Iran and the Caucasus 21 (2017) 415-430 The Uyghur Terrorism: Phenomenon and Genesis* Maria A. Soloshcheva Department of Asian and African Studies, HSE, Saint Petersburg Abstract The aim of this paper is 1) to analyse the historical and political roots of the current situa- tion in Xinjiang; 2) to identify the boundaries that separate the legal opposition from what is usually called non-system opposition; and 3) to study a set of preconditions that have affected the emergence of the phenomenon of the Uyghur terrorism. In a broader sense, the engagement of the Uyghur population in separatist activities under the slogan of the most radical Islamic religious-political movements (Jabhat an-Nusra (alias Jabhat Fateh al- Sham), ISIL, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, etc.) is addressed. Generally, the author tries to answer the following questions: What are the motives and methods of Uyghur terrorists? What dynamics of their violent acts may we consider in the People’s Republic of China and abroad? What legal and terrorist organisations have Chinese Uyghurs as members? And what distinguishes legal and the so called non-system Uyghur opposition? Keywords Uyghur Terrorism, China, ETIM, WUC, ISIL, Al-Qaeda, Pan-Turkism INTRODUCTION The PRC (People’s Republic of China) pursues a specific national policy, which follows the ideological assumptions developed in the early Soviet period. This concerns the idea of national self-determination developed by Stalin, which implied the formal administrative and cultural autonomy for the ethnic groups under full political control (Stalin 1946). Respec- tively, the Autonomous Regions (AR) are organised according to ethnic principles. In each of them (Xinjiang Uyghur AR, Tibetan AR, Inner Mon- * This article is an output of the research project Positive and Negative Discrimination of Cultural Groups and Identification Theory, implemented as a part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE, Saint Petersburg). © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2017 DOI: 10.1163/1573384X-20170408 Downloaded from Brill.com10/04/2021 06:17:47PM via free access 416 M. A. Soloshcheva / Iran and the Caucasus 21 (2017) 415-430 golia AR, Ningxia Hui AR, Guangxi-Zhuang AR), we may to a certain ex- tent speak about a problem of ethno-national character, which the Chi- nese Government is not yet able to solve. Xinjiang has an obvious speci- ficity in comparison with other similar autonomies in that it has a major- ity of Turkic Muslim population, which makes the region vulnerable to the spread of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist propaganda. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The beginning of Uyghur resistance dates back to the time of Qing rule when the Empire conquered the region in the mid-18th century. Disturb- ances never ended, and there were even short periods of de facto inde- pendence when local states were proclaimed (East Turkestan Republic of 1931-34 and 1944-49). Since 1949, as a result of the geopolitical transfor- mation of the post-war period, the region has become an integral part of the PRC, and national autonomy was established in 1955. This painful period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in the his- tory of the PRC buried the idea of the peaceful integration of ethnic mi- norities into Han Chinese society. Traditional and religious communities, such as Uyghur Muslims and Tibetan Buddhists, suffered immensely. In- tellectuals, religions and minority languages became the objects of re- pression. A long chain of mutual reprisals followed, resulting in the cur- rent topical question of “Uyghur terrorism”. The preconditions of the phenomenalisation of the Uyghur question are first of all to be found in the PRC. Han Chinese and Uyghurs were placed in circumstances in which the absence of distinctive principles of intercultural relations created a dramatic collision and made them ene- mies in an internal quasi-civil war in which the official state was on the side of the Han Chinese. The essential idea regarded by the separatist ide- ologists as a reason for their activities is the concept of justice, and it has deep religious undertones in Islamic political culture (see, e.g., Rawls 1999). The rigid measures of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the 1960s and 1970s concerning religion forced Muslim Uyghurs to flee to Ka- zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey forming diaspo- ras there. According to some investigations, about 80,000 Uyghurs fled from Xinjiang in the early 1960s (Harris 1993: 115). In the 1990s, according Downloaded from Brill.com10/04/2021 06:17:47PM via free access M. A. Soloshcheva / Iran and the Caucasus 21 (2017) 415-430 417 to some scholars, the main reason for Uyghur dissent was not only derived from radical Islam but also from socio-economic concerns and a lack of political autonomy (Haider 2005: 524). After the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, followed by the fall