Chinese Public Administration CPAR Review Volume 8 Issue 2, December 2017

In of Collaborative Disaster Prevention? The Experience of Flood Control in Different Levels of Government in

Ming-feng Kuo *, Chun-yuan Wang † * National Taiwan University, Taiwan † Central Police University, Taiwan

With the coming of risk society, natural and human-made disasters have challenged the governance capacity of national and local governments. Although decentralization is a governance trend in various fields, little is known about the appropriate mode and crucial factors influencing its capacity for disaster management. The authors contend that a twilight zone exists between decentralization and centralization, and thus the purpose of this study is to explore how different levels of governments in Taiwan may collaborate in flood control effectively. By conducting in-depth interviews with public officials in Taiwan’s branches of flood control in central and local governments, we analyzed the existing conflicts of power and responsibility between central- and local authorities. We defined the factors that influence the construction of effective collaboration across the levels of governments. Based on our empirical findings, this study ultimately makes policy suggestions to facilitate the establishment of mechanisms for effective governance.

Keywords: centralization, decentralization, collaborative disaster prevention, flood control, local governance, Taiwan

INTRODUCTION in the act and the trend of decentralization has been confirmed in Taiwan, many controversies related to xamining how different levels of government power and responsibility have still emerged between have worked effectively and collaboratively central and local governments in the last two decades. Eduring disaster management has raised a big question and attracted considerable attention One of the most prominent cases in Taiwan is the dispute in academia and practice (Drabek, 1985; Kapucu, of flood control. Since 2011, the disaster prevention Arslan, & Demiroz, 2010; Wolensky & Wolensky, budget has been approximately 1.09% -- 1.33% of the 1990). In Taiwan, the Local Government Act was central government’s annual general budget. In 2015 passed by the in 1999, regulating the and 2016, the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ budget for three levels, structures, and self-government affairs flood and drought control accounted for more than 49% of the local government. In 2009, the legislature of the entire disaster prevention budget (The Executive passed amendments to the Local Government Act to Yuan, 2016). On one hand, one of the more intriguing provide a legal basis for cities and counties to merge issues prevailing in Taiwan throughout the last few or upgrade to special municipalities in order to devote years has been the outcomes of flood control while the more power and responsibility to the authorities at central government invested so much in this field. On the local level (Chao, 2009, pp. 48–51). Although the the other hand, how government at different levels work clear scope of autonomic affairs has been identified more effectively has also drawn a lot of attention.

The authors would like to express our appreciation that part of this study was supported by the research grant from the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan. (103-2410-H-015-006-). Address correspondence to the author Dr. Wang at [email protected]. View this article at cpar.net Kuo & Wang • 68 Twilight Zone of Collaborative Disaster Prevention

Literature on disaster management in Taiwan has organizations—schools, public housing department, addressed the importance of collaboration (Kuo, Wang, park training programs—have the authority to make Chang, & Li, 2015; Wu, Chang, & Collins, 2015; Wu, their own decisions.” In practical terms, studies Chang, & Tso, 2016). In the case of flood control in have demonstrated increased decentralization in Taiwan, according to Articles 18 and 19 of the Local most OECD countries and developing countries Government Act, the rectification and management of during the last three decades (Rondinelli, 1981; rivers, the conservation of catchment areas, and the Stegarescu, 2005). On the other hand, those against construction and management of flood-prevention decentralization emphasize the problems of the tragedy and drainage systems in the special municipality and of the commons (Hardin, 1968), the logic of collective or city are local government affairs. For several action (Olsen, 1965), and the inabilities of the local reasons, the Executive Yuan passed the Flood-prone authority (Prud’Homme, 1995; Segal, 1997). These Area Management Plan (2006–2013) and Integrated arguments seem plausible although they tend to lead River Basin Management Plan (2014–2019), both of to a dichotomy of centralization and decentralization. which rely on a centralized orientation, generating two major questions for this study:(1) what factors Given this background, this paper starts with an might influence the existence of the twilight zone overview of the theoretical debates of centralization of centralization–decentralization? And (2) how can and decentralization. It subsequently identifies a the different levels of government collaborate more mixed authority model and explores the effective effectively in flood control once the twilight zone of governance factors in it. In this paper, an empirical centralization–decentralization appears? study with qualitative data of flood control issues in Taiwan is analyzed. The scope of intergovernmental relations involves at least cross-boundary governance (Daley, 2008), CENTRALIZATION VERSUS multilevel governance (Peters & Pierre, 2001), and DECENTRALIZATION IN DISASTER collaborative public management (Ansell & Gash, PREVENTION 2007; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). These various approaches discuss the phenomenon of In recent years, scholars have debated the nature conflicts and cooperation across levels of government and merits of centralization and decentralization in via vertical systems, horizontal relations, and the academia and the real world. Centralization refers perspectives of governance (Lue, 2012). The purpose to the concentration of a government’s power and of this study is to emphasize and understand the its overwhelming coercive powers; decentralization vertical system of intergovernmental relations; is defined as empowering the authorities and therefore, we elaborated the theoretical centralization– administrative responsibilities over public functions decentralization framework for further discussions. or policies from the national level to the local level (De Vries, 2000, p. 193). Multiple forms of decentralization, Decentralization has been a core issue debated greatly such as de-concentration, devolution, and delegation, in public administration in the past decades (Elcock, as well as factors such as administrative, fiscal, and 1986; Hankla & Downs, 2010; Kwon, 2013; Smoke, political dimensions have been suggested in the 2015). For those in favor of decentralization, it was literature (Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983). considered as a means of overcoming the limitations of centrally controlled national planning and moving However, the field has not reached consensus in closer to solving the problems (De Vries, 2000, p. 197). terms of how centralization and decentralization These problems include a lack of responsiveness and influence the effectiveness and efficiency of public accountability to local citizens. For example, Osborne governance. Of the two distinctive schools in public and Gaebler (1993, p. 251) argued that “in today’s world administration, academics favoring the centralization things simply work better if those working in public approach argue that centralized planning and control

