VIII. 2, Spring 1987 Informal

On Classifications of

MICHAEL F. SCHMIDT San Jose State University

Research suggests to me the conclu­ ever can be" [1] sion that three fundamental kinds of C.L. Hamblin writes: "We [in 1970] fallacies are-interrogative, premisory, have no theory of at all, in the and inferential. However, in this arti­ sense in which we have theories of cle, the focus will be on premisory fal­ correct reasoning or inference. Yet we lacies. In particular, the article aims to feel the need to ticket and tabulate show that there are four distinct kinds [fallacies] .... "[2] Gerald J. Massey of premisory fallacies, "begging the argues that an account of fallacies pre­ question", "inconsistency", "falsity", supposes a theory of invalidity and that and "omission". The article begins "a theory of invalidity has yet to be with a very brief review of some schools developed"[3], while others argue for of thought about classifying fallacies; a "theory of reasoning". One of this then it turns to the task of reviewing journal's referees points out that "no some actual classifications of fallacies a priori scheme of classifications can to see what the tendencies are; five fairly be evaluated until there is some tendencies are found; from them unified theory of argument." emerges the conclusion that "incom­ And, Peter Ramus (in 1543) wrote: plete information" is distinct from First, should not the overall description "false premise" and from "invalid of [dialectical] vices itself arise from the inference", that "begging the ques­ direct opposition of virtues so that, tion" is distinct from all three, and that for every kind of virtue there should "inconsistent premises", "false pre­ be just one kind of vice? And in so far mise", "incomplete information" I and as there are two overall virtues in "begging the question" form a natural dialectic, one of Invention and one of constellation of premisory fallacies, dis­ Judgment, so there ought to be two tinct from the fallacy of many questions overall vices, one opposed and hostile and from the fallacies of invalid in­ to true Invention, the other to correct Judgment; .... [4] ference. Appended is a bibliography of recent and contemporary writings Now! let us review sOme important on the topic of fallacies. and interesting classifications of fal­ lacies-those of Aristotle, Richard Whately, John Stuart Mill, H.W.B. Schools of thought Joseph, W. Ward Fearnside, Howard Kahane, and Ronald Munson-and There flourish several schools of then see what the tendencies are. thought about the classification of falla­ cies. Let us review their main tenets. It is well known that Augustus De Aristotle Morgan claimed: "There is no such thing as a classification of the ways in Probably the best known classifica­ which men may arrive at an error: it tion is Aristotle's. His On Sophistical is much to be doubted whether there Refutations begins: 58 Michael F. Schmidt

Let us now discuss sophistic refuta­ Moreover, in his Rhetoric Aristotle tions, i.e. what appear to be refutations lists some spurious "lines of argu­ but are really fallacies instead .... ment"; there are nine in all; lithe That some reasonings are genuine, first. .. arises from the particular words while others seem to be so but are not, employed"[9]; this first spurious line is evident. This happens with argu­ ments as also elsewhere, through a of argument has two varieties: (a) certain likeness between the genuine "when, without having gone through and the sham.[5] any reasoning process, we make a final statement as if it were the conclusion According to Aristotle, sometimes of such a process"[10]; and, (b) when reasoning and refutation fail because we use "similar words for different arguments depend upon language: things"[11] (probably a reference to a It is impossible in a discussion to bring number of sorts of ambiguity). Note in the actual things discussed: we use that the former variety is not among their names as symbols instead of them; the fallacies enumerated in On Sophis­ and therefore we suppose that what tical Refutations. follows in the names, follows in the The remaining eight spurious "lines things as well, ... {6] of argument" are presumably inde­ Fallacies due to language include: pendent of language; they include some that are enumerated in On Sophistical word ambiguity f grammatical ambi­ guity (i .e., amphiboly), accent, and Refutations, including the special case three others. of "false cause" now known as "post At other times reasoning and refuta­ hoc, ergo propter hoc"; and, they also tion fail because of factors that are include some that are not enumerated "independent of language" .[7] Fal­ in On Sophistical Refutations, including lacies of this sort include: ignoratio "the use of indignant language, elenchi, begging the question, false whether to support your own case or to cause, many questions, and three overthrow your opponent's" .[12] others. Notice that Aristotle discusses Whately these two sorts of fallacies in connec­ tion with what he calls "contentious arguments" as opposed to "demon­ In Richard Whately'S Elements of

