Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 2005 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met at 10:29 a.m., in room SD–192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Gregg, Cochran, Stevens, Craig, Allard, Byrd, and Inouye. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG Senator GREGG. We will convene this hearing. The purpose of this Homeland Security hearing is to review where we stand relative to defending this Nation from biological or chemical attack, which is in my opinion the biggest threat to our country. If you prioritize threat, which is exactly what we should be doing as a Congress and as a Government, you have to put at the top of the list the concerns weapons of mass destruction used against the American population somewhere here in the United States or overseas obviously. We, 2 years ago, began the effort to try to aggressively address this issue, recognizing some fundamental flaws within our struc- ture as a country, the biggest flaw being the pharmaceutical indus- try, which one would presume would naturally pursue ways of being able to respond to a biological attack, was not structured to do so, and the Government was not structured to deal with a chem- ical or a biological attack. BIOSHIELD So we worked very hard, in my prior role as Chairman of the Health Committee, to pass a piece of legislation called BioShield, which was the initiative of the administration. And the purpose of this bill was to reenergize the vaccine industry in this country and to energize the research community within our Nation to pursue ways to respond to various chemical and biological agents which might be used against us. We understand, obviously, there is no market for a product to re- spond to these type of agents. These agents are by definition agents (1) 2 which do not commonly occur, but only occur when we are at- tacked, although smallpox was a problem, but it has been eradi- cated. So we needed to create a structure where there would be not only an atmosphere where creative individuals and scientists would step forward to develop responses to attacks involving threats such as anthrax, smallpox, botulism, and plague, but we also had to cre- ate a monetary system, a market system which would encourage this from a standpoint of making it a reasonable place to invest your money if you were an investor. And that is what BioShield was all about. It basically put the Government in the business of buying antidotes and vaccines for this list of major threats. We are now well into this process. Progress has been made in some areas but there is still a long way to go in other areas. The purpose of this hearing is to discuss what we are doing and what we should be doing that will better produce results. My own personal concern is we have still not stood up a vaccine industry in this country at the level I would like to see it. We still do not have many participants in the production of vaccine, that the research community, especially our academic research commu- nity, has not yet embraced this initiative as well as and as aggres- sively as I would hope, and that there appears to be some incen- tives in the system which are discouraging research in this area, and the question of how we are purchasing products, to the extent it is being brought on line, whether that is chilling competition or participation of other parties in the research and development of creative new ways to address these types of threats. It is a complex issue involving the most cutting-edge levels of science, and it does not have a simple solution. If it did, we would have gotten to it much sooner. But we do have a committed effort to do it, and we have got a committed Government to accomplish it, and I think we have got some good witnesses today to find out where we stand and where we should go. With that, I will yield to the honorable Senator from Virginia, Senator Byrd. STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD Senator BYRD. That is West Virginia. Senator GREGG. I apologize profusely. BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL ATTACK Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank you for your service. I listened with rapt attention at your remarks. You are well prepared to be the Chairman of this subcommittee and well prepared to probe this very important subject. I welcome the witnesses on both panels for this hearing, and I applaud you, Mr. Chairman, for calling us together for such an im- portant topic. Earlier this year during testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, CIA Director Porter Goss warned and I quote ‘‘It is only a matter of time before Al Qaeda or another terrorist group tries to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons in the United States.’’ Mr. Chairman, I believe that. I believe it is ab- solutely the case, and I am not sure that we are prepared. I doubt it because we do not know when, we do not know where this mon- 3 ster will confront us with a bioterror attack, a chemical attack, a nuclear attack, or a radiological attack. With regard to a biological attack, Congress made a serious com- mitment by appropriating $5.6 billion to pursue new vaccines and medications to protect the American public from known biological threats. It is essential the agencies involved in this process be ac- countable for progress in this area. So, I look forward to discussing this and other homeland security efforts, not only to detect and re- spond to a bioterror incident, but what efforts are being made to prevent a biological, chemical, also to examine nuclear terror inci- dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator GREGG. Thank you, Senator Byrd. We will turn to the panel now. The first panel will be people in our Government who have first-line responsibility for getting us prepared for a biological or chemical attack and being able to re- spond to it. Our first witness is Dr. Albright who was confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security, Plans, Programs, and Budgets on October 3. Our second witness is Mr. Simonson who is the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, United States Department of Health and Human Services. And these two gentlemen have the portfolio and we look forward to hearing how we are doing. So let us start with you, Dr. Albright. STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT Dr. ALBRIGHT. Good afternoon, Chairman Gregg, Senator Byrd, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the progress the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security is making in the Nation’s efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of bioterrorism against the American peo- ple. President Bush has made strengthening the Nation’s defenses against biological weapons a critical national priority. The Presi- dent’s focus on these issues has resulted in a joint Homeland Secu- rity Presidential Directive/National Security Presidential directive entitled Biodefense for the 21st Century that provides a com- prehensive framework for our Nation’s sustained and focused effort against biological weapons threats. ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN BIODEFENSE The Department of Homeland Security and the Science and Technology Directorate have explicit responsibilities in this inte- grated national effort. In particular, I want to highlight the strat- egy, planning, and accomplishments to date of the Science and Technology Directorate in the area of biodefense and the essential collaborations with key Federal partners, including those rep- resented here today. In 2004 and 2005, the Science and Technology Directorate devel- oped a national architecture and plan for the detection of biological attacks, should they occur, and as initial steps, deployed the BioWatch Environmental Sensor System to protect our Nation’s cit- ies from the threat and ramifications of such an attack and also 4 initiated the design of the National Biosurveillance Integration System as part of an interagency process. We completed the planning and conceptual design of the Na- tional Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. This cen- ter will focus on, among other things, creating a scientifically based understanding of the biological threat. We established the Biodefense Knowledge Center, which is an operational hub for enabling collaboration and communication within the Homeland Security enterprise. We have certified four material threats and have two additional certifications underway. These material threat determinations are required in order to com- mit BioShield funds. We have established a National Bioforensic Analysis Center to provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evi- dence from biocrimes and terrorism to obtain a biological finger- print to identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of the attack. In 2006, our expectations are to complete the deployment of the second generation BioWatch system to the top threat cities and to complete test and evaluation of the laboratory prototypes for the third generation of these detection systems. We will also complete the first formal risk assessment that is re- quired under HSPD-10 and close many of the key remaining exper- imental gaps in our knowledge of the classic biological threat agents. We will continue operations of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and essential upgrades to the facility and initiate the design of the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility.