A Professional Journal of National Defence College
Volume 7 Number 1 June 2008
National Defence College Bangladesh EDITORIAL BOARD
Chief Patron Lieutenant General Mohd Aminul Karim, ndc, ldmc, psc Editor-in-Chief Air Commodore Mahmud Hussain, ndc, psc Associate Editors Captain S Aslam Parvez, (TAS), afwc, psc, BN Lieutenant Colonel Md Abdur Rouf, afwc, psc Assistant Editor Civilian Staff Officer-3 Md Nazrul Islam Editorial Advisor Professor Dr. Fakrul Alam
DISCLAMER The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NDC, Bangladesh Armed Forces or any other agencies of Bangladesh Government. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in NDC Journal are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editors or publisher. ISSN: 1683-8475
INITIAL SUBMISSION Initial submission of manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to the National Defence College, Mirpur Cantonment, Dhaka-1216, Bangladesh. Tel: 88 02 9014922, Fax: 88 02 8013080, E mail : [email protected], ndc@ndc. gov.bd. Authors should consult the Notes for Contributions at the back of the Journal before submitting their final draft. The editors cannot accept responsibility for any damage to or loss of manuscripts.
Subscription Rate (Single Copy) Individuals : Tk 300 / USD 10 (including postage) Institutions : Tk 375 / USD 15 (including postage) Published by the National Defence College, Bangladesh All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electrical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. Design & Printed by : GraphNet Limited 55/B, Purana Paltan (3rd Floor), Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh Tel : 880-2-9566649, 7168945, E-mail : [email protected] COLLEGE GOVERNING BODY
PRESIDENT Prof Dr Iajuddin Ahmed Hon’ble President People’s Republic of Bangladesh
VICE PRESIDENT General Moeen U Ahmed, ndc, psc; Chief of Army Staff Vice Admiral Sarwar Jahan Nizam, (C), ndu, psc; Chief of Naval Staff Air Marshal S M Ziaur Rahman,, ndc, psc; Chief of Air Staff MEMBERS Mr Kamrul Hassan Lieutenant General Mohd Aminul Karim Secretary, Ministry of Defence ndc, ldmc, psc Md Abdus Salam Khan Commandant Secretary, Ministry of Establishment National Defence College Lieutenant General Md Abdul Mubeen Dr Mohammad Tareque ndc, psc Secretary, Ministry of Finance Principal Staff Officer Md Touhid Hossain, ndc Armed Forces Division Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Major General Iqbal Karim Bhuiyan, psc Commandant Mr Md Momtazul Islam Secretary, Ministry of Education Defence Services Command & Staff College Professor S M A Faiz Vice Chancellor, Dhaka University Professor Mohammad Muniruzzaman Vice Chancellor, Jahangir Nagar University Professor Syed Rashedul Hasan Vice Chancellor, National University
MEMBER SECRETARY Commodore A S M Abdul Baten, (E), ndc, psc, BN; Senior Directing Staff (Navy), National Defence College Captain M Shakhawat Hossian, psc, BN; Colonel General Staff, Defence Services Command and Staff College III LIST OF FACULTY AND STAFF
COMMANDANT
Lieutenant General Mohd Aminul Karim, ndc, ldmc, psc
NDC FACULTY Brigadier General Ferdous Hasan Khan, ndc, psc, SDS (Army) Commodore A S M Abdul Baten, (E), ndc, psc, BN, SDS (Navy) Air Commodore Mahmud Hussain, ndc, psc, SDS (Air) Joint Secretary Mohd Abduz Zaher, ndc, SDS (Civil)
AFWC FACULTY
Brigadier General Md Mainul Islam, awc, psc, CI Colonel Gazi Md Solaiman, afwc, psc, DS (Army-1) Colonel Mehdi Hasan, afwc, psc, DS (Army-2) Captain S Aslam Parvez,afwc, psc, BN, DS (Navy) Group Captain A H M Fazlul Haque, afwc,psc, DS(Air)
STAFFS
Lieutenant Colonel Sakhawat Hossain, psc, GSO-1 (Admin) Lieutenant Colonel Md Abdur Rouf, afwc, psc, GSO-1 (Trg) Major Alim Hossain Khan, Accts Officer Major Md. Nazrul Islam, MTO/QM Squadron Leader Jahangir Alam Talukder, GSO-2 (SD) Major Irshadur Rahman, GSO-2 (Coord) Major Md Bokhtier Rahman Khan, psc, GSO-2 (P&C) Major Syed Jamil Ahsan, psc, GSO-2(Coord) AFWC Wing Major Mohammad Ashraful Alam, GSO-2 (Computer) Mr Md Nazrul Islam, CSO-3 (Library)
IV VISION AND MISSION STATEMENTS OF THE COLLEGE
VISION The National Defence College is dedicated to be the premier National Centre of Excellence in security, strategic and development studies.
MISSION
To Educate and Train Selected Senior Armed Forces and Civil Services Officers at Operational and Strategic Level of National Security and Development.
To Focus on Long Term National Security and Development Issues and Suggest Appropriate National Response.
To Support the National Agencies in Policy Making on Security and Development Matters.
To Support the Armed Forces on Strategic and Operational Level Planning of Warfare.
To Strengthen Civil-Military Relation in Bangladesh.
To Strengthen Military to Military Cooperation in the Region and Beyond.
FOREWARD
Tenth year into our ongoing quest for better understanding of development and security, the National Defence College, Bangladesh is constantly striving to offer a pragmatic and time-befitting academic curricula to the potential policy planners, leaders and strategic thinkers of the future. In the ever changing perspective of its internal and external dynamics, Bangladesh has to constantly adjust and align its policy perceptions to keep up with the globalized world yet meeting the challenges of a developing small state within the South Asian geo-political reality. I firmly believe that our endeavor to constantly review , analyse and assess our security dynamics and search for viable strategy options will contribute to secure our nation and its citizens positively. We clearly see a reflection of that as we notice that the alumni of the College have already begun to make the difference in their respective fields. In this contemporary era development and security are a broad and comprehensive concept. It is no more only traditional security although it is an important pillar of it. It is state, human, environment and trans-state security in one whole. Therefore, insularity within a nation’s geo-political boundary and military power alone can no longer make a state secure. External and international imperatives are too obvious and interlinked and their implications are bound to affect the state, be it large or small, weak or strong. Environmental degradation, syndicated crimes, terrorism and fundamentalism, for example, are issues which obviously have global linkages and therefore can no longer be addressed alone by individual states. Most issues need a concerted understanding by all in the international community and states need to devise their policies and strategies to address these in line with the global policy and strategic framework complementing each other. The National Defence College over the years has been promoting this concept to that end and encouraging free flow of diverse opinions and sharing of ideas through international exposure and international participation. Course Members of 2007, many from eleven overseas countries, shared a common roof here in the College to freely exchange ideas and views to make tomorrows’ world a better place to live. I am happy to note the publication of the 7th issue of NDC journal bears the testimony of our contemporary thinking and attitude. A number of selected research works, of the Course Members of both National Defence Course and Armed Forces War Course, of diverse subjects have been accommodated here. As usual the articles have been condensed from the originals in the interest of space management. Although in some cases it might have, to an extent, told on the quality it will not deprive the readers of the intellectual stimulant offered in the articles. I congratulate the Course Members and the guest contributor for contributing to the Journal. I also compliment the Editorial Board for editing and publishing the Journal on time. I wish that our alumni and the readers find this Journal useful in consolidating their conviction of attaining ‘Security through Knowledge’ and evoking greater understanding and interest of the gamut of development and security.
Mohd Aminul Karim, ndc, ldmc, psc Lieutenant General Commandant VI EDITORIAL
This volume is the seventh issue of the ‘NDC Journal’. National Defence College has been very regular in bringing out on time its publication every year. This happens just before the scheduled departure of NDC to foreign countries on a study tour. This speaks highly of the laborious effort and genuine commitment on the part of both the editorial staff and writers. For writers, it is a difficult task to shorten lengthy papers under strict conditions set upon them for publication. The selected ones which appear in the NDC journal are the abridged version of their long research papers. While research papers are usually of 12000 -15000 words, the abridged versions are of 5000 -6000 words. To shorten the length of a research work by more than a half, and still be able to maintain its original quality so that it is selected for publication in a reputed journal requires high degree of writing and mental skills. For the editorial staff, the task is even more challenging and daunting. This year, the total output in research work from both National Defence and Armed Forces War courses was about close to seventy individual research papers. To select only ten of them demanded consensus based on serious examination of these papers on the part of the editorial staff. Two other papers, one from the previous year and the second, an analytical essay have also been included in this issue. This year’s volume includes papers that can be grouped into five major areas of interest. These highlight the subjects of national security involving its challenges, formation of national security council, management of power sector, implications of human rights upon limits of sovereignty, and effects of Indo-US nuclear deal; of operational concerns relating to asymmetric warfare, and defence procurement and budget; of geo- strategic importance dealing with de-limitation of maritime boundaries of Bangladesh; of socio-economic issues concerning poverty reduction, and the history of an ethnic community; and at last, of military education addressing strategic and operational context. A reader, before getting into the pleasure of reading, can get an idea of what these papers are about from the abstracts included at the beginning of this journal. While selecting papers for this issue, the focus had been to look at security from a holistic angle. As one reads through them, one will observe a smooth and systematic progress in the development of the idea of security. The reader will get a comprehensive picture of the factors that encompass the security paradigm in modern perspective. The practice of measuring effectiveness of security in terms of territorial integrity and sovereignty is, no longer, the only method available to researchers. Non-traditional factors of security as envisaged in political, economic, societal and environmental issues apart from military-centric value have equal claim upon intellectual exercise. A state is an abstract entity while citizens within that state are living objects. While a state presupposes a nominal worth of security, the citizens demand a real and tangible value of it. The substance of the papers included in this issue is to articulate this living, real and tangible truth as espoused in the comprehensive view of security. Research is a highly committed undertaking. It has two principal goals: one, to investigate a matter of urgent importance to a part or whole of society; and other, to create a sense of responsibility for further investigation in those researchers who are connected with it. It is the second group of people to whom research serves a most useful purpose. A research work that does not contain seeds of germination withers away before it has done its duty, while a scholarly one continues to be referred to for its merit and utility. We hope that all papers included in this volume will satisfy both these goals.
Mahmud Hussain Air Commodore Senior Directing Staff (Air)
VII CONTENTS
Page Foreward vi Editorial vii Abstracts ix National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options 1 - Brigadier General Mohammad Saber, ndc, psc, G National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues 27 - Captain Kazi Kamrul Hassan, ndc, psc, BN Effective Management in Power Sector and Its Implication in National Security 51 - Commander Mahmudul Huq Chowdhury, afwc, psc, BN Human Rights and Limits of Sovereignty: Implications for National Security 77 - Major General J J P S T Liyanage, RSP, USP, ndc, IG, ldmc Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Its Implications for South Asia and Beyond 91 - Air Commodore A B M Mostafizur Rahman, ndc, psc Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective 111 - Major General Sheikh Md Monirul Islam, ndc, psc Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation in Bangladesh Perspective 133 - Lieutenant Colonel Abu Sayed Siddique, afwc, psc Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces 159 - Lieutenant Colonel Saleem Ahmad Khan, afwc, psc, te Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects. 185 - Director General Shabbir Ahmad Chowdhury, ndc Poverty Reduction through Effective Social Safety Nets Programmes: Revisiting Rural Maintainance Programme as Poverty Reduction Strategy 203 - Joint Secretary Md Ataur Rahman, ndc Socio-Cultural and Socio-Economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulavi Bazar District 221 - Additional Secretary Md. Zahurul Alam, ndc Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: The Case of Bangladesh 239 - Lieutenant General Abu Tayeb Muhammad Zahirul Alam, rcds, psc -Air Commodore Mahmud Hussain, ndc, psc List of Individual Research Papers: 2007 253
VIII ABSTRACT
NATIONAL SECURITY OF BANGLADESH: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS Brigadier General Mohammad Saber, ndc, psc, G
National security essentially means safeguarding the territorial boundary of a nation-state against external aggression and ensuring a cohesive society. Any thing which comes in the way, whether internally or externally, is a threat to national security. The question of national security in the 21st century context has emerged as a topic of intense debate in national, regional and international forums. Traditional militaristic and state-centric security discourse can hardly encompass contemporary problems of security. The non-traditional dimensions of national security and the inadequacy mechanism of a state to deal with such issues are equally serious threats to a country. Bangladesh faces wide ranging traditional and non-traditional threats of serious magnitude to her security. Changes in the sources, level and nature of threat over time constitute a new dynamics in the concept of the national security of Bangladesh and have moved to the top of its security agenda. Therefore, need for a comprehensive study to comprehend traditional and non-traditional threats and challenges to the national security of Bangladesh demands high priority. A perspective analysis of challenges threatening the national security of Bangladesh both from traditional and non-traditional points of view, covering socio-politico-economic, environmental and external aspects, including options to address these, shall put an effective check on her multi- dimensional sources of insecurities, and eventually will help resolve the dynamics of security challenges of Bangladesh.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FOR BANGLADESH: DEBATES AND ISSUES Captain Kazi Kamrul Hassan, ndc, psc, BN
The concept of national security in the present days’ perspectives has undergone a paradigm shift recently to take us beyond military might and external threats. New and innovative dimensions of internal security have come into view. A holistic approach to security today embraces all sources of insecurities emanating from internal political, economic and social disorders as well as external threats. Security issues in Bangladesh have not been handled adequately till now and consequential developments are a number of fault-lines generating threats. Recent political anarchy and the nation-wide coordinated explosion of bombs have thrown great challenges to its security. Moreover, issues of poverty, corruptions, lack of justice, etc have also become relevant. Accordingly, platform like the National Security Council (NSC) has been floated by some to handle the present day’s
IX security problems. But, some are suspicious that NSC will mainly serve the corporate interests of the military. Experiences of NSC in the world’s democratic nations show that it can have a flexible structure and variable modus operandi to suit the particular needs of a country. The key here is the set of principles on which the organisation has its edifice. Bangladesh too can establish mechanisms to suit its own interests. There is, thus, a need to work out a solution so that NSC can be made acceptable to the majority, and national security is not threatened and trampled upon in the long run.
EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT IN POWER SECTOR AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Commander Mahmudul Huq Choudhury, afwc, psc, BN
Bangladesh inherited weak infrastructure of power generation and distribution. Instead of improving the power generation situation, the sector has worsened due to inefficient leadership, over-centralization, corruption and mismanagement at all levels. System loss in the sector is the highest in the developing world. The coverage of electricity in the country is limited; only about one third of the population has access to electricity, though the power requirement is increasing fast. Generation of power cannot keep pace with requirement. Shortage of electricity and unreliable power supply are costly. Frequent and prolonged load shedding causes huge losses to industrial production and regularly disrupts economic activities. Efficient and affordable power supply is essential for sustained economic growth. Households need reliable and reasonably priced electricity to attain full socio-economic potential and achieve decent standards of living. Power is thus directly linked to national development. The cumulative effect due to shortage of power can turn into social violence posing a threat to national security. Now a day, security is more concerned with the economy, fighting poverty and encouraging development in all spheres of national life especially for developing countries like Bangladesh. The infrastructure in our country is not adequately geared to providing optimum power in the coming years. Hence there is an urgent need to address this issue at the national planning level before we fall into the trap.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY: IMPLICATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Major General J J P S T Liyanage, RSP, USP, ndc, IG, ldmc
The research was carried out to identify the implications for national security of fighting terrorism within the frame work of human rights. It hypothesizes that in a situation where a state’s sovereignty is threatened due to terrorism, national security can not be ensured without prejudicing human rights in some way or the other. Books, periodicals, newspapers and the internet were used in the investigation along with the authors experience in fighting terrorism in various capacities for over last three decades. The findings confirm the hypothesis was confirmed. However, it was also found that violating fundamental/human rights by the state propagate terrorism and endangers its own national security. Further, it was also found that terrorism has an impact on human rights in three ways, i.e. due to terrorist acts, curtailing of fundamental rights and use of state power against domestic/political opponents of the state on the pretext of fighting terrorism. To safeguard national security, there thus has to be a formula based on laws to fight terrorism and genuine effort by the state to preserve human rights with transparency. Once the problem posed by terrorism is solved, action must be taken immediately to suspend the enacted laws to return to normalcy. Good governance is the key to prevent human rights violations and terrorism. National security can be safeguarded by maintaining human rights, good intelligence agencies, well-equipped, well-trained professional security and police forces.
INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA AND BEYOND Air Commodore ABM Mostafizur Rahman, ndc, psc, ADWC
The Indo-US strategic convergence in a changed geopolitical context resulted in a nuclear deal meant for peaceful cooperation on nuclear energy. Though the agreement seriously dents the non- proliferation regime, it makes sense from a US perspective as it serves US strategic interest in the region by helping India to hedge against China and thereby maintains US supremacy. India, on the other hand, aspiring to become a regional power and desperately hungry for energy, needs US assistance. More to the point is the possible spill over effect of this civilian nuclear deal into power politics and military strategy. This paper contends that the deal will enhance India’s existing nuclear capabilities manifold and may offset the balance of power in the region which may in turn trigger an arms race. Such possibilities when viewed against the socio-economic background of the South
XI Asian region appear as a perfect recipe for disaster. Thus, to offset the negative implications of the deal, the paper suggests a continuous dialogue between the parties for creating an environment of restraint and peace in the region. Concurrently, efforts should be on to improve confidence building measures and institutionalize those by setting up Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs). A multilateral approach by creating and tapping the potentials of the regional forum to discuss the nuclear issue and agreeing to ideas like Nuclear Free Zones, pre-disaster standing procedures, etc. are areas where smaller nations need to focus to restrain or minimize the effect of a nuclear war.
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE Major General Sheikh Md Monirul Islam, ndc, psc
Bangladesh’s security threat emanates from both external and internal sources. The important consideration is to identify the asymmetry that Bangladesh may face from these sources. Future military confrontations will be multi-dimensional with non-linear operations characterized by movement, maneuver and high lethality. These necessitate Bangladesh to conserve her limited resources and employ those for maximum effect with minimum cost. On the other hand, internal conflicts caused by non-state actors may pose unexpected yet serious threat to national security. These threats originate from within and can escalate to dangerous level in dimension and severity. If not addressed at the nascent stage, the actors concerned may gain strength and extend the effort into a protracted campaign, posing severe threats to Bangladesh’s national sovereignty and integrity. Strategic interaction and theory of conflict outcome suggests adoptions of opposite approach interactions for Bangladesh since it is weak actor in any future conflict. Adoption of asymmetric warfare strategy will allow Bangladesh to maximize relative strengths, exploit weaknesses and gain greater freedom of action. The blending of conventional and unconventional warfare (UW) can be done from the beginning of hostilities with a view to upsetting the decision cycle of the enemy through widespread disruption of its force facilitation and time lines. In contrast, political solution to internal issues can be the prime option in defusing any internal conflicting situation. Dealing with the unexpected requires rapid adjustment to the actual situation and hence the necessity of a doctrine, that must create flexible, creative and well-thought in defusing our asymmetric advantages.
XII DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND BUDGET: AN EVALUATION FROM THE BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE Lieutenant Colonel Abu Sayed Siddique, afwc, psc
While defence procurement is a subject of critical importance in any country, for a third world country like ours, it assumes greater significance since our total defence budget is never sufficient, especially in the face of other social and developmental priorities. Therefore, to maximize our meager resources, a comprehensive system of defence procurement is essential to ensure quality equipment and services for the defence forces, keeping in view the need for transparency and accountability. Now the primary question is whether the defence procurement system in Bangladesh is able to fulfill the requirements of the three services, in terms of fielding quality equipment for our services, by ensuring optimum utilization of the available budget. In answering this question an effort has been made in this research paper to carry out an objective analysis of the existing system of defence procurement and suggest measures for optimum utilization of the defence budget. It is an outcome of both primary and secondary research carried out by the author, where his experience as a staff officer of the Armed Forces Division, essentially involved in the procurement process, has been extensively relied upon. Through this research the author has tried to prove that the budget allotted for defence procurement in Bangladesh is substantial, considering the country’s socio-economic condition. But for the optimum utilization of the defence budget, particularly in the field of capital procurement, there is a need for effective planning, policy and procedural reforms and organizational restructuring.
INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL COMMUNICATION RESOURCES TO NHANCE THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF BANGLADESH ARMED FORCES Lieutenant Colonel Saleem Ahmed Khan, afwc, psc
Because of the rapid development in the field of Information and Communication Technology, a silent revolution has taken place in Bangladesh. Communication resources of different organisations are scattered all over the country. National communication resources can be of great value for the Armed Forces, if coordinated and integrated at the appropriate level. In this paper, resources of national organisations possessing communication assets have been examined to fulfil military communication needs both during peace and war. The integration of national communication resources with military communication is likely to enhance the operational capability of the Armed Forces. Besides, the integration is likely to complement military communication to a great extent and serve as an alternate communication means as well. This research project thus analysed the prospects and challenges of integrating the resources leading to requirement of policy guideline at the national and Armed Forces level. The integration will also provide multiple options of operational and tactical communication for the Armed Forces.
XIII DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES OF BANGLADESH Director General Shabbir Ahmed Chowdhury, ndc Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka are four littoral countries of the Bay of Bengal. As soon as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III came into force in 1982, these countries acquired the right to submit their claims to different portions of the Bay of Bengal in the sea water, the sea bed and the sub-soil areas that consist of living and non living entities and sea bed resources including oil, gas or mineral resources beneath the sea bed. The deadline for submission of claims to the Committee on the limitation of Continental Shelf by Bangladesh is 2011 whereas that for the other three countries is 2009. Before UNCLOS 82 came into being, Bangladesh held several meetings with India and Myanmar to demarcate its maritime boundary, but no agreement could be reached in demarcating the overlapping portion of the claims submitted by these countries. It is most likely that a similar disagreement may occur again after submission of claims tabled by these states to the CLCS in the stipulated time. This article analyzes legal and technical aspects of maritime claims as per the provisions of UNCLOS 82, determine the maximum permissible claims that can be made on behalf of Bangladesh and the possible claims conceivable of other littoral states and submit suggestions and recommendations for possible solutions for future delimitation scheme.
EVALUATING THE RURAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME AS A POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY Joint Secretary Md. Ataur Rahman, ndc Bangladesh is one of the most poverty stricken countries in the world. A recent survey reveals that 40 percent of its population live below the poverty line. The Government of Bangladesh’s efforts at poverty reduction has not been very successful. There have been fluctuations in the poverty situation of the country, but the percentage of rural poor has remained high. For last few years, the government has been pursuing Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). One of the avenues for poverty reduction is the Social Safety Nets Programmes that transfer income to target groups. Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP) is one such programme, targeting destitute rural women. RMP not only transfers income, it also provides training and savings to target groups with the expectation of their graduation from the poverty’. This paper attempts to show how far the aims of the programme have been achieved and find out if target groups have really been able to lift themselves from poverty. At the same time, we have tried to examine if PRS has any contextual limitations in changing poverty and if those prevent it from fulfilling its goals. The quantitative as well as qualitative aspects of poverty are examined. Results show that since poverty is multi-dimensional, poverty reduction strategy requires multi-directional efforts. Addressing only the income-poverty is not enough for poverty alleviation since qualitative characteristics of poverty also require to be addressed to ensure sustainability of efforts.
XIV SOCIO-CULTURAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE AND POLITICAL VIEWS OF AN ETHNIC COMMUNITY: A CASE STUDY OF TWO SELECTED VILLAGES IN MOULVI BAZAR DISTRICT Additional Secretary Md. Zahurul Alam, ndc
The main focus of this article is to present the uniqueness of the Manipuri community living in two villages predominantly inhabited by both Manipuri Muslims (Pangans) and Manipuri Hindu- Sanamahi (the Meiteis) religious sects. Two adjacent villages selected are Konagaon and Sonagaon, under the Adampur Union of Kamalganj Upazilla of Moulvibazar District. The selection criteria of the villages have been, among others, (i) predominance of the Manipuri community ---- - both the Meiteis and the Manipuri Muslims and (ii) spatial accessibility. Maximum Manipuris live in Kamalganj upazilla in Sylhet alone. Population of the study area is around 950 and area of the villages is about 1.5 sq km. The article presents an excellent account of anthropological details of a particular sect of Bangladesh and its implication for Bangladesh’s security.
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL MILITARY EDUCATIONAL IMPERATIVES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION: THE CASE OF BANGLADESH Lieutenant General Abu Tayeb Muhammad Zahirul Alam, rcds, psc Air Commodore Mahmud Hussain, ndc, psc
The ultimate goal of military education is to aim for professional excellence. This requires a prudent and discreet understanding of what is exactly needed as course materials so that the officers’ corps gets access to the right kind of knowledge. Designing the syllabi of such education is in itself a creative and dynamic process. Usually academic objectives must conform to the three levels of military operations; tactical, operational and strategic. While it is easier to formulate a modular design for education at the tactical and operational levels, making the course contents worthwhile and interesting at the strategic level is a more complex task. What is needed at this level is a fine balance between military and non-military subjects. The objective must be to arrive at a synergy between military imperatives and non-military issues whose combined effects should lead to clear insights into security studies that will have a bearing upon human development. Such a multi-dimensional approach to security must reflect its cognitive value into the minds of both military officers and civil servants to elevate them to the higher echelons of policy making. This paper discusses the significance of military education with regard to areas where attention needs to be paid at the three distinct levels.
XV NATIONAL SECURITY OF BANGLADESH: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS
Brigadier General Mohammad Saber, ndc, psc, G INTRODUCTION Security is a matter of both perception and reality. The security outlook of a nation is built up largely on how and where it perceives the threats to her security are coming from. Other things that go into shaping a nation’s security perspective are its geo-strategic and geo-political environment. It is necessary to recognize that this security notion may be defined not merely as a goal but as a consequence. In some sense, therefore, security is defined and valorized by the threats, which challenge it.1 This concept usually undergoes transformation with the march of time. The world has witnessed in silence substantial change in threat perception since the end of the Cold War. Traditional security concerns have now given way to a comprehensive approach to security. Four main types of threats have been identified: territorial, economic, political and environmental threats. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the end of the Cold War did not lessen the chance of war; in fact we have seen more of them, mostly in the form of proxy war to enforce national objectives. Nevertheless, the preponderance of national security preoccupations differ from the stand point of the physical security of the state from the perspective of both internal and external threats.2 It is clear that security in the post-Cold War era can no more be understood in terms of only military threats emanating from across the border. Barry Buzan has suggested that there are primarily five major sources of threats to any nation-state’s national interest, namely, military, political, economic, social and environmental, though these are not in ascending order of importance.3 The inadequacy of the traditional state, territory and military-centric definition of security in capturing the current existential concerns of states, societies, groups and individuals is now well-recognized. An esoteric mix of violent and non-violent
1. Sean M Lynn - Jones and Steven E Miller, ed, ‘Global Dangers - Changing Dimension of International Security’, The MIT Press, London, 1995, p.19 2. Brigadier General M Sakhawat Hussain, ‘National Security in South Asian Perspective’, The Daily Inde- pendent, 14 September 2001. 3. Barry Buzan, New Pattern of Global Security in the Twenty - First Century, International Affairs, Vol 67, No 3, RIIA, London, 1991, Pp.431-451 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
issues is also considered to be newer issues of security. So, in a bid to grapple squarely with the newer issues, the recent preoccupation is to emphasize non- traditional security (NTS) discourse.4 Internal and external security threats make Bangladesh quite vulnerable. Bangladesh should always keep in mind its neighbours and the ongoing nuclear proliferation in the region while reviewing her external threats. The primacy of the internal dynamism of security is even more pressing today in Bangladesh. In current security discourse, both internal and external non-traditional threats must be emphasized. The level and nature of threat to national security of Bangladesh has changed over time. This transformation of the concept of security basically denotes a broad shift of concept from a traditional ‘state and military’ centric concept to the ‘people’ centric security concept. However, one should guard against overexpansion of the concept of security and have not to legitimize the levels of analysis below the nation-state level, because, such broadening of the concept may render it less useful as an analytical tool. National security of Bangladesh should be viewed as a ‘comprehensive security’ to encompass both traditional and non-traditional threats. The paper deals with the concept of security. It attempts to identify the various changes in the source, level and nature of threat, challenges and vulnerabilities impinging on the security of Bangladesh and likely to do so in the near future. The paper finally goes on to highlight and discuss various options essential for maintaining, strengthening and enhancing the national security of Bangladesh.
4. Dr. Abdur Rob Khan, “Non-Traditional Security in Bangladesh in the New Millennium’, Draft Paper, Presented at a Seminar in BIISS, 29 March, 2005, p.2
TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL SECURITY General The fundamentals of national security perception should be the recognition that security issues can no longer be treated accommodating to a ‘conventional warfare’ framework. National security is now a holistic concept, entailing dealing with non-conventional and asymmetric threats and subject to interpretation in an ever-shifting context of human relations at different levels and with varying manifestations. The notion of security, thus, must be related to new perspectives of threat perception, vulnerability and reality.
Reconceptualisation or Redefining National Security Till recently, the dominant security discourse i.e. state-and-regime-centric and threat-based, had been concerned with the geo-political and military formulations of security in terms of spatial exclusion of threats by military means and ensuring a stable political order internally.5 Such was the focus of the international academic community, at least since the start of the Cold War. All other dimensions of security were relegated to the background, and only threats projected primarily from external sources were accorded primacy in the security calculus of states. In the aftermath of the Cold War, there were many calls for adopting a new conception of security and revisioning the traditional concept. The international commission on Global Governance recommended in 1995 that Global security must be extended from its traditional focus on the security of states to the security of people and the planet.6 Clinton administration officials repeatedly referred to extended or ‘human’ security’ and including a new understanding of national security and the role of individuals and nations-states. R B J Walker, for example, writes, “It is scarcely possible to involve the term of security without sensing something is dreadfully wrong with the way we live.” 7 Walter Lippmann declares “a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by such a victory in such a war”.8 The apparent ‘vagueness’ of Lippmann’s reference to core value is explained by Talukdar Maniruzzaman when he writes that “by security, we mean protection and preservation of minimum core values of any nation: political independence and territorial integrity.” 9
5. Kabir, Mohammad Humayun, ‘National Security of Bangladesh in the Twenty - First Century’, Academic Press and Publishers Limited, Dhaka, June 2000, p.1 6. Miller, Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Security : Should it be Redefined’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 24, No.2, June 2001, p.13 7. R B J Walker, ‘Security, Sovereignty and the Challenges of World Politics’, Alternatives, XV (1990), Pp.3-27 8. Walter Lippmann, “US Foreign Policy : Shield of the Republic”, Little Brown, Boston, 1943, p.51 9. Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “The Security of Small States in the Third World”, Canberra Paper on Strategy and Defence, No-25, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Can- berra, 1982, p.15
National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
The Realist school of international relations refused to conceptualise the ways in which internal politics shape and direct the foreign policy agenda, on the grounds that they are irrelevant to any specific outcome. Recently, however, it has been noted that the state-centric geopolitical approach to international relations is inadequate for conceptualising the third world security environment. Buzan has also noted the tendency in the past to treat ‘ third world national security problems as a mere extension of systemic level dynamic’, that is, as a function of superpower or great power rivalry without any reference to the alignment of domestic forces.10 Among scholars Richard Ullman has advocated an extension of security concept to include a wide range of threats from natural disaster and diseases to environmental degradation. Such advocacy became more prominent with the end of US-Soviet rivalry when other threats, notably environmental ones and those directed at human well-being, have been seen to increase in recent decades. “Our national security today depends on things like balance of payments, economic affairs, foreign assistance...... ,11 in a statement made to the US Congress in 1972, the then Deputy Assistant Secretary of States for Public Affairs observed. The diverse philosophies of security raises the following questions: firstly, are new conceptions and extensions necessary or is the traditional concept the right way to address the security issue? Secondly, are the re-definitions useful or do they carry a heavy burden to our understanding of security? Certainly, it will be appropriate to define national security as a notion of security that stresses a feeling of being free from fear. Security, generally appears to represent a universal good that all in society strive to achieve. Therefore, the dynamics of security lies in both state-centric and human security. The transformation of the concept of security over time, referred to as “Temporal Evaluation of National Security Concept” is appended below: 12 Pre-Industrial Revolution Industrial Age Post Cold War Era Broad Reliance on Narrow Reliance on Broad Reliance on *Soldier *Industrial Strength (Eco- * Food (Economics) (for security) nomics) *Nature (Environment) *Resources (Environment) *Soldier (for security) *Soldiers/Weapon for security.
10. B. Buzan, ‘States, People, Fear’ in Edward E Azar and Chung In Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World, Pinter, London, 1988, Pp.14-43 11. Quoted in Hussein Solomon, “From Marginalised to Dominent Discourse : Reflections on the Evolution of New Security Thinking” in ISS Mongraph Series, No.20, February 1998. 12. Robert Mandel, “The Change Face of National Security - A Conceptual Analysis’, Greenwood Press, UK, 1998, p.10
Therefore, while the political will and energy of a state are focused on military solutions, the non-military tasks are likely to grow ever more difficult to accomplish and will be dangerous to neglect. At this stage, it will be pertinent to introduce the concept of comprehensive security that readily brings out the tensions and contradictions between state security and human or societal security into sharp focus.
Traditional Concept of Security Traditionalists tend to see security either as derived from power or as a consequence of peace, in the sense that lasting peace will bring security for every one.13 Due to the many threats that states have traditionally faced to their values and independence in an anarchic international environment, the concept of security has long been a key concept in international relations. Anarchy, resulting from the absence of a supreme reliable law enforcement agency, may encourage wars among states. Traditional conceptions of security have undergone criticism, these being more militaristic. The concept of traditional security should now be expanded to include diverse non-military strategies for reducing security threats. These alternative strategies should be made to contribute to national security and not dismissed as counterproductive.
Shift from Realism to Neo-realism Until recently, the concept of security was exclusively oriented to power and prioritized military security. The shift from this ‘realist’ view to ‘neo-realism’ encompasses first, security as protection of state boundaries and second, security as a psychological state or freedom from fear. Both these aspects represent the bedrock of security.
Post-Cold War Concept: Three Tier Security and Paradigm Shift in Security Arena The end of the Cold War raised questions about the utility and relevance of conventional notions of security that were based on military preparedness or power. A three-tier post-Cold War security mechanism was proposed. The first tier would deal with the traditional security, the second with macro-security debates concerning trans-border military capabilities and the third with micro- security notions involving a complex mix of national, international and trans- national forces, the prevailing focus being on economic gain, environmental and feminine or gender concerns. Since the Stockholm conference of 1972 and the founding of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), there has been a major paradigm shift emphasizing both environment and development.14
13. Samiruddin, Rumana, “Non-Military Security of Bangladesh”, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1996, p.31 14. Kalam, Abul, Lecture on ‘National Security of Bangladesh: Multilevel Perspective’ in DSCSC, 05 February 1998.
National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
With the emergence of a sustainable development paradigm, the concept of non- military or non-traditional threats have emerged in the arena of security.
Non-Traditional Concept of Security The concept of national security has also undergone major changes in the United States (US). US national security experts have called for strengthening American military power to thwart any perceived Soviet military threat. A number of studies have demonstrated that chronic internal politics and economic instability in newly independent Third World countries pose a serious threat to America’s core values, the independence and sovereignty. The post Cold War era professed a more progressive approach on security issue to include both traditional and non-traditional aspects which later on got crystallized as the Comprehensive Conception of Security (CCS).
Conceptual Components of National Security Robert Mandel explains the conceptual components of national security through two communication filters, an information filter and a perception filter which ultimately relies on internal capabilities, external threats and alliances. These components of national security appear to possess general applicability.15 Another scholar has identified the following five components of national security: first, economic progress and prosperity of a country; second, national cohesion; third, political stability; fourth, a viable defense infrastructure; and finally, good relation with neighbours, which can serve the national interest. He argued that when all these five components can be achieved, an ideal scenario would be in place as far as the national security of a country is concerned.16
National Security and its Scope: Bangladesh Context Bangladesh faces wide ranging military and non-military threats of serious magnitude. Barry Buzan has noted that any state has the array of threats to tackle. He divides these into five distinct but interdependent sectors, namely military, economic, environmental, political and societal.17 The inputs to insecurity of Bangladesh at the primary level are three-fold: size, underdevelopment and dependency and geo-political and geo-strategic location which interact to produce secondary level inputs : vulnerabilities and external/internal threats, both military and non-military. This, in turn, constitutes the elements of insecurity of small states at the critical level. 15. Mandel, op cit, p.27 16. Vice Admiral (Retd) I F Quadir, ‘Security of Pakistan : Internal and External’, National Development and Security, Quarterly Journal, Vol. V, No 2, November 1996, Rawalpindi, Pp. 165-166 17. Barry Buzan, op. cit, Pp. 19-20
Bangladesh will be said to have assured its own security only when it becomes economically and technologically developed, politically stable and socio- culturally cohesive. Security, therefore, has become a multidimensional concept. Robert McNamara, former US Defense Secretary offered a definition of security that is more relevant to a country like Bangladesh when he said that security is development and without development there can be no security. In the Bangladesh context, internal cohesion and human security are inevitable preconditions for enduring security though the military aspects of security cannot be-emphasized.
CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF BANGLADESH- TRADITIONAL THREATS General Bangladesh is still a ‘soft state’ and its existential realities are intertwined with development and traditional security issues. The spectrum of traditional security has to be strengthened for Bangladesh’s survival. The traditional threat to Bangladesh is most likely to emanate from neighbouring India or Myanmar. By balancing and managing its neighbours, Bangladesh should resolve the dynamics of its traditional security challenges.
Geo-Strategic Environment of Bangladesh Geo-strategically, Bangladesh’s importance is on the rise with the passage of time. It has both constraints to face and opportunities to take advantage of as far as geopolitics is concerned. Huntington argues that after US and the next layer of six major powers, India is currently the predominant emerging power in the South Asian sub-system. China, major player in this region has made India to adopt the “Look East” policy as part of the Gujral Doctrine.
National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
Bangladesh lies at the crossroads of South Asia, South-east Asia, Central Asia and the passage along the Indian Ocean. It has many unresolved bilateral issues with India and Myanmar. China, India and Pakistan’s massive military modernization, including nuclearization and even the modest military modernization of Myanmar, are also matters of interest and concern for Bangladesh.18 General Krisna Rao has projected Bangladesh as a potential military threat, though not a serious one to India. He has predicted that Bangladesh may be instigated to side with China by capturing the Siliguri Corridor or Silchar in the event of a Chinese offensive against India.19 On the other hand, Bangladesh is ‘India Locked’, and the passage through the Bay of Bengal can be completely blocked by any mighty naval armada. Alleged Bangladeshi exodus to India could be a catalyst for a war-like situation. India’s desire for a direct thoroughfare through the normal land route of Bangladesh and need to use Chittagong land port, the “seven sister” issue and the insurgency problem in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) have also the potential to erupt into a conflict. Myanmar shares a common boundary with Bangladesh of about 176 miles. This traditionally friendly neighbour has demonstrated its military preparedness in the recent past on the Rohingya refugee issue and may pose a military threat to Bangladesh in the not-too-distant a future. Due to its geo-strategic importance, Bangladesh still holds the trump card in bargaining with likely adversaries, though it is not a strong and credible one. Any alliance of Bangladesh with a regional or extra-regional power unfriendly to India is likely to threaten Indian dominance in the Indian Ocean and also endanger the Shiliguri Corridor.
TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO BANGLADESH Traditional security threats to Bangladesh emanate from its immediate geographical vicinity, that is to say, its big neighbour India that encircles her from three sides and also to some extent Myanmar.
18. Mohd Aminul Karim, “Geostrategic Environment of Bangladesh”, ed in Contemporary Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific and Bangladesh’, Academic Press and Publishers Library, Dhaka, December 2006, Pp. 173-177 19. Rao, General K U Krishna, “Prepare or Perish” - A Study of National Security, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1991, p.387 and 406.
The India Factor General. India, by virtue of its geo-strategic location, size, resources, technological and industrial base, military capability and preparedness and the other attributes it possesses of a regional power occupies a position from which it can dictate terms in the subcontinent. The India factor is now a dominant element of internal and foreign policy formulations of all South Asian states. Indian Foreign Policy and Security Perceptions. Indian foreign policy is basically based on four determinants; economy, technology, ideology and military. Jawaharlal Nehru’s foreign policy had as its hard core the continuous augmentation of India’s power in all its dimensions.20 According to this policy, India should be the centre in all regional activities, and other countries of the region should fall in line India’s aspirations. The thrust and contents of so called India doctrine or Indira doctrine has been seen as India’s version of the ‘Monroe Doctrine’. In line with this doctrine, Jaswant Singh has floated a concept according to which India would like to influence the internal politics of its neighbours so that its security is ensured.21 This standpoint is further reinforced in the articulation of India’s “Neighborhood Policy” which states that India will take whatever steps are necessary to safeguard its interest. Subash Kapila, an Indian security strategist, has argued that Bangladesh should not be allowed to be used as a “spring board” for anti-Indian activities and must not be “Talibanized”. This goes in tune with the global anti-terrorist program undertaken by the US.22 Bangladesh-India Relations. Bangladesh -India relations are based on a historical congruence of interests, especially active during the Liberation War of Bangladesh of 1971. But this warmth of relations could not be sustained in between these two close neighbours in a peculiar geo-strategic environment. The Indian Security Specialist, JN Dixit notes that, “India’s relations with Bangladesh have remained problematic for one reason or the other...... The point to be noted is that Bangladesh’s creation and India’s support to the process have not made much difference.”23
20. K Subrahmanyam. “Indian Security Perspective” ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, p. 128 21. Jaswant Singh, “National Security-An Outline of Our Concerns” Publishers, in association with United Service Institutions of India, New Delhi, 1996, Pp.59-60 22. Dr Subash Kapila “ Bangladesh Misperceives New Indian Government’s Foreign Policy Thrust - An Analysis”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No 1017, June 2004, htt p: II www. saag. org/papers II/paper 1017. html. 23. JN Dixit, “Future of Security in South Asia-Trends and Directions” in Security in South Asia : Trends and Direc- tions, Vananda A, and Ashok C. Shukla (Ed), A PH Publishing Corporations, New Delhi, 2004, Pp. 10-11
National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
However, the same author in “Liberation and Beyond” points out that India got involved in the Liberation movement of Bangladesh, inter alia, to meet India’s own political and strategic interests.24 Indian academics influenced by its Press come up with comments, such as, “insurgents from North East India takes shelter in Bangladesh and are being trained in different camps inside Bangladesh”. 25 BJP leader LK Advani and analysts like Raja Mohan of Delhi University have expressed concern on issues which according to them pose a threat to India’s national security and which emanate from Bangladesh. Such allegations were countered by the then Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia when she gave an open invitation to Mr Advani and civil society to visit Bangladesh and verify the existence of such military camps. Bangladesh shares 4,156 km border with India of which 6.5 km remain undemarcated. This issue, along with the exchange of 62 enclaves and adversely possessed lands, has not been resolved due to lack of ratification of the Land and Border Agreement of 1974 by India. This agreement, however, was ratified and implemented by Bangladesh soon after its formulation. However, the broad- based accommodating “Gujral Doctrine” may offer some silver lining in the horizon. Indian Military Threats against Bangladesh. The issues that could lead to Indian military action against Bangladesh may be summarised as follows; Firstly unresolved border demarcation and maritime boundaries; secondly, alleged illegal immigration into India; thirdly, India’s allegation that Bangladesh has been harbouring insurgents and facilitating insurgency in India’s NE states; fourthly, the impetus for development of the NE states and the need for access through Bangladesh; fifthly, India’s future requirements for resources, particularly fossil and marine ones and finally, water sharing issues.
The Myanmar Factor General. Myanmar’s location provides it a strategic advantage, since it serves as a “Land bridge” between the sub-regions of South-east and South Asia. Actions taken by the military regime there has twice led to the exodus of over quarter million Muslim minorities, known as Rohingyas, who live in the bordering province of Arakan that borders Bangladesh. The brutality the enemy
24. JN Dixit, “Liberation and Beyond Indo-Bangladesh Relations”, UPL, Dhaka, 1999, p. 270 25. Singh, Awadhesh Kumar, “Bangladesh Illegal Immigration in India : Implications for National Security”, Pp. 204-206
10 face was unveiled on 21 December 1991 when there was a sudden attack on the Rijupara border outpost of Bangladesh threatening its sovereignty. The hostile act of the Nasakas of Myanmar26 also indicates that Bangladesh faces threats from Myanmar as far as its national security is concerned. Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations. Diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar began officially on 13 January 1972, when what was then Burma recognized Bangladesh as the sovereign nation. Myanmar maintains both economic and political ties with Bangladesh. The Rijupara incident created a long-lasting mistrust which virtually took both the countries at one point to the brink of war. Myanmar’s recent emphasis on changed foreign policy and economic diplomacy has resulted in the formation of a Joint Economic Forum to promote joint venture initiatives in the industrial sector, and augment road and railway linkages to promote a new era of Bangladesh-Myanmar sustained bilateral relations. However, Myanmar’s insurgency problem and the continuing longing to demographic migration of Rohingyas must not be viewed with neglect. The issues that could escalate military conflict between Bangladesh and Myanmar are firstly, illegal migration of huge number of Rohingya from Myanmar and secondly, the undemarcated maritime boundary between these two states.
Nuclear Proliferation South Asia today is clearly under a nuclear shadow. The effect of nuclear weapon on security interest of Bangladesh has not been defined yet and is unclear. However, the country would not be able to escape the collateral damage and fallout of a nuclear confrontation in South Asia.27
26. “Nasaka Hostile Activities” Bhorer Kagoj, September 7, 1998, p.1 27. Iftekharuzzaman, ‘Living with South Asia Nuclear Reality’, The Daily Star, April 14, 2000,
11 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH TO ADDRESS TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES/THREAT TO ITS NATIONAL SECURITY Non-Military Options Political Stability. Military intervention by Bangladesh’s potential adversary under a weak and unstable political environment cannot be ruled out even in the present global context. Bangladesh should not politically rely too much on “Oppose India” philosophy and expect any external assistance for its security need.28 Development of a broad-based political system and objective based on democratic values would enable Bangladesh to safeguard its interest from both internal and external threats. Economic Development. Economic development and security go hand in hand. To survive as a viable state, radical measures are needed to attain a robust economy and to sustain Bangladesh’s defence capabilities, without which the country’s security would be reduced to an ephemeral notion. Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. The Foreign policy of a country is its first line of defence and security. Hence, Bangladesh’s foreign policy objectives should be pursued both at the regional context and beyond. Bangladesh should endeavour to develop special relations with countries which are economically, ideologically and strategically important to Bangladesh. Its Foreign policy ought to be pursued so that it can serve as a deterrent against any external force. Bangladesh’s foreign policy should aim to avoid, mitigate or postpone conflicts. Bangladesh should work with its neighbours in South Asia to build a climate of durable trust and understanding in the region. Thrust areas and future direction of Bangladesh foreign policy must be pursued earnestly. Refugee Management. Myanmar’s military threat may be mitigated by resolving Rohingya refugee issue through good gesture and by involving the UN and international legal systems. Policy of Neutrality. The policy of neutrality is voluntarily declared by a state, while others commit themselves to respecting and upholding the status of a neutral country. Switzerland and Sweden are examples of neutral countries, but neutrality in the international community is more easily desired than achieved. Whether a policy of neutrality will be suitable for Bangladesh remains to be ascertained.
28. Mohd Aminul Karim, op. cit, p. 160.
12 Balancing versus Bandwagoning. In the absence of numerical superiority, Bangladesh can opt for several diplomatic options like the following: policy of appeasement, reliance on nuclear deterrence or offensive conventional capability, alignment with great power and last but not least collective security. Out of these options, ‘collective security’ is the only viable path forward.29 Bangladesh’s reliance on the US as part of a collective security agreement is a necessity, though the US request in 1998 to station its force under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is yet to be agreed upon by the Bangladesh Government.30 Bangladesh may try balancing instead of bandwagoning as the geo-political and geo-strategic environment is propitious for Bangladesh to opt for that strategy. Multilateralism. Bangladesh’s experience with multilateralism is quite rich and varied. Therefore, it can be argued that Bangladesh has to explore and exploit all available sources of power and finance. Bangladesh’s strategy of multilateralism should be, firstly, to avoid and neutralize conflict with any external aggressor (s) and secondly, to resist any aggressor (s) through timely support of the international community if a conflict develops actually into a war.31 Engagement. The primary objective of any engagement policy is to minimize conflict and avoid war without compromising the existing international order. Bangladesh’s engagement policy should be more pertinent and relevant in respect of India and Myanmar, they being its closest neighbors. Reliance on the United Nations and the International Legal Systems. Bangladesh’s involvement with the UN and the international legal system as a part of a strategy of multilateralism and a policy of continued commitment to world peace should be fully exploited to work as a deterrent for any potential military aggressor. Bilateral Approach : Bangladesh’s India Policy. It is no secret that India has always been the prime object of concern in formulating Bangladesh’s foreign policy and in its security calculus. This is due to the asymmetry in size and power, the location factor and New Delhi’s strategic ambitions in the region. Among policy options to deal with this regional giant, it would be better for Bangladesh to develop a non-partisan policy towards India on the basis of sovereign equality and to build a peaceful, enduring and mutually beneficial relationship between the two close neighbours.32 29. Mohd Aminul Karim , op cit, Pp 163-164 30. Mohammad Humayun Kabir, op cit, p. 271 31. Md. Nuruzzaman, “National Security of Bangladesh : Challenges and Options”, BIISS Journal, Dhaka, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1991, p. 402 32. Mohammad Humayun Kabir, op cit, Pp 271-272
13 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
Regional Cooperation as a Security Strategy. Regional cooperation through a holistic approach can reduce the level of threat. Total security for one state means insecurity for another and in any given regional setting, no state can be secure and at rest if its neighbours are feeling insecure.33 The security of a Third World state like Bangladesh can best be protected on the basis of consensus on fundamental issue at the national and regional level. Bangladesh must also adopt a regional perspective on security matters and should look outwards to check any looming menace that she may be exposed to.
Military Options Collective Security and Regional Security Arrangement. Collective security arrangements at the regional level would be the best arrangement for the security of Bangladesh. Besides, any regional security cooperation in South Asia without India’s participation is unlikely to yield any positive outcome. Restructuring SAARC as ARF will help nations to address such insecurity. It is by considering security dialogue on an extra-regional basis apart from regional security arrangement, Bangladesh will benefit in long run. Cooperative Security. South Asian states should adopt the notion of cooperative security for their overall national security dynamics to prevent large scale aggression. Cooperative security is essentially military- centric. Mattoo, for example, has built a cooperative security model for South Asia, with military, political and socio-economic elements of cooperation in it, from a short, medium and long-term perspective.34 Bangladesh should try to incorporate cooperative security as an agenda in SAARC or BIMSTEC as a part of its security strategy for dealing with neighbouring countries. Civil-Military Relations. Civil-Military relation is increasingly gaining currency in the security studies parlance of Bangladesh. While political masters determine policy, military leaders need to provide a military view point. Healthy Civil-Military relation is needed to develop a viable national security policy to deter or defeat any perceived or real aggression.
33. Lieutenant General (Retd) A I Akram, “ The Security of Small States in South Asian Context”, BIISS Journal, January 1987, p. 19 34. Mohammad Humayun Kabir, op cit, Pp. 273-276
14 National Security Apparatus. The National Security Council (NSC) that was formed in 1982, and later on renamed National Committee for Security Affairs (NCSA) in 1992 is the highest security policy making body in Bangladesh. It has failed to fulfill its defined tasks and mandate. Bangladesh should re-think NSC and give it more power and authority to deal with national security affairs from a more comprehensive perspective. Strengthening National Power through Military Modernization. Given the size of its economy, the security of Bangladesh depends largely on its ability to achieve qualitative superiority to avert the enormous disparity in quantitative war capabilities. The military force structure of Bangladesh and its modernization should depend on who it needs to fight with and for how long. Considering the equation of guns-versus-butter and geo-strategic realities, Bangladesh may adopt the following options. Firstly, adopt a deterrence strategy; secondly, consider the weapon system as a force multiplier; thirdly, aim for a large standing armed forces with small reserve; fourthly, consider a small standing army with a large reserve; fifthly, formulate a national defence strategy of Nation-in-Arms, a strategy built on the idea that arming of a nation is a great means of defence, although not cost effective. Finally, consider asymmetric warfare. As regards to ‘Nuclear South Asia’, Bangladesh may opt for a trilateral agreement about the “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons state or seek protection under the nuclear umbrella of a world class power. Defence Policy. As part of its defence strategy, Bangladesh’s defence posture should be non-proactive and non-threatening, but must include armed forces capability of credible deterrence and enduring national political will to use those forces to defend the country. Our NSC/NCSA and a Higher Defence Management Organization (HDMO) should aim for a dynamic defence policy aimed at maintaining the country’s core values as well as protect vital national interests.
15 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS TO SECURITY: BANGLADESH CONTEXT General The new concept of comprehensive security deals with both traditional and non-traditional security (NTS) issues.35 Apart from security for whom, from what/which sources and how, Greg Mills identifies four types of NTS threats; territorial, economic, political and environmental.36 Besides, there is a serious need to examine other sources of threats and the nature and level of threats over time.
Economic Threat General. Threats to economic security in the Bangladesh context emanates from two sources : internally, from poverty and externally, from the process of globalization. The dull world economy after 9/11 and reduction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) indicate Bangladesh’s vulnerability as far as economic security is concerned. 37 Poverty Trend in Bangladesh. Despite the avowed goals of planned development, the development strategies involved, poverty alleviation has been rather slow. The rural poverty index is twice as high as urban poverty in spite of the micro credit programmes of Non-Government Organizations (NGO) and food safety net programmes operative in rural areas. Unless Bangladesh grows far faster than it is doing, poverty will remain a crippling burden to the nation and to millions of its inhabitants. The perceived outcome of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is still not clear. The foreign trade sector indicators depict an uncertain situation for Bangladesh in world trade. Dependence on Foreign Aids. Bangladesh’s external dependence is on the rise. Between 1971 and 1991, donors committed US $ 22 billion of external grants and loans to Bangladesh.38 In 1998-1999 alone, the amount of foreign aid was US $ 1536 million39 despite the hardening of conditionality. More ominous are the conditions being imposed all the time by donor countries.
35. Abdur Rob Khan, op. cit. 36. Greg Mills, “A 21st Century Security Agenda : The End of Defence as We Know it ?” Strategic Balance, Vol XX, No. 2, May 1977, p. 181 37. The Daily Independent, September 18, 2002. 38. Samiruddin, Rumana, “Non-Military Security of Bangladesh”, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1996, p. 31 39. Statistical Pocket Book of Bangladesh 1999, p. 304
16 Smuggling. Smuggling is a major threat to the Bangladesh economy as smuggled goods from different countries of the world pour into Bangladesh. After the signing of a trade agreement with India on 28 March 1972, smuggling became rampant in Bangladesh from the early seventies, discouraging growth of domestic industries and threatening its ever-fragile economy.
Political Threat Lack of Consensus on National Issues. The lack of institutionalised politics and poor political culture and practice has been obstructing the development projects. Lack of internal cohesiveness and effective foreign policy has rendered the country vulnerable to foreign aggression and has also impeded internal economic growth and FDI. Political Unrest. Since independence, the country has been rocked by political violence, and witnessed coups and counter coups. In fact, political history has been endemic in Bangladesh. Political parties and politicians still fail to agree on core issues. It can be said that Bangladesh is not only politically unstable from the security perspective, a weak state as well. The more the political situation worsens, the more the law and order situation deteriorates, creating human insecurity. Poor Law and Order Situation. The prevailing poor law and order situation is a major impediment in the path of industrialization, FDI, political stability, economic growth and commerce and trade. The crime-population ratio is on the rise. In 1993, the ratio was 62.67 (per 100 thousand population) whereas in 1997, the figure was 83.74.40
Societal Threats Human Trafficking. Human trafficking, a major societal threat, is often loosely referred to as migration in the Bangladesh context. The leading causes of trafficking are poverty, social issues and lack of legal awareness and mass information campaign as well as an enabling policy environment. Violence and Crime. In Bangladesh, societal security is often lacking due to social disorder, disharmony, violence, crime etc. The causes of violence are anger, frustration, revenge, poverty, adventurism, etc.