strative arguments" and II dialectical Logic we find a somewhat different arguments"; that is, in On Sophistical classification: Fallacies are of two main Refutations he focuses more on ques­ sorts: logical and material. First, logical tions about refuting an opponent than fallacies occur "when the fault is on questions about proposing a scienti­ strictly, in the very process of Rea~ fic explanation or a solution to a prob­ soning"[13], i.e., I/[w]here the Conclu­ lem; and, consequently, he focuses sion does not follow from the Pre­ more on sham refutations than on sham mises."[14] Second, in the case of ma­ explanations or sham solutions to prob­ terial fallacies, although the conclusion lems. does follow from the premises, some­ Notice too that Aristotle acknow­ thing else goes wrong. In particular, ledges the possibility of classifying fal­ there are those material fallacies that lacies differently; for example. are due to an "unduly assumed" pre­ mise and those due to ignoratio elen­ The right way, then, is either to divide chi .[15] apparent proofs and refutations as above, or else to refer them all to ig­ Under the heading of "premise un­ norance of what 'refutation' is [ignora­ duly assumed", Whately includes tio elenchi], and make that our starting­ petitio principii (i.e., begging the ques­ point: for it is possible to analyse all tion) and "false or unsupported pre­ the aforesaid modes of fallacy into mise"; and, under the heading of

breaches of the definition of a refuta­ ignoratio elenchi I he includes ad homi­ tion·IS] nem, ad verecundiam, etc., "shifting Classifications of Fallacies 59

