of conventional capabilities and strategic weapons capabilities indicates that the latter was an abstract solution to compensate for the KPA’s weaknesses. Indeed, there is little doubt that the development of strategic weapons reflects

Pyongyang’s desire to boost its deterrence capabilities. Yet, there are still contradictions that expose the DPRK’s poor management capabilities. If the development of CBRN arsenals and ballistic missiles was planned to diversify the KPA’s capabilities, Pyongyang would have made more efforts to remedy the zero-sum problems between its conventional and strategic capabilities.

While the development of strategic weapons capabilities allowed Pyongyang to remedy its conventional weaknesses for the short term, the long-term problems continue to grow.

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Specifically, under the current economic circumstances, it is unlikely that the KPA’s conventional power projection and precision-strike capabilities will significantly develop without acquiring essential platforms such as: air refuelling systems; long-range fighter jets/bombers; and blue-water capabilities. Rather, it is likely that the DPRK’s conventional platforms will focus on speedy, short-mid-range capabilities using artillery/MLRs, light-duty airborne/amphibious vehicles and SOF units.

2.3 THE DPRK’S ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY

The DPRK’s military strategy is vague. It features both offensive and defence aspects that structurally utilize the regular and irregular components of the KPA. The mixed traits of the

KPA was one of the central aims of the dangui gunsa roseon. More to the point, the expansive nature of the dangui gunsa roseon purported to maximize the KPA’s capability base to bolster its asymmetric tactics. The recent diversification of the KPA’s capabilities, therefore, does not symbolize a shift in tactics, but rather, an expanded readiness of asymmetric tactics vis-à-vis the

US, the ROK and Japan.

The DPRK’s military doctrine has been consistent. The guerrilla-tactics of the KPA were inherited from Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns. Kim Il-sung was correct in following asymmetric tactics as a way to challenge technologically superior opponents. The fact that Pyongyang diversified the KPA’s capabilities and conducted two deadly military provocations in 2010 without making any significant platform acquisitions clearly underlines the leadership’s faith in the strengths of its asymmetric tactics.

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Conversely, we could also argue that the DPRK is constrained by its asymmetric military doctrine. A shift to a military with similar characteristics to that of the US, ROK or Japanese defence forces, would require significant changes in terms of economy, structure and doctrine.

By adhering to its asymmetric military strategy, the DPRK is saved from making major force structure adjustments.

The diversification of the KPA’s mobilization capability also illustrates Pyongyang’s expertise in exploiting its unique conditions. Moreover, while the US alliance has focused on the DPRK’s strategic weapons capabilities, Pyongyang has searched for ways to penetrate the US alliance’s deterrence capabilities. Since January 2010, the DPRK has conducted at least two live-fire exercises that involved the three branches of the KPA (7 September 2011 and 14 March 2012).

The fact that the KPA is annually holding these cross-branch drills indicates that the DPRK focuses on promoting greater coordination between its air, ground and naval capabilties.

Yet, as we saw in Chapter 6, the WPK’s military doctrine produced mixed results in its military capability. As politics became the main determinant of military affairs, the KPA’s force structure became increasingly centred on quantitative asymmetric capabilities as opposed to qualitative innovation. While technology is not the absolute factor determining a state’s military capability, it is important, as even the DPRK’s own slogans suggest. Indeed, the DPRK’s asymmetric capabilities may be beneficial in terms of deterrence or surprise attacks, but whether they are effective in an actual war with the US and the ROK is dubious.

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3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: CONCEPTUALIZING NEW STRATEGIES

The three developments outlined in the previous section have policy implications in the regional security context. Specifically, the KPA’s diversifying mobilization capabilities compounded by domestic circumstances points to the changing nature of the DPRK military threat. Given the fluidity of the security balance in East Asia, it is hard to predict how events will unfold.

However, the myriad problems surrounding the DPRK have dragged on for decades without any real solution. Hence it is time to employ more effective alternatives to deal with the DPRK, to effectively deter their military threats and regional proliferation of WMD. When new, effective strategies are executed against the DPRK, we will be able to build a platform for the long-awaited peaceful unification of the two Koreas.