40. M Azizul Haque, ‘The Unfavorable Police Image’, Bangladesh Observer, Dhaka, October 10, 1999.
17 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
Drug Addiction. Drug addiction is an ever-increasing problem due to easy access of drugs as well as socio-cultural-economic factors. An estimated 5 million people of this country are hard core drug addicts. Married male and female addicts have increased in number from 3% a few years ago to 33% at present. Needless to say that the trend is threatening.41 Demographic Threat. Bangladesh ranks as the eighth largest country of the world in terms of population size. The UN has projected the population density of Bangladesh as 1632 persons per square kilometer by 2025. If the growth rate cannot be checked effectively soon, the total population will be nearly 182 million by 2025.42 The high population density has contributed in reduced farm land, deforestation, increase in crime and social tension. Money Laundering. Money laundering has become a major problem undermining the fabric of our ill-structured society. Money accrued from illicit ventures is often invested in legitimate business, making it difficult for government agencies to keep track in financial transactions. AIDS. The World Health Organization (WHO) is afraid that there are as many as 40,000 AIDS/HIV positive cases in Bangladesh due to Bangladesh’s increased vulnerability to this deadly disease. According to a recent report, 60% of drug addicts have tested HIV positive.43 Computer Crime. As more and more information is made available cheaper, various groups will show a greater capacity to draw resources and conduct terror operations with little or no risks. One e-mail virus, ‘I Love You’ has thus led to business losses of estimated US $ 1 billion. Attacks on computer networks controlling critical infrastructure and military computer networks have been assessed as one of the most dangerous threats to national security.44
Ecological Threat Natural Disaster. Bangladesh currently ranks as one of the world’s foremost disaster-prone countries. The situation is aggravated, all the more, by its being the mostly densely populated country in the world. Environmental disasters ravage the country almost every year. Thus proper monitoring of disasters and adequate measures to deal with them are of utmost importance for national security.
41. The New Nation, “The Threats from Drug Addiction”, p.5 42. World Population Prospects 1990, United Nations, New York, 1993, p.20 43. Md Asadullah Khan, ‘Disaster Waiting in the Wings’, The Daily Star, September 15, 2000. 44. Dr Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Transnational Threats in the Post Cold War Era’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 2001. p. 49
18 Environmental Challenges. In the ultimate analysis, environmental challenges are more threatening and more political than any other challenges and can lead to massive catastrophe even if nuclear war is averted. The combined effect of global warming, rising sea-level, harsher storms and subsistence may wreck much damage to Bangladesh, as it is known today that the country itself may virtually cease to exist.45
New External Sources, Nature and Level of Non-Traditional Threats: Concern For Bangladesh Trans-border Insurgency. Trans-border security dimension of insurgency in CHT arises from the fact that NE states of India and Arakan state of Myanmar are infested with chronic insurgency.46 Bangladesh’s security will be jeopardised if it is sucked into the vortex of NE insurgency. The domestic insurgency may gradually acquire a trans-border character. Indian officials and academics claim that Bangladesh has become the cross-roads of foreign intelligence agencies. Transit of Arms, Drugs across Bangladeshi Land. Bangladesh is alleged to be a transit route for illegal weapons, a constant sore point in Bangladesh- India relations. The seizure of armaments in the country between 2003-2004 is a manifestation of activities of illegal arms dealer and the nexus that prevails amongst criminals of the underworld, the corrupt police force and hungry politicians. As regards to drug trafficking, Paris based Interpol has suggested that roughly 5% of world drug trafficking is routed through Bangladesh. The possession of illegal weapons by drug traffickers contributes to the spread of fear and violence, threatening overall social condition.47 International Terrorism. No nation including Bangladesh should or can remain immune to international terrorism since this problem is not confined to any geographical area.48 Widespread terrorism and violence in recent years along with host of root causes and triggering factors, both domestic and trans-border ones are sources of threats to our national security. Today, terrorism poses serious social, political, economical and above all legal challenges to the survival of Bangladesh.
45. M G Kabir, “Environmental Challenges and the Security of Bangladesh”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1989, p. 92 and p. 99 46. Shafiqur Rahman, Brigadier General, ‘Non-Traditional Military Threats to Security: Challenges for Ban- gladesh”, NDC Journal, Vol.4, No.1, June 2005, p.4 47. Hoq. M. Emdadul, ‘Inernational Drug Traffickers and Security Concerns in Bangladesh’, The Daily Star, December 06, 2003, p.1 and p.3. 48. Shafiqur Rahman, op cit, p.6.
19 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
New Internal Sources, Nature and Level of Non-Traditional Threats: Concern for Bangladesh Clashes between Indigenous and Migrant People. The dispute over settlements continues to remain in Bangladesh despite the signing of CHT Peace Accord in 1997. Bengalee settlers until now has been subjected to repeated attacks by the Shanti Bahini (SB). Therefore, it can be argued that armed violence in CHT will remain an unresolved issue until these disputes are amicably negotiated.49 Clashes Among Insurgent Groups. The conflict between JSS and UPDF is yet to be resolved and has led to killings and kidnappings of members of both groups. Non-tribal people are also involved/affected.50 Violent Crimes Conducted by Criminal Gangs and Underground Left Leaning Extremist Parties. Violent crimes are on the rise and can be linked to political god fathers and corrupt law enforcement agencies who are directly involved in extortion and other activities.51 It is alleged that left-leaning extremist parties like “Jonojudha’ and ‘Lal Pataka’ have links with the Nakshalite movements in India and that people have become hostages of different outlawed parties due to ever-rising terrorist activities. Violence Generated by Militant Religious Organizations. Extremist religious groups have shown their capacity for violence all over Bangladesh on many occasions and must not be de-emphasized. Country wide grenade attacks by Jaamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the subsequent hangings of their top six leaders in late March 2007 was a high point in the official retaliation against terrorists. But it will be wrong to think that the JMB threat in Bangladesh is over because only 700 JMB extremists have so far been arrested, although their actual number is well over eight thousand.52
49. Shafiqur Rahman, op cit , p.6 50. Ibid, Pp, 6-7 51. Rahman, SM Matiur, ‘Crushing Crime Network’, The Independent, March 09, 2004. 52. Editorial, The New Nation, Dhaka, Tuesday, April 03, 2007, p.5
20 ENHANCING BANGLADESH’S CAPACITY TO ADDRESS NON- TRADITIONAL THREATS TO ITS SECURITY General Combating all forms of non-traditional threats squarely is possibly wishful thinking in the present context for Bangladesh. The nation should rather opt for capacity building, strengthen the nationalist fabric and broaden its national security vision until it is strong enough to ward off insecurity both internally and externally.
Addressing Economic Threats Economic Development. Bangladesh’s economic future will rest increasingly on tapping economic opportunities. Bangladesh must adopt a strategy for sustained economic development. Efficiency of economy in domestic and global markets coupled with rapid empowerment and equitable distribution of justice are essential for Bangladesh’s economic development. It should aim to develop a self-reliant economy and ensure that foreign aid is not misused. Poor Must be Ready to Ride Globalization. “Economic development is the front line of battle. Remove the debilitating effects of poverty, and the important battle will be won, and quite possibly the war. It will never be enough, or indeed good enough, for the small states to be just well defended bastions of poverty”.53 Globalization can help Bangladesh to overcome poverty quickly. However, if it leaves its poor at the mercy of globalization without preparing them to ride its waves, they will get drowned.54
Minimizing Political Threat Political Stability. The capacity of Bangladesh to deal effectively with problems of nation building and modernization depends upon the development of a coherent and viable political system. Political stability is connected to free and fair politics. There must be a consensus on major national issues and this will enable Bangladesh to tackle political insecurities. Good Governance. Bangladesh should reform its system of governance transforming it from its current apathetic, secretive and unaccountable state to effective, responsive and accountable one. The reform should put greater emphasis on transparency, accountability and public participation.
53. Sheila Harden, ed, ‘Small is Dangerous : Micro State in a Macro World’, Frances Printer Publishers, London, 1985, p. 8 54. Prof Muhammad Yunus, ‘A National Strategy for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction’, The Daily Star, June 27, 2002.
21 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
Dealing with Societal Treat Counter-Trafficking Programme Strategy (CTPS). Trafficking is driven by a complex sets of dynamics, therefore, a CTPS should be developed that focuses on programming, implementation and a timeframe against which concrete progress can be measured. Improving Academic Atmosphere. Although the literacy rate is estimated to be 64%, due to absence of proper academic atmosphere, the desired progress in education sector has not been made. The government should form an ‘Education Commission’ with a specific agenda and must ensure timely and effective implementation of viable recommendations. Combating Violence and Crime. Rampant violence and crime should be minimized through police reform, strict enforcement of law and an oversight mechanism. Guidelines to Combat HIV/AIDS. The national HIV and AIDS communication strategy 2005-2010 formulated by the interim caretaker government must be implemented.
Mitigating Ecological Threat Environmental Policies and Development. A well-articulated policy encompassing regional and global strategies together with mass awareness programme to sensitize public opinion and environmental legislation can be an effective instrument in any sustainable development initiative.
Suggested Measures to Deal With New Dimension of Non-Traditional Threats. 55 Controlling the Influx of Weapons. The root cause for ‘weaponisation’ in our society is poor governance. Political patronization of criminals and illegal possession of weapon must cease. Our surveillance status must be improved to control the influx of arms alongside sharing of information with neighbouring states and international organizations. To stop proliferation of small arms and to endure the test of time, socio-politico-economic aspects must be addressed in right earnest.
55. Shafiqur Rahman, op cit, Pp. 15-20
22 Controlling Cross-border Insurgency. Insurgents and infiltrators, whether local or foreign, have been active carriers of small arms and light weapons. The nexus of local well-organized group and international illicit arms dealer must be identified and apprehended through a collaborative effort and brought under speedy trial. Bangladesh and its neighbours should not allow their territories to become havens for arm trafficking and insurgent activities. Control of Drug Trafficking. Cross-border drug trafficking into Bangladesh is a threat to international security. The recent rise of cross-border drug trafficking and related rise in narcotic-related crime demand a well-concerted effort to curb trafficking and use of drugs. Police Reform. Immediate police reform and its modernization strategy must receive top priority in Bangladesh agenda for good governance. Intelligence sharing at the inter- and intra- agencies must receive accelerated momentum. The newly formed RAB should deal with high-tech crimes and their posting and promotion should be based purely on merit and not on political allegiance. Solution of Insurgency Problem in CHT. The signing of the CHT Peace Accord was a milestone in the security dynamics of Bangladesh. However, the spirit of the accord to bring back peace in CHT is yet to see fruition. The unimplemented issues of the Peace Accord should be immediately addressed. Addressing Political and Religious Extremists. Unless efforts are taken to generate adequate employment, militants are likely to be lured by underworld elements to criminal activities, taking the advantage of their vulnerability. Well- concerted combined economic measures are required to tackle this situation. Besides, the syllabus of Madrasha education should be redesigned to create self- employment opportunities for Madrasha students. Legal Reforms. The Judiciary should be de-politicised to ensure rule of law without any prejudice and discrimination and criminal investigation ought to be carried out to determine whether a defendant is guilty. Revival of Social Order. The fact is that a strong community policing and effective social resistance can drastically reduce the threat of violence in a particular area. Such initiatives will curb violence and criminality in all forms. Addressing Border Disputes and Related Issues. Border disputes are to be amicably settled, smuggling and illegal crossing of borders stopped and shooting/killing of poor people along the border averted through liaison and discussions at all levels. Neighboring states should constitute “Joint intelligence
23 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
and monitoring cell” to forecast probable vulnerabilities to national security and help resolve the dynamics of insecurity through information/intelligence sharing and confidence-building.
CONCLUSION The intent of this paper was to place the security context of Bangladesh in a broad framework and also to examine the various changes in the source, level and nature of threat to the national security of Bangladesh. The fact that the term security has now much wider dimension has led to this attempt to strike a balance between the realist restrictive vision and the expansionist argument of indiscriminate expansion of the concept and prescribe a more moderate concept of comprehensive security. The paper argues that the security strategy of Bangladesh ought to be holistic in approach and composition due to potential military, non-military and non- classical threats inter-woven in inextricable knots. Security through internal capacity building and sustained development should form the bulwark of a comprehensive security strategy for Bangladesh. While the paper attempted to examine the comprehensive security threats to Bangladesh through security and strategic studies, some policy guidelines have been suggested to address the threats squarely. However, this subject is complex, dynamic and ever-expanding, and therefore, an analytical eye should be kept on the threats to update and tackle Bangladesh’s security problems in the future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Sean M Lynn – Jones and Steven E Miller, ed, Global Dangers – Changing Dimensions of International Security, The MIT Press, London, 1995. 2. Kabir, Mohammad Humayun, National Security of Bangladesh in Twenty First Century, Academic Press and Publishers Limited, Dhaka, 2000. 3. Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Little Brown, Boston, 1943. 4. Buzan, Barry, State, People, Fear, in Edward E Azar and Chung In Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World, Pinter, London, 1988. 5. Mandel, Robert, The Changing Face of National Security – A Conceptual Analysis, Greenwood Press, UK, 1998. 6. Samiruddin, Rumana, Non-Traditional Security of Bangladesh, University Press Limited, Dhaka, 1996.
24 7. Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado, 1991. 8. Karim Aminul Mohd, Contemporary Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific and Bangladesh, Academic Press and Publishers Library, Dhaka, 2006. 9. Rao, General K U Krishna, Prepare or Perish-A Study of National Security, New Delhi, 1991. 10. K Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspective, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982. 11. Dixit, JN, Liberation and Beyond Indo-Bangladesh Relations, UPL, Dhaka, 1999. 12. Harden, Sheila, ed, ‘Small is Dangerous: Micro State in a Macro World’, Frances Printer Publishers, London, 1985. 26. M G Kabir, “Environmental Challenges and the Security of Bangladesh”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1. 1989. 27. Shafiqur Rahman, Brigadier General, “Non-Traditional Military Threats to Security: Challenges for Bangladesh”, NDC Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1. 2005. 28. Sujit Dutta, “In Search of New Security Concepts” Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, 1997.
25 National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options
Author Brigadier General Mohammad Saber was commissioned in the Regiment of Artillery of Bangladesh Army in 1977. He has attended a number of training courses and international seminars both at home and abroad that included Long Gunnery Staff Course at School of Artillery in India. He is a graduate of both Defence Service Command and Staff College, and National Defence College at Mirpur. He holds a Master of Defence Studies degree from National University. He has held command, staff and instructional appointment in various capacities. Some notable ones are: Instructor in School of Artillery, Brigade Major of an Infantry Brigade, General Staff Officer 1 of an Infantry Division, Staff Officer in Military Operations Directorate and Military Training Directorate of Army Headquarters, Commanding Officer of two Field Artillery Regiment, Colonel Staff of an Infantry Division, Commander of Artillery Brigade etc. He has also served as UN Military Observer in UNIKOM and MONUC.
26 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FOR BANGLADESH: DEBATES AND ISSUES
Captain Kazi Kamrul Hassan, ndc, psc, BN INTRODUCTION Concern for security has been universal. The phrase in Thucydides epic, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”, remains a classic instance of hard realism even today.1 Though the UN Charter is supposed to pursue peaceful causes, it has failed to refrain parties from bloody conflicts. Tens of millions of people have died after the emergence of UN and even now nearly half of the world’s population wrestles with hunger triggering new subjects of conflicts.2 It has gradually become clear that the overall economic scenario as well as political concern beyond borders and ideological differences are key to the security of a nation. The security rubrics of these times have been essentially complex. Experts like Clausewitz and Alvin Toffler have stressed on adopting national policy and assuring at the right mix of national power elements to achieve security objectives. National institutions are accordingly seen to have emerged to integrate response mechanisms to suit security needs. Of these institutions, the concept of National Security Council (NSC) is one that has been widely discussed. Bangladesh’s security is fraught with complex challenges and dangers. Although it has not experienced any major conflicts except the insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and few border skirmishes with India, recent incidents of internal insecurities have led to a national emergency. The accelerating pace of terrorism unfolding in the last few years has posed a serious threat to its security system. The nation’s economy has also struggled to support the huge population because of extreme poverty. Lack of good governance and justice, intolerant and unstable politics, etc have retarded people’s emancipation, threatening the security of the nation in the process.
1. Thucydides’ epic, written in 416 BC, indicates that the Athenian Generals put to death every male citizen of Melos and carted off women and children into slavery in punishment for not surrendering in the first place, though historians have doubt about the actual incident. However, the Melos claimed that they had rights to remain neutral in the war between the Athenians and the Spartans, but the Athenians denied their rights as they were strong. 2. Centre for Study of Civil War Database at www.prio.no/cscw/battle_deaths/UppsalaPRIO_YearlyBD.xls and Anup Shah, “Poverty Facts and Status” at www.csmonitor.com/2004/ 0617/p16s01-cogn.html visited on 24 June 2007. National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
Why are the existing mechanisms in Bangladesh are unable to handle the situation and how can it be tackled in the coming days. Establishing a NSC is now being discussed as a solution to the problem, but some people are sucpicious about its military components. While few doubt the need of an enhanced security platform, the concept of NSC is perceived to be threatening to democratic precepts. Hence, it must not be thrust upon people; its causes are to be espoused by all, including politicians. Keeping these points in view, this study incorporates insights from different democratic models for security planning and attempts to design a practicable one for Bangladesh to suit its security environment.
AIM The aim of this study is to analyse the national security environment and examine the concept of NSC as an option for Bangladesh and to suggest an appropriate and effective policy planning and coordination structure in the 21st century perspective.
NATIONAL SECURITY DIMENSIONS AND BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVES
Concept of Security - The Gradual Evolution National security has been traditionally taken to have military connotations intimately linked to the idea of external threats. Talukder Muniruzzaman has argued that the foremost element of national security should be “the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation: political independence and territorial integrity”.3 Consequent to the formation of the UN, incidents of external aggressions have reduced drastically but conflicts amongst newly decolonized states and non-state groups have surfaced because of ethnic, ideological and other internal issues. A study of these conflicts reveals that Third World countries in Asia and Africa are the main areas of conflict, while Europe and North America have largely remained outside the theatre. The differences between these two groups of states are mainly democratic practices, economic strength, good governance and security conscious policies. Reinforced by post-Cold War developments including globalisation, Barry Buzan has come up with the idea of four novel domains of security in 1991 in addition to military conflicts, namely, political, societal, economic and environmental domains.4 The terrorist attack on USA on September 11, 2001, to which the US responded with the strategy of pre-emptive retaliation, leading to immediate attack on Afghanistan and subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, has given rise to a more complicated notion of security.
3 Talukder Muniruzzaman, “The Security of Small States in the Third World”, Papers No.25, Canberra, 1982, p.15 4. Buzan Barry, People, States and Fear, Lyne Publications, Colorado, USA, 1991, Pp.19-20
28 Meanwhile, Robert McNamara, the former World Bank President, has viewed security as linked to development and he feels that without development there can be no security. Andrew Mack of the University of British Columbia notes, “in much of the poor world, root cause drivers of armed conflicts are weak state capacity, economic decline, political instability, and horizontal inequality”.5 Ken Booth has also equated security with emancipation of people; the pursuit of emancipation encourages a focus on the welfare of people, justice and change.6 The concept of security in essence thus extends above the nation-state.
Bangladesh’s Security Environment Bangladesh’s security is framed by the multitude of issues described above. The fundamental principles enshrined in Part II and III of Bangladesh’s Constitution also reflect people’s will and well-being in terms of economic and social justice, freedom and equal rights and a vision of democracy that constitutes its national core values and interests. Table 1 reveals the politico-economic situation of the country and the way it can be aimed at consolidating national security. Bangladesh is achieving some progress, but what has been achieved is not enough for the large number of people still in poverty. Whatever is being done is vitiated by weak policies and anaemic implementations. Garment workers fight against inhuman working conditions and low irregular payment of wages. Foreign investments have had little impact. The incident at Kansat, in January 2006, is an example of bad governance that led people to challenge the administrator when they were denied justice. Democratic politics is key to stability and development, but in Bangladesh it has undergone negative transformations. Use of black-money, muscle power, illicit arms and manipulation of communal sentiments has been endemic. Politics is characterized by hartals, violence and unrest; these cause loss of life and serious damages to the education, economic and social system. In October 2006, the political situation was so traumatic that Bangladesh was almost thrown into the vortex of civil war. National institutions including the administration and even the judiciary were reduced to compliant instruments of those in power. Reportedly, 671 teachers and 350 employees were appointed in Dhaka University during the last 5 years on political considerations.7 Such arbitrariness incites lawlessness, corruption and crimes like human, drugs and arms trafficking. Moreover, the environmental
5. Andrew Mark, “Coping with Crisis”, a working paper for International Peace Academy, 2007. 6. Booth Ken, “Security and Emancipation,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No.4, 1991, Pp.313-326
29 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
Table-1 Politico-Economic Attributes of Bangladesh Attributes Bangladesh Score Reference/ Target Remarks Population To reduce growth to total Highest in the World 1090 per sq km Density fertility replacement rate except the microstates HDI Rank 139 and 0.53 Human Development As better as possible and Score (UNDP, 2004) Index, out of 177 States Poverty 49.6 % (2005) ↓ 29.4 % As per MDG by 2015 GDP - Per US$ 476.00 Medium level coun- ↑ 4500.00 Capita (BBS, 2006) try like Malaysia GDP Rank 174 (2006) World Fact Book by CIA out of 229 Countries Governance Poor ↑ As better as possible One of the Worst Transparency Interna- Corruptions Highest From 2000 to 2005 tional Annual Survey Research and Poor (scored ‘0’ Important attribute ↑ As better as possible Technology in most areas) for development Source: World Development Indicator 2007 (World Bank) except otherwise mentioned. conditions in Bangladesh are ominous. It is believed that due to global warming by 2050, 16 percent of the land will be inundated displacing 13 percent of the population.8 Some of these displaced people would look for inter-state migration, creating new causes for concern about security. The US and her allies believe that Islamist terrorist groups have links with the Muslim states. The West as such has been keeping an eye on Bangladesh, particularly after the nearly 500 coordinated bomb blast in 2005. The Daily Star, referring to a Jane’s Intelligence Review article, reports that Bangladesh is being dragged into the global war on terror by becoming a sanctuary for extremist organisations.9 Extremism especially in the student sections of Quomi madrassa is a cause for concern in Bangladesh. Isfaq Ilahi feels that the government needs to control these madrassas before things get even worse.10 In the geopolitical calculus, Bangladesh has numerous issues of disagreement/
7. The Daily Star, June 27, 2007 8. Banglapedia at http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/S_0166.htm visited on July 10, 2007. 9. Zayadul Ahsan, The Daily Star, August 21, 2005. 10. Isfaq Ilahi, “Madrassa Education in Bangladesh: Its Genesis and Growth and its implication on the Society and Politics”, Master of Philosophy Thesis at Bangladesh National University, June 20, 2006.
30 contention with her mighty neighbour, India, involving alleged spreading of radicalism, insurgency support, migration and disputes over water sharing and borders at sea and on land. With Myanmar, there are disputes over Rohingya and the maritime boundary. Bangladesh is also affected by the characteristics of the regional sub-system that include relationships amongst the nuclear-bombs equipped countries of India, Pakistan and China and their relational matrix with the only superpower USA. Besides, the insurgency in CHT is another issue continuing for long that needs delicate politico-military handling.
Figure- 1
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Bangladesh’s national interests, involving people’s well-being and establishment of a stable democracy as per its constitution, transcend military issues. A holistic security sphere with elements of concerns is shown in Figure-1,
31 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
but it may not be quite exhaustive. Here, the conflicting politics and consequential elements have found place in the center to indicate the gravity of the situation.
BANGLADESH’S SECURITY POTENTIALS AND POLICY SYSTEM Constituents of National Power National security hinges crucially on the power and capability of a nation and its rational pursuit of national interests. Alvin Toffler views power as an inescapable aspect of every human relationship involving the use of violence, wealth and knowledge.11 The first two of the Toffler’s trinity can be equated with military and economics, while knowledge is related to human resources, leadership, vision, etc. The use of aggregate power base is dependent on adoption of appropriate policy, in accordance with the famous ‘ends-ways-means’ strategic paradigm.12 Bangladesh as a nation-state draws its power mainly from its people and their coherence; 98.8 percent are homogenous ethnic Bengalis.13 The Language Movement and Liberation War confirm their common concern about language, culture and democracy. The remaining 1.2 percent consists of small ethnic groups, the majority of whom live in CHT comprising nearly 0.5 percent of population. They too have grievances about their identity and rights but these are being managed with politico-military efforts. Bangladesh as a developing nation has inherent weaknesses in military and economic capability. However, the armed forces have endeavoured to draw strength from its professional corps of officers and hard working men through rigourous physical training and innovative tactics of asymmetric warfare. The forces are now properly trained and have developed a culture of shunning state affairs. Bangladesh Armed Forces have been very successful in UN peace keeping missions and thus, have scored a huge political mileage in the world. Intellectual leadership and security vision and statesmanship are important for national security. Professor John Kotter of Harvard Business School says,” the challenges faced by strategic leaders in implementing complex and long- range consequential decisions demand that they be sophisticated with respect to issues of leadership”.14 Dr Subhash Kapila defines vision in national security plane as imaginative insight and statesman like foresight, including political
11. Alvin Toffler, “Power Shift”, Bantam Books, New York, 1991, Pp.3-14 12. Like many strategists, Arthur F. Lykke of US War College explains ends for objectives, ways for concept and means for resource in his article “Defining Military Strategy”, US Military Review 69, No. 5, May 1989. 13. “Background Note: Bangladesh”, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm visited on Mar 21, 2007. 14. Strategic Leadership and Decision Making, National Defence University, USA at http://www.au.af.mil/au/ awc/ awcgate/ndu/strat-ldr-dm/pt4ch17.html visited on August 18, 2007.
32 sagacity.15 He points out that vision leads to a national strategy to adopt vertically and downwards a set of security policy. In Bangladesh, political leaders with blurred or no vision continue to politicise national organs for partisan interests.
Civil-Military Relations Professor Huntington views civil-military relations as the principal institutional component of security policy.16 In his analysis, civil-military relations have been placed at the centre of security dynamics. Civil-military relations in erstwhile East Pakistan had been negative due to people’s experience of social injustice at the hands of military rulers. After independence, Shiekh Mujib and Ziaur Rahman were killed by groups of army officers in 1975 and 1981. Although the higher military command was not apparently involved in 1975, they ultimately became the main beneficiary of the coup. In 1982, General Ershad annoyed people due to his direct involvement in the coup and his long autocratic rule. After Ershad, common people gradually developed trusts on military due to their withdrawal of support from Ershad, their role in the 1996. Constitutional crisis, CHT insurgency and the part they played during emergencies/ disasters. Civil-military relations are still evolving and the armed forces have again been called in to aid civil power after the declaration of emergency. People in general are still happy, but rumblings of suspicion amongst some are emerging. It is worth remembering that though military involvement in state affairs was welcomed when lawlessness and poor-governance crossed the people’s endurance, its continuation for long would not be desirable.
Security Policy and Planning Mechanism Regarding security policy planning, there is no effective platform in Bangladesh. All major policies appeared to have been decided by the PM in a “Kitchen Cabinet” consisting of a few selected civil-military bureaucrats.17 The Planning Commission and other agencies deal with economic policies but are subject to partisan influences from politicians and donors and lack coordination. A National Committee on Security Affairs (NCSA) was set up in 1992, but it was never that active. The PM is the Convener and its members include ministers and government officials. The NCSA has no legislative basis and its activities are subject to the absolute desire of the PM.
15. Kapila, Subhash, “India’s National Security and Defence Prescriptions” South Asia Analysis Group Paper No.1118, September 16, 2004. 16. Huntington S, “The Soldier and the State”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, England, 1985, Pp.3-4 17. Harun Ur Rashid, “Foreign Relation of Bangladesh”, Rishi Publications, India, 2001, p.38
33 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
The National Security Intelligence (NSI) is responsible for collecting foreign intelligence and monitoring internal affairs. It was created by a cabinet decision in 1972 but had no statutory basis.18 The pivotal intelligence agency is the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) manned by armed forces personnel as well civil. The heads of the NSI and DGFI are usually the closest advisers of the PM. There is no known central coordination agency like the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) between these two to avoid overlapping and to ensure that complementary collection and analysis paths are followed. The major weaknesses of Bangladesh’s security planning lie in its weak leadership and highly bureaucratic practices. Attributes like security consciousness and ability to make own decision have not been nurtured. Often a strong Chairman becomes a lone decision maker while others just keep nodding heads to display predetermined loyalties. Henry Kissinger’s views on Indians can be apt here, “neither education nor exposure nor incentives existed for the Indian political leadership nor civil bureaucracies to think in strategic terms or appreciate military matters”.19 The busy PM as nodal point for all decision making has definite limitations. Following the Falkland War in 1982, a committee was convened in the UK with Lord Franks to investigate its causes. Franks attributed the failure to the absence of a full-time adviser on national security. Since then, the UK has instituted a full time Chairman of the JIC.20 Then in absence of a strong organisation, the PM is not bound to consult anyone for decision making. Hence, she/he sometimes cannot avoid, even if she/he wants, the undue requests, lest the party members and friends become unhappy. We can summarize the fault lines in the security sphere of Bangladesh under the following heads: a. Politics for power and money, divorced from ethics and morals. b. Death of two Presidents due to weaknesses in civil-military relations. c. Rise of radical extremists from 1999 and expansion of their capacity for violence. d. Inadequate human resource development and endemic poverty. Though the number of poor has started to fall slowly, poverty is still evident across the society
18. Adilur Rahman Khan, “Bangladesh: National Security Laws, Security for Whom? at http://www.hrsolidar- ity.net/ mainfile.php/1998vol08no01/1304/ visited on June 23, 2007. 19. Kapila Subhash, “India’s National Security Council- A Critical Review”, South Asia Analysis Group Pa- pers, May 10, 2000. 20. Frontline, Volume 16 - Issue 17, Aug, 1999 at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1617/16170200.htm vis- ited on December 23, 2006.
34 and regions. Most of the economic gains have been in Dhaka, while Rajshahi and Khulna have large pockets of poverty. To tackle these problems, Bangladesh needs her own vision of security and institutional mechanism. Bangladesh should adopt new measures to ensure human security in the future.
SECURITY POLICY AND COORDINATION AGENCIES IN THE WORLD Amongst the many models of security agencies current now, the concept of NSC is the most common. However, its organizational models and roles vary from state to state. Two different systems from four different countries have been considered for this study. The relevant security parameters of these countries, USA, the UK, Pakistan and India, are diversified and sometimes contrasting and thus have been helpful for own purposes. The US Model of NSC The NSC in USA was established vide the national security act of July 26, 1947 during Truman’s presidency to assist him in policies relating to national security.21 Events like the formation of NATO, Soviet detonation of atom bomb, etc. around the 1950s dramatically changed the functioning of NSC, making it the principal arm of security matters under the next President Eisenhower. In the 1960s, NSC was somewhat side-lined due to President Kennedy’s preference for informal advisory arrangements which was also shared by President Johnson.22 Under President Nixon, NSC was revamped to acquire more interdepartmental information and to generate foreign affairs ideas. In early 1990s, President Bush restored collegial relations amongst departments and structured it with eight Policy Coordinating Committees. For last 60 years, NSC has been a forum to initiate new policies for the President of the US so that he can take decisions effectively.
21. History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html, visited on May 23, 2007. 22. Endicott E John, “The National Security Council: Formalized Coordination and Policy Planning”, at “Na- tional Security Policy, The Decision Making Process edited by Pfaltzgraff and Ra’anan Op Cit Pp.177-187
35 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
The NSC is under the chairmanship of the President; its statutory members include the Vice-President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the NSA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and the Director of Central Intelligence Agency. The CJCS also acts as the military advisor to the Council. The NSA is supported by the NSC staff, which comprises of civil servants lent out by other agencies, political appointees and other personnel. The NSC structure includes means to cover national and international interests, and research and thinking mechanisms. While the exact role of NSC in the US has largely depended on the role of the President, the general features involving national security has remained most consistent. The main role of NSC in USA may be enumerated as follows:23 a. NSC is a platform for coordination of all security policies for advising the President and enabling him to execute policies having the NSC ‘stamp of approval’. This endorsement acts to move his policy out of the realm of partisan politics. b. NSC has dealt with budgets and budgetary recommendations with varying degrees of success. c. NSC has contributed to security education and communication for officials and specialists in and out of governments. The NSA in NSC generally acts like its manager and facilitator to integrate foreign and defence policies. While working as NSA under President Nixon, Henry Kissinger acquired enormous clout which tended to stifle departmental initiative and innovation in policy-making. Most NSA members except a few came from a non-governmental background; they were always experts on foreign policy matters. Since 9/11 incident, they have been criticized for their tendency to over-focus on foreign policy issues, leaving other aspects of national security to their subordinates. Condoleezza Rice has come under serious criticism for not being able to act as expected during the post and pre 9/11 disaster.24 The US Congress has oversight of national security issues. The Government Accountability Office supports Congress in overseeing federal programs and operations to ensure accountability to the American people.
23. Endicott E John and Roy W Stafford Jr (eds), “American Defence Policy”, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977, Pp.314 -319 24. Doug Bandow,“Failure Personified: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice” January 5, 2007 http://www. Antiwar .com/bandow/?articleid=10266 visited on 20 May 2007.
36 The US also enjoys a vibrant ‘think tank’ community comprising thousands of highly trained and experienced professionals, engaged in discussions/ criticisms on national security issues. The NSC in USA encourages exchange of data amongst civilian specialists and sometimes media which contributes to the development of a security conscious society. Decisions of the NSC are sometimes declassified for publications after certain interval of time.
The United Kingdom Model Security policy and decision-making in UK is decentralized amongst different departments. Of key importance is the role of the PM, the Cabinet office, the Foreign and Commonwealth office, the MOD and the Home office. The Chairman of JIC, Security Intelligence Coordinator and other executive actors are brought together by a variety of inter-departmental ministerial and secretarial committees focusing on different aspects of security policy making. The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR, popularly pronounced as Cobra) is their official meeting place. COBR is highly organised and it remains on ‘one hour’ notice during day and night. In fact, when considering national security issues, the Cabinet Office structures are mostly like a NSC. The JIC in the Cabinet office analyse the intelligence received, and provide their assessment to COBR, Security and Intelligence Coordinator and Ministerial Committee for PM’s perusal as and when felt essential. The Cabinet office assessments staff in JIC, consisting of staff from various departments, are in fact the heart of that analytic engine. Traditionally, the decisions of the Ministerial Committees are not opposed by the Cabinet. This, therefore, would appear to be a general British government policy that permeates both civilian and military sectors at different levels in decision making. The UK has an active community of think-tanks, academics, and NGOs. Traditionally, central government policy-making has only selectively brought in advice from “outsiders” but the national security policy-making system has become more inclusive and transparent in the recent years. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a renowned think tank, plays an important role in security research and policy planning.
NSC in India The Indian NSC came into existence through an executive order on November 19, 1998.25 Activities of NSC include intelligence assessment, generation of intellectual input and watch over the implementation process. At the
25. Karim A T, “Securing the Nation: Pros and Cons of NSC”, The Daily Star, March 22, 2007.
37 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
apex, India has a six-member body with the PM as Chair and the NSA, Ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home and Finance and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission as members. Others may be invited to attend its scheduled monthly meetings as required. Other organs of NSC include a Strategic Policy Group (SPG), a National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and a JIC. The SPG is the first level of the three-tier organisation stated to be responsible for inter-ministerial coordination. It is a 17 member bureaucratic body that forms the nucleus of the NSC system comprising the Cabinet Secretary, three Service Chiefs and Secretaries of core ministries. The NSAB is a 32 member body comprising basically of eminent retired officials and economic experts that acts as the think tank for NSC. The JIC in India has evolved in line with the British after the 1962 War with China for evaluation of data from Intelligence agencies. It has been re-designated as the NSC Secretariat, a role it has embraced along with its traditional role as JIC. Indian NSC has a NSA and a separate Adviser to the PM on Internal Security. As with the US system, the NSA has direct access to the PM and plays a key role in the NSC. The working of NSC during the last seven years has come under criticism mainly regarding military components that have no direct access to the apex body. Analysts view the JIC as secretariat of NSC that may not be effective in handling the intelligence component. The NSAB with its staffs from outside the government may also not be effective because the Indian bureaucracy may be reluctant to share intelligence information to them, especially with people who have never had any association with the government. NSC’s creation by an executive order has also been criticised in India.
NSC in Pakistan The NSC in Pakistan has a long history starting from the era of President Yahya Khan. Pakistani Columnist Altaf Gauhar believes that it was aimed to control the general elections of 1970.26 Then President Zia-ul-Haq established an 11 member NSC in 1985 but was disbanded soon due to overwhelming pressure.27 Within 18 days of his assuming power, General Musharraf, established the new NSC on October 30, 1999. Subsequently, the NSC underwent several re- shuffling, and finally got established by an Act of the Parliament in April 2004.
26. Altaf Gauhar: “How Intelligence Agencies Run Our Politics” at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/ politics .html visited on May 04, 2007. 27. Rizvi H A, “National Security Council: A Comparative Study of Pakistan and Other Selected Countries”, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, August 2005.
38 The NSC of Pakistan comprises of the President (Chairman), the PM, CJCS Committee, 3 Services Chiefs, Leader of the Opposition and few others. It is a consultative body constituted to deal with matters of national security, including crisis management. Meetings of the NSC may be convened by the President either at his discretion, or on the advice of the PM within the time frame indicated by him. The NSC Secretariat, headed by a Secretary to be appointed by the President, is under the control of the President.
NSC in Other Countries After 9/11, security organisations in the world have undergone thorough reforms. Recently, the Canadian Government has spent over US$ 6 billion to address key security gaps. A 15-member Advisory Council on National Security with eminent specialists from civil society has been established in 2004.28 Newly democratic countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia etc. and other countries in East Europe like Czech Republic, Romania and Slovenia have developed their NSC mostly in line with the US. The Turkish NSC was established in 1961; in it people with military background constitute the majority. In Asia, countries like Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Indonesia, Japan and others have gone for the NSC system. The Malaysian NSC was established in 1971 where the Chief of Defence Forces is the statutory member while the Chiefs of Services are called as required.29 In Africa, countries like South Africa, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and others also have NSC. The South African system is structured to deal with threats from internal stability which include poverty, hunger, corruption, economic crime, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Generally speaking, South Africa does not perceive any ‘hard-security threats’ such as military aggression.30
Synthesis of the above NSC Models The above studies reveal that the fundamental roles and missions of the NSC in different countries are mostly similar. The UK exercise centralised decision- making in a very flexible structure based on deep rooted democratic values. However, these overarching organisations function as forums for debate, but are not generally involved in the decision- making and implementation process. The Council formalises a continuing relationship between those responsible for security policy planning. The matrix below captures some of the generic aspects of those NSCs.
28. Advisory Council on National Security at www.pco-bcp.ga.ca visited on July 23, 2007. 29. National Security Division at www.bkn.gov.my/index.php?module=h_carta, visited on July 11, 2007 and interview of a Malaysian Armed Forces officer. 30. “National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform”, RAND Europe (UK), June 2005 at www2.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/security-decision-making.pdf visited on 30 May 2007.
39
National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
Planning
Emergency Emergency X X Assessment
X X Table-2 Implementation
X Integration
* Invited or detailed as required as detailed or Invited * X X X Advice
X X X X Coordination
X X X X Oversight
X X Legislative Basis Legislative
X X Military Personnel Military
- * *
01 03 04 01* Decision Making Decision
X
Decision Makers Decision
Interaction with Interaction X X X X X
Management Security Security X X X X X - Body NSC NSC Organs Cabinet Of fice Committees NSC NSC Organs NSC Involvement of NSC in Different Fields Different ofin NSC Involvement USA UK India Pakistan Country
40 NSC AS A MODEL FOR BANGLADESH People’s Perception of NSC in Bangladesh The concept of NSC is not new in Bangladesh; Ershad first promoted the idea in 1979, but politicians and bureaucrats misperceived the concept then as a ploy adjusted for militarisation of politics.31 Subsequently, both the Awami League and the BNP Governments established NSC but never pursued it further. Now, during the Caretaker Government, the old agenda has got a new illumination, but people’s perception of NSC is again mixed. They feel that the voices of three Services Chiefs will carry weight out of proportion and decisions may be military-biased. Some have raised questions about its viability in a poor nation; powerful nations may need it because they have global and regional interests to protect and manipulate but does Bangladesh need it? They also feel that NSC may not be able to deal with the deep-seated problems of governance and may fail to tackle the issue of poverty reduction in the country. There are opinions in favour of NSC as well; some feel that NSC is now required to combat terrorism and threats that are coming from different fault-lines. Some scholars opine that NSC may only be acceptable if it is not prejudicial to democracy. Other analysts would like to see the President as Chairman of NSC and draw some sort of balance of state power between the President and PM. Politicians, the main stakeholders, are not very vocal on the issue of NSC. However, on July 12, Mannan Bhuiyan of BNP issued a 13-point reform program that includes, among others, a plan for including an NSC to ensure national security.32 Dr Kamal Hossain and Serajul Alam Khan have also expressed their views in favour of NSC.33 Recently, a report published in the weekly magazine ‘PROBE’ claims that analysts also feel that a mature political reaction would be to accept the formation of such a council in good spirit, as it would solely begin functioning in the national interests.34
Arguments and Rationales Establishing a NSC in Bangladesh is possible only after successful negotiation of some obstacles. In this perspective, the important attributes are identified below:
31. M Sakhawat Hussain, “National Security Council: Need of the hour” at PROBE News Magazine, January 26 - February 01, 2007. 32. Mumtaz Iqbal, “Never say die”, The Daily Star, July 20, 2007. 33. National Daily, The New Age, 12 January 2007. 34. “The need for a National Security Council”, PROBE, January 26 - February 01, 2007.
41 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
a. A form of NSC that is working in other democracies should not be incompatible with democracy in Bangladesh. Regarding military components, Bangladesh, like others, can create a post of CDS/ CJCS who will represent the entire services, keeping the armed forces away from the NSC apex body. As long this is not done, the Chiefs of Services can work as statutory advisers and not as members in the NSC. b. The Chief Executive of the country is also the head of NSC in the rest of world. Since the PM in Bangladesh, as per article 55(2) of the Constitution, exercises the executive power of the Republic, she/he should lead the NSC as well. It is particularly important since the Chief Executive is ultimately responsible to the nation for the total affairs of the state. c. Some people believe that that the formation of NSC during the present government could send a wrong signal to society. Others opine that the name ‘NSC’ should be changed to ‘Public Security Council’ or ‘National Security and Development Council’ to make it acceptable. While there is no reason as to why these matters cannot be discussed, the main focus should be on its performance. Under the present government, NSC may also be instituted as a pilot project, the output of which could be analysed before it is given any permanent shape. Finally, NSC’s ability to address political conflicts, poverty alleviation, etc. may be debatable, but discussion on these issues at the apex national organisation can be expected to influence positively. The NSC or a similar institution should also be viewed in the historical and political context of the state. The NSC in Pakistan may not have worked due to its military domination there year after year. But Bangladesh is now in a far different situation; the armed forces of the nation are a more professional body and are aware of the implication of military rule in the present world. Moreover, an operating NSC with democratic parameters should only play a limited advisory role accepting the primacy of the government. For instance, the NSC in USA or Malaysia has never created any opportunities for the army to take over state power. In contrast, the Turkish experience is quite different; the country has seen a number of coups although it has a military-heavy NSC in existence.
Suggested Model of NSC for Bangladesh While no other country can be an exact model for it, Bangladesh may consider the experience of other democratic nations in the evolution of its own NSC. In addition to a comparative study of different countries, Bangladesh can utilise the experiences of USA and India while keeping in mind its own requirements. Bangladesh may keep in view broad areas such as, external threats and internal
42 insecurities like terrorism, insurgency, political instability etc. in delineating the area of responsibility of its NSC. NSC can maintain its integrity if it is not involved in implementation and decision- making. As a matter of practice, it should only have few basic objectives. First, it should be a mechanism of thinking, forecasting and strategic planning; second, it should represent a link between the civil-military elites, including the Chief Executive; and third, it should act as an administrative body only in an emergency. Though this is not common practice in other NSCs, the Leader of the Opposition may be included in its workings to tackle the prevailing distrust between the government and the opposition in Bangladesh and to develop a national consensus on security issues. The broad roles and functions of NSC like security policy planning and prioritisation, coordination, etc. should be ascertained at the beginning. Taking socio-economic aspects into consideration, Bangladesh may not go for a heavy-weight structure like the ones in USA or India. The following table may be considered and may of course be restructured as and when felt essential: a. The structure of the apex body could be as in Table - 3 shown below:
Table-3 Suggested Composition of NSC in Bangladesh (1) The Prime Minister/ Chief Advisor - Chairman Minister/ Advisor of Defence, (2) Foreign Affairs, Finance and Home - Statutory Members Affairs. (3) Leader of the Opposition Statutory Member (4) National Security Advisor - Member Secretary (5) Chiefs of the Armed Services Statutory Advisors (Vice (6) Cabinet Secretary Chairman, Planning Com- mission may be a Statutory Member Secretary of Planning (7) - Member when not acting as Commission Finance Minister) Advisor and they may be 3 x Representatives of Civil Society the members of the Strategic (8) with expertise on Economics, For- Policy Group in the next tier eign Policy and Technology. - as well. Note: Other Ministers and Heads of Organisations may be invited to attend as required.
43 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
b. There may be two other second tier organisations. First, a SPG under the Chairmanship of NSA with government high officials at the level of Secretary and members of civil society with expertise in economics, environment, foreign policy, technology and other areas as recommended by the NSC. Secondly, a JIC, again under the NSA including Heads of Intelligence Agencies, is to be formed and it should act as the Secretariat of the NSA as well. The Secretariat of the NSA should also include experts to handle the media effectively. c. The NSA and other advisors may be selected taking into account the weaknesses of our bureaucrats and partisan political practices. Some of the criteria to be set may include : non-political background; experience in security and intelligence matters; etc. The status of the NSA should be reasonably high to ensure his role as the coordinator. Figure- 2 A suggested structure of NSC for Bangladesh is shown below:
Parliament NSC (The Apex Body) PM Office/ Cabinet
Policy Planning and Formulation NSA Ministries & Agencies External Security Decision Making and Internal Security Strategic Policy Group Implementation by Not a Part Government Crisis & Disaster of NSC Management
Research and Secretariat JIC Coordination Development. (NSI & DGFT) Monitoring
Technology and ...... Coordination/ Monitoring Cyber Security National Defence College Implementation (Adjunct Faculty) Functional Advisory Suggested Structure of NSC for Bangladesh
For legitimacy, NSC would need a legislative basis and people’s support that is possible through transparency and accountability. Legislative safeguards are particularly essential to ensure that NSC can meet at regular intervals, and so that the Chairman is made to consult it on security issues. All NSC matters should be properly recorded and be declassified after a certain interval so that decision- makers remain careful about its future implication. Provisions for occasional
44 press briefings may also be considered. Finally, decisions within the NSC should be taken on the basis of consensus and voting should be considered only when such effort fails after repeated attempts. Implementation of NSC in Bangladesh is subject to many activities. In the absence of a Parliament, the formation of an NSC has to be promulgated through an Ordinance; in that case it should be discussed beforehand with civil society and other political parties. Most importantly, the matter should be studied in details with the help of experts drawn from other related fields. For instance, India in 1998 set up a special Task Force led by K C Pant to study NSC mechanisms and to submit recommendations in this regard.35
CONCLUSION Security is one of the widely traveled domains where the humans have been involved in their quest for survival. Traditionally, national security has been defined largely in military terms, but contemporary analytical perspectives posit that continued long-term effective security is predicated on the political, economic and societal bases of the state. Particularly in the context of developing countries, it has been seen that political instability, abysmal poverty, extreme socio-economic disparities, etc. are serious sources of national insecurity even surpassing external threats. Bangladesh has had to face insecurity issues of huge dimensions on many occasions. It has had to suffer due to weak civil-military relations, terrorism, lack of security consciousness and inappropriate policies. In fact, security matters in Bangladesh have been traditionally side-lined. The concerned agencies do not work in a coordinated manner. The PM, wearing many hats and burdened with official and political responsibilities and interests, is the nodal point of security but cannot deal with the situation properly. The concept of NSC and its military components is also not clearly understood in Bangladesh. A NSC designed under democratic premise can relegate the military to a distant advisory role. This idea corroborated by experience shows that NSC does not facilitate military participation in political affairs elsewhere in the world. What it can do is establish a watchdog system for security matters and create a platform for interaction between the military and civilians, including politicians that can help improve the civil-military relations and strengthen the national security mechanisms.
35. B Raman, “ National Security Mechanism”, South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 1228, January 24, 2005.
45 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
To have a NSC in Bangladesh, we need to analyse every aspect of its working from pragmatic perspectives. While some generic aspects of different NSC models may be considered for Bangladesh, the ‘one size fits all’ approach will not be effective. A high power committee should examine all existing models for ensuring optimum outcome. It is likely that a blended model mainly combing elements of the Indian and the US systems and incorporating arrangements like the inclusion of the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament and eminent personalities of civil society could prove to be suitable for Bangladesh. To make the NSC truly effective, a legal mandate with oversight mechanism should also be required. Finally, people with patriotic and independent mindset would be required to manage it to pursue the security interests of the nation and lead it towards a secure future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books 1. Alvin Toffler, “Power Shift”, Bantam Books, New York, 1991. 2. Buzan Barry, “ People, States and Fear”, Lyne Publications, Colorado, USA, 1991. 3. Endicott E John, “The National Security Council: Formalized Coordination and Policy Planning”, at “National Security Policy, The Decision Making Process edited by Pfaltzgraff and Ra’anan, Transasia Publishers, New Delhi, 1986. 4. Endicott E John and Roy W Stafford Jr (eds), “American Defence Policy”, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977. 5. Huntington S, “The Soldier and the State”, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, England, 1985. 6. Mohsin Amena, “Bangladesh: An Uneasy Accommodation” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, Stanford University Press, New York, 2001. 7. Rao, K V Krishna, “Prepare or Perish, A Study of National Security”, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, India, 1991. 8. Rashid Harun ur, “Foreign Relation of Bangladesh”, Rishi Publications, India, 2001. 9. Shultz Jr, Roy Gordon and Qester, ”Security Studies for 21st Century’, Brassey Inc, Washibgton, USA, 1997.
46 Journals/ Periodicals/ Articles on Internet 1. “Background Note: Bangladesh”, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3452.htm visited on Mar 21, 2007. 2. Strategic Leadership and Decision Making, National Defence University, USA at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/ndu/strat-ldr-dm/pt4ch17.html visited on August 18, 2007. 3. Kapila, Subhash, “India’s National Security and Defence Prescriptions” South Asia Analysis Group Paper No.1118, September 16, 2004. 4. Adilur Rahman Khan, “Bangladesh: National Security Laws, Security for Whom? at http://www.hrsolidarity.net/ mainfile.php/1998vol08no01/1304/ visited on June 23, 2007. 5. Doug Bandow,“Failure Personified: Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice” January 5, 2007 http://www.Antiwar .com/bandow/?articleid=10266 visited on 20 May 2007. 6. Centre for Study of Civil War Database at www.prio.no/cscw/battle_deaths/ UppsalaPRIO_YearlyBD.xls and Anup Shah, “Poverty Facts and Status” at www.csmonitor.com/2004/ 0617/p16s01-cogn.html visited on 24 June 2007. 7. Andrew Mark, “Coping with Crisis”, a working paper for International Peace Academy, 2007. 8. Banglapedia at http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/S_0166.htm visited on July 10, 2007. 9. Professor Nurul Islam, “Sustainability and Energy Security for Bangladesh”, Key note paper for a Symposium at Hotel Sheraton on April 12, 2007, p.6-7. 10. Frontline, Volume 16 - Issue 17, Aug, 1999 at http://www.hinduonnet.com/ fline/fl1617/16170200.htm visited on December 23, 2006. 11. Karim A T, “Securing the Nation: Pros and Cons of NSC”, The Daily Star March 22, 2007. 12. Altaf Gauhar: “How Intelligence Agencies Run Our Politics” at http://www. fas.org/irp/world/pakistan/isi/politics .html visited on May 04, 2007. 13. Rizvi H A, “National Security Council: A Comparative Study of Pakistan and Other Selected Countries”, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, August 2005. 14. Advisory Council on National Security at www.pco-bcp.ga.ca visited on July 23, 2007. 15. National Security Division at www.bkn.gov.my/index.php?module=h_carta, visited on July 11, 2007 and interview of a Malaysian Armed Forces officer.
47 National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues
16. “National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform”, RAND Europe (UK), June 2005 at www2.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/security- decision-making.pdf visited on 30 May 2007. 17. M Sakhawat Hussain, “National Security Council: Need of the hour”, PROBE, January 26 - February 01, 2007. 18. The Daily Star, June 27, 2007 19. Zayadul Ahsan, The Daily Star, August 21, 2005. 20. Mumtaz Iqbal, “Never say die”, The Daily Star, July 20, 2007. 21. National Daily, The New Age, January 12, 2007. 22. “The need for a National Security Council”, PROBE, January 26 - February 01, 2007. 23. B Raman, “ National Security Mechanism”, South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 1228, January 24, 2005.
48 Author Captain Kazi Kamrul Hassan was commissioned in Bangladesh Navy in 1982. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and National Defence College, Bangladesh. His academic credentials also include B.Sc Engineering (Electrical) from BUET, Post Graduation Studies in Weapon Engineering from Royal Naval Engineering College, UK and Masters in Defence Studies from National University, Bangladesh. Presently, he is pursuing Masters of Philosophy (M Phil) in National Security Studies from the same university. Experienced in instructional duties and military command and administration in different fields and areas including Naval Headquarters, the officer also took part in UN Observer Mission in Georgia. He is a widely traveled person who also took part in different job oriented trainings at home and abroad. He is happily married and has two children. Captain Kamrul is presently working in NHQ as Director of Naval Training.
49
EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT IN POWER SECTOR AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Commander Mahmudul Huq Choudhury, afwc, psc, BN INTRODUCTION In the modern age, we are primarily dependent on power. Efficient and affordable power supply is essential for rapid economic growth and poverty reduction. Industry and commerce need accessible and reliable electricity. Households need reliable and reasonably priced electricity to realize their full socio-economic potential and attain decent living standards. The coverage of electricity in Bangladesh is limited to only one-third of the population. Electricity consumption grew at an average annual rate of 8.1% during the last ten years. Identical growth in electricity demand is expected to continue in next decade. The country inherited a weak power generation and distribution system. In recent years, power generation within the country has been a victim of inefficient leadership, over- centralization, corruption and greed. The net countrywide system loss is probably among the highest in the developing world. The system is also characterized by heavy losses and poor collection performance. Maintenance of generating units has been ignored grossly resulting in unscheduled shut downs of units causing acute power shortages. The power sector cannot attain optimum production due to frequent breakdowns of power generation plants. The cumulative effect is gross shortage of power coupled with frequent interruptions of power and random load shedding. In Bangladesh, demand for power has always outstripped supply. Generation of power cannot keep pace with requirement. The current net generating capacity is about 4120 MW as against an installed capacity of over 5000 MW, while peak demand is about 4832 MW. To cope with the situation, private participation in power generation capacity was encouraged in the 90s. The government announced an incentive-oriented energy policy to attract private investment and participation in the power generation sector. Unfortunately, the policy met formidable obstacles causing the power shortage to peak. For sustained economic growth, availability of uninterrupted power is essential. Power is thus directly linked to national development. However, the power sector escapes notice until one faces scarcity of it. As a matter of fact, per capita power consumption is an index of the level of development of a country and testifies to the living standard of the people. With 145 million people, Bangladesh is the world’s most densely populated country. Here 975 people live in one square kilometer area. With 75% of its population concentrated in rural areas, Bangladesh has amongst the lowest per capita power consumption in the world. The Government is, at present, locked in bitter recrimination, primarily on the tariff issue. The unreasonably high tariff is the result of problems at the planning, Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
policy, institutional and operational levels. As a result, the financial capacity of PDB has been crippled with a consequent adverse impact on the already fragile economy of the country. This has led to demonstrations, strikes, violence, low production and in some cases, closure of industries. The cumulative effect has affected the overall security of the country. The term ‘security’ has different connotations in different fields of human activity. Currently, security is more linked to the economy, poverty and the level of development in the case of developing countries like Bangladesh. The emphasis is now on the flow of vital economic resources of national state functions and in today’s world the vital economic resources in energy, agriculture, industry, trade etc. Hence, there is an urgent need to address this issue at the national level.
