! ! ____________________________________________________________________! ! Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility ____________________________________________________________________ Frank Arthurs Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Sheffield March 2014 ! ! ! ! PREFACE ____________________________________________________________________ Since long before I began reading any academic literature on philosophy, I have been interested in the question of how we could have the free will required for moral responsibility. More recently, however, the key question has at times seemed to be not so much how we could have this kind of free will, but more fundamentally whether we have it. Before becoming exposed to (some might say corrupted by) the work of professional philosophers on this subject, it had not so much as crossed my mind that the possibility of possessing the free will required for moral responsibility might be called into question. I took it as read that libertarianism—with its belief that, in a given set of circumstances an agent is able to take more than one possible course of action—was the correct theory. However, upon sustained exposure to the seductive arguments of compatibilist philosophers, urging that the kind of ‘open’ futures libertarians posit are not necessary for free will, I saw my pre-philosophical intuitions begin to founder. When to these compatibilist arguments was added the influence of Spinoza and his remorselessly logical case for necessitarianism, there was nowhere left for my libertarian leanings to hide. In spite of myself, my Damascene conversion to determinism was effected. Only then, once I had disavowed libertarianism, did the issue of whether we could have the free will required for moral responsibility really come into play. During my undergraduate career, I continued to wrestle with a dilemma that seemed to me to have no satisfactory solution. On one horn of this dilemma was compatibilism, with its various plausible-sounding but ultimately (I felt) specious explanations of how determinism posed no problem for our free will and moral responsibility. On the other horn was hard determinism, which, while it seemed more intellectually satisfying, demanded the impossible in the form of a repudiation of belief in moral responsibility. The dilemma remained disquietingly unresolved as I embarked on an MA thesis in Buddhist philosophy. Once again, my focus remained on questions of free will, determinism, and moral responsibility, although the task at this point was as much hermeneutical as it was purely philosophical. iv! PREFACE) ! The present PhD thesis, then, represents an opportunity to return to the purely philosophical task of resolving the dilemma I unwittingly found myself caught on the horns of, and marks the culmination of my thinking so far on this most absorbing, contentious, and intractable of philosophical issues. Still, it is merely that: the culmination of my thinking so far. I am conscious that it is a long way from being the finished product as it stands. In any case, even if I never revisit this topic in writing—which seems a welcome prospect after having just written the 77,777 words contained here—these certainly do not represent my final thoughts on it. ! ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ____________________________________________________________________ Thanks to my supervisors, Yonatan Shemmer and Eric Olson, for their help at all stages of my PhD. Their comments and suggestions have played a large part in shaping what is at last the finished product, and which have without doubt improved my thesis immeasurably. Thanks also to Simon Kittle, whose perceptive and challenging comments on the first three chapters led to some rewriting and just a little soul-searching. I would like to extend my gratitude to Saul Smilansky and Manuel Vargas. Their thoughts and advice—offered in email correspondence and in person—were of much assistance when it came to writing about their theories. I owe them a debt also in terms of the influence their theories had on my own thinking about free will and moral responsibility. This thesis is dedicated to my wife, Yuko, whose presence throughout has made the whole thing worthwhile. vi! ! CONTENTS ____________________________________________________________________ Preface iii Acknowledgements v Introduction 1 1. A Survey of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 8 1.1 Ancient Greeks 9 1.2 Middle Ages 12 1.3 Spinoza and Leibniz 14 1.4 Modern Day 19 2. Arguments For and Against the PSR 24 2.1 Arguments For the PSR 25 2.2 Arguments Against the PSR 36 2.3 Conclusion 51 3. Is Libertarianism a Counterexample to the PSR? 54 3.1 Ginet’s Libertarianism 55 3.2 Criticisms of Ginet’s Libertarianism 58 3.3 Kane’s Libertarianism 68 3.4 Criticisms of Kane’s Libertarianism 70 3.5 Conclusion 77 4. The Case for Hard Determinism 81 4.1 The Consequence Argument 82 4.2 Lewis’s Critique 84 viii! CONTENTS) ! 