Above all, reconceptualization and reconstruction of the US, the ROK and Japan’s strategies vis-à-vis the DPRK is required. The US alliance’s deterrence strategy has managed to prevent the escalation of conflict and a full-scale resumption of the Korean War. However, both the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island indicated that the US alliance’s deterrence capabilities are ineffective against asymmetric military provocations. The DPRK is likely to continue finding ways to keep its asymmetric capabilities one step ahead of countermeasures, and we may only be witnessing the start of the diversification of the KPA’s mobilization capabilities. Hence the US, the ROK and Japan must devise new comprehensive deterrence strategies to deal with the DPRK.

For over six decades, the series of military provocations and development of strategic weapons have pulled the US alliance into playing the DPRK’s “game”. Under such circumstances, three

371 options have been debated amongst the US and its alliance partners: an offensive strategy; status quo; or conditional engagement. The three strategies however, have brought no real benefits to the US, the ROK or Japan. One recent example was the launch of the kwangmyongsong-3 on

13 April 2012. Considering that the DPRK signed a deal with the US to suspend nuclear and missile tests in exchange for nutritional aid on 29 February 2012, the launch illustrated another episode of Pyongyang’s “game”. Moreover, the DPRK’s military provocations in recent years reflect Pyongyang’s will to take bold moves despite risking a proportionate response. Therefore, we need a fourth option that pulls the DPRK into the US, ROK and Japan’s “game”, and forces it to honour agreements.

From this perspective, the key is to make an offer that the DPRK cannot refuse. Broadly, the US alliance could pursue a strategy with a bigger stick and a poisonous carrot. That is, employ a stronger military leverage both to deny and to punish the KPA, flanked by economic leverage aimed at further luring the DPRK into stable market reform. The successful implementation of these measures will not only change Pyongyang’s attitude, but could set the stage for a soft-landing demise of the totalitarian regime. However, there are crucial questions concerning both the specific nature of the strategy the US alliance should adopt and how it should be aligned to the situation in the DPRK.

3.1 THE SITUATION IN THE DPRK

The policy implications of the DPRK’s defence planning are apt to fluctuate depending on the fate of the Stalinist regime. For the short term, Kim Jong-un is unlikely to introduce significant

372 reform. Rather, given that the centre of political gravity rests more on the CMCWPK, the leadership will place even greater emphasis on the KPA’s political role to ensure the regime’s survival. Yet given pressing economic and political circumstances, it is not clear just how much longer the Kim Jong-un regime will survive.

The Kim Jong-un leadership is influenced by close aides such as Jang Song-thaek, Kim

Kyong-hee, and perhaps even Choe Ryong-hae and Kim Jong-gak.5 While Kim Jong-un’s

“guardians” will do their best to ensure that the current leadership survives, conflicting interests between the influential WPK/KPA cadres could create cracks in the regime. Given the robust political structure, the weakening of the current leadership would not necessarily lead to instant dismantlement of the DPRK governing organ or the state itself.6 However, if the system does significantly weaken and the regime collapses, a coup d’état or rise of political factions could lead to an impromptu regime that takes advantage of the existing totalitarian system. Given the pivotal role of the KPA, four scenarios can be considered.

In the first scenario – which is also the current situation – the regime concentrates on the political solidarity of the KPA and the WPK to ensure regime survival in spite of persistent serious economic problems. As this thesis has illustrated throughout, until Pyongyang remedies its economic problems, effectively achieving the dangui gunsa roseon is beyond the state’s capacity. Against this backdrop, the DPRK leadership will focus on the diversification of the

KPA’s asymmetric capabilities whilst doing what it can to stay in power. This may explain the regime’s recent efforts to promote its public image and symbolic military power.

5 6 Lankov, "Conditions Unripe for North Korea Revolt".

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In the second scenario, the DPRK’s economic capacity revives to sustainable levels whilst the regime maintains its autonomy. Such circumstances are ideal for the DPRK, considering that it is a significant step towards achieving kangsong taeguk. Consequently, the situation will allow

Pyongyang to significantly strengthen the KPA’s mobilization capability and make force structure adjustments. This could lead to Pyongyang pursuing more offensive strategies to boost its deterrence capabilities. Yet as discussed in Chapter 5, it is important not to underestimate the level of resources required to alleviate the problems in the KPA let alone to gain a military edge over the US, the ROK and Japan. Hence even if the second scenario is achieved, the actual effects on the KPA would be gradual.

In the third scenario is an ambiguous one, where the regime’s control over the state and the

KPA diminishes as the economy revives. One may argue that political faith in the leadership may increase if welfare needs in the civilian and military economy reach satisfactory levels.