ground", and two others,[16] As it is foreign to the purpose of the Notice that Whately acknowledges present treatise to decide between these that the classification of fallacies is, to confl icting [methaphysical] theories, we are precluded from inquiring into a degree, arbitrary and uncertain :[17] the existence, or defining the extent .. " from the elliptical form in which and limits, of knowledge a priori, all reasoning is usually expressed, and and from characterising the kind of the peculiarly involved and oblique form correct assumption which the fallacy in which Fallacy is for the most part of incorrect assumption, now under conveyed, it must of course be often a consideration, simulates.[23] matter of doubt, or rather, of arbitrary Fallacies of Inference comprise (1) choice, not only to which genus each the Inductive Fallacies of Observation, kind of fallacy should be referred, but even to which kind to refer anyone (2) the Inductive Fallacies of Generali­ individual Fallacy.[18] sation, (3) the Deductive Fallacies of Ratiocination, and (4) Fallacies of Con­ He does not explain why it is indeter­ fusion.[24] Fallacies of Confusion are minate "to which genus each kind of "fallacies in which the source of error fallacy should be referred", but does is not so much a false estimate of the explain why it is indeterminate[19] probative force of known evidence, as lito which kind to refer anyone indivi­ an indistinct, indefinite, and fluctua­ dual fallacy", He says: ting conception of what the evidence is, "[25] For, Since. in any Argument, one Under the heading of Inductive Fal­ Premiss is usually suppressed, it fre­ lacies of Observation, Mill includes quently happens, in the case of a Falla­ "non-observation" and "mal-observa­ cy, that the hearers are left to the alter­ native of supplying either a Premiss tion".(26] Under the heading of Induc­ which is nol true, or else, one which tive Fallacies of Generalization, one does not prove the Conclusion.[20] might include the two forms of the Fal­ lacy of Hasty Generalization: (a) He gives the following example: if a generalization from an overly small person argues from the premise that sample and (b) generalization from an 'the country is distressed' to the con­ unrepresentative sample. Under the clusion that 'the government is tyran­ heading of Deductive Fallacies of Ratio­ / nical , "we must suppose him to cination, one might include the Fallacy assume either that 'every distressed of Affirming the Consequent, the Fal­ country is under a tyranny,' which is lacy of Denying the Antecendent, etc. 'a manifest falsehood, or, merely that And, under the heading of Fallacies 'every country under a tyranny is dis­ of Confusion, one might include equivo­ tressed,' which, however true, proves cation, the "black or white" fallacy, nothing".[21] the argument from the heap, and the fallacy. Additionally, Mill quotes Whately Mill with approval-concerning the reason why it is determinate to which class of In John Stuart Mill's A System of fallacies to refer any actual error. [27] Logic we find a similar classification: Fallacies are of two main sorts: "Fal­ lacies of Simple Inspection/' and "Fal­ Joseph lacies of Inference" .[22] Fallacies of Simple Inspection (or, In H.W.B. Joseph's An Introduction a priori fallacies; or, natural prejudices) to Logic there is a return to Aristotle, simulate genuinely self-evident propo­ a return both to the letter of Aristotle's sitions (if there are any genuinely self­ On Sophistical Refutations and to its evident propositions). Note that Mill spirit. Joseph quotes the Greek, pro­ does say: vides translations, and follows Aris- 60 Michael F. Schmidt totle's classification of fallacies[28]. cation Fallacies are of three main Joseph does raise one objection sorts: material, psychological, and against Aristotle's classification: logical. Fearnside explains the classifi­ lilt suffers", he says, "from the defect cation by means of a figurative analogy of not positively characterizing one between the process of reasoning and groupl/[29]; that is, as a group, falla­ a manufacturing process- in which cies that are not due to language "three kinds of things can go (extra dictionem) have no positive wrongl/[33]: the raw materials may be characterization, and are merely con­ defective; the workers may make mis­ trasted with those that are due to takes; or the machinery they use may language (in dictione). be defective. Joseph also raises objections to As Johnson and Blair point out, Whately's classification' he objects pri­ Fearnside introduces sub-groupings marily to Whately's inclusion of "argu­ I 'that are clearly pedagogical in inspira­ ments which have no fault except that tion"[34]; for example, "stirring up their premisses are false"[30]; that is, prejudice", "rationalization and lip under the heading of "premise unduly service", and "diversions" .[35] assumed", Whately includes not only In what follows, I will use traditional petitio principii but also "false or un­ names even in cases where Fearnside supported premise", and Joseph translates and/or modernizes them. objects thus: Under the heading of Material Falla­ ... it is true that in [doing so] he follows cies, Fearnside includes the two forms the words of Aristotle [Topics, 100b, 23; of the Fallacy of Hasty Generalization, see also Topics, 162b, 3 and 12-15J; post hoc, ergo propter hoc, the (Ma­ but in the body of his treatise Aristotle terial) Fallacies of Composition and proceeds as if he had not included them. Division, the "black or white" fal­ And the practice of Aristotle appears lacy, the argument from the heap, preferable in this respect; ... [31] the slippery slope fallacy, begging the ... it is good advice to a disputant to question, and seven others. Under the consider well the truth of the pre­ heading of Psychological Fallacies, misses he is asked to grant, or to a Fearnside includes , solitary thinker to consider well the ad verecundiam, ad populum, ad mi­ truth of what he supposes to assume and build upon. Nevertheless there sericordiam, ad ignorantiam, ad bacu­ seems to be a real difference between lum, and ten others. Under the heading a plausible but inconclusive argument, of Logical Fallacies, Fearnside includes which we can see through by clearer the Fallacy of Affirming the Conse­ and more attentive thinking, and a false quent, the Fallacy of Denying the Ante­ proposition (whether or not plausible), cedent, and eight other formal fallacies. which cannot be exploded by any more attentive consideration of itself, though it may [be exploded] by reasonings that Kahane are within our power. For this reason the extension of the term fallacy to In "The Nature and Classification of cover 'any false assumption employed as a premiss' seems undesirable; Fallacies", Howard Kahane explains ... [32] the classification of fallacies employed in his textbook Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric. And, he also presents and explains a second claSSification, based Fearnside on ' 'the psychological mechanisms that lead us to reason poorly" .[36] We will In W. Ward Fearnside's About survey only the former classification. Thinking (and also in the older Fallacy, Fallacies are of three main sorts: The Counterfeit of Argument, co­ invalid inference, unwarranted pre­ authored by Fearnside and William B. mise, and suppressed evidence. As Holther), we find yet another classifi- before, I will use traditional names Classifications of Fallacies 61 even in cases where Kahane translates heading of "invalid inference". or modernizes them. Under the heading Notice too that like virtually all of of "invalid inference", Kahane in­ his predecessors Kahane remarks cludes ad verecundiam, ambiguity f about overlapping categories: that his the "slippery slope" fallacy, ad homi­ three categories, invalid inference, nem, the two forms of the Fallacy of unwarranted premise, and suppressed