NATIONAL SECURITY In the modern world, security has become a multidimensional concept and is to be addressed as the collective aspiration of citizens. Threats are no more seen as restricted to the military domain. Physical protection and psychological freedom must be addressed. National security now relates to the protection of citizens; economic, cultural and ecological as well as military aspects must be addressed. A nation can be secure when it is economically developed, politically stable and socio-culturally cohesive. This transformation of the concept of security basically entails a broad shift from traditional ‘state and military’ centric ideas to ‘people’ centric ones.
Determinants of Security Food, energy and environment are prime determinants of security. Financial stability along with technological upkeep is also a critical element of national security. To establish credible armed forces, there is a requirement to commit huge resources through economic and technological activities.
Security in the Energy Spectrum History of civilization demonstrates the growing consumption of per capita energy. The basic principle of energy security is to ensure the supply of adequate energy to meet the demands. Insecurity arises due to the failure of supply with respect to time, availability and purchasing capability. Energy insecurity leads to a number of vulnerabilities and adversely affects the national economy. Therefore, energy security is an important dimension of national security.
Vulnerability of Energy Insecurity and its Alternative Energy insecurity can be due to uncertainty arising from social, political, financial or military reasons. If the supply depends upon foreign sources, it is
52 then a matter of real concern. Energy insecurity may occur at different levels; individual, household, community, national and even global. After the Arab Israeli war of 1973, the whole world ensured an energy crisis. Bangladesh had also to suffer then from the shortage of kerosene. Long term sustainable development in the energy sector requires a gradual shifting towards renewable sources of energy. Bio-gas technology is a cheap option. Bio-gas generation based on disposal waste of animal husbandry, agricultural residues, human excreta, and poultry dropping is an environmental friendly technology. The gas generated from a bio-gas plant can meet the fuel requirement of cooking without causing any environmental problem. About 39 million tons of organic matters are burnt in Bangladesh every year. As a result, community and public forestry are being depleted at an accelerating rate creating environmental and ecological problems. Natural gas deposits in the country are limited and can meet energy demand for only 20 years or so. At present, Bangladesh meet 46.15% of its energy needs from agricultural residue, 10.5 % from fuel wood and 33% from tree residue. Use of bio-gas can reduce energy deficit by15 %.
POWER SECTOR IN BANGLADESH Evolution of Power System At the time of partition, power generation and distribution were in the hands of some private companies. Power used to be supplied to most districts at night, with Bhola being the one exception. There were no long distance transmission lines. In aggregate, the generation capacity of the country was only 21 MW. In 1948, the Electricity Directorate was created to plan and improve power supply situation. WAPDA was created in 1959 and subsequently merged with the Electricity Directorate in 1960. The basic philosophy was to give more autonomy to this organization for development of basic infrastructure. At that time, plants with relatively higher capacity were built at Siddhirganj, Chittagong and Khulna. At the same time, Kaptai dam with unit size of 40 MW was constructed by the Irrigation Department. The construction of Dhaka-Chittagong 132 KV transmission line was also initiated then. In 1972, BPDB was created as a public sector organization to boost the power sector. In mid 70s, the government emphasized on the need for rural electrification. A comprehensive scheme was undertaken to arrive at this goal. As a result, the government created REB in October 1977. Later in 1991, DESA
53 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
was created to improve the distribution system in and around Dhaka and bring about improvement of customer service and collection of revenue and lessened the administrative burden of BPDB. Since the inception of REB, 67 PBSs have been established, covering almost 90% of Bangladesh. Over 34,000 of a total of about 64,000 villages have been electrified and almost 4 million connections have been given. PBSs arekeys to the electrification strategy of the REB. REB has resulted markedly in lower system losses in distribution and its system is better than either BPDB or DESA. REB has also shown superior performance in terms of bill collection.
Energy Use Scenario in Global Perspective Since industrial revolution, global use of energy has betrayed enormous disparity between developed and developing countries since the industrial revolution. 70% of world population, for example, in developing countries account for less than 30% of global energy consumption. In contrast, the USA alone with only 5% of the world’s population consumes 26% of the world’s energy. On an average a person from a developing country consumes less than one-tenth of a US citizen. In fact, the energy content of food eaten by an average North American is more than the total energy used by a Bangladeshi for cooking, lightening, transportation, industry, agriculture etc. Figure-1 Disproportion of Energy Consumption
USA Bangladesh 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 Per Capita Energy Consumption (Mhh)
54 Energy Use – South Asia and Bangladesh The per capita energy consumption in Bangladesh is the lowest in the South Asian region. Even after the discovery of 22 gas fields and one oil field, the country cannot provide energy security to her people. Only 10% people enjoy pipeline connection of gas to their kitchen and less than 30% households are connected to electricity. The per capita energy use is shown in Figure 2.
Figure-2 Energy Use of South Asian Region14.
500 476 446 450 400 371 350 320 300 250 197 200 150 100
Energy Consumption (KgOE) 50 0 Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka
Food, shelter, health and education are basic human needs, all involving energy input. Energy is required for cooking food, construction and maintenance of houses, production of weather-appropriate clothing, providing sufficient and safe drinking water and maintaining a healthy environment. Forms of energy utilization in human life are shown in Figure 3.
55 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
Figure-3 Variety of Energy Use
Space heating R E Water heating S Cooking 11.00% I Clothes drying D 24.90% 1.90% Refrigeration E 1.10% Air conditioning N 0.30% C 1.10% Others 19.20% 0.70% E 25.20% 2.10% Space heating C Residential Water heating O Transportation 6.90% Cooking M M 0.30% Commercial 1.10% Refrigeration 14.40% E 1.10% Air conditioning R 0.20% 7.50% 1.80% Feed sticks C Industrial 1.60% Others E 1.70% Process steam I 41.20% 3.60% Electric drive N D Electrolytic process U Direct heat 11.40% 16.70% S Feed stocks T 1.20% 0.80% Others R Y Raw mtrs. TRANSPORT Direct Fuel
Energy Resources In Bangladesh, energy resources are neither adequate nor varied. Natural gas, petroleum products, coal and hydropower are used to produce electricity, of which petroleum products are being imported at a high cost. Electrical power generation from 1996 to 2005 by various fuels is shown in Table 1. The contribution from GFUs, LFUs and HUs are 87.33%, 6.67% and 6.0% respectively though the available capacities are about 83.03%, 10.17% and 6.80% respectively.
56 Table-1 Generation of Electricity by Various Types of Fuels. Year Total Gas Liquid Fuels Hydro (GWh) GWh 0/0 GWh 0/0 GWh 0/0 1996 10806 9512 88.03% 922 8.53% 372 3.44% 1997 11474 9994 87.10% 741 6.46% 739 6.44% 1998 11858 10021 84.51% 1118 9.43% 719 6.06% 1999 12882 10896 84.58% 1121 8.70% 865 6.71% 2000 13872 12278 88.51% 761 5.49% 833 6.00% 2001 14318 12603 88.02% 688 4.81% 1027 7.17% 2002 16653 14535 87.28% 1148 6.89% 970 5.82% 2003 18221 16561 90.89% 980 5.38% 680 3.73% 2004 19178 17173 89.55% 1168 6.09% 837 4.36% 2005 20820 18531 89.01% 1486 7.14% 803 3.86%
Power Generating Units As on June 2007, BPDB had a total of 70 generating units with capacities ranging from 02 MW to 360 MW. Total installed capacity as of 23 April 2007 was 5167 MW including IPP (BPDB - 3907 MW and IPP - 1260 MW). Total 15,417 Gwh gross energy was generated in public sector power plants managed by BPDB. In addition, total 8286 Gwh of energy was purchased by BPDB from IPP. The transmission network of BPDB is 3919 km long comprising 230, 132 and 66 KV lines. The total numbers of grid sub-stations are 7 and the capacity is 13,309 MVA.
Sharing of Power Plants by BPDB & IPP18 . Table-2 Owned by No. of Installed Available Units Capacity Capacity MW % MW % BPDB 58 3907 75% 2056 63% IPP 12 1260 25% 1220 37% Total 70 5167 - 3276 -
57 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
It is a matter of great concern that although 30% (1560 MW) of existing generators have already crossed their service life of 20-25 years, but they are still in use; indeed, 11 % generators will terminate their life in the next three years. These ageing generators cannot produce rated electric power. Consequently, forced shut downs are common, lowering the available capacity and creating power shortfalls.
Demand versus Supply Growth in the Country Electricity demand increases by 250-300 MW per year. National demand for power has increased manifold. While demand has been growing in absolute terms, availability and growth of electricity generation has been negligible. The inverse equation is best demonstrated by the fact that while demand has grown by over 2000 MW between 2001 and 2006; actual supply has grown by only 80 MW. Ideally, the minimum capacity to be installed in a year should be the MW to be phased out that year plus the yearly incremental MW. Table-3 Power Supply and Demand in Bangladesh 1994 – 2006 Item 1994 1999 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Installed Capacity 2608 3603 4230 4680 4680 4995 5245 (MW) Peak Demand - 2881 3659 3947 4259 4597 4832 (MW) Served Generation 1875 2449 3217 3428 3592 3720 3782 (MW) Load Shedding 23-500 16-774 5-367 5-468 2-694 7-770 29-1050 (MW)
58 Figure-4 Trend in power supply and demand 6000
5000 W) W) (M (M W)
W)
4000 ty (M on ci (M ti 3000 ra and ne Capa Ge hedding S Dem
2000 ed alled rv st eak P Se Load 1000 In
0 1994 1999 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Energy requirements have to be assessed in the light of continuing and chronic shortage of power and distressingly low per capita consumption. Only around 30% of the population (50% in urban areas and 15% in rural areas) has access to electricity. Thus, power availability must be increased urgently to meet the growing demand. Unhappiness amongst the people due to shortfall of electricity has made the PDB face trouble repeatedly in recent times. Another major problem facing the power sector is lack of regulation. The tariff rates for the non-productive domestic sector are lower than that for productive sectors like industry and agriculture while efforts have been directed towards improving the supply situation, while the “demand regulation”, a vital ingredient of comprehensive and cost effective planning has been completely ignored. This has also encouraged the high rate of growth in the domestic sector.
POWER SHORTAGE: CAUSES The total generating capacity of East Bengal, in 1947, was a mere 21MW, all of it privately owned. After 60 years, total installed capacity has increased to 5245 MW, an increase of more than 250 fold. Though an impressive achievement by international standards, per capita consumption of electricity in Bangladesh is, in effect, extremely low. There is a wide gap between demand and
59 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
supply of electrical energy. This gap has been increasing due to non-existence of a comprehensive and compatible plan. Shortage of power hinders overall development of the country to a great extent. The power sector has ended up in this situation due to various reasons.
Organizational Weakness Electricity Distributions and System Loss. Power sector is incurring high losses in the distribution system. Theft and pilferage of electricity at the user end level are the root causes of high system loss. Employers and a significant number of customers have teamed up in an unholy alliance. Unless radical reforms and restructuring are taken up in this sector, it will be very difficult to provide energy security to the country. As a matter of fact, no technical explanation can account for the 22% system loss in the power distribution system. System loss for technical reasons should at best be 5% as per International Standard. Lack of Supervision. The number of illegal connections is enormous though no one knows the actual figure. Theft also takes place by way of tapping distribution lines, bypassing meters, ‘fixing’ meters, and free misuse of electricity supply by BPDB employees. High-tension consumers, particularly textile mills, jute mills and chemical plants, often remove fuses from instrument transformers in order to disable energy meters. The cumulative effects pose great hindrance in providing electricity to 145 million people of Bangladesh. If this impediment cannot be overcome, only generating power will not suffice in providing energy security. Inadequate Maintenance of Power Plants. There have been gross irregularities in the maintenance and setting up of new power plants. Experts are amazed that some of the existing power plants are still operating and generating power. Any power station, according to manuals, needs major overhauling every three years. Unfortunately, most power plants of the country do not undergo such overhauling even in six to seven years. As overhauling requires complete shut down of the plant, authorities have been reluctant to undergo such procedures as that would cause load shedding of great magnitude. And so the ageing power plants continue to operate, albeit in fits and starts. Technological Backwardness. The Energy sector is closely related to technology. Almost all projects in this field are dependent upon foreign technology and expertise. Since its inception, Bangladesh has not been attentive to the needs of a knowledge based economy and has not developed techno-based manpower. Even after three decades of independence, foreign experts have been summoned for very simple decisions. The size of energy sector organizations has expanded
60 both vertically and horizontally although quality work is absent. As a result, the problems cannot be solved instantly on indigenous capacity. Operating Inefficiency. The power sector is not in good shape as far as operating efficiency is concerned. It requires considerably more employees per customer served than is the case in many other countries. According to unofficial statistics, 40% of the 6000 or so DESA employees do not work regularly or at all. In addition to their regular wages, many workers collect overtime money, part of which finds its way into the union’s coffers. The country has been unable to establish tariff structures and billing procedures that could enable the power sector to be financially self-supporting. The resulting losses require subsidies from government or donor agencies that divert revenue away from other important programmes. This problem has afflicted the Bangladesh power sector entities in varying degrees.
Unprofessional Conduct in the Sector There have been gross irregularities in management. Electricity tariff continue to be higher in some cases than rates prevailing in regional countries. Consumers facing high electricity bills relative to their income are tempted to get their bill totals reduced by bribing meter readers, billing clerks, and account keepers. Unjust Stances. 75% of the country’s population live in rural areas. But adequate attention has not been paid to meet the energy needs of rural people. Next to food and water, rural people struggle for cooking. Unplanned use of bio- fuels has been contributing to environmental degradation. Moreover, production cost in rural areas is also high due to higher cost of energy. As a whole, only 15% rural people have been connected to electricity. Although rural electrification programme has made positive contribution to some targeted areas, large number of households within a designated area can remain beyond electric service. Disparity in Charging Electricity Bill. The per unit PBS tariff for electricity at Narsingdi is Taka 2.69 and Taka 2.71 at Gazipur. Surprisingly, the same unit costs Taka 3.97 at Sylhet. On the other hand, the per unit electricity tariff of PDB’s electricity is Tk 2.82 on an average, DESA’s and DESCO’s tariff is Tk 2.50 to Tk 3, but rural people pay Tk 3.50 on an average. As a result, variations in electricity bill within the same country cause discontent resulting in demands for fair treatment by the government.
61 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
Figure-5 PBS tariff for electricity 4.5 3.97 4 3.5 k) 3.5 (T
te 3 2.69 2.71 Ra 2.5 it 2 Un r r 1.5 Pe 1 0.5 0 Narsingdi Gazipur Sylhet average
Figure-6 Tariff of other electricity distributors.22 4 3.5 3.5 2.82 3 k) 3 2.5
it (T it 2.5 Un
r r 2 Pe 1.5 te
Ra 1 0.5 0 PDB DESA DESCO PBS
62 Discrepancy of Zones. a. Energy Security for West Zone. In Bangladesh most of the known commercial energy resources are located in the East zone of the country covering the geographical areas of Chittagong, Sylhet and Dhaka Division (excluding greater Faridpur district). The ratio of electricity generation of the East and West zone is 9:1. The production cost of electricity in the Western Zone is about 6 times than that of the East. The vast majority of electricity consumption also takes place in the east. The entire west zone accounts for only 22% of the total consumption. Greater Dhaka alone consumes around 45% of electricity from the national grid. Economic development activities of the east zone got momentum due to secured energy supply. On the contrary, development activities of the west zone have been considerably constrained due to energy insecurity. b. Energy Security of Coastal Area and Offshore Islands. The coastal area and offshore islands of Bangladesh lack energy security. Electricity is a dream in many places in coastal belt and islands. The situation worsens after a tidal surge or cyclone. So the challenges of energy security for these areas are severe in nature. Ineffective Administration. Both BPDB and DESA are hostages in the hands of union leaders whose sinister influence reaches every section of the organization. They dictate what can or cannot be done in matters of posting and transfer of officers, award of small contracts and settlement of the financial claims of contractors and suppliers. Union leaders collect overtime money in addition to regular wages, part of which finds its way into the union’s coffers. About 30% of the staff are active participants in union activities. Very few officers dare challenge the unions’ illegal authority for fear of bodily harm, knowing that support from the head office would not be forthcoming.
Corruption in the Sector The number of new ‘Jamuna Bridges’ that can be built from the savings arising from the reduction in ‘system loss’ in the power sector may be a somewhat contentious issue. What is more relevant to BPDB today is how much generation capacity it could finance out of its own resources by plugging some of its revenue and expenditure leakage. At a rough estimate, a 10% reduction in system loss would yield Tk 3 billion in savings, sufficient to add to the system 200 MW of simple cycle gas turbine generation every year. Alternatively or additionally, a mere 5% reduction in inefficiency would yield Tk 750 million, sufficient to add another 50 MW to the system, thereby raising total additional generation capacity by 250 MW. In one year, the current power crisis of greater Dhaka could
63 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
be tackled and in two years, the shortage of generation capacity in the entire country could be put right. Genesis of Corruption. Corruption in the power sector did not assume serious proportion until after the independence of Bangladesh. In 60s, electricity theft was significantly more widespread in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. Suspicions about corruption were mainly focused on purchase and construction contracts relating to power, and not so much on execution of large projects. As shame and remorse once attached to corruption gradually vanished and certain sections of employees became gradually emboldened under protection of their CBA, corruption spread to the wider sphere of BPDB’s activities and cases once confined to only subordinate staff extended to other sections. Causes of Corruption. Scarcity increases the opportunity cost of any service and provides opportunities for corruption. The acute shortage of generation capacity and its consequent effects, frequent load-shedding, low voltage and low frequency led to many types of corruption. The most pernicious phenomenon nurturing corruption is the so-called system loss which involves the theft of a substantial volume of electrical energy. What was initially a minor issue became gradually more serious due to the neglect in enforcing discipline at a time when things were still under control. With no disciplinary actions forthcoming, delinquent power sector employees developed the attitude of having the “right to steal”. The BPDB employees have been an active party to system loss, causing huge revenue losses and undermining financial viability. Corruption in Getting Connection. Getting an electric connection from BPDB/DESA is a difficult process, involving hassles, delays and, for the average consumer, bribery. The application form for a service connection asks for details of property ownership, lease deeds and, for industrial connections, clearance certificates from the Fire Department and the Health Division are also needed. It is easy to find faults in the dozen or so attachments, unless appropriate palms are greased. Six signatures of various officials are required for the approval and the time involved for moving the case is inversely related to the amount of gratification paid. Corruption in Procurement. Major corrupt practices in large contracts take place outside the organization, which is indicated to be the ministry. The existence of minor vices at different levels of BPDB is also a common phenomenon. The rate of corruption is over 20% of the value of procurement contracts, although in limited cases it is reportedly as high as 30%.
64 Analysis The significant causes of corruption in BPDB/DESA are: a. Absence of significant anti-corruption drives and court actions against corrupt employees. Instances of departmental inquiries or disciplinary actions against lower grade employees are absent due to the supposed or real fear of retaliation by trade unions. b. Centralization of decision-making powers with respect to procurement of capital equipment in the hand of political governments who are less accountable and controllable in comparison to BPDB/DESA officialdom. c. Unnecessarily stringent and lengthy procedures for getting connection. d. The acute shortage of generation capacity and consequent scarcity of electricity, which has opened up many opportunities for corrupt transactions. e. Inadequate special magistrate courts and mobile courts to handle cases. f. Vested interests inducing illegal gains. g. The maintenance of the status quo benefits many vested interests. Conscientious officers eventually fall in line with the system, some perhaps joining it, when they discover that the known culprits enjoy the protection of powerful godfathers, some of whom surface as lawmakers. SHORTAGE OF POWER: ITS CONSEQUENCES Impact on Economy There is no escape from the globalization. The entire world is turning into an open market. Attaining high productivity, efficiency and competitiveness is a must. A nation’s economic emancipation greatly depends on the development and use of energy sources. Electricity is the prime energy source for industrial and other socio-economic development. Unfortunately, electricity generation in the country presently benefits only 30% of the total population. Moreover, frequent and prolonged load shedding causes hamper to industrial production and disrupt economic activities. Extensive recourse to captive power by export-oriented industries raises production cost and reduces export competitiveness as well as productivity of personnel. It causes time loss, and compels users to use expensive alternate sources of energy thus leading to negative impact on the environment. According to WB estimates, the load shedding and black outs cost the economy almost US$ one billion per year. Canadian consultants have revealed that every unit (Kwh) of load shedding costs a minimum of Tk 25 - 30 to the economy of the country.
65 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
Loss of Production. This is a fast-moving world. Bangladesh needs to move fast to compete in it. Her exports are price-competitive in relation to countries like China, India and Vietnam, owing to the fact that labour costs are substantially lower. But Bangladesh loses out badly on “time-to-market”: lead times are 90- 120 days, compared to less than 90 in India, or 50-60 days for Asian benchmark competitors. The unreasonable time is high due to power interruption, political unrest and bureaucratic complexities. As a result, garments industries which have investment of 8 billion US dollars are hampered. Production in hundreds of export-oriented industries in the country has dropped to a low level resulting in a huge loss to the economy. The situation can be summarized thus: a. Export-oriented industries experience loss of nearly Tk 10 crore on an average per day. b. Shrimp export and fish preservation companies have been affected due to extreme power crises in the Khulna, Barisal and Chittagong regions. c. Frequent power outages have affected other electricity based industries negatively. d. Irrigation has been causing food grain shortages. Irrigation connection in 2006 had to be stopped, resulting in less crop production. Foreign Investment. A foreign investment is a key to bringing the technology, modern management systems, finance and access to markets. On paper, Bangladesh can boast of having the most liberal investment regime in South Asia. To exploit it many foreign investors have showed considerable investor interest in mid-1990. Unfortunately, that enthusiasm has died down. The impediments to investment extend far and deep owing to the critical constraint of infrastructure. Bangladesh is the most power scarce country in South Asia, and unreliable power supply is often seen as a big ‘negative’ for the investment climate. Given the importance of adequate power supply for economic growth and poverty reduction, donors have been keen to help in the sector but to little avail. New generation plant construction has been delayed by a consistent pattern of questionable tendering and re-tendering. As a result, generation of power remains far below requirement. Reduction of GDP Growth. Energy plays the role of prime mover for the flow of vital economic resources contributing to GDP growth. The situation in garments industries is grim due to continuous load shedding. The BGMEA President has unsuccessfully demanded supply of power for five to ten hours everyday on a rationing system to keep production uninterrupted. However, the table below can substantiate the situation.
66 Table-4 GDP growth rate in Bangladesh32 GDP – real growth Year Rank Percent Change Date of Information rate 2002 4.40 % 51 2002 est. 2003 5.30 % 48 20.45 % 2003 est. 2004 4.90 % 84 -7.55 % 2004 est. 2005 6.40 % 50 30.61 % 2005 est. 2006 6.10 % 62 -4.69 % 2006 est.
Damage of Equipment. Innumerable electric motors used in irrigation pumps have been burnt due to frequent power interruptions. Abrupt power failures have also rendered a good number of medical equipment at public and privately- owned health and diagnostic centres inoperative. Costly medical equipment have become dysfunctional; 349 registered privately owned clinics in Dhaka and 811 in other parts of the country have been affected by power interruption. The loss incurred in household equipments is even greater although proper statistics have not been produced in this case.
Impact on Society Frequent load shedding has made the lives of common people miserable. Power shortage creates problems in social sectors; affects students, increases criminal activities, affects water supply and sanitation services, disrupts vital life saving medical services, etc. Human Sufferings. The elite who live in cozy apartments and shopping malls have their own generators and therefore suffer from interruption of power supply. The rich people can afford to have IPS, UPS and generators to provide them with electricity when load shedding strikes. But the poor and marginalized middle classes neither have the purchasing power nor the capacity to buy diesel regularly for generators. Thus sufferings are enormous. Below are listed only a few: a. The water supply drops drastically due to the power crisis while other power- based activities get stalled, multiplying the miseries of city residents. b. The situation is so acute that patients in different parts of the country fail to get their diagnostic reports in time. In most cases, they have had to wait for long in diagnosis centers due to the frequent load shedding. c. Life-saving drugs can also become ineffective leading to loss of human lives, especially in rural areas where load shedding is higher.
67 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
d. Many patients fail to have dialysis in time because of water crisis and some have to leave hospitals without treatment. e. Sufferings worsen in hospitals located in multi-storied buildings as lifts and escalators become dysfunctional due to power outages. Social System. Power outages have also had an adverse impact on safety and security systems. Outages make hospital unsafe for patients, attendants and even the staff. A number of cases have been reported in which people, including doctors, were robbed of cell phones and other valuables in hospital premises. Black outs enable hijackers to conduct anti-social activities. People feel insecure to move after sunset despite urgent need. Impact on Poverty Alleviation. Energy use has had a direct link with poverty reduction. Access to modern energy has significant effects on the poor in terms of time and effort because of the reduced need to gather bio-mass fuels. This allows diversification of labor and results in increased individual productivity. Generally, the poor spend a much higher portion of their income on energy than the rich. Thus, poverty reduction measures are influenced by the availability of modern forms of energy, particularly electricity. Lower income households spend higher proportion of their income to meet the energy needs. Lower income households are supposed to use inferior type energy sources (fuel wood, straw rice husk, dung and trash etc. for cooking and kerosene for lighting). Environmental Degradation. At present Bangladesh meet 46.15% of its energy need from agricultural residue; 10.5% from cow dung, 12.9% from fuel wood and 33% from tree residue. This means that to meet our energy need we are depriving ourselves of organic fertilizer and creating environmental imbalance by deforestation.
Cumulative Effects on Society Due to Shortage of Power Human security is of central importance for a nation. The history of the last two hundred years confirms beyond doubt that the foundation of a modern nation lies on the social and economic well being of its people. National security ensures flow of vital economic resources contributing towards the GDP and the overall development of the country. Load shedding and power failure is a recurring phenomenon. On paper, the progress made in the field of power generation is impressive and commendable. In reality, it is far from being even satisfactory. Consumers experience two spells of load shedding every year, one during January and early February and the other from mid-April to mid-July. The peak shortage is to the tune of 1000 MW to
68 1500 MW. This necessitates extensive load shedding, ranging from 4 to 5 hours for domestic consumers in larger cities and up to 16 hours daily in far-flung rural areas. The situation warrants immediate intervention but initiative on the part of the government is absent.
COMPREHENSIVE POWER MANAGEMENT: WAY OUT Efficient and affordable power supply is essential in Bangladesh for rapid growth and poverty reduction in Bangladesh. Industry and commerce need accessible and reliable electricity to conduct business and expand economic activities. Households need reliable and reasonably priced electricity to realize their full socio-economic potential and ensure a decent standard of living. For mechanized irrigation, farmers rely more on diesel than on electricity. To address the situation, projected load is imperative to take into cognizance.
Projected Load Growth To cope with the present trend of power demand, an ambitious range of 10-20% total annual growth and retirement of existing plants should be set up. The cost of such plants is 4 crore/MW, while the cost for grid and transmission is another 3 crore/MW. Thus generation and distribution of 1 MW electricity will cost 7 crore. Bangladesh has to go for immediate construction of minimum 3200 MW of generation to meet power requirements up to 2011 at the cost of Tk.42,350 crore.
Anticipated growth rate of power and corresponding cost Table-5 Peak Shortage Growth & Year Genera- Construction Demand against peak Retire-ment % tion cost (Tk) (MW) demand from 2007 2007 5500 3000 2500 17500 10 2008 6250 3100 3150 22050 25 2009 7250 3200 4050 28350 45 2010 8250 3200 5050 35350 65 2011 9250 3200 6050 42350 85
69 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
Managing the Crisis Procrastination on the part of BPDB and the government has led to the gradual worsening of the power crisis. We have no alternative then to fully implement the aforementioned projects which require a lot of foreign currency. Thus the possibility of installing such power plants is quiet remote. How, then, should the problem be tackled? It should be made very clear that although the government can do very little at this stage, power consumers can help to a great extent by economizing power consumption. This can be achieved by adopting various measures.
Immediate Measures a. Curbing Corruption. Before embarking into any actions, sufficient funds are to be made available for “golden handshakes” to all corrupt meter readers, bill clerks, and inefficient supervisors whose assets do not match their legal income in order to clean the slate in one go. Simultaneously, disconnection drive must continue with heavy penalty. These measures will save at least 10% of total electricity production (300 MW). b. Ad hoc Arrangements of Staff. Until new meter readers, bill clerks, and supervisors are appointed or alternative arrangements made, non- commissioned defence officers should be employed for meter reading and billing in order to establish a benchmark position. c. Economizing. Citizens should economize so that other consumers can share power with them. Every household and commercial consumer can help overcome the situation partially by reducing consumption. The government can educate people through programmes designed to teach people to use power economically. d. Holiday Staggering. The government in consultation with the FBCCI could take appropriate measures for holiday staggering for industries. This will save some power which can be utilized for essential needs. e. Use of Power-saving Bulb. Most consumers in the household sector use conventional 60 W or 100 W bulbs which can be replaced by 23 W power- saving bulbs or 40 W tube lights. The use of less power consumable blasts for tube lights will lead to the consumption of 25% less electricity, i.e. a 40 watt tube light will consume 30 watt electricity. f. Subsidizing Power-Saving Bulbs. The government can encourage use of power-saving bulbs and tube lights by helping manufacturers through fiscal incentives to keep prices low so that low-income consumers can also buy them. Local offices of PDB, DESA, DESCO and REB can be utilized to distribute power saving bulbs at a low cost.
70 g. Use of Captive Power. The large number of generators available to the private sector should be utilised for running mills and factories. The generators can also be effectively utilized for public use. h. Community Based Private Generators. Since the electricity supply is unlikely to improve in near future, an alternative system of power supply by small generators can be organized. In rural market areas such system has already been developed on a commercial basis. The changes incurred are rather low, indicating that the system is efficient. System can be expanded by combining community action and commercial operation by private entrepreneurs. j. Pre-paid Meter. System loss, more precisely pilferage of electricity is still a major problem. Introducing pre-paid meters can reduce system loss to a great extent and can also smoother revenue collection. This will improve the financial capacity of the power sector, encourage investment and reduce dependence on external funding. k. Use of Industrial Power Saving Device. Industrial power saving devices are extensively used worldwide. These devices can save as much as 25% power. Plants and industries such as cold storages, central AC super markets, hotels etc can undertake the projects. l. Power Plant Improver in the Industries. 80% of the industrial load is inductive which is about 1135 MW (80% x 47.32% x 3000 MW = 1135MW). This load can be reduced by installing PFI. m. Rational Distribution of Power by CLDC. Zone wise distribution of electric power is to be judicial and implemented systematically with special attention being paid to the areas having irrigation schemes. n. Tariff Adjustment. There is an urgent need for cost-reflective tariffs and mechanisms for addressing inequities and distortions in deriving the benefits of the subsidies through BPDB and DESA. Urban residents are the main beneficiaries of energy subsidies. Medium Term Measures. Large scale electricity generation requires massive investment and a long implementation period. But some medium- term measures can improve the situation considerably. Medium-term measure could include: a. Adopt effective steps to contain corruption within the sector. If tackled properly, it will add billions of taka to the exchequer of power development authorities which will then enable them to invest more in that area.
71 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
b. Set up an independent body to undertake technical auditing of all installed capacity and also come up with project proposals either for repairs, maintenance or fresh generation units. The regulatory body could be composed of technical experts both in engineering as well as accounting. c. Persuade the private sector and the existing PBS to invest in small power plants with generation capacities of between 10 and 15 MW each. Such a step could lead to generation of over 1600 MW within two years. d. Install small-scale power companies in rural areas which could also provide employment for landless and marginal farmers. e. Enhance efficiency of older power stations by ensuring regular maintenance. f. Use bio-mass as an alternative energy. According to one source, the use of bio-gas will reduce the energy deficit by 15%. The gas generated from bio-gas plant can meet fuel requirements of cooking without causing any environmental problem. Long Term Measure. The energy sector has to be restructured through adoption of macroeconomic concepts. The changes may entail repercussions. Power generation capacity must be increased on a continuous basis, assuming around 10% increase in demand every year. This means that electricity demand will be around 9250 MW by 2011 and 13000 MW by 2016. So, the capacity of electricity generation should be raised 2.5 fold in the next 5 years and 4.3 fold in the next 10 years. To attain these goals, following measures should be taken: a. Projects can be undertaken to procure Berge-mounted and Rail-mounted small power plants of the capacity of 20 - 100 MW. About 20 such stations can significantly improve the situation in about four years. b. The viability of electrification can be enhanced through decentralized small grids using small gas turbines and solar cells etc. With appropriate technologies local power plants can offer cheaper electricity as transmission losses are avoided. c. Consider the financial and strategic implications of nuclear energy by convening a committee of nuclear scientists and economists. Without this measure, we will not be able to attain our anticipated requirements and there will be no poverty eradication or economic development. d. The most pressing problems in the power sector have been in the distribution system, which is characterized by heavy system loss and poor collection performance. To make it efficient and effective, its administration must be restructured. System loss in any power distribution system should not exceed 10%, i.e., collection–import ratio should be above 90%.
72 RECOMMENDATIONS To date, no government has demonstrated the political will to take on the powerful nexus composed of dishonest workers, corrupt officials in government agencies, opportunist traders, lobby groups and most certainly political leaders. A government having the required political conviction may consider the following recommendations: a. Immediate measures as suggested may be undertaken to improve the situation of the power sector. b. The tariff of all distribution authorities may be enhanced and brought at par so as to remove anomalies in tariff structure. c. All distribution organizations to be converted into limited companies with private sector participation. d. Rationalize the staffing of utility organizations, revise salaries and allowances, making them commensurable with the cost of living, and provide employment on contract basis with the flexibility of hiring and firing. CONCLUSION Power generation; be it hydroelectric, thermal or nuclear is a highly technical and complex subject. It requires commitment, political will, vision, perspective planning as well as a large pool of highly skilled electrical and mechanical engineers. The juxtaposition of all these elements can lead to the creation of the necessary infrastructure. Since its inception, Bangladesh has not opted for a knowledge-based economy and has not been able to develop techno-based manpower. Even after the discovery of 22 gas fields and one oil field, the country has not been able to provide energy security to its people. Statistics indicate urgent need of power for daily life. There is a wide gap between demand and supply of electrical energy. The gap is increasing with the passage of time due to non-existence of comprehensive and compatible plan. Shortage of power hinders the overall development. The unhappiness amongst the people due to shortfall of electricity has brought power management authorities to their knees several times in recent years. History confirms that the future of a modern nation lies in the social and economic well-being of its people. National security is thus related to meeting all the basic needs and the ability to shield from dreadful mishap. Food, energy and environment are three physical determinants of security. Shortage of power has become so widespread in our society that it affected all areas of public life. It not only threatens our economic security, it also caused dissatisfaction,
73 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
disillusionment with the government and thus poses a direct threat to our national security. Increased generation of power could lead to increased revenue collection. Greater access to electricity will result in improved living standards and contribute to rapid socio-economic development. It will be possible to supply more efficient and lower cost power under a competitive market structure, with greater private sector participation. Rationalization in the cost of electricity will remove the sense of discrimination from poor people thereby neutralizing the possibility of security threats. Policy makers will have to think beyond emergency management to ensure that economic activities are not hampered for long due to power shortage. The situation thus necessitates undertaking immediate action to overcome problems through effective management of the sector. Viable energy policies have to be formulated for 50 years and even beyond. Above all, it is vital to have a vision for a society with equitable distribution of wealth and a knowledge-based economy, which can in turn provide national security in general and the energy security in particular.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books 1. Amartya Sen, Social Security in Developing Countries, Dhaka. 2. Asit K Biswas, Contemporary Issues in Development, Bangladesh. 3. Hasnat Abdul Hye, Governance - South Asian Perspective, Dhaka. 4. Moazzem Hossain, Bangladesh’s Development Agenda and Vision 2020, Dhaka. 5. Mufleh R Osmany, Security in the Twenty First Century – A Bangladesh Perspective, Dhaka. Journals 1. Asian Development Bank Annual Report 2006. 2. Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, January 2001. 3. Bangladesh Power Development Board Annual Report 2003-2004. Papers 1. Electric Power Crisis – Long Term Solutions by Dr Md Quamrul Ahsan, Professor, BUET.
74 2. Seminar Paper on Energy Security for Bangladesh: The Need to Develop other Sources of Energy.
Interviews 1. Engr Mustafizul Huq Choudhury, Director - Planning and System Engineering, Rural Electrification Board, Dhaka, 10 August 2007. 2. Engr Nazrul Islam, Executive Engineer, Power Development Board, Dhaka, 17 August 2007. 3. General Manager, PBS, Noakhali, REB. 4. Md Ariful Hoque, Deputy Director, Board of Investment, Bangladesh. 5. Prof M Shamsul Huq, Director Pioneer Medical College, Dhaka on 17 August 2007. 6. Syed Mossaddeque Hossain, Director - Procurement, Rural Electrification Board, Dhaka, 03 August 2007.
Internet Web Sites 1. http://expert-eyes. org/power/capacity.Rtml. 2. Archive of www.thedailystar.net. 3. Web site of Power Cell, Government of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh. List of Abbreviations BPDB Bangladesh Power Development Board DESA Dhaka Electric Supply Authority DESCO Dhaka Electric Supply Company FBCCI Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry IPS Interaptable Power Supply KV Kilo Volt PDB Power Development Board MW Mega Watt REB Rural Electrification Board UPS Un-Interaptable Power Supply WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority CLDC Central Load Dispatch Circle GFU Gas Fired Units HU Hydro Units LFU Liquid Fuel Units IPP Independent Power Plant
75 Effective Management in Power Sector and its Implication for National Security
Author Commander Mahmudul Huq Choudhury, (E), afwc, psc was commissioned in Bangladesh Navy on 30 January 1982 in the branch of Engineering. He did his cadetship training and graduation in Mechanical Engineering from Marshal Tito Naval Academy, Yugoslavia. He served in various staff and instructional appointments. He also served as Directing Staff at BIPSOT . He participated in United Missions in Georgia as a Military Observer. He attended a number of professional courses both at home and abroad. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and Armed Forces War Course 2007 at National Defence College. He attained Master of Defence Studies and Master of War Studies from National University. The Officer is presently posted as Deputy President at ISSB.
76 HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY: IMPLICATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Major General J J P S T Liyanage, RSP, USP, ndc, IG, ldmc INTRODUCTION Respect for state sovereignty and human rights, the key values of International Law and the key components of the UN Charter of 1948 co-exist uneasily. These two principles have more often confronted than partnered each other. A country affected by terrorism would find it a major challenge to adhere to the norms of human rights, as military operations against terrorists are likely to lead to violation of the fundamental rights of people. The need to keep some arrested suspects incommunicado for sometime to facilitate investigations violate human rights. The absence of such operations, on the one hand, can seriously undermine the security of the state. A developing country engaged in such punitive actions against terrorists stands to be labeled a black sheep by Human Rights watch dogs that tend to place such actions under the microscope and immediately report such incidents to the UN Human Rights Commission, subjecting the country concerned to great pressure diplomatically and through economic embargoes. The U.N. Charter in Article 2(7) prohibits the organization from intervening in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member states1. On the other hand, it is the duty of the particular state to protect human rights within the state by arranging laws, rules etc. into a system that can ensure that individuals within the state are accountable for international crimes. In addition to respecting for human rights, states need to investigate, prosecute or extradite individual perpetrators. If the state fails to ensure this, or is unable or unwilling to do so, other states and the International Court may intervene in the internal affairs of the state. The emergence of human rights as a subject of concern in international law affects sovereignty because these agreed upon principles place clear limits on the authority of governments to act within their borders. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that emerged in the 1960s-70s have been striving to uphold human rights. The sovereignty of states is no longer limited to a simple exercise of power within a defined territory. International law, although still state-centric, has become more permissive regarding cross- border intervention to protect human rights and prosecute individual offenders residing abroad. In the light of the above, sovereign states facing threats to their national security from terrorism are confronted by the dilemma of maintaining
1. Charter of the UN, Chapter I, “Purpose of the Principle”, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ chapter1.htm, accessed on 01 May 2007. Human Rights and Limits of Sovereignty: Implication for National Security
human rights while ensuring national security. In such cases those countries have no option but to formulate laws to protect international interests, even if this involves curtailing certain human rights. Sri Lanka, a developing country faced with terrorism, has been taken as the case study for this paper. It is aware of the limitations that govern its actions in safe guarding its national security. However, national security is non-negotiable. Hence, it is prudent to study and analyze the limitations it has, and its impact on national security in fighting terrorism within the frame- work of human rights so that appropriate action can be taken to avoid international sanctions and diplomatic pressures which could cause hardships to its people and hinder its development.
TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS “Fighting terrorism is central to the human rights cause. But using illegal tactics against alleged terrorists is both wrong and counterproductive,” Kenneth Roth.2 In countries where terrorists are active, government forces are frequently blamed for violations of human rights. However, violations of human rights by terrorist groups are not often condemned. The violation of human rights by terrorists (be it by a terrorist organization or a sovereign state) is well within the very definition of terrorism. Though it is the duty of the state to protect its citizens from terrorism, it has no right to sidestep democratic values. In countries where terrorism exists, the state often forgets that even terrorists have rights in the course of their apprehension and prosecution. They thus have the rights not to be subjected to torture or brutal methods of interrogation and the right to be presumed innocent until they are found guilty as well as right to a public trial. For the security forces, in other words, it is a ‘damn’ if you do or ‘doom’ if you don’t situation. The Relationship between Terrorism and Human Rights. Terrorism and violence go hand in hand. Where there is violence, there has to be violation of human rights. Governments that come to power through elections enjoy absolute power of governance. Thereafter, some states forget their responsibility towards their people because of the unlimited power they enjoy. Such states violate the human rights of their people in trying to implement some of their policies, although these may not be acceptable to the majority. As a result, those who get affected due to a government’s actions at times resort to terrorism and violence
2. Human Rights News, “Human rights world report 2006”, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/ 2006/01/13/ global12428.htm, accessed on 03 June 2007.
78 to hit back at the government. This vicious cycle continues. The situation in Kashmir, Punjab, Assam and Sri Lanka can be cited as examples. Wide powers are given by the state through the Prevention of Terrorism Act No 48 of 1979 to the Sri Lankan armed forces/ police to act against terrorism. Similarly, the Indian armed forces/police too were empowered by the Special Powers Act enforced of 1958 which was amended in 1972 to fight terrorism. These acts give additional power to the armed forces to search without warrants, arrest, and keep those arrested incommunicado for a period of time. Interpretation of Section Two of Article 29 of the Charter of Universal Declaration of Human Rights indicates that a nation has laws to protect its sovereignty against terrorism, terrorism- related acts, separatism and laws that ensure the prevention of such situations. However, as per Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states are restricted from using their powers to violate human rights and discriminate against any groups. The relationship between counter-terrorism and human rights was elaborated in 2003 at a ministerial level meeting of the UN Security Council in a statement annexed to resolution 1456 (2003). The council made the following declaration: “States must ensure any measure(s) taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and Humanitarian Law”.3 This position was reaffirmed by Resolution 1624 (2005) adopted by heads of state and governments at a meeting of the Security Council during the 2005 World Summit.4 Though international law allows states to fight terrorism, it is allowed to do so with many restrictions. Post 9/11 Scenario. Before 9/11, western governments and human rights champions were critical of efforts taken by elected governments to maintain national security and ensure public safety in the face of terrorism. After 9/11, the perspectives on human rights issues in counter-terrorism operations undertaken by the states changed drastically. In countering terrorism, little or no regard was now given to human rights. After the declaration of “the Global War on Terror” by the United States, it was observed that western democracies with long
3. UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, “Human Rights”, available at http://www.un.org/sc/ ctc/humanrights.shtml, accessed on 17 May 2007. 4. UN Security Council 5261st meeting, “Security Council Meeting Of World Leaders Calls For Legal Prohi- bition of Terrorist Incitement, Enhanced Steps to Prevent Armed Conflict” available at http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2005/sc8496.doc.htm, access on 22 June 2007.
79 Human Rights and Limits of Sovereignty: Implication for National Security
records of respecting human rights also became defaulters. The UK, Australia, and European countries too restricted civil liberties for some of their citizens. The UK is one of the perpetrators of illegal detention, and has been transporting terrorist suspects to detention camps in a third country where they are often subjected to torture. Violation of Human Rights by the Terrorists. There are many books/ articles written on the violation of human rights by states. However, there is hardly anything available in print on the violations of human rights by terrorists who violate human rights on a large scale. Terrorism is based on violence. In their process to achieve their goals, terrorists ignore the fact that violence can also be countered by violence by the state. As a result, violence and counter- violence is on the rise, and mass violations of human rights by both terrorists and state agencies and consequent chaos is evident in many places of the world. Thus, terrorism has an impact on human rights in three ways: Firstly, it is itself an extreme denial of the most basic human right and it creates an environment in which people cannot live free from fear and cannot enjoy basic human rights. Secondly, the threat of terrorism can be used by governments to enact laws that strip away civil liberties and political freedoms. Thirdly, without necessarily amending laws or enacting new ones, governments can make fighting terrorism an excuse to stifle dissent and criticism and imprison or threaten domestic opponents. Hence, terrorists striving at self-determination, states may end up violating their human rights. The proper way to achieve the right to self-determination needs to be realized by means of political activities and not by terrorism. However, this process is time consuming. People lose their patience due to the slow nature of this process. As they suffer, they end up thinking that the only solution is to fight the system (government). For the process, the leaders emerge who try to grab power by hook or by crook. This is how most terrorist organizations come into being. Often when they feel they will not be accepted by their own people in a democratic situation, they do all they can to avoid a peaceful settlement. Even when offered an amicable power sharing solution, they will not settle for anything less than absolute power. The present situation in Sri Lanka is the best example of such a situation. Importance of Training and Equipping Security Forces. The role of the security forces in combating terrorism has come under increasing scrutiny of the media. Human rights NGOs and also the judiciary have been making their job
80 extremely difficult. Especially, when troops are fatigued because they have been fighting militants for years, troops are likely to break the laws. When their lives are exposed to constant threats and they are unable to avail leave, troops tend to take the law into their own hands. This leads not only to serious human rights situations but also cause serious breaches of discipline amongst troops. Excessive deployment round the year, inadequate rest and family obligations that they have not been able to meet lead to psychological stresses that culminate in violent outbursts. This is very evident in the campaign directed by the Sri Lankan armed forces against the LTTE terrorists. In such a trying environment to safeguard the national security, troops must be well-trained, well-equipped, and well-motivated. Sri Lanka has had tremendous pressure exerted on it by human rights NGOs and foreign countries in its conflict with the LTTE. Such pressures not only put troops in a defensive posture, it also allows the enemy to take advantage of the government forces. The Sri Lankan Army has taken action to set up a ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ directorate under Army Headquarters, with a view to making army personnel voluntarily and consistently comply with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR) principles, and ensuring that the army leads by example in pursuit of its fundamental objective of preserving the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the nation. Its mission has been to transform the army into a force that ‘voluntarily observes’ the principles of IHL and HR through training, enhancement of awareness and dissemination of knowledge in the field, thereby minimizing IHL and HR violations. This has paid off dividends and the human rights situation has improved tremendously in recent times. Troops must also be well-equipped to fight terrorists. Basic protection like body armour and helmets must be available to them to make them feel secure. It is only when a soldier feels secure that he will think of the security of others. Motivation also plays a major role in make up of a soldier who must be able to bear mental and physical stresses and who must tackle situations where human rights can be abused. Importance of Intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence can often prevent terrorist activities, thereby saving lives and protecting property. Information gathering, processing and timely dissemination inside and outside the country are the main roles of the intelligence agencies. State intelligence and military intelligence must work hand in hand to ensure state security. Intelligence personnel must be provided with the necessary and latest technology to combat terrorism. An effective and committed intelligence network backed with technology can ensure greater security for a country. More importantly, there should be no cases of arrest and release of accused terrorists due to lack
81 Human Rights and Limits of Sovereignty: Implication for National Security
of evidence if the intelligence agencies are effective. An efficient intelligence service must have the intelligence required to put these culprits behind bars. There must be no violation of human rights due to torture, because a suspect will talk, if he is convinced that he cannot hoodwink his interrogator. Efficient Police Force. It is essential for a country to have an efficient, well- equipped and unbiased police force to maintain law and order and to maintain human rights. When Sri Lanka fought a bloody insurgency in the south of the country in 1988 /1990, there were many abuses of human rights by the police. Then many innocent people were killed or were reported missing. This was caused mainly because the police had succumbed to the pressure exerted by the ruling party.
IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY ON NATIONAL SECURITY The concept of national security has been much debated in human rights discussions. Basically, the controversy revolves around the balance between the “interest of the society” and the “interest of the individuals”. However, any individual’s security depends on the security of the society. Hence, “National Security” must take precedence over all other interests. In previous paragraphs, it was clear that though sovereign entities posses absolute power, they cannot use it in a manner where a part of society loses fundamental rights. When there is a real threat to social order and to civilians life, national security must be restored at any cost. Sadly, more often than not, states distort the concept of national security, suppress political dissent and curb fundamental freedoms and the rights of people. In a wartime situation, where the life of soldiers and their families are threatened, preservation of human rights becomes almost impossible. When human rights are quite often violated by government agencies, the government loses public support, and political stability is threatened. Foreign aid too may be stopped due to pressure exerted on the government to cease human rights violations. The development process can slow down or stop altogether due to insufficient financing. These can be plus points for terrorists leading to take the upper hand and endanger the security of the nation. Furthermore, things could happen as they did in 1987, when India sent its peace keeping force to Sri Lanka, even without UN approval. This was one instance where national security of Sri Lanka was threatened to the ultimate degree. Had the President of Sri Lanka refused to sign the agreement (peace accord) with the Indian Premier in 1987, Indian invasion of Sri Lanka would have been inevitable.
82 In 1956, when the Sri Lankan government made Sinhalese the only official language they wouldn’t have ever thought the country would bleed as much as it did and that national security would have come to the brink of collapse. They had thought then only of the majority Sinhalese vote that would give them political mileage. Unfortunately, deprivation of fundamental rights of the Tamils led to a war where, at least, 70,000 lives have been lost up to now. Over hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced and thousands of people have been maimed. One of the world’s most ruthless terrorist organizations came into existence in Sri Lanka and at one point, the country’s sovereignty was threatened by its neighbour, India. When the fundamental rights of the Tamils were denied by the Sinhala Only Act, two ethnic communities that had lived harmoniously for hundreds of years were at each other’s throat. Though this problem was rectified almost immediately, the psychological damage remains even now. Its effects on national security have been enormous. Further, it has led to human rights violations in a big way. As mentioned earlier in this paper, in any country where terrorism is fought, if one side errs in human rights violations the other reciprocates in a much worse manner, putting national security at risk. Human Rights and Economy. When the human rights situation of a country deteriorates, the economy of the country too deteriorates. Hence, it is not then possible to procure much-needed equipment to fight terrorists. Though there is no direct link with the economy and military effectiveness, a country with a good economy will have a stronger military than one with a weak one. In the world today, it is countries with stronger economies that are militarily powerful. The stronger the economy the better will be the army. If the human rights situation of a country is bad and there is a terrorism problem in it too, with the international embargos the country’s development can be stopped or restricted. When it is economically weak or its economy declines in relation to the challenges it faces due to terrorism, national security of a country too will become weaker. Therefore, to achieve state security, a state must aim at securing economic growth and social justice and not act the other way around. Effects of the Limits of Sovereignty on National Security. Though sovereign states have the supreme authority and absolute power within their territory, they cannot use it absolutely. According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, derogating obligations on the covenant should be done only when the life of the nation is threatened. However, as per Article 4 of the same covenant, no derogation from articles 6, 7, 8(1 and 2 Paragraphs), 11, 15, 16 and 18 are allowed even if the security of the nation is at risk. That also has to be done without discriminating on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.5
5. Dr S.Subramanian, Human Rights: International Challenges, New Delhi, Manas Publication, 1997, p21.
83 Human Rights and Limits of Sovereignty: Implication for National Security
Due to the limitations imposed by International Law, a state faced with a terrorism problem may not be able to arrest and keep in custody a terrorist, even a suicide bomber who has been arrested without any explosives, weapons, ammunitions or any other evidence betraying him as a suicide bomber. Therefore, what he or she has to do is to wait for the most opportune time to go for the target. This is clearly a major threat to national security. Without special laws likely to curtail fundamental rights, terrorism cannot be fought effectively with the limitations faced by states. In a situation where a country’s national security is threatened due to terrorism, there is little scope for a country to fight terrorism if International Law is respected fully. This can pose a threat to national security.
RECOMMENDATIONS Good Governance. Good governance is the key to solving many problems in states in the world today. It gives confidence to citizens. If the state looks after the rights of its citizens, there is no need for any violence against it. Under good governance, there is very little chance of human rights violations. For good governance, the constitution of the country must give guidelines so that all governments that come to power will follow its provision for the betterment of its people. To avoid human rights violations, states must strive to bring their constitutions in accord with international standards. The legislature of states must incorporate the International Bill of Rights in their constitution. Such actions will make security forces and police personnel accountable for their actions and will ensure transparency in tackling security situations in the country. Maintain Well-trained, Well-equipped and Motivated Security Forces. The security of a nation ultimately lies in the hands of its security forces. Hence, it is essential to train them well and educate them in International Humanitarian Law and International Laws to make them better professionals. The quality of the service is much more important than its size. Therefore, an army should be of the size the country could afford and of a proportionate quality. Maintain Efficient Intelligence Agencies. Intelligence agencies in the state must be well- trained, well-equipped, motivated and accountable for the intelligence they provide. Latest technologies in the field of intelligence must be made available to them. Capable and efficient officers must be selected for key appointments. Intelligence agencies must be integrated at the national level to make them more effective.