69 • Chinese Public Administration Review Volume 8 Issue 2, December 2017 systems can enhance the integration, uniformity, public services’ efficacy delivered to citizens. decisiveness, and cost-efficiency for public service Nowadays, the focus is more on the concepts of (De Vries, 2000, p. 202). They argue that, when decentralization and the implementation of programs dealing with public affairs, problems inevitably arise for local governance. Such a tendency toward in terms of “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, decentralization has been observed in both developed 1968), “the free-rider problem” (Olsen, 1965; Ostrom, and developing countries worldwide (De Vries, 2000, 1990), and “the prisoner’s dilemma” (Daws, 1975). p. 193), which resulted from various factors, such To avoid such “tragedies,” scholars have proposed the as the bottom-up demand (e.g., post-Communist need for a centralized governance framework, such as Europe), aspirations of nationalist movements (e.g., the Leviathan country derived from the classic theme Spain, Belgium, United Kingdom, Canada, Indonesia, put forth by Thomas Hobbes (1968). Researchers Nigeria, Russia), the post-war peace-building have further pointed out that these problems “cannot process (e.g., Uganda, South Africa, Cambodia, be solved by cooperation” and “the rationale for Iraq), and even the role of international development government with coercive powers is overwhelming” agencies (Brinkerhoff & Coston, 1999; Gordin, (De Vries, 2000, p. 199). 2010; Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1983; Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983). Scholars favoring the decentralization approach also came up with strong theoretical arguments. THE TWILIGHT ZONE OF Derived from the political thought of J. S. Mill’s DECENTRALIZATION (1861) territorial decentralization as well as public administration thoughts from influential works, The literature discussed thus far facilitates our such as Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) Reinventing understanding of the conceptualization and Government, proponents of decentralization consider measurement of decentralization, but there are that it can facilitate the approach to effective limitations in real-world applications. Figures 1 to 3 governance by transferring the responsibilities and illustrate the possible relationships across different revenue from national government to subnational levels of government that could supplement De Vries’ authorities (Rondinelli, 1981). Scholars of this (2000) and Wright’s (1988) types of decentralization.1 perspective indicate that, while local governments Each circle represents the entity of a central or local are closer to their residents and more sensitive when government. The circle with a solid line represents a dealing with their problems, they would be more government entity with substantial power whereas the responsive and responsible to the citizens’ needs. circle with a dashed line represents an entity with no From this perspective, decentralization not only substantial powers. The following sections introduce overcomes limitations by, for example, cutting red tape their content and characteristics. in centralized hierarchical commanding systems, but also by creating tailor-made policies and increasing Centralized Authority the disparities of policies (Rondinelli, McCullough, & The types of centralized authorities depend on the Johnson, 1983). Decentralization can also enhance the allocation of fiscal resources, grant administrative accountability of elected officials and responsiveness to local citizens. To sum up, scholars have attempted 1 These three modes are useful and supplementary to De Vries’ (2000) to build a more democratic, flexible, and accountable and Wright’s (1988) works. In the former study, De Vries emphasized form of public service delivery through the process categorizing the decentralized/centralized mode, focusing on the characteristics of “external effect” and “economics of scale” in policies of decentralization (Bannink & Ossewaarde, 2011; De area, whereas the latter study on the interdependent relationships Vries, 2000; Montero & Samuels, 2004; Musgrave, in federal governments emphasized the characteristics categorizing the decentralized/centralized mode based on bargaining power. 1959; Oates, 1977; Ryan, 2004; Tiebout, 1956). The contribution of this study is to identify three heterogeneous The traditional literature of policy implementation cooperation circumstances when conflicts of responsibility exist between centralization and decentralization and how to build good partnerships emphasized how central control systems enhanced across governments.

Kuo & Wang • 70 Twilight Zone of Collaborative Disaster Prevention autonomy, and degree of responsibility for the while increasing accountability and responsiveness political functions the central governments possess (De Vries, 2000; González, 2012). Hence, it would (Elazar, 1997; Riker, 1975; Witesman & Wise, 2009). provide incentives to form a more responsive and The governance framework of centralized authorities participatory government. In an extreme form within focuses on centralized authorities in national- or central this governance type, the entities of local authorities governments. Fiscal resources and administrative would take full authority and responsibility over power are concentrated in the national government; public functions and policies; thus, a competitive the sub-unit or local entities subordinated to the central relationship might exist among different entities of government have no substantial powers, and their local authorities. Figure 2 shows the shift and transfer given tasks are to be responsible for implementing the of the power in decentralized authorities. policies decided by the central government. To sum up, this type of governance framework emphasizes Figure 2. power-concentrating characteristics and elite-led top-down policy-making processes (González, 2012; Lijphart, 1999).