Hasty Generalization, and seven evidence, 1/ are not mutually exclusive others. Under the heading of "unwar­ ... [since, for example, an] ... argument ranted premise", Kahane includes the which is invalid may contain an unwar­ straw man fallacy, begging the ques­ ranted premise and/or suppress tion, inconsistency, and three others. evidence" .[41] Under the heading of "suppressed evidence", Kahane includes the fallacy of suppressed evidence. Munson Kahane denies that a fallacious argu­ ment is simply an invalid argument that In Ronald Munson's The Way of appears to be valid; he also denies that Words we find a very different classi­ a fallacious argument is simply an un­ fication. Munson classifies traditional sound argument that appears to be fallacies not according to their source sound, since question-begging argu­ but rather according to their typical ments that happen to have a true con­ role. That is, instead of classifying fal­ clusion are sound but fallacious:[37] lacies as arising from, say, language, or prejudice, or observation, or rea­ Nor can we say that a fallacious argu­ soning, he classifies them as (1) "com­ ment is one that is either unsound or question begging. For this criterion mitted in making a case for a claim, focuses too much on arguments and too in arguing for a position", (2) com­ little on arguers .... lt is, in other words, mitted in "criticizing or attempting to not sufficiently pragmatiC or epistemic. refute a claim", and (3) committed in It is not the actual truth or falsity of "defending a claim against counter­ premises that counts, but rather the arguments" .[42] Munson calls them: rationality of believing or accepting (1) Fallacies, (2) Sophistical Refuta­ those premises.[38] tions, and (3) Sophistical Defenses, For a cogent argument, Kahane's first respectively. requirement is "valid inference" and Under the heading of Fallacies, Mun­ his second requirement is "warranted son includes ad ignorantiam, ad vere­ premises" To these he adds a third: cundiam, ad misericordiam, ad bacu­ ... which is, roughly, the use of all lum, ad popu/um, false cause, begging available or known evidence. This is the question, and four others. Under the requirement appealed to, for the heading of Sophistical Refutations, instance, when we reject a use of Mill's he includes ad hominem, tu quoque, Methods because relevant information the straw man fallacy, and three others. has been ignored, or when we accuse And, under the heading of Sophistical someone of the fallacy of biased statis­ Defenses, he includes shifting ground, tics, ... (39] hedging, shifting the burden of proof, Hence, the three sorts of fallacies. and th ree others. Notice that Kahane raises an objec­ Notice that Munson adopts Aris­ tion to Whately's classification: he ob­ totle's contrast between propounding jects that Whately's category, ignoratio and refuting, and adds defending. elenchi, does not belong "in his general Additionally I in the introduction to category of non-logical fallacies ... be­ the chapter in which these 23 fallacies cause arguments which validly yield & sophistries are presented, Munson an irrelevant conclusion generally makes two special points. First: fail to validly yield the conclusion There's no particular magic in any at issue"[40]; ignoratio elenchi should, of the common schemes of classifica­ therefore, be subsumed under the tion, and they all have good paints. 62 Michael F. Schmidt

