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The Islamic Jihad Union on the Internationalisation of Uzbek Jihadism

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The Islamic Jihad Union on the Internationalisation of Uzbek Jihadism Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs The Islamic Jihad Union On the Internationalisation of Uzbek Jihadism Guido Steinberg SWP Comments The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), founded in 2002 after splitting off from the Islamic Move- ment of Uzbekistan (IMU), has been trying since 2007 to boost its public image. Unlike the IMU, the largest militant organisation in Central Asia, it advocates the internation- alisation of the “Holy War” and has joined forces with the Taliban in Afghanistan and with al-Qaida on the global level. It is a young and small organisation and together with al-Qaida has been training volunteers from Central Asia, Pakistan and Europe in the Pakistani region of Waziristan. Although so far the IJU seems to have had little influ- ence in its native Uzbekistan, it has managed to recruit a group of Turks and Germans, some of whom planned attacks in Germany in 2007. It is still too early to speak of a trend, but should the IJU and al-Qaida succeed in recruiting greater numbers of young Turks and Germans of Turkish origin, the likelihood of attacks in Germany will increase. In early March 2008 the Islamic Jihad 2007 [of those suspected of planning bomb- Union announced on a Turkish website ing attacks on targets in Germany] the IJU (www.sehadetvakti.com), that Cüneyt Ç., a has come under great pressure. In October Turk born and living in Germany, had the Pakistani army launched an offensive carried out a suicide attack on American against Uzbek fighters in Mir Ali in North and Afghan troops in the Afghan province Waziristan, where the IJU has its head- of Paktika. The website showed pictures of quarters. In January 2008 the IJU’s liaison Ç. while training. This announcement to al-Qaida, the Libyan Abu Laith al-Libi, marked the first peak of an intensive public was killed by a missile fired from an Ameri- relations campaign that the IJU began in can drone in Mir Ali as well. Several mem- 2007. In a bid to gain access to new recruits bers of the IJU were also killed in the attack. and funds the IJU has tried to present itself on the Internet as a transnational organisa- tion with supporters in Pakistan, Afghani- A Splinter Group of the stan, Central Asia and Europe. At the same Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan time, since the arrests in the Sauerland Some members of the IMU had already town of Oberschledorn in the German state rejected the line followed by its leadership of North-Rhine Westphalia in September which still primarily targets the Karimov Dr. Guido Steinberg is researcher at the Middle East and Africa Research Division of SWP SWP Comments 7 April 2008 1 regime in Uzbekistan in 2001. In 2002 they to prevail. Nevertheless, the fact that most founded the more internationally oriented members of the organisation came from IJU, which follows the global Jihad of the Fergana valley meant that it had an al-Qaida. international component as well. Mainly The IJU still maintains close contacts inhabited by ethnic Uzbeks, it was divided with its mother organisation, the IMU. in the 1920s between the three Soviet Until 1998 the IMU had its headquarters in republics Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Tajikistan, but subsequently relocated to Kyrgyzstan. The division brought about a Afghanistan, at that time still governed by complex mixture of territories and ethnic the Taliban, after it was subjected to in- groups, the main reason why Tajikistan and creasing pressure in Central Asia. In the Kyrgyzstan have also become targets of the summers of 1999 and 2000 its fighters IMU. The IMU is thus actually more of a infiltrated to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan liberation movement for the Fergana valley, from Tajikistan. fighting the three ruling regimes there, During the invasion of Afghanistan, rather than a purely Uzbek organisation. starting from October 2001, the IMU Nevertheless, after 1998 the IMU moved suffered massive losses, and its leader Juma closer to more globally oriented groups like Namangani was killed. Under the leader- al-Qaida. This was due partly to the nation- ship of the religious-political head of the ality of its recruits: along with Uzbeks who organisation, Tahir Yoldashev, its remain- form the majority of fighters, Kyrgyz, Tajiks ing members retreated from northern and and a few other Central Asian nationalities central Afghanistan to the Pakistani side of started affiliating with the IMU. These were the Afghan-Pakistani border zone. Today joined by Chechens and Uighurs from the they continue to operate mainly from Chinese province of Xinjiang, who together South Waziristan. with the IMU and the Taliban fought the Even before the loss of its base in north- Northern Alliance in northern Afghanistan. ern Afghanistan there