Fighting for the Speakership: the House and the Rise of Party Government
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Fighting for the Speakership: The House and the Rise of Party Government Jeffery A. Jenkins Department of Politics University of Virginia Charles Stewart III Department of Political Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology Chapter Outline Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. The Evolving Roles and Responsibilities of House Officers in the Antebellum Era Chapter 3. Organizational Politics under the Secret Ballot Chapter 4. Bringing the Selection of House Officers into the Open Chapter 5. Shoring Up Partisan Control: The Speakership Elections of 1839 and 1847 Chapter 6. Partisan Tumult on the Floor: The Speakership Elections of 1849 and 1855-56 Chapter 7. The Speakership and the Rise of the Republican Party Chapter 8. The Organizational Caucus Institutionalizes, 1861–1891 Chapter 9. The Organizational Caucus Persists, 1891–2011 Chapter 10. Conclusion Chapter 1 Introduction The U.S. House of Representatives is organized by whichever political party holds a majority of its seats. This fact has consequences. Controlling the organization of the House means that the majority party decides who will preside over its deliberations, who will set the policy agenda, and who will dominate the workhorses of the chamber, the standing committees. Organizing the House does not mean the majority party will win all battles, but it does give the party a leg-up in virtually any question that gets considered by that body. There is nothing in the Constitution that rests the organization of the House in the hands of the majority party. The practice has evolved over the past two centuries, to the point that party organization of the House has become routinized. Ahead of each election, the two parties announce that they will meet in caucus on a date certain, just after the election, to choose not just their own leaders, but also their nominees for the leadership positions of the chamber, notably the Speaker as well as other officers like the Clerk. The party caucuses also select the committee slates, including the chairs. When the new House finally convenes, the decisions determined in caucus are presented to the full House by the caucus leaders, where they are ratified either by party-line votes (as in the case of the speakership election) or by unanimous consent (as in the case of committee slates, including the chairs). It was not always this way. For the first half century after the founding of the Nation, it would be a stretch to say that parties controlled the organization of the House at all; it would be a lie to say that the organization of the House was routine. The first several Congresses chose Speakers and other officers who were known by contemporaries to be dedicated Federalists and Republicans, but they were not nominated by Federalist or Republican caucuses. When caucuses 1-2 arrived on the scene in the 1840s, their record was spotty. They sometimes settled on a nominee, sometimes not — and even when they did, the nomination often exhibited little weight on the final outcome. For example, anyone not physically present at the caucus meeting was under no obligation to support the nominee. Thus, party caucuses might settle organizational matters, but quite frequently they were just the first round of a fight that would resume on the House floor. Before the Civil War, struggle, contention, and deadlock over the organization of the House was common. Nearly one-third of all speakership contests from the founding of the Republic until the outbreak of the Civil War (13 of 41) took more than one ballot to resolve. At least twice, the “minority party” actually saw one of their own elected Speaker. Even the selection of subordinate offices could be contentious. During the same antebellum period, the House required multiple ballots to select its Clerk nine times and its Printer four times. If the majority party did not routinely control the top officers of the House, why would we expect them to control the committees? Even though party caucuses and leaders had a role in determining committee lists, the composition of important congressional committees well into the nineteenth century frequently favored the minority party (Canon and Stewart 1995, 2001; Canon, Nelson, and Stewart 2002). The first Speaker, Frederick Muhlenberg, was selected through an informal process that lacked any trappings of formal party politics, and he initially lacked the authority to appoint committees. Modern Speakers, such as Newt Gingrich, Dennis Hastert, and John Boehner, are recognized primarily as agents of their parties who are expected (normatively and empirically) to use the formal levers of power in the House to further their parties’ legislative goals. The standing committees are constructed by party-based “committees on committees” that have 1-3 increasingly used the lens of party goals to focus attention on whom to give plum assignments and to allow to chair the committees (Dodd and Oppenheimer 2001; Aldrich and Rohde 2005; Sinclair 2005, 2006). How did we move from the world of Muhlenberg to the world of Boehner? What difference did this evolution make for internal House politics, policymaking, and the course of American political development? These are the questions that animate this book. At the core is our account of how the chief House officers, but especially the Speaker, came to be presumptively owned by the majority party, meaning operationally, the majority party caucus. Party caucuses first arose in the mid-1790s, in an attempt to bind party members in the critical organizational votes that are the first order of business when a new Congress convenes (Harlow 1917; Risjord 1992).1 Yet, they were only sporadically employed in the earliest years of the Republic and largely fell into disuse in the early years of the nineteenth century. The role of the majority party caucus in the formal organization of the House reentered regular practice later in the nineteenth century. The grip of the majority party caucus on organizational matters tightened twice, at moments when the political stakes were high and party leaders saw control of the Speaker and other senior House officers as central to achieving their political goals. The first instance was during the early years of the Second Party System, when Martin Van Buren and his followers recognized that the formal leadership of the House possessed valuable resources for the creation of effective mass political parties in the United 1 At the same time, congressional caucuses (made up of party members of both the House and Senate) were major players in determining presidential nominations. These congressional nominating caucuses were a staple of the First Party System, and lasted through 1824. 1-4 States. The second instance was during the Civil War, when efforts to effect a cross-party organization in the prior Congress nearly backfired for the majority Republicans. These were two critical moments in the history of the House’s organization that resulted in the majority party caucus claiming an enhanced role in determining who would sit in the chair and who would dominate the committees. However, the influence of party on the House’s organization did not grow monotonically. Rather, from the 1830s to the 1860s, the House often fought bitterly over who the Speaker and other officers would be, with the party caucus playing a highly variable role in determining the final outcome. The primary reason why the majority party failed to guarantee its predominance in organizing the House after the 1830s is that Van Buren and his followers also unwittingly created a highly visible platform on which anti- and pro-slavery forces could test their strength in national politics. This platform was constructed by a House rules change in 1838 that for the first time made the ballot for Speaker public. (Previously, the balloting for all House officers, including Speaker, had been secret.) The rules change was instituted to give party leaders reliable information about who had supported the party nominee for Speaker and other offices. Before long, it was transformed into a mechanism for the ultras on both sides of the slavery debate to observe who was voting for nominees considered to be on the “right” side of the issue — not at all what the Van Burenites had in mind. The modern Republican party, starting with the second Civil War Congress, established the party caucus, once-and-for-all, as the only legitimate venue for the resolution of intra-party divisions about who would be Speaker. The utility of settling internecine disputes in caucus and then presenting a united front on the floor was quickly recognized by the minority Democrats, who followed suit by settling on their Speaker nominee in caucus, too. As a result, the opening 1-5 session of the 39th Congress (1865) was the first in which each party officially placed a single individual’s name into nomination for Speaker and then proceeded to vote for these nominees strictly by party. The Civil War Congresses were unique in American history, owing to the exclusion of the South from the body. The majority Republicans were a purely regional party by construction and highly cohesive, viewed historically. The minority Democrats were also northern, but not by construction. When the South returned to the House at the end of Reconstruction, the result was to make the two parties more evenly matched numerically. They also became more ideologically diverse. These two factors — narrow party margins and ideologically divided parties — had been the primary ingredients that fueled the intense battles over the speakership before the Civil War. And yet, unlike the antebellum era, the parties after the Civil War managed to keep their fights to themselves and their ideological divisions from spilling out onto the House floor. As a consequence, when Thomas Brackett Reed (R-Me.) became Speaker in 1889, the common understanding in the House, bolstered by two decades of experience, was that the party caucuses were cohesive on organizational matters.