Lumping has the disadvantage of fail­ that are not due to language; Whately ing to call attention to certain distinc­ distinguished "logical" and "mate­ tive features of fallacies. On the other rial" fallacies; Mill distinguished those hand, splitting has the disadvantage due to "inference" and those due to of creating so many distinct categories "observation"; but Fearnside, Ka­ that they can't all be kept in mind. Since the primary purpose of talking hane, and Munson each distinguish about fallacies in this book is to warn three basic kinds of fallacies. Also, people about recurrent kinds of bad recall Joseph's criticism of Aristotle's arguments and to help them detect classification: that it "suffers from the such arguments in ordinary affairs, defect of not positively characterizing it's perhaps better to lump than to one group", that is, as a group, fal­ split. [43] lacies that are not due to (say,) lan­ guage have no positive characteriza­ Second: Munson is careful to point out that some fallacies and sophistries fall tion, and are merely contrasted with under more than one category. those that are due to language. And, For Munson, although the failure to compare Kahane's observation that a meet the condition that the premises fallacious argument is not an invalid must be true is, strictly speaking, not argument that appears to be val id, a fallacy, it is one of four grounds on and that a fallacious argument is not an which to "challenge an argument"; unsound argument that appears to be likewise, although the failure to meet sound, since question-begging argu­ the condition that the premises must ments that happen to have a true con­ "tell the whole truth" is, strictly speak­ clusion are sound but fallacious. It ing, not a fallacy, it is one of the four appears to be Kahane's point that the fallacy of begging the question should grounds on which to "challenge an not be classed under either-not under argument" . "invalid inference", nor under "false (1) Challenging the Truth of the premise". Perhaps it can be concluded Premises.[44] that without a sufficiently large number (2) Challenging the Relevance of the of basic categories, there is a likelihood Prem ises. [45] that the "Iast'l category wi II be a (3) Challenging the [Sufficiency] of the Premises.[46] catch-all. (4) Challenging the Fairness of the Second, there is the question whe­ Premises .... We are aware that all ther the category, "false premise" facts and all reasons-pro and con, [or anything like it], belongs under the favorable and unfavorable, for and category, "Fallacy". The tendency is against-can't be given in the pre­ to include it; Aristotle includes "false mises of an argument, and we don't premise"; Whately includes "premise demand the impossible. All we want unduly assumed"; Mill includes "mal­ is a just representation of the rele­ observation"; Kahane includes "un­ vant and important considerations. warranted premise" , and Munson ... Any bureaucrat worth his pen­ sion can show that the program he makes "false premise" one of the four administers is "by and large suc­ grounds on which to "challenge an cessful" if he judiciously selects argument"; only Joseph excludes it. the right sort of cases and closes his Third, there is the question whether eyes to the wrong sort. [47] the category, "incomplete informa­

tion" I belongs under the category, "Fallacy". The tendency is to include Tendencies it; Mill includes "non-observation" Kahane includes "suppressed evid~ Let us now see what the tendencies ence" , and Munson makes "unfair­ are: First, that the basic categories ness" (e.g., unrepresentativeness or or classes of fallacies are increasing omission) one of the four grounds on in number: Aristotle distinguished which to "challenge an argument". fallacies "due to language" from those Fourth, there is the question whether Classifications of Fallacies 63

Fearnside's introduction of the cate­ case of a functional classification, a gory, "psychological" fallacy, should fallacy of a particular logical kind may be retained. Though the analogy on perform different functions on different which it is based is an attractive one, occasions; and, in the case of a psycho­ between the process of reasoning and logical classification, a fallacy of a parti­ a manufacturing process, it stands cular logical kind may be the result of alone in mixing categories in a radical different psychological mechanisms on way. Aristotle's considerations were different occasions. rhetorical; recall that he was concerned with "refutations". Whately distin­ guished between "logical" and "mate­ Conclusion rial" fallacies; Mill, between those due to "inference" and those due to From these schools and trends, rea­ "observation"; Joseph and Kahane soning leads to the conclusion that follow suit; and Munson distinguishes "begging the question" is distinct from on rhetorical grounds, between falla­ "false premise" and from "invalid cies committed in making a case for a inference". Recall Kahane's insight claim, committed in criticizing or at­ that a question-begging argument can tempting to refute a claim, and com­ have true premises and, therefore, mitted in defending a claim against be sound. For Whately "begging the counterarguments. Also recall Ka­ question" falls under the heading of hane's two classifications; and, he "premise unduly assumed"; similarly, maintains that fallacies can be classi­ for Kahane "begging the question" fied in either of two ways, in terms of falls under the heading of "unwar­ "what makes an argument fallacious" ranted premise". The fallacy of "beg­ or in terms of "what leads us to commit ging the question" involves reasoning fallacies"[ 48]; and though he attempts from premises that are flawed because a "psychological classification", he one or more of them are what is to be acknowledges that psychological proved. mechanisms are "in the realm of psy­ It also follows that "incomplete in­ chology, not philosophy or logic"[49]; formation" is distinct from all three. and let me add, they are, of course, Mill contrasts "non-observation" with in the realm of cognitive science. "mal-observation" ["incomplete Fifth, there is the question whether information" with "false premise"]; it is indeterminate, as Whately says, Kahane contrasts "suppressed evi­ "to which genus each kind of fallacy dence" with "unwarranted premise"; should be referred". As Whately points Munson contrasts "unfairness" (e.g., out, an actual argument can be anal­ unrepresentativeness or omission) with yzed in a plurality of ways, each way "falsity". Alfred Sidgwick, too, con­ resulting in the attribution of a different trasts "incomplete information" with fallacy; and, as Kahane points out, "false premise"; his third "general an argument may actually contain more objection to any argument" is that than one fallacy; but none of this rea­ "some important factor has been over­ soning comes even close to supporting looked or forgotten"[50], whereas Whately's claim that the classification his fourth is that "some absurdity of fallacies is, to a degree, arbitrary (or at least untruth) must ... be be­ and uncertain. It is, of course, plain lieved"[51] in order for the argument from the preceding paragraph that to do its job. The fallacy of "incomplete there is a plurality of classificatory information" involves reasoning from grounds, e.g. psychological, according a set of premises that fails to "tell to rhetorical function, or in terms of the whole truth" (or, that fails to tell features of arguments; but this does not enough to be representative). make it indeterminate to which genus Of course, the fallacy of "false pre­ of a particular classification each kind mise" involves reasoning from one or of fallacy belongs. Of course, in the more untrue premises. 64 Michael F. Schmidt