were differences of Had the organisation focused its efforts opinion in the IMU about the organisation’s entirely on Uzbekistan it would have risked ideological and strategic direction, which losing the support of non-Uzbeks. In ad- ultimately led to the IJU splitting off from dition, by operating together with the the main organisation. One of the main Taliban, its Pakistani sympathisers and issues in the dispute was whether the IMU al-Qaida’s Arab fighters the IMU strength- should continue to limit its activities to ened the feeling of solidarity between the combating the Karimov regime in Uzbeki- different nationalities. Tahir Yoldashev stan or whether they should be extended to responded by devoting more of his speeches the whole of Central Asia, or even, like publicised on the Internet to conflicts out- those of al-Qaida, to western states as well. side Central and Southern Asia, declaring In summer 2001 it initially looked as if the that the IMU supported the struggle against internationalist camp would gain the the West in Chechnya, Iraq and Palestine. upper hand. The Central Asian media re- But this seems to have been mainly pro- ported that the IMU had changed its name paganda, for elsewhere in his messages, to Islamic Party of Turkestan (Hizb-i Islami Yoldashev repeatedly emphasised that the Turkestan) and was working to bring about IMU’s primary aim was to overthrow the an Islamic revolution in the whole of Cen- regimes in the Central Asian states of tral Asia. This report was, however, quickly Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and denied by the IMU leadership which empha- that it had not renounced its original goals sised that the organisation was continuing in Central Asia. to focus only on Uzbekistan. Also in the Consequently, the IMU’s supporters only following years it appeared as if the Uzbek occasionally participated in the campaigns nationalists within the IMU had managed of the Taliban and its Pakistani and Arab SWP Comments 7 April 2008 2 supporters in Afghanistan—even though in (which then still called itself the Islamic the meantime it had relocated its head- Jihad Group) staged suicide attacks on the quarters near the Afghan-Pakistani border. Israeli and US embassies and on the office Instead, since 2006/2007 the IMU together of the attorney general in the Uzbek capital with its local ally Baitullah Mehsud has Tashkent. These were not only the first fought mainly against the Pakistani govern- attacks on western targets but also (in com- ment. Mehsud, a local Pakistani supporter bination with related bombings in Tash- of the Taliban, was designated as the leader kent in spring 2004) the first suicide attacks of the Pakistani Taliban movement in in Central Asia. Some of the attackers were December 2007. Since then he has stepped apparently trained in Waziristan. Since up his campaign against the Pakistani state then other attacks on western states and and has been held responsible for attacks their allies have been planned. outside the Pashtun tribal areas in central Pakistan. Because Mehsud is its most im- portant local supporter, but also because The Alliance with al-Qaida the Pakistani army has already launched In the years that followed the organisation several attacks on the IMU’s bases in Waziri- strived mainly to consolidate its base in stan, the organisation is backing Mehsud’s North Waziristan. The IJU probably has no anti-Pakistani strategy. Yoldashev con- more than 100 to 200 supporters. Most of firmed this in a video message in January them are from Uzbekistan, but they also 2008, in which he called for an intensifica- include Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, and it tion of the “Holy War” against the Pakistani also cooperates closely with Chechen and security forces. Uighur militants. Since the much stronger IMU also has a presence in Waziristan, until 2007 the IJU had major problems establish- An Internationalist Ideology ing a profile of its own. It has tried to In June 2007 the Uzbek Najmiddin Jalolov, achieve this by actively supporting the who is purported to be the leader of the IJU, Taliban in Afghanistan and by maintaining outlined the ideology and aims of the IJU in close links with al-Qaida. an interview that appeared on Turkish For al-Qaida and the Taliban the IJU is a websites. In the interview Jalolov explained much more attractive ally than the IMU, that the IJU was still intending to overthrow because it has given its unconditional back- the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan but that ing both to the campaign against foreign this was only one of the organisation’s troops in Afghanistan and to al-Qaida’s goals and that its main area of combat in global Jihad. The liaison figure between 2007 was Afghanistan. He said the IJU was al-Qaida and IJU was Abu Laith al-Libi, one trying to coordinate its activities there with of Bin Laden’s most important field com- other Central Asians and fighters from the manders, who was killed in early 2008.
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