aerospace medicine

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JULY-AUGUST 1968

air u n I ve r s ity R KYI EW THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Aer o spac e Me d ic in e ...... 2 Maj. Gen. Charles H. Roadman, usaf (mc )

M edica l Eval uation of Ast r o n a ut s and USAF T est Pil o t s ...... 6 Col. Timothy N. Caris, usaf (mc )

T oxicolocy Consideration in Ext ended Aer o spac e Flight...... 16 Dr. A. A. Thomas

T he Physiological Clock Across Tim e Zones and Beyo n d...... 28 Dr. Hubertus Strughold

D evel o pmen t of Aer o spac e Esc a pe Syst ems...... 34 James W. Brinkley

Post-Vie t n a m Role of the Mil it a r y in Foreign Policy...... 50 Cen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret)

V ie t n a m : O ur World War II L ec a c y...... 59 Maj. John F. McMahon, Jr., usaf

S trategic Stability...... 67 Mrs. Amoretta M. Hoeber

On C lausewitz and the Appl ic a t io n of F orce...... 74 Dr. Robert D. Miewald

S yst em Ma n a gemen t and Logistics...... 79 Maj. Graham W. Rider, usaf In My Opinion

W hy the VTOL F ig h t e r ? ...... 86 Lt. Col. Kennith F. Hite, usaf

On L ea r n ing from the Soviets...... 92 Maj. Robert H. Kelley, usaf Books and Ideas

Civ ic Action—A W ea pon for Pea c e...... 97 Maj. Laun C. Smith, Jr., usaf

T he Contributors...... 101

the cover Address manuscripts to: Editor, Air Univer- With the advent of manned space flight early sity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute. Max- in this decade, aerospace medicine came into well Air Force Base, Ala. 36112. Printed by Government Printing Office, Washington, D C. its own. Through intensive scientific research, Subscriptions are sold by Air University man has been enabled not only to withstand 7 ?°^ Maxwell Air Force Base. the alien conditions of space but also to Ala. 36112: yearly $4.50. back issues 75 understand hitherto unknown aspects of the cents. USAF rbcubbinc pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. human organism. In this issue, Major Gen- eral Charles H. Roadman, Commander, Aero- space Medical Division, AFSC, and several Vol. XIX No. 5 of his specialists discuss some of the Air Force J uly-August 1968 contributions to that body of knowledge. AEROSPACE MEDICINE

M ajor Gen er a l Charles H. Roadman

• In this issue, Air University Review presents several aspects of aerospace medicine. First is an introductory overview by Major General Charles H. Roadman as Commander of Aero- Space Medical Division, Air Force Systems Command. The succeeding articles deal with areas that are receiving intensive ; study because of their applicability to current and future USAF and NASA aerospace programs. Colonel Timothy N. Caris ex- plains some of the techniques used in medical evaluation of astro- nauts and test pilots. Dr. A. A. Thomas discusses toxicology factors affecting occupants of closed cabins during extended space flight. Dr. Hubertus Strughold sees a problem in man’s reactions to time cycles different from the normal 24-hour, day-night cycle. And Mr. James W. Brinkley describes the work in developing escape systems for aerospace vehicles. INCE man’s first feeble efforts to lift health standards of this country have been himself on fragile wings, medical men derived from sick people, for they were the S have had a part in his struggle to con- ones most in contact with the nation’s physi- quer aerospace. Military men had been flying cians. We are now dealing with very healthy onlv a few months during World War I when people, we have amassed considerable infor- it was discovered that over half of all pilot mation about their normal state of health, and casualties were directly attributable to the thus we are establishing new health standards. physical unfitness of the man for flying duty A case in point, during the past few years rather than to mechanical or other external we have found that one of the peculiarities of causes. an electrocardiogram tracing that had been Although the term “aerospace medicine” thought to be indicative of heart disease is in is relatively new, aerospace medicine as a sepa- fact benign. The result is that we have several rate technical discipline began in America thousand pilots flying today who might have early in 1918 with the establishment of the been grounded because of their electrocardio- Army Medical Research Laboratory at Hazel- gram interpretation a few years ago. hurst Field on Long Island. The history of this Another important facet of our medical discipline can be traced through the last fifty evaluation program is that we are actually do- years by following the development of that lab- ing predictive medicine. The astronaut or aero- oratory into what is today the usaf School of space test pilot who takes his initial medical Aerospace Medicine. The school and asso- evaluation today will not go into space for an- ciated units that make up the Aerospace Medi- other four to five years. Our job is to predict cal Division ( amd) of the Air Force Systems his fitness at that time. Command, together with the personnel who In the area of environmental control, amd have served in them over the years, have has for several years been involved in research played a key role in the development of aero- to determine the best gaseous mixture and the space medicine. best possible pressure for a specific space cabin Aerospace medicine today encompasses on a given mission. In an effort to determine specialty areas that did not exist fifty years ago, man’s ability to survive and perform normally primarily because we did not know as much in an atmosphere that can be provided by the about the human body as we know today. The engineers, some of our more comprehensive progress in aerospace operations has also re- studies have required human volunteer sub- sulted in physiological stresses being applied jects to remain in space-cabin atmospheres for to the human body that could not have been up to sixty days. During this time we not only foreseen fifty years ago. Both these factors have study their ability to survive and perform but influenced the efforts of aerospace medical per- also do detailed analysis of their bodies’ ability sonnel. Most of the research work being done to metabolize certain space foods while in this in aerospace medicine falls within three very environment. broad categories: medical evaluation, environ- We as a nation are becoming more and mental control, and physiological stresses im- more conscious of the air we breathe and the posed by aerospace operations. possible contaminants that it might contain. It The physical standards that were devel- is important to realize, of course, that we are oped for the early aviator were considerably surrounded by and exposed to materials that simpler than those used today. The earlier were not even known fifty years ago, and some medical evaluation procedures were also less of the simplest of our everyday, materials can sophisticated. As we learn more about the hu- become toxic in such confined quarters as a man body and the physiological stresses im- space cabin, amd has expended a considerable posed by contemporary aerospace operations, amount of its resources in recent years to deter- we are modifying our standards. In the process, mine the toxicity of various materials in con- we are developing completely new standards fined quarters and the possible effect of long- for the healthy human being. Traditionally, the range exposure on the human body. These The Aerospace Medical Division of Air Force Systems Command and the USAF School of Aero- space Medicine share these facilities at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, as well as the threefold mission of research, education, and clinical evaluation in the field of aerospace medicine.

studies will provide some basic data to the na- the main problem was to push oneself over the tion’s clean air program. side in such a way as to avoid the vertical or Almost from the beginning, medical per- horizontal stabilizer. Escape from the aero- sonnel have been concerned with the physio- space craft of today and tomorrow imposes logical stresses imposed by aerial flight on the problems that make a “step over the side im- human body. These stresses manifest them- possible. selves in many ways, and they become more We are now flying at speeds and altitudes important as our aircraft fly faster and higher. that compel us to resort to escape systems Escape from early aircraft was uncomplicated: which, in themselves, impose physiological AEROSPACE MEDICINE 5

stresses that test the extremes of human effort escape environment where many factors may and endurance. We have, for several years, be unknown. studied these stresses individually. We have Although each of the component organiza- studied the effect of increases in the pull of tions of the Aerospace Medical Division makes gravity on the human body, the effect of a sud- a somewhat different attack on aerospace med- den change in atmosphere, sudden changes in ical problems and each has its unique facility temperatures, and even the effect of rotation with which to work, all of them have one goal— in all axes. After studying these stresses indi- to keep aircrew members functioning effec- vidually, we have a pretty good idea of man’s tively and efficiently in their environment. ability to withstand each. However, when the Aerospace medical personnel may seldom stresses are applied simultaneously as they are be seen in the forefront of development of aero- in a real-time escape situation, these param- space systems, but they have played a key role eters for withstanding may not apply. —if backstage—in the development of every air- We are in the process of developing new craft or space system in the last twenty years. devices to apply these physiological stresses in Our business is to support the Air Force mis- such a way as to duplicate almost any real-time sion by insuring the health and welfare of Air escape situation from any type of aircraft or Force personnel and their ability to perform, spacecraft. When perfected, the ability to do wdiether it be in an aircraft, on the flight line, this will save untold dollars and possibly some in an underground silo, or in a spacecraft. lives by permitting us to experiment at lower Aerospace Medical Division, AFSC levels of stress before duplicating a real-time EDICAL EVALUATION OF ASTRONAUTS AND USAF TEST PILOTS

4 C olonel Tim o t h y N. Caris kRESENT-DAY flight research activi- coronary heart disease. This entity is not lim- ties, including manned space flight and ited to the aged but is encountered frequently Ptesting of advanced aircraft, impose new in the fifth, fourth, or even in the third decade and increasing demands on man’s biologic tol- of life. It is of particular significance in aero- erance. Not all apparently healthy individuals space medicine in that it may cause sudden possess the physical and mental stamina need- incapacitation or death. Not uncommonly, ed to cope with the exacting mission require- warning symptoms that may be present for ments. As a consequence, the Air Force has variable periods of time are misinterpreted by developed a medical evaluation program to the individual and passed off as merely gas identify those candidates who have the bio- pains, indigestion, muscle soreness, etc. A logic capacity to complete such specialized skilled examiner is alerted once he elicits such missions safely. a history, but then he must obtain confirmation The primary goal of the examination con- that these complaints are really due to signifi- tinues to be the detection of significant dis- cant underlying heart disease rather than to orders or disease processes, but emphasis is innocent bodily changes. In some instances, placed also on the measurement of an individ- there may be no symptoms whatsoever preced- ual’s response to various forms of stress and to ing the catastrophic event. It is obvious, then, those procedures that might provide informa- that one cannot rely on history alone to detect tion of a predictive nature regarding his future susceptible individuals. Physical examination health. usually is not revealing in these cases. The elec- The foundation of any medical evaluation trocardiogram will show diagnostic changes if consists of a comprehensive history and a de- permanent damage has been done to the heart tailed physical examination. Many health dis- muscle. It should be noted, however, that heart orders, some not suspected by the individual muscle damage is the end result of coronary himself, are detected by these means. As some heart disease. Significant abnormality can exist significant abnormalities may not be uncovered in the coronary arteries for long periods of time by these techniques, additional laboratory, before segments of heart muscle are altered in X-ray, and other diagnostic tools must be util- any way. ized. Finally, despite all these procedures, Years ago, it was noted that characteristic some disease states may remain hidden when electrocardiographic changes occurred in indi- the subject is examined in the basal or resting viduals with coronary heart disease during state. Only when he is evaluated under condi- their episodes of pain. After the pain subsided, tions that tax the functions of the various or- these changes disappeared and the tracing re- gans do the defects appear. Thus, medical eval- turned to completely normal limits. Since pain uation during dynamic states characterizes the in people afflicted with this disease is usually Air Force program and distinguishes it from brought on by physical exertion, a diagnostic the more conventional and traditional ap- test was developed utilizing the electrocardio- proaches of medicine. gram in association with exercise. This proce- One of the most prevalent disorders that dure, known as the Master 2-step test, is one we watch for during the Air Force regimen is of the earliest (1940) stress tests still in use