In addition to "false premise", "in­ "false premise", "incomplete informa­ complete information", and "begging tion", and "begging the question" the question", there is a fourth kind of form a natural constellation of premi­ fallacy associated with the premises of sory fallacies, an argument: "inconsistent premises". In contrast to this constellation of Although an inconsistent set of pre­ premisory fallacies, there is the in­ mises contains at least one false pre­ terrogative fallacy of "many ques­ mise and, therefore "inconsistent tions" and a variety of inferential fal­ premises" might be thought to fall lacies, a variety of non sequiturs, under the heading of "false premise", ranging from strictly deductive falla­ inconsistency is a more fundamental cies, through the inductive fallacy of kind of flaw than falsity since inconsis­ "generalizing from an unrepresenta­ tency is a purely logical flaw and since tive samplel/[52J, to "material non truth presupposes consistency; there­ sequiturs" such as non causa pro causa fore, "inconsistent premises" cannot reasoning, the gambler's fallacy, and be subsumed under "false premise" the several fallacies of arguing ad this and must be differentiated from it. and ad that (for example, arguing ad The fallacy of "inconsistent premises" populum, i.e., arguing as though involves reasoning from a set of pre­ enthusiasm arlsmg from popular mises that is flawed by being self­ opinion were constitutive of truth).[53] contrad ictory. Thus: Thus, "inconsistent premises",

Fallacies

Interrogative Premisory Inferential

Many questions Begging the question strictly deductive fallacies Inconsistency generalizing from an unrepresentative sample Falsity material non sequiturs Omission

Notes The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, edited by Peter A.

[1] Augustus De Morgan I Formal French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., Logic, 1847 (London: The Open and Howard K. Wettstein (Min­ Court Company, 1926, edited by neapolis: University of Minnesota A. E. Taylor), p. 237; page refer­ Press, 1981), p.494. ence is to the original page num­ [4] Peter Ramus, Aristote/;cae Anim­ ber, which is in square brackets adversiones ["Remarks on Aris­ in boldface type in the 1926 re­ totle's], quoted from Hamblin's print edition. Fallacies, p. 138. [2] Charles L. Hamblin, Fallacies [5] Aristotle, On Sophistical Refuta­ (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., tions, in The Works of Aristotle, 1970), p. 11 translated into English, under the [3] Gerald J. Massey, liThe Fallacy editorship of W.O. Ross, Vol. 1 behind Fallacies", in Midwest (London: Oxford University Press, Studies in Philosophy, Volume 6, 1928; reprinted, 1963), 164a, 20-26. Classifications of Fallacies 65

