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Country Reports on Terrorism 2017

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Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 September 2018 ________________________________ United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism Released September 2018 Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. 1 2 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2017 Table of Contents Foreword Chapter 1 – Country Reports on Terrorism AFRICA Overview Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Somalia South Africa Tanzania Uganda EAST ASIA and PACIFIC Overview Australia China Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand EUROPE Overview Albania Austria Azerbaijan Belgium 3 Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Cyprus Denmark France Georgia Germany Greece Italy Kosovo Macedonia The Netherlands Norway Russia Serbia Spain Sweden Turkey United Kingdom THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA Overview Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq Israel, Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA Overview Afghanistan Bangladesh India Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic 4 Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan WESTERN HEMISPHERE Overview Argentina Brazil Canada Colombia Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Trinidad and Tobago Venezuela Chapter 2 – State Sponsors of Terrorism Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Iran Sudan Syria Chapter 3 – The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Chapter 4. Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report) Terrorist Safe Havens Africa Southeast Asia Middle East and North Africa South Asia Western Hemisphere Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front Multilateral Efforts to Counter Terrorism Long-Term Programs and Initiatives Designed to Counter Terrorist Safe Havens Countering Violent Extremism Civilian Counterterrorism Capacity Building Programs Support for Pakistan Counterterrorism Coordination with Saudi Arabia Broadcasting Board of Governors Initiatives: Outreach to Foreign Muslim Audiences Visas for Participants in United States Programs 5 Basic Education in Muslim Countries Economic Reform in Muslim Majority Countries Chapter 5 – Foreign Terrorist Organizations Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) Ansar al-Dine (AAD) Ansar al-Islam (AAI) Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) Army of Islam (AOI) Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Boko Haram (BH) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) Hamas Haqqani Network (HQN) Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) Hizballah Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM) Indian Mujahedeen (IM) Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) ISIL-Libya ISIS Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Jaysh Rijal Al-Tariq Al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Jundallah Kahane Chai Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) 6 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) National Liberation Army (ELN) Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Al-Qa’ida (AQ) Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Revolutionary Struggle (RS) Al-Shabaab (AS) Shining Path (SL) Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Chapter 6 – Legislative Requirements and Key Terms 7 Foreword The United States and our international partners made major strides to defeat and degrade international terrorist organizations in 2017. We succeeded in liberating nearly all of the territory ISIS once held in Iraq and Syria. We increased pressure on al-Qa’ida to prevent its resurgence. We amplified efforts to expose and curtail Hizballah’s malign activities inside Lebanon, in the Middle East, and across the globe. We worked with allies and partners around the world to expand information sharing, improve aviation security, enhance law enforcement and rule of law capacities, and prevent terrorist recruitment and recidivism. Despite our successes, the terrorist landscape grew more complex in 2017. ISIS, al-Qa’ida, and their affiliates have proven to be resilient, determined, and adaptable, and they have adjusted to heightened counterterrorism pressure in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere. They have become more dispersed and clandestine, turning to the internet to inspire attacks by distant followers, and, as a result, have made themselves less susceptible to conventional military action. Further, the return or relocation of foreign terrorist fighters from the battlefield has contributed to a growing cadre of experienced, sophisticated, and connected terrorist networks, which can plan and execute terrorist attacks. As ISIS lost territory, it continued to shift away from a centralized command and control structure toward a more diffuse model. It has experimented with and employed small unmanned aerial systems and has used rudimentary chemical weapons. The group encouraged sympathizers to use whatever weapons were at hand – such as large vehicles – against soft targets and public spaces. Increasingly, the responsibility for deciding where, when, and how to attack has devolved to homegrown terrorists inspired or enabled by ISIS to conduct operations far from the war zone. In 2017, we saw such attacks in Manchester, UK; Barcelona, Spain; Sinai, Egypt; Marawi, Philippines; New York City; and elsewhere. Al-Qa’ida quietly expanded its membership and operations in 2017. Its global network includes the remnants of its core in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Nusrah Front (in Syria), al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab (in Somalia), and al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent. Nusrah’s formation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, drawing in other hardline Syrian opposition groups, exemplified its effort to rebrand itself to appeal to a wider segment of the Syrian population. Al-Qa’ida affiliates also conducted major attacks, such as in October 2017, when al-Shabaab detonated a truck bomb in the heart of Mogadishu, killing over 300 people, the deadliest terrorist attack in Somali history. Al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri continued to publicly call for supporters to attack the U.S. government and citizens globally. Iran remained the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and continued to support attacks against Israel. It maintained its terrorist-related and destabilizing activities through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force and the Lebanon-based terrorist group Hizballah. Iran is responsible for intensifying multiple conflicts and undermining the legitimate governments of, and U.S. interests in, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. In particular, Iran and Hizballah are emerging from the Syria conflict emboldened and with valuable battlefield experience that they seek to leverage across the globe. IRGC leader Qasem Soleimani recruited and deployed Shia militias from diverse ethnic groups across the Middle 8 East and South Asia to fight in defense of the Assad dictatorship in Syria. Beyond the Middle East, Iran and its terrorist affiliates and proxies posed a significant threat and demonstrated a near-global terrorist reach. Notably, in June 2017, the FBI arrested two suspected Hizballah operatives in Michigan and New York who allegedly were conducting surveillance and intelligence gathering on behalf of the organization, including in the United States. Regionally focused terrorists groups remained a threat in 2017. For example, Hamas continued to rebuild its military infrastructure and capabilities to support terrorist attacks against Israel. Additionally, Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar e-Tayyiba continued to pose a regional threat in the subcontinent. Some regional and local terrorist groups have avoided greater international attention by remaining independent from ISIS and al-Qa’ida while others may have concluded that the benefits of greater expertise, resources, and prominence outweighed the risks of a formal connection with a notorious transnational terrorist network. In short, the nature of the terrorist threat confronting the United States and our allies around the world evolved in 2017. While the immediate dynamics that led terrorists to flock to Iraq and Syria since 2014 have diminished, other factors that terrorists exploit to recruit new followers remained a challenge, such as sectarianism,
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