Figure 1.

Mixed Authorities with a Twilight Zone Collin (1998) adopted the term “twilight zone” to describe the character of public–private partnership. This twilight zone also appears in the process of decentralization. According to De Vries’ (2000) third Decentralized Authorities type of collaborative and co-responsible policies, Decentralized authorities focus on the devolution of some public affairs should be collaboratively power and responsibilities over public functions, from solved and share accountability across all levels of the national level to the local level (De Vries, 2000, government. Ideally, this type of governance might p. 193). This type of authority grants subnational emphasize more on the partnership or the cooperation units or local authorities more autonomy and leverage between different levels of government. A partnership in managing their financial budgets and more is viewed as an appropriate arrangement in which resources to deliver public services for which they are the entities across governments agree to cooperate responsible (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1977; Tiebout, to advance their mutual interests (OECD, 2001). The 1956). In other words, the sub-unit or local entities characteristics of this type of authority focus on power have substantial powers transferred from the central and accountability sharing. Building an effective government in decentralization. Transferring the governance framework, especially enhancing good central decision-making authority to democratically partnership and accountability across governments is elected local authorities and regional entities gives important in both academia and reality (Gaffikin & civil citizens more access to the public services, and Morrissey, 1998; Teisman & Klijn, 2002). thus enhances opportunities for public participation

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Figure 3.

1. What factors might influence the existence of the twilight zone of centralization–decentralization? 2. How can different levels of government collaborate more effectively in flood control once the twilight zone of centralization/decentralization appears?

As shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, types of To summarize, this study aims to explore the crucial decentralization are illustrated in terms of the central factors influencing capacity building in central and government’s proportion of the overall public local governments, which can facilitate effective functions. One unresolved question is whether a governance in the decentralization process such twilight zone of cooperation might still exist across as carrying out public functions more efficiently, different levels of governments (see Figure 3). The effectively, and responsibly. twilight zone, in this type of decentralization, might involve inter-government goal conflict: The central RESEARCH CONTEXT AND government aims to satisfy the nationwide goal of METHODOLOGY a civil society whereas the local government aims to satisfy the needs of local citizens. This leads Development of Flood Control in Taiwan to our major research questions: (1) what factors Previous studies have identified three dimensions in might influence the existence of the twilight zone of decentralization programs: fiscal decentralization, centralization–decentralization? And (2) how can the administrative decentralization, and political different levels of government build good partnerships decentralization (González, 2012).3 Taiwan’s Local or collaborative relationships2 and manage the diverse Government Act was passed by the Legislative Yuan needs and consistent goals across various levels of in 1999, and the legislature passed amendments to government once the twilight zone of centralization– the Local Government Act in 2009; they all provide a decentralization appears? Extant literature presents legal basis for cities and counties to merge or upgrade critical elements of collaborative disaster governance, including information sharing, trust, shared authority, 2 The idea of “working together” involves various concepts, such as and accountability (Bae, Joo, & Won, 2016; Kuo, partnership, cooperation, and collaboration. Definitions and discussions can be found in Kamensky and Burlin (2004) and Keast and Mandell Wang, Chang, & Li, 2015; Moynihan, 2009). How (2009). According to the literature, partnership does not necessarily these elements of collaborative disaster governance mean collaboration, but there are still overlapping areas. In this study, one of our major concerns is collaborative governance in different levels work in the case of flood control in Taiwan will be of government related to flood control, and the authors do not ignore examined in the following section. some studies that have adopted partnership to describe the relationships when working together.

