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Università Di Pisa UNIVERSITÀ DI PISA Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Studi Internazionali Tesi di Laurea LIBIA: CIÒ CHE (NON) RESTA DI UNO STATO Frammentazione territoriale e identitaria. Un nuovo scenario o un ritorno alle origini? Relatore: Prof. Maurizio Vernassa Candidato: Massimiliano Desideri Anno Accademico 2014-2015 Alla mia cara e splendida Big Family, vicina e lontana. Ai miei nipoti fatti non foste a viver come bruti, ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza. Sommario Introduzione ...................................................................................................................... i Capitolo 1 Il processo di creazione dello Stato e dell’identità nazionale ...................................... 1 1.1. Origini storiche e confini territoriali ............................................................................... 3 1.2. Da “quarta sponda” italiana a Regno Unito di Libia .................................................... 6 1.3. Il ruolo di Muammar Gheddafi nel forgiare l’identità nazionale .............................. 13 Capitolo 2 Gli anni del Qa’īd .......................................................................................................... 20 2.1. Tra politica interna ed economia ................................................................................... 20 2.1.1. La Jamahirīya Araba Libica Popolare e Socialista ........................................................ 22 2.1.2. Il settore economico ....................................................................................................... 27 2.2. Politica internazionale .................................................................................................... 34 2.2.1. L’aiuto ai movimenti di liberazione e le accuse di terrorismo ....................................... 34 2.2.2. Le guerre di Gheddafi .................................................................................................... 38 2.2.3. Le difficili relazioni con l’Occidente ............................................................................. 43 2.2.4. Il rapporto speciale e privilegiato tra Italia e Libia ........................................................ 50 2.2.5. Tra panarabismo e panafricanismo ................................................................................ 56 Capitolo 3 La fine di un’era ............................................................................................................ 64 3.1. La Libia nel XXI secolo: la situazione antecedente alle sommosse del 2011 ............. 64 3.1.1. I pilastri su cui si reggeva la Jamahirīya e il contesto interno libico ............................ 65 3.1.2. I rapporti con l’Occidente e le “Primavere arabe” ......................................................... 69 3.2. La rivolta .......................................................................................................................... 76 Capitolo 4 Il declino: dall’illusione dell’unità alla frammentazione ........................................... 89 4.1. L’uscita dalla guerra civile e l’inizio del processo democratico ................................. 89 4.2. La transizione politica: tra speranze di pace e realtà di guerra ............................... 100 4.3. La seconda guerra civile libica ..................................................................................... 113 Capitolo 5 La Libia oggi: scenari di un Paese sull’orlo del disfacimento ................................. 124 5.1. L’evoluzione della crisi libica: fra guerre e mediazioni ............................................ 124 5.1.1. Una lettura del quadro interno ..................................................................................... 124 5.1.2. La reazione internazionale ........................................................................................... 129 5.2. Risorse energetiche ed economia ................................................................................. 140 5.3. Islamisti e terrorismo .................................................................................................... 146 5.4. I principali traffici illeciti che passano dalla Libia .................................................... 151 5.4.1. Proliferazione delle armi e contrabbando .................................................................... 151 5.4.2. Il traffico di migranti .................................................................................................... 157 Conclusioni ................................................................................................................... 172 Bibliografia .................................................................................................................. 