MEDICAL EVALUATION OF ASTRONAUTS AND PILOTS 9

Human Centrifuge today. Equipment and techniques were not The human centrifuge at the USAF School of Aerospace available at that time for recording the elec- Medicine. Brooks AFB, Texas, exerts up to 50 times trocardiogram successfully while the subject the pull of gravity on a subject when rotated was exercising, so tracings were taken imme- at 90 revolutions per minute, thus simulating diately after, two minutes after, and five min- stresses experienced in space missions. utes after a standardized work load: a given It is used for research. teaching, and medical evaluation. ... As g-forces increase, number of trips up and down two steps in a contraction and expansion of blood vessels can lead to given period of time, depending on sex, age, blackout, the effects of which will show up in and weight. Because excessive physical exer- photograph of blood vessels in the fundal disk tion in individuals with latent coronary heart (retina) of the eye. . . . The subject in the centrifuge gondola is protected and instrumented for the disease may induce not only pain but also other high-g ride.... Just outside the centrifuge, very serious consequences, great care was operators keep check on the subject’s taken to limit the work load on the heart in the electrocardiogram, blood pressure, and Master test to safe levels. other reactions, by instruments, by direct and As was hoped, this test did indeed produce television surveillance, and by constant two-way voice communication with him. characteristic findings in 50 to 70 percent of patients in whom the diagnosis of coronary heart disease could be established by other criteria as well. Apparently healthy groups have been tested with the Master technique, and abnormal responses have been obtained in a very small percentage of them. When fol- lowed over a period of years ( up to ten), healthy individuals who demonstrated an ab- normal response to this test have developed overt signs of coronary heart disease twenty times more frequently than control groups of healthy individuals who had a negative re- sponse to the test originally. This procedure, then, is useful in evaluating those who com- plain of chest discomfort, indigestion, gas pains, etc., as well as providing data of a pre- dictive nature in individuals with no com- plaints at all. More recently, with the advent of devices that permit reliable electrocardiographic moni- toring during physical activity, subjects can be placed on a treadmill and exercised to any degree of exhaustion. If electrocardiographic changes appear indicating potential hazard, the activity can be stopped at any time, before pain or other untoward effects appear. Maximal exercise testing has increased considerably the yield of diagnostic responses in patients with known coronary heart disease, providing an even more sensitive method for identifying high-risk individuals who are otherwise appar- ently healthy. The specialty of aerospace medicine has had to develop new knowledge from experi-

ences undergone in space flight, in order to accommodate man to meet the physical and mental requirements demanded of him. Some of the new phenomena encountered, e.g., in weightlessness, were found to have a useful basis in old and elementary medical knowl- edge. The state of consciousness is dependent upon adequate perfusion of the brain by oxy- genated arterial blood. The contraction of the heart provides adequate force to propel oxy- genated blood to the brain and the other organs of the body. This pressure head is dampened considerably by the passage of blood from arteries to the smaller arterioles, to the capil- laries, and through the tissue spaces, so that once it reaches the venous side of the circula- tion for its trip back to the heart it is flowing under very little pressure. Since the greater part of the body lies below the heart with man in an upright posture and since venous flow must overcome the effect of gravity, blood would tend to pool, particularly in the lower extremities, if some other mechanisms were not present to add impetus to continuing blood circulation. If for any reason the amount of blood returning to the heart should be dimin- ished, the amount it could expel to the lungs and subsequently to the remainder of the body would likewise be less. Brain perfusion would be compromised, and loss of consciousness would ensue. Compensator}' bodily mecha- nisms do exist, however. The bellows-like action of normal breathing activity tends to “suck” blood up the veins. The large veins in the legs all lie in close proximity to large muscle groups. Muscle contraction tends to “milk” blood up

Biaxial Stim ulation In the biaxial stimulator, the subject is tilted at an angle, rotated, then tilted in the other direction, approximating what is experienced in aerospace flight. Electrodes attached to the eye area enable determination of the subject’s sensitivity to changes in attitude and his recovery rate.. .. A biaxial stimulator, called the Coriolis chair, rotates in one plane and simultaneously tilts on another axis, to determine the subject’s response to such stresses and detect any abnormality of the vestibular mechanism. .. . Action sequence of the Coriolis chair is suggested by a double exposure.

the veins. Even when an individual stands still, the muscles are active, antagonistic groups alternately contracting and relaxing without conscious effort on his part. This activity is sufficient to help propel blood upward. Finally, neurovascular reflexes prevent excessive dilata- tion of the blood vessels and in this manner resist pooling. It has been shown that prolonged expo- sure of normal man to weightlessness causes some loss of blood volume, wasting of muscle mass, and a temporary sluggishness of the neurovascular reflexes due to disuse. These changes become significant when man returns to earth’s environment and his blood must overcome the effects of gravity to return to the heart. Obviously, men whose cardiovascular system is not compromised even to a minor degree must be selected for such missions. Furthermore, various diseases that begin in- sidiously may affect either the neurovascular reflex components or the vessels themselves without any other manifestations at first. Under normal circumstances, the respiratory factors and muscle activity may well compensate for this deficiency, excessive pooling may be lim- ited, and no symptoms may be recognizable. If such an individual is placed in an upright posture without permitting any weight bear- ing, the lower-extremity muscles could be re- laxed completely. With both the neurovascular reflexes and the muscle activity gone, blood flow back to the heart would diminish consid- erably. Cardiac output and blood pressure then drop quickly, the brain receives inadequate Rotation and W eightlessness circulation, and loss of consciousness follows. Pilots trained in the rotational flight simulator The tilt-table orthostatic tolerance test learn to recognize symptoms of disorientation provides these circumstances to identify loss experienced in flying—thus prepare to avoid the cause of normal neurovascular responses. The subject of many early accidents. . . . During the 20 to 30 lies on a table to which he is attached by a seconds of weightlessness achieved as an aircraft executes a Keplerian trajectory, researchers parachute harness. He is then tilted to an up- are able to test devices developed right position and remains suspended so that to improve man's maneuverability in space. no weight bearing is required. His pulse rate, blood pressure, electrocardiogram, and state of consciousness are monitored continuously. In healthy individuals, the normal breathing ac- tivity and neurovascular reflexes are sufficient to maintain adequate circulation for a good number of minutes despite the absence of muscle action. 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Our pilots and astronauts frequently en- the liver takes up excess sugar and stores it. counter circumstances for pooling of blood in The blood sugar levels become inordinately the lower body during aerospace missions high, the kidneys’ threshold to preserve blood while “pulling” positive g-forces. All the com- sugar may be exceeded, and then sugar spills pensatory mechanisms that have been de- into the urine. People with severe diabetes usu- scribed are required to maintain circulation, ally show a positive response for sugar when but these are eventually overcome even in their urine is tested. In moderate diabetes, normal individuals if the accelerative forces though, even if the blood sugar level is high, are maintained or increased enough. The range it may not reach the point where the kidney of tolerance varies. Individuals who are less threshold is surpassed, in which case such a test able to cope with such forces, although they may be negative. Unfortunately, the complica- are physically normal, can be identified by tions of diabetes are very common even in their reactions in the human centrifuge. The moderate or mild instances of this disease. Ob- accelerative forces of any flight profile, includ- viously, the measurement of sugar in the blood ing lift-off and re-entry of space flight, can be is a better test than urinalysis. In mild or latent accurately produced by this mechanism. The cases, however, the blood sugar level with the subject’s heart rate, heart rhythm, and electro- patient in a fasting state may well be within cardiogram as well as his visual capacities can normal limits. The liver-pancreas axis must be be monitored continuously during the proce- stressed to bring out the abnormality. Such is dure. The appearance of grayout can be deter- the rationale for the glucose tolerance test. A mined quickly and the test concluded before heavy sugar load ( a specific amount of glucose actual loss of consciousness occurs. During the in lemonade or some other vehicle) is ingested run, the subject is visually monitored continu- by the subject. Blood sugar determinations are ously by television as well. checked one-half, one, one and one-half, and The strenuous medical evaluation of can- two hours later, and the blood sugar levels are didates for aerospace missions includes a thor- plotted in a curve. The normal ranges are well ough search for diabetes, another disorder that known, and levels above them are indicative may develop insidiously. This entity is impor- of diabetes. tant in that its complications can progress Because of the complete incapacity pro- significantly before the symptoms of diabetes duced by a convulsion, a susceptible individual itself can be recognized. Diabetics tend to de- cannot be considered qualified for flying mis- velop atherosclerosis much earlier in life than sions. Epilepsy, brain tumor, blood-vessel dis- others, and this degenerative process pro- ease, and brain scarring from previous injury gresses at a rapid pace. If the arteries supplying or infection as well as other abnormalities can the brain are involved primarily, sudden stroke first manifest themselves by a seizure. Brain may develop; if the small arteries of the eye are activity is associated with electrical phenomena the targets, blindness may ensue; and if the that can be recorded by the electroencephalo- arteries of the heart are implicated, coronary gram. When it discloses the specific disarray of heart disease results. In diabetes, a common the normal pattern which indicates such a pos- occurrence is a malfunction of the nerves sup- sibility, little question remains as to the proper plying the arteries and providing the neuro- decision from the standpoint of flying safety. vascular reflexes so important in preventing Even in the presence of such underlying ab- the pooling of blood in the lower extremities. normalities, however, the electroencephalo- For many years, testing urine for sugar gram may remain normal. Examining the brain has been one of the hallmarks of a standard after it has been stressed may uncover a diag- medical evaluation and is a part of aerospace nostic electroencephalographic record. Forms medical evaluation, too. Diabetes mellitus is of stress include sleep deprivation, hypoxia a complex disease process in which the action ( subject breathes a mixture of 10% oxygen and of insulin, which is produced by the pancreas, 90% nitrogen for a given period of time), and is inadequate, hampering the steps by which partial occlusion manually, one side at a time, MEDICAL EVALUATION OF ASTRONAUTS AND PILOTS 15 of the carotid artery in the neck, which supplies chair, rotated in one plane, and then tilted on oxygenated blood to the brain. an additional axis. A normally functioning vestibular organ is Emotional stability and well-being as well essential to flying, particularly when visual ori- as mental capacity are equally as important as entation is not possible. The vestibular appara- physical health in the selection of astronauts tus located in the inner ear is one of the organs and research test pilots. A detailed psychiatric involved in the maintenance of equilibrium interview is an integral part of the medical and sense of balance in man. This organ per- evaluation. The addition of psychometric ceives, accelerative or decelerative changes and testing to this facet of the examination also signals the direction of the gravitational attrac- includes a form of stress, since some of the tion of the earth. A tilt of the head is registered procedures require responses within a distinct as a change in gravitic relations, and appro- period of time. priate reflexes are initiated to bring about cer- tain changes in the neck and body musculature to maintain posture and produce adjustments T he cited exa mpl es of examination under for preservation of normal position of the eyes. stress are characteristic of the Air Force ap- There is also impartation to the brain of an proach to medical evaluation in a dynamic awareness of the position of the head. state. Newer and more revealing techniques To determine the range of tolerance in now under development will require valida- normal individuals and to detect insidious ab- tion before they can be utilized as diagnostic- normalities of the vestibular mechanism, this tools. We have much to learn yet as to what organ can be stressed in several ways and the the aerospace mission will demand of man’s response measured by recording and measur- biologic tolerances. As our knowledge grows, ing the direction of the compensatory eye the standards for acceptance of prospective movements. In one technique, the subject is test pilots and astronauts will become more placed in a biaxial stimulator called a Coriolis specific and the details of the examination will become more refined. Aerospace Medical Division, AFSC

