Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 6, Issue 2 Global Taiwan Brief Vol 6. Issue1 2 Fortnightly Review Russell Hsiao Sweeping Recall Attempts Have Potential to Destabilize Taiwan’s Political Process J. Michael Cole Prospects for Taiwan-Israel Economic Cooperation amid Sino-US Rivalry Christina Lin Assessing the Rationale Behind the Lifting of Taiwan Contact Guidelines Michael Mazza Japan’s Three Pillars of Defense and the Future of the Japan-Taiwan Defense Relationship Joseph Ross Exploiting the PLA’s Global-Local Dilemma for Taiwan’s Defense Toshi Yoshihara Fortnightly Review The Global Taiwan Brief is a By: Russell Hsiao bi-weekly publication released every other Wednesday and pro- Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and editor-in-chief of the vides insight into the latest news Global Taiwan Brief. on Taiwan. Biden Administration Signals Continuity Rather than Change in Initial Approach to -Tai Editor-in-Chief wan Policy Russell Hsiao Staff Editor The Biden administration formally took office on January 20, 2021 following a tumultuous Katherine Schultz transition from the 45th to the 46th president of the United States. While there are many Copy Editor areas in which the new administration clearly disagrees on policy with the former admin- Marshall Reid istration, one area where there appears to be less disagreement is Taiwan. To be sure, The views and opinions expressed questions remain about the new administration’s fundamental policy approach with re- in these articles are those of the gard to Taiwan—this will only become clear with time—but the early signs appear to signal authors and do not necessarily re- more continuity than change in its approach to Taiwan policy. Perhaps the most significant flect the official policy or position indicator thus far came from Antony Blinken’s confirmation hearing for Secretary of State. of the Global Taiwan Institute. In response to a pointed question from Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT) about Taiwan (“How does Taiwan and our commitments to Taiwan figure in your thinking with regards to our To view web sources cited in the interests in the region?”), Blinken stated: published papers (underlined in printed text), visit https:// “There’s been a strong and long bipartisan commitment to Taiwan. The Taiwan Re- globaltaiwan.org/2021/01/vol-6- lations Act, also the communiqués with China, and part of that commitment is mak- issue-2/. ing sure that Taiwan has the ability to defend itself against aggression, and that is Global Taiwan Institute a commitment that will absolutely endure in a Biden administration. We will make 1836 Jefferson Place NW, sure Taiwan has the ability to do that. Washington DC 20036 I’d also like to see Taiwan playing a greater role around the world including in in- [email protected] To subscribe, visit ternational organizations when those organizations don’t require the status of the http://globaltaiwan.org/sub- country to be a member, they should become members, and when it does, there are scribe/. other ways that they can participate. © 2021· Global Taiwan Institute Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 6, Issue 2 2 And I think our own engagement with Taiwan Indeed, this marks the first time since 1979 that Tai- should be looked at and indeed that’s being done. wan’s representative to the United States was formal- As you know, some regulations were promulgat- ly invited by the presidential inaugural committee as ed by the outgoing Secretary of State, we’re go- a foreign diplomatic guest and attended the inaugu- ing to take a hard look at those pursuant to the ration. The invitation for Taiwan’s representative to Taiwan Assurance Act and we will look at that. attend the inauguration follows Secretary Pompeo’s I had the opportunity, Senator, when President 11th-hour decision to lift self-imposed restrictions on Tsai was running for office to actually receive her contact guidelines with Taiwan in the last few days of as a candidate at the State Department when I the Trump administration. While there is unlikely to be was last there. I spoke to her a number of times a blanket endorsement of Pompeo’s revocation of the when she became president and I was Deputy self-limitations, the Biden administration will inevita- Secretary of State. But the commitment to Tai- bly draft new guidelines of its own. In light of recent wan is something that we hold to very strongly.” events, it is more likely that any new contact guidelines will be prescribed and proscribed carefully and selec- The clear statement of commitment to the provi- tively by the new administration. sions of the Taiwan Relations Act [1] and support for Taiwan’s international space from the nominee for Beijing was of course far from a passive player in the America’s top diplomatic position will likely be seen presidential transition process. Any hopes that one as a reassuring signal for Taiwan supporters who are would have for a quiet—if only temporary—lull in ten- looking for