Kuo & Wang • 72 Twilight Zone of Collaborative Disaster Prevention to special municipalities in order to put in more power regional drainage when they should have raised funds and responsibility to the local level, regulating the three themselves (Water Resources Agency [WRA], 2005). levels, structures, and autonomic affairs of the local In 2014, the Executive Yuan passed the Comprehensive government (Chao, 2009, 2016). Thus, a clear scope Management Plan of River Basin (2014-2019) and the of autonomic affairs within local authorities has been budget is about US$ 2.2 billion (NT$ 660 billion). The identified in those acts, confirming decentralization previous plan in 2006 was expected to last for eight trend in Taiwan. years and was divided into three stages. The current plan is expected to propose a water-control plan to Article 3 of the Disaster Prevention and Protection address homeland disaster prevention, integrated Act in Taiwan made the Ministry of Economic Affairs water management, stereo flood control, and watershed the central regulating authority for flood control management across different ministries and agencies prevention and protection. Article 4 regulates that “the (WRA, 2015). municipal or county (city) government and township (city) office handle the affairs of disaster prevention Most literature about Taiwan’s flood control focuses and protection.” In continuation, according to Articles on engineering. There are a few exceptions discussing 18 and 19 of the Local Government Act, some affairs collaborative watershed management (Fang & Chen, are designated as local self-government affairs, such 2014; Lee, 2009) or the cross-ministries project as the rectification and management of rivers, the (horizontal collaboration) on flood control (Lin, 2006). conservation of catchment areas, and the construction Studies about collaboration in the vertical government and management of flood-prevention and drainage system on flood control in Taiwan are still limited. systems in the special municipality and county or city. Methodology From 2006 to 2013, the Water Resources Agency This study conducts in-depth interviews to identify of the Ministry of Economic Affairs funded the the factors influencing the degree of centralization– local government with approximately US$ 4 billion decentralization for Taiwan’s flood control (NT$116 billion) for rivers administered by local policy. The main characteristic of this qualitative governments and regional drainage management. To method emphasizes face-to-face contact among promote local self-government, the programs granted researchers and interviewees through an unstructured by the ministries were changed into general grants, questionnaire to collect the data. The purpose is for the same amount, which local governments have to identify research issues based on respondents’ planned and used since 2002. However, most local observations, experiences, opinions, and insights, governments failed to budget well for their river providing researchers with in-depth research material management, regional drainage, or improvements to to help clarify the key issues. As Creswell (2003, p. urban sewers because of the financial difficulties or 179) indicated, this can be done effectively to improve the lack of concern about water and soil conservation. the internal validity of the research results. Local governments are still depending on the grants from the Water Resources Agency to improve the To collect qualitative data effectively and efficiently, this study followed the standard in-depth interview processes: planning, developing instruments, 3 Fiscal decentralization is characterized by locally determined tax income and expenditures to strengthen and manage accountability by collecting data, analyzing data, and disseminating linking expenditures for local services and goods to sources of revenues findings. First, to understand the collaborative disaster (Montero & Samuels, 2004, p. 7). Administrative decentralization stresses bureaucratic decision making by focusing on managerial prevention and flood control issue, we identified the responsibilities and administrative powers for the delivery and regulation main relevant principals involved. Taiwan’s flood- of public services while transferring revenues generated from the central government to the local government. Political decentralization prone areas cover approximately 1,150 km2, and emphasizes the establishment or reestablishment of a democratically elected body with some degree of local autonomy (Falleti, 2003, 2005; 80% of the areas are located at land subsidence Willis, Garman, & Haggard, 1999, p. 8). regions or regions that have not finished improvement

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Table 1. List of Interviewees

Date of Code Place of Interview Agency Interviewees Interview Water Resources Agency, A 2014/08/14 Taichung City Ministry of Economic Affairs Water Resources Bureau, B 2014/08/14 Taichung City Water Resources Department, C 2014/08/19 Yunlin County Yunlin County Government Water Resources Department, D 2014/08/19 Chiayi County Government Water Resources Department, E 2014/08/21 Changhua County Changhua County Government Mr. OOO The 7th River Bureau, F 2014/09/04 Water Conservancy Department, Ministry of Economic Affairs The Branch for Water Resources G 2014/09/11 Hualien County of Economic Affair Department, Hualien County Government Water Resources Bureau, H 2015/01/14 City Kaohsiung City Government Water Resources Bureau, I 2015/01/14 Tainan City J 2015/02/02 Kaohsiung City Kaohsiung City Councilor OOO K 2015/02/03 Kaohsiung City Kaohsiung City Council

Source: author’s compilation projects for river systems, drainage systems, or sea general, deputy directors, deputy supervisors, and dikes, especially in the coastal districts, villages, and chief engineers. Table 1 summarizes the information townships of Yilan, Taipei, Changhua, Yunlin, Chiayi, of interviewees in central and local governments. Tainan, and Kaohsiung (WRA, 2015). Participants for these in-depth interviews were selected using In the second stage, this study built up rules that purposive sampling. The criteria for case selection guide the administration and implementation of were as follows: (1) We selected the related authorities the interviews. In this study, we identified which of central governments, but governments. In central information is needed from the previously mentioned governments, we chose agencies in charge of flood principals. According to research purpose, we defined control, such as the WRA. (2) Selected interviewees specific questions with an open structure relevant to were public officials from related branches of flood collaborative disaster prevention on flood control control in central and local governments in Taiwan issues, challenges of goal conflicts across levels of who are directly involved in the policy decision governments, the existing collaborative governance making. They are all mid-level or senior managers in framework across governments, the vertical divided central or local public agencies, including the director- government challenges in Taiwan’s party politics,