TOXICOLOGY CONSIDERATION IN EXTENDED AEROSPACE FLIGHT

i/ D r . A. A. T homas

E are living in an age of complex veloping new missile and space systems. In revolution in chemical technology, 1961 an accelerated research program was Wand we are daily reminded of its started in the areas of toxicology, pharma- implications. We are becoming increasingly cology, industrial hygiene, and occupational aware of the influence of this revolution on medicine, to provide the necessary under- our every day life and our health. At first, this standing and suitable control measures for awareness centered on air pollution because of handling new propellants and other high- some dramatic occurrences that emphasized energy compounds by Air Force and contrac- its importance. Then came agricultural chemi- tor personnel. While this program initially was cals, pesticides, and insecticides. In a more directed toward the protection of ground- subtle manner, they also found their way into based personnel, the rapid progress of the our everyday life through the publicizing of space age made it mandatory that an equal the cranberry scare, and soon everybody was emphasis be placed on the health of aero- talking about “residuals" that may or may not space crews confined to artificial atmospheric be harmless when present in the food we eat. environments for extended periods. To expe- Meanwhile, the pharmaceutical industry dite research in this area, unique facilities were was pursuing the game of structural roulette, established in 1963 at the Aerospace Medical synthesizing entirely new drugs to tranquilize Research Laboratories, Wright-Patterson Air the ruffled soul of a public deeply' worried Force Base. Ohio. about air pollution, pesticides, and the amis The purpose of this discussion is to de- race. Then, of course, came thalidomide and lineate the chemical hazards affecting the more pointing of fingers and looking for scape- health of aerospace crews manning future goats. The arguments became more heated, systems capable of long mission duration and pro and con, and, as human nature dictates, to forecast the operational implications of a period of overcompensation began. Some toxic hazards on the design of such systems. thought that the “Silent Spring” was imminent, To be more specific, we are projecting our- and others concluded that the internal com- selves into the 197,5-85 era when mission du- bustion engines would have to go. This atti- rations of 100 to 1000 days should be feasible. tude, of course, had to give way to more constructive thinking and the realization that scientific effort should not be restricted to the the environment search for new chemical compounds but also The space cabin environment is designed must include development of adequate safety to sustain man as best we can for a long period and precautionary measures so that we shall of isolation from earth. Everything is artificial. be able to afford both the progress and the To create a microcosmos capable of support- price for it. ing life, new chemicals and new chemical The United States Air Force has been processes had to be developed and incoqio- fully aware of the impact of new technology rated into the life-support system. Our main on the health and welfare of the people de- concerns are the chemical composition and 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW purity of the atmosphere and the partial pres- their lives, the readaptation is incomplete, sures of oxygen and inert gases. since much of the normal lung structure is If these parameters are changed from destroyed and replaced by connective tissue the familiar earth atmosphere, the human that is nonfunctional for the purpose of res- organism must either learn to live with these piration. The animals, although appearing changes or perish. In other words, as soon as healthy, have decreased pulmonary function we change the ratio of oxygen to nitrogen, or and thus represent incomplete readaptation. substitute another inert gas, or omit the inert This response suggests the possibility of occu- gas, we are prevailing upon the organism to pational diseases in future spacecrews. accommodate in order to survive. This proc- ess is called adaptation. We know from bio- contaminants logical experience that, in general, adaptation is possible only if it is gradual. We can adapt Contaminants, by definition, are either easily to a slight change, but adaptation to toxic or annoying materials which inadvert- considerable change in the environment is pos- ently find their way into the cabin environ- sible only where the rate of change is slow. ment and the life-support system. They can There is a price for adaptation. Although the be gases, vapors, aerosols, dusts, or other organism can adapt to the new environment, particulate matter such as fibers, microorga- if the old environment were suddenly re- nisms, etc. They may constitute a toxic hazard established the organism again would have primarily because of the recirculation of the to readapt to the original conditions. The real atmosphere in a very limited cabin volume. danger is that adaptation can be pushed so For the purpose of this discussion we will dis- far that readaptation may become very diffi- regard problems concerning ionized particles, cult or incomplete. Plausibly, there may be a dusts, and microbial contamination. number of artificial atmospheres (using various The sources of contamination are mani- partial pressures of ingredients) to which the fold and extremely hard to eliminate. Those crew on a 1000-day mission could adapt com- contaminants of biological origin produced by pletely and upon return find themselves in the the crew are controlled only in the waste dis- untenable position of depending on a higher posal processes and by the oxygen reclamation percentage of one or more ingredients of systems. Since no such process operates with that atmosphere or perhaps dependent on a 100 percent efficiency, there will be a gradual lesser or greater total pressure than our earth accumulation of such contaminants on mis- atmosphere. sions of long duration. Another major source We have already produced concrete evi- is the air purification and disposal equipment, dence that this situation can occur in ani- together with the chemicals used in the re- mals exposed to oxygen-enriched atmospheres. actions, specific reaction bv-products, and These animals survive the initial toxic effects specific chemical processes. Finally, all mate- of oxygen and can live in such environment rials used in the construction of the cabin and indefinitely. The price they pay for this adap- its maze of instrumentation contribute sig- tation, however, is that upon return to the nificantly by outgassing volatile materials that normal earth atmosphere, they die from lack were used during manufacture or installation. of oxygen because their lungs underwent This outgassing phenomenon is greatly en- adaptive moqffiologic changes, such as thick- hanced in the cabin’s reduced pressure. ening of the gaseous exchange surfaces, to pro- Since all these sources continuously sup- tect them from the excess of oxygen in the ply many different types of contaminants, the artificial atmosphere. However, they can be end result is a highly complex mixture of con- saved by “weaning” them back to normal con- taminants made up of minute quantities of ditions if the oxygen content of the artificial primarily organic chemicals representing all atmosphere is decreased gradually over a major classification categories. They are gen- period of weeks. Although this process saves erally referred to as trace contaminants. TOXICOLOGY CONSIDERATION IN AEROSPACE FLIGHT 19 toxic effects from trace contaminants another real danger to health. Beyond the fact that trace contaminants affect all vital organ This article will not dwell on the toxico- functions, classes of contaminants having dif- logical characteristics of individual contami- ferent target organs or modes of action can nants for two reasons. First, such information exert additive and even synergistic toxic is readily available in the literature on those effects. This compound mechanism is a real chemicals which have been extensively used detriment to any potential adaptive response. in industry. Second, many of these trace con- For example, while adaptive processes can taminants have never posed a problem in increase tolerance to pulmonary irritants, the industrial operations, and therefore no specific end result is a decrease in the efficiency of toxicological information is available. Rather, pulmonary function, ventilation, and compli- thev should be regarded and classified accord- ance of pulmonary tissues. This is a highly ing to groups possessing similar mechanisms undesirable course of events in an artificial of toxic action, irritation, or mere nuisance atmosphere. Poor lung ventilation will lead to value. atelectasia first and to emphysema in the long The main reason trace contaminants must run. As a direct consequence, the pulmonary be taken seriously is the complexity of the defense mechanisms are impaired, the resi- mixture contaminating the atmosphere and the dence time of toxic substances in the lung long mission duration, which constitutes a increases, resulting in more complete absorp- truly long-term continuous exposure. Con- tion and, hence, a more severe toxic effect. If, tinuous exposure per se seldom, if ever, occurs in addition, there are contaminants present in anybody’s life under normal earth condi- which affect the cardiovascular system, the tions. The industrial worker, although exposed heavier load imposed on the heart by the pul- to certain toxic contaminants in the milieu of monary changes will establish the classic his job, is seldom exposed for more than 8 vicious circle of cardiopulmonary decompen- hours a day, 5 days a week. When he leaves sation. his site of occupation, he is removed from the Similar additive and/or synergistic effects noxious atmosphere for the rest of the day or can be postulated for an infinite variation of for the weekend. This allows a period of re- mechanisms, target organs, and classes of con- cuperation from any incipient damage to his taminants. Many organic chemicals do have health. In a continuous-exposure situation, a depressive effect on the central nervous sys- there are no recuperative periods, and the tem (cns). In their more subtle manifestation increments of damage, however slight per 24- of toxicity, these affect only performance with- hour period, accumulate without opportunity out causing overt clinical symptomatology or for repair. This is often referred to as a neurological deficit. It is quite easy to see how “summation of interest” type of situation. the presence of carbon monoxide as a contami- There is a role for adaptation in this instance, nant could complicate the effects from cns too, but it is much more limited than physio- depressants. Any interference with oxygen logical adaptation to an artificial atmosphere. transfer mechanism will lead to relative hy- Here, we are dealing not with one mode of poxia in all tissues. If the cns is already de- toxic damage and one target organ but with pressed, a relatively small decrease in tissue many modes of action affecting every organ. oxygen availability caused by carbon mon- Consequently, we should consider the dele- oxide could have precipitous results. terious effects of trace contaminants as a non- These few examples are cited to empha- specific toxic stress affecting the whole orga- size the serious consequences of continuous nism. Thus, as the exposure continues and exposure to bizarre mixtures of trace contami- damage mounts upon damage, eventually the nants. It is well to remember that the chemical proverbial straw that breaks the camel’s back stress is only one burden of life in a space arrives. cabin, but it could be enough of a burden to The absence of recuperative periods poses undermine the health of the crew in a long-

(Continucd on page 22) Altitude Chamber Facility

Cryogenic storage tank for liquid oxygen, 7500 gallons ca- pacity, supplies gaseous oxygen (by conversion) for research on the toxicology of space cabin environments. . . . Altitude chambers (Thomas Domes) usually simulate the atmosphere at 27,000 feet, 5 psia pressure, with either pure oxygen or a mixture of 68 percent oxygen and 32 percent nitrogen, the flow adjustable from 24 to 100 cfm. Vertical airlock sys- tem allows access without changing the atmosphere inside. The control panel monitors and records pertinent data. . . . Clinical laboratory tests performed on blood drawn from ani- mals under altitude conditions reveal biological response. Other tests include punch biopsies of liver and kidney tissues for electron microscopic evaluation of subcellular and ultrastructural changes. Test group typically includes 40 rats, 50 mice, 8 beagles, and 4 monkeys in a dome.

