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Minority Ethnic Groups Country Information and Guidance Libya: Minority ethnic groups 18 February 2015 Preface This document provides guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling claims made by nationals/residents of - as well as country of origin information (COI) about - Libya. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies. Within this instruction, links to specific guidance are those on the Home Office’s internal system. Public versions of these documents are available at https://www.gov.uk/immigration- operational-guidance/asylum-policy. Country Information The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, dated July 2012. Feedback Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please e-mail us. Independent Advisory Group on Country Information The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office‘s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office‘s COI material. Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/ It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at: Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN. Email: [email protected] Website: http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews Page 2 of 34 Contents Section 1: Guidance 4 1.1 Basis of Claim 4 1.2 Summary of Issues 4 1.3 Consideration of Issues 4 1.4 Policy Summary 9 Section 2: Information 10 2.1 Overview 10 2.2 Tawerghans/Tawarghans/Tawurghans 14 2.3 Tuareg 19 2.4 Tebu/Toubou/Tabu 21 2.5 Black Libyans 24 2.6. Amazigh (Berber) Nationalism 25 2.7 The Mashashiya 27 Annex A: Map of Libya 29 Annex B: Caselaw 30 Page 3 of 34 Section 1: Guidance Date Updated: 18 February 2015 1.1 Basis of Claim 1.1.1 Fear of mistreatment and persecution by the Libyan authorities, or by other, non-state actors, because the person is a member of an ethnic minority. Back to Contents 1.2 Summary of Issues ► Is the person’s account a credible one? ► Are members of particular ethnic groups at risk of mistreatment or harm in Libya? ► Does the person fall to be excluded from a grant of protection? ► Are those at risk able to seek effective protection? ► Are those at risk able to internally relocate within Libya? Back to Contents 1.3 Consideration of Issues Is the person’s account a credible one? 1.3.1 Decision makers must consider whether the material facts relating to the person’s account of their ethnicity and tribe and of their experiences are reasonably detailed, internally consistent (e.g. oral testimony, written statements) as well as being externally credible (i.e. consistent with generally known facts and the country information). Decision makers should take into account the possible underlying factors as to why a person may be inconsistent or unable to provide details of material facts such as age; gender; mental or emotional trauma; fear and/or mistrust of authorities; education, feelings of shame; painful memories, particularly those of a sexual nature, and cultural implications. See also: ► Country Information and the Asylum Instruction on: ► Considering Protection (Asylum) Claims and Assessing Credibility Back to Contents Are members of minority ethnic groups at risk of mistreatment or harm in Libya? 1.3.2 Ethnic minority groups suffered discrimination under the Gaddafi regime and continue to be marginalised. On 9 April 2013, the General National Congress (GNC) adopted a law mandating punishment of not less than one year’s imprisonment for anyone guilty of discrimination on the basis of class, group, region, gender, or colour. However the interim governments enforce neither the prohibitions nor the punishments effectively, particularly with regard to women and minorities 1.3.3 In general the level of societal discrimination faced by members of ethnic minority groups in Libya is not such that it will by itself reach the level of being persecutory or otherwise inhuman or degrading treatment. Page 4 of 34 1.3.4 However other additional factors may put members of ethnic minority groups at risk. Some members of ethnic minority groups have been accused of supporting, or are perceived to have supported Gaddafi during the uprising. Perceived supporters of Gaddafi and his regime are at risk of extra-judicial killings, abduction, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, including in unofficial detention centres, torture, ill- treatment and death in detention. These abuses have been perpetrated by the authorities of the Interim Government or its armed affiliates, as well as by armed militias operating outside of government control. 1.3.5 Communities perceived to be loyal to Gaddafi based on their ethnicity have also experienced forced displacement, indiscriminate shelling, looting and the burning of homes. Poorly resourced and makeshift camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) housing minority ethnic groups have been attacked by militias resulting in arbitrary arrests, abductions, deaths and the re-displacement of their residents. Women IDPs report feeling unsafe to leave the camps unescorted and IDPs perceived to have supported Gaddafi experience harassment, violence, intimidation and discrimination. 1.3.6 Human rights abuses against dark-skinned Libyans, including those originally of sub- Saharan descent, derives in part from allegations that Gaddafi used African mercenaries during the conflict. In the country guidance case of AT and Others (Article 15c; risk categories) (CG) [2014] UKUT 318 (IAC) (14 July 2014) the Upper Tribunal held that (see paragraph 215) (7-9): (7) A ‘Black Libyan’ is a Libyan of black African appearance, and includes a person who may not actually possess Libyan nationality but for whom Libya is their country of former habitual residence. There is endemic racism within Libyan society towards Black Libyans. However, Black Libyans who are not Tawergha or Tuareg are not per se at risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment on return, and will only be able to establish the need for international protection with reference to some additional factor particular to that individual. (8) The Tawergha are Black Libyans who are perceived by Libyans to have been mercenaries on the side of the Gaddafi regime and to have committed human rights abuses during the revolution. The Tuareg are also Black Libyans and are also perceived to have been supporters of the former regime. (9) Whilst there remains a need for an individual assessment of each individual’s circumstances, a person who is Tawergha or Tuareg will in general be able to establish the need for international protection. The same is true of persons from the Mashashiya ethnic or tribal group. The Mashashiya are not Black Libyans but are similarly perceived as a group to have been supporters of the Gaddafi regime. 1.3.7 In addition there are also reports of clashes between ethnic minority groups, in particular between the Tebu and the Zway tribes and between the Tebu and Awlad Suleiman tribes over smuggling routes in the southeast of the country and in southern Libya between Tuareg and Tebu armed groups. Men from certain internally displaced populations, such as the Tuareg and Tebu, have been arrested and detained by armed groups on the basis of their suspected association with rival groups. Assassinations and abductions motivated by tribal conflicts are perpetrated by militia groups in Tripoli and Benghazi with impunity, with civilians being targeted solely for their actual or suspected tribal, family or religious affiliation. See also: ► Caselaw Page 5 of 34 ► Country Information and Asylum Instruction on: ► Considering Protection (Asylum) Claims and Assessing Credibility Back to Contents Does the person fall to be excluded from a grant of protection? 1.3.8 Decision makers should note that members of Gaddafi’s security forces have been responsible for serious human rights abuses and acts of terrorism against the Libyan people, and the international community. If it is accepted that a person was an active operational member of the security forces, decision makers should consider whether one of the Exclusion clauses is applicable. Decision makers should seek advice from a Senior Caseworker if they consider that a person in this category may have been responsible for crimes against humanity. 1.3.9 Where a person is excluded from protection under the Refugee Convention they are also excluded from Humanitarian protection but if there is a real risk of a breach of Article 3 ECHR or Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive they may be entitled to Discretionary leave or Restricted leave.
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