Kuo & Wang • 74 Twilight Zone of Collaborative Disaster Prevention and ways to enhance capacities of local government Determinants Influencing the Span of the on flood control in Taiwan. Each interview lasted Twilight Zone in Decentralization approximately 1.5 hours. The core qualitative data This study examined the case of flood control were summarized by the researchers immediately and disaster prevention in Taiwan to demonstrate after the interview. The information provided by governance goal conflicts and dilemmas across levels interviewees was transcribed, reviewed, and verified, of governmental cooperation. According to Articles as necessary. 18 and 19 of the Local Government Act, a clear scope of autonomic affairs has been identified, such as the In the final stage, we analyzed data and discussed the affairs related to flood control and disaster prevention findings. In this way, the study not only provided a falling under local authorities’ self-government static inductive analysis of the theoretical literature, affairs.5 Thus, local authorities (e.g., county or city but also explored how to realize the delegation governments) should take full administrative power of power and corresponding administrative and responsibility for disaster prevention and flood responsibilities from Taiwan’s central government to control. In practical terms, this decentralization local governments in terms of disaster management appears not to function well. The determinants of issues in a dynamic process. The respondents also this problem could be attributed to the capability of provided different perspectives regarding the topics local authorities. According to the news reports and under study—namely, capacity building in pursuit of in-depth interviews, their administrative and financial effective collaboration across levels of governments. capabilities are two crucial factors. The results and findings are provided in the following sections. Whether public organizations function well or not depends on their organizational capabilities. By ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION definition, organizational capabilities are rooted in the organizations’ abilities to develop, deploy, reconfigure, The Twilight Zone in Taiwan’s Flood Control and recombine scarce resources that cannot be easily To determine if leader confidence has an impact on imitated (Bhatt, 2000; Wernerfelt, 1984). Here the the performance of public organizations, analysis resource can refer to “an asset or input to production focuses on three key output indicators for Texas public (tangible or intangible) that an organization owns, education – performance on the statewide exam, daily controls, or has access to on a semi-permanent basis” student attendance, and a measure of college-bound (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003, p. 999). Tangible resources performance. usually refer to organizational members, machinery, or financial capital whereas intangible resources are For the last several decades, Taiwan has been knowledge-based resources. devoted to building a decentralized governance framework. The efforts include making the policies In Taiwan, the sequential Comprehensive more decentralized and flexible, and reframing the Management Plan of River Basin (2014-2019) has administrative districts.4 Theoretically speaking, been implemented: The Six-year about US$2 billion the programs for decentralization should be well (NT$660 billion) flood control program, in which done, especially after the establishment of the Local experts evaluated the performance of the former Government Act, which clarified that public affairs Flood-prone Area Management Plan (2006-2013). fall under local self-government affairs. However, The experts criticized the lack of human resources and in practice, some problems still exist, especially in cases when local governments must cooperate with 4 The administrative districts were divided into six municipalities and 16 the central government for public affairs. In this county/city governments at the end of 2014. paper, we call this the “twilight zone” of collaborative 5 See http://weblaw.exam.gov.tw/LawArticle.aspx?LawID=A0025009 governance. (accessed on 15 January 2015).

75 • Chinese Public Administration Review Volume 8 Issue 2, December 2017 financial support in the local government, resulting Taiwan put pressure on the legislators when disasters in decentralization inefficiency. Former Minister of occurred. The pressure then pushes administration in the Interior Professor Hong-Yuang Li pointed out a central government to involve as an important role in serious problem in the local government after a recent local governance affairs.9 disaster: Central and local authorities cooperate with engineers After the Morakot Typhoon, the central according to their allocated proportions. For example, government allocated NT$ 22 billion dollars to cope in the Flood-prone Area Management Plan (2005– with the flood disaster to Taitung County. But the 2013), central and local governments are responsible interesting thing is, although the local government for 70% and 30% of efforts, respectively. It seems to be has enough budget, the Chief of Water Resources a clear division, but the interviewee indicated that the Department of Taitung County Government was still power and responsibility allocation are ambiguous.10 unable to do much for the disaster prevention. Because their department only has six servants for flood To summarize, this section briefly discussed how control, and they did not have the capability to write a administrative and financial capabilities are important proposal for dealing with the flood disaster. Professor for decentralization. Although decentralization is Li even pointed out that the Pingtung County also an obvious trend, some obstacles might exist when faced the similar problem. (United Evening News, local governments lack capabilities corresponding to 2010, original in Chinese, authors’ translation) decentralized policies. Under a democratic system, the pressure derived from local entities might enhance the During the in-depth interviews with public servants from several related branches of flood control in 6 “The budget for flood control engineering is huge, and the local Taiwan’s central and local governments, interviewees authorities cannot afford to do such things without the support of the central government.” (Interviewee B) directly indicated that the key elements of effective “Recently, the problems of lacking a budget in local government have governance in decentralization are building the become more and more serious. The city government has difficulty paying the employees through local internal revenue sources.” administrative and financial capabilities of local (Interviewee K) authorities. They indicated that local authorities’ 7 “The failure of the decentralization of Taitung County is not only resources are limited, so support from central because the simultaneous occurrence of various damages is unusual, governments is crucial.6 but the policy also does work due to their limited financial resources and manpower. Therefore, although the central government affords them a huge amount of financial support, the task is overloaded beyond their One of the interviewees further pointed out the existing abilities.” (Interviewee A) characteristics of natural disasters, such as uncertainty, 8 “There are serious limitations to local governments’ financial budgets; we still hope to have some support from the central government. In suddenness, and unusual nature. Therefore, local addition, the central government has a well-established governance authorities would not have enough abilities and division and practiced experiences to deal with the problems for flood 7 control. Therefore, they have more professional knowledge and skills experiences to deal with large scale disasters. The than local governments.” (Interviewee C) interviewee indicated that the local government “The local government knows where the most vulnerable places for should learn from the central government’s flooding are. They should prepare and respond to the flooding first… experiences to build an effective operation of flood but central government should guide the flood control policy goals.” (Interviewee H) control.8 9 “Originally, the national project for flood control emphasized its assistance function to local authorities, but finally the Legislative Yuan Finally, another interviewee pointed out that, despite passed the bills and decided the central government should take full responsibility for this project because of the pressure from local the clear scope of autonomic affairs identified in representatives, local factions, and citizens to legislators.” (Interviewee A) the Local Government Act, local entities’ lack of 10 “Central and local authorities simultaneously cooperate to implement capabilities put pressure on the central government flood control programs, which might result in a serious problem of to intervene the local self-governance affairs. As a ambiguous accountability. The public servants would be concerned about whether the central or local governments should take full democratic representative system, interest groups in responsibility.” (Interviewee F)