84 Maintain an Efficient, Uncorrupt and Politically Unhindered Police Force. It is essential for a country to have an efficient, well-equipped, corruption- free and professional police force to maintain law and order and to ensure human rights. The police must be allowed to perform its duties unhindered by political influence. There have been many instances in Sri Lankan history of terrorism and insurgency where the Police have been accused of human rights violations. Enact Laws to Fight Terrorism. Safeguarding its citizens is the core responsibility of a State. When a state fights terrorism, emergency situations arise where swift and decisive actions are required to safeguard the national security of the country. Under these circumstances, certain types of special legalisation that do not normally belong within the legislative framework of a democracy such as emergency regulations and the Prevention of Terrorist Act (PTA) are necessary to combat terrorism and uphold democracy. Educate the Public, Security Service and Police. Education in International Humanitarian Laws (IHL) and International Law must be given to security force and police personnel including the public. Refresher training must be conducted from time to time for the armed forces and police personnel to make them respect human rights in order to demonstrate the professionalism of government troops before the international community. Strive to Achieve Economic Security. The economic security of a country will ensure social security too. When opportunities are created for citizens to contribute to their economy, they will have less time to think of armed struggle. In fact, there is no need for them to fight unless they face discrimination on the basis of race, sex, language or religion. The Judiciary must be made Independent and Fair. The Judiciary must be separated from the Executive. This will allow the Judiciary to take independent decisions without being biased to the executive. The constitution of the state must strengthen the judiciary to bring in transparency in government actions. As the saying goes, “Justice delayed is justice denied”; hence, to avoid delays in tackling human right violations, it is recommended that a court of session be specified in all district courts. Speedy action taken against human rights violations will be a deterrent for those who are likely to violate human rights. Train Media Personnel and Achieve Media Freedom. The media plays a vital role in controlling human rights violation in a country. Hence, it is important to arrange seminars and workshops to educate the media on human rights violation without taking the sting out of it and without harming national security. There should be no restrictions on the media to give more transparency
85 Human Rights and Limits of Sovereignty: Implication for National Security
to action taken by the government. A responsible media would be expected to highlight aberrations from the norm, which would check the arbitrary actions of police and security forces personnel, thus making them more professional. Allow Liberal NGO Activities. States should allow renowned NGOs free access to prisons and detention camps to make actions by the government much more transparent. They must even be allowed to visit terrorist controlled areas. Use of Diplomacy. For particular, developing and least developed countries must have very good relations within and outside the region to protect their national security. Cooperation with inter and intra-regional organizations like SAARC, BIMSTEC, NAM and ASEAN has to be encouraged to build a ‘all for one and one for all’ type of concept to strengthen the national security of each member state.
CONCLUSION “We should all be clear that there is no trade-off between effective action against terrorism and the protection of human rights. On the contrary, I believe that in the long term we shall find that human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are one of the best prophylactics against terrorism, ”Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary-General, 2002”6 There isn’t a single country that has not violated human rights whether it is the US troops in Afghanistan or in Iraq, Indian troops in Kashmir, the Bangladesh army in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the IPKF in Sri Lanka or Nepal against Maoist Guerrillas. They have all violated human rights. If an advanced and most powerful country like the USA violates human rights, other countries can be expected to do the same. It is practically impossible for troops not to violate human rights in conflict situations to protect the national security of the country. However, a sovereign state has obligation to its citizens and must protect them if their lives or the material base required for their existence is in danger. That is what national security is all about. Hence, it becomes necessary and justifiable for the state to take action to safeguard the nation disregarding other considerations such as the civil rights of the citizens temporarily; however, once the national security is ensured, civil rights must be restored at the first opportunity. At the same time, it is also very clear that states cannot take cover behind sovereignty to violate human rights at their will even within their domestic jurisdiction. Hence, there has to be a balance in upholding national security. The United Nation
6. UN Security Council-Counter Terrorism Committee, “Human Rights”, available at http://www.un.org/sc/ ctc/humanrights.shtml, accessed on 29 June 2007.
86 Charter clearly legalized the defense of the territorial integrity of the state but also commits a state to ensuring human rights and guarantees the rights of groups to self determination. When a country genuinely makes an effort to safe guard the fundamental and human rights of its citizens, it is not necessary for its people to resort to terrorism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books 1. Dr S. Subramanian, Human Rights: International Challenges, Volume 1 & 2, India, 1997. 2. B.S.Waghmare, Human Rights: Problems and Prospects, India, 2001. 3. K.P.Saksena, Human Rights: Perspectives and Challenges, India, 1995. 4. K.P.Saksena, Teaching Human Rights: A Manual for Adult Education, India, 1996. 5. Gopal Bhargava, Human Rights: Concern of the Future, India, 2001. 6. S.K Ghosh,Terrorism: World Under Siege, India, 1995. 7. Imtiaz Ahamed, Understanding Terrorism in South Asia, Sri Lanka, 2006. 8. Pramod Mishra, Human Rights in South Asia, India, 2000. 9. Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution, Sri Lanka, 1995. 10. R.C.Paul, Situation of Human Rights in India, India 2000. 11. Jaswant Singh, National Security, India 1996. 12. The Cambridge Encyclopedia Web Sites 13. F.R. Duplantier, Human Rights vs State Sovereignty? available at www. politickles.com/behindtheheadlines/2001/aug01/01-0826a.php. 14. Eric Brahm, Sovereignty, available at www.beyondintractability.org/ m/ sovereignty.jsp. 15. Wikipedia-the free Encyclopedia, “Human Rights”, available at http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Human rights. 16. Wikipedia-the free Encyclopedia, “Nuremburg Trials” available at http:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/ Nuremberg Trials. 17. Wikipedia-the free Encyclopedia, “Augusto Pinochet”, available at http:// en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Augusto_Pinochet.
87 Human Rights and Limits of Sovereignty: Implication for National Security
18. Article 71 of the UN charter, “Participation of NGOs and NHRIs”, available at http://www.ishr.ch/ handbook/Chpt7.pdf. 19. Dr T.N. Shalla, “Role of Human Rights Organizations”, available at www. kashmir-information.com. 20. Blake’s law dictionary, “Sovereignty”, available at www.hawaii-nation.org/ sovereignty.html. 21. Wikipedia-the free Encyclopedia, “Sovereignty”, available at http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty. 22. World Report 2007, “Sri Lanka: Events of 2006”, available at http://hrw.org/ englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/slanka14837.htm. 23.Human Rights Council, “Act to End Serious Abuses in Sri Lanka” available at http://www.humanrightswatch.org/english/docs/2007/03/13/slanka15478. htm. 24. By a special correspondent, “Centre considering unified command for armed forces”, The Hindu (01 June 2007), available at http://www.thehindu.com /2007/06/01/stories/2007060108050100.htm. 25. Human Rights News, “Human Rights World Report 2006”, http://www.hrw. org/english/docs/ 2006/01/13/global12428.htm. 26. UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, “Human Rights”, available at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/humanrights.shtml. 27. Paul Sieghart, “Indictment Against Sri Lanka”, available at www. tamilnation.org/indictment/ indict025.htm. 28. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour-USA, “Country Report on Human Rights Practices on the UK - 2006”, available at http://www.state. gov/g/drl/ rls/hrrpt/2006/78847.htm. 29. Department of Public Information- United Nations, “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, available at http://www.un.org/ Overview/ rights.html. 30. Charter of the UN chapter I, “Purpose of the Principle”, available at http:// www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm.
88 Author Major General JJPST Liyanage, RSP, USP, ndc, IG, ldmc, was born in Colombo, Sri Lanka on 04 April 1956. He was commissioned as Second lieutenant on 23 January 1980 to the Regiment of Sri Lanka Artillery from the Sri Lanka Military Academy (SLMA). Having initially acquired GCE Ordinary Level, he further educated himself and currently holds a Masters Degree in Management Studies from Usmania University, India. Enhancing his Military career, he attended Artillery Young Officers’ Course-School of Artillery, India in 1980, Regimental Survey Officers Course - School of Artillery, Pakistan in 1985, Advance Gunnery Course - School of Artillery, India in 1990, Long Gunnery Staff Course - School of Artillery, India in 1991/1992, Senior Command Course- School of Artillery, India in 1995, Long Defence Management Course - College of Defence Management, India in 1999/2000, and Senior Executive Course- APCSS, Hawaii, in 2004. He served in different capacities in both Command and Staff mainly in operational areas. Some of his major appointments are: As a Captain Instructor at Sri Lanka Military Academy, as a Lt Col, GSO-I at Security Force Headquarters (Jaffna), Commandant of School of Artillery, Sri Lanka, Commanding Officer of an Artillery regiment in infantry role, as a Colonel, Colonel General Staff at Security Force Headquarters (Jaffna), Colonel General Staff at Army Headquarters, Brigade Commander of a Infantry Brigade in Eastern operational area, as a Brigadier, Artillery Brigade Commander, Director Personal administration at Army Headquarters, Commander Presidential Security Unit, and Director Military Intelligence. Prior to attending NDC in Bangladesh he served as the Director General Military Intelligence at Army Headquarters. He has visited India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the UK, Romania, Singapore, USA, Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia. His hobbies are rearing dogs and horticulture. He is a Buddhist and a vegetarian. His wife’s name is Pushpa. He is blessed with a daughter Yeshani 22 and two sons, Manuja 21 and Lakkitha 17.
89 INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA AND BEYOND
Air Commodore ABM Mostafizur Rahman, ndc, psc, ADWC INTRODUCTION The augmentation of the Indo-US strategic partnership in recent times signifies a possible transformation of the geopolitical scenario in South Asia and beyond. Greater cooperation in previously restricted areas between the two countries is viewed by many to have a significant impact on the strategic alignment of the nations in the region. But in the not-so-distant past, Indo-US relations were deadlocked in a nonproliferation straitjacket that had doomed all efforts at bilateral rapprochement after the firstl Indian nuclear test in 1974. Successive US administration at that time viewed India as an inextricable part of the problem of proliferation because of its nuclear capability and the existence of that capability outside various global regimes. Moreover, India’s close relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union, its opposition to virtually every U.S. position at the United Nations and its activities within the nonaligned movement during that period kept these ‘natural allies’ oceans apart. But as things changed, the strategic convergence of India and US became inevitable if not certain in the post 9/11 scenario and in a changing geopolitical context. US realization that India would not give up its nuclear weapons as long as various regional adversaries (China and Pakistan) continued to possess comparable capabilities coupled with its assessment that India’s nuclear weapons did not pose a threat to U.S. security and larger geopolitical interests, and could rather advance her strategic objectives in Asia and beyond in certain circumstances, accelerated the pace of this convergence. The events of September 11 lent urgency to the US plan to put the Indian nuclear technology and delivery system under some kind of international safeguard. These perceptions and compulsions became dominant in the Bush administration’s thinking and radically transformed US outlook leading to a historic agreement on civil nuclear cooperation that was signed on July 18, 2005. The deal envisaged satisfying New Delhi’s long-standing desire for greater access to restricted commodities in the areas of nuclear energy. With such an accommodative attitude of both countries, it is likely that the deal will finally take effect in a not too distant future. Undoubtedly, this will have a far- reaching impact on South Asia and beyond. On foreign policy issues, the Act creates space for India to be eventually recognized as a nuclear state. There are apprehensions that externally the deal could offset the regional Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
balance of power, trigger a nuclear arms race and even affect US multilateralism in South Asia. On the nuclear front, the Act offers India access to technology so that it can build new, bigger, and better reactors, as well as procure uranium for those reactors – something that India is short of domestically. Internally, this could also ensure India’s energy security and bolster her efforts to be a more assertive regional player. Such consequences deserve to be assessed fully, either to consider the possibility of altering the terms or with a view to mitigating undesirable effects. This is of particular importance when weighed against a nuclear China and Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear test and open declarations on the possession of nuclear weapons by those countries which has unleashed a continuing nuclear arms and missile arms race in the Subcontinent.
NUCLEARIZATION OF SOUTH ASIA Nuclearization of India ‘India’s underground nuclear tests on May 11 and 13 (1998) caught the world by surprise.’1 To any ‘moralist’ looking on, the twenty-four year old restraint (from Pokhran-I in 1974 to Pokhran-II in 1998) was but a thin immoral veil for India bent on getting adequate technological and economic capability to make the bomb. To the ‘realist’ observer the break-up of the USSR, the superpower mentor of India, and increasing Chinese nuclear power, had created a ‘security dilemma,’2 so that ‘only India’s nuclear capabilities could elevate India to a position where it could not be subject to Chinese nuclear coercion.’3 And to the ‘orientalist’4 observer, since the security policies of the Third World countries ‘are aimed at safeguarding the existing regime rather than the nation,’5 it was a ploy by the ruling Hindu nationalist party6 to bolster dwindling public support.
1. David Albright, “The Shots Heard `Round the World,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54,No.4(July/ August1998),on-line,Internet, available from http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/ 1998/ 2. Barry B. Hughes, Continuity and Changes in World Politics: Competing Perspectives, Third Edition. (N.J Princeton Hall Inc, 1991) See for details discussion on the theory of “Realism” and definition of ‘Security Dilemma’. 3. Bradley Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” quoted in George Perkovich, India’sNuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (C.A.: University of California Press, 1999), p.5 4. Haider K. Nizamani, Roots of Rhetoric, 7.See for the definition of the term ‘Orientalist’.5 Ibid.,7 5. Ibid, p.7 6. David Albright, Opcit, This stereotypical label of the political party (BJP) in power at the time of the nuclear tests is found in most American reporting. This fallacy most probably pertains to the facts that the party’s parental organization (RSS) has predominant Hindu membership, in 1947 it had opposed the idea of Indian partition on religious grounds.
92 1945 to Pokhran-I. India’s independent research in the field of nuclear physics started as early as 1945. Homi J Bhabha, an Indian physicist of repute, contributed money towards the creation of a centre for the study of nuclear physics named Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC).7 In the early post-independence period ‘Nehru’s word and actions, indicate an essential duality and ambiguity that characterized India’s nuclear programme.’8 On one hand, ‘the moralist visionary… abhorred the wanton destructiveness of nuclear weapons’9 but on the other he granted Bhabha a free hand in the development of India’s nuclear infrastructure pending a clear political decision.10 The contradiction remained till the early 60’s when India confronted China over a land dispute in its Northeastern border. Following this episode, on October 16, 1964 China conducted its first nuclear explosion in Lop Nor. The fact that a territorial dispute existed between China and India ensured that India could not ignore the reality of the Chinese nuclear programme.11 Such concerns became the impetus for India’s frantic search for security. It took India ten more years before she could explode her first atomic device. However, India had always hoped to have US sanction for its nuclear ambition. Bhabha himself, in fact, had declared in 1965, that ‘with a US blue print it (India) could do the job in six months.’12 Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then Indian Prime Minister, authorized the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to prepare for a nuclear test.13 This shows that the 1962 defeat and the 1964 Chinese nuclear test had already led the Indian leadership to overcome their earlier Nehruvian stance. The background sketched here will be incomplete without mentioning the US nuclear policy of coercion adopted in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. ‘Perceiving a threat to Pakistan, the United States responded by moving a large naval force into the Bay of Bengal off the coast of India.’14 It has since been revealed that the mission of the carrier group was to neutralize probable Soviet pressure on China to prevent it from intervening in the war.15 Nevertheless, the experience of ‘nuclear intimidation’ and the associated developments ‘must have influenced Mrs. Gandhi in giving the green signal for the nuclear test.’16 7. Sumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Indian Nuclear Tests of 1998,” In India’s Nuclear Security, ed. Raju G. C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, Boulder, C.O.: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p.39 8. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, Pp.13-14 9. Ibid., 14. 10. Ganguly, Opcit, p.40. 11. Air Cdre Jasjit Singh, “Why Nuclear Weapons?” in Nuclear India, ed. Air Cdre Jasjit Singh, The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 1998, p.14 12. Ibid., p.95 13. Kapur, p.133 14. Morton H. Halperin, Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy, Ballinger Publishing Com- pany, Cambridge, 1987,p.42 15. Perkovich, p.164 16. Ibid., p.31
93 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
Pokhran-I to Pokhran-II. On 18 May 1974 India tested its bomb,17 following which there was international denouncement of India for undermining non- proliferation efforts. However, the superpowers were themselves on shaky ground morally and could not take any concerted action against India. After Pokhran-I ‘the scientists had assumed that other tests would follow’ but ‘moral doubts, competing domestic priorities, and international considerations combined to turn India’s prime ministers away from a nuclear weapon programme.’18 Through the early 1980s the US administration continued to push through military assistance to Pakistan to channel weapons and funds to the anti-Soviet’ resistance movement in Afghanistan. The Reagan Government’s reasoning was in consonance with the US non-proliferation policy of the day.19 India may have learned to live with China as a nuclear power as it had to do so for past three decades, albeit with implicit security assurance from the USSR. However, continuous Chinese assistance to Pakistan on nuclear issues and missiles created a condition where two closely aligned hostile nuclear powers surrounded India, both of whom had claims to vast Indian territories. This situation made India take a fresh look at its strategic environment. Sino-Indian competition can be explained in terms of China’s policy to ‘prevent the rise of a peer competitor’ to challenge its status as Asia Pacific’s dominant power. With Pakistan already an ally, China started its encirclement of India with its military forays into Myanmar after 1990. In addition to providing military aid, China established military facilities on Myanmar’s Coco islands, which is within striking distance of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands and missile testing site in the Bay of Bengal. In the North, China augmented its troop presence. In addition, runways were extended to handle China’s newly acquired long-range Su-27 fighter aircraft. In the absence of a strong Russia which had earlier provided the semblance of a security umbrella to India, it was increasingly facing a security dilemma in the changed environment. In effect, India’s aspiration as a dominant regional power was at stake unless it could attract US attention. Thus maintaining threshold status, it had widespread support inside and outside the government in India.20 It was against this backdrop that on May 11, 1998, India simultaneously detonated three nuclear devices and followed this act by two more detonations on May 13, 1998.
17. Some observers claim that the atomic device was termed PNE because of the commitment that the Cana- da–India reactor would not be used for purposes other than peaceful. 18. Perkovic, p.188 19. Ibid., p.154. 20. Deepa M. Ollapally, “India’s Strategic Doctrine and Practice: The Impact of Nuclear Testing”, in India’s Nuclear Security, ed. Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, p.74.
94 Two conclusions emerge from the foregoing narrative. Firstly, the decision of Indian ‘nuclearization’ was not arrived at based on unidimensional factors. While a couple of events may have precipitated the final act, the process has been the result of an ongoing debate and had been under active consideration over twenty-four years. Secondly, India had been content with the ambiguous nature of its nuclear weapon status since it had offered her adequate security without putting demands on her economy. However, the imperatives of superpower politics in South Asia, the deteriorating security environment, a nuclear-armed China across the border, unresolved territorial issues and China’s nuclear support to Pakistan, lack of assurance of global nuclear disarmament and renewed boost to non-proliferation regimes finally forced India into overt ‘nuclearization’.
Nuclear Doctrine of India The draft Indian nuclear doctrine emphasizes ‘no first use’ (NFU), implying that its nuclear weapons would not be used against any non-nuclear state or ‘any state not aligned with a nuclear power.’ It also emphasized that India would use her nuclear weapons only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory or on Indian forces anywhere. However, an ambiguous statement inserted in clause 2.5 of the doctrine makes it clear that in the event of a major attack involving biological or chemical weapons against India or Indian forces anywhere, India would retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons. India maintains that in such an event it would have sufficient survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces. It also calls for early warning capabilities, thereby implying creating space-based and other assets. To fulfill the objective of credible deterrence, India’s doctrine calls for forces which would be effective, enduring, diverse, flexible and responsive and as such based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based assets. India thus created the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in January 2003. The NCA comprises a Political Council and an Executive Council. The Political Council, headed by the Prime Minister, ‘is the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons’. It is presumed that the Political Council, in effect, would be the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).21
21. Raja Mohan, “Nuclear Command System: Credible India”, the Hindu, January 8, 2003 (on line edition, accessed on 26 Jun 07)
95 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
Nuclear Technicalities India’s first power reactors, installed at the Tarapore Atomic Power Plant (TAPP) were from the US. BARC and the Indian Government consistently maintained that reactors would be used for programmes such as, Apsara, CIRUS (1960; with assistance from Canada), the now defunct ZERLINA (1961; Zero Energy Reactor for Lattice Investigations and Neutron Assembly), Purnima1 (1972), Purnima11 (1984), Dhruva (1985), Purnima111 (1990), and Kamini. However, Indian scientists and engineers had been working steadily since 1974 to refine and expand India’s nuclear capability. India is believed to have begun work on a thermonuclear weapon in 1980. This was confirmed when in 1989, the Director of U.S. Central Intelligence told a Senate Subcommittee that India was seeking to purify lithium-6, which he called an ‘indication of interest’ in thermonuclear devices (hydrogen bomb). In the same time frame, fusing tests were carried out by the Indian military to verify that a nuclear bomb could be attached and released from an Indian aircraft. Indian scientists appeared to be anxious to measure the efficiency of new approaches to bomb-making, including miniaturization of warheads and new trigger mechanisms. It is believed that the miniaturized warheads are boosted fission devices. There were recurring reports that India had developed a thermonuclear device. It was also reported that the attempted nuclear test in December 1995 (cancelled under U.S. pressure) was a ‘hydrogen’ device. India, apparently, had not dedicated nuclear facilities for military purposes, and the same facilities were used for both civil and military purposes. For instance, the 40 MW CIRUS reactor imported from Canada for peaceful purpose had manufactured the plutonium used in the 1974 Pokharan 1(PNE) device; but also produced radioactive isotopes for medical, agricultural and other civil applications.22
It is estimated that India currently has between 75-110 warheads. It is claimed that the number of nuclear missiles will be raised to anywhere in-between 250-400 weapons in a matter of 3-5 years. These missiles and Prithivi-1 are mobile liquid fueled 150 km tactical missiles, currently deployed with the army. Prithivi-II has a range of 250 km. Agni, on the other hand, has a 2500 km range equipped with 1000-5000 PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle). It can carry a payload of 1200 kg. GSLV (Gyro synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) has a payload of 2500 kg. Indians could also use their MIG-27 and Jaguar aircrafts for delivery of nuclear weapons after some modification. MIG-29, SU-30 and Mirrage2000 aircrafts could also be modified to air drop nuclear weapons. India has 16 submarines, one aircraft carrier, 23 destroyers and some fast frigates.
22. “Implementing the Indo-US Nuclear Deal:a Pyrrhic Struggle.” Available at http://www.india-defence.com/ reports/1130, accessed on 23 August 07.
96 India plans to have five nuclear submarines capable of carrying missiles with nuclear warheads. Such military hardware support, no doubt, ensures that India could augment its doctrine to adapt to ground realities.
THE INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL
Making of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal Though many analysts have categorized the recent Indo-US nuclear deal as inevitable and have termed the countries as ‘natural allies’, it took quite some time for both the countries to reach where they are today. In fact, Indo–US cooperation on security issues started blooming only in 1992 when an Indo-US Army Executive Steering Committee was set up. This was followed up by the setting up of a Joint Steering Committee of the two navies, which conducted joint exercises in 1992. In 1993, the US Congress sought to establish new categories for providing assistance to India. This was intended to bring India closer to the US position. In 1995, the US and India signed their first agreement relating to defence relations, which provided for joint exercises. The Vision Document signed by Clinton and Vajpayee in 2000 expressed a “resolve to create a closer and qualitatively new relationship between the US and India” on the basis of common interests for ensuring regional and international security. This document envisioned India as ‘strategic partner’ of US ready to work towards stability in Asia and beyond. The landmark Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, signed during the visit of US President George W. Bush to India in March 2006, amounted to a quantum leap in US-India relation. Apart from the US and India, the Indo-US nuclear deal also needed to be endorsed by the 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Indian Prime Minister in his recent visit to South Africa, a country which is also a member of the NSG, requested its support on this issue. The deal has successfully crossed a number of major hurdles in its way after being approved by US House of Representatives’ International Relations Committee and then by the powerful US Senate Foreign Relations Committee with overwhelming majorities of 37 to 5 and 16 to 2 respectively. The US congress passed a legislation by 359-68 vote authorizing the President to waive the application of certain requirements under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 with respect to India while asserting congressional oversight.23 The deal needs to be approved in the US senate. The subsequent legislation would be an ‘up-or-down’ vote with expedited procedures if the President of the United States:
23. The legislation is termed as the ‘United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Act of 2006’. See for details, Aziz Haniffa, “Praise Pours in for Passage of Nuclear Bill”, available at http://www.rediff.com/ /news /2006 /jul /27 ndeal6.htm.
97 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
• makes a number of certifications related to India and nonproliferation (along with a detailed report); • exempts the agreement from certain restrictions contained in the Atomic Energy Act; and • submits to Congress the India-IAEA agreement on safeguards for India's civilian nuclear facilities. To bring it into effect, both countries have to pass it in their respective parliament. A bill numbered S 3709 (United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act) has already been placed in the US senate. It was supposed to be placed in the senate in the third week of September 2006 but was deferred till November of that year, which many observers attributed to US pre-election theatrics.24 Many believed that if passed, the bill will ‘cross the point of no return.’ and the world will never be the same again.’25 Although it looks like that the bill will have an easy sail in the senate, India has reasons for worrying about its future.
Controversies with the Deal The biggest concerns regarding the Indo-US nuclear agreement is its nebulous stand on non-proliferation issues. The agreement does not clearly spell out what will happen if India carries out another nuclear test. Legally, India would continue getting US cooperation on civil nuclear issue even if it explodes another nuclear device. Responding to this question in a BBC interview on 23 Jul 07, US under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns avoided making any comments on it. Instead he defended the deal as historic and one that would allow US firms to do business with India on nuclear technology and saw it bringing these two countries closer. This is why, many (like Perkovich) sees the deal as undercooked “…This particular agreement was very under cooked and not well-considered; very important details were omitted, but the idea of changing the rules to make some accommodation with India was correct.” India’s apprehension starts with the Sections 106 and 107 of the bill dealing with the ‘Prohibition of Certain Exports and Re-exports’ and ‘End Use Monitoring Programme’ respectively. Understandably, such apprehensions are obviated by the fact that India will need approval from the US which might otherwise undermine its indigenously developed nuclear program. India is also concerned about keeping its FBR’s out of IAEA inspection for its national interest.
24. Delays at US Senate Hamper Nuclear Deal, The Financial Express, (Internet Edition), October 1, 2006, Available at http://www.financialexpress.com/fe-full-story.php?content_id=142108. 25. Siddaharth Varadarajan, “The Truth Behind the Indo-US Nuclear Deal”, The Hindu (internet Edition), July 29,2005, p.1
98 The FBRs are the second of India’s three-stage nuclear power programme and are vital for maintaining its long term energy security and minimum credible deterrent. The energy that comes out of the spent fuel resources from domestic uranium and thorium mines may constitute a large part of India’s nuclear energy programme. Hence placing them on the civilian list would be tantamount to India compromising on its integrity and autonomy. It can force India into an import trap involving constant dependence on the US for supplies of imported enriched uranium.26 Non-proliferation experts from across the political spectrum have so far voiced their concern about the agreement. They have argued that the nuclear deal would put the U.S. in violation of its central obligation under the NPT of not assisting a non-nuclear weapon state. They charge that the agreement could free India’s limited domestic nuclear fuel-making capacity, allowing highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons.27 While some appreciate the idea of accommodating India given the reality, they feel that the agreement does not include enough safeguards to prevent India from applying nuclear technology and material for military use. Therefore, they believe that some changes need to be worked out before it is finalized.28 Irrespective of the advantages and disadvantages of the deal, it is true that without internationally agreed and enforceable rules, nuclear materials will be difficult to keep out of the hands of terrorists. Nuclear black marketers cannot be detected, deterred, and punished. Without a rule-based system, many states and not only rogues states might seek nuclear weapons. This will destabilize an international system that currently benefits the US above all other states. In such a context, the deal certainly has its merits as it compels India to bring some of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In the backdrop of all these controversies, it is worth examining the implications of the deal on the region and beyond.
26. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 15 February 2006, Fast Breeder Reactors: A milestone in India’s nuclear programme, htt:// www. Ipcs.org/indo-us-nuclear 05. jsp 27. U.S. hints changes in nuke deal with India, 27 July 2006. The Daily Star, 27 June 2006. 28. Carnegie endowments for International peace for Faulty promises The U.S. India Nuclear Deal by George Perkovich. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
99 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
IMPLICATIONS OF THE INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL Strategic Partnership with US To put it in simple words, the US wants a balance of power in the region that would work to maintain its own supremacy in a unipolar world. If China and India can be brought to a state of balance, US supremacy will remain unchallenged. However, there is more to the story. Since ‘India is kind of reproducing unipolarity in its own fashion by demanding its own dominant position’29 in the region, the Indo-US nuclear deal will reinforce Indian ambition. Moreover, US want India to replicate regional unipolarity. To dissuade or prevent China from competing harmfully with it, the US must mobilize the states on China’s periphery to balance Chinese power. Because India is a rising power with great intrinsic merits, including its attachment to democracy, it can be a natural partner of the US in the global system. Thus it is more likely that the US would cultivate a partnership with India and enhance India’s international power. Indeed, some experts (like Mr Tellies of RAND Corporation) argue that allowing India access to US nuclear material and equipment will make New Delhi more likely to help further American strategic goals in the region. He further stresses that : “[It] would buttress [India’s] potential utility as a hedge against a rising China, encourage it to pursue economic and strategic policies aligned with U.S. interests, and shape its choices in regard to global energy stability.”30 To win over India, the US has altered national and international laws and rules that bar nuclear and missile technology cooperation with India. From an American perspective, changing these rules was necessary to cement the partnership. India’s need to increase its use of nuclear energy in order to fuel economic growth is also coincidental. India has never been a threat to the United States or the liberal international system. Thus India’s exclusion as an accepted nuclear weapons power was viewed by the Bush administration as a historical anomaly and it set out to correct it. However, some have argued that the US should have based her partnership with India on the need to augment the political- economic development of India’s one billion people and not its nuclear program. India is too vital a country for the US to be regarded only as an instrument against another country. However, most US policy makers do not understand this fact and are motivated primarily by the desire to counter China. Problems may arise, however, when India decides not to accede to a particular US preference, as
29. Group Captain Mahmud Hussain, “Unipolarity: Its Reflection in South Asia with Special Reference to Bangladesh”, NDC Journal, 2006. p.5 30. Siddharth Varadarajan, “The Truth Behind the Indo-US Nuclear Deal”, The Hindu, Internet Edition, July 29, 2005.
100 when New Delhi refused to send troops to Iraq. India has clear strategic interest in improving relations with China. For the foreseeable future, it will continue to see the benefits of good relations with both the US and China.31 Thus U.S. accommodation of the Indian government’s preoccupation with nuclear power may not lead to any lasting partnership with India. Nevertheless, the strategic partnership will not prevent new power blocks from engaging in the region: one with a distinct inclination towards India and US, while the other with China. Such alignments are likely to increase as India asserts her new position more aggressively. Indeed, the tone in the Indian foreign minister’s statement in recent times about their smaller neighbours betrays symptoms of big brotherly attitude. South Asian neighbours will have to adjust to this new power scenario as US-India cooperation grows. The flip side for US is that this might affect its multilateralism in the region. India’s smaller neighbours too may find it increasingly difficult to adjust to the spill over effect of Indo-US cooperation. Indeed the US has clearly stated that it has dehyphenated its relationship with India from its relationship with Pakistan. However, dehyphenation has meant that the Indo-US relationship directly impacts and aggravates Pakistan’s security milieu. For Pakistan, therefore, the Indo-US strategic partnership will have a direct bearing on Pakistan-US relationship.
Dominance in Indian Ocean Indo -US alliance is undermining the strategic stability not just in South Asia but also in the East Asia region. This resulting instability is highlighted by the much less known aspect of the Indo-US nuclear deal called Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).32 PSI is part of the US notion of ‘coalitions of the willing’ which in some way undermines International law (in this case, the Law of the Sea) by attributing to members of the coalition the right to stop traffic on the high seas and in international air space on the slightest suspicion of transportation of WMD material or components This right can lead to harassment of many countries. India’s access to PSI would allow her to conduct military operations in the high seas without a UN mandate. Apart from the US, India has also for the first time, agreed to multinational military operations with the US without a UN mandate. This will ease US concerns about the monitoring of non-proliferation regimes as India may be asked to let its Navy operate more frequently alongside the US Navy in the Indian Ocean. The purpose of these joint operations is essentially strategic since the US wants India to be an active partner in enforcing the PSI. Mr Tellis
31. George perkovich, “Faulty Promises-The US-India Nuclear Deal’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2005,p.6 32. The Military Balance, 2005-2006, p.230
101 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
predicts that a nuclear deal would “increase [India’s] enthusiasm for taking part in counter-proliferation activity in the Indian Ocean.”33 Although the Indo-US joint statement makes no direct mention of such cooperation, yet the real purpose of this initiative is revealed by the apparently inappropriate sub-heading under which it finds mention: ‘For Non-Proliferation and Security.’ India is clearly being seen as a regional manager allied to the US and increasingly dominant in the Indian Ocean.
Potential Arms Race In spite of the kind of restraint widely urged by the international community, Pakistan went ahead with its nuclear test on May 28, 1998 after India had conducted five such nuclear tests. Even an uncertain ‘set of international guarantees’ could not stop Pakistan from giving up a matching response. Such realities reflect the potentials of an arms race in the region that looms ever large with the signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Pakistan believed that its five tests on May 28, 1998 were justifiable. Both China and Pakistan reacted sharply to the Indo-US nuclear deal and feel that it gave India an extra advantage in the field of dual-use high technology, which could ultimately alter the balance of power in Asia. China has thus launched a well-orchestrated campaign against the deal. It wants India to fulfill NPT obligations and strengthen the non-proliferation effort. It would not be wrong to suspect that if India uses the agreement as a license to expand its weapons programme, Pakistan will be compelled to do the same. Pakistan has been ignominiously refused a similar deal by the United States.34 A nuclear deal with India that allows China to seek precedent similar rule for changes or exemptions in the future could undermine U.S. efforts to contain Chinese power. Pakistan would not have acquired nuclear weapons without significant assistance from China, including provisions for tested nuclear weapons design.
Impact on the Economy and People Economic development is the most important determinant of Indian power and stability. However, the US-Indian strategic framework emphasizes weapons sales, co-production, and military to military cooperation and offers little that would significantly augment India’s economic prospects. Most observers feel that economic rather than military is the most pressing political-economic challenge China poses to the US, India and other developing countries. Thus, the greatest strategic support the US could provide to India should be economic in nature.
33. Siddharth Varadarajan, Opcit 34. Indian Defense, New Delhi, March 2006, ‘China Pakistan Oppose United States – India Nuclear Deal’. http://www.india-defence.com/reports/1424 accessed on 15 July 2007. 35. George Perkovich. Loc cit.
102 Energy generation, distribution, and efficiency are vital in this regard.35 Nuclear power is an important element in India’s long-term energy strategy and may or may not merit the value Indians have put on it. But developing nuclear energy will be a slow, expensive and uncertain process at best. Much more attention and assistance should be channeled to provide quicker and more efficient means to meet India’s energy needs. Since 60 percent of Indians derive their livelihood from agriculture, the most important way for the US to bolster India’s development would be to support trade rules and provide assistance designed to foster rural development and create social infrastructure to protect poor people as they move off the land into cities that lack jobs, housing and other resources. Electricity grids do not reach many rural Indians but rural Indians lack the well paid and powerful lobbyist that defence contractors and nuclear industrial interest have mobilized in Washington and New Delhi to put military sales and nuclear cooperation at the top of the US Indian agenda.
Indian Hegemony The use of force in foreign policy is not a new strategy, and India is no exception to that policy as was evident recently, when India sent her military to Sri Lanka on the pretext of peace keeping. The state of Sikkim lost its independence because of Indian military tactics. Land locked Nepal was at India’s mercy after a blockade and there were even talk in the Indian media of sending troops to Nepal during the recent crisis with the King. India also sent troops to the Island of Maldives (Operation Cactus) to flex its muscle. In 1962 a border conflict with China erupted when for the first time India was defeated by a neighbour of comparable size. Reverberations from this defeat still rankle the command structure of the large and well-equipped Indian Army. These actions by India over the years certainly do not inspire confidence in her smaller neighbors.36 Not surprisingly, even in the early years of independence, India believed that its security parameters extended well beyond South Asia. For instance, in a message to the youth of Sri Lanka in 1945, Nehru declared that India was likely to become the center for defensive moves and trade for Southern and South East Asia. When India went overtly nuclear, it did so within the parameters of a well-defined long-term security policy. The parameters of this policy are being carefully and gradually enunciated by Indian analysts. Primarily, India is seeking to reassert its regional and global ambitions within the overall context of its nuclear capability. The reach of this capability has been translated into an expansion of India’s regional parameters as India once again seeks to be acknowledged as a major regional and global power.37
36. Defence Journal, Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine by Lt General (Retd) Sardar FS Lodi, http://www. defencejournal. com /apr99/ pak-nuclear-doctrine.ht, accessed on 27 August 2007. 37. Dr. Shireen M Mazari- The Indo-US Strategic Partnership. The Security for Peace & Development, Institution of Safety Security of IT Ltd. Dhaka,
103 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
Implication of the NPT The Indo-USA nuclear agreement clearly undermines the NPT on a number of counts. First, it contravenes the commitment by nuclear weapon states ‘not to transfer nuclear technology and materials to states not signatory to the NPT’. Second, the NPT only recognizes the five nuclear weapon states that conducted tests before 1967 and yet the US, by accepting India’s nuclear weapon facilities as being outside the purview of IAEA safeguards, has acknowledged India’s standards as a nuclear weapon state. The reasons given by the US Undersecretary of State, Nicholas Burns, for such a position includes ‘India’s exceptionally strong record of non-proliferation and very strong commitment to protect fissile material, other nuclear materials and nuclear technology.’ However India’s ‘exceptional non-proliferation record’ is not above controversy. In 1975 India signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iraq and began helping in the completion of the Bushehr plant between 1980-1983. This included sending nuclear scientists and engineers to Iran in November 1982. In 1991, despite US opposition, India negotiated the sale of 10-megawatt nuclear reactor to Iran. In 1992, India also supplied thiodyglycol and other chemicals to Iran. In 1993, thirty tones of trimethyl-phosphite were supplied to Iraq by the United Phosphorous Company of India. The Indo-US nuclear agreement has further undermined the global non-proliferation regime, which had already suffered a setback with the failure of the NPT Review Conference in May 2005. It has also destabilized the nuclear balance in South Asia. Because of its direct contraventions of the NPT, it will undermine the international community’s pressure on Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programmes.38
38. Ibid.
104 Policy Options for South Asian Countries The policy options for the small nations of South Asia can have both military risk reduction and diplomatic collective security dimensions. Living under the specter of a nuclear war, India’s South Asian neighbours cannot ignore this development. As alluded to before, the nuclear bullying syndrome may compel the smaller states of South Asia to join either India or Pakistan or ask for a nuclear umbrella from nuclear powers, such as USA or China. In a conventional setting aligning either with Pakistan or India would make sense. But in case of nuclear environment, countervailing either Pakistan or India, USA becomes the best possible alternative, since China is also a power in this nuclear equation. However, the Indo-US nuclear agreement has changed this scenario to some extent. Countries that are not ‘comfortable’ with India may also feel the same unease with the US because of the deal. Indeed, America’s role as an honest arbiter in South Asia has been dented through this deal. This has made South Asian smaller non-nuclear states more vulnerable and brought a step closer to China. Diplomatically, South Asian states have to resort to some kind of Collective Deterrence where a multilateral response would have to be directed to offset nuclear threat. Diplomatically, they should move to make South Asia denuclearized zone or make both parties sign a ‘no first use of nuclear weapons’ pact. There is however, remote possibility of either of these options being implemented. The idea of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) is in vogue now but may not be sufficient for nuclear risk reduction. Bangladesh, being the largest non-nuclear state in South Asia, may take initiative along with other non-nuclear states, to organize sustained and quiet diplomacy between New Delhi and Islamabad “to delicately probe for an empathic understanding of the real thinking of the leadership of the two countries on their post-nuclear happenstance... and to facilitate their meeting across the negotiating table in a reasonable cordial frame of mind’’.39 What can be emphasized is the need for dialogue between the two parties; this is critically important for mutual survival and for the survival of the other small states of the region. South Asian leaders would, therefore, be well-advised to reengage in negotiations to which there can be no substitute in a nuclear environment.
39. Khurshid Hamid, ‘’Nuclearization of South Asia: Challenges for Bangladesh Diplomacy’’ in BIISS Papers Number 17, A. K. M Abdus Sabur ed., Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Dhaka, December 1998, Pp. 55-56
105 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
CONCLUSION The Indo-US nuclear deal has been of great interest for the region as it offers conflicting outcomes for nations in South Asia and beyond. The Indian pursuit of uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply sources to meet its civil nuclear facilities to provide the increasing demands for energy, together with the US bid to hedge China is often cited as the main stimulus for the deal. Sadly, the repercussions of the deal will be far more than what is perceived now. Indeed, India’s aspirations of becoming a regional hegemon together with US patronization to that end attach a stigma to the deal and can arouse suspicion in the mind of other small nations of the region. It has also unleashed the specter of a renewed regional arms race. Interestingly, the recently unveiled 123 Agreement between US and India does very little to address these concern. The 123 agreement spells out the details for implementation of the July 2005 Indo-US nuclear accord. It has already been cleared by the Indian cabinet. However, it is likely to face ‘symbolic’ opposition from the left in the Indian parliament. Indians have reasons to be happy with the final text of the 123 Agreement since it ensures sufficient safeguards and assurances for uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel and will not make India subservient to America. The forty year agreement, extendable by ten years, containing seventeen articles commits the US to ensuring uninterrupted fuel supplies to Indian reactors even if it terminates its cooperation. It will help create a strategic fuel reserve to safeguard its nuclear reactors. Significantly, the agreement is silent on nuclear testing by India but makes clear that it will not hinder or hamper New Delhi’s military nuclear programme. Ironically, it ensures access to nuclear technology to India without any obligation for it to sign the NPT or CTBT. A closer scrutiny of article 2 (Scope of Cooperation) and article 4 (Nuclear Trade) of the deal reveals interesting facts as to how far the US has committed itself to addressing Indian concerns. Additional step promised by the US includes permission for India to negotiate with the IAEA on an India-specific fuel supply agreement. This will support Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply to India’s reactors. However, if despite all efforts, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, “the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.” Clearly, the intent here is to isolate China and ensure uninterrupted nuclear assistance for civilian use, overlooking India’s military nuclear capabilities and aspirations. Understandably, as the deal gets through, India will reach its desired nuclear parity (with China) in a manner which will create a security dilemma. Such
106 perceptions are based on the Indian track record of using the nuclear assistance obtained under PNE for military purpose. The weakness of the agreement is that the distinctions between civil and military use are not strictly invoked in it. Silence about any future nuclear test by India and keeping the ‘by product materials’ out of IAEA safeguards etc. are ominous signs of the implications of the deal and possibilities of military use. Thus the precipitating effect of the deal will be felt in the military arena as well. The commissioning of the FRBs, which India is keen to keep out of the deal, and their perceived use will give India a much faster rate of growth in the nuclear field. This will, in turn, fulfill India’s dream of developing a nuclear triad. The consequence of this process may lead to a regional arms race and also a more assertive India in regional matters. The PSI agreement between India and US is a sign of such an assertive role that has bypassed the UN. On balance, however, the U.S.-India nuclear deal as proposed will accomplish less than a lasting peace in the region. It will, in fact, result in many unforeseen situations and dash expectations, creating new fissures in an already fractured global nonproliferation regime.
Bibliography
Books/Papers 1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace, Kalyani Publishers, New Delhi, India, 2001. 2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill, USA, 1979. 3. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Perseus Books Group, USA, 1997. 4. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Harper Collins Publishers Limited, Glasgow, Great Britain, 1996. 5. Michael Hogan, (ed.) The End of Cold War, Its Meaning and Implications, Cambridge University Press, USA, 1995. 6. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press, USA, 1998. 7. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Longman, USA, 2001. 8. General K Sundarji, The World Power Structure in Transition from A Quasi Unipolar to Quasi Multipolar State and the Options of A Middle Power in this Milieu, United Services Institute, India, 1993.
107 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
9. Agha Shahi, “The Emerging World Order,” in Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, Summer 2003. 10. Graham P. Chapman, The Geo-politics of South Asia, Ashgate Publishing House, Great Britain, 2003. 11. Vernon Hewitt, The New International Politics of South Asia, Manchester University Press, Great Britain, 2001. 12. Katherine Jacques, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan: International Relations and regional tensions in South Asia, Macmillan Press Limited, Great Britain, 2000. 13. Sarbjit Sharma, US-Bangladesh Relations: A Critique, UBS Publishers, India, 2001. 14. Muhammad Humayun Kabir, edited et al, Security in the Twenty First Century, BIISS, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003.
108 List of Abbreviations ASEAN Association for Southeast Asian Nations ARF ASEAN Regional Forum BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BIISS Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies BARC Bhaba Atomic Research Centre CCS Cabinet Committee on Security CBM Confidence Building Measure CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty FMCT Fissile Material Cut off Treaty FBR Fast Bread Reactor GSLV Gyro synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency LEU Low Enriched Uranium MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MD Missile Defence MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NFU No First Use NCA National Command Authority NGS Nuclear Group States NRRC Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre NPT Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty PSI Proliferation Security Initiative PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion PVSL Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle RAND Research And Development SARF South Asian Regional Forum SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile USSR United Soviet Socialist Republic WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction ZERLINA Zero Energy Reactor for Lattice Investigation and Neutron Assembly
109 Indo-us Nuclear Deal and its Implications for South Asia and Beyond
Author Air Commodore ABM Mostafizur Rahaman was commissioned in Bangladesh Air Force in Air Defence Weapons Controller branch on 29 December1976. He passed Masters in Defence Studies from National University. He has completed successfully Command and Staff, War and National Defence Courses. In his service career, he has held various important Command, Instructional and Staff appointments including Command of Air Defence Radar Units, and Air Defence Operation Centre. He served as the Director of Air Defence and the Director of Welfare at Air Headquarters. He also worked as the Deputy President at ISSB. He served as the Chief Air Supper Officer in the UN Mission Angola in 1995. He visited China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, India, Pakistan, KSA, Turkey and UK. Presently he is posted at Director General Forces Intelligence (DGFI).
110 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE
Major General Sheikh Md Monirul Islam, ndc, psc
INTRODUCTION The vital interests of a nation always need protection from both internal and external threats.1 Nations prepare and fight war to ensure national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In war, insignificant differences between the belligerents have little or no bearing on the outcome; whereas significant differences between opponents place one in a position of advantage and the other at a disadvantage. The Bangladesh Armed Forces is of moderate size and doctrinally presuppose that it must follow a defensive posture and hence limited offensive capability. Thus, military conflict between Bangladesh and an aggressor is likely tobe asymmetric. Bangladesh’s security threat does not so much emanate from external sources. Indeed, in recent times, internal threats have increased manifold. Leftist movements in the southwestern part of the country, unrest in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), resurgence of religious extremism, repeated large scale arms haul and serial bombings pose great threats emanating from different non-state actors from within. Considering the importance of the security scenario discussed in the foregoing, ‘capacity building’ effort against an aggressor as well as to tackle non-state actors has led Bangladesh to resort to a strategy of asymmetric warfare, often termed as the ‘fourth generation warfare’. To predict possible doctrinal compulsions for Bangladesh for asymmetric warfare at the strategic level, an in- depth analytical examination and intellectual exercise has become increasingly inevitable.
1. Threat is an act of co ercion wherein a negative consequence is proposed to elicit a response. Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective
ANALYSES OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT General View Asymmetric warfare can be defined as a military situation in which two or more actors2 or groups of unequal power interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic weaknesses.3 Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, in which “weaker” combatants attempt to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.
Asymmetric Conflict Outcome – Historical Perspective If we look at the 200-year period covered by Singer’s Seminal Correlates of War data, we discover that “strong actors” i.e., those with anywhere from a 5:1 to 10:1 asymmetric advantage have lost more and more asymmetric conflicts.4 Again according to the international relations theory, power implies victory in war.5 Thus in asymmetric conflicts, strong actors should almost always win.6
Percentage of Asymmetric Conflict Victories by type of Actor, 1800-1998. Figure-1
6WURQJ$FWRU :HDN$FWRU
2. ‘Actors’ here mean states or coalitions of states, although the same dynamics would apply to Govern- ments fighting against rebels. 3. Wikipedia, Asymmetric Warfare at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_warfare. 4. Four Questions and Answer on Asymmetric Warfare at www.ndc.nato.int/download/research/ asym_war comments.pdf. 5. The term international relations theory refers to a simple version of realist theory with three key ele- ments: (1) there is no authority above states that is capable of regulating their interactions; (2) all states have some capacity to harm other states; and (3) states therefore seek to increase their relative power, which can deter other states from launching attacks, intimidate them into making concessions, or defeat them in war. 6. Toft, Ivan Arreguin, How the Weak Win War: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, International Security, Vol 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), at www.samllwarjournal.com/ref/counterinsurgency.htm.
112 In contrast, the military history of the last 200 years, suggests,7 weak actors were victorious in nearly 30 percent of all asymmetric wars and has won with increasing frequency over time.
Percentage of Asymmetric Victories by type of Actor 4 X Fifty Year period Figure-2
6WURQJ$FWRU :HDN$FWRU
Logic of Strategic Interaction In an asymmetric conflict between state actors, indirect defense via Unconventional Warfare (UW) is in most cases the only sensible strategy for the weaker side to follow because a direct defense in all probability may lead to a defeat. The weaker side relies on delay and steady infliction of casualties and other war costs to subvert the stronger opponent’s political will to continue fighting. While considering any threat from a non-state actor, it is to be remembered that most insurgencies fail without decisive external assistance. The weaker side’s possession of superior will and strategy is hardly a guarantee of success.
Conflict Outcome – the Hypotheses There are two defence strategies for a weaker side, i.e. direct defence and indirect defence/guerrilla warfare and two offensive strategies for the stronger adversary i.e. direct attack and barbarism. The interaction between these strategies yield following hypotheses:8
7. Ivan, Ibid, p.4 8. Ivan, Ibid, p.107
113 Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective
Serial Strategies Result Hypothesis Strong Actor Weak Actor (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 1. Direct Direct Strong Wins 1 2. Direct Indirect Weak Wins 2 3. Indirect Direct Weak Wins 3 4. Indirect Indirect Strong Wins 4
These hypotheses describes either same-approach or opposite-approach strategic interaction. It follows that all four may be tested as a single hypothesis. Hypothesis 5: Strong actors are more likely to win same approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions.
Use of Asymmetry in Recent Wars – Case Studies Iraq War While capturing Baghdad, coalition forces realized that they were being drawn into a long protracted war as Iraqi guerrillas started engaging them from roadsides and every nook and corner of Iraq’s cities. They used low-tech counter measures, guerrilla tactics, Built-up Area (BUA) battle and fought with man-portable weapons. The Iraq campaign then shifted to a different type of asymmetric warfare where Coalition Forces casualties rose over time, making it look like a costly venture to the people of the US and its allies.
Israel – Lebanon War of July 2006 In this asymmetric conflict a strong actor, Israel, adopted the direct strategy and a weak actor, Hezbollah, adopted a blend of direct and indirect strategy. The important features were preparation of strong point entrenchment, guerrilla tactics and mobility. Hezbollah launched attacks through small, well-armed units equipped with anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) causing serious problems for the Israel Defence Force.9
9. Jane’s Defence Weekly, op.cit.
114 The Economist10, concluded that by surviving this asymmetric military conflict with Israel, Hezbollah emerged victorious militarily and politically.
Battle of Grozny In this asymmetric conflict the then Russian adversaries, Chechen fighters were better motivated and were familiar with the terrain. They were divided into combat groups consisting of 15 to 20 personnel, each group subdivided into three or four-man fire teams. To destroy Russian armoured vehicles in Grozny, five or six hunter-killer fire teams were deployed at the ground level, in second and third stories, and in basements. Snipers and machine gunners pinned down the supporting infantry while anti-tank gunners engaged armoured vehicles aiming at the top, rear and sides of vehicles. Unable to either crush or contain the rebels, Russia was forced into a humiliating peace deal in August 1996.
Types of Asymmetric Threat A country is likely to face asymmetric opponents at two levels, namely external by state actors and internal by non-state actors. a. External Threat – Geographically a small state has common borders with many countries. Some have almost equal military strength and capabilities as their neighbours. Again comparing others military and economic potentials, a state may find huge asymmetry amongst themselves. b. Internal Threats – A small state faces numerous vulnerabilities such as political instability, social-economic unrest, age-old judicial system, religious fanaticism, yellow journalism, irredentism etc. The end state of the non-state actors can be classified into two broad categories. For example, the armed struggle of ethnically diverse people and political agitation in the name of autonomy or independence, such as, Swadhin Bangabhumi Andalan is a classical example of a non-state actor who wants independence and thus wants a change in the map of Bangladesh. The second group intends to impose passioned ideologies, such as, Islamic or Sharia law11 in Bangladesh, bringing in ideological changes in society.
10. “Hezbollah’s Shallow Victory”, The Economist, 19 August 2006. 11. ‘Sharia’ deals with many aspects of day-to-day life, including politics, economics, banking, business, con- tracts, family, sexuality, hygiene, and social issues. There is no strictly static codified set of laws of Sharia. Sharia is more of a system of devising laws, based on the Qur’an, hadith, ijma, qiyas and centuries of debate, interpretation and precedent.
115 Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective
USE OF ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY AGAINST CONVENTIONAL ADVERSARY – A SMALL STATE PERSPECTIVE Current Concepts Offensive Strategy The likely strategy of a big and strong state will be to shape up the battlefield, create superiority in ‘points of decision’ and ensure momentum in the war effort. In order to bring enemy forces to the ‘point of culmination,12 it must target enemy’s ‘centre of gravity,13 within minimum possible time. To generate impetus, it must avoid surfaces and exploit gaps based on the terrain and own dispositions. To achieve surprise through unexpected presence in unexpected areas, threat force is likely to undertake specialized operations such as airborne, air mobile and amphibious assaults. The whole campaign will be supported by air and naval operations to create overall strategic advantage in all dimensions of warfare.
Defensive Strategy a. Conventional Approach. Defence strategy of a small state will entail reduction of enemy strength to achieve a more balanced correlation of force. Maximum advantage of terrain and weather should be made to maximize the ‘ground friction’14 to combat the threat forces. Knowledge of enemy intentions, movement and marshalling of forces will allow vital time to own forces for preparation of advantageous ground positions including time for fall-back positions on identified enemy ‘thrust lines’.15 The mechanics of defence would be to destroy the attackers when they expose themselves during the process of attack. As the battlefield environment turns favourable, own forces could launch counter-offensive with a view to restoring the territorial integrity of the country.
12 ‘Culmination point’ principally relates to the direct application of combat power, which is normally reduced if not regenerated in timely fashion during battle. 13. ‘Centre of gravity’ is the point where the enemy is most vulnerable and an attack on it will have the best chance of being decisive. 14. ‘Ground frictions’ are the constant streams of obstacles thrown in the way of planning and the governor of progress. Armies encounter unpredictable obstacles in any number of situations. Each friction requires a different solution. 15. ‘Thrust line’ is the general axis of advance that extends toward the enemy.
116 b. Blending of Conventional and Unconventional Warfare. Blending of conventional and unconventional warfare will be made from very outset of hostilities. An Unconventional Warfare Force (UWF) will receive mission- orientated order and contribute towards achieving synergy while remaining within operational concept of dependent field formation. They will relentlessly harass and disrupt enemy C3 systems.16 Their effort should be to try to upset the decision cycle of the enemy through widespread disruption of force facilitation and violation of scheduled ‘time lines’.17 They will not involve themselves in any decisive battles rather they will break clean to reorganize and strike elsewhere. Analysis Between the Strategies From a historical perspective of conflict outcomes, it is assumed that a strong actor should almost always win. However, a study of 200 year period war data suggests that a small state has at least 30% chances of winning. A strong actor has options of adopting direct or indirect attack, while a small state has choice of direct or indirect defence i.e. UW strategies. The study of the hypothesis gives us the following result:
Strategies Serial Result Remarks Strong State Weak State (Attack) (Defence) (a) (d) (e) (b) (c) 1. Direct Attack Direct Defence Strong Wins 2. Direct Attack Indirect Defence Weak Wins 3. Indirect Attack Direct Defence Weak Wins 4. Indirect Attack Indirect Defence Strong Wins
16. C3 stands for command, control and communication. It is an integrated system comprised of doctrine, procedures, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities and communications which provide authorities at all levels with timely and adequate data to plan, direct and control their activities. 17. ‘Time line’ is the graphical representation of the movement of forces or the flow of an operation over time. It usually represents the location of forces at various increments of time.