However, significant economic improvement would require at least some level of political reform, which would create opportunities for alternative organizational entities (i.e., factions and opposition groups) to emerge. In such a situation, the leadership is likely to ensure that the political integrity of the KPA is maintained to preempt any sudden collapse. Militarily, the leadership could take advantage of its growing economic capacity by strengthening the KPA’s mobilization capabilities for internal security and conduct bold military provocations against the

ROK or Japan to shore up the regime’s legitimacy.

In the fourth scenario is perhaps the most disastrous. In it the regime loses its control over the state while the economy continues to in fail. In this case, the situation will be uncontrollable,

374 triggering reactions from the KPA. As discussed in Chapter 4, given that the DPRK leadership has previously prevented and preempted potential organization of factions, multiple groups would form according to differing backgrounds and interests. One could expect the rise of a nationalistic faction that seeks to redeem the economic and political failures of the old regime.

Such groups could be more hard-line, and take bold actions towards the US, the ROK, Japan and perhaps even China.

The DPRK leadership is likely to do whatever it can to avoid the third and fourth scenarios.

Pyongyang’s fear of losing its autonomy is epitomized by the recentralization and further politicization of the KPA and the political system in recent years. Empirically, the DPRK regime persisted with short-term measures to keep the regime’s head above water. Still, the

DPRK is wedged in a tight dilemma. On the one hand, unless the economic situation improves, the leadership’s political control is likely to diminish. On the other hand, economic improvement would require some sort of compromise in the political system. Either way, given that the DPRK’s defence planning is so closely tied to the state’s political-economic system, the overall effects on KPA capability will be negative.

Until we can be definitive about the scenario that will unfold, it is hard to measure the regional security implications. Yet none of the four scenarios outlined above are ideal for regional stability. In particular, scenarios that lead to inertia or multifaceted security threats like the fourth scenario (and to some extent, the third scenario), are least favourable. While deterrence and preparations for countermeasures should be strengthened to deal with the KPA’s diversifying capabilities, cutting the wrong fuse may only exacerbate the problem. Therefore, stability is the top priority, and an uncontrolled collapse of the DPRK regime should be avoided.

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Humanitarian issues must also be kept in mind. While the DPRK has refrained from fully employing its destructive capabilities against other states, it has caused extensive destruction amongst its own population and the extent of the human rights abuses are horrific. The crisis within the DPRK, has reached the point where significant numbers of KPA personnel with highly credible positions (such as officers, SOF personnel, and fighter pilots) are committing illicit crimes or even defecting despite their status. While the DPRK is doing all it can to control the populace, instability is growing. Although the situation in the DPRK is rather different, the fall of totalitarian regimes witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya is a reminder that circumstances following the collapse of tyrannical regimes are not always rosy.7 Against this backdrop, contingency measures to deal with the DPRK must be taken aggressively, but also carefully and flexibly.

3.2 MILITARY LEVERAGE VIS-À-VIS THE DPRK

In terms of military leverage, the most crucial issue is not about strengthening the force structure of the US, the ROK and Japanese defence capabilities, but improving operational readiness and sharpening force postures against future provocations by the KPA. Given the diversifying nature of the KPA’s mobilization capabilities, the US and its alliance partners need to diversify their capabilities and strategies to deter the DPRK. Specific options could include, but are not limited to: increasing the number of ROK and USFK amphibious capabilities

7 While we should welcome the fall of dictatorships and oppressive regimes, there are major concerns regarding the insurgencies and instability that follow.

376 capable of instant deployment to areas near the DMZ and NLL; improving anti-Ballistic Missile

Defence systems; increasing the number of MLRSs targeting key sites in the DPRK; and strengthening air/naval power. The key is to deny and nullify the DPRK’s options and counter-attack/counter-strike capabilities. Considering that the KPA lacks air and naval power projection capabilities, the US, the ROK and Japan should increase the number of joint military exercises that features their superiority in the air and sea.

It is also imperative to develop better Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities over the DPRK. In particular, improving HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT capabilities would be pivotal in grasping the ongoing changes in the DPRK. We are able to decipher greater amounts of information from of the DPRK than ever before. Yet there exist problems in the way information regarding the DPRK is analyzed. It is one thing to know how to collect the dots; it is another to know how to connect them. By improving our intelligence, surveillance capabilities against the DPRK, we will be able to devise faster and more effective response strategies.