4.3 Slote’s Critique 90 4.4 The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility Argument 96 4.5 Hurley’s Critique 99 4.6 Conclusion 106 5. Mixed Views on Moral Responsibility 108 5.1 Vargas’s Revisionism 110 5.2 Debating Vargas’s Diagnosis 114 5.3 Debating Vargas’s Prescription 122 5.4 Double’s Free Will Subjectivism 125 5.5 Why Free Will Subjectivism is Inadequate 130 6. Smilansky’s Mixed View 135 6.1 Smilansky’s Fundamental Dualism 136 6.2 Smilansky’s Illusionism 139 6.3 Assessing Smilansky’s Mixed View 144 6.4 Consequentialism and Moral Responsibility 149 6.5 Conclusion 154 7. A New Mixed View 158 7.1 Defending a Consequentialist Justification of our Moral Responsibility Norms 159 7.2 The Debt to Other Mixed Views 172 7.3 The PSR and Its Limits 180 Conclusion 185 Bibliography 192 “Life calls the tune, we dance” John Galsworthy, 1910 viii! CONTENTS) ! !!!!!1! !!!!!! ! Introduction ____________________________________________________________________ This thesis came into being from a desire on my part to achieve three interrelated goals. The first of these was to help rekindle a general interest in a principle that I felt has come to be undeservedly neglected in recent times.1 The principle at issue is the Principle of Sufficient Reason (hereafter the PSR), first expressly formulated in the 17th century by Leibniz, and implicitly appealed to on occasion prior to that point. To quote one of Leibniz’s formulations, the principle holds that “there can be no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise.”2 In the present day, it is rare to find the PSR being explicitly invoked in the way that figures such as Spinoza and Leibniz did not hesitate to do, yet implicit appeals continue to be made to just such a principle in the arguments of many contemporary philosophers. In other words, even as the principle is looked upon as evidence of rationalism having overreached itself, the intuition to which it gives expression remains alive and well, and as such I believe that its relative neglect is unwarranted. My second goal in writing this thesis went beyond the first, in that I sought not only to ‘raise awareness’ of the continuing importance of the PSR to our philosophical debates, but also, and unfashionably, I resolved to come down on the side of the principle and affirm its truth. As a consequence of embracing the truth of the PSR, I would thereby be committing myself also to affirming the truth of determinism—at least, I would be if I were to embrace the principle in the form that Spinoza and Leibniz present it, which is indeed what I had in mind. I wished to make the case, then, that the PSR, as articulated by Leibniz in the preceding paragraph, was true, and that this entailed the truth of determinism (the thesis that the laws of nature, conjoined with any proposition accurately describing the complete state of the world at some instant, entails any other true proposition). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 Although it is heartening to note that Pruss’s (2011) The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment was published soon after I began this thesis, providing the first monograph devoted to the principle for at least half a century. 2 Leibniz (1956a), p. 646. 2!!!!!!!FREE!WILL,!DETERMINISM,!AND!MORAL!REPSONSIBILITY! ! While the first two goals are metaphysical in their concerns, my third goal shifts the latter part of this thesis into the territory of ethics. The question I had in mind to answer was: what, if any, are the consequences of embracing determinism in terms of our ability to legitimately ascribe one another with the free will required for moral responsibility? More particularly, I wanted to know whether, as incompatiblists argue, the truth of determinism precludes the possibility of legitimately ascribing moral responsibility, or whether instead a compatibilist solution can be found. The short answer, as my thesis reveals, is that I concluded that it is possible to provide a satisfactory compatibilist solution to this problem, although the compatibilist solution I offer is by no means an orthodox one. While I accept that ascriptions of moral responsibility are sometimes justified, I argue that they can only be so on consequentialist grounds, since incompatibilists are right to think that no-one is truly deserving of the praise, blame, reward, or punishment they receive. The pursuit of these three goals spans the course of seven chapters. Chapter 1 is essentially a work in the history of philosophy, offering a survey of the PSR from antiquity to the present day. We begin by looking at figures such as Anaximander and Archimedes, to see how explicability intuitions informed the arguments of the ancient Greeks at a time when the PSR had yet to be afforded the status of a principle. Following this, we proceed chronologically to the Middle Ages, then on to the era of Spinoza and Leibniz in the 17th century as Leibniz provides the first formulation of the principle.