117 Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective
Bangladesh defence strategy calls for UWF to operate alongside the conventional force. This is a blend of direct and indirect strategy instead of direct or indirect alone. War of Liberation 1971 teaches us that the power generated by participation of the entire mass i.e. indirect defence strategy crippled the Pakistan Army and contributed to the victory of the allied force. On the contrary, if the Bangladesh approach is fine-tuned with experiences of indirect strategies like Iraq war, Israel-Lebanon war etc. there are possible chances of gaining asymmetry in the forms of method, will, organization, morale, and patience.
Use of Asymmetry – Bangladesh Perspective a. Bangladesh Armed Forces should develop the capability to withstand overwhelming odds and yet fight back. Own forces should confront the adversary following the conventional war doctrine as a principal means of seeking decision and unconventional war as its adjunct. In the event of diminishing conventional capability, the unconventional war should assume the major role with conventional war in its support. b. If the whole of Bangladesh is considered as a theatre of operation and is divided into different operational sectors, then there may be a ‘time and situation’ when conventional forces will predominate and continue fighting in some sectors while due to an adverse situation, transition to unconventional warfare may be deemed necessary in other sectors. This implies that a reverse situation in one sector will not influence or affect the forces fighting ina favourable situation in another sector. c. The numerical disadvantage of Bangladesh can be offset by the use of UWF. The UWF may be employed to interdict adversary’s follow up echelon and degrade its key capabilities such as logistic installations, C3 centers, bridging equipments, gun positions, troop and armour concentrations. This fluidity of UWF allows them to operate in nonlinear fashion and can synergize the efforts of the conventional force fighting battle along the traditional front line. d. UWF provides greater security for the conventional force by increasing the depth of the battle space. It provides a significant effect as they operate behind enemy lines and carry out destruction and neutralization of threat forces such that its decision cycle is disrupted and time plan upset.
118 e. The advantages offered by terrain and the weather of Bangladesh must be maximized and fully capitalized by its forces. Counter-mobility will be vital to separating threat fighting echelons from its supporting and logistic echelons. f. Own forces should exploit the defence potential of the Built-up Areas (BUAs) falling within ‘Avenues of Approaches’18 and turn them into fortresses. With mutually supported strong point BUA defences, own forces can upset any attacker’s efforts by causing out of proportion damage to its human resources, reducing its tempo of operational progress and upsetting its timetable, and restricting its freedom of action.19 g. Own forces will have to use both passive methods and electronic warfare capability to protect C3 systems. All civil communication facilities should be integrated and be used as alternative means of communication. h. During adverse air situation, forced infiltration and limited offensive can be achieved by raids, ambushes and infiltration attacks on key logistic installations of the enemy instead of engaging it from the traditional defensive line. DEMAND FOR AUTONOMY/INDEPENDENCE: ASYMMETRIC THREAT FROM NON-STATE ACTOR General On the pretext of religious differences and/or deprivation of privileges in Bangladesh, two notable separatist movements have been experienced by the country; firstly, Swadhin Bangabhumi Andalan and secondly, the CHT issue.
18. ‘Avenues of approach’ are the air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading onto its objective or to key terrain in its path. 19. Interview with Moen U Ahmed, Chief of Army Staff, Bangladesh Army, 27 September 2007.
119 Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective
Swadhin Bangabhumi Andalan ‘Bangabhumi’, meaning the land of Bengal, is the proposed name of a homeland for Hindus who had migrated to India from East Bengal in the past.20 Bangabhumi movement was announced on August 15, 1977.21 The area proposed for Bangabhumi comes to 20 thousand square miles, which is more than one- third of the total area of Bangladesh. Even though no violence has so far been reportedly committed by these groups and their activities are dormant at this point in time, yet they may create disturbances, terrorism and communal disharmony in the south-western part of Bangladesh at any moment favourable to them.
CHT Issue The CHT is about 13,184 sq km, which is approximately one-tenth of the size of Bangladesh.22 In 1960, the construction of a hydro-electric dam at Kaptai submerged about 54,000 acres of fertile and cultivable land and displaced nearly 0.1 million people. Lack of substantial compensation gave rise to intense resentment among the affected hill population. The perceived sense of deprivation and the quest for autonomy led the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) to launch an armed struggle. Due to integrated approach by the government and tenacious Counter-Insurgency Operations (CIO), the Shanti Bahini (SB) was made to declare unilateral cease- fire on 10 August 1992 which later culminated in a peaceful solution through signing of a ‘Peace Accord’23 on 02 December 1997. United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) opposed the treaty outright.
20. Bangabhumi, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangabhumi 21. Hussain M. T. Opinion: No to sovereignty of Bangladesh? at http://nation.ittefaq.com/artman/ 22. exec/view.cgi/ 38/22292 http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/C_0215.htm 23. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/document/actandordinances/CHT1990.htm.
120 Significance of the Accord The peace accord views to uphold the political, social, cultural, educational and economic rights of all the citizens of CHT. It led to official end to the CIO through democratic negotiation and without international intervention. PCJSS stepped aside from its demand for full regional autonomy and complete withdrawal of the Army and the Bengali settlers.24 It has facilitated the establishment of potentially strong and effective local government institutions in the region and the growth of tribal leadership.
Dichotomies of the Peace Accord Despite many positive features, the peace accord is not without its limitations and constraints. Many clauses like 9, 26(1), 29 and 32 of part B25 are contrary to article 122, 143, 144 and 80 of the constitution26 of Bangladesh and challenge fundamental citizen rights. The accord undermines the existence of non-tribal population with clauses such as the one that mentions ‘CHT will be treated as tribal inhabited area’.
Present Status of the Peace Accord The accord was signed between the National Committee on Chittagong Hill Tracts formed by the Government and the PCJSS but still needs to be ratified by the parliament. Thus it remains susceptible to changes in future. Some important provisions like withdrawal of temporary camps, transfer of land, law and other matters related to the district council and transferring important subjects to Hill District Council are yet to be completed.
An Evaluation of the Present Situation Ten years have elapsed after the signing of the treaty, but the overall environment in CHT is still not conducive to durable peace and sustainable development. The PCJSS is trying to intensify the movement for full implementation of the accord, whereas the UPDF agenda27 include demand for the full autonomy of CHT.
24. Dowla, Rokon, Strategic Management of Insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 25. Chittagong Hill Tracts Treaty, 1997, op.cit. 26. Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 4th Nov 1972. 27. http://www.updfcht.org/menifesto.html
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To ensure equal rights, distressed Bengali settlers started ‘Somo Odhikar Andolon’ in 2004. Until now, this party rarely has had left any impact in the wider political front of CHT. A group of elderly tribal elite tried to remove the differences between PCJSS and UPDF, but failed to do so due to huge ideological differences. If the unification succeeds, the combined pressure may force the GOB to succumb to the demand for full implementation of the peace accord or as an extreme option they may initiate fresh insurgency as a unified entity. Either situation will not be supportive of the peace and development of Bangladesh in general and CHT in particular.
Challenging and Neutralizing the Non-State Threats Swadhin Bangabhumi Andalan has never really taken off as a movement. However, it does have the potential to turn into an active catalyst for communal disharmony leading to involvement and influence of external forces. As the movement is based on the issue of religion, it can be assumed that good bi- lateral relations with India and communal harmony in Bangladesh can tackle it. Besides, own intelligence agencies must be able to detect, identify and preempt any attempt made by any group to revive the struggle. In contrast, the solution to CHT problem may not come in one go. In order to find a permanent solution to the CHT problem, the following major issues are to be settled:28 a. What will happen to the ‘Bengali’ population? b. Who will be the voters? c. What is the extent of Khas land and how will it be distributed? d. What will be the power of the Regional Council? e. What would be the role of the military in ensuring that insurgency is not revived? Unless these issues are managed strategically, keeping the national interest always in view, the development in CHT would be problematic and incapable of fulfilling the aspirations of the different communities living there.
28. Interview of Retired Major General Syed Muhammad Ibrahim, Bir Protik.
122 ARMS STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM – ASYMMETRIC THREAT FROM NON-STATE ACTOR Religious Extremism General The off-again and on-again bomb attacks by religious extremists have posed a serious threat to public safety, security and economic activities. It allowed both local and international propagandists to portray Bangladesh as the next Afghanistan. This worrisome situation is therefore, a great challenge for the peace and stability of the country.
Reasons for Religious Extremism in Bangladesh Distorted Political Leadership and Culture Critics say that the GOB failed to thwart the uncertain situation when it was in its embryonic form. Allegedly, they provided undue patronage to religious extremists for minor political gains.
Unequal Growth of Various Types of Educational Systems The education system in Bangladesh is characterized by the co-existence of vernacular-based secular education system, a religious system of education and English as the medium of instruction. The differences in quality have reinforced divisions rather than facilitated social mobility.
Economic Disparity, Poverty, Overpopulation and Unemployment Economic disparity in Bangladesh has taken quantum jumps mainly in the last three decades or so. The enormous problem that exits is continuing to aggravate because of an ever growing population and soaring unemployment.
Effects There is no scope for viewing religious extremism issue with any degree of complacency because it is localized and has been well-taken care of by recent tough actions by law enforcing agencies. In effect, internally, there can be threats to national security, democracy, secularism, economy and development, impacting on law and order. At the regional level it can create mistrust, lead to migration and impact on bi-lateral relation, while at the international level there can be image crisis, loss of credibility, adverse media coverage, economic boycott, uncertainty in cooperation and other unforeseen external response.
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Suggestive Measures The Bangladesh Enterprise Institute in its strategy paper ‘Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh’ (July 2007) has suggested four principal responses to terrorism, namely to prevent, pursue, protect and prepare. Applying a similar response, rise of fundamentalism/extremism can effectively be addressed.29 ‘Prevent’ includes determining the causes of grievance and pursuing better ways of addressing other than using indiscriminate violence and extremism. This calls for identification of causes for gross deprivation, grievances, sense of injustice, alienation, inequality, discrimination, youth unemployment and problems in democratic and electoral institution and addressing them with due importance. ‘Pursue’ should aim at determining the magnitude of threats and adopting all possible measures to minimize risks. It calls for good coordination between intelligence and law enforcing agencies to identify and track fundamentalist/ extremist activities and destroying their command and support infrastructure. Identification and freezing fundamentalist/extremist sources of financing and putting an accountability system in place will curb transactions of illegal money in support of terrorism. Extradition treaty and regional and international co- operation with partners and allies will strengthen the process of preventing fundamentalist/extremist threats. ‘Protection’ can reduce vulnerability by focusing on key utility areas such as airports, power stations, government offices and crowded places. Strict border control will deny access to new recruits, discourage financing, check arms, explosives and equipment smuggling, and provide information about terrorists. Additionally, effective, efficient and continuous law enforcement, pursuit of fundamentalist/extremist organizations and increasing awareness can reduce the vulnerability from attacks. ‘Preparation’ is concerned with ensuring that the nation is ready for the consequences of fundamentalist/extremist attack. Identification of potential risks, assessment of impact and building necessary capabilities to respond any attack will have good effect and help stabilize the situation in Bangladesh.
29. Interview with Brigadier General A T M Amin, Director Counter-Terrorism Bureau, DGFI, 27 Septem- ber,2007.
124 OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH Doctrinal Thoughts A military doctrine suitable for Bangladesh should succinctly express the collective wisdom on the subject and show how Bangladesh Armed Forces can conduct future military operations successfully. Historian J.F.C. Fuller has written that “the central idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to be sound must be principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. In its ultimate relationship to the human understanding this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense, that is, action adapted to circumstance.”30 The implicit premise is that asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise manoeuvres in terms of ends, ways and means. The more dissimilar the opponent, the more difficult is to anticipate its actions. If we know in advance how an opponent intends to exploit our dissimilarities, we will be able to develop specific doctrine to counter its actions. Against asymmetric opponents, doctrine should provide a way of thinking about asymmetry and an operational philosophy that can take asymmetry fully into account. Unfortunately, uncertainty is inseparable from the nature of warfare, and asymmetry increases uncertainty. Those who expect only doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures to provide solutions and checklists for action are soon disabused of that notion during actual operations. Doctrine must therefore prepare military forces to have the mindset to deal with uncertainty quickly and effectively.
Developing Bangladesh Doctrine - Recommendations Indirect defense or UW is in most cases the only sensible strategy for Bangladesh, because a direct defense is an invitation to swift defeat. The principal elements of UW are protraction, attrition, and camouflage. Protraction requires willingness to trade space and resources for time, because attempted territorial defence plays to the conventional enemy’s strength in firepower. Camouflage or the capacity to dissolve into the local population and terrain shields UWF from the potentially catastrophic consequences of the enemy’s firepower superiority and compels the threat forces to inflict politically self-defeating collateral damage on the civilian population.
30. U.S. Military Review, Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, July-August 2003.
125 Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective
In contrast, non-state actors posing asymmetric threats can have a spill-over effect on domestic policy initiatives. Poor governance, law and order situation generally aggravate conflict situations. For Bangladesh, a holistic approach to the problem can address and take care of contentious issues. In fact, for GOB, understanding the grievances that give rise to fundamentalism/extremism/ secessionist movements is of prime importance. There is no alternative to targeting the mind as the mind in all cases can influence and dominate decisions and actions of the non-state actors. Social, cultural, religious and economic equity works as solace to the mind and hence must get priority in the overall effort. The present thinking of blending conventional and UW with modification and versatility seems to fulfill most requirements enumerated above. The modification needed will be in the areas of task organization in order to maximize both mobility and firepower. While the doctrine will call for blending conventional and UW from the very outset of any military campaign, the switching of the mode by the regular forces would be ‘off and on’, depending of course on the battlefield situation. This transition has to be well synchronized as only perfect coordination can possibly allow the units and formations to retain combat effectiveness so much essential to achieve ultimate victory. To solve the CHT problem, the political leadership of 1996-97 was in a hurry to reach an agreement. In the process, a number of issues remained unattended or inadequately attended. The expectation of the people of CHT may be much higher than what was offered. More important than the offer is the sincerity of the implementation of the offer. If the GOB and the political leadership are sincere in their approach to the problem, the situation in CHT may improve over a period of 5 to 6 years. The whole issue should be reviewed accordingly to make it acceptable to all interested quarters. Sincerity and concerted effort of all agencies of the government and political leadership can lend to success in tackling/defusing other forms of secessionist/extremist movement waged by other non-state actors. To meet the challenge of non-state actors and address contentious issues, Bangladesh needs an integrated approach at the local, national, regional and international level.
Local Approach The experience of the ‘Bangladesh liberation War’ is something so unique that it should always be taken into account in developing our doctrine. In line with the organization of the Freedom Fighters of 1971 war, the UWF in essence will be drawn from the local population. Their determination and morale will hinge upon the love they have for their own country.
126 In case of non-sate actors, adopting local approach will basically mean tackling them at the very root level. The causes of grievance, dissatisfaction and hatred are to be identified and analyzed and measures are to be taken on ground to defuse the tension locally. The following may pay dividend: a. Local population should be motivated to identify the difference between what extremists offer vis-à-vis the efforts of the government. All efforts must be made by the government through implementation of developmental projects and activities necessary to win the support of the population which can effectively separate the extremists/insurgents from the common mass, making it easy for security forces to hunt and destroy them. b. There should be provisions for strict monitoring and deterrent action must be taken against radical leaders to disrupt their command and support structures. A profiling of the type and nature of extremist/insurgent activities at the local level should be made which will serve the purpose of background information in planning and conducting any military/security forces operations. National Approach It is important that the issue be not viewed as a military matter and left to the military leadership. Comprehensive study and analyses should be carried out to determine the dimension of the threat that emanates from both state and non- state actors to ascertain specific responsibilities of different organizations and establishments of the government. The following may be considered:
Against a State actor a. Force restructuring and reequipping should be considered to allow for mobility and firepower. Lack of geographical depth should have to be compensated by leaving “stay behind” parties in the enemy occupied territory. UWF should attack the overstretched threat forces from multiple directions, forcing it to dissipate strength for rear area and other security duties. b. In a limited or total war situation, there will be inevitable requirement of integration of civil resources to support military operations. A national policy defining the process and modality of integration will facilitate the process in time of crisis and take care of confusions or contradictions which are likely to happen. c. Intelligence preparation of battlefield (IPB) should always be updated. This would necessitate dynamism in intelligence operation. Both conventional and indigenous methods are to be adopted randomly to turn the terrain of Bangladesh into a spider web, which is otherwise known to be a defender’s paradise.
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d. Bangladesh’s foreign policy should be able to effectively deal with contentious issues with the neighbouring countries and conflict diffusions must be attempted by vigorous diplomatic initiatives. Against a Non-State Actor a. A national strategy should be formulated and persuaded to combat secessionist movement, fundamentalism and extremism. The strategy would address structural problems, and address grievances and sense of social injustice. b. The education system of the country should be reviewed to bridge the yawning gap that exists between mainstream and Madrassa education. Besides, tribal population must be offered the same standard of education and their higher education should also be facilitated. Efforts may include provision of vocational training to turn them into a skilled or semi-skilled labour force that has demand in the international job market. c. Intelligence and law enforcing agencies capability should be enhanced through good coordination. There should be arrangement to have good border control, while border security system should be reviewed periodically to prevent all kinds of illegal cross-border movements. Military training should be aimed at developing and promoting officers and men with the skills necessary for success across the full spectrum of military operations both against state and non-state actors.
Regional Approach Regional forums like SAARC and BIMSTEC should be used for an integrated regional approach which can handle state and non-state threats. The success of poverty reduction initiative will automatically take care of the aspirations of the common people, resulting in regional harmony. Regional connectivity should be given priority to enhance movement, trade, education and people-to-people contact. Such interaction both at the official and private level will lead to a solid foundation of trust and amity between the countries of the region. There should be regional co-operation to strengthen intelligence and promote efforts to curb terrorism in the region. Extradition treaties should be signed to curtail cross-border movements of extremists/secessionist groups.
128 International Approach Ever-expanding spread of terrorism/extremism has turned into a prime cause of international concern. Bangladesh should opt to be a member/party to any international resolution adopted to deal with conflicts/terrorism/extremism. It should always voice its opinion resolutely in United Nations General Assembly, negating military hegemony as well as terrorism. Bangladesh should be a strong proponent of international co-operation to strengthen the intelligence and other related issues for capacity building to offset conflicts/extremism at international, regional, national and local levels.
CONCLUSION The primary aim of asymmetric warfare is to constrain the ability of the stronger opponent to intervene rapidly and at a relatively low cost. It is important, however, to note that asymmetric threat in the present context can and in all probability will emanate from both stronger and weaker actors. Having a doctrine suited to the contemporary operational environment is not sufficient. Where we need to improve is in our understanding of the importance of asymmetric threats and their implications for national security. Considering the ramifications of increasingly asymmetric threats, a holistic approach to education, professional development, and assimilation is still necessary. This must happen at the highest political and military level. Military victory is a beginning, not an end. Fighting power is a combination of measurable factors like force composition and strengths, weapon counts, available number of sorties; and intangible factors such as generalship, organizational quality and morale. It seems reasonable to conclude that no amount of outside assistance could redeem the fortunes of a weak-willed and strategically incompetent force. Hence, we cannot afford to be slow to formulate a doctrine that will take care of the impending asymmetric challenges of our nation. In the ultimate analysis, military conflict has two dimensions, ‘winning wars and winning the peace’. If we can plan, prepare and excel in the first, we can obviously be victorious in the second.
129 Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective
BIBLOGRAPHY
Books 1. Abedin, Mohammad Zainal, The Chittagong Hill Tracts a Victim of Indian Intervention, London, Eastern Publication, 2003. 2. Shelley, Dr. Mizanur Rahman, The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: The Untold Story, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1992. 3. Chittagong Hill Tracts Treaty, 1997. Project Study and Presentation 4. 24 Infantry Division, AHQ Presentation Paper, Strategic Management of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Dhaka, May 2007. 5. 33 Infantry Division, AHQ Presentation Paper, Asymmetric Warfare in Bangladesh Perspective and How Bangladesh Army can Prepare for It, Dhaka. Research Works 6. Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, A Strategy Paper – Counter Terrorism in Bangladesh, Dhaka, July 2007. 7. U.S. Military Review, Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare, July-August 2003. 8. Dowla, Rokon, Strategic Management of Insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 9. Grange, L. David, Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern, National Strategy Forum Review, Winter 2000. 10. Rahman, Mushfiqur, Religious Extremism and Internal Security of Bangladesh. 11. Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 4th Nov 1972. 12. Jeffrey, Why the Strong Loose, Review, Winter 2005-2006. Interview 13. Karim, Mohd Aminul, Military Secretary to the Hon’ble President of Bangladesh, 26 September 2007. 14. Jamali, Sina Ibn, Chief of General Staff of Bangladesh Army, 26 September 2007. 15. Amin, A T M, Director, Counter-Terrorism Bureau, DGFI, 27 September 2007.
130 Journal/News Paper 16. “Hizbullah’s Shallow Victory”, The Economist, 19 August 2006. 17. Daily Anandabazar : September 13, 1989. 18. BSF Goes Back on Zero-Line Fencing, Border Talks End Inconclusively; BDR Unhappy With Outcome, The Daily Star, Vol. 5. No. 316, 17 April 2005. Internet Sources/Web Sites 19. Wikipedia, Asymmetric Warfare at http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Asymmetric_ warfare 20. Metz, Steven, U.S. Army War College Asymmetric Warfare: An Review at http:// radio.weblogs.com/0001134/Stories/2003/01/11/ asymmetricWarfareAnOverview. html 21. Toft, Ivan Arreguin, How the Weak Win War: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, International Security, Vol 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), at www. samllwarjournal.com/ref/ counterinsurgency.htm. 22. Asymmetric Warfare: A Review at http://radio.weblogs.com/0001134/stories/ 2003/01/11/ asymmetric WarfareAnOverview.html 23. Four Questions and Answer on Asymmetric Warfare at www.ndc.nato.int/ download/ research/asym_war comments.pdf 24. Mallat, Chibli, Victory and the ‘Battle of Forms’, 12 August 2006 at http:// lineoffire.blogs. nytimes.com/2006/08/12/victory-and-the-battle-of-forms/ 25. http://mobile.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/23262 26. Bangabhumi at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangabhumi 27. Hussain, M.T. Opinion: No to sovereignty of Bangladesh? at http://nation. ttefaq.com/artman/exec/view.cgi/38/22292. 28. http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/C_0215.htm 29. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bandladesh/document/ actandordinances/ CHT1990.htm 30. Chittagong Hill Tracts: PCJSS Meeting in Rangamati Calls Upon the Govt. for Implementation of CHT Accord at http://www.unpo.org/article.php?id=1280 31. http://www.updfcht.org/menifesto.html 32. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Grozny_(1994-1995) #_note-LG
131 Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective
Author Major General Sheikh Md Monirul Islam was commissioned on 18 July 1978 in the East Bengal Regiment of Bangladesh Army. Till date, he has held important command, instructional and staff appointments. Some of them are: Commanding Officer of East Bengal Regiment, General Staff Officer First Grade of an Infantry Division, Commander of an Infantry Brigade, Directing Staff and Senior Instructor at Defense Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC), Chief of Protocol at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and General Officer Commanding of an Infantry Division. He served in Iraq in UN mission in 1988-1989. He has visited a number of countries in official capacity that include USA, UK, Iraq, China, Thailand, France, Germany, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, UAE etcetera. He holds a Masters degrees in Defense Studies from National University of Bangladesh, in Defense and Strategic Studies from Madras University of India and in Business Administration from Trinity University of USA. Presently, he is serving as Director General National Security Intelligence.
132 DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND BUDGET: AN EVALUATION FROM THE BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE
Lieutenant Colonel Abu Sayed Siddique, afwc, psc
INTRODUCTION Defence procurement is a subject of critical importance as it relates to the security of the country. It is largely dependent on the availability of the defence budget. Universal debates on ‘gun versus butter’ notwithstanding, for a third world country like ours, total defence budget is never sufficient, in the face of other social and developmental priorities. Again, the bulk of the defence budget needs to be spent on revenue sector e.g. pay, allowances, infrastructures and services, which leaves a negligible amount for actual modernization of weapon and equipment. Therefore, there is a need for a comprehensive plan for the best utilization of the available budget. ‘Defence procurement’ is the complete process by which defence forces acquire the equipment and services necessary to fulfill the mission assigned to them. However, a key question in defence procurement is what to buy given the financial limitation. ‘Defence Budget’ is the process that reflects the interplay of the strategic objectives and limited national resources. Defence procurement depends on defence policy, force structure, perspective plan and availability of a sound procurement policy. All these factors are interlinked and contribute to each other. In our country, it has been observed that at the end of each Fiscal Year (FY), a substantial amount of defence budget remains unexpended and is often surrendered. This clearly testifies to the weaknesses of our procurement process. Surprisingly, even the most advanced armed forces sometimes face severe criticism for faulty system of procurement. However, for Armed Forces like ours with its limited budget, the importance of sound defence procurement is crucial, since with the available budget we do not have the luxury of coming up with remedies after faulty procurement. This paper is mainly aimed at carrying out an evaluation of the existing defence procurement process in relation to the available defence budget in Bangladesh. It will examine our probable weaknesses in optimum utilization of the defence budget and procurement vulnerabilities of some other countries with a view to drawing important lessons. Finally, it will recommend measures for optimum utilization and maximization of the defence budget of Bangladesh. However, the paper will focus only on capital procurement i.e. the procurement of major platforms, weapons and equipments of the Armed Forces. Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective
CONCEPT OF DEFENCE BUDGET
General The total level of defence budget of a country is determined by both objective and subjective factors. The strategic environment and threat perception of a country at any particular time, the extent to which the government wishes to employ its defence forces and national income are some factors that determine defence spending.
Defence Budget of Some Regional Countries
The table below gives a picture of the comparative position of the defence budget of some of the countries of the region in relation to Bangladesh:
Defence Expenditure and GDP of Some Regional Countries in 2005 Table-1 Rank in world in Rank in world in Country Budget(USD) GDP terms of budget terms of GDP Bangladesh 101 crores 56 1.8% 85 India 1904 crores 9 2.5% 57 Myanmar 3.9 crores 139 2.1% 69 Pakistan 426 crores 27 3.91% 30 Sri Lanka 60.62 crores 72 2.6% 53 Source: World Fact Book
Management Approach to Defence Budget in Bangladesh Allocation Principle. The defence budget is allotted annually in Bangladesh. At the beginning of the each FY, the requirement is set at services headquarters, which is then forwarded to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). MOD submits the requirement to the Ministry of Finance, after necessary scrutiny, based on discussions with services headquarters. The Ministry of Finance again discusses the figures with the MOD and representatives of the services headquarters before tabling the budget. Therefore, in each stage of the process, active interaction with representatives of the defence forces take place. Allocation Trend of Defence Budget. The table given below shows the defence budget in relation to the budget of the other sectors of the country:
134 Defence Budget in Relation to Budget of other Sectors Table-2 FY : 2005-06 FY: 2006-07 FY: 2007-08 Sectors (Tk in crores) (Tk in crores) (Tk in crores) Defence 4,320 4,908 5,473 Education 9,686 11,107 12,380 Agriculture 4,729 5,820 6,900 Communication 6,721 7,545 7,161 LGRD 6,383 6,798 7,474 Health 4,240 4,794 5,479 Energy 4,293 4,283 4,585 Source: Ministry of Finance. Defence Budget versus Defence Procurement. Once the defence budget has been allotted, responsibilities remain with the defence forces regarding the expenditure of the budget. It has been noted that a substantial amount of budget is surrendered by the Armed Forces at the end of each FY. The total amount surrendered in the last four FY is given as under:
Total Amount Surrendered by Armed Forces Table-3 FY : 2005-06 FY: 2006-07 FY: 2007-08 Sectors (Tk in crores) (Tk in crores) (Tk in crores) Defence 4,320 4,908 5,473 Education 9,686 11,107 12,380 Agriculture 4,729 5,820 6,900 Communication 6,721 7,545 7,161 LGRD 6,383 6,798 7,474 Health 4,240 4,794 5,479 Energy 4,293 4,283 4,585 Source: Compiled by Author based on the information available in Services Headquarters. Findings It is understood that in most cases the total allotted budget has not been utilized. This, in no way, suggests that we have an inadequate defence budget. Rather, it indicates a faulty procurement system, which acts as a barrier to optimum utilization of the scarce resources available. This situation definitely calls for an objective evaluation of our existing procurement system to find out its weaknesses.
135 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective
THE DEFENCE PROCUREMENT APPROACH IN BANGLADESH
Basic Criteria for Procurement Defence Policy. Defence policy is the basis of all defence procurement. It provides policy guidance, legislative support and resources for dealing with threats to national security. It also reflects the decisions about the development of Armed Forces in pursuit of the national interests. Therefore, while resorting to major defence procurement, determining defence policy should be the first step. Force Structure. In formulating a defence policy, planners should gauge the perceived threat and then recommend a proposed force structure that would be required for the country. The policy would guide defence planners in carrying out their objectives and help them determine affordable force structure in terms of strength, weapon and equipments needed to operate the forces with a given set of resources. Perspective Plan. As not all requirements of force structure are achievable and affordable within given resources at a time, there is a need for a perspective plan. This plan should include the broad timeframe by which weapons or equipment should be inducted into the defence forces. It should not only include the initial cost of procurement of the main equipment but should also cater for the long-term costs incurred for repair, maintenance and training of users associated with a given equipment. Policy and Procedure. Once the planning part has been completed, then formulating a policy and procedure for procurement becomes important. The procurement policy and procedure gives guidelines to the concerned agencies for selecting and procuring the best equipment within the given resources in a systematic manner.
136 Organizational Structure. Having set the requirements, plans and policies, there is a need for an organizational structure that will materialize the procurement process. Basically, this is a coordinating body between the agencies that receive the requirement, carry out tendering as per rules and regulations and negotiate and finally conclude the contracts.
Existing Procurement System in Bangladesh Guiding Principles. In our defence forces, there are a number of rules, regulations, instructions, policies and procedures that provide guidelines for following the correct procurement process. ‘Procurement Policy 1990’, which was circulated on 3 April 1990 by the then Supreme Command Headquarters, provides a broad perspective on defence procurement. ‘DP-35,’ another old procedure published by erstwhile government of Pakistan on 25 January 1961, is still in vogue for defence purchase with some amendments on financial aspects. It amplifies the detailed procedures of procurement for all agencies including vendors. Implementing Procedure. The detailed procurement procedure is explained in the diagram given in the next page:
137 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective
Existing Procurement Procedure
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138 EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
General Evaluation Foreign Dependency. Our existing capital procurement is dependent on foreign sources that restrict our flexibility and optimum utilization of defence budget. Procurement of main equipment from abroad also makes us dependent on foreign sources for spares and in the long run, causes us to spend more on our defence budget. Lack of Specialised Manpower. Specialized manpower is a prime requirement for any procurement system, but this is lacking in our country. At least for capital purchase, some experts, having the capability to negotiate with foreign vendors or agency, are required. Lack of Professional Knowledge. Indeed, procurement is a specialized job and should be done only with qualified persons. But sadly, many of the personnel, who are actually involved in the procurement process, often lack adequate technical knowledge.
Policy and Planning Evaluation Absence of Defence Policy. Even after thirty-six years of independence, we do not have a written defence policy although efforts are on to formulate one. Because of this lacuna, we are yet to formulate a broad structure for the Armed Forces. The Forces Goal for our Armed Forces has been drafted but is to be finalized. As a result, all our planning and procurement is generally based on ad hoc requirements, rather than on detailed assessment resulting in unplanned procurement and expenditure of defence budget. Absence of Perspective Plan. We do not have a perspective plan on capital procurement. Perspective plan is a chain function derived from the force structure. It must be understood that procurement without a perspective plan can lead to unplanned procurement, which may cause misuse of defence budget. Age Old Procurement Policy. ‘Procurement Policy 1990’ is a seventeen years old policy, which has not been reviewed since its formulation. On the other hand, ‘DP-35’ is also a forty-five years old document that needs reviewing too. An initiative was taken by AFD in 2001 to review it and a board comprising senior officers of the Armed Forces was formed to make it work. Accordingly, the board prepared and recommended a new procedure known as ‘Defence Procurement Regulation (DPR)-2005’, which was circulated amongst the Armed Forces after government approval. However, it had to be discontinued within a month as the Ministry of Law and Legislature did not concur with some of the legal aspects.
139 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective
Adhoc Planning. Our basic weakness in procurement and poor utilisation of the defence budget is attributed to adhoc planning. In most cases, requirements are set just before or during the FY. This often causes hurried and faulty procurement and as such leads to loss of government money. Inadequate Organizational Structure. In the existing system, DGDP is responsible for inviting the tender and concluding the contract after necessary formalities. But there is no dedicated Defence Procurement Organization (DPO) to harmonize and coordinate the budgetary and procurement activities of three services, which is the practice in many countries of the world. Although, presently it is the responsibility of AFD, because of the fact that at least three different branches under different directorates of the AFD are involved in the process, objective harmonization remains impossible.
Procedural Evaluation Not Assessing the Lifecycle Cost. In the existing system, we only calculate procurement cost and do not calculate maintenance and training cost, known as the lifecycle cost of the equipment. But a substantial amount of the budget is expended subsequently on training and maintenance purpose. As such, our budget calculation fails to be accurate. Lengthy Procurement Procedure. Our procurement procedure is very lengthy and the time taken for procurement of major equipment is shown in the next page on the basis of a case study.
140 Case Study: Time Taken for Procurement of Major Equipment Serial Event Case-1 Case-2 Case-3 1. AIP 08 August ’05 24 July 04 16 April 05 2. Indent Placed to DGDP 30 October ’05 05 January 05 12 October 05 3. Vetting of Indent 29 November ’05 27 January 05 - 4. Opening of Tender 29 November ’05 10 April 05 09 March 06 Proposal for Technical 5. 12 February 06 11 April 05 - Vetting 6. Completion of Vetting 18 May 06 31 October 05 20 April 06 7. Administrative Approval 13 June 06 22 May 06 15 June 06 Forwarding to AFD for 8. 20 June 06 26 June 06 20 June 06 Financial Approval 9. Decision Given by AFD 28 June 06 29 Jun 06 29 June 06 1 year 2 10. Total Time Taken 10 months 2 years months Source: AFD
It is evident from the case study that generally one year or more is taken to complete all the procedures for procurement of major equipment. Therefore, if the budget is allotted for only one year, then it is difficult to complete the procurement process in one FY, which often is the main reason for surrendering part of the budget.
DEFENCE PROCUREMENT VULNERABILITIES- STUDY OF OTHER COUNTRY
General Defence procurement is a delicate and complex process throughout the world since there are a number of actors and agencies involved and many technical aspects related to it. In this respect, an effort will be taken to study the procurement vulnerabilities of some countries with a view to drawing important lessons and incorporating them in our country when appropriate.
141 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective
United Kingdom (UK) Identification of Problem. The UK spends on an average £ 9-10 billion on defence procurement each year. In 1997, the government observed that there would be an additional requirement of £ 3 billion for induction of new equipment, which would be utilized three years later. This time lag essentially indicates some weaknesses in the procurement system. Consequently, a key element of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review was a re-examination of the procurement process from both an organizational and procedural perspective. Approach for Solution. The following changes were then made in the procurement system: a. Procedural Changes. The procedural changes were named the Smart Procurement Initiative (SPI). The SPI included introduction of ‘Through Life System Approach’, covering both initial acquisition and in-service management of equipment and preparation of comprehensive perspective planning. b. Organizational Changes. A central organization named Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) was formed with a view to carrying out procurement for the defence forces. Besides, Defence Logistics Organization in tandem with the DPA was also formed. Its objective was to bring together the three single service logistics organizations and to establish a consolidated approach to the inter-service management of defence equipment. India Identification of Problem. The Government of India promulgated the ‘Defence Procurement Procedure-2002’ on 30 December 2002. However, the relevant industries noted the issues of transparency in defence procurement and the delays in the procurement process. Approach for Solution. The government promulgated ‘Defence Procurement Procedure-2005’ to make some qualitative changes. The objective was to ensure expeditious procurement by optimally utilizing the allocated budgetary resources. The following changes were made: a. Procedural Changes. The changes made included making qualitative requirements more broad-based to avoid a single vendor situation. It also included interoperability of equipment amongst the three services. The capital procurement catered for a long-term (15 years), medium-term (5 Years) and short-term (Annual) perspective plan.
142 b. Organisational Changes. A separate, dedicated structure for defence procurement was set up with a mixture of civil and military persons, including the political leaders. The organizations involved in the procurement process included Defence Acquisition Council, Defence Procurement Board, Defence Production Board and Defence Research and Development (R&D) Board.
Pakistan The DGDP of the Pakistan Armed Forces, assisted by directorates from the three services is responsible for carrying out all types of procurement. Besides, Defence Production Division (DPD) was established to attract investment from various sources for technology transfers and to sustain an industrial base for defence production. The objectives of DPD are to achieve maximum self-reliance and technological development through optimum indigenous production.
Findings The foregoing analysis points out that the three armed forces carried out some organizational and procedural reforms to make the procurement system progressive. The reforms made included the amendment of policies and procedures, preparation of a perspective plan and creation of a central organization for harmonizing the procurement of the three services. Moreover, all countries have taken into account the importance of R&D and indigenous production systems.
SUGGESTED MEASURES FOR BANGLADESH
Options Available for Bangladesh Armed Forces Analysis and evaluation of the entire procurement system and the defence budget of Bangladesh vis-à-vis the procurement vulnerabilities of other countries reveal major changes are required in our system for optimum utilization and for maximizing the defence budget. The following could be made available to us for our active considerations: a. Option-1(Policy and Procedural Reforms). Bangladesh Armed Forces may adopt an approach of policy and procedural reforms, without changing the existing organizational structure and their responsibilities. In this option, the policies for the procurement and the procedural aspect at all levels would be modified and simplified with a view to minimizing the time required in the procurement process.
143 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective
b. Option-2 (Policy, Procedure and Organisational Reforms). Bangladesh Armed Forces may adopt an approach of policy, procedure and organizational reforms. In this option, beside policy and procedural changes, there will be a need for the establishment of new organizations that would ensure interoperability, R&D and indigenous production. c. Analysis of the Options. (1) Option 1 is a short-term option, which can be materialised quickly and does not require any financial involvement. This would make the procurement process simple and essentially faster. As the option does not envisage any organizational change there will be difficulty in monitoring the utilization of the defence budget for the entire Armed Forces. Moreover, it would not ensure full interoperability, which is one of the key issues in maximizing the defence budget. The option would not also allow the scope of R&D and indigenous production for the entire defence forces. (2) Option 2 is a long-term option where apart from policy and procedural reforms, longer time would be required for setting a new organogram. Besides, it would also require additional manpower and hence mean extra financial involvement. Nevertheless, it would pay more dividends in the long run, especially from the perspective of the collective interest of the Armed Forces, in the fields of R&D, interoperability and indigenous production.
Suggested Option Considering the collective interest of the Armed Forces vis-à-vis attaining the minimum degree of self-reliance in defence production with a view to maximizing the defence budget, it is suggested that Bangladesh Armed Forces adopts option 2 (Policy, Procedure and Organizational reforms). However, the option would require comprehensive planning, policy formulation, and some dedicated organizations with specific duties and responsibilities.
144 IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES OF SUGGESTED OPTION
Policy Reform Defence Policy and its Parameters. We must have a written defence policy and it should be developed to ensure that plans and budgets are aligned with national objectives and activities. Such a policy should give a guideline on the following aspects that should set the basis for major procurement: a. The strategic profile of the defence force consists of its mission and vision. It should give a clear statement of the required defence capabilities of the Armed Forces and a clear statement of the required supporting force structure. b. It should lay down the basic military objective. c. It should formulate a military strategy. d. It should provide guidelines on major weapon and equipment required and their deployment pattern. e. It should sanction creation of a modest defence industry, mainly to meet the basic needs from domestic resources. Review of Procurement Policy.‘Procurement policy 1990’ should be reviewed. ‘DP-35’ should be replaced by ‘DPR-2005’ with immediate effect. For this purpose, necessary clarification may be sought from all concerned. ‘DPR- 2005’ should also stipulate procedures for government-to-government deals and for direct procurement by defence forces from the local sources like Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory (BMTF) and Khulna Shipyard Limited (KSY). Budget Policy. It is evident from the study that capital procurement takes long time, often more than a year to complete procedures. Accuracy in the procurement cannot be achieved with undue speed. As such, for smooth procurement there should be a provision of a lapsable budget for defence forces. If the budget cannot be expended in a particular FY, the unexpended amount may be carried forward to the next FY.
Future Outlook and Planning Suggested Perspective Plan. We must have long-term, medium-term and short-term perspective plans for the optimum utilization of the budget. A suggested concept of perspective plan for our Armed Forces is indicated in the next page.