22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW duration mission. Unfortunately, there are other should we be concerned with setting mission- stresses which also can act in an additive oriented tolerance limits for specific contami- fashion. Weightlessness and resultant decon- nants. ditioning affect the cardiovascular status. The dynamic stresses during re-entry require a materials selection great deal of physiological reserve in the crew. The heat stress during extravehicular activity This is an area where an ounce of preven- could play havoc with an already unbalanced tion is worth a pound of cure. Fortunately, cellular energy metabolism caused by toxic the crucial importance of material selection action from some contaminants. Tolerance to has recently been recognized, and standard radiation can be greatly reduced by contami- testing procedures have been established for nants that have a radiomimetic effect; i.e., act materials acceptability from the standpoints through the mechanism of free radical forma- of both fire and toxic hazards. Thermogravi- tion in the body. Ozone is a classic example. metric analysis, coupled with mass spectrome- For the sake of brevity, I will not consider try, gas chromatography, and infrared spec- the many other stresses which also play an troscopy where necessary, is used to identify important role in taxing the general status of volatile contaminants emanating from cabin health, such as toxic effects from microbial materials. As a result, cabin construction ma- organisms and radiation and the entire area terials are being catalogued for acceptability, of psychological stress. Many of these stresses and the engineers will have a suitable refer- are inherent in the nature of space missions, ence list for selecting or substituting materials and many of them cannot be controlled en- for specific applications. tirely or at all. The chemical stress is the most To complement the analytical screening amenable to control, provided sufficient care effort, biological test methods are also em- and foresight are exercised during the design ployed in qualifying cabin materials. Small phase of the system. animals are exposed to the gas-off products from cabin materials in a recirculating life- support system to test for overt signs of toxic- philosophy of contaminant control ity and for chronic effects. To avoid unpre- The design goal of zero contamination is dictable surprises from potential additive or desirable but probably unattainable within the synergistic effects between contaminants, these time period with which we are dealing. For- tests also include large mixtures of typical tunately, there are very few toxic substances cabin materials for a specific system. that would require the assignment of a zero tolerance limit. Still, this ideal goal should be human tolerance limits adhered to as closely as possible in the initial design phase so that the sizing of air-purifica- For control of the most common undesira- tion and waste-disposal equipment, with the ble contaminants, tentative tolerance limits attendant power consumptive figures, will be have been established by the ad hoc Commit- taken into consideration by the engineers. In tee on Air Standards of the Space Science the process of prototype design and testing Board. These are for preliminary engineering of life-support systems and subsystems, what- purposes and consider mission durations of ever contamination is functionally inherent in 100 and 1000 days. Development of more these units must be carefully identified and definite limits requires extensive biological remedied if possible. But even before this experimentation, which has already been ini- stage, we should be certain that no materials tiated. The same is true in establishing physi- were used in the construction and assembly cal limits for alert or abort situations. The processes which would impart an undue con- importance of animal experimentation in the taminant burden to the system. Only when development of valid human tolerance limits engineering remedial action is unsatisfactory cannot be overemphasized. Because of the TOXICOLOGY CONSIDERATION IN AEROSPACE FLIGHT 23 many uncertainties and dangers of long-term rates, etc. If all this fails, as a last resort the continuous exposure, objective estimates of leak rate of the cabin toward the vacuum of tolerance, adaptation, and readaptation must space can be increased at the expense of first be established in various animal species either mission duration or weight of stored to facilitate extrapolation to man. Since many oxygen supplies. A word of caution is in order of the attending changes must be quantitated here. Any such manipulations should be thor- in tissues and at the subcellular level, the oughly tested for efficacy in space simulators necessity- for animal experimentation is quite on the ground, and a careful analytical sur- obxious. In this respect the procedures re- vey of the cabin atmosphere should be made quired to declare a specific concentration of to insure that the shifts in operating param- contaminant safe are closely related to those eters of certain systems have not led to the routinely employed in -the safety evaluation production of previously unencountered con- of new drugs, food additives, pesticides, and taminants. Previous experience with a num- insecticides. ber of life-support system simulators shows The validity of extrapolation from animal that indeed this can occur very frequently. data to human has often been questioned by This type of testing is important because it can engineers and technical personnel from other also reveal unexpected toxic hazards that might than the biological area. Without going into occur during emergency phases of the mission lengthy polemics, suffice it to say that these when the crew must attempt alternate meth- procedures have been all worked out and ods of repair on the life-support system which that the safety record in marketing such new have not been originally planned. As a matter drugs and chemicals is both extensive and of fact, a complete mode-of-failure analysis is impressive. Besides the ethical considerations an absolute necessity to define well in advance involved in experimentation with human vol- the consequences of failing parts or processes, unteers, the difficulties in obtaining human with concomitant effects on other parts and experimental subjects for 100-day' confinement other processes within the system. are great enough, let alone for 1000 days! In For very long-duration missions, several any case, animal experimentation must pre- engineering trade-offs should be considered. cede the exposure of humans to either a simu- As our exploration of space progresses and lated contaminant atmosphere or to an actual carries us farther and farther away from earth, one occurring during a space mission. The the spacecraft logistics and resupply aspects area where human experimentation may be- become more and more difficult. In relatively come necessary is that of relatively short- short-duration missions, increasing the leak duration continuous exposure for the purpose rate of the cabin can decrease atmospheric of verifying intactness of performance in an contaminants to tolerable levels. This approach alert or abort situation. is not practical logistically when mission length requires resupply, because of the pre- in-flight control of contaminants in the cabin mium price on payload. At any rate, there must be sufficient oxygen reserve aboard to Assuming that everything possible has allow for complete dumping and repressuriza- been done to eliminate volatile contaminants tion of the cabin atmosphere in emergency during the design and construction phase, one situations, such as generation of noxious gases still may find certain contaminants when all from fires or fire extinguishants and contami- systems and subsystems become integrated nants produced by malfunctioning life-support into a functional spacecraft. In many instances equipment. systematic search for the origin of these con- Air-filtering and purification equipment taminants will also reveal potential methods must always have sufficient redundancy and of control by slightly changing performance capacity to allow for alternate modes of opera- characteristics or efficiency of such air-purifi- tion during repair or emergency periods. In- cation devices as catalytic burners, filter flow flight periodic maintenance will be an absolute I rained subhuman primates used in experiments must Extraterrestrial materials suitable for absorb- sliou no clinical pathology changes after the exposure ent beds probably could be found on the period if the test atmosphere and contaminant level are to be acceptable. To evaluate performance decrement, moon and other planets or their satellites and the animals visual and audio reaction times are measured might be processed into usable form with for comparison to their conditioned performance of the relatively little effort. This approach may also same continuous discrete psychomotor avoidance tests. be useful for replenishment of media for waste disposal and trickling filters. Extraterrestrial materials may also be found which will serve as energy sources for the operation of the life-support system. Other possible uses include shielding materials for extraterrestrial shelters and germination media must in long-duration flights. Devices and for growing seedlings for dietary supplements. media that can be regenerated to prolong their The use of extraterrestrial material must service life are preferable. But even regenera- be preceded by systematic physical/chemical tive devices have a limited useful life cycle. and toxicological characterization so that no If too many spares are provided, they also new contaminants are introduced into the represent an added weight penalty on takeoff. spacecraft. EJIIIP

• 0 • O U 6

Materials tested for use in space cabins are heated to 1550 F in an oven, and the gas-off products are recircu- lated into a closed-loop system within the dome. The dome remains on an open dynamic flow at 5 psia 100% oxygen, from which replenishment oxygen goes into the closed system. The effect on mice and rats helps in finding the range of acceptable materials. . . . Samples of contaminants in the cabin atmosphere are collected through multistage cryogenic trapping systems and ana- lyzed by mass spectrometry, gas liquid chromotography, and infrared spectrometry. . . . Simpler chambers (right) are used in establishing tolerance levels for ground ex- posure to such toxic hazards as fuels and oxidizers, toxicology research needed fire-fighting agents, engine oils and lubricants, deicers, and new chemicals used in aerospace activities. A The gaps in knowledge concerning re- steady concentration of test contaminant is maintained sponse to very long-term continuous exposure in the airflow to animals undergoing toxicity study. to a mixture of contaminants and the effects of combined stress during such exposures must be closed in the next ten to fifteen years. Without this closure, extended aerospace and on the entire organism. This will require flight would present unpredictable toxicologi- the development of new methodology in assay- cal risks, and contamination of the cabin ing “half lives” for typical contaminant cate- atmosphere could become one of the most gories. To perform such studies, tagged con- serious limiting factors in the overall safety taminants should be used which embody aspects of space flight. Mathematical models radioisotopes that have as little radiobiological of chronic toxicity must be developed and effect as possible. This will require the modifi- tested in a systematic manner to evaluate the cation of existing exposure facilities to accom- effect of absorption and clearance rates of modate the use of low-activity radioactive toxic contaminants on specific target organs materials. 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

As a next logical step, better methods the spacecraft require other approaches. On- must be found for the evaluation of non- board high-resolution analytical capability can specific chemical stress. In conjunction with cope with the appearance of unexpected con- the development and testing of mathematical taminants only if a sufficient number of differ- models, a statistically significant number of ent sensing principles is incorporated. While animals from each exposure group should be some form of readout capability must be subjected to meaningful terminal stress tests aboard for quick interpretation of dynamic to assess biological reserve. These terminal changes, the more detailed information can stress methods should approximate, both qual- be transmitted back to the operational base itatively and quantitatively, the combined for data processing and final identification. stresses of the space mission. Special emphasis Assuming that the proper mathematical should be placed on the re-entry profile and models are successfully developed, a small the attendant thermal and biodynamic stress, special computer should be built to aid the to insure detection of subliminal biological de- medical monitoring personnel onboard and on compensation resulting from the exposure to the ground in decision-making. Since the con- toxic chemicals. With such new tools as the taminant profile of the atmosphere will be dynamic escape simulator nearing completion, continually changing as a result of accumu- this type of terminal stress testing can be op- lation and removal of old contaminants and timized and made quite realistic. the appearance of new ones, the crew’s tol- New instrumentation must also be devel- erance will have to be computed repeatedly. oped, both in the biological monitoring area Such computations should take into considera- and for the generation and detection of con- tion the previously discussed phenomena of taminants. Various organ function tests are adaptation, tolerance, additive and synergistic highly desirable during long-term continuous effects on target organs, and the physiological exposure. Pulmonary and cardiac function reserve needed for the rest of the mission and should be evaluated on a day-to-day basis, and re-entry. This computer should also be able improved psyehopharmacological test methods to trade off increased contaminant levels with are sorely needed to detect deterioration of mission duration if such trade-offs are feasible higher mental functions and decision-making and meaningful. processes. By the judicious application of such Much fundamental research must be car- function tests, the intactness of the integrated ried out concurrently with the applied pro- organic functions of the experimental animals gram. Once we start to delineate the deleteri- can be ascertained. Very likely, many of these ous effects of continuous exposure, approaches methods to be developed will be applicable will become apparent for counteracting some to medical monitoring of the crew itself. of them. Probably periodic interruption of the Contaminant generation equipment for exposure by respiratory' protective devices or animal exposures is still quite primitive, and by special clean-atmosphere compartments few advances have been made in the past 50 can counteract the “summation of interest years. To study highly complex mixtures one type of damage mechanism. The optimum will need equipment that can generate, in length of such recuperative periods must be various proportions, 50 to 100 contaminant determined experimentally and concurrently species with great reliability for long time with the continuous-exposure studies. 1 his periods. The advantage of such equipment will both save lead time and also shed further employing a fixed-ratio principle is obvious light on the nature and degree of adaptive from the monitoring standpoint. Any one of cellular and subcellular mechanisms, if prop- the easy-to-monitor components can be se- erly supported by electron microscopic studies lected for quality control purposes with assur- of the ultrastructure and concurrent biochem- ance that the concentration of contaminants ical determination of energy metabolism in will be maintained at the intended level. mitochondrial and microsomal preparations. Contaminant detection and monitoring in The latter area alone has a significant TOXICOLOGY CONSIDERATION IN AEROSPACE FLIGHT 27