To achieve a more expanded and comprehensive approach to the DPRK’s military threat, there needs to be greater cooperation between the US, the ROK, Japan and Australia.8 Confidence in and credibility of the alliance network in the Asia-Pacific need to be strengthened and maintained. In particular, security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo will be pivotal. If

Japan and the ROK can work towards greater coherence and coordination, this may serve as the key to not only contain the DPRK, but also to provide better response to contingencies in the

8 For Australia’s role in the DPRK issue, see: James Cotton, "Australia, Korea, and East Asia: Re-calibrating Relations with Regional Powers," Korea Observer 42, no. 1 (2011).

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DPRK.

There still exists a great deal of animosity between Japan and the ROK and the two often do not see eye to eye in their threat perceptions of the DPRK. Certainly, the ROK postponing the signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and the

Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in June 2012 is a setback. Yet, it is important not to overestimate the differences and underestimate the potential benefits cooperation can present. Tokyo should negotiate ways to facilitate greater effectiveness and efficiency of the ROK forces vis-à-vis the DPRK. Means for greater security cooperation between Japan and the ROK could include, but are not limited to: frequent exchange of strategic perceptions to coordinate contingency plans; intelligence sharing; improving inter-adaptability and coordination of security forces; and holding command post exercises.

It is also important to note that China also has the potential to exert pressure vis-à-vis the DPRK.

As discussed in Chapter 6, closer military ties between the KPA and PLA could be interpreted in two ways. If we are optimistic, we could argue that China’s security assurance could calm the

DPRK’s belligerent military attitude. If we are pessimistic, we could conclude that Pyongyang will only exploit its alliance with Beijing as a cover to conduct further military provocations.

While China would not encourage military aggression against the DPRK, it is increasingly irritated by the DPRK’s military provocations. War avoidance is in the interest of the US, the

ROK, Japan and China. However, the four states are concerned about the the regional security balance. Therefore, the US alliance should be more proactive in convincing China to calm the

DPRK, while simultaneously preparing for assertive military measures to pressure Beijing.

Military pressures could include greater coordination between the US, the ROK and Japan to

378 expand and strengthen the US’s Air-Sea Battle Strategy (ASB) to deny China’s

Anti-Access/Anti-Denial (A2AD) capabilities.

3.3 ECONOMIC LEVERAGE VIS-À-VIS THE DPRK

Economic measures against the DPRK are crucial as military ones. Given the DPRK’s political-economic vulnerabilities, economic leverage would exacerbate Pyongyang’s resource management dilemmas, compelling it to devote even more scarce resources to defence for disproportionate returns in actual military capabilities. Indeed, economic sanctions often seem to accelerate Pyongyang’s belligerent behaviour. Hence we need to identify specific “soft spots” in the DPRK’s economy that does not embolden Pyongyang’s military behaviour.

The recent increase in foreign investments (particularly by China, the ROK and Russia) provides valuable hints. While Pyongyang feels threatened by the increasing economic influence of China and Russia, it also has trouble resisting these investments. Thus economic investments in the DPRK could serve as effective economic leverage. While the Kaesong

Industrial Complex and other regional Special Economic Zones areas where Pyongyang can flirt with capitalism and welcome investments, activities in these zones have depended largely on the regime’s mood.

Therefore, economic aid and investments should be targeted at locations outside Special

Economic Zones or the Kaesong Industrial Complex. In particular, if properly monitored, investments or economic aid aimed at reconstructing urban infrastructure and mass transport

379 systems could be key areas. Indeed, upgrading transport systems would improve the KPA’s logistical capabilities. However, given the visible nature of such projects, transparency of the

DPRK economic and military activity could significantly improve. Moreover the DPRK may be inclined to accept such an offer as it would legitimize its kangsong taeguk status. Yet depending on the nature of the contracts, there could be long-term economic benefits for the investor as the

DPRK is one the few places in East Asia where property prices could increase – especially after the unification of the two Koreas.

Given the urgent food shortages in the DPRK, nutritional aid is imperative from the humanitarian viewpoint. However, it also seems inevitable that Pyongyang will distribute a significant portion of the aid to the KPA. Against this backdrop, we could focus on lessening the amount of nutritional aid that goes to the KPA. Hints are provided in the Kaesong Industrial

Complex, where ROK companies have distributed Choco Pies (chocolate coated wafers with marshmallow) to DPRK workers. A similar approach, but on a wider scale, may prove to be effective economic leverage against the DPRK. For example, states or international organizations could offer assistance in setting up farms and food factories and reward farmers and workers who participate.