185 Linkografia .................................................................................................................. 196 Introduzione La rivolta che ha portato alla caduta del regime di Gheddafi nel 2011 ha segnato lo spartiacque della storia contemporanea di questo Paese e non solo. La Libia oggi è uno Stato frammentato, sia dal punto di vista territoriale che identitario nonché politico e sociale, nel quale non esiste un’autorità centrale che abbia la legittimità e la forza di imporsi come punto di riferimento per i cittadini libici e la Comunità internazionale. Il contesto di instabilità e violenza sviluppatosi in conseguenza del crollo del regime del Colonnello è col tempo degenerato sempre più in una spirale negativa che ha favorito l’instaurarsi sul territorio libico di fenomeni tipici di contesti d’emergenza: crisi economico-sociali, violenza indiscriminata, terrorismo, fondamentalismi, criminalità organizzata, traffici illeciti, rivendicazioni autonomiste, territoriali ed etniche. In questo contesto si sono innescati poi gli interessi di attori statali esterni che hanno complicato il quadro e inserito la crisi libica nel più ampio conflitto ideologico e politico in atto nella regione, contribuendo all’aggravamento della situazione e allo status quo del conflitto interno. La caduta del Qa’īd, da far risalire sia a fattori interni al contesto libico sia a fattori esogeni, ha stabilito l’inizio di un nuovo corso per la Libia rilevatosi però ben presto fallimentare. Nonostante i tentativi di dare avvio ad un processo democratico che coinvolgesse la maggioranza della popolazione, il Paese si è trovato velocemente nel mezzo di una crisi politica e sociale. Tale fallimento è attribuibile alle caratteristiche stesse della società libica, su tutti la mancanza di integrazione sociale, l’assenza di una forte identità nazionale, il vuoto istituzionale lasciato dal regime quarantennale di Gheddafi, che non ha permesso la creazione di una cultura politica autoctona, il diffuso clientelismo e tribalismo, così come le istanze autonomiste di alcune regioni. Le stesse vicende che hanno accompagnato la guerra civile libica nei mesi del 2011 hanno concorso a complicare fortemente il quadro di pacificazione interna e ricostruzione post-regime. Hanno giocato un ruolo determinante però anche le potenze straniere, quelle occidentali, intervenendo dapprima durante la rivolta e ritirandosi poi nella fase più delicata della transizione politica, e quelle regionali, ricomprendendo la Libia nel più ampio conflitto in atto nella regione e conducendo a tutti gli effetti una proxy war che ha alterato gli equilibri interni. La divisione della Libia in due schieramenti, posti l’uno di fronte all’altro, e riassunta sbrigativamente dai media internazionali come contrapposizione tra islamisti e laici è i una semplificazione eccessiva e sviante dell’effettivo contesto libico e una lettura faziosa orientata ad alimentare una certa visione congeniale a interessi esogeni. La realtà dei fatti è molto più complessa di questa costruzione manicheista del conflitto libico. Esistono effettivamente due governi all’interno della Libia, ma le componenti dei due schieramenti sono molto complesse e hanno al loro interno visioni variegate e trasversali che fluiscono in entrambe le alleanze; complica il quadro politico l’appoggio esterno di alcuni Stati in favore di uno dei due schieramenti. Ma l’aspetto che sicuramente risalta maggiormente, ad un’analisi più profonda, è l’iniquità di entrambi i governi dinanzi alla reale situazione di instabilità e violenza interna, che pone le milizie presenti nel Paese come il principale elemento di potere, seppur estremamente diviso, all’interno del territorio. Altri fattori contribuiscono inoltre ad aggravare il contesto locale libico, su tutti l’ampliamento del fenomeno terroristico e fondamentalista associato principalmente allo sviluppo sul territorio dello Stato Islamico nonché l’aumento dei traffici illeciti che attraversano tutta la Libia e concorrono a peggiorare fortemente il quadro di violenza e criminalità in cui ormai versa il Paese. La forte crisi economica e le rivendicazioni etnico-tribali concludono il quadro di instabilità. Il presente elaborato esamina lo Stato-nazione Libia partendo dalla sua costruzione territoriale e identitaria, passando poi all’analisi della struttura interna e delle sue relazioni internazionali, dando risalto alla sua importanza geopolitica nel quadro regionale (Mediterraneo, Medio Oriente, Africa centro-settentrionale), dall’epoca gheddafiana fino ad arrivare all’attuale contesto storico-politico. La comparazione tra questi due periodi (gheddafiano e attuale) permette di cogliere meglio l’effettivo cambiamento provocato dalla caduta del Colonnello nel contesto locale e in quello internazionale,
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