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Revolution in Rojava Revolution in Rojava Revolution in Rojava Democratic Autonomy and Women’s Liberation in Syrian Kurdistan Michael Knapp, Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboğa Foreword by David Graeber Afterword by Asya Abdullah Translated by Janet Biehl First published 2016 by Pluto Press 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA www.plutobooks.com Copyright © Michael Knapp, Anja Flach and Ercan Ayboğa 2016 The right of Michael Knapp, Anja Flach and Ercan Ayboğa to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 0 7453 3664 0 Hardback ISBN 978 0 7453 3659 6 Paperback ISBN 978 1 7837 1987 7 PDF eBook ISBN 978 1 7837 1989 1 Kindle eBook ISBN 978 1 7837 1988 4 EPUB eBook This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental standards of the country of origin. Typeset by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England Simultaneously printed in the United Kingdom and United States of America Contents List of Figures ix Translator’s Note xi Foreword by David Graeber xii Introduction xxiii Prologue: On the Road to Til Koçer xxviii 1. Background 1 1.1 Geography of Rojava 2 1.2 Historical Overview 9 2. Rojava’s Diverse Cultures 18 2.1 Kurds 18 2.2 Arabs 22 2.3 Armenians and Syriacs 26 2.4 Smaller Population Groups 32 3. Democratic Confederalism 36 3.1 The PKK and Its Paradigm Shift 36 3.2 Democratic Confederalism 39 3.3 Council Democracy 41 3.4 Democratic Concepts 43 4. The Liberation 47 4.1 Organizing Begins 47 4.2 The Arab Spring in Syria 49 4.3 Illegal Councils 51 4.4 The Hewlêr Agreement 53 4.5 The Revolution Begins in Kobanî 54 4.6 The Liberation of Dêrîk and Afrîn 55 4.7 After the Liberation 57 5. A Women’s Revolution 61 5.1 Rojava Women 62 5.2 Women in the Revolution 63 5.3 Kongreya Star 64 revolution in rojava 5.4 Women in the Three Cantons 67 5.5 Dual Leadership and the 40 Percent Quota 69 5.6 Women’s Organizations 70 5.7 Gender Equality Is Also a Men’s Issue 76 5.8 Radical Islam Versus Women’s Emancipation 77 5.9 Outlook 79 6. Democratic Autonomy in Rojava 84 6.1 The Democratic Union Party (PYD) 84 6.2 The People’s Council of West Kurdistan (MGRK) 85 6.3 The MGRK System 87 6.4 The Commune of Aleppo 95 6.5 The Supreme Kurdish Council (SKC) 103 6.6 The Municipal Administrations 104 6.7 The Social Contract 109 6.8 The Democratic-Autonomous Administrations (DAAs) 114 6.9 The Federal System in Rojava/Northern Syria (FRNS) 116 6.10 The MGRK and the DAAs 118 7. Civil Society Associations 122 7.1 Union of Civil Society Associations 124 7.2 Culture and Art 126 7.3 The Revolutionary Youth Movement 126 7.4 Association of Families of Martyrs 128 7.5 Human Rights Commission 129 7.6 Civil Society Organizing 130 8. Defense: The Theory of the Rose 133 8.1 People’s Protection Units (YPG) 133 8.2 Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) 135 8.3 Legitimate Self-defense 139 8.4 The Liberation of Serêkaniyê 140 8.5 The Liberation of Til Koçer 146 8.6 Training and Induction 148 8.7 Equipment, Units, and Tactics 152 8.8 Serêkaniyê Today 153 8.9 The Liberation of Girê Spî and Şengal 154 8.10 The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) 156 8.11 The Significance of the YPG and YPJ 158 vi contents 9. The New Justice System 164 9.1 Structure 165 9.2 Peace Committees 168 9.3 Procedures 168 9.4 Justice Platforms 170 9.4 Asayîş 171 10. The Democratization of Education 175 10.1 Before and After the Revolution 176 10.2 Reconstruction and Pedagogy 178 10.3 The Academy for Kurdish Language, History, and Literature (AZDW) 179 10.4 Academies 181 10.4 Outlook 183 11. Health Care 185 11.1 Before and After the Liberation 185 11.2 Health Assemblies 186 11.3 Challenges 188 11.2 Health Assemblies and the DAAs 189 12. The Social Economy 192 12.1 Under Ba’ath Colonization 192 12.2 Effects of the Liberation 194 12.3 The Embargo 195 12.4 The Social Economy 197 12.5 Cooperatives 199 12.6 Control of Production 204 12.7 Expanding the Cooperatives 205 12.8 The Challenges Ahead 207 13. Ecological Challenges 211 13.1 The Destruction of Biodiversity 212 13.2 Water Crisis 214 13.3 Waste Disposal 217 13.4 Air Pollution 219 13.5 Petroleum Production 219 13.6 Outlook 220 vii revolution in rojava 14. Neighbors 222 14.1 The Islamization of the Syrian Opposition 222 14.2 Islamic State (IS) 227 14.3 The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 231 14.4 Turkey Under the AKP 234 14.5 Democratic Autonomy in North Kurdistan 238 14.6 Turkmen Militias 241 14.7 The SDF and the Jihadists 243 15. Prospects 250 15.1 Rojava and Hegemonic Powers 250 15.2 