impact on the entire field of safety evaluation industrial worker from the chemical environ- of new drugs, cosmetics, food additives, pesti- ment but also on the medical-legal assessment cides, and agricultural chemicals. The morpho- of disabilities occurring as a result of lifetime logical changes at the cellular and subcellular chronic exposures. The developments in the levels must be correlated with functional bio- biological and contaminant monitoring areas chemistry in order to be meaningful. Indeed, will undoubtedly find immediate applicability the demarcation between adaptation, toler- to clinical medicine and industrial hygiene. ance, and degeneration is a very thin line and The tolerance limits in space-cabin atmo- must be described thoroughly and quantitated sphere can be extrapolated easily and safely accurately. to shorter-duration continuous exposure, such as occurs in severe air pollution episodes, and will supply the basis for calculating commu- spin-off benefits from space-cabin toxicology research nity air standards. The development of a valid mathematical model alone will eliminate the As has been demonstrated with other guesswork in experimental planning and in areas of the expanding space technology, toxi- selecting of dose rates for the safety evalua- cology research will have several major bene- tion of new chemicals. The relationship of fits in the area of medical research. The most changes between ultrastructure and biochem- prominent of these will apply to occupational istry at the subcellular level will further in- medicine, industrial hygiene, air pollution, and crease the overall safety and validity in the the safety evaluation of new chemicals. The evaluation of new drugs. In general, the entire better understanding of biological responses to area of toxicology and pharmacology will gain toxic agents in general and to chronic expo- from almost every bit of new knowledge that sures in particular will have a revolutionary is generated as the result of an intensive re- effect on concepts governing the control of search program dedicated to the protection occupational exposures and the development of the health of aerospace crews during ex- of protective methodology. The quantitative tended missions. evaluation of residual toxic effects will have Aerospace Medical Research great impact not only on the protection of the Laboratories, AFSC THE PHYSIOLOGICAL CLOCK ACROSS TIME ZONES AND BEYOND / D r . H ubertus Struchold

INCE the beginning of motor technology the mode and speed S of travel have shown a revolu- tionary development. Before this tech- nological time, back to the era of the caveman, man stayed in his local time zone with its regular cycle of day and night to which his activity and sleep cycle were adapted. The development of trans- continental and intercontinental surface transport vehicles within the past hundred years made it possible to travel through some four to five time zones within a week or fractions of a week. With the appearance of aircraft at the beginning of this century, a radical change took place. Subsonic and supersonic speeds have enabled man to cross half a dozen time zones within a fraction of a day. An even more radical change has been achieved with the orbital velocities of rocket-propelled spacecraft, which cross half a dozen time zones within fractions of one hour, making time zones meaningless for the spaceman. But, like the caveman, the spaceman requires a regular sequence of activity, rest, and sleep. This physiolog- ical rhythm is usually synchronized with the PHYSIOLOGICAL CLOCK ACROSS TIME ZONES 29

physical day-night cycle in the local time zone lations per second and of several millivolts— of man’s habitat. Rapidly crossing the time the so-called alpha waves. During sleep their zones, as in trav el by air or moving beyond the frequency decreases to 3 to 2 per second, with realm of time zones as in space travel, poses increased voltage—delta waves. A dream or problems of special medical, professional, and nightmare causes bursts of more frequent and general human interest. violent oscillations. Before discussing this topic in detail, we Wakefulness, characterized by mental and have to familiarize ourselves with man’s natu- voluntary motoric activity, and restful sleep ral sleep and wakefulness cycle, regulated by are the most conspicuous signs of the physio- his physiological clock. logical day-night cycle, now called the circa- dian cycle (from circa and dies = about a day), ( F. Halberg). Many more changes be- hind the visible scene are found in the activi- The Nature of the ties of practically all other body organs. Their Physiological Clock and Its special functions can be recorded by electrical Cycle Phases: and biochemical methods. Wakefulness and Sleep During sleep, activity of the voluntary The considerable progress made in our motoric muscles practically disappears except knowledge of the nature of sleep and wakeful- for some dozen reflex movements triggered by ness has been elaborated in detail in the classic the so-called gravitational pressure points. The book, Sleep and Wakefulness, by X. Kleitman, muscle tone is relaxed. Consequently, during but I must confine myself to a few essential sleep we observe a slowdown in metabolic rate, points. respiration, heart rate, and blood pressure. During the state of wakefulness we are In contrast, motoric and secretionary ac- aware or conscious of the outside environment tivity of the digestive system increases during and of some processes inside our body via the the night; but the kidneys and urinary trans- exteroceptors and interoceptors, respectively. port system are more active during the day- There are various levels of wakefulness de- time. The blood, as a kind of mirror, reflects scribed as alertness, attentiveness, and vigi- the picture of the overall activities in the form lance. of day-night variations in its cellular and During sleep we are not aware of the out- chemical constituents. side world. There are also different stages in Of special significance is the hormone the depths of sleep—drowsiness as the first secretion of the endocrine glands because they stage, light sleep (second stage), and deep play an important role in control of the wake sleep (fourth stage), with a transitional stage and activity cycle. Adrenalin production by the between the last two. Light sleep is the phase medulla of the adrenal gland is at a maximum of dreams and rapid eye movements. Concern- between 4 and 6 o’clock in the morning, ante- ing the amount of sleep, in addition to the six ceding the awakening by about two hours, thus to eight hours of nightly sleep many people mobilizing the body via the sympathicus for enjoy a short afternoon nap. Furthermore, after the events of the day. Minimum adrenalin pro- a night with not enough sleep, sleep seizures duction is at around 10 p.m. A similar pattern occasionally occur, lasting only several seconds has been observed in the cortisone-producing and therefore called “micro-sleep”; they can adrenal cortex and in other endocrine glands. be the cause of auto accidents late at night. A All these secretionary functions are coordi- deeper insight into the stages or levels of sleep nated by the pituitary gland or hypophysis. and wakefulness has been gained by recording This “master gland” is closely connected by the electric activity of the brain. nerve fibers with the hypothalamus of the During the state of wakefulness the elec- mesencephalon, or midbrain, the central sta- troencephalogram shows one dominant fre- tion of the autonomic nervous system, which, quency of “brain waves” of about 9 to 13 oscil- with its sympathetic and parasympathetic divi- 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sion, controls all vegetative activities of the ments. Be that as it may, within the time frame human body. Generally, during sleep the para- of 24 hours man needs a certain amount of sympathicus is dominant. sleep to restore the energies spent in physical All these periodic variations on an organ, and mental activities during the phase of wake- cellular, and molecular level, harmoniously fulness. integrated into a functional circadian system with the hypothalamus as the coordinating Stability and Changeability center and the hormones as the intermediary of the Clock’s Circadian Cycle chemical agents but strongly influenced by the cerebral cortex, repeat themselves with a clock- The circadian cycle in man and numerous like regularity within the temporal frame of animals shows a certain degree of stability, 24 hours. This has led to the coining of the which may be properly expressed by the term terms “metabolic clock” and “physiologic “cyclostasis” if “stasis” is used in the same sense clock,” the best-known indicator of which is as in “homeostasis” or the tendency of the body the body’s temperature, which shows a peak to keep the physical and chemical properties in late afternoon and a low in early morning. of the intercellular body fluid nearly constant All in all, the body’s clock is actually a (proposed by W. B. Cannon in his book, The clock system composed of various subsystems Wisdom of the Body, 1929). If “homeostasis” with their own individual clock indicators. This means controlled internal environment, then clock system as a whole is predominantly a “cyclostasis” means controlled internal rhyth- circadian one-wave system, but the subsystems micity. show additionally intradian fluctuations in The stability of the circadian cycle, or the their activities in order to meet the needs of cyclostatic nature of man, is demonstrated by the whole body system at the right time. the following facts: The natural time signal (Zeitgeber—]. (1) It is impossible to break this cycle by Aschoff) time cue or “synchronizer,” for the ignoring sleep completely over a number of phase setting of sleep and wakening within the days; this sleep loss would lead to neurotic circadian cycle is the change from darkness to disorders, as proven by numerous sleep- light at sunrise and back to darkness at sunset. deprivation experiments. Also from history it This refers to both the “light active” or diurnal is known that Napoleon I and Frederick the and the “dark active” or nocturnal creatures. Great of Prussia tried to demonstrate that sleep The adult’s physiological requirement for is just a bad habit. After two nights without sleep is about 7 ± 1 hour every 24 hours, plus sleep they had to capitulate to Morpheus, the one or two catnaps for those people who are more powerful god of sleep and dreams. It took not under community, social, or professional them several days to recover from their loss of pressure. As mentioned earlier, there are vari- sleep, to the delight of their generals. ous stages in the depth of sleep—light sleep (2) According to Kleitman’s sleep studies in and deep sleep, with transitional stages be- Mammoth Cave, Kentucky, the duration of the tween. As a measure of sleep, the concept that circadian rhythm can be shortened to 18 hours the amount of sleep is the product of the dura- or extended to 28 hours by exposing the indi- tion and the depth of sleep has been suggested vidual to artificial light-dark cycles; the phys- (W . von Frey, 1930). Most people at the be- iological clock accepts these durations by ginning of their night’s sleep fall into a deep adaptation. But going below this minimum or sleep for two to three hours, which is followed beyond this maximum is outside the clocks by a light sleep. Some people seldom enjoy adaptability, and it continues to run at its a deep sleep; these light sleepers need more routine optimum 24-hour cycle. time than deep sleepers to get the same amount (3) The sleep and wakefulness cycle con- of sleep. But there is at present no unit for tinues in its nearly circadian pattern in con- measuring the amount of sleep comparable to stant photic environments, as observed on in- the calorie for measuring metabolic require- habitants of the subpolar twilight zones and PHYSIOLOGICAL CLOCK ACROSS TIME ZONES 31 on animals kept under similar constant condi- to a week to get adapted to the local time at tions in the laboratory. the termination of the trip, or until the two (4) The physiological circadian cycle can cycles, physical and physiological, are resyn- be shifted in reference to the physical one, but chronized. it requires a number of days for readjustment. As statistical studies in long-distance This is a familiar problem in work shifts in flights have shown, the majority of people are certain industries, communication and trans- sensitive to this travel-produced phase shift portation services, fire and police departments, and experience some discomfort for several hospitals, military services, astronomical ob- days. They become hungry, get sleepy, or are servatories, on ships, etc. Individuals involved wakeful at the wrong time with regard to the in these professional activities feel some incon- new local time. Their “head clock” and venience when they have to change the work “stomach clock” and elimination system are time. There are, of course, individual differ- confused. Such is, in brief, the picture of the ences in the sensitivity to a phase shift. Some circadian “phase shift syndrome.” people can sleep like a cat any time, any place, After transcontinental flights in the U.S.A., under any conditions, but the majority are this condition lasts from two to four days; after more or less sensitive in this respect. This is transatlantic flights, four to six days. After even indicated by the public reactions to such crossing twelve time zones, or a complete re- a small time change as that to daylight saving versal of the day-night cycle, resynchronization time. may take ten to twelve days. As a general rule, These four points definitely illustrate the most travelers adjust to a new circadian cycle basic cyclostatic nature of the human body in at a rate of nearly one hour per day. Some terms of a relative stability of its internal circa- people adjust more easily after eastbound dian cycle. flights, others after westbound flights, and In all these examples of changes in work some when returning to their home time zone time, the individual stays in his home time with its familiar climate and social order. But zone. With the development of fast-moving no definite statements in this respect can be surface vehicles and especially since the ad- made at the present time. There are, of course, vent of the airplane, a new way of phase shift- also some people who are not particularly sen- ing of the day-night cycle is experienced by sitive to time disorientation. millions of people, that is, by time zone changes It must be emphasized that the psvcho- during travel, particularly by air. physiologic effect of cycle desynchronization, or, more in line with medical language, desyn- chronosis, is not a pathologic condition; it is the physiological clock in air travel merely a time disharmony concerning what the Within the higher range of subsonic speed body’s physiological internal milieu expects and in supersonic speed, about half a dozen from the physical and social external milieu at time zones are crossed in six hours or less. This the new locale. But this time disharmony can exposes a traveler in a very short time to a day- be significant in many respects. night cycle different from that at the point of First, circadian cycle desynchronization departure and consequently different from the can have some significance concerning political physiological day-night cycle which dominates summit meetings, emergency sessions of the his body. This means a phase shift between the United Nations, international scientific con- geographic and physiologic cycles. Flight in gresses, the Olympic games, etc. During the an easterly direction advances the cycle and first few days of such events the participants in a westerly direction delays it. who had to cross a number of time zones may This unaccustomed relation of the internal be temporarily in a somewhat handicapped time of the traveler to the local geographic position due to their desynchronotic condition. time is called desynchronization or desyn- The problem of circadian cycle desyn- chrony, and it may take him from several days chrony is especially important for those whose 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW occupation involves time zone changes. Pilots from cities on the East Coast of the U.S.A. to of long-distance air routes and stewardesses as the West Coast and return. In this case phase well are in this category. Too frequent shift shift is an intradian matter and should cause of their circadian cycle causes fatigue and re- no desynchronization symptoms, especially if quires special attention; this is well recognized the speed is supersonic, which makes possible and taken care of by the pilot associations, the even a round trip from Washington, D.C., to medical directors of the airlines, and the medi- the capital cities of Europe within one day. cal officers of the Air Force. What can be done to avoid the state of desynchronization of the circadian cycle on a the physiological clock in space flight certain occasion which requires full alertness Supersonic speed exceeding mach 5 is after long-distance flights? There are several called hypersonic speed. This third aeronauti- ways to achieve this and to be synchronized cal speed blends with the first astronautical or with the local time at the destination of the cosmic velocity (8 km/sec) which permits journey at the right time. orbital flight. With this we enter a completely First, if an individual has to attend an im- novel situation—the customary geographic portant meeting at a distant location he can day-night cycle is replaced by a cycle of short preset his physiological clock by adopting sev- sunlight, short earth-shadow. eral days before the trip a sleep and wakeful- Within the relatively radiation-safe alti- ness pattern corresponding to the physical day- tude range from 200 to 800 km below the inner night cycle of the place in question. This is pre- Van Allen radiation belt, the orbital periods flight adaptation or synchronization. When last from 80 to 130 minutes. About 30 percent traveling in an easterly direction, one can do of this time, depending upon the orbit’s inclina- this by going to bed every evening one hour tion, the spacecraft is in the earth shadow. The earlier, and in a westerly direction one hour external photoscotic (light-shadow) period is later, beginning three to five days before not longer than one-tenth of the light-darkness departure. cycle on earth. Second, the individual can fly to the dis- But in this unearthly photic environment tant place several days in advance of a certain of near-earth space, with short, contrast-rich event or meeting; this is postflight local pre- photic periodicities, orbiting astronauts in the adaptation. arrangement of their sleep and activity regime Each of these two methods, preflight and have to follow the dictate or, better, the “tick- postflight preadaptation, should be effective to tock” of their internal clock. It has to be isoch- keep the traveler alert during the day desired. ronous with their natural inborn circadian A traveler who cannot afford the time for pattern, and preferably synchronous with their preadaptation should know that the morning home time zone. (Isochronous: occurrence in hours during the first days after long eastbound equal time periods; synchronous: occurrence flights and the late afternoon hours after west- at the same time.) bound flights are not the proper times for im- In addition to the absence of a suitable portant discussions and decisions. external light-dark cycle, the absence of weight Finally, mild medication, taken at the enters the life of the astronauts. Fortunately, proper time, might be helpful to accelerate, as sleeping under weightless conditions seems to a kind of biochemical synchronizer, the phys- be no problem. One of the reasons: no gravita- iological adjustment to the new local time. tional pressure points. Furthermore, weight- All this is of no concern to vacation trav- lessness makes the parasympatheticus domi- elers. nant, which conforms with the sleep-induced Furthermore, the higher-speed jets can parasympathicotonia. All our astronauts and also mitigate the problem of time zones and the Russian cosmonauts had a sound sleep circadian rhythm in that they allow flight to a when the radio noise level was kept in proper distant place and back in one day; for instance, relation to the silence of space. With two astro- PHYSIOLOGICAL CLOCK ACROSS TIME ZONES 33