of the Soviet Union, Uyghurs saw neighbouring Muslim states with a tendency for radicalisation achieving independence and started regarding them as a positive example to be followed. Thus, both foreign and internal reasons made separatist ideas flourish in XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) and forced Uyghurs to flee their homeland to chase a dream of a better life. Another important factor that fuelled discontent was the demographic policy of the СPC. At the moment of the establishment of the PRC, Uy- ghurs made up about 90% of the population in the region. Now they ac- count for less than half (statistics from 2015 showed 11,3 million Uyghurs and 11,91 million “others”). In the neighbouring Tibetan autonomous re- gion, for example, Tibetans, according to the official data census, account for more than 90% of the population (Statistical Yearbook 2016: 108; Fayaz 2012: 242). National minorities began to regard Han people in Xinjiang as invaders who came to take their land and jobs. Some Uyghurs disliked Han Chinese so much that the latter began to feel discriminated against. For example, Han Chinese claim that Uyghur drivers don’t take Han pas- senger (Wang 2012). New factors have more recently emerged. There are not just internal national minority members trying to make their dreams of an independ- ent East Turkestan come true. These have real ideological, financial and material support from abroad, including unofficial encouragement from different states (that sponsor Uyghur organisations advocating democ- racy, “real autonomy”, or even freedom for Xinjiang) and terrorist training in some Central Asian countries. On the other hand, we see other coun- tries supporting the PRC, developing their economic ties with China and sustaining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) anti-terrorist activities. In March, 2017, a video was released by the Uyghur ethnic minority members of the Islamic State who vowed “to return home and shed blood like rivers”. This was in fact the first direct threat against China by ISIL Downloaded from Brill.com10/04/2021 06:17:47PM via free access 418 M. A. Soloshcheva / Iran and the Caucasus 21 (2017) 415-430 Uyghurs (Clarke 2017). Chinese scholars agree that the influence of ter- rorism on the territory of the PRC is constantly growing (Gu 2014). UYGHUR ORGANISATIONS The Uyghur diaspora outside the PRC may number 550,000–650,000 peo- ple (Shichor 2009b). A lot of organisations (based in Washington D.C., Munich, Istanbul, and other places abroad) with different agendas claim to represent the interests of the Uyghur people all over the world. Some of them officially announce violent radical ideas to be their ideology, while others pretend to be just freedom fighters that use peaceful methods to protect human rights. The most influential “East Turkestan” organisations are the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) based in Germany and the terror- ist organisation the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Non-“East Turkestan” terrorist organisations that have Chinese Uy- ghurs as their active members include the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). ● World Uyghur Congress (WUC). According the official website of the WUC (www.uyghurcongress.org), its goal is not to achieve independence for East Turkestan, as there is no legal process to redraw state boundaries according to the will of people, and secession within a single state is a domestic matter not covered by international law (Pavkovich/Radan 2003; Gudeleviciute 2005). An official statement announces that “The World Uyghur Congress strives to promote democracy, human rights and freedom for the Uyghur people through peaceful, non-violent, and demo- cratic means in order to determine their political future”. This seems to be more or less politically correct. Yet, when we look at other statements of the organisation, it is easy to understand why they are outlawed in the PRC. Take for example the following statement: “East Turkestan has nine countries as neighbours—Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Af- ghanistan, Pakistan, India, Tibet and China”. This not only means that the WUC regards XUAR as a separate state, but that they proclaim Tibet to be one too. The WUC was established in Munich, Germany in 2004 as an amal- gamation of the East Turkestan National Congress and the World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC), forming a united organisation to represent the Downloaded from Brill.com10/04/2021 06:17:47PM via free access M. A. Soloshcheva / Iran and the Caucasus 21 (2017) 415-430 419 collective interest of the Uyghur people in XUAR and abroad. The WUYC had previously been listed as a terrorist organisation by the Chinese Min- istry of Public Security (CPG 2005). Many tragic events that have occurred in the PRC, such as the riots of 2009 in Urumchi, may be identified as terrorist acts that were inspired by Rebiya Kadeer, the chairwoman of the WUC since 2006 (Xinhua 2009).