Kuo & Wang • 76 Twilight Zone of Collaborative Disaster Prevention central government’s role in decentralization policies. for the lowest-level bureaucracies to cope with such This results in twilight zones for collaboration and difficult flood control tasks.12 ambiguous accountability mechanisms in disaster prevention work. Challenge 3: Outflow of talent damages the function of decentralization, especially for Challenges within the Twilight Zone of agricultural counties. Decentralization In Taiwan, administrative districts are divided into As previously discussed, local governments’ lack of municipalities and counties/cities. This framework administrative and financial capabilities results in for decentralization might be helpful, but in practical inefficiency and ineffectiveness when implementing a terms, public servants tend to move from agriculture decentralization program. As a result, the twilight zone counties to municipalities because they are more likely might lead to problems in power and responsibility to be promoted to a higher job grade for the same sharing. Based on our in-depth interviews, we explored position. This is a serious challenge. Flood control and several other challenges in the twilight zone. disaster prevention programs need qualified persons; without them, policy implementation will suffer from Challenge 1: Merit and professionalism may be lack of professional skills.13 overruled by local political concerns. Even though decentralization expands the service Challenge 4: Monitoring outcomes and delivery for local needs, the merit and professionalism providing protection against corruption and of the policies still face many challenges to maintain mismanagement. its quality. Different perspectives for the political Several news articles have pointed out many scandals parties and local representatives’ opinions on the arising when implementing programs for flood control sharing of the resources are just some of the reasons and disaster prevention. Indeed, several officials in both that threaten the efficiency and professionalism. One central and local governments, such as Kaohsiung and interviewee indicated that local representatives still Taoyuan City, have been imprisoned due to scandals.14 put pressure on public servants for flood control Authorities should take measures against corruption, establishment.11 How can we manage the conflicts yet too much examination by public investigators and between stakeholders with different perspectives? inspectors might also frustrate the public servants. How can we promote merit and professionalism for They may not have the courage to take responsibility flood control? The intervention is a crucial challenge to offer public services.15 facing decentralization.

11 “Basically, we cannot avoid this problem. When citizens suffer Challenge 2: The designs of governance from flood damage, they inevitably try to put pressure on the local frameworks within local government threaten the representatives or the officials, especially hoping the government does something near their house.” (Interviewee D) efficiency of decentralization. The authorities in Taiwan have provided a legal basis 12 “I think the attitude of the township office is a problem. Some township offices are not actively cooperating with us, even when we start to in the Local Government Act for regulating the three intervene with the program and support them. The relative public servant even steps aside from coping with the affairs. This response immediately levels, structures, and autonomic affairs of local frustrates our morale. ”(Interviewee F) government, but they still face drawbacks. When central 13 “In practical terms, seven or eight years should be spent training authorities cooperate with the local government to deal a useful and experienced public servant. It would facilitate the public with flood control-related issues, they often neglect to servant becoming familiar with the details of flood control. But newly recruited individuals usually have a strong incentive to be transferred to forge a stronger link from the local government to its another post, especially to manipulate a higher job level.” (Interviewee D) sub-entities (e.g., the administrative entity of villages “The truth is there is indeed a lack of manpower and financial budget. and towns). The different partisanships of the elected Overly heavy workloads and a low job level will result in the frequent chiefs within the local governance framework might outflow of talent. Therefore, the government should take some measures and provide incentives to hold on to talents to stay in local government.” worsen the goal consistency, creating little incentives (Interviewee C)