nauts on a space flight, it has been found prac- ably cause fewer sleep-interrupting body tical for them to sleep at the same time, so that movements than on earth because of lighter Space Center on earth can give both of them pressure points, sleep might be more refresh- radio silence for sleep and still leave maximum ing in the easeful arms of Luna, goddess of the time for communication with them (Berry). moon. With a crew of more than two, a properly ar- On the most attractive postlunar astronau- ranged shift in the sleep and activity cycle will tical target, the Red Planet, Mars, the day-night be required. cycle is only 37 minutes longer than that on All in all, nothing illustrates more clearly earth. Thus the temporal day-night alternation the built-in cyclostasis of the human body than on Mars offers a time sequence familiar to ter- space flight with its exotic photic environment. restrial visitors for their sleep-activity cycle, On the moon, the physiological sleep and and consequently there should be no difficul- activity cycle will be completely independent ties in this respect on a Martian station. of the physical or selenographic day-night In conclusion, the circadian cycle of the cycle, which is 27 terrestrial days in length. physiological clock, as an inborn property of This photic environment does not provide a the human bodv, is and will remain of medical “time cue" comparable to earth’s sunrise and and professional interest in air travel with sunset within 24 hours. The selenonauts must reference to the global network of time zones, arrange in the lunar station the sleep and activ- and beyond them it will play a vital role in the ity regime that accords with their geocvclo- success of man’s further conquest of space. static nature. Fortunately, since the moon’s low gravity (one-sixth of one g) would prob- USAF School of Aerospace M edicine

Bibliography Aschoff, J. “Zeitgeber der tierischen Tagesperiodic,” Naturuis- Kleitman, N. Sleep and Wakefulness. Chicago: University of senschaften, 41: 49-56. 1954. Chicago Press, 1939, 1963. Beny, C. A., Coons, D. D., Catterson, A. D., and Kelly, G. F. Luce. G. G., and Segal, L. Sleep. New York: Coward-McCann, Gemini Mid-Program Conference, Part I. Houston: NASA Inc.. 1966. Manned Spacecraft Center, 1966. Oswald, I. Sleep. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966. Biinning, E. Die Physiologische Uhr. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, Parin, V. V.. Volynkin, Yu. M., and Vassilyev, P. V. “Manned 1958, 1963. Space Flight.” COSPAR Symposium, Florence, Italy, 1964. Endres, G., and von Frey, \V. “ Ueber Schlaftiefe und Schlaf- Pittendrigh, C. S. “Perspective in the Study of Biological Clocks” menge,” Zeitschrift fur Biologie, Vol. 90. Munich: J. F. in Symposium on Perspectives in Marine Biology. Berkeley: Lehmanns Verlag. 1930. University of California Press, 1960, pp. 239-68. Gazrnko, O. G. “Medical Investigations of Spaceships Vostok Richter. C. P. Biological Clocks in Medicine and Psychiatry. and Voskhod” in Chap. XVIII, Third International Sym- Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1965. posium on Bioastronautics and the Exploration of Space, ed. Strughold. H. “Physiological Day-Night Cycle after Global T. C. Bedwell, Jr., and H. Strughold. Brooks AFB, Texas: Flight,” Journal of Aviation Medicine, 23: 464-73, 1952. Aerospace Medical Division, 1965. Strughold, H. “The Physiological Clock in Aeronautics and Halhrrg, F. “Circadian (about twenty-four hour! Rhythms in Astronautics,” Annals of The New York Academy of Sciences, Experimental Medicine," Proceedings of the Royal Society 134: 413-22, 1965. of Medicine 1963), Vol. 56. pp. 253-60. Halberg, F. “Physiologic Rhythms” in Physiological Problems in Space Exploration, ed. J. D. Hardy. Springfield. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1964. Acknowledgment Hants-, G. T. “Psychological Problems of Space Flight.” Chap. The author wishes to acknowledge consultation with Colo- 25 in Physics and Medicine of the Atmosphere and Space, nel R. F. Fitch of Wilford Hall USAF Hospital, Lackland AFB, ed. O. O. Benson. Jr., and H. Strughold. New York: John Texas, and Colonel William Douglas, Commander, USAF Hos- Wiley & Sons. 1960. pital, Wiesbaden, Germany. At/<" ** \ /

SIA /

k f , DEVELOPMENT OF AEROSPACE ESCAPE SYSTEMS

J ames W. B rinkley

WO decades have passed since the first operational ejection seat was installed in a United States Air Force aircraft. Within these two decades the escape systems used 'by the Air Force, have evolved from av relatively simple, baNistically catapulted crew seat to the explosively severed, rocket- propelled cockpit escape system of the F-lll. This evolution has been marked by a progres- sion of subsystem improvements, including the autotpatic^ly opened lap belt, automat- ically actuated parachute, and seat/man sepa- ration devices. Each has significantly enhanced the efficacy oS| escape systems. The overall performance envelope of the escape system has been extended'’by the development of seat stabilization techniques, forcefully deployed parachutes, and methods of protection from windblast and altitude, such as the encap- sulated seat. DEVELOPMENT OF AEROSPACE ESCAPE SYSTEMS 35