Solutions Within Syria 254 15.3 International Solidarity 256 15.4 Communalism or Barbarism 259 Afterword: The Philosophy of Democratic Autonomy 262 Asya Abdullah Glossary 268 About the Authors 272 Index 273 viii 1 Background The name Kurdistan (“Land of the Kurds”) first appeared in Arabic historical writing in the twelfth century, referring to the region where the eastern foothills of the Taurus Mountains meet the northern Zagros range.1 Estimates of the number of Kurds in the world vary considerably, but the most realistic range from 35–40 million; of that number, about 19 million live in Turkey, 10–18 million in Iran, 5.6 million in Iraq, 3 million in Syria, 0.5 million in the former Soviet Union, and about 1 million in Europe.2 The Kurds are the third largest ethnic group in the Middle East, after Arabs and Turks. Today, the area of Kurdish settlement, while relatively compact, straddles Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The region is of strategic importance due, among other things, to its wealth in water. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which supply water for Syria and Iraq, flow through the Turkish part of Kurdistan (Bakûr). Linguists agree that the Kurdish language belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family, although Kurdish differs significantly from Persian. There is no common, standard Kurdish language, nor even a standard alphabet or script, owing in part to the division of Kurdistan and to the bans on Kurdish language in the various states. Kurdish can be divided into five main dialects or dialect groups: Kurmancî, the southern dialects (Soranî, Silemanî, Mukrî), the southeastern dialects (Sinei, Kimanşah, Lekî), Zaza (sometimes considered a separate language), and Guranî.3 These dialects are so different that speakers can’t readily understand each other. As to the Kurdish people, we have no certain knowledge of their origin. Researchers, nationalists (both Kurdish and Turkish), and even the PKK have all offered theories, depending on ideological orientation. Kemalism, the official state ideology of Turkey, upholds the “indivisible unity of the State with its country and its nation.”4 According to Kemalism, 1 revolution in rojava all citizens of Turkey are Turks, and any aspiration to recognition of a non-Turkish identity is persecuted as separatism. Turks insist that the Kurds descended from the Turkic peoples. Many Kurds, for their part, consider the ancient Medes their forebears. The PKK’s first program, issued in 1978, states, “Our people first attempted to reside on our land in the first millennium bce, when the Medes, progenitors of our nation, stepped onto the stage of history.”5 When Kurds try to legitimize their rights as a nation to live in Kurdistan, their arguments tend to rest on territorial settlement rather than con- sanguineous ancestry.6 But assumptions about continuous Kurdish settlement and descent from the Medes entered the collective under- standing long ago. 1.1 Geography of Rojava During the Ottoman Empire (1299–1922), nomadic Arabs entered the area that is now northern Syria, where they encountered the local Kurds. A central trade route connected Aleppo with Mosul and today’s southern Iraq. Between the two world wars, Kurds and Christians fleeing persecution in Turkey settled here. Together with the region’s nomads, they make up the bulk of Rojava’s population today. In 1923, the victors in World War I created the 511-mile (822- kilometer) border dividing Syria and Turkey. This arbitrary line was drawn between Jarabulus and Nisêbîn (in Turkish, Nusaybin) along the route of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Three islands of mostly Kurdish settlement lie just south of that border. The easternmost is Cizîrê, which also abuts Iraq for a short stretch of the Tigris; the middle island is Kobanî, and the westernmost is Afrîn. Due south of Cizîrê, in Iraq, lie the Şengal mountains (also called Sinjar), which are inhabited by Kurdish Ezidis. In July 2012, during the Syrian war, the Kurdish movement was able to liberate these three majority-Kurdish regions from the Ba’ath regime. In January 2014, these three regions declared themselves cantons and embarked on the task of establishing a Democratic Autonomous Administration.7 Each canton is currently under the administration of a transitional government. In March 2016, the Federal System of Rojava/ Northern Syria was declared [see 6.9], encompassing the three cantons and some ethnically mixed areas that had recently been liberated from IS.
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