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To summarize, this section briefly discussed several As effective institutional design plays a vital role in barriers to the pursuit of effective operations building collaboration in flood control, maintaining the when executing programs of decentralization. operation of institutions is imperative in collaborations. Determining how to establish an appropriate balance When viewing flood control as the common pool of of centralization and decentralization is essential for different levels of governments, Ostrom (1990, pp. ensuring the effective and efficient functioning of the 88–102) identified profound arguments critical for government. The next section offers some suggestions institutional maintenance, including the provision for building a good partnership across governments in (definition) of a set of institutions, establishment of the twilight zone. credible commitment to mobilize and share resources, and the creation of mechanisms of mutual monitoring. Institutional Design of Collaborative Governance to Overcome Decentralization Keys to effective collaborative disaster Dilemmas prevention within the twilight zone With the rapid change and development of society In Taiwan, the central government has been in the last three decades, the government’s roles influential in flood control in the past decades by and functions have continued to be reformed. In providing financial grants and other resources to local the process of reforming, there should be a new governments. In long-term development, this makes way of collaboration between central and local many local governments incapable of dealing with government. Collaboration means connecting multiple flooding. In other words, local governments’ financial organizations to a common goal, creating sound and dependence leads to decentralization dilemmas, active interactions to create collaborative governance thereby leading to the loss of institutional autonomy and relationships of interdependence. The definition and greater financial instability (Gazley & Brudney, of collaboration is establishing arrangements with 2007). Thus, efficient collaborative governance in at least two consenting organizations or parties, disaster prevention has been hard to develop. known as partners, with all agreeing to cooperate to share resources, advance their mutual interests, Based on the theoretical framework of strategic and accomplish their mutual goals (Glasbergen, and collaborative disaster management (Kuo, Biermann, & Mol, 2007; Kuo, Wang, Chang, & Li, Wang, Chang, & Li, 2015; Wang & Kuo, 2017) 2015; Linden, 2002; Saltiel, 1998; Yang, 2009; Yang, and the empirical findings of the current research, 2010). In this way, it can facilitate improving the some directions are provided for establishing good competency of governmental public service, which collaborative governance. involves establishing organizational cooperation and addressing any problems in coordination and First, strengthen the local government capacity management (Chen & Chang, 2010; Lee & Lin, 2009). to narrow down of the twilight zone. Whether the Based on the examples discussed in this article, the local government operated efficiently depended on establishment of collaboration between central and the quantity of usable resources, and the central local government helps overcome the decentralization government activated collaborative governance dilemma. through the guidance of financial resources (Lee & Lin, 2009). For future disaster prevention and water

14 “Involved with money scandals, three thugs applied to a court for an control in Taiwan, the proportion of financial burdens arrest warrant.” Liberal Times, 2008/5/1; “Acceptance for illegal money for central and local government is expected to be fixed contribution, the chief of River Bureau is heavily punished to prison in cage.” Liberal Times, 2014/07/18. at ratios of 7:3 or 6:4, instead of mainly depending on the central government. This could help the local 15 “As in the case of the Morakot Typhoon, when a disaster occurs, the authorities of public investigators and inspectors for the first time government develop the willingness and ability to investigated the illegal behavior of our public servants. This would raise financial resources and improve the local human immediately influence the ability of crisis response and attack the morale 16 of our public servants.” (Interviewee F) resources and skills at the same time.

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Another approach to enhance effective collaboration Collaborative disaster prevention: Easier said is trust-building, which helps shape the legitimacy than done? of governance and further generates commitment, Although both the literature and interviewees enabling individuals to go beyond their personal, indicated that collaboration contributes to eliminating organizational, or final challenges in the permission the twilight zone (see Figure 3), there are still some frame (Emerson et al., 2012). Regarding the limitations to achieving effective collaboration in collaboration on disaster prevention and water control, practice. Kelman (2005) argued that individuals some interviewees stated that, at times, the clear goal create the most obstacles to organizational change. of reducing time, minimizing areas, and decreasing Therefore, when facing the concerns of politics people’s life and property losses are influenced by or parties, individual benefits,22 and the increased party differences and different opinions from various awareness of public rights,23 it is possible to misplace levels of government. However, enhancing the public resources. Usually when there are conflicts of common goal and communicating from expertise18 in political interests, trust is eroded. At this moment, an informal way19 help build trust. central and local governments are apt to shirk their responsibilities.24 In addition, information sharing also helps. Collective interactions are usually based on information sharing It seems easy to design a reasonable system of and joint actions (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 231). collaboration, but the intangible elements, such as Information sharing provides actors in the network with an opportunity to share the database and establish common decisions based on sufficient information 16 “The goal that we expect is returning to the local government. But how do you help? It is not using special statutes or using a special budget— (Comfort, 2007; Dawes, 1996). When establishing a none of these ways are legitimate after all. It should be returned to the platform connected with the information from central mechanism of official budget.” (Interviewee A) and local government through the Internet, the local 17 “It may be okay, but it’s hard when there is an intervention of political government can play a role as an informational force. Just like we are Chiayi, it’s obvious that there are legislators of blue and green parties. This legislator and that legislator both argue for mediator, spreading the information on disaster the contribution as their own.” (Interviewee D) prevention to the community and the public. These 18 “We (with the central government) are cooperative, so everybody fits are all the keys of an efficient collective collaboration. each other with the current goal. Since the public and representatives are not clear about the skills we perform, or they do not understand Among them, social media and apps are good these kinds of skills and processes, they might have some doubts in technologies that the government can make use of.20 their persistence.” (Interviewee C) 19 “I think that our direct interaction with ministries exists in most formal Finally, an integrative platform of cross-boundary meetings; when we have almost no informal meetings, it influences a lot, like understanding and trust.” (Interviewee C) governance is helpful to clarify responsibility and authority between central and local government.21 20 “Once there is a flood alert, we share the information at the same time. We also develop a disaster information system, integrating information Through these platforms, dialogues and reciprocity in from national central ministries and making a platform for the public to save themselves… Our city government owns a LINE (a social media) the intergovernmental relationship may be cultivated account, and we spread the information about disaster prevention because the consensus-oriented and collaborative through LINE when a typhoon comes.” (Interviewee B) governing framework is built up in both formal and 21 “There is a platform for WRA in central government and local informal mechanisms (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Comfort, governments. People in this platform will discuss and coordinate the mobilization and utilization of human resources and budget distributions. Ko, & Zagorecki, 2004; Connick & Innes, 2003; Innes In addition, there is also a lower-level platform for the (regional) River & Booher, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Seidenfield, 2000). In Management Office of WRA and water-related agencies in the local government to deal with the issues of implementation.” (Interviewee A) other words, the more positive the communication and coordination in vertical and horizontal public “I think our direct interaction with ministries exists in most formal meetings, but rarely in informal meetings. It influences a lot, like agencies, the more effective the collaboration will be. understanding and trust.” (Interviewee C)