Aerospace medical research has been an ity. The trajectory height remains a critical inherent part of the escape-system develop- parameter from point E through points F and ment effort. One need only consider the fac- G. In this range a combination of trajectory tors that limit die performance capability of height and horizontal velocity determines the a given escape system to recognize this rela- actual limits. Point F represents the airspeed tionship. Figure 1 illustrates a typical per- that, for a given system, is considered suffi- formance envelope for an open ejection seat cient to obtain an open parachute with the assuming level flight and no sink rate. The inherent trajectory' height available. Point G performance limit from point A to point B represents the limit of the ejection trajectory is established by the requirement to provide height solely and is directly or indirectly in- altitude protection for the ejectee. The limit fluenced by the ejectee’s ability to tolerate between points B and C is determined by the ejection acceleration without spinal injury. power capability of the aircraft. The ejectee’s The line between points F and G represents ability.' to withstand high dynamic pressures the trade-off between the trajectory height and rapid deceleration defines the limit from and horizontal velocity parameters. None of point C to D. The human tolerance to para- these limits represent an insurmountable bar- chute-opening shock determines the limit of rier. The altitude limit has been overcome the envelope between D and E. Point E repre- by use of the pressure suit and the enclosed sents the highest velocity at ground-level air escape system. The dynamic pressure limit density at which the personnel parachute may has been extended by enclosing the ejectee be opened without injury to the parachutist. to eliminate windblast injury and by improv- (In some escape systems the parachute open- ing the drag characteristics of the escape sys- ing is automatically retarded until the velocity tem to reduce the magnitude of the rapid decays below this limit.) The limit between D deceleration. Furthermore, current research and E is caused by the time delay and resultant and development efforts are disclosing meth- ejection trajectory loss until the ejectee has ods to reduce the low-altitude escape barriers. decelerated to a safe parachute-opening veloc- Nevertheless, advances in aerospace-system performance and the concentration of fatali- ties outside of current escape-system perform- ance envelopes continue to spotlight vividly the requirement for expansion of the escape Figure 1. Typical escape-system performance envelope. Determining the ability of the human to withstand a given environmental stress is basically the same problem that confronts the aerospace-vehicle designer when he must de- termine whether a vehicle subsystem can function within the environment. The vehicle designer may test the subsystem to failure numerous times, enabling him to describe with a relatively high degree of accuracy such factors as the performance decrement with each increase in stress, as well as the varia- bility of the level of stress causing system failure. The point of human failure, however, may be the level of stress that will cause physical or-psychological injury or even fa- tality, so of course destructive tests with a t.O 2.0 3.0 moch number living human are impossible. Unfortunately, ’ £AS •quivolent airspeed the human factors that limit the performance the escape-system performance envelope. Per- formed within the current envelope limits, ejections have reached a success rate of 95 percent; however, the overall success rate is 88 percent.1

historical background Early in World War II the German Air Force recognized the need for a method of assisted escape from disabled high-perform- ance aircraft. By the end of the war they had developed and flight-tested the ejection seat, and it had been used approximately sixty times. In 1943 the Allied forces began to con- sider seriously the requirement for an escape system. A study of accident reports conducted at that time by the United States Army indi- cated that 12.5 percent of all emergency bail- outs accomplished in the preceding 12-month period had resulted in fatal injuries. Nonfatal injuries were experienced by 45.5 percent of the personnel involved in the bailouts. Of the aviators abandoning single-engine aircraft, approximately 24 percent had been fatally injured. The alarming nature of these statistics was emphasized when they were compared to The pilot ejection seat for the German Heinkel 162 was in parachute training records. These records re- production when World War 11 ended. A propulsive unit vealed that less than 1 percent of personnel propelled both seat and pilot clear of the airplane; after involved in parachute training exercises were manual release from the seat, the pilot parachuted to safety. killed, and 1.5 percent injured. Analysis of emergency bailout reports indicated that envelope of escape systems are indeed ones escape was complicated by the centrifugal involving injury and fatality. Thus the aero- forces developed by the disabled aircraft, medical problem is a paradox in that the level collision with the aircraft structure after of stress that will cause injury must be defined egress, and lack of sufficient time to accom- without deliberately causing injury in the plish escape. process. To circumvent this situation, injury The British began investigating methods limits must be investigated by use of accident of assisted escape in 1944, and by 24 July 1945 data, cadaver tests, operational experience, they had completed their first in-flight ejection and laboratory tests to stress levels which pro- test using a human subject. voke pain rather than injury. All these tech- In August 1945 the United States Army niques are laden with problems that eliminate Air Forces initiated an effort to design an them as an individual solution. The purpose ejection seat to provide an escape capability of this article is to review the development for the F-80. The basic design concept was of aerospace escape systems from the aero- patterned after the German Heinkel 162 medical standpoint and describe recent ad- ejection seat. Study of the German seat and its vances that have made it possible to define catapult indicated that they were inadequate more completely the human factors limiting for use in the F-80. The ejection velocity of DEVELOPMENT OF AEROSPACE ESCAPE SYSTEMS 37 the seat did not provide sufficient clearance standpoint it is possible to use the static tol- between the seat and the vertical stabilizer erance limits only if the acceleration is applied at the maximum airspeed of the F-80. Hence so slowly that the loads within the elastic- primary emphasis was given to the develop- systems, in this case the human spine, do not ment of a new ballistic catapult. dynamically overshoot the input loads, i.e., The most fundamental problem in the the seat acceleration. The experimental effort design of an ejection catapult is in assuring was oriented toward finding a workable trade- that the ejection velocity is adequate to pro- off between the parameters of acceleration vide safe clearance between the seat trajectory magnitude and acceleration onset rate. The and the aircraft tail surfaces. In a ballistic experimental effort was conducted by the catapult, the velocity is limited by the length Army Air Forces Aero Medical Laboratory of the ejection stroke and the magnitude of at Wright Field. Using catapults developed by the seat acceleration. Since the ejection stroke the Frankford Arsenal, the laboratory exposed of a ballistically propelled seat is determined volunteer human subjects to progressively by the depth of the cockpit, the required seat higher catapult accelerations until the re- velocity must be obtained by maximizing the quired seat velocity had been reached and catapult acceleration. This must be accom- proved tolerable. Two of the subjects partici- plished within the restrictions imposed by the pating in the aeromedical experiments were capability of the human anatomy to withstand concurrently being prepared to flight-test the the acceleration without injury. The injury ejection seat, an effort being managed by most commonly experienced during the cata- the Aircraft Laboratory and the Flight Test pult phase of the ejection sequence is com- Division at Wright Field. The ejection-seat pression fracture of the vertebrae of the spinal research and development effort reached a column, with associated damage to the sur- major milestone on 17 August 1946 when the rounding muscle and ligamentous structures. first human ejection within the United States Until 1945 little effective research had was completed from a P-61B aircraft. been accomplished to determine man’s toler- The first operational ejection did not oc- ance to short-duration acceleration. German cur until three years later. On 29 August 1949 scientists had conducted numerous ejection a successful ejection was accomplished from experiments with human subjects,- but their an F-86A at an airspeed of approximately 500 instrumentation was considered inadequate, knots and an estimated altitude of 1000 to so that many of their conclusions were viewed 2000 feet. with considerable skepticism by scientists in From the very beginning of the develop- the United States.3 The conclusions that were ment of escape systems, human tolerance to more seriously considered were based on the acceleration environment has been a major data from tests of cadaver vertebrae under stumbling block. As soon as the acceleration static load conditions. The data from these criteria for the ejection catapult had been tests indicated that the vertebral segments provided, it was recognized that the major would fail at 23 to 25 g. Since it is not pos- human tolerance problem remaining to limit sible to extrapolate directly to the dynamic the useful range of the ejection seat was rapid loading situation, these data did not repre- deceleration following ejection at high air- sent the answer to the catapult design prob- speed and air density. Once again the limita- lem, but they were a basic piece of the puzzle tions of the human body were found to be and a reasonable starting point. inadequately defined, and therefore the re- The response of elastic systems to static quired limit of the escape-system performance versus dynamic loads had been studied by envelope could not be established. The first Frankland/ and so the rate of application of approximation of the envelope was accom- the acceleration was recognized as a critical plished by ejecting human subjects from parameter in optimizing the catapult accel- a flight-test aircraft. Ejections were accom- eration. More specifically, from a theoretical plished at progressively higher airspeeds—up 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to 482 knots true airspeed at 9000 feet altitude for the high-performance aircraft of that time —without injury to the subjects. In view of period. these tests the investigators concluded that In order to provide better estimates of ejection could be safely accomplished to ap- human tolerance to the ejection-seat decelera- proximately 600 knots equivalent airspeed tion and windblast under more controlled con- ( ea s). This capability appeared to be adequate ditions, the Aero Medical Laboratory con-

On the linear decelerator at Edwards AFB, California, in December 1952, the test subject was exposed to 35-g deceleration. DEVELOPMENT OF AEROSPACE ESCAPE SYSTEMS 39 ducted a series of human experiments using acceleration environment, acceleration modi- rocket-sled techniques.5 This extensive series fication, and imposed acceleration versus the of tests provided data that remain the basis ejectee’s load-bearing ability. The most funda- for human tolerance criteria for rapid decel- mental parameters in determining the poten- eration when the acceleration is applied chest tial for injury are the characteristics of the to back or back to chest. acceleration imposed at the interface between the subject and his environment and his ability to tolerate the acceleration. The char- acceleration tolerance parameters acteristics of the acceleration are defined in From the experimental evidence available terms of the acceleration-time function, i.e., and an understanding of the basic mechanics they are defined primarily by the time to involved, it is now possible to identify the maximum acceleration, the duration of maxi- parameters that directly or indirectly deter- mum acceleration, and the duration of the mine if the ejectee will be injured by the entire acceleration. From the earliest human ejection acceleration. These parameters are testing, the rate of application of acceleration

To determine how best to help pilots escape from supersonic aircraft, a rocket sled carries dummy pilot at more than 500 miles per hour down a 12,000-foot test track at Hurricane Mesa, Utah. 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