145 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective
Suggested Perspective Plan
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3URJUDPPH *XLGHOLQH 0HGLXP7HUP 3ODQQLQJ 3URJUDPPH 3URSRVDOV %XGJHW(VWLPDWH 6KRUW7HUP 3ODQQLQJ $QQXDO3URFXUHPHQW 3URSRVDO ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ &RQWUROOLQJ Source: Defence Procurement in the Federal Republic of Germany by Regina H.E Cowen. 146 A broad guideline for a proposed perspective plan for Bangladesh Armed Forces is given below: a. Long-Term Planning. A plan for as long as 15 years can be devised where aim should be to qualify long-term decisions on Armed Forces goals and budgets. Long-term planning should not aim at providing one particular set of criteria for decision-making; rather, it should have many variables and options, which should provide flexibility to decision makers. Long-term planning may be divided into three phases. In the preparatory phase, planners should take a bird’s-eye view of the national budget vis-à-vis the defence budget and the requirement of the Armed Forces. In the planning phase, the Armed Forces should submit a planning proposal to the government for their approval and in the execution phase, they should materialize the planning. The entire process should be executed through a joint committee comprising three services, under guidance of AFD or DPO (proposed later) with a representative from the MOD and the Ministry of Finance. b. Medium-Term Planning. Once the long-term planning is approved, the medium-term planning may begin and could be devised for 3 to 5 years. Within the parameters of the Force Structure, the services should present their individual service requirement, which should again be harmonized at the AFD or DPO. Once agreed upon, the final proposals should contain the total requirement of the Armed Forces according to the type, quantity, cost categories and maintenance. c. Short-Term Planning. The task of short-term planning is to formulate an annual estimate of the respective services as may be termed under the Annual Perspective Plan. The plan should be carried out by the services headquarters. It may be done through a committee, which could start functioning at least six to nine months prior to the commencement of the FY. However, to ensure the interoperability and economy of effort, the requirement of the services headquarters may be coordinated at AFD or DPO. The entire perspective planning process may be coordinated as follows: 147 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective Coordination Aspect of Perspective Planning Process /RQJ7HUP3HUVSHFWLYH3ODQ 0HGLXP7HUP3HUVSHFWLYH 3ODQ 3URFXUHPHQW (YDOXDWLRQRI%XGJHW Source: Prepared by Author Step Towards Indigenous Production. Bangladesh Armed Forces should cater for indigenous production to avoid complete dependence on foreign sources and adopt a number of options after due consideration of their budgetary implications. Some of the options are given below: a. Technology Transfer. When contract for a major procurement is concluded with foreign sources, especially procurement of major equipment and overhauling of engines of aircrafts and naval ships, a clause may be incorporated in the proposal regarding technology transfer. The clause should include the timeframe, infrastructure facilities and the financial implication in details. b. Promoting Local Facilities. The other possibility is promotion of available local facilities. For example, KSY and BMTF can produce selected equipments for Armed Forces within their capability. Already KSY has taken a project of manufacturing patrol crafts for BN and BMTF is assembling light vehicle for the Armed Forces. However, government rules and regulations need to be more flexible for promoting their capability so that these organizations can be sustainable financially. c. Formulation of Cluster Production Unit. It may not be possible for a single industry to produce complete equipment, but a number of industries may be required to come up with a finished product. Possibility of incorporating a number of local industries as cluster production units may be studied. 148 Outsourcing. Reduction of the revenue expenditure may enhance investment in capital procurement and the fighting capability of the Armed Forces can be enhanced thereby with the same budget. In this regard, possibility of outsourcing some of the services like repair, maintenance, catering and utilities may be studied with the aim of reducing revenue expenditure of services. Procedural Reform Simplified Procedure. The existing procedure of procurement in our Armed Forces is very lengthy and can be shortened by eliminating some unnecessary steps. A suggested procurement procedure is given below. The proposed procedure involves six steps instead of existing eight steps, which would make the process simpler, and less time-consuming: Suggested Procurement Procedure 3URFHGXUH $FWLRQVE\'LIIHUHQW2UJDQLVDWLRQV 2EWDLQLQJ$,3IURP$)' 6HUYLFHV +HDGTXDUWHUV 2EWDLQ $,3 IURP $)' MXVWLI\LQJWKHLUFDVHIRUSURFXUHPHQW ,QGHQW3ODFHGWR'*'3 6HUYLFHV +HDGTXDUWHUV IRUZDUGV WKH LQGHQWV WR '*'3ZLWKWKHWHFKQLFDOVSHFLILFDWLRQZKLFKZLOO EHSUHSDUHGHDUOLHU )ORDWLQJDQG2SHQLQJRI '*'3 IORDWV WHQGHU DV SHU '3 DPRQJVW WKH 7HQGHU SURVSHFWLYHELGGHUV 7HFKQLFDO9HWWLQJ '*'3 IRUZDUGV WKH WHQGHU SURSRVDO WR WKH $FFHSWDQFHRI7HQGHU 6HUYLFHV+HDGTXDUWHUVIRUWHFKQLFDOYHWWLQJ$IWHU DQG$GPLQLVWUDWLYH YHWWLQJ6HUYLFHV+HDGTXDUWHUVPD\JLYHILQDQFLDO $SSURYDO DSSURYDODQGIRUZDUGWKHSURSRVDOWR'*'3 )LQDQFLDO$SSURYDO '*'3IRUZDUGVWKHSXUFKDVHSURSRVDOWR$)' IRUWKHILQDODSSURYDOE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW &RQWUDFW&RQFOXGHGE\ $IWHU JRYHUQPHQW DSSURYDO '*'3 FRQFOXGHV '*'3 FRQWUDFWZLWKWKHVXSSOLHU Source: Prepared by Author. 149 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective Assessment of Life Cycle Cost. While assessing the cost of equipment, not only the procurement cost of the item, but also the total life of the equipment along with maintenance and training cost should be considered. This will forecast the actual cost of the equipment being procured. Budget-Making Process. There should be a system in place for ensuring the best value for the money allocated to meet defence needs. The budget-making process may be implemented through Planning, Programming, Budgetary and Execution (PPBE) system. This is a system that was developed by Robert McNamara and followed in many countries. The ultimate objective of PPBE is to provide operational commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. The planning process should culminate in the development of a strategic planning guidance and initial defence fiscal guidance for the services and defence agencies. The programming process identifies the ways to attain objectives while the budgeting process should provide a platform for a detailed review of the programme. A diagram showing the budget-making plan is given below for further clarification: Diagram Showing Budget Planning 1DWLRQDO$LPDQG2EMHFWLYH 0LOLWDU\$LPDQG2EMHFWLYH $QDO\VLQJ 2SHUDWLRQDO3ODQ %XGJHWLQJ 5HYLVLRQRI2SHUDWLRQDO 3ODQ &RQWUROOLQJDQG0HDVXULQJ Source: India’s Defence Budget and Expenditure Management in a Wider Context by Amiya Kumar Ghosh, Former Financial Adviser, Defence Services. 150 Organizational Reform Formulation of DPO. a. Organization of DPO. A separate organization known as DPO may be created under the administrative control of AFD. Special training may be arranged for the officers of DPO so that they can negotiate with the vendors to secure the interests of the Armed Forces. Formulations of DPO will harmonize the activities of the three services and ensure interoperability and jointness and thus ensure optimum utilization of the defence budget. A proposed organization of DPO is below: '32 3ROLF\DQG 7HFKQLFDO 3URFXUHPHQW )LQDQFH 3ODQQLQJ %UDQFK %UDQFK %UDQFK %UDQFK 6WDQGDUGLVDWLRQ (YDOXDWLRQ 6HFWLRQ 6HFWLRQ $UP\ 1DY\ $LU 3URFXUHPHQW 3URFXUHPHQW 3URFXUHPHQW $UP\ 1DY\ $LU)RUFH %XGJHW %XGJHW %XGJHW 6HFWLRQ 6HFWLRQ 6HFWLRQ Source: Prepared by the Author. 151 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective 5 ' 2UJDQLVDWLRQ &RPPDQG&RQWURO 3ODQQLQJ 3URMHFW )LQDQFH ([HFXWLRQ DQG&RRUGLQDWLRQ %UDQFK %UDQFK %UDQFK %UDQFK %UDQFK 'HIHQFH &LYLO &RRUGLQDWLRQ&HOO &RRUGLQDWLRQ&HOO Source: Prepared by the Author. b. Tasks of DPO. The tasks of the DPO are defined in what follows: (1) Monitor, assist and coordinate in the preparation of the perspective plan. (2) Study and scrutinize the proposals; this involves selection and assessment of proposed purchase, procurement procedures and financial implications of the purchase. (3) Preparation of the procurement policy and updating it for the defence forces. (4) Study, scrutinize, standardize and evaluate the technical specifications of major weapons and equipments of the three services. (5) Coordinate with services headquarters and DGDP for timely process of purchase proposals. (6) Coordinate the preparation of the budget and budget transfer for the three services. 152 Formulation of Defence R&D Organization. A R&D organization may be established for the Armed Forces. Detail organization and functions of proposed R&D are discussed below: a. Organization of Proposed R&D. Proposed organization of R&D is given as under: b. Tasks of R&D Organization. The tasks of the R&D are outlined in what follows: (1) To ensure development of a major system to the Armed Forces according to current requirements. (2) To improve technology of the Armed Forces to minimise foreign dependence. (3) To build up capabilities and overcome deficiencies. (4) To carry out indigenous production and promote development of local resources. (5) To promote improvisation. c. Phases of R&D. The R&D projects may be executed in three phases namely, Short-Term, Medium-Term and Long-Term Projects. In the short-term, overseas visits may be arranged with a view to acquiring ideas about the programs and productions of other countries. In medium-term, efforts may be taken to develop indigenous capability and infrastructure. The long-term efforts may be taken for the technology transfer. Problems in Adopting the Suggested Options and their Remedies Policy Reforms. In Bangladesh, where the national budget is very meager, allocation of a lapsable budget may, at times, be difficult. However, at least certain percentage of it may be allotted, considering the national security aspect. Procedural Reforms. In procedural reforms, especially in the Budget Making Process, the functions of PPBE are to be performed by two different groups of people; the planning by the military planners and budgeting by the civilian bureaucrats. This will necessitate coordination. In the long-term and medium-term perspective plan, the planning horizon is upto fifteen years and five years respectively while the projected budget is for one year only. Again, whatever has been perceived in the perspective plan may not be fully implemented as the planning was evolved in terms of weapons systems and force structure, although this plicy might change. To solve these difficulties, the DPO in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defence could be the ideal organization. 153 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective Organizational Reforms. In organizational reforms, especially for the R&D organization, there should be substantial financial involvement as there will be requirement of laboratory facilities, associated equipments and additional manpower. This problem may be solved by sharing the budget proportionately amongst the three services. The project may be developed gradually and the budget and the work force may be increased proportionately in every FY. However, to reduce the expenditure, the proposed DPO may be formed reorganizing the method of procurement and the budget section of AFD and additional requirement may be filled up by the services headquarters. RECOMMENDATIONS The defence procurement process in relation to the defence budget in Bangladesh has been discussed in detail in the paper. With a view to maximizing the defence budget and for its optimum utilization, the following steps are recommended: a. Bangladesh Armed Forces may adopt option 2, i.e. policy, procedure and organizational reforms for the optimum utilization and maximization the defence budget. b. Required financial expenditure and manpower for organizational reforms may be proportionately shared by the three services. This may be done in different phases according to the capacity of the Armed Forces. CONCLUSION Defence procurement and budget is always a delicate issue in a country like Bangladesh. Allocation of defence budget varies from country to country depending on national income, perceived threats, mission and the capability of the armed forces. Defence procurement is critical in nature and the difficulties are not only faced in Bangladesh. Many countries in the world have also faced similar problems but could overcome them by timely action. In Bangladesh, there is a need of policy, procedure and organizational reforms for optimizing and maximizing the defence budget along with its implementation modalities. There should be a written defence policy for us, which should set out the national objective. It should give a clear picture about the mission of the defence forces including its objectives. Our existing procurement policies require to be reviewed. The budget that cannot be expended in a FY may be carried forward to prevent rushed expenditure of the budget at the end of the FY. For coming up with estimates, the life cycle cost needs to be assessed. The 154 PPBE system may be followed in our country for budgeting. Our procurement procedures require to be simplified to avoid red tapism and allow for speedy procurement. We need to make some organizational reforms in our Armed Forces, particularly in the field of procurement. We may form a DPO, which would harmonize procurement activities of the three services and would allow for the optimum utilization of the defence budget by them. Besides, we need to also come up with a R&D organization, which would enhance indigenous capability and lessen our dependence on overseas sources. There are, to be sure, certain difficulties to be faced in implementing the proposed option. Nevertheless, they could be overcome by meticulous planning. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books 1. Cheemah Pervez Iqbal, The Armed Forces of Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2002. 2. Cowen Regina H.E, Defense Procurement in the Federal Republic of Germany, London, Westview Press, 1986. 3. Ghosh Amiya Kumar, India’s Defence Budget and Expenditure Management, New Delhi, Lancer Publishers, 1996. 4. Hobkirk Michael D, The Politics of Defence Budgeting, London, The Macmilan Press Ltd, 1984. 5. Whynes David K, The Economics of Third World Military Expenditure, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979. Journals/Publications 6. Analysis of Defence Procurement Process and Suggestions for Simplifying the Procedure, Army Headquarters Project Study Paper, Prepared by Logistic Area, 12 July 2007. 7. Brigadier General Anup Kumar Chakma, psc, Defence Policy For Bangladesh, Project paper written while attending National Defence Course at National Defence College, Mirpur. 8. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Internal Control Manual, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, July 2005. 9. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Public Expenditure Management Manual, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, July 2005. 155 Defence Procurement and Budget: An Evaluation from the Bangladesh Perspective 10. Major Md Towhidul Islam, Present Procurement System of Bangladesh Army- Its Weaknesses and Remedies in Respect to Advanced Management System, Commandant’s Paper written during Unit Command and Staff Course at School of Infantry and Tactics. Documents 11. Air Headquarters Operations and Training Branch Letter Number Air HQ/5067/Ops& Trg/V-1/E-2A dated 25 February 2007. 12. Defence Procurement Procedure 2005 (Capital Procurement), Ministry of Defence, India, June 2005. 13. Defence Procurement Process and its vulnerabilities, Transparency International Report July 2004. 14. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence, Karachi, Letter Number 557/40/DGDP/Coord dated 25 January 1961. 15. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, President’s Secretariat, Supreme Command Headquarters Letter Number 4005/R/A&L (P) dated 03 April 1990. 16. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Prime Minister’s Office, Armed Forces Division Letter Number 4301/R/Army/A&L (P)/151 dated 04 October 2001. 17. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Prime Minister’s Office, Armed Forces Division Letter Number 4301/R/Army/A&L (P)/897 dated 12 June 2002. 18. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Gazette Number DA- 1dated 30 September 2003. 19. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Prime Minister’s Office, Armed Forces Division Letter Number 4301/R/Army/A&L (P)/115 dated 04 September 2004. 20. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Prime Minister’s Office, Armed Forces Division Letter Number 4301/R/Army/A&L (P)/102 dated 11 September 2005. 21. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Prime Minister’s Office, Armed Forces Division Letter Number 4301/R/Army/A&L (P)/204 dated 23 November 2005. 22. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Prime Minister’s Office, Armed Forces Division Letter Number 4405/Navy/ NP-1/A&L (P)/01 dated 03 July 2006. 23. Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Gazette Number DA-1 dated 06 July 2006. 24. Research Paper 03/78, UK Defence Procurement Policy, House of Commons, dated 20 October 2003. 156 Author Lieutenant Colonel Md. Abu Sayed Siddique, afwc, psc was commissioned in the Ordnance Corps in 1986. He has held various command, staff and instructional appointments including that of Platoon Commander in Bangladesh Military Academy, Instructor Class ‘B’ in Ordnance Centre and School, Deputy Assistant Military Secretary in Military Secretary’s Branch,Grade- 2 Staff Officer in Infantry Division Headquarters, General Staff Officer-1 (Procurement) in Armed Forces Division and Chief Ordnance Officer of Ordnance Depot, Chittagong. He has attended a number of professional courses both at home and abroad. He is a graduate of Defence Services Command and Staff College, Mirpur and has obtained his Master in Defence Studies from National University, Bangladesh. He has participated in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) as Team Second in Command in Movement Control Organization, and in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) as an Operations Officer at Force Headquarters, where he was awarded the Force Commander’s Commendation in recognition of his exemplary contribution and performance. Presently, he is serving as the Chief Instructor of the Ordnance Centre and School. 157 INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL COMMUNICATION RESOURCES TO ENHANCE THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF BANGLADESH ARMED FORCES Lieutenant Colonel Saleem Ahmed Khan, afwc, psc INTRODUCTION Development in the field of communications, including Information and Communication Technology (ICT), is considered to be one of the most important technological developments achieved since the World War II. Bangladesh (BD) has not fallen behind in this respect. Telecommunication sector of BD has kept pace with other countries of the world. Much progress has been made in telecommunications field and the credit of development can be given to individual organisations. There has been no significantly developed integrated approach as regard to utilisation and resource sharing in this field. Proper exploration and integration of communication resources will enhance BD Armed Forces ability in providing and maintaining communications both during peace and war. Such integration can serve the purpose of providing operational communications as well as provide alternative means of communications. Moreover, providing communication to unconventional forces can be facilitated through such integration. The best possible method of integration involves the use of communication resources or system during peacetime and to automatically switch to another mode during wartime. The integration of communication resources is a vast subject. It covers not only integration of such resources through optimum use of equipments and channels, but also integration of aspects like Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Warfare (EW), frequency management, communication equipment manufacture, etc. This paper will examine the integration of all such aspects. It will focus on national communication resources of organisations that have the set up needed to support communication needs of the Armed Forces. In addition, the research will critically analyse the prospects and challenges of integrating such resources leading to multiple options of operational and tactical communications for the Armed Forces. The financial aspects will only be highlighted to give a preliminary idea of the likely cost involvement for integration. AIM To evaluate available national communication resources for integration with military communication with a view to suggesting integration options to enhance the operational capability of the Armed Forces. Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces EVALUATION OF THE COMMUNICATION RESOURCES OF THE ARMED FORCES Evaluation of the Communication of Bangladesh Army Communication from Army Headquarters (AHQ) down to unit(s) in the formations is based on the scale of communication set in 1994.1 Such scale does not cover the communications aspects of inter services, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), including communication need basing on the peculiarities of different formations area of responsibility (AOR). The concept of blending conventional warfare with unconventional warfare (UCW) calls for a flexible communication plan (COMPLAN) to support operational plans. At present, the army depends on a single communication backbone provided by the Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone Board (BTTB). A communication network using the Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) microwave system is near completion. Communication with forces deployed in the AOR is not possible with existing resources to support the operational plan of the formations. Besides, appropriate communications through Air Defence Operation Centre (ADOC), Air Support Operation Centre (ASOC), the navy and under joint control have not yet been developed and, as such not yet tested. Development in the field of ICT is another grey area, which needs adequate expert staffing and implementation at all levels. On the other hand, existing workshop facilities including Research and Development (R&D) facilities have not been utilised to fulfil present day needs. Procurement of spares is a matter of concern due to multiple origins of the equipment as well as non-standardisation affects and timely repair of communications equipment. EW and SIGINT Aspects. EW development is another grey area. The absence of EW capability can affect High Frequency (HF) radio communication at all levels. As far as SIGINT aspects are concerned, the Army has only authorisation of manpower in the formation signal units to monitor own communication nets. 1. Lieutenant Colonel Saleem Ahmad Khan, Optimising the Communication Resources of an Infantry Divi- sion, Bangladesh Army Journal, 40th issue, December 2006, Dhaka, p. 47 160 Future Plan and Comments. Instead of quantifying the scale of communications, only the means of communication (circuit/media/link) needs to be mentioned to assist in preparing a flexible COMPLAN. A ten year ‘Perspective Plan’2 has been prepared by AHQ, Signals Directorate, which covers a phase-wise implementation with respect to development of communication and procurement of modern communication equipment including commercial version wireless equipment. The future plan focuses on secured fibre optics based on utilizing BTTB as the main backbone by 2008 - 2009.3 Evaluation of the Communication of BD Navy (BN) As per Draft Joint Warfare Doctrine and likely concept of operations of Bangladesh Navy (BN), communication systems need to be developed to support the joint and maritime operations. BN may have to take over control of all coastal radio stations and promulgate radio policy for adoption by ships during war as part of Naval Control of Shipping (NCS).4 Telecommunication is generally used in shore establishments. BN has a contract with Grameen Phones (GP) to provide fibre optics link between the naval bases. Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS),5 needs to be incorporated in few naval ships6 to provide support for maritime search and rescue (SAR) operations. Besides, communication with Army, ADOC, ASOC and under joint environment is required to enhance BN’s operational capability. EW and SIGINT Capability. BN needs tactical EW capability due to its dependency on radio communication.7 It uses an EW simulator in its School of Maritime Warfare and Tactics (SMWT). Through the simulator, basic to advanced level training is imparted on EW. BN needs to acquire SIGINT capability to monitor communication nets of the adversary and must acquire EW systems in all its ships and communication centres. 2. AHQ, Signals Directorate, Perspective Plan for Corps of Signals–2003. 3. Brigadier General Rafiqul Islam, ndc, psc, Director Signals, Signals Directorate, AHQ, a personal interview by the author on 23 April 2007. 4. Vice Admiral Sarwar Jahan Nizam, ndu, psc, the Chief of Naval Staff, during a lecture before AFWC 2007 on Dealing with Maritime Challenges of a New Era on 09 August 2007. 5. “GMDSS is specifically designed to automate ship’s radio distress alerting function and as a consequence does not need to focus on human watch keeping on distress channels. Few BN communication centres and ships have GMDSS communication as per requirements of the International Maritime Organisation. GMDSS comprises Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB), INMARSAT and high power HF wireless set, Search and Rescue Radar Transponders, Digital Selective Calling (DSC) on Medium Fre- quency (MF), HF and VHF maritime radios.” at http://gmdss.com.au/ requirements.htm. 6. Captain AKM Jashimuddin Sarker, Chief Nautical Surveyor, Department of Shipping, Goverment of Ban- gladesh, personal interview by the author on 04 June 2007. 7. Commander Nazrul Islam, psc, BN, Acting Director Communication, Naval HQ, Banani, Dhaka, a personal interview by the author on 22 March 2007. 161 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces Workshop Facilities. The workshop of BN at Chittagong undertakes repair of Printed Circuit Boards (PCB). Besides, communication equipment and accessories from merchant ships awaiting breaking are taken to BN workshop (known as Bhatiary Store)8 for repair and subsequent utilisation. These equipments may be used by the UCW Forces of the services, if necessary. Future Plan and Comments. The major problems of communication equipment in BN are non-standardization resulting from the procurement of various types of equipments of different origin. BN will connect all shore installations through the BAF microwave system by 2008. Besides, Wide Area Network (WAN) will be extended to all bases by 2008 through GP fibre optics.9 Evaluation of the Communication of BAF BAF communications depend on telecommunications through microwave system as far as communication of ADOC is concerned. Due to absence of a dedicated joint control or coordination, the microwave project is facing operational and maintenance difficulties.10 BAF has recently laid fibre optics from Air HQ to BAF Base Kurmitola as a part of introducing secure communication means. EW Capability.11 BAF has limited EW capability. The identification of friends and foe (IFF) is another grey area. IFF integration of BAF assets and BN ships are essential to support the Campaign Plan. EW integration is required through BAF Radar Squadron, Air Defence Artillery (ADA) regiments of army and BN ships to secure the air defence network of the country. Workshop and R&D Facility. BAF has a well established workshop and R&D facilities. It has developed a number of cost effective projects which are already in use.12 8. Brief on BN Dockyard during a visit on 23 July 2007. 9. Lieutenant Commander Abedin, Information Technology Directorate, Naval HQ, personal interview by the author on 09 August 2007. 10. Brigadier General Rafiqul Islam, No. 4 on 03 August 2007. 11. Group Captain Fuad Bin Ali, Director Communication and Electronics, Air HQ, during a seminar on ‘EW Aspects of the Armed Forces’ for AFWC-2007 on 17 May 2007. 12. Brief on No 205 Maintenance Unit of BAF during a visit on 05 June 2007. 162 NECESSITY FOR INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL COMMUNICATION RESOURCES Integration Necessity During Peace and War The present communications set up of the Armed Forces cannot meet the future requirements for joint operations. Besides, since the Armed Forces often is deployed for operations other than war, for better command, control and communication (C3), an integrated communication system is essential. In addition, Joint Forces (JF) and Joint Task Force (JTF) may also be formed to conduct campaigns necessitating integrated and additional communication resources. Therefore, providing communications to the elements of Joint Command Centre (JCC), ADOC, ASOC, etc. will need an efficient integrated approach with multiple communication means. During the Gulf War 1991, strategic, operational and tactical communications were duplicated by high quality civilian landlines.13 In the Battle of Grozny (1994), civilian communications system (mobile communication network) was used along with military communications both by the Russian Army and the Chechen rebels.14 Thus study of military history suggests integration of civil communications resources act as an aid and multiple communications means for conducting military operations. Existing Cost Factor on Communication by the Armed Forces The Bangladesh Armed Forces constitute a substantial amount of revenue to BTTB and GP each year. Approximately Taka 7, 00, 00,000 (seven crore) is paid each year for utilizing a dedicated channel.15 Resource sharing or integration with national communications assets may not require paying such a huge amount. On the other hand, cost of military communication equipment is another grey area, where the cost of military versions, maritime versions, etc may be a factor which can restrict appropriate integration during the procurement process. The availability of military version communications equipment is also a factor. Some percentage of commercial version communication equipment, which is much cheaper compared to military version equipment, may save communication equipment costs for the Armed Forces. However, specific 13. M A Rice and A J Sammes, Command and Control : Support System in the Gulf War, Vol.12, BRASSEY’s, London, New York, p. 34 14. Timothy L. Thomas, The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat at http://www.carlisle. army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99summer/thomas.htm. 15. Major Abu Zafor Salahuddin, General Staff Officer-2, Signals Directorate, AHQ, personal interview by the author on 23 April 2007. 163 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces requirement of communications equipment under maritime environment and for aircraft operations may necessitate purely military version equipments. It may be mentioned here that the Australian Defence Forces and a few other defence forces of Asia, Europe and Africa use Barrett communication equipments, which are commercial communication equipments.16 Policy Guidelines National Telecommunications Policy and National Telecommunication Act.17 The BD Government formulated the National Telecommunications Policy in 1998 and enacted the National Telecommunications Act 2001. It made the BD Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) the sole authority with respect to policy implementation of Telecommunications Act. It may be mentioned here that, under the amendment to Act, as per Gazette notification dated 16 February 2006,18 it can use communication resources of any organisations, when necessary. ICT Policy.19 The BD Government has also formulated an ICT policy to build an ICT-driven nation comprising of a knowledge-based society, e-governance, and on-line ICT-enabled services. According to the policy, infrastructure and services should be provided by a multiplicity of enterprise, such as BTTB, BD Railways (BR), Power Development Board (PDB), Rural Electrifications Board (REB), etc. In addition, the Armed Forces could use ICT to the fullest extent to increase its effectiveness. Support to ICT (SICT) Task Force.20 Considering the importance of ICT, the Government of BD formed a national ICT Task Force with the Prime Minister as its Chairperson in 2002. As part of one of its projects, backbone connectivity (through fibre optics) of the Armed Forces Division (AFD) computer network with the Prime Minister’s Office and three services HQ will be completed by 2007 – 2008. Policy Guidelines within the Armed Forces. AFD formed a Tri-service committee for implementation of a Joint Service Integrated Communication Network in 2003.21 As a part of this network, BAF microwave is being shared by the services as joint communications backbone. Regarding integration of 16. “Excerpts for the users list of Barrett communication equipment” at www.barrettcommunications.com.au. 17. Justice Mohammad Abdus Salam, Commissioner, BTRC, An Introduction of the BTRC, 2005. 18. BD Government Gazette Notification dated 16 February 2006. 19. Bangladesh Government ICT Policy. 20. http://sictgov.org. 21. AFD letter number AFD/2826/OPO/C dated 19 April 2003. 164 national communication resources, numerous steps have been undertaken by the Army including practice of integration during collective exercises, maintenance and updating database of the national communication resources, etc. As regards the BN and BAF, they have no policy guidelines on such integration. Comments on the Policy Guidelines. As far as government policy guideline is concerned, integration of national communications resources is a priority for the Armed Forces. But Government policy guidelines do not cover the integration aspects of national communication resources with military communication. Representation by defence personnel in the policy making body of the government can assist in taking care of defence, security aspect of planning and development of communications means and resources. Such defence representation is already there for the development of road network of the country. Representative from the Armed Forces can be utilized as commissioners in BTRC and members in SICT Task Force to coordinate communications matters at the strategic level. APPRAISAL OF THE COMMUNICATION RESOURCES OF GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS Bangladesh Rifles (BDR)22 BDR maintains communication from HQ down to the Border Out Post (BOP) level using different equipments. At present, it has monitoring sets at Sector HQ level with limited monitoring capability. Compatibility of communications is an issue as BDR is supposed to fit in the respective formation operational plans when it comes under OPCOMD of Army. ADOC may also depend on BDR to communicate with Mobile Observer Units (MOU) to cover gap in low level radar coverage. The Armed Forces may explore the possibility of extracting SIGINT through BDR monitoring nets. Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)23 RAB has fast, efficient and secure modern communication systems, including microwave and Management Information System (MIS) network, and Internet Phone (IP) since subscribers have internet connectivity. This is the cheapest type of communication at the user end (an IP costs approximately US $ 100). Integration with RAB requires incorporation of terminal equipment at the subscriber level and the use of minimum accessories by the Armed Forces. 22. Colonel Md Saiful Islam, psc, Director Communication, HQ BDR, personal interview by the author on 08 March 2007. 23. Commander Moin, psc, BN, Director and Major Mohammad Jobaer, Deputy Director, Communication and Management Information System (MIS), RAB HQ, personal interview by the author on 22 April 2007. 165 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces BTTB24 BTTB has the biggest communications network in the country. BTTB cell phone (Teletalk)25 provides mobile communication all over the country. BTTB’s SEA-ME-WE-4 project26 has connected BD with the rest of the world through a secure fibre optics network. Integration with this network will allow the BD Armed Forces to get connected with the information super-highway through submarine cable. Maritime Communication.27 BTTB has approved a project on GMDSS in collaboration with the Ministry of Shipping. Under this project two base stations at Silimpur (Chittagong) and Mongla, one monitoring station in Dhaka and microwave links will be installed along the costal belt to communicate with ships. It may be mentioned here that the project has not been planned to integrate with the BN and BD Coast Guard (CG) communication systems. Such integration, however, would have assisted in providing maritime safety. Workshop and Factory Based Facilities. As regards the repair of communication system or equipment, BTTB depends on vendors as per agreement and not on the Telephone Shilpa Sangstha (TSS) any more. However, it retains some capability to manufacture telephones and accessories. Comments. Armed Forces need to depend on BTTB for peace and wartime communication through the latter’s dedicated fibre optics backbone. BN should be integrated with maritime communications project. Communication equipment manufacture for the Armed Forces by TSS may be explored but this necessitates a separate study. Teletalk’s service can be utilised to maintain smooth communications during any crisis. Above all, appropriate representation from the defence establishment at the policy-making level of BTTB is required to deal with planning and development of communication means and resources. It may be mentioned here that such representation existed in the 1980s.28 24. Lieutenant Colonel Ziaur Rashid Safder, General Manager (Security and Surveillance), BTTB, personal interview by the author on 08 March 2007. 25. http://www.teletalk.com.bd. 26. “Excerpts from Submarine Cable Layout” at www.SEA-ME-WE4.com. 27. “A presentation paper by BTTB in May 2006” at www.bttb.gov.bd. 28. Major General Manzurul Alam, ndc, psc (Retd), Chairman BTRC, personal interview by the author on 5 September 2007. 166 BR29 BR has developed fibre optics based digital telecommunication network for its own use along railway lines connecting nearly 250 railway stations and has also leased it to GP. Armed Forces may integrate the resources of BR in likely deployment areas to meet future operational needs without disturbing railway communications and the GP network. Power Generation Organisations Power Grid Company BD (PGCB), a sister organisation of PDB, is now establishing its own fibre optics network through Optical Fibre Ground Wire (OFGW) throughout the country. REB has its own VHF and HF radio communications network with forty-three HF stations and a few hundred VHF/ UHF terminals. As an additional circuit for operational emergencies, Armed Forces could use dedicated OFGW. Radio communications of REB can be used in case of emergency through integration with existing military radios. Gas Transmission and Distribution Organisations Titas Gas Transmission and Distribution Company Limited (TGTDCL) uses the UHF link to connect gas fields.30 In addition, they have a vast VHF/UHF radio network. Gas Transmission Company Limited (GTCL)31 uses microwave and VHF communication to connect gas fields within operational areas. Its microwave channels can be utilised by the Armed Forces, if necessary. Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BRCS)32 BRCS has a wide wireless network in coastal areas with HF and VHF stations. Wireless sets use solar panel chargers with deep cycle batteries to charge batteries in the coastal areas in the absence of regular supply of power. With one full charge, equipments can sustain themselves for five to six days without sun light. Communication network is designed for use during the disaster management under the Cyclone Preparedness Programme (CPP). Armed Forces, especially BN can use the communication resources of BRCS during any natural disaster and also during war while operating in the coastal areas.33 29. HQ Army Signal Brigade, Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance Military Communication : Prospects and Challenges, Formation Project Study Paper 2005. 30. Aminesh Chakma, Telecom Officer, TGTDCL, personal interview by the author on 31 May 2007. 31. “Excerpts from GTCL information on Communication Network”, at http://www.gtcl.org.bd. 32. Nazrul Islam, Assistant Director, CPP, BRCS, personal interview by the author on 04 June 2007. 33. BRCS, ‘CPP At a Glance’ dated February 2002. 167 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces APPRAISAL OF PRIVATE OWNED COMMUNICATION RESOURCES Mobile Phone Operators The mobile network of GP34 covers almost 98 percent of BD, excluding hill districts. To use GP communication facilities, adequate time (approximately 3 to 4 months)35 should be given to the organisation, as it does not have any spare channels for use by the Armed Forces. Network coverage of Aktel36, Citycell37, Banglalink38 and Warid Telecom39 is less than GP, but they depend on either fibre optics / microwave based backbone. Other Telecommunication Operators People’s Telecom and Information Services Limited (Peoplestel)40 is the first private nationwide Public Service Telephone Network (PSTN) operator. It connects 199 upazillas. National Telecom Limited (NTC)41 is another nationwide joint venture PSTN operator, which has its own fibre optics and microwave links. However, it does not operate in the Dhaka region. Other companies, operating in the field include Rangs Tel, One Tel, Jubok Phone, Dhaka Phone, etc. These companies provide wireless based telephone connections in different region of the country by using the backbone of other organisations. Having own mobile network will definitely bring dramatic changes in Armed Forces operational efficiency. It could be mentioned here that after the bombing that took place in London on 07 July 2005, the mobile system collapsed due to simultaneous use by users.42 It should be mentioned that foreign investors in the telecommunication sector needs to be chosen from trusted diplomatic allies only, so that they do not turn their faces away when the country is facing external threat. 34. “Excerpts from GP information on communication”, at http://www.grameenphone.com. 35. Md Shafiqul Islam, Chief Technical Officer, Technical Division and Kazi Md Saiful Alam, Deputy General Manager Regulatory & Interconnection, GP Limited, personal interview by the author on 29 March 2007. 36. http://www.aktel.com. 37. http://www.citycell.com. 38. http://www.banglalinkgsm.com. 39. http://www.waridtel.com.bd. 40. http:// www.ptelco.net/ptis/index.php. 41. http:// www.nationalphone.net. 42. Major Wakelin, Operations Officer, United Kingdom Strategic Command Team, during discussion on Cri- sis and Consequence Management in National Defence College on 14 August 2007. 168 EVALUATION OF SIGINT AND FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT ASPECTS OF INTEGRATION SIGINT Aspects Intelligence organisations have limited the monitoring capability of communication nets, but they do not share SIGINT. Operations-related data can be recorded through monitoring and shared with formations / bases communication units or organisations of Armed Forces for subsequent analysis. BAF has developed a ‘Voice Recorder’ of the communication net.43 Such device can be used for SIGINT by the concerned establishment of the Armed Forces. BAF Radar Stations have also RT scanners for monitoring the communication net. The recently established Joint Monitoring Cell may continue functioning under intelligence organisations and analyse information received through SIGINT of different organisations.44 Besides, intelligence data bank may also be developed by the cell for subsequent use by the Armed Forces as operational intelligence. Frequency Management Aspects Since ‘Radio frequency spectrum’ is a finite resource, it requires effective utilisation of the spectrum. BTRC has National Frequency Allocation Plan with the aim that all government, non-government and civil organisations only use the authorised frequency. It is necessary to allocate frequency within the three services to ensure optimum use of the frequency spectrum. Efficient allocation and management of frequency will become a key coordination issue while planning for integration of communication resources.45 43. During a visit to No 205 Maintenance Unit of BAF Base at Kurmitola, a demonstration was organized showing recording of voice in a wireless net through the developed ‘Voice Recorder’ on 05 June 2007. 44. Major General Manzurul Alam, No. 39 45. “National Frequency Allocation Plan Version 3.1” at http://www.btrc.gov.bd/final-nfap-v3-1.pdf dated July 2005. 169 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces Integration OPTIONS of National Communication Resources Integration Options in General By using commercial communications equipment, Armed Forces personnel are likely to avoid using conventional communications means. This may make them indifferent to improving conventional means.46 Such a situation will be disastrous. However, using the communication channel as the backbone will not cause such problem. Conversely, there may be restrictions against using private communication resources for military use in some cases. The use of private resources by the Armed Forces may lead to legal issues and such resources may become legitimate military targets by opposing forces.47 Civil resources may be used as an alternative means of communication. There is thus a need to select potential access points48 around the country to get connected with communication systems earmarked for use by the Armed Forces. Preparation of the access points should be the responsibility of resource owners. It may be mentioned here that the Peoples’ Liberation Army of China uses access point throughout the country for smooth military communication.49 Interfacing devices50 may also be used for connecting at access points to ensure compatibility. Integration Options at the Individual Services Level Necessary coordination may be made to interface terminal equipments in all BAF microwave stations for use by the army to communicate in deployment areas whenever necessary. The fibre optics link between Air HQ to BAF Base Kurmitola may be extended to Civil Aviation at the Zia International Airport and thereafter from other bases to respective airports to enhance the operational capability of BAF. BN may take support from the Army for establishing a communication link up to Mongla and Kaptai to connect its installations. There BN can use the wireless equipment of BRCS during disaster management and man the coastal radio stations during a war. 46. Brigadier General Md Abdul Hannan, psc, Commander Army Signal Brigade, personal interview by the author on 27 March 2007. 47. Ibid. 48. “Access Point (also a node) is a network junction or connection point. Every terminal equipment, computer, hub and switch is a node”. 49. Major Syed Muzakkir Ahmed, General Staff Officer-2, Signals Directorate, AHQ, personal interview by the author on 02 September 2007. 50. “Interfacing Device is used to bridge two different types of communication equipment together to perform a common task. For example, Modem”. 170 EW. EW capability of BN can be shared by BAF at the tactical level and EW simulator at SMWT can be shared to train Army and BAF personnel. However, for this purpose, a separate feasibility study is necessary. Integration Options under the Joint Environment Joint Communications Aspects. Joint integrated communications system has already been approved and the implementation process required to do so is now underway.51 In order to extract further advantage from the microwave network of BAF, the Army and BN should also plan to establish WAN through the network. A separate organisation under AFD is required to administer joint communication aspects.52 Like the Engineer-in-Chief (E-in-C) and the Directorate General Medical Services (DGMS), a Signal Officer in Chief (SO-in-C) may be introduced at the joint services level to deal with tri-services communication.53 This is the practice in the Indian and Pakistan Army. A proposed structure including responsibilities of SO-in-C’s Branch under AFD is provided at Annex A. Establishment of a Joint Services Communications Unit is also necessary to handle joint communications of the Armed Forces. It may be mentioned here that a Signal Company in AFD (strength 232) has been kept under suspended animation as per revised TO&E of AFD, 1999.54 Same Signal Company can be restructured as, ‘Joint Services Communication Unit’ (modified organisation including their terms of reference is at Annex B) and is to be placed under SO- in-C’s Branch. Taka 52,64,00,000 (fifty two crore sixty four lacs) approximately will be required to raise the SO-in-C’s Branch along with the unit (details are at Annex C). In addition, all joint communication nets55 (command, logistics, movement control, special net, ADOC and ASOC nets) must have multiple secured options through appropriate integration.56 It may be mentioned here that the Capital Air Defence Command Centre of Beijing, China deploys multiple communications means (fibre optics, wireless and satellite) throughout China for effective air defence communications network.57 A suggested diagram of a joint communication net is depicted at Annex D. 51. Group Captain Fuad Bin Ali, No. 65 52. Wing Commander M A Samad Azad, Officer Commanding 205 Maintenance Unit BAF, personal interview by the author on 22 March 2007. 53. Major General Manzurul Alam, No. 39 54. Lieutenant Colonel Md Nazrul Islam, General Staff Officer 1 (Communication, Computer and Intelligence), AFD, personal interview by the author on 02 April 2007 and 02 September 2007. 55. Draft Joint Warfare Doctrine, May-2006, AFD, Pp. 3-10 56. Army Headquarters, General Staff Branch, Military Training Directorate, Staff Duties in the Field – 2006. 57. Brief on Capital Air Defence Command Centre, Beijing, China during visit by AFWC 2007, 12 September 2007. 171 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces Integration through BTTB and BR Resources. BTTB fibre optics can become the main backbone for the Armed Forces. BN can also be integrated with BTTB’s maritime communications system. Approximately Taka 17, 20, 00,000 (seventeen crore twenty lacs) will be required to integrate with the fibre optics communications backbone of BTTB. Besides, around Taka 1, 27, 50,000 (one crore twenty seven lacs fifty thousand) will be required to pay yearly rental charges to use such a backbone. Alternative Means of Communication. The microwave system of RAB, OFGW of PGCB and the microwave network of gas transmission and distribution companies could be an alternative means of communication. A proposed integrated communication backbone for the Armed Forces is given at Annex E. Having alternative means of communication within the financial constraint as per priority will certainly give flexibility to prepare COMPLAN. Mobile Communication. Teletalk’s mobile communications system (through some special arrangement) can be used by the Armed Forces for mobile communication. The Armed Forces may coordinate with the operator to extend network coverage near the likely deployment areas for ensuring uninterrupted network coverage. SIGINT Aspects Integration. Monitoring capability/resources of intelligence organisations, BAF and BDR needs to be integrated/utilised for intelligence gathering and providing update of opposing forces by the services. Through the integration of such nets, missing links of information could be bridged to enhance the combat readiness of the services (proposed SIGINT network is shown at Annex F). Communication Equipment Manufacture and Workshop Facilities Aspects of Integration. The TSS of BTTB may be reorganised for manufacturing communications equipment for the country as well as for the Armed Forces. Besides, there is a scope to integrate workshop facilities of the three services to go for limited production and repair support. BAF may take the lead in this regard, as it is better equipped than the workshops of the other two services. Such integration will also reduce pressure on the defence budget and will help make defence communications more self-reliant. ICT Aspects Integration. The Armed Forces need to integrate voice communication first as data communication needs stable network. Maintaining data storage at different levels is necessary, so that the data can be accessed and shared by users through browsing web (like YAHOO, MSN, etc).58 Websites of Army, Navy and Air Force can also be integrated under AFD as the ‘Official Website of Bangladesh Armed Forces’. 58. Lieutenant Colonel Mustafizur Rahman, te, General Staff Officer-1, Information Technology Directorate AHQ, personal interview by the author on 29 March 2007. 172 Likely Difficulties and Impediments of Integration Integration may pose some difficulties in implementation. Following are likely impediments which may be encountered during the integration process: a. Absence of a specific policy guideline issued by the government and the Armed Forces on use of national communications resources in terms of training, utilisation, coordination, budgeting aspects, etc. It can be pointed out here that BD does not have a national communications policy integrated with the military communications system. b. Some of the existing wireless equipments used by the Armed Forces and not fully compatible. This problem is even more evident while integrating the radio sets with other organisations in terms of frequency range, channel spacing, etc. c. Due to non-availability of appropriate access points and multiplatform communications means and resources of different organisations, the Armed Forces may not be able to access them. Even if they are available, it will be difficult to utilise them due to non- availability of appropriate interfacing devices. RECOMMENDATIONS After focusing on the national communication resources and analysing viable options for integration, we can make the following recommendations: a. A policy needs to be formulated on integration of national communication resources at the national level. Subsequently, a similar policy for the Armed Forces may be formulated. b. To ensure defence and security requirement and implementation of issues relating to national communication resources, a commissioner (Brigadier General / equivalent) of BTRC, an appropriate member of SICT Task Force (Brigadier General / equivalent) and a member of BTTB (Colonel / equivalent) could be chosen from the Armed Forces. c. To establish appropriate links with national level and Armed Forces, SO- in-C’s Branch may be raised under AFD to facilitate better integration, coordination, management and development of communication of the Armed Forces in line with national policy. Side by side, a Joint Services Communication Unit may also be raised as part of Forces Goal – 2020 to support SO-in-C’s Branch and take responsibility of joint communications. A separate budget may also be allocated for joint communications and integration aspects. 173 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces d. The Armed Forces should use dedicated BTTB fibre optics as the main communications backbone. PGCB fibre optics can then be alternate to the main backbone. Communication is backbone of RAB, BR and GTCL will remain as reserve. BAF microwave system may, therefore, be the alternate microwave backbone to the main BTTB fibre optics backbone. Teletalk’s mobile communication can be used by the Armed Forces. e. National Communication Resources can be utilized during peacetime by the services to enhance a confidence building, cooperation, identification of shortcoming and limitations, etc. CONCLUSION The integration of communication is a vast subject. It encompasses integration through communications equipment and channels/media, SIGINT, EW, frequency management, communications equipment manufacture and other related subject matters. The above analyses of communication resources and their implications for the Armed Forces clearly indicate the need for massive integration with national communications resources to fulfil present and future communication need. Such integration is necessary to support peacetime and war-time needs. Future wars will be of short duration and based on technological superiority. The integration of communications is a must; number of the alternative means of communication has to be readied for the Armed Forces. The nature of opposing forces supporting the UCW and the requirement of a total People’s War as well as cost factor involved in communications mustering of adequate resources need to be given due consideration. Although Government policy guidelines specify integration of national communications resources, a clear cut guideline regarding military communication integration is still needed. Analyses of the huge communication resources of the government and private organisations reveal the need for supporting the Armed Forces as it attempts to enhance its operational capability. Communication resources of organisations such as SIGINT, EW, communication equipment manufacturing and ICT are to be integrated as far as possible. Integration options with national communication resources available has advantages and disadvantages, but may be implemented to have main as well as alternate secure communications backbone for the BD Armed Forces. Joint communication aspects can also be augmented and supported through available options of integration. Though budget requirement seems high, implementation 174 of these options will definitely enhance the operational capability of the Armed Forces and will prove to be cost effective in the long run. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books/Manuals 1. M A Rice and A J Sammes, Command and Control : Support System in the Gulf War, Vol. 12, BRASSEY’s, London. 2. AHQ General Staff Branch, Military Training Directorate, Operations of War, Volume One, April 2006. 3. National Telecommunications Policy of Bangladesh, 1998. 4. Bangladesh Government ICT Policy. 5. BD Government Gazette Notification dated 16 February 2006 (Amendment to BD Telecommunication Act 2001). 6. Data Book (Transmission Region) and Data Details–2006 of BTTB as on 30 June 2006. 7. AHQ General Staff Branch, Military Training Directorate, Army Staff Duties in the Field – 2006, Dhaka. 8. Armed Forces Division, Draft Joint Warfare Doctrine - 2006, Dhaka. 9. Institute of Command Automation of Peoples’ Liberation Army University of Science and Technology, Basic of Communication command. Periodicals / Journals 10. Lieutenant Colonel Saleem Ahmad Khan, psc, te, “Optimising the Communication Resources of an Infantry Division”, Bangladesh Army Journal, 40th issue, December 2006, Dhaka. 11. A K M Habibur Rahman, “Data and Internet Service: BTTB Scenario”, published in TELETECH, BCS (Telecom) Samity Journal, 17 May 2004. 12. Major Md Shafiul Haque Chowdhury, psc, “Integration of Civil Communication Resources Towards an Enhanced Military Communication: Prospects and Challenges”, Bangladesh Army Journal, December 2004. 13. Major Md Shafiul Haque Chowdhury, psc, “Modern Days’ Electronic Warfare – Its Need in Bangladesh Perspective”, Bangladesh Army Journal, 35th Issue. 175 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces Interview 14. Brigadier General Md Rafiqul Islam, ndc, psc, Director Signals, Signals Directorate, AHQ, 23 April and 03 August 2007. 15. Commander Nazrul Islam, psc, Acting Director Communication, Naval HQ, Banani, Dhaka, 22 March 2007. 16. Lieutenant Commander Abedin, BN, Information Technology Directorate, Naval HQ, 09 August 2007. 17.. Major Abu Zafor Salahuddin, psc, General Staff Officer-2, Signals Directorate, AHQ, 23 April 2007. 18. Colonel Md Saiful Islam, psc, Director Communication, HQ BDR, 08 March 2007. 19. Commander Moin, psc, BN, Director and Major Mohammad Jobaer, te, Deputy Director, Communication and Management Information System (MIS), RAB HQ, 22 April 2007. 20. Lieutenant Colonel Ziaur Rashid Safder, General Manager (Security and Surveillance), BTTB, 08 March 2007. 176 $ $11(; -RLQW6HUYLFH 'HWDLOVDW$QQH[/ &RPPXQLFDWLRQ8QLW 5 ':LQJ &RO(TXLYDOHQW î 1RWH 6WUHQJWKZLOOEHIURP$UP\ %1%$) 62LQ& 0DMRU*HQHUDO(TXLYDOHQW 362 /W*HQ ' $) 62LQ&¶6%UDQFK &RPPXQLFDWLRQDQG0,6'LUHFWRUDWH 352326('62,1&¶6%5$1&+,1$)' &RRUGLQDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQUHVRXUFHV 5HJXODWLQJERG\RQWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQRIWKH$UPHG)RUFHV 6SHFWUXPPDQDJHPHQW ,&7FRRUGLQDWLRQDQGPDQDJHPHQW (:DVSHFWVRIWKHWKUHHVHUYLFHV 5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV &RRUGLQDWLRQRI-RLQW6HUYLFHVFRPPXQLFDWLRQ %ULJ*HQ(TXLYDOHQW :LQJ :LQJ :LQJ (: 1DWLRQDO 5HVRXUFH 6SHFWUXP 6,*,17 0,6:LQJ 0DQDJHPHQW -RLQW6HUYLFHV &RPPXQLFDWLRQ &RPPXQLFDWLRQ /W&RO(TXLYDOHQW /W&RO(TXLYDOHQW /W&RO(TXLYDOHQW &RRUGLQDWLRQ:LQJ /W&RO(TXLYDOHQW /W&RO(TXLYDOHQW 177 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces % $11(; 3ODWRRQ :RUNVKRS 1,&$7,2181,7 8 6RXUFH 3UHSDUHGE\WKH$XWKRU 0,6 &RPSDQ\ 1RWH 6WUHQJWKZLOOEHIURP$UP\ %1%$) 6,*,17 &RPSDQ\ (: /W&RO(TXLYDOHQWî +4 6SHFWUXP &RPSDQ\ 0RQLWRULQJ UHHVHUYLFHV+4+4-)+4-7) K HOHPHQWV PHG)RUFHV U 7HOHFRP &RPSDQ\ QJDQGDQDO\VLVRI6,*,17 :LUHOHVV 352326('6758&785($1'5(63216,%,/,7,(62)-2,176(59,&(6&200 &RPSDQ\ $GPLQ &RPSDQ\ 5HVSRQVLELOLWLHV 2SHUDWLRQVDQGPDLQWHQDQFHRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQRI-&&DQGLWV $OORFDWLRQRIIUHTXHQF\DQGVSHFWUXPPDQDJHPHQW ,&7PDQDJHPHQWDQGRSHUDWLRQVRI2IILFLDO:HEVLWHRIWKH$ (:VXSSRUWPRQLWRUL $GPLQLVWUDWLYHVXSSRUWWR62LQ&¶V%UDQFK 2SHUDWLRQVDQGPDLQWHQDQFHRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQEHWZHHQ-&&W 178 477 Total 3554 1223 5264 Grand Grand ANNEX C 437 Total 3450 1200 5087 (Taka in Lacs) (Taka - 78 Ve 100 hicle 1400 1578 7 ment 1500 1000 2507 Equip- - Non- recurrence Expenditure recurrence Non- tion 352 550 100 1002 moda Accom- - tal 40 23 To 104 167 2 1 .5 3.5 Misc 4 3 2 9 Ord- nance 3 1 1.5 5.5 Ammo 7 2 15 24 Food Recurrence Expenditure / Year / Expenditure Recurrence 2 2 10 14 POL - 25 70 15 110 ances Pay & Pay Allow - - - - Components SO-in-C’s SO-in-C’s (Ex Branch Joint cluding Services Communica Unit) tion Servic Joint Commu es Unit nication (excluding and EW SIGINT Company) and EW SIGINT Company Total 1. 2. 3. Serial TENTATIVE BUDGET REQUIREMENT OF RAISING JOINT SERVICES COMMUNICATION COMPONENTS COMMUNICATION SERVICES JOINT RAISING OF REQUIREMENT BUDGET TENTATIVE 179 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces ' $11(; $62& $'2& LQW6HUYLFHV&RPPXQLFDWLRQ8QLW R - &RPPXQLFDWLRQVZLOOEHSURYLGHGE\SURSRVHG $,5+4 3UHSDUHGE\WKH$XWKRU $ 1RWH 02' 1&6 6RXUFH & 4 -/& 1+ 0+4 -2&& -&& $)' & 4 -,& $+ 352326('-2,17&20081,&$7,211(7:25. 4 -)+4-7)+ V :KHQHVWDEOLVKHG & %77%)LEHURSWLFV $'2&$62 /HJHQG -&&±-RLQW&RPPDQG&HQWUH -7)+4-RLQW7DVN)RUFH+HDGTXDUWHUV 7RDOO6HUYLFHV+4 DQG%$)0: :LUHOHVV1HW -2&&±-RLQW2SHUDWLRQV&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH -,&&±-RLQW,QWHOOLJHQFH&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH -/&&±-RLQW/RJLVWLFV&RRUGLQDWLRQ&HQWUH -)+4±-RLQW)RUFH+HDGTXDUWHU 180 E ANNEX ANNEX To bases Formations / the Author y b BACKBONE FOR BD ARMED FORCES AFD (JCC) Source : Prepared AHQ, NHQ, AIR HQ PROPOSED INTEGRATED COMMUNTCATION Main Backbone Alternative to main backbone Alternative Backbone Res Backbone (BTTB Fiber optics) (PGCB Fiber optics) (RAB, BR and GTCL Fiber optics / MW) (BAF MW) 1. 4. Legend: 2. 3. 181 Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces ) $11(; $,5+4 $LU%DVHV '*), 'HWDFKPHQW $UHD0+4 1DYDO%DVHV %77%)LEHURSWLFV :LUHOHVV1HW /HJHQG DQG%$)0: 3UHSDUHGE\WKH$XWKRU 6RXUFH 1+4 *XDUG 0+4 +4&RDVW %'5 -&& $)' +4%'5 6HFWRU+4 62LQ&¶V%UDQFK 352326('-2,176,*,171(7:25. $+4 Q +4 'LYLVLR '*), +4'*), 'HWDFKPHQW , 16 7R1DYDODQG$LU%DVHV 182 Author Lieutenant Colonel Saleem Ahmad Khan, afwc, psc, te, Signals was commissioned on 25 December 1986. Besides his unit service in three different signals units, he served as the operations staff officer in an infantry brigade; physical training and sports officer including platoon commander in Bangladesh Military Academy; and an instructor in School of Signals. He has commanded a signal unit. He has served in Army Headquarters in Military Secretary Branch and Military Operations Directorate as grade two staff officer. He was a staff officer in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone. He is a graduate both from Defence Services Command and Staff College and National Defence College. He has undergone Bachelor of Technology from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He obtained Master in Defence Studies and Master in War Studies from National University. At present, he is the General Staff Officer 1 of an Infantry Division. 183 DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES OF BANGLADESH Director General Shabbir Ahmed Chowdhury, ndc INTRODUCTION In contemporary ocean governance, delimitation of maritime boundary assumes special significance because the rights of littoral states need tobe exercised within the oceanic space as enjoined by the provisions of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS 82). This law has emerged as the accepted Law of the Sea (LOS) to overcome the shortcomings of the previous laws. During the 20th century, many nations have expressed the need to extend national claims to include mineral resources, protect fish stocks and enforce pollution control. In 1930, the League of Nations held the first conference at The Hague on maritime issues, but could not reach any agreement. In 1956, the United Nations held its first Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) at Geneva and in 1958 signed several treaties. In 1960, UNCLOS II was convened in Geneva to settle certain limitations of UNCLOS I, but did not achieve much. Thereafter, through a series of negotiations, in 1982 UNCLOS 82 was ready to be signed. It finally came into existence onNovember 16, 1994. The littoral countries that have claims in the Bay of Bengal are Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. All of them have ratified UNCLOS 82. The claim of each littoral state has to be submitted to the United Nations Commission on the Limitation of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The deadline for submission of the claim for Bangladesh is July 2011, while claims of the other three countries are to be submitted by 2009. The coasts of these littoral countries are oriented in such a way that their claims overlap. It is likely, therefore, that disputes may arise and affect Bangladesh’s relations with these states and also pose threat to its security. The resources of the Bay of Bengal play a significant role in the economy of the countries concerned. The media1 have been reporting of encroachment by one state in the maritime zone of the other and of explorations of oil or gas. Since the maritime boundaries of these countries have not yet been demarcated, such news has been creating misgivings2 among these countries. 1. “New Age” of 31 December 2005- Maritime Boundary Demarcation, Dhaka far from settling dispute with Delhi, Yangon. 2. The Daily Inquilab of January 3, 2006-Bangladesh is loosing out Maritime area in the Bay of Bengal. Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh The Foreign Policy of Bangladesh emphasizes maintenance of friendly relations with all countries of the world. In spite of differences on certain areas, Bangladesh has friendly relations with India and Myanmar. The issue of maritime boundary delimitation may affect this relation in future. Hence this sensitive problem needs to be addressed with caution. SIGNIFICANCE OF UNCLOS 82 The permissible maritime claims in the areas of jurisdictions, settlement of disputes and all such maritime matters have been described in UNCLOS 82. Technical and legal experts have interpreted the legal provisions with the help of illustrative figures and with mathematical and geological explanations to make the legal matters comprehensible.3 This chapter attempts to discuss some of the important clauses which coastal states have been employing to legitimize their maritime claims. (a) Baseline4 : In all maritime measurements, including bathymetric5 and seismic data6, the baseline is taken as a reference. So every coastal state must fix its baseline according to articles 5, 7 and 14 of UNCLOS82. (b) Territorial sea7 : Article 3 of UNCLOS 82 permits every coastal state TS which is 12M from the baseline. 3. Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Doc.No. CLCS/11 Dated 13 May 1999, CLCS. 4. Baseline (a) Normal baseline: The normal baseline of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state. (b) Straight baseline : If the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 5. Bathymetric data: Bathymetry is the science of measuring the depth of the ocean floor which includes the continental shelf, slope and rise. The data obtained by bathymetry are used to create the profile of the seabed which acts as a determinant to maritime claims as per law. 6. Seismic data: The data that describes the thickness of the sediment of the sea floor is known as the seismic data. Such data is used to create the profile of the sediment thickness of the continental rise which acts as a determinant to maritime claims as per law. 7. Territorial sea: The sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territo- rial sea. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this convention and to other rules of international law. Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nauti- cal miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this convention. 186 (c) Contiguous zone8 : Article 33 of UNCLOS 82 permits every coastal state a contiguous zone not exceeding 24M from the baseline. (d) EEZ9 : Article 55 of UNCLOS 82 permits coastal states EEZ not exceeding 200M from the baseline. (e) Continental shelf: Coastal states may submit claims to CLCS for the outer limits of the CS which extend beyond 200M. Then CLCS will make recommendations in accordance with the following approaches: (a) Application of Article 76, and (b) Application of the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. The two approaches are described below: APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 76 The applications of Article 76 of UNCLOS82 are as follows: Natural Prolongation As per article 76(1), the CS of a coastal state has been defined to consist of areas beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory. However, the term “natural prolongation” of a state’s territory has not been defined. So the extent of the natural prolongation is based on the nature of the seafloor. 8. Contiguous zone : The contiguous zone is the zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the coastal State where the State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its ter- ritory or the territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 9. EEZ: The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this UNCLOS 82. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds. The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 187 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh The Formula and Constraint Lines (a) The Distance Formula As per Article 76(4)(a)(ii) and article 76(7), points have to be fixed at a distance of 60M seaward from the FOS10. These should be so selected that two adjacent points cannot exceed 60M. The points so obtained are connected by straight lines. The resultant line thus found is one of the criteria utilized to delimit the CM. (b) The Sediment Thickness Formula This formula is also known as the Irish formula. It is derived from article 76(7). Points are fixed farthest seawards so that the thickness of the sediment is at least 1% of the shortest distance of the foot of the slope from this point. Again, such points should be so taken that the distance between two adjacent points does not exceed 60M. The points so obtained are joined. This is also known as Gardiner line and is one of the determinants of the CM limits. (c) The Formula Line The two lines obtained from (a) and (b) above are combined to construct the Formula Line as stated in article 76(4). Depending on the structure of the seabed and the thickness of the sedimentary rocks, it may so happen that any one of the two lines of (a) and (b) above are entirely inside the other or there may be intersections between these two lines. In that case, the segments of each of these two lines which are more seawards from the baseline are taken. Thus UNCLOS 82 provides coastal states the privilege to cover the maximum area in the maritime zone beyond 200M. (d) The 350 M Constraint Line This is the line which is 350M seaward from the baseline (Article 5). (e) The 2500 m Isobath11 +100 M Article 5 guides the construction of this line. Every point of the continental slope that is 2500 metres deep from the sea level is called the 2500m isobath line. The line which is located 100M seaward from the 2500m isobath line is known as the 2500m+100M line considered to be one of the lines that delimit the CM. 10.Foot of the continental slope: This is the point where the continental slope ends and continental rise begins. It is defined as the point where the change of the slope is maximum. 