policy continuity in a highly polarized polit- sion in the Taiwan Strait as Washington and Beijing ical environment. At the very least, they suggest that attempt to recalibrate relations were quickly dashed the Biden administration will perhaps pursue a more as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deployed an traditional approach to Taiwan policy. Despite the reas- unprecedented number of fighter aircraft in patrols suring notes, notably absent from Blinken’s comments around Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). was any mention of the Six Assurances, which was a In turn, this forced a quick and strong response from prominent feature in the Trump administration’s rhe- the Biden administration, with the Department of torical framework for Taiwan policy. Indeed, the Trump State issuing this January 23 statement: administration had declassified the assurances along “The United States notes with concern the pat- with several internal memos and cables that provided tern of ongoing PRC attempts to intimidate its context to their substantive intent. Both Rex Tillerson neighbors, including Taiwan. We urge Beijing and Mike Pompeo, the first and second Secretaries to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic of State under Trump, mentioned the Six Assurances pressure against Taiwan and instead engage in during their confirmation hearings. meaningful dialogue with Taiwan’s democrati- Even still, concerns that the Biden administration cally elected representatives. would buck the trend in the Trump administration’s The United States maintains its longstanding steady upgrade of relations with Taiwan were put commitments as outlined in the Three Commu- at ease when Taiwan’s representative to the United niqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six States, Ambassador Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), revealed Assurances. We will continue to assist Taiwan that she attended Biden’s inauguration ceremony after in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capabil- receiving a formal invitation. Noting the significance of ity. Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid and the event, Senator James Risch (R-ID) tweeted: contributes to the maintenance of peace and “I was gratified to see #Taiwan represented at stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the the inauguration for the first time since 1979 to- region.” day. I commend the new admin. for this invita- Experts seem to generally agree that while a change of tion, & encourage them to build upon the prog- pace is likely, a radical change in policy is unlikely to oc- ress made on US-Taiwan relations to reflect the cur under the Biden administration. However, experts challenges & geopolitical realities we face.” Global Taiwan Brief Vol. 6, Issue 2 3 hold different views about the tactical effects of its ap- CCP’s 2021 Taiwan Work Conference Highlights Ex- proach to Taiwan policy. According to Bonnie Glaser, pansion of Soft-Hard Approach director of the China Power Project at the Center for As regularly scheduled in the beginning of a new year, Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), speaking at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 2021 Taiwan a webinar on Taiwan policy hosted by the Foreign Pol- Work Conference (2021 對台工作會議) was held in icy Research Institute: “The Biden administration will Beijing on January 17-18. Hosted only once a year, the adopt a policy of doing no harm to Taiwan. The Trump Taiwan Work Conference is the clearest indicator of the administration has on occasion used Taiwan as a cud- Party’s official policy towards Taiwan and lays out its gel against Taiwan.” Speaking at the same event where guidance for the Taiwan-related system in the People’s Glaser was quoted, Rupert Hammond-Chambers, Republic of China’s (PRC). [1] [2] Wang Yang (汪洋), the president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, sounded 4th highest-ranking cadre of the CCP and deputy head a more cautionary note. Hammond-Chambers point- of the policy-setting CCP Central Committee’s Taiwan ed out that: “If the Chinese feel that there is leverage Leading Small Group (中央對台領導小組)—chaired there [climate change cooperation] … they will almost by General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平)—delivered certainly make strong demands and concessions in opening remarks at the meeting. other areas, Taiwan to me in on the top of the list.” He also called on the Biden administration to continue the Wang concurrently serves as chairman of the National practice of regularizing arms sales to Taiwan. Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consulta- tive Conference (CPPCC) and is the party’s leading au- To be fair, the line between “doing no harm” and do- thority of the CCP’s United Front system in his role as ing very little is arguably very thin. The execution of the director of the United Front Leading Small Group Taiwan policy has long been largely reactive by design, (中央統戰工作領導小組).