3.4 A GRAND BARGAIN WITH A DIFFERENCE

Employing a strategy that pulls the DPRK out of its “game” with the US and its alliance partners will be difficult. However, more generous conditions for the provision of aid, but with stricter guidelines for the distribution of those goods and clear propositions for dire military consequences for misbehaviour is worth considering. If our aim is to stunt the growth of the

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DPRK’s military capability or moderating its behaviour, simply enforcing economic sanctions is unlikely to bring about productive results. Rather, we should deal with the DPRK’s military activities through containment and deterrence, whilst utilizing economic leverage that the

DPRK cannot easily exploit or resist. Therefore, if we simultaneously employ strict short-term military leverage with generous long-term economic leverage, the DPRK could be drawn into a wedge.

The crux of the problem lies in the nature of the DPRK’s political regime. However, leverage aimed at immediate regime change would be far from productive. Therefore, the focus should be on dealing with the current regime and influencing its behaviour whilst thinking about long-term changes that could be implemented. To successfully execute these new measures, the

US, the ROK, Japan and Australia play pivotal roles as an alliance network in the region. The alliance network can also be extended to states such as Singapore and other ASEAN countries to establish an expansive mechanism to deal with the DPRK. If this expansive approach can be adopted, then we may be able to pressure Beijing to play a more productive role vis-a-vis the

DPRK. Thus by practicing a more diversified approach using a bigger stick and a poisonous carrot, we may be able to successfully reduce the security threats posed by the DPRK.

4. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: DEVELOPING GREATER UNDERSTANDING

Since the state’s founding, the mysterious nature of the DPRK has proven a riddle for analysts and scholars. This thesis has utilized methodologies from strategic planning studies in an attempt to unveil some of the mysteries surrounding the DPRK’s military capability

381 management. In addition, the thesis examined the DPRK’s defence planning by drawing historical institutionalism theories. The thesis proved the linkage between defence planning and classic political science theories, and applied them to a country-specific case study.

Still, many questions have been left unanswered. Therefore, this thesis should also be viewed in the context of identifying avenues for future research and developing greater understanding of the DPRK but also to expand our conceptualization of military capability management.

A great deal needs to be explored on the implications of the DPRK’s defence planning for regional security dynamics. This thesis focused on the domestic aspects of Pyongyang’s defence planning. There is little doubt that the DPRK poses a regional security threat. However, despite the quantity of analyses of the DPRK, many have been inaccurate due to skewed perspectives or erroneous analytical frameworks. Hence one could investigate how the DPRK’s defence planning impacts the strategies of states in the region. Furthermore, there could also be discussions of specific strategies that could deal with the DPRK, especially in terms of containing its future military behaviour.

One other area that deserves greater attention is the DPRK’s defence planning’s impact upon the state’s domestic circumstances and structure. This thesis focused on the effects of the DPRK’s domestic stimuli on its defence planning. Analysts and scholars therefore, could study the ways in which the DPRK’s management of the KPA has manifested itself in the state system. For example, what impact does DPRK defence planning have upon the state’s socio-economic or socio-political scene? Does the diversification of the KPA’s capabilities impact the DPRK domestic economy in a way that was different from past years? Are there signs of change in

382 how the evolving KPA is viewed by the populace under the current domestic circumstances?

Detailed answers to these questions will not only confirm the counterproductive nature of

Pyongyang’s state management, but will also contribute to a more accurate assessment of domestic circumstances. Moreover, by understanding the domestic impact of the DPRK’s defence planning, we are able to complete the “collateral cycle”, which may allow us to decipher those signs that will provide a more accurate measure of how things will unfold.

Finally, the country-specifics of defence planning need to be further tested. States forge their own methods of managing the military and strategy. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the successful marriage of “generalist” defence planning studies and “specialist” country-specific analyses has yet to take place. While this paper has focused on the DPRK, analyses of the military capability management of other states around the world are also wanting.

The central question should be “what is unique about a specific actor’s defence planning?” As this thesis has discussed, structural and situational factors in an actor’s political-economic system are the most pivotal factors. Yet one may question whether there are other stimuli, and whether the coefficients of those factors differ by state. For instance, how do states with a strong religious identity (e.g., Islamic states) do their defence planning? Are religious and political values treated separately, or are they somehow mingled together when it comes to managing the military? What kind of dilemmas emerge when religion plays a strong role in a state’s defence planning? There are also questions regarding the planning framework of states that do not face a clear external threat. We could, for example, examine countries like Malaysia or Singapore, and examine how they deal with strategic uncertainties and manage military capabilities.