11.Isobath : Isobath is the surface in the sea where all the points of the surface are at the same depth from the sea-level. The Greek word iso means equal and bathos means depth. This surface is parallel to the sea-level. The intersecting line between the isobath surface and the submerged land (continental shelf, continental slope or rise) is known as the isobath line. 188 (f) The cutoff line The two lines obtained from (d) and (e) above are combined to get the cutoff line as per Article 76(5). In that case, the segments of each of these two lines which are more seawards from the baseline are taken. It may so happen that any one of the two lines of (d) and (e) above are entirely inside the other or there may be intersections between these two lines. In that case, the segments of each of these two lines which are more seawards from the baseline are taken into consideration. (g) The outer limits of Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) The two lines from (c) and (f) above are combined to get the limit of the ECS. The segments of each of these two lines which are more towards the baseline are taken into consideration. If the formula line and the cutoff line intersect, the segments of each of these lines which are less in distance from the baseline are accepted to construct the composite line which is the outer limit of the ECS. Application of Statement of Understanding (SoU) Application of Article 76 may result in inequity for states having a narrow continental margin but a thick sedimentary rock. Article3, AnnexeII of UNCLOS82, i.e., SoU will be applicable to a coastal state having the following characteristics: (i) The average distance at which the 200 metre isobath occurs is not more than 20M. (ii) The average thickness of the sedimentary rock at the combined formula line is not less than 3.5 km. (iii)More than half of the continental margin will be excluded as a result of the application of Article 76. Coastal states that fulfill the above criteria can claim the outer edge of their continental margin by connecting points where the sediment thickness is not less than 1 Km. Such points should be so selected that the distance between two adjacent points will not exceed 60M. Need for Detailed Data The above notes how a coastal state can apply UNCLOS 82 to establish its claims in the sea to the farthest possible distance from the baseline. It is obvious from UNCLOS 82 that different types of data such as, bathymetric or seismic data can offer variable claims. A coastal state would certainly wish to claim the maximum possible distance from its baseline. Such a position can be achieved only if the relevant maritime data are available. So before a state attempts to determine its maritime claims, it should procure all types of data. 189 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh Format of Data Collecting and presenting maritime data in the appropriate way is essential for a coastal state that wants to make its claims internationally acceptable. A small error in data collection may result in a huge loss for a state12. Coastal states should conduct the data collection process meticulously. The collected data need to be projected in charts, maps and in computers through appropriate soft-wares so that they confirm to internationally accepted formats. Maritime data collection is a complex job since geological features do not remain static. Sea level changes during the seasons of the year vary due to high and low tides13. State coastlines change due to erosion, sedimentation and change of river courses. The thickness of the sea floor also changes due to sedimentation or tremors. Types of Data The following data are necessary to produce claims under UNCLOS 82 provisions: (i) Baseline: Data for baseline is required to define and fix the baseline. The TS of 12M, Contiguous zone of 24M and EEZ of 200M are all measured from the baseline. (ii) Bathymetric data: This data is needed to locate the (a) FOS (b) The 2500m isobath+100M line (c) The 200m isobath line for SoU. (iii) Seismic data: This data is needed to locate (a) the Gardiner line (1% sediment thickness line), (b) the FOS+60M line (c) the 1Km isopach14 line and 3.5Km sediment thickness line. Data Collection for Bay of Bengal The Bay of Bengal is the site of massive deposits of sediment from many rivers. Moreover, two Oceanic Ridges, the 85°E Ridge15 and the 90°E Ridge 12.Manual on the Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea- 1982 , Pub- lication No. 51, 4th Edition-March 2006, Published by the International Hydrographic Organization, MO- NACO 13.F.J. Leahy, B.A. Murphy, P.A. Collier and D.J. Mitchell-Uncertainty Issues in the Geodetic Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries 14.Isopach : Isopach means equal thickness. The thickness of the ocean floor sediment in general goes on decreasing as one proceeds seaward. The points on the sea-floor where the thickness of the sediment is the same are known as the isopach points. The line that connects such isopach points is known as isopach line. 15.The Bay of Bengal and the Statement of Understanding Concerning the Establishment of the Outer Edge of the Continental Margin; Mridha,M, Marine Affairs Program,Dalhousie University,Canada;Varma, H,Bedford Institute of Oceanography,Canada;Macnab,R, Geological Survey of Canada ;http://www.agu. org/meetings/fm05/fm05-sessions/fm05_T12C.html. 190 constitute thick sediment in its ocean bed. It provides an opportunity for Bangladesh to claim a large area by utilizing both bathymetric and seismic data. The CS extends a long distance seaward from Bangladesh’s coastline. So Bangladesh needs to procure both bathymetric and seismic data. Unfortunately, Bangladesh cannot afford to procure the Bay of Bengal data due to lack of budget and technical expertise. Although collection and processing of maritime data is essential but require sophisticated technology and huge expenditure. Consequently, Bangladesh takes advantage of opportunity ships of developed countries which enter the Bay of Bengal for scientific expeditions of their own to collect and process the bathymetric and seismic data without any cost. Bangladesh has to seek such assistance of the developed states until all the required data are in. METHODS OF DELIMITATION Two or more states can be so located that there may be overlapping of their respective maritime claims. Such a situation can occur if the states are either opposite or adjacent to each other. If two opposite states are closely located, the CS or EEZ of one state may fall on that of the other depending on the distance of the two baselines. In case of adjacent states, the question of demarcation will arise. In such a case, UNCLOS 82 has prescribed two methods for settlement (a) mutual agreement and (b) arbitration. Mutual Agreement UNCLOS 82 prescribes two approaches to demarcate common areas of claims (i) Equidistance method, and (ii) Equity (i) Equidistance method Article 1516 of UNCLOS82 states that if two coastal countries are located adjacent or opposite to each other and the maritime claim of one country encroaches into that of the other, then the overlapped part may be divided by drawing a median line so that each point of this line is equidistant from the nearest point of the baseline of each of the coastal states. If the two coastal states are adjacent to each other, then obviously there must be an overlapping of claims. Mathematicians have determined several formulae to draw equidistant lines. All such methods show almost identical results and have been accepted by the relevant authorities. 16.Article 15: Delimitation of the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts Where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two states is entitled, fail- ing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two states in a way which is at variance therewith. 191 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh (ii) Equity There are instances where the application of equidistant method has led to an unjust situation for a coastal state like making it zone-blocked. The reasons behind such an unacceptable situation are many. It could be the disadvantageous position of the state (located between two states), the nature and length of its coastline (convex or concave, short or long), the position of the coastal state (adjacent or opposite) etc. Such states disagree to accept the equidistance principle and look for alternative arrangements through negotiations to demarcate the maritime boundary in a way that can offer more justice. This principle is known as ‘equity’. Every individual case has a merit of its own in the application of this principle. Article 5917 and Article 83 of UNCLOS82 offer provisions for equity, but they do not provide any guideline or methodology that allows for the adoption of this principle. So in many cases, states failed to agree to demarcate either through the principle of equidistance or equity. In those cases, the only alternative is to refer the matter to international courts. Arbitration If disputing states fail to demarcate overlapped portions of their claims through the principle of equidistance or equity, they may follow Articles 83 and 287 of UNCLOS 82 and adopt any of the following means: (a) The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex VI; (b) The International Court of Justice; (c) An arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; (d) A special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein. PRESENT STATUS OF BANGLADESH’S MARITIME CLAIMS Bangladesh first posted its maritime claims through the Territorial Waters and Maritimes Zones Act 1974, Act No. XXVI of 1974 Annex I and Annex II (By Notification LT-1/3/7 of 13 April, 1974 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of this Act has fixed the baseline, the contiguous zone and the EEZ which are explained below: 17.Article 59: Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the ex- clusive economic zone. In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal state or to other states within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal state and any other state or states, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved for the parties as well as for the international community as a whole. 192 (a) Baseline. The baseline from which territorial waters shall be measured seaward are the straight lines linking the successive eight points on the ten-fathom isobath. The latitude and longitude of these eight points are described in the above act. (b) The territorial seas. The TS of Bangladesh will extend to 12M seaward from the baseline and forms part of its internal waters where its sovereignty will extend in the air space over and the seabed and subsoil of such waters. Foreign ships having the right to innocent passage through the TS shall, while exercising such right, observe the laws in Bangladesh. (c ) The contiguous zone. The contiguous zone will extend to 18M from the baseline. GOB may exercise such powers in respect of the contiguous zone to prevent and punish the contravention of any law in Bangladesh relating to (i) the security of the Republic (ii) the immigration and sanitation and (iii) customs and other fiscal matters. (d) EEZ. It will extend to 200M from the baseline. All natural resources within the economic zone, both living and non-living, on or under the seabed and sub-soil or on the water surface or within the water column shall vest exclusively in the Republic. However, this restriction shall not affect fishing within the zone by a Bangladeshi who uses it for the purpose of vessels not mechanically propelled. The Legal Status of Bangladesh’s Baseline The baseline proposed by Bangladesh was opposed by the international community. The objections were that no point of the 10 fathom line was fixed on the land and that an isobath cannot be the basis of the definition of the baseline. During the final negotiating session of UNCLOS 82 in April 1982 in New York, Bangladesh sent a letter to the President of the Conference asking legality of the 10 fathom baseline18. India and Myanmar in separate letters to the President objected to Bangladesh’s proposal and only Vietnam supported its claims. Eventually the proposed baseline was not accepted as per international law19. So Bangladesh has to fix a new baseline by following Article 7 of UNCLOS 82. 18.Commodore Mohammad Khurshed Alam(C ) ndc, psc BN ( Retd ) : Bangladesh’s Maritime Challenges in the 21st Century. 19.Muhammad Nazmul Haque- United Nations, The Nippon Foundation Fellow 2005-2006; The Legal and Scientific Assessment of Bangladesh’s Baseline in the Context of Article 76 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea . 193 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh DELIMITATION STATUS IN THE BAY OF BENGAL In September 1974, India protested when Bangladesh awarded westernmost six blocks to Ashland Company for oil or gas exploration, claiming that they encroached into Indian waters. Through a gazette notification in 1974, Bangladesh claimed an area as EEZ and CS, based on a North-South projection through the termini of its land boundaries with India (Hariabhanga river) and Myanmar (NAAF river). India argued that any maritime boundary must be delimited on the equidistance method by taking into account low-tide elevation and by ignoring the peculiarities of Bangladesh’s coastline. The Myanmar position, formally submitted in November 1985, was to draw a median line on the equidistant method to be deflected slightly to prevent Bangladesh from being zone-locked. Myanmar held rigidly to the position that Bangladesh’s claims extending beyond 200 nautical miles would amount to “coveting my neighbor’s territory” and rejected these claims. The maritime boundaries of Bangladesh with both India and Myanmar thus still remain to be delimited as negotiations with these countries ended in a stalemate. Bangladesh then negotiated to reach mutual agreement on the basis of equity because of the peculiarities of its coastline since the equidistance method would make it zone-locked at a distance less than 200M from the low-water mark line (Fig. 1). Finally, Bangladesh took a principled stand supporting Article 83 of UNCLOS 82 which stipulates that delimitation shall be effected by international law as per Article 38 of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution. Figure-1 EEZ shown for the littoral states in the Bay of Bengal 194 LIMITATIONS OF UNCLOS 82 The previous chapters show that there are cases where UNCLOS 82 cannot solve the demarcation problem either by equidistance or through the application of the equity principle. In such cases, states attempt to settle the matter by negotiation where knowledge of already settled cases may be useful. Even if the matter is referred to international courts, technical and legal experts would try to solve it with the help of their experience of already settled disputes. Though every case has its own merit, study of several cases could provide necessary legal and technical information to settle any new dispute. There are a good number of maritime disputes in the world which have been settled either by mutual agreement using the principles of equity or through the intervention of international courts. Two such cases are described below: The North Sea Continental Shelf Case Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands are three coastal states of the North Sea. Germany has common land borders both with Denmark and the Netherlands which extend up to the North Sea (Fig. 2) and the length of its coastline is longer than those of the other two states. After UNCLOS I was signed in 1964, disputes rose between Germany-Denmark and Germany-Netherlands. Denmark and the Netherlands advocated for the equidistance principle as per Article 6 of UNCLOS I, but Germany opposed it. Germany argued that it would become zone-blocked at North Sea (Fig. 2) if the equidistance method was applied. As may be seen from the figure, CDEBA is the composite demarcation line produced by the equidistance method. Germany thus argued that the CS should be demarcated proportionally as adjacent to the coastal lengths of the three states. This proposal, however, was rejected both by Denmark and the Netherlands. Thereafter the case was referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1967 which rendered its judgment on 20 February 1969. The salient points of ICJ’s decision are as follows: (a) The use of the equidistance method of delimitation was not obligatory. (b) There is no single method of delimitation the use of which is in all circumstances obligatory. (c) The rules of international law applicable to the delimitation between the parties of areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea which appertain to them are as follows: (1) Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking into account all the relevant circumstances, and in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other; 195 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh (2) If in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation leaves to the parties areas that overlap, these are to be divided between them in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally, unless they decide on a regime of joint jurisdiction, use, or exploitation for the zones of overlap or any part of them; (d) In course of negotiations, factors to be taken into account are to include: (1) General configuration of the coasts of the parties, as well as the presence of any special or unusual features. (2) So far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelf areas involved. (3) The element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal state and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitations between adjacent states in the same region. Following the Court’s decision, the equidistant line was modified to CDFBA (Fig.2) thus allowing Germany a lager portion of the North Sea. Figure-2 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases - Sketch Map 196 Sino-Vietnam Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation China and Vietnam are two adjacent states having land borders that extend into the Gulf of Tonkin. In 1993, the two countries reached an agreement on settling the disputes relating to the Gulf. They signed the agreement in December 2000, following the principles of equity. The salient features of the agreement are as follows20: (1) The delimitation allocated Vietnam 53.23% and China 47.77% of the Gulf following the proportion of their respective coast lengths. (2) If a single geographical structure of oil, gas or other mineral deposits straddles the demarcation line, the two states would agree to share the profits thereof equally. (3) They agreed to consult on matters regarding the management of living resources in the Gulf and in the EEZ of the two countries. Relevance with Bangladesh’s Case (1) The North Sea Case is in many ways similar to that of Bangladesh. The coastline of Bangladesh is concave like that of Germany. India and Myanmar are two adjacent states of Bangladesh just as Denmark and the Netherlands are adjacent to Germany. The equidistant lines between Bangladesh-India and Bangladesh-Myanmar converge and meet at a short distance (less than 200M) from Bangladesh’s coastline exactly like the North Sea Case. ICJ rendered its judgment in favour of Germany in the dispute settlement based on equity. So the North Sea case can be a strong precedent for Bangladesh in justifying its claims on the principle of equity. (2) China and Vietnam are adjacent states and their CS was also demarcated on the principle of equity. Their agreement too addressed the management of marine living resources, sustainable growth and the joint management of subsoil oil and gas. These points can provide arguments for Bangladesh in arguing its case. 20.Zou Keyuan, East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore- The Sino-Vietnam Agree- ment on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin . 197 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh DELIMITATION PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR BANGLADESH The foregoing chapters reveal that the issue of Bangladesh’s maritime boundary demarcation is a serious concern for the country. Unsettled issue may hamper bilateral relations with its neighbours; on the other hand, Bangladesh is under compulsion to make early arrangement for submission of the claims as there is a deadline it has to meet. We can, however, find reasons for optimism if the issue is dealt properly. The problems and prospects of the issue are outlined below: Problems. (1) Maritimes Zones Act 1974 has fixed Bangladesh’s baseline in a manner which is accepted neither by India nor by Myanmar; nor is it in conformity with UNCLOS 82. All maritime measurements have been conducted taking the baseline as a reference. So a legally acceptable baseline must be fixed by Bangladesh immediately. (2) Both India and Myanmar advocates the equidistance method of delimitation. Bangladesh disagrees with this method and advocates for the principle of equity. If the equidistance method is applied, Bangladesh will become zone blocked and suffer enormous losses. (3) The only alternative for Bangladesh is to go for an equitable sharing of the EEZ. But UNCLOS 82 does not mention the principles of equitable delimitation. So, Bangladesh need to provide reasons along with legal back- up to establish justification for its claims to the full portion of the 200M EEZ and CS beyond 200M. (4) If no settlement can be reached through negotiations, the options available would be to maintain status quo or to refer the matter to the ICJ. While the status quo may keep the problem in suspension for sometime, it could resurface anytime in future. If the matter is referred to the ICJ, such a move would disturb bilateral relations. (5) A detailed sea-bed profile near Bangladesh’s coastline is needed to establish its maritime claims. However, Bangladesh is yet to obtain the necessary bathymetric and seismic data and process them using computer software programmes. Bangladesh has to make all such arrangements as soon as possible. 198 Prospects. (1) The North Sea Continental Shelf Case provides a good precedence for Bangladesh to help it deal with its problems. There are also a good number of littoral states which are facing similar problems. Study of the disputed cases settled, and working in cooperation with coastal states involved in the dispute will benefit all parties. (2) Apart from maritime issues, there are other areas of cooperation between Bangladesh and the littoral states that need to be taken into account. Considering national priorities, those factors may be brought into negotiations to come up with a deal that best serves the interests of Bangladesh. (3) The last option would be to refer the matter to the ICJ though this may aggravate bilateral relations. There are cases where ICJ’s intervention has been successful. However, before taking the matter to the ICJ, a thorough study should be conducted to see how far there is likelihood to win the case through negotiations. In this regard, opinion of international legal experts may be sought in this regard. RECOMMENDATIONS (1) A number of states have already demarcated their maritime boundaries. Study of those cases can assist Bangladesh substantively in settling its maritime boundary disputes. Since such study is demanding, a team of personnel may be earmarked now who will acquire technical and legal information and develop sufficient expertise to handle negotiations. This permanent team should work till the submission of Bangladesh’s claim with CLCS and in subsequent negotiations. (2) Bangladesh may seek technical assistance from international expert groups for tasks like data collection. Bangladesh should develop expertise on all relevant matters like (a) comprehend raw data and prepare appropriate computer softwares; (b) acquire appropriate knowledge on hydrology and geology; (c) attain expertise on legal and technical matters and thereby curtail dependence on foreign experts. (3) Bangladesh should immediately fix its baseline according to UNCLOS 82. The relevant organizations of Bangladesh should collect the data, indicate them in maps and make them presentable using appropriate softwares. (4) The bathymetric and seismic data for locating the FOS, Gardiner line, FOS+60M line, 2500m isobath+100M line, 350M line, 200m isobath line, 20M line, 1Km isopach line, and 3.5Km sediment thickness line should be collected immediately with the help of international experts and opportunity ships. 199 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh (5) All measures should be adopted to apply the equity method and thus save Bangladesh from being zone blocked. (6) The Bay of Bengal consists of living and non-living resources in water and sea-bed, sub-soil mineral resources, oil, gas etc. During negotiations, if one exclusive demarcation line for all types of resources cannot be agreed upon, the possibility of looking for different demarcation lines for one or more of these resources may also be considered. CONCLUSION Bangladesh must establish the equity method to delimit its maritime boundary with neighbouring states and thus save itself from being zone blocked. Unless the delimitation issue is settled, all other attempts to maximize Bangladesh’s claims will be of no avail. This article, it should be stressed, is written on the basis of public domain data. Even if more precise data were available, that would not make any difference in its basic findings. Detailed and precise data would enable Bangladesh to claim more maritime area, but this would be possible only if the “zone block” problem is solved. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Commodore Mohammad Khurshed Alam(C) ndc, psc BN (Retd): Bangladesh’s Maritime Challenges in the 21st Century . 2. F.J. Leahy, B.A. Murphy, P.A. Collier and D.J. Mitchell-Uncertainty Issues in the Geodetic Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries . 3. Manual on the Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea- 1982 , Publication No. 51, 4th Edition-March 2006, Published by the International Hydrographic Organization, MONACO. 4. Muhammad Nazmul Haque- United Nations, The Nippon Foundation Fellow 2005- 2006. The Legal and Scientific Assessment of Bangladesh’s Baseline in the Context of Article 76 of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea . 5. Nugzar Dundua, United Nations- The Nippon Foundation Fellow 2006-2007; Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries between Adjacent States . 6. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment of 20 February 1969 - International Court of Justice. 7. Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Doc. No. CLCS/11 Dated 13 May 1999, CLCS. 8. Statute of the International Court of Justice. 9. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea III. 200 10. The Daily Inquilab of January 3, 2006-Bangladesh is loosing out Maritime area in the Bay of Bengal . 11. “New Age” of 31 December 2005- Maritime Boundary Demarcation, Dhaka far from settling dispute with Delhi, Yangon . 12. Zou Keyuan, East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore- The Sino-Vietnam Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin. 13. The Bay of Bengal and the Statement of Understanding Concerning the Establishment of the Outer Edge of the Continental Margin; Mridha,M, Marine Affairs Program,Dalhousie University,Canada;Varma, H,Bedford Institute of Oceanograph y,Canada;Macnab,R, Geological Survey of Canada ;http://www.agu.org/meetings/ fm05/fm05-sessions/fm05_T12C.html. 201 Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh Author Shabbir Ahmad Chowdhury graduated from the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology in Electrical and Electronic Engineering in 1988. He served in the Rajshahi University of Engineering and Technology from 1989 to 1991 as a lecturer in the Electrical and Electronic Engineering Department. He joined the Bangladesh Civil Service (Foreign Affairs) Cadre in 1991. Thereafter, apart from receiving mandatory departmental and foundation training in Dhaka, he received overseas training on International Economic Negotiations (in French Language) in the International Institute of Public Administration, Paris. He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dhaka in various capacities in sections and departments such as South Asia, SAARC, Europe, Administration, International Organizations, Multilateral Economic Affairs and UNCLOS. He held assignments in the Bangladesh Embassy in Brussels as Second Secretary (1995-1998), in the Bangladesh Embassy in Beijing as First Secretary and Counsellor (1998-2002) and in the Bangladesh High Commission in London as Minister (2004-2006). He has visited more than twenty countries in different parts of the world on official assignments and tourism. He has taken part in a number of seminars, meetings, senior level meetings and summits both at home and abroad. 202 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy Joint Secretary Md. Ataur Rahman, ndc INTRODUCTION Poverty in ‘Bengal’ has been endemic as revealed by the two great famines of 1770 and 1943. After liberation, the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) focused its endeavour on poverty ‘alleviation’ (now “poverty reduction”). For recent years, the government has adopted ‘The National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction’ (NSAPR) or in short, Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). PRS has identified four strategic blocks and four supportive strategies as “avenues” for poverty reduction. ‘Effective Social Safety Nets Programmes’ (SSNPs) is one of the four strategic blocks. It focuses on the poor in general and poor women in particular. The commonest way of its working is ‘income transfer’ among the poor, that is to say, the poorest amongst the poor. Although SSNPs are not new in Bangladesh, the government has altered their goals, and have incorporated them into developing programmes. The Rural Maintenance Programme (RMP), one of the SSNPs, has been targeting rural destitute women for poverty reduction through providing income generating employment and training for them. Although a study of PRS has admitted that ‘the absence of evaluation makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about past impacts, and future direction for safety nets programmes in Bangladesh’, it accepts that majority of those households have been able to increase their household income. The PRS study asks if safety nets programmes work as a ladder to move people out of poverty, only to answer the question positively. But many economists think that the issue of poverty and its reduction or elimination does not depend mainly upon the ‘pious wishes’ of the government. If the socio-economic factors of causes of poverty are not taken into consideration, people who got the ‘leverage’ to move out of poverty will sooner or later revert to poverty. Therefore, sustainability of the process of poverty reduction is of utmost importance. SSNPs undoubtedly lessen the hardships of poverty for a while. For this reason, SSNPs are highly beneficial for target groups. However, since the PRS is the sole policy being pursued by the government for reduction of poverty, its conceptual soundness scalls for vigorous examination. To this end, we have Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy chosen RMP to see how the issue of poverty has been conceived in the PRS in general and in SSNPs in particular. For the last four decades, many economists from many schools of thought have focused their analyses, explanations and the issue of studies on poverty. Secondary information has been used to build up an analytical framework as well as to examine the prevailing state of poverty in the country. Primary information (data) was collected from female RMP crew members through case studies. Since RMP existed before the introduction of PRS and has been incorporated into the latter after its induction, we have selected beneficiaries from both groups. The rationale was to get necessary data/information from their pre-PRS group on ‘leverage’ or ‘graduation’ (has happened or not) as well as on ‘slippage’. The beneficiaries of ‘during-PRS’ provided current information about increase in income and its effect on poverty reduction. The number of RMP crew members is quite large i.e. 42000. Due to time and resource constraints, we had to limit our sample drastically. Our first assumption was the absence of base line survey and second that RMP crew members of the same area or union might provide us a basis of comparison. Since a group of RMP crew is formed with 10 members from each union, 3 members each from pre-PRS and during-PRS RMP were chosen for case study. The Sara union under Ishwardi Upazila of Pabna district was chosen as the study area. The area has a rich potential for non-farm employment and income generating activity. We tried to collect qualitative information through an extended check list that helped us keep the interview on track and collect similar information from the individual interviewees. The Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) and the Union Parishad (UP) Chairman, they were also interviewed as a primary source of information. The time constraint was the foremost limitation of the study. Another was non-availability of ‘time series data’ from the BBS sources. BBS data covers very limited parameters too. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY Since independence, Government of Bangladesh (GOB) has been pursuing poverty reduction strategies through its development plans. The objective of the Fourth and Fifth Five-year Plans was ‘Alleviation of Poverty’. The PRS declares that the ‘Principal Goal’ of the GOB’s economic policy is to reduce poverty so 204 as to i) gradually lift vast majority of the people above the poverty line, and ii) improve the quality of life for the average citizen. The PRS has described poverty thus: ‘Poverty is a broad front. It is about income level. It is about food security. It is about quality of life. It is about asset bases. It is about human resource capacities. It is about vulnerabilities and coping. It is about gender equalities. It is about human security. It is about initiative horizons. It is each of these and all of these together.’(NSAPR, p. 2) In other words, poverty is a multi-dimensional issue. The World Bank has defined poverty as ‘the inability to attain a minimal standard of living’. To attain such a standard, two elements are required: (i) the expenditure necessary to buy a minimum standard of nutrition and other basic necessities, and (ii) a further amount that varies from country to country, reflecting the cost of participating in the everyday life of society. For operational purposes the best known and most widely used poverty line produced by it is ‘a-dollar-a-day’. UNDP introduced the Human Poverty Index (HPI), defining poverty as ‘the denial of choices and opportunities for a tolerable life’. ILO has developed an idea of ‘Basic Needs’ but asserts that ‘in no circumstances should this be taken to mean merely the minimum necessary for subsistence, it should be placed within a context of national independence, the dignity of individuals and peoples and their freedom to chart their destiny without hindrance’ (ILO 1976:243). Poverty is often seen as ‘Absolute Poverty’ and ‘Relative Poverty’. Relative poverty can be understood primarily in terms of ‘inequality’. Townsend (1979:915) refers to poverty as a form of relative ‘deprivation’, ‘the absence or inadequacy of those diets, amenities, standards, services and activities which are common or customary in the society’. Professor Sen has argued that ‘if there is starvation and hunger- then no matter what the relative picture looks like there clearly is poverty’. The Copenhagen Declaration of the World Summit for Social Development 1995 identified ‘Absolute poverty’ and ‘Overall poverty’ and defined ‘Overall Poverty’ thus: ‘Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness and inadequate 205 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also characterized by lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural life… Furthermore, poverty in its various forms represents a barrier to communication, and access to services… and people living in poverty are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of disasters and conflicts.’ SOME MAJOR MEANS OF IDENTIFYING POVERTY The Biological Approach. A family can be considered as being in poverty if its ‘total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency’ (Rowntree; 1901). Problems with this approach include: i) there can be ‘significant variations related to physical features, climatic conditions and work habits’, which constitute the minimum nutritional requirements; ii) translation of minimum nutritional requirements into minimum food requirements tend to be very low-cost and non- sensitive to people’s food habits; and iii) specifying minimum requirements for non-food items seems to be very difficult. In spite of all those weaknesses, Sen argues that ‘malnutrition must have a central place in the conception of poverty’. The Inequality Approach. Miller and Roby claim that the concept of poverty is ‘an issue of inequality’ and transfers from the rich to the poor can make a substantial dent in poverty. Instead of measuring poverty they ’look at the nature and size of the differences between the bottom 20 or 10 percent and the rest of the society’. Their ‘concern becomes one of narrowing the differences between those at the bottom and the better-off in each stratification dimension’. However, Sen found that ‘inequality is fundamentally a different issue from poverty’. Relative Deprivation Approach. Townsend (1979) notes that ‘people are relatively deprived if they cannot obtain, at all or sufficiently, the conditions of life’. But Sen has underscored a contrast between ‘feeling of deprivation’ and ‘conditions of deprivation’. Moreover, the selection of an appropriate ‘reference group’ in determining whether people have a sense of relative deprivation is of great importance. Therefore, ‘the approach of relative deprivation supplements rather than supplants the analysis of poverty’. IDENTIFICATION AND AGGREGATION OF POVERTY IN BANGLADESH There are at least two alternative methods of identifying poverty ---- the ‘direct method’ and the ‘income method’. Since ‘the income method has the advantage of providing a metric of numerical distance from the poverty line’ it 206 has become popular. From 1995-96 onwards, the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) is using the Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) method, which is similar to the income method for measuring poverty. BBS has constructed two poverty lines using this method: i) An ‘Upper poverty line’ that encompasses moderately poor households whose food expenditure is at the level of food poverty line; and ii) A ‘Lower poverty line’ that incorporates those extreme poor households whose total expenditure equals the food poverty line. Since the upper poverty line includes food as well as non-food expenditures, we have chosen the upper poverty line for own purposes. The trend of poverty situation in Bangladesh can be seen from Table-1 using the Estimated Head Count Rate (HCR) for the upper poverty line. The percentage of the population living below the poverty line can be interpreted as a measure of the ‘incidence of poverty’. The measure is easy to interpret but it does not confirm anything about the depth or severity of poverty. Moreover, it is a static condition and does not speak about the trend over time unless some qualities of poverty are incorporated into the conception. Table-1 Headcount indices of poverty with CBN Method 1983-84 to 2005 (percentage of population below poverty line) Poor (Upper Poverty Line) 1983-84 1985-86 1988-89 1991-92 1995-96 2000* 2005* National 58.50 51.73 57.13 58.84 53.08 48.90 40.00 Rural 59.61 53.14 59.18 61.19 56.65 52.30 43.80 Urban 50.15 42.92 43.88 44.87 35.05 35.20 28.40 i) 1983-84 to 1995-96 – World Bank (1998) quoted in ADB, June 2000. ii) 2000 and 2005 – BBS, HIES – 2005. QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF POVERTY We have tried so far to throw some light on quantitative poverty, but poverty has other dimensions too; such as, qualitative characteristics of poverty. Some of these dimensions are discussed below: i) ‘Vulnerability’ means defencelessness, insecurity and exposure to shocks, risks and stress. People are considered as vulnerable when they are more at risk than others. 207 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy ii) ‘Deprivation’ has been defined by Townsend as ‘a state of observable and demonstrable disadvantage relative to the local community or the wide society or nation to which an individual, family or group belongs’. iii) ‘Command over resources’ refers to ‘the ability of use of resources overtime’. Access to debt is also an important ‘means of commanding resources’. iv) ‘Disadvantage’ refers to ‘command over resources, the structure of opportunities and the distribution of power in a society are relatively unfavourable to poor’. v) ‘Social Exclusion’ may happen due to various reasons but Abrahamson has argued that ‘the socially excluded are the worst off, the poorest among the poor’. The expression ‘marginalization’ is also used as ‘equivalent’ to exclusion. vi) ‘Empowerment’ is the most widely used concept, although the term is used variously and includes ‘self-strength, control, self-power, self-reliance, own choice, life of dignity in accordance with one’s values, capacity to fight for one’s rights, independence, own decision-making, being free, awakening and capability’. The World Bank defines: ‘Empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives’ (World Bank 2002,pp14). To conceptualize ‘empowerment’ in the context of a least developed country, institutions include even the family. In the case of rural poor women empowerment may be seen less as dependency on their husbands or male counterparts and more as the capability to engage themselves in income-generating activities, the increased capacity to accumulate assets along with the rights to sell them, more contributions to household expenditure as well as increased role in household decision-making; moreover, increase in their level of self-confidence and awareness about social issues. PRS Approach to Poverty Reduction Poverty Reduction has been conceived in the PRS as ‘to gradually lift vast majority of the people above the poverty line’. At the same time, the document intends to ‘improve the quality of life for the average citizen’. It has indicated that ‘implementation of appropriate strategy is no doubt important’ but stresses that ‘the strategies themselves must be derived from a long-term vision of a poverty-free society’. 208 During the last three decades, Bangladesh has made noteworthy ‘gains in fight against poverty’. Notwithstanding its many specific achievements, PRS admits that ‘aggregate poverty rates remain dauntingly high’. It found that ‘this was associated with a rise in inequality’. However, the PRS has noticed that gender discrimination persists. Among other strategies, the PRS has followed the SSNPs to reduce poverty, particularly rural poverty. SSNPs were introduced with the following objectives in mind: i) The programmes are to address various forms of risks and vulnerabilities; and ii) They are designed to reduce poverty and inequality through direct transfer of resources to the poor. The government has been spending about 4.4 percent of public expenditure for SSNPs, though the amount is less than one percent of GDP. At present, about 27 SSNPs are functional in Bangladesh and RMP is one such SSNP. RURAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME (RMP) The RMP is basically a ‘cash-for-public works’ programme designed by CARE, Bangladesh. It is a pilot project to be operated in 7 unions in 1983 in collaboration with the GOB. The objective is to provide year round employment to rural destitute women. On successful completion of the pilot project the programme finally covered all (approximately 4200) unions of 61 districts out of 64 districts (the 3 left were the CHT districts) of Bangladesh. The number of crew members selected from each union was 10. In other words, 42,000 destitute women crew members were selected for four years. Before completion of the tenure, each crew member had undergone a 9 month- long training. On completion of 4 years of their job, they were released from the programme and their entire savings along with the accrued interest were refunded to them. Thereby, the destitute women were able to graduate from poverty. The RMP has some unique characteristics, particularly, i) Joint funding that created ownership; ii) RMC, IDC and CSC components; iii) Provision of cash wages for the crew women; iv) Concern about ’slippage’ and adoption of remedial measures; v) An in-built price fluctuation adjustment process for wages. 209 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy The programme believes in poverty reduction beyond the programme period and is also serious about elevating target group above poverty. Empirical Observation and Analysis Our focus of discussion is rural poverty in general and rural poor women in particular. Studies show that ‘during the 1990’s the poor in the developing countries were mostly concentrated in South Asia, typically located in rural areas’ (Krishnainah, 2003). They were mostly ‘landless, and participants in the rural labour markets’. They lived in ‘disadvantaged and resource-poor areas’ and generally constituted of ‘women and members of backward and economically disadvantaged communities’. These women frequently suffered from hunger, malnutrition and consequential illness that undermined their capacity for labour; often their only assets were perishable commodity for exchange and thus, their income opportunities were limited. Rural women face all sorts of ‘cultural, social, legal and economic obstacles that men, even poor men, do not’. They typically work longer hours and are paid less wages. In many countries, the poorest also include single-mother households due to broken family by way of divorce, separation, abandonment and/or husband’s death. Poor female-headed households are also common in rural Bangladesh and 42% of them suffered from income poverty in 2005. Female Headed Households Women in Bangladesh are weaker than their male counterparts in many respects. Studies have shown that within a family, food nutritional poverty is more of a problem for women. At the societal level, they have the least assets, the least investments, the least education and even the least social recognition as a result of discrimination. There are minimum three types of female heads of households in Bangladesh: i) Widowed females, who inherit the assets and liabilities of their husbands; ii) Divorced and/or abandoned females who don’t inherit any asset or liability of their husbands, but are burdened with children; and iii) Females whose husbands have migrated to other places or abroad temporarily for seeking jobs or working. A BIDS (Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies) study found that ‘while female headed households were worse off than other households in almost all aspects, those headed by widows and divorced/abandoned women are 210 in the worst possible economic situation’. The study has further found that these ‘households had an exceptionally high proportion (62%) of female members’. Since females earned less, the aggregate earning of the households was also lower. The study concludes that ‘they are the end product of a pure pauperisation process and represent the poverty situation in its most acute form’. The Population census of 2001 calculates the number of widowed, divorced/ separated women at around 3.57 m. The number of rural widowed and divorced/ separated is estimated to be 2.62 m and 0.25 m respectively. The census found 3.44 m female headed households in the country. They constitute 13.83% of total households and support 10.97% of the total population. Their family size is 3.87, which is lower than the national family size of 4.88. The 62.07% income for rural people (all groups) comes from agriculture, fisheries and agricultural labour, whereas 36.40% income for rural female-headed households come from these three sources, indicating limited access to these sectors. According to the Labour Force Survey 2002-03, females earn 66.56% of wages of their male counterparts. It also reveals that 1.56 m females earn up to Tk. 1500 a month which is well below the World Bank recommended earning of a-dollar-a-day. This indicates that the government needs to intervene to help them to keep their ‘body and soul together’. Kirsten Westergaard in her study on ‘Pauperization and Rural Women in Bangladesh’ has described pauperization as ‘a development process whereby an increasing number of families are becoming poorer’. She argues that ‘polarization’ i.e. a process whereby the rich get richer and the poor poorer is also ‘taking place in Bangladesh’. However, she has noted that ‘the most noticeable sign of change and of a deteriorating position of women is seen in the changing pattern as concerns exchange of gifts (dowry) at the time of marriage. This more than anything else highlights the plight of women in the process of pauperisation’. She further comments that ‘the changing marriage pattern thus symbolizes a devaluation of the women’. POVERTY REDUCTION THROUGH RMP RMP was designed for reduction of poverty of rural ‘destitute’ women. The crew members are ‘heads of households’ and in some cases, have been burdened with minor children. They were selected to work in the RMP and were provided training. They were given the savings, which had been created from their daily wages. It was expected that they would graduate from poverty using their savings and training. 211 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy We undertook two sets of case studies for RMP crews. Both ‘set A’ and ‘set B’ were composed of three crew members each; ‘set A’ and ‘set B’ were meant for pre-PRS and during-PRS respectively. We used some common parameters to compare the two sets. We further interviewed the UNO and the concerned UP Chairman. The findings are reproduced in the next chapter. FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS As mentioned earlier, we selected RMP crews from two sets, one from Pre- PRS (set A) and another from during PRS (set B) to assess the impact of PRS upon them specifically through RMP. Certain parameters were used to compare changes in their economic and social conditions. The parameter of ‘origin of destitution’ was used to identify background of the crews. The findings for both groups based on the parameters used in the study are presented below: i) Origin of Destitution. For set A, two crews became destitute after becoming widows and one after she was divorced. For set B, two crews were abandoned by their husbands and one was widowed. The origins of destitution were more or less broken homes. ii) Asset Creation. Considering purchase of land, one crew from set A was able to buy two kathas of land for her father’s homestead and contribute money for buying land for her family. Through remarriage she graduated from destitution. One crew from set B was able to buy back her possession rights to two kathas of land and another crew succeeded in buying two kathas of land relying partly from sale proceeds of her father’s land. But in the case of their other crews, two from set A and one from set B could not buy any land at all, though they needed homestead land for their own use. Therefore, impact on asset creation for pre-PRS and during-PRS, RMP crews is uncertain. Again, all crew members have been able either to construct new CI sheet roof top dwelling houses for themselves or could extend the house by constructing kitchen etc. Therefore, the impact of PRS is neutral in asset creation. iii) Savings and Investment. No one from set A had any savings and investment; on the contrary, all had which can be considered as ‘negative savings’ because they did not use the loans for income generating activities (IGA) i.e. investment ( one had ‘pseudo’ investment in land). Only one crew had ‘negative savings’ and two had investment from set B. One of the possible reasons may be that two of the crews from set A had to pay a handsome amount of dowry during the marriage of their daughters while another crew had given the money to her husband. We may underscore this point because one of the crews from set B also did not have any investment, since she had to pay dowry. We found only one crew member, who, after payment of dowry, had some investment. The explanation may be that she 212 was the only member of her family; therefore, had the least expenditure and had also some inherited land. Therefore, during-PRS, RMP had small role in savings and investment. iv) Use of Trainings. None of the crew members from both sets rely on their training. One member from both sets started business, but could not continue in it due to meagre return. PRS could create no headway in this respect. v) Health and Sanitation Awareness. All the crews were conscious of health and sanitation issues though there was a difference in degree, particularly among the two crews of set B. This could be attributed to the composition of their families – one had two sons and the other a lone member. Nothing could be attributed to PRS. vi) Social and Political Awareness. All three crews from set A and two out of three from set B were very aware about social and political issues. Therefore during-PRS RMP had little impact on awareness building. But once again, awareness perhaps depends partly on the individual and partly on institutions. So, no definitive conclusion should be drawn on this issue. vii)Institutional Linkage to Credit. Viewing NGOs as lending institutions, all three crews from set A had established linkages for credit with them. One crew from set B established such links early; the other two did not need it yet. But they too had the opportunity to link themselves if they needed to do so, though they felt they just did not need to do so then. Therefore, RMP is quite neutral in this respect. viii) Payment of Dowry. Two crews from each set had married off their daughters and paid dowry for them. One from each set had not solemnized any marriage. Therefore, payment of dowry had become compulsory, irrespective of RMP or PRS or whatsoever. ix) Empowerment. Two crews from set A enjoyed the fruits of empowerment in terms of running their families and taking all decisions. All three members of set B enjoyed empowerment according to the terms.. Again, if it was not acquired, it was because unfortunately they themselves were head of the family. By virtue of re-marriage, one member from set A had graduated from destitution but had lost her empowerment. But the example of payment of dowry for their daughters’ marriage reveals the level of societal empowerment. PRS had an indifferent role to play in this respect. x) Coping with Vulnerability. Two crew members from set A and all three from set B were found to be vulnerable and unable to cope with vulnerability. The one from set A who, after re-marrying, seemed to be better off, was able to graduate from destitution. Her case was totally different from the others. It may be noted that here ‘vulnerability’ has been used to mean the lack of ‘stability of household welfare’ in a narrower sense. 213 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy In Bangladesh poverty is directly linked with asset and employment both of which are dependent on several economic and non-economic factors. Therefore, many economists and social scientists have suggested that the broad front of poverty should be attacked from several directions including ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ factors responsible for poverty. PRS describes poverty as multidimensional but ‘prescribes’ for uni- dimensional ‘income’ avenues through RMP. Second, PRS has considered poverty as growth sensitive. Therefore it has policy prescriptions for ‘growth’, ‘conducive environment for growth’, ‘pro-poor growth’ etc. Though it has admitted the limitations of growth in poverty, reductions have targeted SSN programmes including RMP, but its coverage is still very limited. PRS, in general has not focused to identify the forces that remain active during polarization or pauperization in society which was required for its fulfilment. SSNPs address various forms of risk and vulnerability and attempt to reduce poverty through direct transfer of resources to the poor, according to government statement on SSNPs. Although the statement addresses various forms of risk and vulnerability, but it is very cautious in talking about attempts to reduce poverty (attempts may or may not end up in success). However, the objective of RMP has clearly been set up “to alleviate rural poverty through providing year-round employment and wages approximately 42000 members of the most disadvantaged destitute rural women”. According to LFS data, while the active female labour force in Bangladesh is 7.67 million, the number of beneficiaries from RMP is only 42 thousand. Therefore the RMP had a very insignificant impact on overall women employment in the country. If we see the issue in terms of destitute women only, whose number is 2.87 m (population census 2001), then the percentage coverage for employment generation stands at 1.46. Considering the fierce competition in the employment market, the coverage is still very low. MDG has set a standard income for the poor at US $1 per day, but the wage rate for RMP crew was fixed at Tk. 55 at the terminal year which is well below $1. In any consideration, the wage rate is not commensurate with MDG for poverty reduction. 214 Considering the year-round employment situation, none can deny the fact that the majority of RMP crews enjoyed increased income, however marginal or incremental this might be. But various economic and non-economic factors are constantly creating ‘downward mobility pressure’ on this increased income. BIDS has identified some factors, such as more dependants and less earners (life-cycle factors); low opportunities, bad initial conditions (structural factors); and natural disasters, illness expenditure, property loss, ceremonial expenses, litigation (crisis factors) etc. Neither the case of PRS nor that of RMP, the influences of ‘downward mobility pressure’ was taken into account, a fact supported by the interviews conducted with UNOs and UP chairmen. Till now, we have discussed the issues of poverty reduction and have seen that RMP crews got a ‘leverage’ to get out of ‘income poverty’ i.e. incidence of poverty. The performance of the RMP was satisfactory, though the possibility of ‘slippage’ was also very high. We have seen that both pre-PRS and PRS crew members do not have income earning assets, savings and investment. Therefore their capacity to cope with vulnerability and sustainability has not increased substantially. Similarly, they have not been able to use their training for IGAs and lack access to empowerment. Social forces are still active against them and rob them of their surplus, if any, in the form of dowry and possibly in many other ways. Therefore, apprehension of ‘slippage’ still exists. They were not even provided with protection by institutional forces. PRS characterised ‘extreme poverty’ as ‘going without any meals a day for significant parts of the year’. The ‘challenge of poverty’ to policy makers thus ‘has been transformed from that of hunger per se to a larger challenge of poor diets and other basic needs’. This sort of ‘minimalist yard stick’ of measuring poverty can hardly tackle the causes of poverty, and if beyond. From empirical observation, analysis and studies, we have seen that ‘incidence of poverty’ has decreased significantly for RMP crews. But ‘incidence of poverty’ measures only one characteristic of poverty and does so in the most convenient way. Indeed, the headcount ratio of poverty i.e. the ‘incidence of poverty’ does not and cannot reflect qualitative poverty. Through getting into indebtedness, a person can consume more and thereby lessen the ‘incidence of poverty’ at the cost of enhanced vulnerability, thereby further lessening empowerment and broadening deprivation. 215 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION From our study we find that the RMP has played a positive role in reducing income-poverty of the targeted destitute women, though ‘graduation from poverty’ is something that is difficult to determine. However, based upon our findings, we place the following recommendations for considerations: i) Since poverty is a complex function of ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ factors, poverty reduction policies should be formulated by taking both ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ factors into consideration. ii) Considering the risk factors involving the vulnerabilities of poor people and income distribution effects from the rich to the poor, SSNPs for targeted people should continue. iii) Government spending on SSNPs was ‘less than one percent of GDP and about 4.4 per cent of public expenditure’ for 40% of the population as income transfer. Therefore, the expenditure on SSNPs should be increased. iv) Since the forces leading towards ‘pauperization’ and ‘polarization’ are active in society and is always a source of threat for ‘slippage’ to the poor, these forces should be identified properly and remedial actions should be taken to neutralise them. v) Only 1.46% of female headed house holds were covered by RMP. Quoting a BIDS survey, PRS admit that SSNPs ‘cover about 10 million people, and consequently fall short of the needs of 23.9 million people who belong to the ‘extremely poor’ category’. To bring this vast majority of the extreme poor into the SSNPs, the coverage should be increased. vi) The RMP wage rate is Tk. 55 per day which was less than ‘a-dollar-a-day’ earning. The wage rate of RMP crews should be increased, at least to that level. vii) To reduce the risk of ‘slippage’ the ‘downward mobility pressure’ must be reduced or neutralized. viii) To enhance the scope of ‘leverage’, close supervision and monitoring of the targeted people is needed, even after the tenure is over, so as to help them face their problems and realise their potentials. ix) A standard definition of poverty is necessary to set the goals of ‘poverty reduction’. We opine that the qualitative characteristics of poverty should be incorporated into the definition. The poverty reduction strategy cannot remain indifferent or neutral to socio- economic dynamics. In other words, the poverty reduction in Bangladesh should be placed in the context of political economy. 216 In Bangladesh, though national income-poverty (incidence of poverty) has been reduced to a considerable degree during the last few years (from 49% to 40%) much credit goes to reduction in urban poverty (28.40%). Rural income poverty (43.80%) is still higher than the national level. Another issue of concern is that the absolute number of poor people has not declined considerably. In terms of nutrition, underweight was observed in 56% of under-5 children, which is higher than the income-poverty level. During preparation of any policy to reduce poverty, policy planners should keep in mind that ‘control of or access to resources’ is one of the most important internal dynamics of poverty. A report of like-minded experts (1990) analysed government intervention for poverty reduction and observed that ‘interventions which have been advanced as a means of combating poverty have, in practice, usually failed to recognize that poverty is grounded in a lack of access to resources, stemming in turn from the existing inequitable distribution of resources of all kinds, the resultant power structure and institutional structure. Without tackling these issues, an incremental supply of resources, in itself, will be of little help to the poor, because the poor will not have access to them. Instead, the enlarged supply is more likely to reinforce the polarization’. Bibliography Books/Papers 1. Coates, K. and Silburn, R. Poverty: The Forgotten Englishman, Macmillan, London, 1977. 2. Hobsbawm, E.J. ‘Poverty’, New International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol 12, Macmillan and Free Press, 1977. 3. Husain, A.M. Moazzem et al. Poverty Alleviation and Empowerment, BRAC, Dhaka, 1998. 4. ILO, Employment Growth and Basic Needs: A One World Problem, ILO, Geneva, 1976 5. Planning Commission, Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction, BGP, Dhaka, 2005. 6. Quddus, M.A. Solaiman, M. Karim, M.R. Rural Women in Households in Bangladesh, BARD, Comilla, 1985. 7. Rahman, H.Z. et al. Rethinking Rural Poverty: Bangladesh as a Case Study, UPL, Dhaka, 1995. 217 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy 8. Rahman, S. Poverty Monitoring in Bangladesh: A Success Story, in 25 Years of CIRDAP, CIRDAP, Dhaka, 2004. 9. Rowntree, B. S. Poverty: A Study of Town Life, Macmillan, London, 1991. 10. Saha,S.K. ‘The Political Economy of the Labour Market in Bangladesh’ in Employment and Labour Market Dynamics: A Review of Bangladesh’s Development 2002, UPL, Dhaka, 2003. 11. Sen, A. Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981. 12. Titmus, R.M. Commitment to Welfare, Allen and Unwin, London, 1968. 13. Townsend, P. et al. The Concept of Poverty, Heineman, London, 1970. 14. Poverty in the United Kingdom, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979. 15. Tussing, A. D. Poverty in a Dual Economy, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1975. 16. Abrahamson, P. Social Exclusion in Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles, Paper presented at ESF Conference, March 1996, Blarney, Ireland. 17. Asian Development Bank, Addressing Poverty in Bangladesh: Bangladesh, Economic Policy Paper; ADB RMB, Dhaka, 2000. 18. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Population Census 2001: National Report, (Provisional) BGP, Dhaka, 2003. 19. Report on Labour Force Survey 2002-03, BGP, Dhaka, 2004. 20. Agriculture Sample Survey of Bangladesh-2005, BGP, Dhaka, 2005. 21. Preliminary Report on Household Income & Expenditure, Survey-2005, BGP, Dhaka, 2006. 22. ICDDR’B, IPHN, NIPORT Base Line Survey 2004, National Nutrition Programme Report, mimeo, NNP, Dhaka, 2005. 23. Like-Minded Group, Rural Poverty in Bangladesh: A Report to the Like Minded Group, UPL, Dhaka, 1990. 24. Miller, S.M. and Roby, P, Poverty: Changing Social Stratification in Townsend, 1971. 25. Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Bangladesh, BGP, Dhaka, 2001. 26. Economic Survey of Bangladesh, BGP, Dhaka, 2006. 27. M/o LGRD&C, Project Proforma for Rural Maintenance Programme, mimeo, Dhaka, 1995. 28. Project Proforma for Rural Maintenance Programme (Third Revision), mimeo, Dhaka, 2000. 218 29. Project Proforma for Rural Maintenance Programme (Fourth Revision), mimeo, Dhaka, 2003. 30. United Nations, The Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action: World Summit for Social Development, UN Department of Publication, New York, 1995. 31. UNDP, Human Development Report 1990: Concept and Measurement of Human Development, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990. 32. Human Development Report, Human Development to Eradicate Poverty, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997. 33. Westergaard, K. Pauperization and Rural Women in Bangladesh: A Case Study BARD, Comilla, 1983. 34. World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty, World Bank, Washington DC, 1990. 35. Empowerment and Poverty Reduction: A Source Book, World Bank, Washington. DC, 2002 219 Evaluating the Rural Maintenance Programme as a Poverty Reduction Strategy Author Md. Ataur Rahman completed his Masters in Economics from Rajshahi University. He joined the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration Cadre) on 19th June 1983. He has held various positions under different ministries both in field administration and the Secretariat. After receiving promotion to the post of Joint Secretary on 5th March 2005, he was posted to the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs and later transferred to the Economic Relations Division (ERD) under the Ministry of Finance. Before that he served as Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Industries; Director (Administration), Bangladesh Television (BTV); Deputy Secretary, Local Government Division under M/O Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives. He also served as Deputy Director, Export Promotion Bureau; Additional Deputy Commissioner, Dinajpur; Senior Assistant Secretary, M/O Commerce; Senior Assistant Secretary, Local Government Division; Assistant Director, General Education Project, M/O Primary Education; Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), Baghmara, Rajshahi; Land Acquisition Officer (LAO), Rajshahi and Barisal and Upazila Magistrate, Kahaloo, under the district of Bogra. He attended many training programmes home and abroad and presented the country in few seminars. He visited Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, USA, Thailand, Hong Kong, China, UK and led a Bangladesh delegation to Germany for biannual aid negotiation from ERD. His hobbies are reading, watching TV and listening to classical and instrumental music. He is married to Rokshana Ferdausi, now a Deputy Secretary to the Government. The couple have two daughters, Medha Monjaury, 16, and Krietee Monjaury, 12. 220 SOCIO-CULTURAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE AND POLITICAL VIEWS OF AN ETHNIC COMMUNITY: A CASE STUDY OF TWO SELECTED VILLAGES IN MOULVI BAZAR DISTRICT Additional Secretary Md. Zahurul Alam, ndc “Hindu-Muslim relations in Manipur are a lodestar for the rest of India. The Muslims in the land came from outside, found wives among the local womenfolk and settled down. The Maharajas did not treat them as aliens”. - A. R. Constantine: Manipur: Maid of the Mountains As it is obvious from the quotation above, it can hardly be overemphasized that development and security depend on a better understanding of the dreams and desires of the mainstream population as well as those of the ethnic groups. Article- 28 (1) of our constitution declares, “The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth”.1 Most recent publication of draft Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, entitled, Unlocking the Potential, while highlighting issues like Participation, Social Inclusion and Empowerment, has correctly pointed out these aspects under the heading Supporting Strategies. The section of PRSP that deals with Tribal People (TP) issues, expresses the view that in the social development inclusion framework the tribal people of the country are not effectively included in the development actors – whether as contributors or as beneficiaries. The sense of social, political or economic deprivation felt by the tribal people has been highlighted in the draft PRSP.2 The words Manipuri and Meitei are synonymous with each other, except for drawing a conceptual line of demarcation between the Manipuri Muslims and Manipuri Hindus/Sanamahis, in the discipline of Meiteiology. And there are differences for sure and so is for our present study too. The prevailing sense of mistrust, exclusion, discrimination, insecurity and deprivation etc. which are mentioned in the draft PRSP, can be addressed if a congenial atmosphere prevails. If studies are carried out sociologically, the wholeness of the real life situation of a community gets unfolded. The aim of this article is to explore socio-economic, socio cultural, socio- political along with brief historical aspects of the community. While dealing with their political views, attempts have been made to assess whether that poses any direct or indirect threat to our national security. 1. The Constitution of The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, The British Council Bangladesh, Dhaka, p.24 2. General Economic Division, Planning Commission, Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accel- erated Poverty Reduction, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2004, Pp.136-137 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MEITEIS Manipuris of Bangladesh The Manipuris inhabit the Northeastern districts of Sylhet, Moulvibazar, Sunamgonj and Habigonj in Bangladesh. Historians believe the Manipuris are the original inhabitants of the Northeastern Indian State of Manipur. According to Tanubabu,3 “Manipuris are living in Bangladesh since 18th century in four districts of Sylhet Division, located in North-eastern part of Bangladesh.” Political incidents, such as war with Burma and annexation by the British colonists, etc. led the Manipuris to migrate to different places in India and Bangladesh. They came to this country mainly between 1819 and 1826 AD. Meiteis belong to Mongoloid race. Their language belongs to the Tibetan-Burmese branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. It has similarity and historical connection with Kuki-Chin language family. A section of Manipuris of Bangladesh are Muslim, known as Pangan. Their language is similar to those of the Meiteis but physical features are not.4 Sheram5 maintains that during the reign of Maharaj Garibniwaz (1709-1748), some missionaries went to mainland Manipur from Sylhet. There is a view among researchers or meteiologists that these missionaries named the land ‘Manipur’. Meiteiologists’ View A sovereign state of the past and a northeastern state of present India, Manipur, was the homeland of the Manipuris of Bangladesh, one of the many ethnic communities of the country. ‘Manipur’ literally means the city or the land of gems. During the course of historical developments Manipur was known by different names, such as Mekhala or Mekhali, Kangleipak, Poireipak and Metrabak.6 The present name ‘Manipur’ was first officially introduced in the eighteenth century when Garibnewaz was reigning. 3. Tanubabu, Hamom, op cit. p.2 4. Source: http://www.weeklyholiday.net/2005/220705/cul.html Accessed on 26-03-2006 (10:04pm) 5. Sheram, A.K., “The Manipuri”, in Islam, Sirajul and Sajahan Miah (Eds), BANGLAPEDIA: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, Vol. 6, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2003, p.409 6. Kabui, Gangmumei, History of Manipur: Precolonial Period, Volume-I, National Publishing House, New Delhi: 1991, p.1 222 Parratt and Parratt7 quote from Grimwood’s description of Manipur in his My Three Years in Manipur, as follows.8 In order to know the Ethnic Community under study from different angles it is essential to have some idea about the Mainland Manipuries, the Meiteis, including the genesis and evolution of the term Meitei. Kabui, at the very outset of his book on the history of Manipur, states in the preface “The History of Manipur is the story of the evolution of the culture and society of a remarkable people who built up their cradle of civilization in Manipur valley amidst the mountain ranges that divide India and Burma. The beautiful valley of Imphal9 which is situated on the trade and migration route between South Asia and South East Asia was a valley of cultural assimilation of the varied people who came to this hilly country in search of land, fortune, better living and glory.”10 He goes on to maintain which is given in footnote.11 It follows from above that history, culture, religion, ethnicity, tradition etc. have intermingled with one another in the process of making of the history of Manipuris. 