[6] Ibid., 165a, 5-9. [32] Ibid., p. 576. [7] Ibid., 166b, 22. [33) W. Ward Fearnside, About Thinking (Englewood Cliffs, New [8] Ibid., 168a, 17-20. Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), [9] Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Basic p.5. Works of Aristotle, edited by [34] Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Richard McKeon (New York: Blair, "The Recent Development Random House, Inc., 1941), of ", in Informal 1401a, 1. Logic, The First International [10] Ibid., 1401a, 2-3. Symposium, edited by J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson [11] Ibid., 1401a, 13-14; see Aristotle's (Inverness, California: Edgepress, examples, 1401a, 14-23. 1980), p. 15. [12] Ibid., 1401b, 4. [35] Johnson and Blair also point out [13] Richard Whately, Elements of that lists of fallacies have changed Logic, 1826; 9th ed., 1848 (London: in a number of ways; and, though Longmans, Green, Reader, and they do not mention him in this Dyer, 1866), p. 108. connection, Fearnside's list of [14] Ibid., p. 105. fallacies displays two of these changes: (1) "Latin labels have [15] Ibid., p. 108. been translated in[to] English, [16] Ibid., p. 108. or replaced with more descriptive English labels" (Johnson & Blair, [17] Ibid., pp. 104 & 112. p. 16) and (2) "completely new [18] Ibid., pp. 104-105. fallacies have been added as wri­ ters have canvassed real argu­ [19] Ibid., p. 105. ments about current issues. '" [20] Ibid., p. 105. and have pondered the respon­ sibilities of arguer and audience [21] Ibid., p. 105. as reflective citizens or consu­ [22] John Stuart Mill, A System of mers" (Johnson & Blair, p. 16). Logic, 1843; 8th ed., 1872 (London: In particular, Fearnside makes Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), traditional fallacies breathe with p.487. life, and he adds new ones such as "stereotyping" and "half-truth"; [23] Ibid., p. 489. in Fallacy, The Counterfeit of [24] Ibid., p. 487. Argument, pages 26-27 cover "stereotyping" under the heading [25] Ibid., p. 530. of "faulty analogy" and page [26] Ibid., p. 506. 100 presents the notion of a half­ truth in connection with personal [27] Ibid., p. 487; Mill quotes from attacks, i .e. in co n nection with Whately virtually the same pas­ ad hominem arguments. sages quoted above, from pp. 104-105. (36] Howard Kahane, "The Nature and Classification of Fallacies", in (28] H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Informal Logic, The First Interna­ Logic, 1906; 2nd ed., 1916 (Oxford: tional Symposium, edited by J. Clarendon Press, 1961); see pp. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. 577-578. Johnson (Inverness, California: [29] Ibid., pp. 574-575. Edgepress, 1980), p. 33. [30] Ibid., p. 575. [37] Ibid., p. 31. [31] Ibid., pp. 575-576. [38] Ibid., p. 32. 66 Michael F. Schmidt

[39] Ibid., p. 32. of logic from the practical side, 1883; 2nd ed., 1886; 3rd ed., 1901 [40] Ibid., p. 33. (New York: D. Appleton & Co./ [41] Ibid., p. 33. 1895), p. 178. [42] Ronald Munson, The Way of [51] Ibid., p. 178. Words (Boston: Houghton Mifflin [52] Thomas Leddy, "ls There a Fal­ Company, 1976), p. 262. lacy of Small Sample?" Informal [43] Ibid., p. 261. Logic, Vol. VIII, No.1, pp. 53-56. [44] Ibid., pp. 185-187. [53] I wish to thank friends, colleagues, and this journal's two referees for [45J Ibid., pp. 187-189. their help. Special thanks to Ruth [46] Ibid., pp. 189-194. Manor who kept after me to make this article self-rewarding. [47] Ibid., pp. 194-197. [48] Kahane, "The Nature and Classi­ fication of Fallacies", p. 33. Prof. Michael F. Schmidt, Department of Philosophy, San Jose State Univer­ [49] Ibid., p. 33 sity, One Washington Square, San [50] Alfred Sidgwick, Fallacies, a view Jose, California 95192·0096. 0