22 “It is an election this year, and some issues are hyped again. These things are actually connected to each other.” (Interviewee D)

79 • Chinese Public Administration Review Volume 8 Issue 2, December 2017 trust, accountability, and communication are key to a control is to emphasize institutional design. successful collaboration. For example, flood control involves not only coordination among different CONCLUSION divisions in the central government, but also vertical relationships across levels of government and Over the past decades, the design of relationships and stakeholders. If the mechanism for coordination does structures across different levels of government has not work well, it is difficult to pursue effective operations attracted increasing attention in the public administration when conflict occurs.25 More communication based on field. Faced with the trend of decentralization, local professionals’ interactions is one effective approach to governments will play an important role in the future facilitating collaborations.26 (Kusumasari, Alam, & Siddiqui, 2010). Theoretically speaking, decentralization would not only increase To summarize, this section analyzed the necessary responsiveness to local needs and preferences, but also elements for establishing an effective partnership bring wider economic and social benefits. The policies framework across different levels of government. of decentralization focus on building a governance The interviews reflected that mutual trust building, framework emphasizing a more participatory, information sharing, and a cross-boundary democratic, and responsible mechanism. Despite the governance and dialogue platform are crucial. These many advantages of decentralization, public policies empirical findings also reflect the conceptual model for decentralization still face constraints. For example, of collaborative governance. In seeking stable and for local authorities, decentralization can sometimes sustainable collaborative governance, according to lead to public resource mismanagement and more Ansell and Gash (2007) and Gopalakrishnan and corruption as well as serious problems when the Okada (2007), the next critical step for Taiwan’s flood central government tries to cooperate with the local government to address public affairs.

23 “It costs the least, but the public could not accept it. They are fierce when negotiating and communicating, and all kinds of dirty words are This study explored the existing conflicts of power said.” (Interviewee A) and responsibility between centralization and 24 “Everybody thinks that it is not his responsibility the first time. Such as decentralization and identified those factors with a the case by the Sixth River Management Office (regional office of WRA) in Kaoshiung, we have no idea whether the central or local government significant influence on building good collaboration carried out the case, but it needed cooperation. Land expropriation was across levels of governments. This is a critical issue executed by the local government, while the engineering was performed by the central government, and there was lots of cooperation. However, in academia and in practice, especially in Taiwan. when media outlets reported something bad, everybody denied their Since 2011, Taiwan’s governance framework has responsibility.” (Interviewee F) been divided into five municipalities and 17 counties. 25 “I think our current system does not work well for consistent In December 2014, this framework shifted to six management. Take the centrally controlled river as an example. The administrative power over the upper reaches of the river is controlled municipalities and 16 counties. How can we enhance by the Forest Bureau and the Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan; capacities in this new governance structure in Taiwan? the middle and upper reaches of the river are controlled by the Soil and Water Conservation Bureau; the lower reaches of the river are controlled This is indeed a new challenge. by the Water Resources Agency at the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The management system should be unified.” (Interviewee G) This study examined the case of flood control to best “The problems do not only appear between central and local governments, but also in the horizontal governmental units. For illustrate the challenges of establishing cooperation example, there are four agencies involved in flood control, such as across levels of government. By using in-depth the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA, ministerial level), Construction and Planning Agency of the Ministry of Interior, Council interviews, this study has contributed to the existing of Agriculture (ministerial level), and WRA, the Ministry of Economic decentralization literature in three ways. First, we Affairs.” (Interviewee J) extended the traditional criteria and categorized the 26 “We meet with representatives of the central government regularly different types of decentralized systems. They are and clarify each responsibility in meetings. Even the ruling parties are different in our city and central government; based on the communication based on the degree of whether the central government platforms, we don’t have many problems in cooperating with them.” (Interviewee I) possesses a significant share of fiscal resources and

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Ming-feng Kuo, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science & Graduate Institute of Public Affairs, National Taiwan University. His research interests include local governance, policy analysis, performance evaluation, political behavior. E-mail: [email protected].

Chun-yuan Wang, Ph.D., is Associate Professor, Department of Police Administration, Central Police University, Taiwan. His research interests include crisis management, strategic planning and management, policy analysis. Address: No. 56, Shujen Rd., Kueishan Dist., Taoyuan City, 33304, Taiwan. Phone: +886-3-328-2321 #4617. E-mail: g885422@ seed.net.tw.

85 • Chinese Public Administration Review