7. Parratt, Jhon and Saroj N. Arambam Parratt, Queen Empress vs.Tikendrajit Prince of Manipur: The Anglo-Ma- nipuri Conflict of 1891, Har-Anand Publications & Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, New Delhi: 1992, p.11 8. “A pretty place, more beautiful than many of the show places of the world; beautiful in its habitable parts, but more beautiful in those tracts covered with forest where the foot of man seldom treads.” 9. Present capital city of the North-East Indian State of Manipur. 10. Kabui, Gangmumei, op.cit. 1991, p. vii. 11. Manipur was a cradle of human civilization and creativity which has come under the influence of many cultures of many different ethnic groups who came at various times and contributed to the growth of the civilization in this hilly state in India’s north eastern frontier. Manipur being a gateway of India to South East Asia, was influenced by her geographic situation and ecology in the shaping of her history and cultural development. (ibid, p.1) 223 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE COMMUNITY During a previous study conducted by the researcher almost in the same study-area, it was found that Manipuris of Bangladesh do have poverty, in some cases ‘abject poverty’. Following is a brief discussion based on data collected from the study area, it is found that Meitei households have higher incomes, on average, compared to Muslim households. Percentage of Manipuri Muslims and Meitei in the study area is 66.67% and 33.33% respectively. Manipuri Muslims have larger family size compared to Meiteis—97% of Muslim households have family size of 4 or more, as compared to 85% of Meitei households. Distribution of the Respondents by Family Size and Religion Table-1 Family Muslim Hindu / Sanamahi Total Size (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) 1-3 1 2.5 3 15 4 6.67 4-6 25 62.5 14 70 39 65 6+ 14 35 3 15 17 28.33 Total 40 100 20 100 60 100 Meitei households have higher incomes, on average, compared to Muslim households—60 percent of Meitei families have annual income above Tk 40,000, compared to 40 percent of Muslim families. Distribution of the Respondents by Annual Family Income (Taka) and Religion Table-2 Income Group Muslim Hindu / Sanamahi Total (in Taka) (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) 1-20000 6 15 1 5 7 11.67 20001-40000 18 45 7 35 25 41.67 40001-60000 7 17.5 4 20 11 18.33 60001-80000 2 5 2 10 4 6.67 80000+ 7 17.5 6 30 13 21.67 Total 40 100 20 100 60 100 224 Distribution of the Respondents by Number of Children and Religion Table-3 Number of Muslim Hindu / Sanamahi Total Children (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) Still Single 1 2.5 1 5 2 3.33 0-2 14 35 8 40 22 36.67 3-4 17 42 7 35 24 40 4+ 8 20 4 20 12 20 Total 40 100 20 100 60 100 The above Table-03 shows that Manipuri Muslims tend to have more children—62% of Muslim families have 3 children or more, as compared to 55% of Meitei families; whereas the following Table-4 shows that Meitei households have higher incomes, on average, compared to Muslim households—60 percent of Meitei families have annual income above Tk 40,000, compared to 40 percent of Muslim families. Distribution of the Respondents by Annual Family Income (Taka) and Religion Table-4 Income Group Muslim Hindu / Sanamahi Total (in Taka) (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) 1-20000 6 15 1 5 7 11.67 20001-40000 18 45 7 35 25 41.67 40001-60000 7 17.5 4 20 11 18.33 60001-80000 2 5 2 10 4 6.67 80000+ 7 17.5 6 30 13 21.67 Total 40 100 20 100 60 100 225 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District Distribution of the Respondents by Illiterate Family Members and Religion Table-5 Illiterate Muslim Hindu / Sanamahi Total Family Members (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) 0 12 30 7 35 19 31.67 1 12 30 9 45 21 35 2 10 25 4 20 14 23.33 3 4 10 0 0 4 6.67 4 1 2.5 0 0 1 1.67 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 2.5 0 0 1 1.67 Total 40 100 20 100 60 100 Table-5 depicts that percentage of Manipuri Muslims is higher than Meiteis in categories having greater number of illiterate family members. While Meitei families have at most two illiterate family members, 15% of Muslim families have three or more illiterate family members. As regards their landholding pattern, it is apparent from Table-6 that Manipuri Muslim families have lower- size landholdings—77.5% of Muslim families have landholdings of 200 decimals or less, compared to 60% of Meitei families. Distribution of the Respondents by Total Land (in Decimal) and Religion Table-6 Land Group Muslim Hindu / Sanamahi Total (in Decimal) (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) 0-100 23 57.5 3 15 26 43.33 101-200 8 20 9 45 17 28.33 201-300 2 5 6 30 8 13.33 301-400 4 10 2 10 6 10 401-500 1 2.5 0 0 1 1.67 500+ 2 5 0 0 2 3.33 Total 40 100 20 100 60 100 226 Distribution of the Respondents by Occupation and Ability to Save Table-7 Yes No Total Occupation (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) Farmer 6 33.33 25 59.52 31 51.67 Business 5 27.78 2 4.76 7 11.67 Service 6 33.33 0 - 6 10 Carpenter 0 - 2 4.76 2 3.33 Day Laborer 0 - 11 26.19 11 18.33 Others 1 5.56 2 4.76 3 5 Total 18 100 42 100 60 100 Percentage 30.00 70.00 Table-7 reveals that 30% of the respondents stated to have the ability to save. Of them, 33% are farmers, and 61% are businessmen or service holders. Since business or service yields higher incomes than farming, this implies that the ability to save increases with income. Of the 70% of the respondents who said that they do not have the ability to save, 60% were farmers and 26% day labourers. Table-8 reveals that a greater percentage of Manipuri Muslims claim to have some ability to save compared to their Meitei counterparts. Interestingly enough, it is apparent from Table-9 below that Meiteis are more interested in making contributions to cultural activities than the Manipuri Muslims. Distribution of the Respondents by Ability to Save and Religion Table-8 Ability to Muslim Hindu / Sanamahi Total Save (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) Yes 13 32.5 5 25 18 30 No 27 67.5 15 75 42 70 Total 40 100 20 100 60 100 227 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District Respondents by Religion and Willingness to Donate for Cultural Activities Table-9 Willingness Muslim Hindu/Sanamahi Total to Donate (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) Yes 14 35 15 75 29 48.33 No 26 65 5 25 31 51.67 Total 40 100.00 20 100.00 60 100.00 Distribution by Mode of Spending/Saving Their Earned Money and Religion Table-10 Hindu / Muslim Total Mode of Spending/ Sanamahi Saving (f) (%) (f) (%) (f) (%) Spending For 40 100 20 100 60 100 Family Contribution to 14 35 15 75 29 48.33 Cultural Activities Deposit to Bank 10 25 6 30 16 26.67 Purchase of Land 5 12.5 3 15 8 13.33 Out of 100% Out of 100% Out of 100% Total 40 at 40 20 at 20 60 at 60 In terms of mode of spending, all families do, incur normal household expenditures. Apart from that, Meiteis have a much greater tendency to make cultural contributions. This may imply that Meiteis are culturally more conscious and concerned than Muslims, which indicates that millennia-old religio-cultural evolution of the Meiteis have left a permanent imprint in their social mind. 228 SOCIO-CULTURAL PROFILE OF THE COMMUNITY Cultural Background This community grew with the growth of its cultural trends and traits, which shaped their norms and values, religious belief system, their polity ans society, psychological bent of their ‘social mind’, taboos and socio-cultural sanctions, in a word, every aspect of their existence. Their ‘cultural uniquness’ is manifested in all possible spheres of the life right from birth to death which, in Sharma’s12 view, didn’t have to wait for the western renaissance to come and teach them. An extraordinarily high degree of sense of self-dignity derivative of their core cultural values system has been embodied in their behavioral pattern and has taken possibly the deepest possible roots in their ‘social mind’. Manipuri Language Manipuri Language is about 3,500 years old and belongs to the Kuki-chin group of the Tibeto-Burmese stream of the Mongoloid family of languages. In the original Moitoi language there were 18 alphabets.13 Other alphabets were added later. Alphabets are similar to the Tibetan family. The Manipuri language began to be written in Bangla script during the days of Maharaja Garib Newaz in 18th century due to phonetic closeness of the two languages.14 Meiteis have been using Bangla script for last two and a half centuries. 12. Sharma, B.I., In the confluence of cultures, The Daily Telegarph, Kolkata, Date: July 30, 2004, Source: http://www.northeastvigil.com/articles/index.php?itemid=92Accessed on 15-04-2006 (At 11:52 AM) 13. It seems that the author of this article might have intended to mean letters by using the word alphabets. As is found in the Bookman-Franklin Electronic Dictionary, ‘letter’ means ‘unit of an alphabet’. 14. Nawaz, Ali, “Tribal Culture”, in Islam, Sirajul and Sajahan Miah (Eds), BANGLAPEDIA: National Ency- clopedia of Bangladesh, Vol. 10, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2003, p.213 229 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District Religion The religious history of the Meiteis can be divided into following periods including (1) Pre-Hinduism and (2) Hinduism and (3) Revivalist Movement of the traditional Meitei religion popularly known as Sanamahism.15 The essence of their cultural uniqueness lies in Hindu-Muslim harmony as mentioned by Constantine.16 “Every ceremony and almost all aspects of day-to-day life of the Manipuris has a religio-cultural orientation.”17 Manikchand18 writes, “(t)he Meiteis have their own system of religion, which has its own myths and legends, gods and goddesses, priests and priestesses, rituals and festivals etc. The religion centres around their belief in a Supreme Being.” The Meiteis of the study area are the followers of two religions; Islam and Hindu/Sanamahism. About three hundred years ago, they used to follow their traditional religion i.e. Sanamahism. Manipuri Non-Muslims practice their ancestral religion Sanamahism wholeheartedly in their homestead, while outside they practice Hinduism (for more19). In fact, the original religion of the Meiteis that their ancestors had been practicing since time immemorial was animistic. Singh20 et al writes21 as follows. And Manikchand opines in following way.22 Manipuri Community under study has been practicing high degree of religious harmony among the Meiteis and the Manipuri Muslims. 15. Nilabir, Sairem, “The Revivalist Movement of Sanamahism”, in N. Sanajaoba (ed), Sanajaoba, N.(ed) , Manipur Past and Present: The Ordeals and Heritage of a Civilisation, Vol.II (Philosophy, Culture and Literature), Mittal Publications, New Delhi: 1991, p.109 16. Source: http://www.kanglaonline.com/index.php?template=kshow&kid=47 Accessed on 25-03-2006 (09:53pm) 17. Sharma, B.I., In the confluence of cultures, op cit, (ttp://www.northeastvigil.com/articles/ index. php?itemid=9) 18. Manikchand, Dr. Konsom, op cit, 1988, p.145 19. Source: http://manipuri.itgo.com/intro.html#top Accessed on 25-03-2006 (05:02pm): The Manipuri Reli- gion is said to be the oldest organized religion of Southeast Asia. Manipuri religion is Open, Universal in outlook and without any founder prophet or any holy book. The deeply philosophical Manipuri religion propounds the universal concept of equality of mankind that all human made on the image of God, in other words all human are made equal since there is only one creator. 20. Singh, L. Jeetendro, N. Biraj Singh and Abhik Gupta, Environmental Ethics In The Culture Of Meiteis, (Source: http://manipuri.itgo.com/intro.html#top Accessed on 25-03-2006 (05:02pm) 21. “Worship of nature and its various components forms an important part of the Meitei religious practices. However, the original animistic religion of the Meiteis was largely replaced by Hindu Vaishnavism in the 18th century.” 22. Hinduism couldn’t destroy nor sweep away the timeless Meitei religion and culture, rather, Meiteis rejected many of the tenets of Hinduism keeping up most of their own traditional basic elements, which formed the core of the Meitei religion. 230 Customs and Traditions Meiteis have deep respect for their traditional religion. Their customs and traditions conform to their religious ethics and aesthetics woven in a highly balanced pattern and fashion, which covers whole gamut of the events from pre- birth stage of a life to post-death funerals. Laiharaoba: “Of all the Meitei religious ceremonies, the Lai Haraoba, literally ‘Pleasing the gods’, is the most important. In this, the beliefs, expectations and hopes of the people are reflected”.23 This ceremony celebrates the God’s (Sanamahi/Ashiba) joy of creation of universe. The Maibas (Priests) and Maibis (Pristesses) come from mainland Manipur, who determine the length of such ceremony – normally ranging from one to two weeks. Their growing concern about their traditional religion indicates that Meiteis are getting increasingly inclined to their quest for roots. Manipuri Dances: The Manipuri classical and folk dances and folksongs are lauded worldwide and have occupied a special place in the Bengali culture. Generally, the Manipuri Dance is divided into two main groups, folk dance and classical dance. Laiharauba, Khamba-thoibi, Thable Chongba, Maibi Jagoi, Leima Jagoi dances are categorized as folk dance; whereas, Ras Lila is classical. Ras Lila: The Rush/Ras is the biggest among Manipuri festivals. In 1776, the devoted Vaisnav, Rajrishi Bhagyachandra, established the Govindaji temple and inaugurated the divine idol of Radha Krishna and introduced the dance. Beauty lies in the movements and the fixation of eyes is to the point of the tips of the fingers of dancers. It fixed only at, not higher than forty-five degree above, a distance of about three meters. The artist never looks at any person or audience as a mark of concentration to the Lord surrendering the outward world and illusions of Maya and also giving up all lust, greed, anger, envy, hatred and pride of the Gopies. Birth: On the delivery of the child, the attending maiba and other maibis use to perform rituals of birth. Umbilical cord of the child is cut ritually with the sharp edge of bamboo piece by the maibi24 The pregnant mothers are allowed to take any foodstuffs. On a particular day fixed by the Brahmins a sacred ceremony known as Savasti Puja is conducted on the birth of a child. Depending on the financial solvency, the women from mother’s family of the child join in traditional dress like saffron, fanek, white endi or silk shawl. Presents brought by them include foodstuffs and clothes for both the child and mother. In this procession men follow the women as symbol of honour. 23. Source: http://www.kanglaonline.com/index.php?template=kshow&kid=66& Accessed on 09-04-2006 (01:37am) 24. Bhagyachandra, L., “The Meetei Rites and Rituals”, in Naorem Sanajaoba (ed), Manipur: Past and Present: The Ordeals and Heritage of a Civilisation, Volume-II: (Pgilosophy, Culture and Literature), Mittal Publica- tions, New Delhi: 1991, p.128 231 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District Marriage: “Ordinarily, there cannot be marriage between a girl and a youth belonging to the same yek (salai). A formal traditional marriage has certain stages to pass through.”25 In fact, intra-clan marriages are strictly prohibited but inter- clan marriages are allowed. Hodson26 writes as follows.27 Manipuris do not want to confront criticism by samaj. Mannan28 describes samaj as follows.29 Whereas Jahangir30 describes it in the same manner. The same is true of the Manipuris under study. “Polygamy is allowed but polyandry is disapproved socially. In the present day the trend is mostly to have only one wedded wife. A widow cannot marry her husband’s brother. Divorce is very uncommon.”31 “Early child marriages are unknown. In ancient Manipur, there were no strict rules for the marriage. … Then laws of marriage also developed gradually.”32 Rich or Poor, Manipuris maintain cleanliness in attending and participating in ceremonies of marriage and others. This ‘participation’ itself is very important social phenomenon. Reception of the guests is very simple and formal. Only sweets are distributed among the guests. Bride’s dress is very decorative known as Raslila Skirt, which is obligatory. They spend very minimum amount and avoid any wastage or extravagancy. Dowry is not obligatory but optional depending on the ability of the girl’s parents. Family: Manipuris do have patriarchy in their family structure, which was not an eternal phenomenon at all. Rather, the patriarchy gradually but partially replaced original Matriarchy with the introduction of Hinduism. Both joint as well as nuclear families are found in the villages. Head of the family is called Karta (in Bangla) or Yumburen (in Manipuri Language). Death: Since the early primitive stage there had been rituals observed in connection with death of an individual. King “Kangba’s future generations began to bury the dead in a specified place called Mongfam. Cremation was little known to the Meiteis”33 before Hinduism. Their after-death-rites are almost same as those of the Hindus. 25. ibid, p.129 26. Hodson, T.C., The Meitheis, Low Price Publications, Delhi, 1908 (Reproduced in 1993), p.75 27. “The Meitheis are exogamous as regards the clans or saleis into which they are divided, but are endoga- mous as regards members of others.” 28. Mannan, M.A., Rural Leadership and its Emerging Pattern in Bangladesh, Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, Comilla, 1972, p.4 29. Though the samaj is an informal body, it is the basic element of social organizations in the villages. It car- ries out important social, ceremonial and economic functions. 30. Jahangir, B.K., Differentiation, Polarization and Confrontation In Rural Bangladesh, Centre for Social Studies, Dacca, 1979, Pp.87-88 31. Source: http://www.webindia123.com/MANIPUR/PEOPLE/customs1.htm Accessed on 15-04-2006 32. Devi, K.B., “Manipuri Woman – A Study”, in Sanajaoba, Naorem (ed.) Manipur : Past and Present ( The Heritage and Ordeals of a Civilization), Vol. I, History, Polity & Law, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 1988, p.160. 33. Bhagyachandra, L., op cit, 1991, Pp.132-32 232 Manipuri Women: “Outsiders never go back from Manipur without praising the hard working qualities of the Manipuri woman.”34 There was a custom in the Manipuri society35 that anyone sentenced to death was occasionally reprieved if a large number of women appeared to intercede for him. It showed that women were held in high esteem in Manipuri society. Captain E. W. Dun writes,36 “They are very industrious. It would be difficult to find a more industrious woman in India than the Manipuri.” In another book, “My Three Years in Manipur”, Grimwood, is stated37 to have written, “The Manipuris do not shut up their women … and they are much more enlightened and intelligent in consequence.” Devi writes, “Manipuri women thus played a major role in the productive process of the state … Cleanliness again is another virtue for Manipuri women. … Majority of them are early-risers. In every house, one always finds the floors of the house … very clean. … majority of the women population are still engaging in small internal trade and commerce, weaving, agricultural and other domestic works. … Female labour … has been the normal feature of Manipuri society from time immemorial.”38 Dalton39 further endorses this finding saying, “(The Manipuri Women) have the entire management of the household in their hands and do most of the outdoor as well as indoor work, including all the marketing”. As regards the Beauty of the Manipuri women, Devi writes,40 “Majority of the women have fair complexion of a yellowish colour. They are more alike the women of Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, China and Japan. Some of the Manipuri girls are very pretty and they may be classed as Asian Beauty… They have jolly brown eyes.” During this study the above comments have been found to be true for Bangladeshi Manipuri women too. Hodson also observes the same way, “The women hold a high and free position in Manipur, all the internal trade and exchange of the produce of the country being managed by them ... The women weave all the cloths, and all girls whose position is at all respectable learn to dance, for in Manipur the dancing profession is often a road to dignity …”41 It follows from the above quotations that at a certain point in time, when the means of production was under womens’ control they had a command over the society and family. Some kind of matriarchy might have had prevailed, which is revealed by the ancient worship of number of goddesses. Besides, a high degree of self-respect had grown, and is still continuing to prevail, in their inner psyche, to finally become a part and parcel to their socio-civic conscience. 34. Devi, K.B, op cit, 1988, p.160. 35. Rakesh, Manipur is Aflame, Source: http://www.peoplesmarch.com/archives/2005/feb2k5/Manipur. htm Accessed on 24 March 2006. 36. Dun, Captain E.W., As quoted in Devi, K.B, op cit, 1988, p.160 37. ibid, p.160 38. ibid, Pp.160-61 39. Dalton, E.T., Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal, Cosmo Publications, Delhi, 1973, p.55 40. op cit, Devi, K.B., 1988, p.163 41. Hodson, T.C, op cit, 1908 (Reprinted in 1993), p.23 233 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District Manipuri Houses: Colonel McCulloch observed the houses of the Meiteis were all of the same form. The Manipuris conceived of the House in conformity of the human limbs. Colonel McCulloch, as quoted in Hodson,42 “The dwelling houses of the Munniporees are all of the same form ... All the dwelling houses face to the eastward, in which direction they have a large open verandah”. Same is the case with the Manipuri houses under this study area. The style dates back to their past. SOCIO-POLITICAL VIEWS OF THE MEITEIS Structural interviews containing eighteen questions were conducted with the respondents to assess their attitudinal awareness of mainland Manipuri politics and also their preparedness to make any active contribution whatsoever. The questions include, among others, the most recent ones regarding Manorama killing, hunger strike unto death of Sharmila Chanu and ceasefire issue between Indian Government and National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). Besides, from amongst past issues, they were asked about victorious Anglo- Manipuri women-war of 1939 to assess their sense of pride and prejudice and their concerns. The findings are discussed: Manipuri Muslims are indifferent about political matters, whereas, the Meiteis are a little more concerned about mainland politics. In fact, they all are indifferent due to lack of awareness about at least the ceasefire issue. But, in respect of the Tipaimukh dam both the religious sects express their deep concern. It is found that Manipuri Muslims have no idea about this Manorama killing issue of the mainland Manipur. On the contrary, the Meiteis are much more concerned about the issue. Similarly, it is observed that although both the religious sects of the study area are considerably aware of this widely circulated issue of Sharmila Chanu’s fast-unto-death-strike in mainland Manipur, the Hindu/Sanamahis (the Meiteis) show much higher level of awareness in this regard. It also appears that attitudinally both the sects of our study area take pride about the victorious Anglo- Manipuri war fought by the Manipuri women in 1939. Meiteis are more concerned about this historical issue. In response to a question all the Meitei respondents said that they confronted no odd situation in Bangladesh like their mainlander counterparts. It follows from above that the respondents are not adequately aware about the politics of mainland Manipur. One of the reasons behind asking aforementioned questions was to assess whether or to what extent the Manipuris under study have been concerned with and anxious about the political activities and movements of the mainland Manipuris. Regarding the question whether they 42. Hodson, T.C, op cit, 1908 (Reprinted in 1993), 1993, p.25 234 harbour any mainlander counterparts to help them any way and, thereby, pose any indirect external threat to our country, level of their awareness about politics, doesn’t allow the researcher to believe that our respondents can be involved in such activities. It seems that any such activity is improbable, at least, in so far as this particular investigative research is concerned. CONCLUSION On the basis of the basic findings as stated above, it may reasonably be asserted that the Manipuris of the villages under study are culturally aware due to their life long exposure to those cultural activities. They are born and brought up in an environment that is endowed with the elements of cultural awareness. Similarly the Meiteis possess a unique kind of value system infused in their conscience by the socio-cultural environment itself that enables them to grow as appreciably good human souls. No matter how poor or how illiterate they are, they have strong and sincere sense of harmonious belongingness to their community. Bangladeshi Manipuris are a peace loving, self-reliant and hardworking community with high sense of self dignity, who maintain imitable kind of civic and aesthetic sense. In their community life the social cohesion that they maintain is something that many of the developed and forerunner societies have only recently started to conceptualize. We believe that the greater cultural arena may benefit by trying to learn from their nice neighbours. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Alam, Md. Zahurul, Role of Manipuri Community in Alleviating Poverty: A case Study of Konagaon Village from Sociological Viewpoint, (An Unpublished Research Paper Prepared for the 41st Senior Staff Course), Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC), Savar, Dhaka, 2005. 2. Alam, Md. Zahurul, Role of Rural Leaders in the Process of Modernization: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Rajshahi District, (An Unpublished Thesis), Rajshahi University, Rajshahi, 1981. 3. Bessaignet, P.(ed), Social Research in East Pakistan, Asiatic Society of Pakistan, Dacca, 1964. 4. Blalock, Ann Bonar and Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Introduction to Social Research, Division, Planning Commission, Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2004. 235 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District 5. de Sola Pool, Ithiel. Trends in Content Analysis. University of Illinois Press, Urbana: 1959. (http://www.colostate.edu/Depts/WritingCenter/references/ research/content/page2.htm). 6. Dooley, David, Social Research Methods, Fourth Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc, New Jersey, 2001. 7. Genaral Economics Division, Planning Commission, Unlocking the Potential: National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction (Draft), Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 2004. 8. General Economic Social Capital: A Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 2002. 9. Golden-Biddle, Karen & D. Locke, Karen, Composing Qualitative Research, SAGE Publications, New Delhi, 1997. 10. Goode, W.J. and Hatt, P.K. (eds), Methods in Social Rearch, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., Tokyo, 1952. 11. Gopal, M.H., An Introduction to Research Procedure in Social Sciences, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1970. 12. Haq, M.N., Gram Sarker in Historical Perspective, Bogra: Ruural Development Academy. 1980. 13. Haq, M.N., Village Development in Bangladesh, Commilla: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1978. 14. Hodson, T.C., The Meitheis, Low Price Publications, Delhi, 1993. 15. Indramani, Naoroibam, Meitei Yumsarol, N.I. Publications, Imphal, 1995. 16. Kabui, Gangmumei, History of Manipur: Precolonial Period, Volume-I, National Publishing House, New Delhi: 1991. 17. Khan, F.R., Principles of Sociology, Shirin Publications, Dhaka, 1969. 18. Khanzode, V.V., Research Methodology: Techniques and Trends, APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 2002. 19. Madge, J., The tools of Social Science, Longman Group Ltd., London, 1976. 20. May, Tim, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process – Third Edition, Open University Press, Maidenhead: 2001. 21. Moser, C.A. and G.Kalton, Survey Methods in Social Investigation, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London, 1971. 22. Nath Mukharji, Pantha, Methodology in Social Research, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd, 2000. 23. Osipov, G., Sociology: Problems of Theory and Method, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969. 236 24. P. Warwick, Donald & Bulmer, Martin, Social Research in Developing Countries, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1993. 25. Pande, Prof. G.C., Research Methodology in Social Sciences, Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi: 1999. 26. Parratt, Jhon and Saroj N. Arambam Parratt, Queen Empress vs.Tikendrajit Prince of Manipur: The Anglo-Manipuri Conflict of 1891, Har-Anand Publications & Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, New Delhi: 1992. 27. Parratt, John, Wounded Land: Politics and Identity in Modern Manipur, Mittal Publication, 2005. 28. Quibria, M.G., The Puzzle of Social Capital: A Critical Review, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 2003. 29. Saha, Bimal K., Socio-economic Effects of Technological Changes in Agriculture: A Study of Two Villages in Bangladesh, (An unpublished M.Phil Thesis), Institute of Bangladesh Studies (IBS), Rajshahi University, Rajshahi: 1978. 30. Sanajaoba, N.(Ed.), Manipur: Past and Present: The Heritage and Ordeals of a Civilization: Volume-I, History, Polity, & Law, Mittal Publications, Delhi, 1988. 31. Sanajaoba, N.(Ed.), Manipur: Past and Present: The Heritage and Ordeals of a Civilization: Volume-II, Philosophy, Culture & Literature, Mittal Publications, Delhi, 1991. 32. Sanajaoba, N.(Ed.), Manipur: Treaties and Documents (1110-1971), Volume- one, Mittal Publications, Delhi, 1993. 33. Selltiz, C. et al., Research Methods in Social Relation, Methuen & Co. Ltd., New York, 1971. 34. Sheram, A.K., Bangladesher Manipuri: Troyee Shongskritir Tribenee Shongomey, Agaamee Prokaashonee, Dhaka: 1996. 35. Singh, N.Khelchandra., Documents of Anglo-Manipuri War 1891, Part-I, N. Debendra Singh, Imphal, 36. Sultana, M.A., Snaotal Sansktite Khristo-Dhormer Provaab: Rajshahi Jelaar Panchti Graamer Upor Ekti Nritaattik Gobeshona, ( An Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis), Institute of Bangladesh Studies, Rajshahi University, Rajshahi, 2002. 37. The British Council Bangladesh, The Constitution of The People’s Republic of Bangladesh (As modified up to 30th April, 1996), Dhaka. 38. Zaidi, S.M. Hafeez, The Village Cultural in Transition: A Study of East Pakistan Rural Society, East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1970. 237 Socio-cultural and Socio-economic Profile and Political Views of an Ethnic Community: A Case Study of Two Selected Villages in Moulvi Bazar District Author Md. Zahurul Alam, ndc, born on 15 June 1954, passed SSC and HSC examinations in 1970 and 1972 both in First Division. He passed BA (Honours) and MA (Final) in Sociology from Rajshahi University securing 2nd and 1st position respectively. Securing 8th position in Combined Merit List of BCS-1982 examination Mr. Alam joined BCS (Taxation) Cadre on 27 October 1983. A life-long student of Society and Culture and a cultural activist, he has quite a few sociological research works to his credit. At the moment he is doing his M.Phil. under the National University. Trainings, among others, include: (1) 8th Foundation Training Course, COTA, (2) Departmental Training Course, NBR, (3) International Seminar on Taxation, Japan, (4) Procurement Management Course, Italy, (5) Procurement training: Goods and Services, in Turin, Italy and in Dhaka, (6) TOT, BSTD, Dhaka, (7) 41st Senior Staff Course, BPATC, Dhaka and (8) NDC-2006 in Dhaka. Besides, he has traveled India, Pakistan, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Italy, and France mostly in connection with Study Tour, Seminar etc. Mr Alam is happily married to Mrs. Rokeya Khatun Rubee, a civil servant, working as an Additional Commissioner of Taxes, NBR. 238 Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: The Case of Bangladesh Lieutenant General Abu Tayeb Muhammad Zahirul Alam, rcds, psc Air Commodore Mahmud Hussain, ndc, psc “A merely well-informed man is the most useless bore on God’s earth. What we should aim at producing is men who possess both culture and expert knowledge in some special direction. Their expert knowledge will give them ground to start from, and their culture will lead them as deep as philosophy and as high as art.” ------Alfred North Whitehead in The Aims of Education INTRODUCTION The proper function of military education at higher levels of mental cultivation is still imperfectly understood. The kind of debates raised on the issue leaves much to be desired. What needs to be investigated is the purpose of ascertaining the goals necessary in developing the military mind. The problem arises primarily from the nature of the military profession. The profession of war is unique in the sense that it is a rationally expansive field involving a multi- dimensional discipline that has the capacity to absorb ever-expanding realms of dynamic pressure of our time. The simple question of whether war is an art or a science itself poses challenging predicament to the discourse centering on the military’s professional obligations. Before undertaking the task of exploring the true nature of military education, it is imperative to understand the functional environment that the military aims to create through its roles and tasks. The military operates at three levels: tactical, operational and strategic. These levels are also determinants of the kind of training and education that the military as a professional body calls for. The most articulate and technically sound of these is the tactical level where needs and the actions to be undertaken to fulfill them can be clearly delimited. Difficulties arise in the domain of operational and strategic levels because of their many overlapping and nebulous ramifications. In particular, the strategic level functioning of the military is a complex issue where the separation between the military and the non-military parameters impinging upon military exigency, has generated a host of illustrative and interesting themes. Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: the Case of Bangladesh Contemporary ideas about strategic levels of military function are wider and more extensive field of investigation now than it was in the past. The most important notion is to broaden the space of intellectual engagement of top military leaders in the multi-disciplinary intellectual pursuit of knowledge. This encompasses an empathic intertwining of both the state and the individual at the level of rational comprehension. As such, it has to embrace all the dimensions of security ------military, politics, economic, social, diplomatic, technological and environmental. It proliferates into domestic, trans-national, regional and global issues involving vertical and horizontal interplay. It consists of an academic exploration into the civil and military regions of knowledge and endeavours to develop their combined strength so as to cultivate military’s vast expanse of professional landscape. It is this inclusion of non-military aspect into the military domain that makes the military mind of today much more amenable to modern means of education than it was even a decade ago. The changing patterns of societal revolutions have expanded the definition of security beyond traditional domains into non-traditional ones. Both domains have their significance within the national boundary as well as outside it. This growing intellectual pressure on revisioning security has blurred the traditional spatial boundaries of authority or professional expertise for the military as was conceived in traditional security paradigm. At present, a state is required to have senior generals, admirals and air marshals who must be experts on warfare as well as equipped to offer solid advice on security to the political leadership. This societal demand on intellectual and psychical capacities of top military leadership has added a new dimension to military strategy. While at the tactical and operational levels, professional military training mostly deals itself with science, at higher level of strategic planning, they are linked more and more to the realm of art. Such a combination of art as well as science requires modern day military leaders to be not only able commanders in their professional duties but also equipped to cultivate the intellect. The combination ensures that they contribute to statecraft during crises or an emergency. There have been few moments in the history of the Bangladesh military which resembled the present situation where we see a preoccupation with disseminating professional knowledge to its members in a manner that is appropriate and goal- oriented towards achieving excellence. Since all education is aimed at building a rational model, military education in Bangladesh must develop and pursue a distinctive course with a view to producing worthwhile consequences that will fulfill ever-growing professional demands. 240 THE LANDSCAPE OF MILITARY STRATEGIC THOUGHT Military thought on strategy is indebted to two enduring texts: Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Clausewitz’s On War. Despite their antiquity, they provide the cognitive spark that can still illuminate the passion of an inquiring mind. Their relevance lies in their presentation of certain fundamental principles raised almost to the level of objective laws. These laws have not changed over time and are impervious to any distortion. One can only take the risk of negating them at one’s own peril. For example, their brilliance is embodied in the way they envisage war as an instrument of policy, thereby correctly establishing the abidingly umbilical relationship between political objectives and military operations. Thus, this orientation makes strategy an object demanding intellectual mastery and utilization of the state’s resources for the purpose of implementing its policy in war. In other words, military strategy per se cannot perform the task of waging a war; a nation’s entire asset at the material, psychical and physical planes need to be counted. Therefore, military strategy must be viewed as a highly pragmatic and scientifically complex intellectual exercise. It is dependent on geographical, societal, economical, and political realities, as well as on factors that not only train minds to wage war but also educate military professionals to strategize ways how not to wage war or how to orchestrate its peaceful resolution. Its substance lies in producing a unified course of actions that is dependent upon diverse contingencies. The second level of military function is called the operational level. It is the exclusive domain of war-making professionals. It is the testing ground of a general’s ability in directing his forces and marshalling other resources for executing a mission given him through strategic guidance. With regard to warfare, the operational level can be designated as ‘operational art’. This implies that the core military function is embodied in the operational art that is the exclusive domain of generals, admirals and air marshals. Orchestrating war at the operational level, after all, is a highly concerted endeavour, in contemporary times often involving multinational and coalition forces. Excellence and mastery in operational art, therefore, remains the core expertise of the highest level of military professionalism. The ability to co-ordinate forces with resources available in order to converge the right amount and the right time into the designated place of engagement requires extraordinary mental skills. Such skills do not depend merely on scientific education but demands as well judgement resulting from years of arduous and painstaking pursuit of reflective knowledge. In addition, operational art is continually being changed and modified by 241 Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: the Case of Bangladesh Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA). State of art technology, network-centric warfare, Information Communication and Technology (ICT) etc. are important tools of operational art that military professionals need to incorporate and update constantly. The realm of strategy and operational art has been greatly influenced and shaped by changes in the global security paradigm. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new kinds of threats in failed and fragile states have created complex humanitarian emergencies, global terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and internecine ethnic conflicts, gradual decline of inter- state wars and their replacement by global connectivity of warring parties have changed the ways wars are being fought in the last one hundred years. War no longer involves only clashes between two opposing armies. Today, it is difficult to confirm its features within defined boundaries. It could involve a conventional army fighting an unconventional enemy, a state-centric force facing a multi-centric foe or a traditional troop meeting an asymmetric threat. Therefore, the expanded strategic domain, operational art and new threats emerging all the time necessitate that military education be reformed and recast for present day scenarios and exigencies. The Context of Bangladesh The geography of Bangladesh confers upon her a unique position. Spatially, it bestrides two important geographical regions, namely, South Asia and South East Asia. It offers to many the shortest route to trade, commerce, and economic privileges. This is a great advantage to Bangladesh in terms of strategic location. On the other hand, all sides except the south of Bangladesh is bordered by India. Up north and north east, a small distance away across Indian territory lies Nepal and China. Since both India and China are rising powers, and since Bangladesh is adjacent to and in close proximity of these powerful states, it is not immune to the opportunities and challenges facing these two nations. Bangladesh’s location thus has concurrent implications for geo-politics and can give rise to some tensions. The surrounding areas are afflicted by insurgency as is the case with northeast India and in the Arakan state of Myanmar. Bangladesh has also not been spared an irredentist movement in its Southeast region. It has had to fight an insurgency war there, which has been successfully terminated through a peace deal. However, the reemergence of insurgency is still possible, and proximity of the Golden Triangle as a transit route of narco-trafficking and gun-running make Bangladesh susceptible to severe security tensions. 242 As a maritime nation, Bangladesh shares the Bay of Bengal with India and Myanmar. The delimitation of the maritime boundary in this area is an outstanding issue. Bangladesh is sandwiched between these two neighbors and there are potential strategic complications that may arise from any failure in the amicable resolution of maritime boundary and disputes. Bangladesh is also a lower riparian country of the Ganges and Brahmaputra basin system. Like other lower riparian states elsewhere, she is entangled in multi-lateral water management disputes with her neighbours. The overuse and withdrawal of water by upper riparian countries has had serious adverse effects on its eco-system. Global warming and the specter of sea-level rise could submerge one-third of the country. According to some experts, this adds to the challenges facing Bangladesh. As part of the Himalayan and the Bay of Bengal climatic systems, it is prone to floods and cyclones. As a nascent democracy too, Bangladesh faces many domestic challenges. It is still in the category of Least Developing Countries (LDC) and is struggling to meet diverse problems due to lack of equity, employment, low Human Resource Development (HRD), distributive justice, all-pervasive corruption, and undeveloped state institutions. In spite of impressive growth in most of the social indices sustaining a GDP growth of 6 to 6.5 percent over the last decade and also a dynamic civil sector, it is troubled by continuous political instability that is due to lack of democratic practice within political parties, ‘winner takes it all attitude’, non-compromising attitude of the politicians, wanton politicisation of state institutions and absence of competent political leadership. Over-population has also led to unwarranted migration to neighbouring states. The wave of global terrorism and the Afghan fall out have not spared Bangladesh. It has seen the rise of homegrown radical Islam although this threat has been curbed significantly. Nevertheless, there is still the possibility that radicalism may reemerge as a serious threat to internal security of the country unless sustained vigilance is maintained and the reasons that breed radicalism are addressed by serious intellectual examination and at the same time, by undertaking stern measures. These are some of the issues that need to be taken into consideration in revisioning security studies relating to Bangladesh. They suggest that for Bangladesh, economic security and development strategy are linked to its freedom to maneuver at national, regional and international levels. After all, the discourse on national development cannot be seen in isolation. Its ramifications are important for anyone trying to arrive at a holistic perspective. 243 Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: the Case of Bangladesh This is what makes the role of Bangladesh military so significant in adoption of a comprehensive approach towards the question of national security and development. The military’s success in recent years stems from its engagements in the Chittagong Hill Tracts against the insurgency there that has prevented the country its nationhood from becoming prey to any sort of divisiveness. Since the military is a well-organized outfit, it has made a fundamental and effective contribution during national crises such as disaster management, insurgencies and even political deadlocks. Not only domestic crisis, the armed forces have played a laudatory role in the maintenance of global peace and security. At present, it is the second largest troop contributing country for UN peacekeeping mission. In Bangladesh, serving senior military officers take up appointments in civil sectors on deputation, go on ambassadorial appointments and assume higher leadership posts in the United Nations peacekeeping missions. Many senior military generals have taken up key positions in national politics after retirement. The instances cited above of the many roles played by senior military officers, are important in devising a comprehensive curriculum for the training of the officer corps. The ultimate goal of such a curriculum should be to produce leaders, not only for military purposes but also to meet other social needs. Leaders do not emerge in a day. It requires years of experience strengthened by appropriate tools of education to create a leader. No wonder that Plato provided Alexander, the Great, with the intellectual stewardship which led to the latter’s accomplishments. For military leaders to run military establishments in an enlightened manner requires an understanding of subjects that are integral to a military’s institutional development. Merely remaining confined to the teaching of war is too limiting and can never bring about effective results at a time when the traditional security paradigm is gradually giving way to the compulsions of a much broader notion of security. Because of its strategic and domestic imperatives, the military in Bangladesh has to play an important strategic role in addition to its conventional military one. This, in turn, calls for a military education system that should provide knowledge of areas in which the role of the military is directly or indirectly intuited. New Paradigm for Military Education In every age, as paradigm shift has had to adapt to dominant intellectual thinking, so should the military’s outlook. It is the task of the strategic practitioner to mould himself and remain abreast with the theoreticians’ reformulation of 244 social dynamics. If we draw on historical experience, a three-fold typology of the military institution can be framed. The first is the modern type, which dates from the nineteenth century to the end of World War II. The second is the late- modern type, which stretched from the mid-twentieth century to the early 1990s and is coterminous with the Cold war period. The post-modern type is that of the present age and is postulated to continue so into the conceivable future. The post- modernist notion of the military coincides with current post-modernist theory. The term ‘post-modern’ as applied to the military implies significant departure from earlier forms of military organisation. The post-modern military is characterized by three major organizational changes. First, is the shift in military purpose from fighting wars to involvement in roles and tasks that are not considered to be military in the traditional sense. The second is the growing use of the military in multinational forces for peacekeeping operations. These operations entail authorization by agencies from beyond the nation-state. The United Nations, as a global supra-national body, has made a major impact upon the psyche on national militaries and the way they need to conduct themselves at international level. The third is the increasing inter- penetrability of the civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally. This inter-penetrability has also given rise to inter-operability of both military and civilian functions not merely at administrative levels but in the areas of information-sharing and knowledge dissemination as well. It is in all these three areas that appropriate academic curricula can play a significant infusing role. At the strategic leadership level, it is essential to master the multi-dimensional aspects of strategy. Senior military leaders must become expert in the trilateral model of policy-strategy-operational art. The need is for not only mastering war studies but also to become adept in strategic studies in subjects like politics, international affairs, economics and scientific thought. The goal is to educate and train military leaders in double-hatted exigencies of war fighting with skills and expertise that will enable them to combat the emergent new threats, and provide advice to the state in politico-strategic matters. The ultimate phase of learning for top-echelon military leaders should be geared towards giving them a comprehensive and connected view of things. The field of operational and strategic learning may perhaps be easy to pursue in isolation but to connect them under one roof is what merits the attention of military institutions. A post-modern military leader, while prosecuting strategic knowledge cannot simply ignore operational art; one who has mastered the numerous elements of operation, cannot simply overlook the potentials of wisdom inherent in the strategic fruits of liberal education. 245 Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: the Case of Bangladesh PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN BANGLADESH Bangladesh’s armed forces accord the highest importance to the intellectual and professional excellence of its military leaders. It has adopted an education system that systematically educates a military leader through the process of imbibing tactics, operational art and strategy through different methods of learning. Three courses that embody the full range of professional military education beginning from the lowest tactical and strengthening to the highest strategic level with the interjection of the operational level in the middle are Staff Course, War Course and National Defence Course. Staff Course is meant for officers of rank of major/equivalent from army, navy and air force. The course is basically aimed at sharpening the mental skills at the tactical level of war. Some operational level instruction is provided in the form of ideas about campaign planning and the operational level of war. The major emphasis is on developing the minds of officers to produce effective staff work. This is meant to emphasize training for critical thinking. The ability to understand a problem and focus on the most efficacious solutions is given the highest priority. The Armed Forces War Course (AFWC) is for selected Lieutenant Colonels/ Colonels and their naval and air force equivalents. It aims towards producing military commanders well versed in the planning and management of warfare and operations other than war at the operational art level. The emphasis is on mastering the planning and execution of military campaigns and major operations. Operational art is considered to be a core military expertise for generalship. The course also draws its curriculum from the higher level of military strategic thought and from related issues. It is the highest military course for officers of the Bangladesh armed forces. Experts on operational art also have to acquire a sound understanding of strategic and national security imperatives. Non-traditional security issues, such as terrorism, disaster management, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping-making to nation-building and their operationalization form part of operational art level studies. The Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations and Training, in short BIPSOT, offers on the other hand, operational art level education in peacekeeping and peace-support operations. After all, the post-modern military professional operating in the peacekeeping context is a war fighter as well as a peacekeeper. All these areas of military involvement in actions, called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), have offered new challenges to military education in terms of tactics and operational art. The successful implementation of MOOTW poses great challenges. It requires multi-dimensional inter-agency 246 co-ordination and integration of military and non-military functions. There are cross-cutting areas of responsibilities that demand correct and thoughtful understanding of civil and military obligations on the part of those conducting operations other than war. The Bangladesh Armed Force’s educational system at the operational level is aligned to these challenges. The third and highest course offered for military officers is the National Defence Course (NDC). It is not a military course per se. It is a course of strategic domain where all elements of power, namely, military, economic, political, diplomatic, social, technological are its constituents. As such, major contribution to the course contents is taken from the non-military dimensions of strategic thought. That is why a substantial proportion of the class composition of the course includes senior civil servants of the rank of joint secretary or of equivalent status. Military course members are of the rank of brigadiers/colonels and their equivalents from navy and air force. This is a course which educates future policy makers who will be operating within a strategic environment. The aim is to blend harmoniously higher civil and military officers through the sharing of knowledge. Much of this harmonious blending is aimed at tackling national, regional and global problems that impinge on each other, and fine tuning their solutions. Strategic level national goals warrant interaction amongst civil-military bureaucrats, academics and experts for deeper understanding of interlinked issues and interplay of thought at the national, regional and international levels. Hence, civil-military mix is given much importance in the National Defence Course. This approach also prepares state policy to benefit from civil-military mix at the strategic level of policy formulation and implementation. Inclusion of civil bureaucrats in the National Defence Course has done enormous good in educating military officers about the civil service. Civil servants, for their part, get a close look at the military’s role in national security. This exposure to each other’s role is an enabling factor in balancing traditional and non- traditional aspects of security. That security predisposes development can only be properly understood if the foundation of strategic thought is strengthened through exposure to numerous shades of opinions, observations and experiences that call for a holistic investigation into security studies. The National Defence College, Bangladesh is an institution which is designed to offer the operational and strategic level military education. The establishment of this institution in 1999 is a great achievement for Bangladesh and a significant land mark in the history of military education. What is even more encouraging is that each of three courses is augmented by research-based post-graduate level 247 Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: the Case of Bangladesh civil education, namely Masters in Defense Study for Staff Course, Masters in War Study for War Course and Masters in Philosophy in national security for National Defense Course. Military education in Bangladesh owes a great deal to outside influences. Strategic and operational level education is augmented by foreign training in renowned institutions both in the neighbourhood and the West. ‘National Security Education’ is supplemented by Security Studies and Defence Management Studies undertaken routinely at prestigious security and management institutes, notably there in the United States of America. Seminars, workshops and symposiums both at home and abroad enable Bangladesh military officers of today to remain current and be able to cross-fertilize concepts and ideas in security, governance, global politics, economics, social aspects and many other vital issues. Effects of Full-Spectrum Education The military education at the operational and strategic levels in Bangladesh aspires towards maintaining full-spectrum capability. Politico-strategic military education enables the military to engage in participatory nation-building without nurturing the desire of military intervention in state-running. Post-modern developments in military thought have helped the military in strengthening civil- military relationships by augmenting civil confidence in the military. Top military leaders are not merely confined to exploiting their energies in the operational art of warfare but also in the strategic art of providing effective advice to political leadership about strategic issues. The results so far have been encouraging. The figure in the next page summarizes the main points of our discussion. 248 Operational and Strategic Level Military Education Operational Strategic Aim: To educate on Operational Aim: To educate on Art. strategic issues. Target: Cols/Lt Cols and equivalent Target: Brigadiers/Colonels and from navy and air force. their equivalent in army & air force; joint secretaries and their equivalents from civil service. Contents: Joint/Combined Contents: Security and operations. Development. Focus: Specific to military. Focus: Broad and multi-dimension. Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of Effectiveness: Intellectual development as planners Development in understanding for campaigns and major operations. of strategic environment of socio-political, economic, informational, international and military significance. Outcome: Professional expertise in Outcome: Professional military military strategy. and civilian expertise in national strategy. 249 Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: the Case of Bangladesh CONCLUSION Bangladesh’s top military leadership has correctly identified an all- encompassing functional role for military leaders in the 21st century. It knows that military’s future lies in espousing knowledge across the full spectrum of national life. But the mode of that knowledge must be pragmatic, substantive and holistic. Merely binding the military to war will deprive future leaders of the ability to live up to international commitments. That is why, in order to create world class military commanders and leaders, military education in Bangladesh has fused operational art and strategic art. This combination will give the nation professionals well-equipped, both internally and externally, to meet the challenges of 21st century through skilful application of their intellectual merit. Sources: 1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, New York, 1971. 2. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1971. 3. Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education, The New American Library, 1964. 4. Stuart A. Cohen edited, Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2000. 5. Seminar paper by Lt Gen Abu Tayeb Muhammad Zahirul Alam at 11th ARF Heads of Defense Universities/Colleges/Institutions meeting hosted by Australian Defense College, Canberra, 9-11 October 2007. 250 Author Lieutenant General Abu Tayeb Muhammad Zahirul Alam, rcds, psc was born on 06 October 1952 in Chittagong, Bangladesh. General Zahirul Alam until recently has been the Commandant of National Defence College, Bangladesh an appointment he assumed on 04 January 2004. General Zahirul Alam was commissioned in the Bangladesh Army on 11 January 1975 in the Corps of Infantry. He is a proud member of the first batch of the Bangladesh Military Academy. He was awarded the ‘Sword of Honour’. He was promoted to the rank of major general on 20 July 2000 and Lieutenant General on 26 May 2007. General Zahirul Alam in his long military career served in a variety of important command, staff and instructional appointments. He commanded two infantry battalions, two infantry brigades and two infantry divisions. He was an instructor in the Bangladesh Military Academy. His staff appointments include General Staff Officer-3 (Operation) at the Division Headquarters, Brigade Major, General Staff Officer –1 (Counter Insurgency) at an operational Division and Colonel Staff in an Infantry Division. He served at the Army Headquarters as Director Military Training. General Zahirul Alam has attended various training and courses both at home and abroad. He is a graduate of British Army Staff College, Camberly (1985-86). He participated in a seminar on Counter Insurgency organized by US Pacific Command, at Hawaii in 1989 and an Executive Seminar on multi-agency negotiation at Harvard University, USA in May 2001. He participated in the Shangri-la Dialogue, the 6th IISS, Asia Pacific Security Summit at Singapore from 1-3 June 2007. He also participated in the 11th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Head of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions meeting at Canberra, Australia from 09-11 October 2007. General Zahirul Alam has a Bachelor of Arts degree from Chittagong University (1980) and a Master’s degree in War Studies from King’s College, London (1992-93). He is a graduate of year 2003 of the prestigious Royal College of Defence Studies, UK. General Zahirul Alam has participated in a number of military operations. He has active service to his credit in Counter Insurgency Operation at Chittagong Hill Tracts both in Staff and Command appointments. The key appointments were General Staff Officer Grade -3(Operation) and General Staff Officer Grade -1(Counter Insurgency) at Division Headquarters engaged in Counter Insurgency Operation, Commanding Officer of an Infantry Battalion and Commander of an Infantry Brigade in Counter Insurgency . 251 Strategic and Operational Level Military Educational Imperatives and their Implementation: the Case of Bangladesh General Zahirul Alam participated in peacekeeping mission under United Nations. He commanded a mechanized infantry battalion in United Nations Iraq Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) from 26 November 1994 to 04 March 1996. General Zahirul Alam is a widely traveled person. He has visited many countries. Some notable ones are People’s Republic of China, Malaysia, United Kingdom, Germany, United States of America, Kuwait, India, Nepal, Russia, Estonia, Singapore, Turkey, Czech Republic, Thailand, Belgium, Vietnam, Australia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia etc. He loves to read books and journals and watch feature programmes on the television. He is a learner golfer. He is married to Shefa Noor. They have a son named Muhammad Asif Zahir (21) and a daughter named Fara Fatima Zahir (17). Air Commodore Mahmud Hussain was born on 20 December 1960. He joined Bangladesh Air Force on 19 September 1978, and was commissioned on 01 February 1981 in the Helicopter-stream of GD(P) branch. In his service career, he has held important command, instructional and staff appointments. He did his staff college course from DSCSC, Mirpur in 1998, and obtained First Class in the Masters in Defence Studies (MDS). He also attended the second staff college course in the United States of America and received a Masters Degree in Operational Art and Military Science from Air University, Alabama. He has served in the UN mission twice; first as a Military Observer in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia in 1993-94 and then, as a Contingent Commander of the first BAF Contingent in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003-2004. Before joining NDC, he was the Senior Instructor (Air) at DSCSC. He has visited Singapore, Guam, India, Sri Lanka, UAE and Turkey on official and training duties. He joined NDC on 21 Dec 2006 as Senior Directing Staff (Air). 252 LIST OF INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPERS NATIONAL DEFENCE COURSE 2007 1. Collective Security in South Asia: Stability and Sustained Growth in the 21st Century: Analysis and Recommendations Captain Ajay Saxena, ndc 2. New Issues of National Security: Trends of Multi Polarity and Maintaining Regional Stability Senior Colonel Wang Yong, ndc 3. Global Economy: Trends and Options for Developing Countries Senior Colonel Yousef Shaheen al- Dosari, ndc 4. Civil Military Relation and Democracy with Particular Reference to Nepal Brigadier General Daman Bahadur Ghale, ndc 5. The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Regional Security: A Case Study of West Africa Colonel Funso Samson Owonibi, ndc 6. Effective Anti – corruption Measures in Developing Countries: Panacea for Economic Growth, Stable Policy and Nigeria and Bangladesh as a Case Study Colonel Ibrahim Altine Del- Yakubu, ndc 7. Technology and Strategy for Economic Development in Third World Countries: A Comparative Study of Malaysia and Nigeria Captain William Kunle Ogunbiyi, ndc 8. Politics, Conflict and Natural Resources in Developing Countries: Nigeria a Case Study Captain Yusuf Jongas Hinna, ndc 9. The Role of the United Nations in Combating International Terrorism: Challenges and Prospects Group Captain Nicholas Ayebaemi Spiff, ndc 10. Sub-Sahara African Security in the 21st Century: Challenges and Response Group Captain Ahmed Abdullah Iya, ndc 11. Human Rights and Limits of Sovereignty: Implications for National Security Major General JJ P S T Liyanage, RSP, USP, ndc, IG, ldmc 12. Cultural Invasion: Impact on Ethics and Values of Muslim Countries: Analysis and Recommendations Brigadier General Thaher-Amer-Mohammed, ndc 13. Economic Upliftment in Saudi Arabia –An Analysis and Recommendations Colonel Yahya Mobarak Shotwan, ndc 14. Future Energy – Probability, Feasibility and Ultimate Solution –A thorough Study and Recommendations Colonel Ali Ahmed Al Faifi, ndc 15. China-Myanmar Relations: Implication for Bangladesh Colonel San Lwin Aung, ndc 16. US War on Terror and the Muslim World Brigadier M Inam Ul Haq, ndc 17. Sudan in U.S.A Strategy between the New Middle East and Sub-Saharan Countries Major General (Engineer) Hassan Salih Umar Muhamed Din, ndc 18. Poverty Reduction through Effective Social Safety Net Programmes: Revisiting Rural Maintenance Programme as Poverty Reduction Strategy Joint Secretary Md Ataur Rahman, ndc 19. Role of Bureaucracy in Bangladesh: Development since 1971 and Recommendations for Improvement in the Light of Lessons from other Modern Administration Joint Secretary Nazrul Islam, ndc 20. Sericulture Extensions: A Pro-Poor Activity towards Financial up Gradation. A Case Study of Village Balia Dighi, Shibgonj Upazila, Chapai Nawabgonj Joint Secretary AHM Afzal Hossain, ndc 21. Land Utilization Policy and Its Future in Bangladesh Joint Secretary Biman Kumar Saha, ndc 22. Chittagong Port: Bottlenecks Affecting its Efficiency and Probable Solutions Joint Secretary Md. Ershad Hossain, ndc 23. Bureaucratic Accountability: Bangladesh Perspective Joint Secretary Setara Banu Chowdhury, ndc 24. Student Politics: A Boon or a Curse Joint Secretary A K M Manzurul Haque, ndc 25. The Constructive Approach to the Formation of Budgeting System of Bangladesh Joint Secretary Hasina Alam, ndc 26. Police Reforms in Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects Deputy Inspector General Md. Majedul Huq, ndc 254 27. Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries of Bangladesh: Problems and Prospects Director General Shabbir Ahmad Chowdhury, ndc 28. Indo-US Nuclear Deal and its Implication for South Asia and Beyond Air Commodore ABM Mostafizur Rahman, ndc, afwc, psc 29. South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA): Problems and Prospect for Bangladesh Group Captain H N M Ehtesham Mahmud, ndc, psc 30. Port Management – A Precondition to Maritime Power: The Context of Bangladesh Commodore M Moqsumul Quader,(C),ndc, afwc,psc,BN 31. Fish Resource Management of Bay of Bengal – An Exploration Commodore M Mohiuddin Razib,(G),ndc, afwc, psc, BN 32. National Security Council for Bangladesh: Debates and Issues Captain K Kamrul Hassan,(L),ndc, psc,BN 33. National Security of Bangladesh: Challenges and Options Brigadier General Mohammad Saber,ndc, Psc,G 34. Remote Sensing & GIS in Agriculture in Bangladesh – Problems and Prospects Brigadier General Muhammad Shafiqul Islam, ndc 35. The Role of Local Governments in Socio Economic Development of Bangladesh: A Study of Union Parishad Brigadier General Syed Golam Faruque, ndc 36. Media Campaign against Corruption: Bangladesh Perspective Brigadier General Md. Ehtesham Ul Haque, ndc, psc 37. Police Corruption in Bangladesh: Causes, Remedies and Recommendations Brigadier General Tushar Kanti Chakma, ndc, psc 38. India – China Relations: Implication for Regional Security Brigadier General Abdullahil Amaan Azmi, ndc, psc 39. The Palestine Problem (Post Arafat Scenario): Impact on Peace and Security in Middle East: Prospects and Implications for Regional and Global Peace and Security Brigadier General Sarwar Jahan Talukder, ndc , psc 40. India’s Strategic Interest in the 21st Century: Analysis and Recommendations for National Security of Bangladesh Brigadier General Abu Sayeed Khan, ndc, psc 41. Asymmetric Warfare: Bangladesh Perspective Major General Sheikh Md Monirul Islam, ndc, psc 255 LIST OF INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPERS ARMED FORCES WAR COURSE 2007 1. Aid and Trade Diplomacy-Security Implications to Bangladesh Lieutenant Colonel Md Motlub Ahmed, afwc, psc 2. Enhancement of Air Surveillance Capabilities of Bangladesh Armed Forces against Perceived Threats Wing Commander M K Zakir Hassan, afwc, psc, ADWC 3. Asymmetric Threat: An Increasing Trend to National Security Challenges - Bangladesh Perspective Lieutenant Colonel F M Zahid Hossain, afwc, psc, Engineers 4. China Bangladesh Military Co-Operation and Its Implication on Regional Security Lieutenant Colonel Md. Jaglul Pasha, afwc, psc, EME 5. Integrated Coastal Defence for Bangladesh Commander M Ashraful Haq, (c), afwc, psc, BN 6. Control of the Air in War-An Evaluation in Bangladesh Perspective Wing Commander Muhammad Kamrul Islam, afwc, psc 7. Defence Procurement and Budget- An Evaluation in Bangladesh Perspective Lieutenant Colonel Md Abu Sayed Siddique, afwc, psc 8. Effect of Rapid Urbanization on Our Future Land Operation and State of Preparedness Lieutenant Colonel Md Jashim Uddin, afwc, psc, Inf 9. Operational Reserve for Bangladesh Armed Forces and Its Effective Employment Lieutenant Colonel Ibne Fazal Shayekhuzzaman, afwc, psc 10. Enhancing Air Defence Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel T M Jobaer, afwc, psc 11. Environmental Challenges in the 21st Century and Bangladesh Security Perspective Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Ashraful Quader, afwc, psc 12. Integration of National Communication Resources to Enhance the Operational Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces Individual Research Project Lieutenant Colonel Saleem Ahmad Khan, afwc, psc, te 256 13. Night Fighting Capability of Bangladesh Armed Forces against Perceived Threat Individual Research Project Lieutenant Colonel Md Rafiqul Islam, afwc, psc, Ac 14. Effective Management in Power Sector and Its Implication in National Security Commander Mahmudul Huq Chowdhury afwc,psc, BN 15. Psychological Warfare as a Weapon of War in the 21st Century Lieutenant Colonel Shah Sagirul Islam, afwc,psc 16. Research and Development (R&D) in Bangladesh Armed Forces – An Evaluation Lieutenant Colonel Sheikh Pasha Habib Uddin, afwc, psc 17. Capabilities and Limitations of Paramilitary Forces and their Effective Employment during War Lieutenant Colonel S M Matiur Rahman, afwc, psc, E Bengal 18. Seaports in Bangladesh – Development Imperatives and Security Concerns Commander Wahid Hasan Kutubuddin, (N), afwc, Psc, BN 19. Appropriate Strategic and Operational Infrastructure For Bangladesh Armed Forces to Meet the Challenges of 21st Century Lieutenant Colonel Md Shamsul Huda, afwc, psc 20. Role of BAF in Accordance with Draft Joint Warfare Doctrine with Special Emphasis on Unconventional Warfare Wing Commander Muhammad Mafidur Rahman, afwc, psc 257