383

We should also investigate ways in which militaries can be better managed. For example, what is the way to minimize the zero-sum aspects of military capability management? Are there ways in which states can alter their military capability management process to promote greater security cooperation? Is there a feasible formula where a state’s defence planning can also address non-traditional security issues (e.g. environmental issues, Humanitarian Aid and

Disaster Relief) whilst strengthening its military capability? These are controversial questions.

Yet depending on the angle, greater understanding of defence planning may serve as a way to change the way we view the armed forces – or even conflict itself – which may be a significant step towards sustainable peace and stability.

5. THE FUTURE OF THE DPRK

When discussing the DPRK’s future, it is easy to ponder whether the Kim Jong-un regime will last. If we look at the DPRK solely through the lens of socio-economic logic, the state would have collapsed long ago.9 However, at the political-military level, the DPRK’s survival is a result of the regime’s preventative strategies. Empirically, the DPRK leadership was alarmed by the fall of dictators such as Nicolae Ceausescu, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. In such an atmosphere, it is hard to imagine that the DPRK will revise its political system as did

Myanmar – at least for the time being.

Fearing collapse, the DPRK took measures to prevent implosion and deter intervention from

9 See: Cha, The Impossible state: North Korea, Past and Future.

384 external powers. Domestically, the DPRK leadership centralized and politicized the KPA to the extreme to prevent the formation of factions. The DPRK’s possession of strategic weapons, and recent developments in the KPA’s mobilization capability was designed to deter the US, the

ROK and Japan.10

The DPRK’s military capability management framework remains unchanged since Kim Il-sung systemized the dangui gunsa roseon and established the SEC in the 1960s. The politicized nature of Pyongyang’s defence planning may bolster the leadership’s domestic political security and build a symbolic military power. However, it is a distraction when it comes to prioritizing military systems acquisitions and operational preparedness. It is unknown how much Kim

Il-sung or Kim Jong-il foresaw the problems that the DPRK would face in coming decades.

Nonetheless, the path dependence forged by the DPRK leadership hints that it will continue to rely on asymmetric capabilities while maintaining a military with potent levels of centralization and politicization.

Since his ascension, Kim Jong-un is proving to be a hardliner, and his strong influence within the WPK and KPA is apparent. Politically, it is highly likely that Kim Jong-un and his aides will do whatever they can to stay in power. Militarily, the launch of kwangmyongonsong-3 in mid-April 2012, the numerous combined military exercises, and the personnel changes are some of the behaviour that highlights Kim Jong-un’s political, yet military-centred outlook. Although the DPRK has made some ostensive efforts to adopt new economic measures, they are yet to have effective results. Calls for improvement in the standard of living, and Kim Jong-un’s

10 The DPRK was developing ICBMS and CBRN weapons long before the fall of Iraq and Libya. However, there are good reasons to believe that the fall of these regimes further emboldened the DPRK’s WMD ambitions.

385 relatively interactive leadership are motivated by the regime’s efforts to shore up legitimacy, as opposed to liberalizing the economy or society. Policy changes to address the DPRK’s domestic problems will only take place as long as they do not compromise the regime’s security. This undermines any logic and viability for any substantial socio-economic improvement.

Thus far, “DPRK 3.0” is characterized by efforts to bolster regime security. That said, even if politicization has enabled stronger political control over the state, Pyongyang’s scope for future decisions are narrow. This will further exacerbate the zero-sum dilemmas in the DPRK’s military capability management to fully achieve the dangui gunsa roseon. In 2009, the DPRK released a propaganda song dedicated to Kim Jong-un titled balgeoreum (sound of footsteps).

For the DPRK, footsteps of new problems are starting to be heard.

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"Bring About a Decisive Turn in the Improvement of the People's Standard of Living and the Building of a Great, Prosperous and Powerful Country by Accelerating the Development of Light Industry Once Again This Year." Rodong Sinmun, 1 January 2011.

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Unpublished Work (1)

Boyd, John R. "The Essence of Winning and Losing." 1995.

Web Page (2)

"Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System." Daily NK, http://www.dailynk.com/english/keys/2001/6/06.php.

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