(the rate of onset) or the time period to the ment may either amplify or attenuate the maximum acceleration level has been known, acceleration. at least empirically, to have a direct effect on The ejection-seat cushion was the first the tolerability of the acceleration environ- piece of equipment known to modify the ment. More specifically, higher acceleration acceleration adversely.7 The deformation of levels have been observed to be more easily the seat cushion during ejection isolates the tolerated if the rate of onset of acceleration ejectee from his environment for a brief pe- is reduced. In fact, as mentioned earlier, if riod, allowing the seat velocity initially to the acceleration is increased gradually, it is exceed significantly that of the ejectee. Once feasible to reach an acceleration level equal the seat cushion bottoms, the ejectee is rapidly to the static load that would cause injury. accelerated until he and the seat reach the Conversely, if the acceleration is applied too same velocity. In the process the acceleration rapidly, the acceleration within a mechanical system such as the human body may theoreti- cally exceed the input acceleration by as much as a factor of two if the system is undamped.6 Figure 2. Acceleration terminology, arrows The ability of the human body to tolerate indicating direction of inertial responses the acceleration is quite complex and is de- pendent upon factors such as position of the body with respect to the acceleration vector, maintaining the body position during accel- eration, and the subject’s age, musculoskeletal development, etc. As an example of the mag- nitude of effect of these factors, the tolerance to acceleration applied parallel to the spinal column (4- G2) is approximately one-half of that which can be tolerated when the accel- eration is applied perpendicular to the spinal column ( + GX) as shown in Figure 2. With the exception of the body position, these fac- tors are fixed in each subject, but they vary widely in the total population and therefore must be handled on a statistical basis. The imposed acceleration is controlled by two rather broad factors: the characteristics of the acceleration environment and the modi- fication of the acceleration by structure and equipment interposed between the human of the subject usually exceeds the acceleration body and the environment. Each of the factors he would have experienced had he been contains many variables within it. The accel- rigidly coupled to the seat. Other similar fac- eration produced by the ejection catapult tors that might adversely modify the accelera- varies as a function of the weight of the seat/ tion transmitted to the subject include elas- man combination, the preignition temperature ticity of his restraint system, slackness of the of the catapult propellant, and variations in restraint, and flexion of the seat structure. the catapult propellant. The degree of accel- The acceleration environment may be mod- eration modification is dependent on the de- ified beneficially by interposing acceleration- formation characteristics of the structure and attenuating components, such as crushable equipment through which the acceleration foam, hydraulic shock absorbers, crushable environment is transmitted to the subject. honeycomb, air bag decelerators, etc. Such The characteristics of structure and equip- components have been used in escape systems DEVELOPMENT OF AEROSPACE ESCAPE SYSTEMS 41

of the B-58 and B-70 capsules and the F-lll ments known to have caused accidental injury. crew escape module as well as the Project The human response to short-duration Mercury and Project Apollo vehicles. accelerations applied parallel to the vertebral column ( -|- Gz) is currently studied by use of a mechanical analog, since the critical mode human analog of injury in this axis, compression fracture Two difficult problems in the development of the vertebrae, is a structural phenomenon. of escape systems have been, first, the lack of The simplest analog for this axis is a mechan- data on the capability of the human being in ical model composed of a mass, a spring, and the hostile environments sometimes encoun- a damper. The system elements are lumped- tered in emergency escape; and, second, the parameter elements, e.g., all the mass of the ambiguity and inconsistency of the data that human body that acts upon the vertebrae to have been made available to the escape-system cause deformation is represented by the mass designer. The first problem stems from the element. A diagram of the analogous model is inherent difficulties in conducting human tol- shown in Figure 3. This model is used to erance research and from the discontinuity predict the maximum deflection and associ- of research emphasis on the escape-system ated force within the vertebral column for development problem. The second problem any given short-duration acceleration environ- developed initially out of the inconsistencies ment. The properties of the model elements in the methodology used by the first investi- gators to describe the acceleration environ- ment and the associated human response. This situation has been perpetuated by the slow pace of the research and by lack of a unifying m = mass (lb-sec2/in) methodology. Within the last five to ten years there has S = deflection (in) been a gradual improvement in the method- ology. The most significant advance has re- £ = dam pin g ratio sulted from the use of analogs to describe the k = stiffness (Ib/in) human response to mechanical environments, such as the short-duration acceleration associ- z = acceleration input ated with ejection. Since the response of the (in/sec-’) human body that results in injury is mechani- ’DRI = oA, 8„„y cal in nature (i.e., deformation of body tissue 9 to the point of failure), the analog is a me- to'-,, = n a tu ra l fre q u e n c y of 'dynam ic response index chanical system composed of elements analo- the analog = k/m gous to the mass, elasticity, and damping (radians/sec) properties of the body. The response of the g = 386 in/sec2 analog is describable by differential equations containing terms representing the positions of Figure 3. Spinal-injury model the mechanical elements with respect to time. Thus, by computation of the response of the analog elements for a given acceleration input, the response of the human body can be pre- have been derived from existing data. For dicted. The accuracy of the analog may be instance, the spring stiffness has been deter- determined by comparing the computed re- mined from tests of cadaver vertebral seg- sponse of the analog with the measured re- ments, and the damping ratio has been cal- sponse of the human body to noninjurious culated from measurements of mechanical acceleration environments created in the lab- impedance during vibration and impact of oratory and also by analysis of the environ- human subjects.8 Weber Seat Ejection Test

Development of an ejection seat for the supersonic F-102 that could be safely used at very low altitudes involved testing from a vehicle standing still on the ground. The W eber seat ejection test at Edwards AFB in January 1967 used a dummy (shown side view, front view, and after firing). DEVELOPMENT OF AEROSPACE ESCAPE SYSTEMS 43

Study of the spinal-injury model provides operational verification a great deal of insight into the findings of The human analog provides more than a earlier experimental evidence. It reveals rather basis for handling the complex acceleration simply that there is a physical basis for the profiles of the operational world; it provides observation that the acceleration level that a statistical method of predicting the injury mav be safely tolerated is a function of the potential of any given environment. Since the time required to reach the acceleration level. biologically important response of the analog In this instance the experimental data can be can be measured in terms of a single param- used to verify the adequacy of the model. This eter, such as the peak force within the system verification provides additional confidence in or the corresponding deflection of the system, the model’s ability to predict the human re- the analog avoids the problem of relating the sponse in environments that have not been as multiple descriptors of the environment, i.e., thoroughly investigated. acceleration magnitude, pulse duration, time One of the greatest limitations of the to peak acceleration, etc., which may vary method previously used to describe human individually or in combination. Using the tolerance to spinal injury was the oversimpli- analog, the analysis of environments known to fication to fit the acceleration-time history of cause injury can provide a correlation between the environment in terms of a trapezoidal the single human response parameter and the wave form. The trapezoidal wave form was risk of injury associated with it. selected because it fit the accelerations pro- Some insight into the probability-of-injury duced within the laboratory and, at least ini- relationship can be seen from the cadaver test tially, the operationally encountered environ- data that have been used to develop the stiff- ment. Unfortunately, as escape systems became ness characteristics of the spinal-injury model. more complex, the acceleration environment As one might expect, the breaking strengths became complex. With the advent of the of the tested vertebral segments varied. The escape capsule, the complexity of the accelera- breaking strengths of these specimens can be tion environment reached a level that could statistically described. These values appear to not be handled by the method. be normally distributed about the mean value The acceleration environment of the es- of the breaking force or deflection. Thus, for cape capsule represents a major departure a given force or deflection there is a specific from the open ejection seat, since the ejectee probability of failure. However, since these remains within the capsule during parachute breaking strengths are obtained from research deployment, descent, and landing phases of with cadaver material, the direct application the escape sequence. Because of variability of these data to the operational circumstance of the descent velocity, oscillation of the cap- must be limited. sule beneath the parachute, horizontal wind To provide correlation between the pre- drift, and nature of the landing surface, the dictions of the model and the injuries being acceleration wave forms during landing im- experienced operationally, an analytical effort pact are highly irregular and the direction of has been in progress to collect data describing the acceleration vector unpredictable. It was the accelerations produced by aircraft escape this almost insurmountable problem that pro- systems and to determine the spinal compres- vided the greatest stimulus to the analog de- sion fracture rates associated with the use of velopment. The human analog has not evolved each system. This proved to be no simple to the point of sophistication that the prob- matter. Either instrumented ejections had not lem of changing direction of the acceleration been accomplished or there had been so few vector can be handled adequately, but the instrumented ejections and the measurements irregularity of the wave form is no longer a so varying that they could not be described difficult problem. The limitation thus far is with any statistical confidence. However, a the lack of biological data to incorporate into large body of data was found to exist from the human analog. catapult qualification firings. These data were 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

collected under controlled conditions and cases somewhat higher than would be pre- were sufficient in number to allow statistical dicted by the cadaver data. The more obvious analysis. Use of catapult qualification data has reason for this difference would be that the the potential failing of not being representa- intact living vertebral column embedded in tive of the environment that causes the re- the torso would almost certainly be stronger ported injury. The inherent variability of than cadaver segments. Since there are rela- catapult performance due to preignition tem- tively few data points, it is not possible to perature of the propellant, the ejected weight, describe a complete distribution of the dri and the variability of the propellant make it versus probability of injury. Nevertheless, virtually impossible to estimate the actual the distribution should be similar to the dis- environment that caused the injury. Never- tribution of the cadaver breaking strength. theless, from the standpoint of controlling the design of catapults by use of the analog ap- proach, use of the catapult qualification data provides an important advantage. Briefly, since the catapult performance data are usually the only comprehensive and statistically valid data collected during system development, it appears practical from a system design stand- point to relate the statistical distribution of qualification test results to the rate of opera- tional injury. Conversely, although very inter- esting from a research standpoint, it did not appear practical to determine an absolute injury level and then attempt to relate this level to the probability of its occurrence operationally. The relationships between the accelera- tion environment and the risk of injury that have been derived to date are given in Figure 4. The response parameter of the model has Figure 4. Probability of spinal injury predicted from been nondimensionalized and expressed in cadaver data compared to operational experience terms of dynamic response index ( dri) values. The probability of injury determined from the cadaver data is indicated by the broken line. The operational escape-system data points Such a predicted distribution is represented have been obtained by calculating the dri by the solid line in Figure 4. The points that from an acceleration-time history representa- represent the Navy F-4B and the Air Force tive of the escape system’s mean catapult per- F-4C ejection seats deviate from this predic- formance characteristics at nominal conditions tion, the latter considerably. This can be par- of weight and temperature and then deter- tially explained by the fact that the seat of the mining the actual spinal-injury rate associated F-4B and F-4C is so designed that the axis with the system. Only compression fractures of the ejectee’s spinal column is not aligned of the vertebral column that have been attrib- with the acceleration vector of the catapult. uted to ejection acceleration, rather than land- The spinal column may be misaligned as ing impact, are used. Each data point repre- much as 10 to 16 degrees, so that during sents the injury rate associated with at least ejection the spinal column flexes forward, 25 successful nonfatal ejections. creating a greater load concentration on the As might be expected, the operational anterior surfaces of the vertebrae, which re- system data points in Figure 4 are in most sults in a greater compression fracture potcn- DEVELOPMENT OF AEROSPACE ESCAPE SYSTEMS 45

tial.9 The more deviant position of the F-4C system components quantitatively rather than point is caused by the poorer degree of re- use the former “cut and try” methods. Further- straint, a different survival kit-seat cushion more, in designing the seat cushion one might configuration, and the operational use of the conceivably be able to determine analytically between-the-legs D-ring as the primary ejec- a reasonable trade-off between acceleration tion actuation control. In the Navy F-4B the protection and crew comfort. These two re- face curtain is used primarily rather than the quirements are currently considered to be D-ring. The face curtain provides head re- antagonistic. straint that retards flexion of the torso and spinal column. Use of the D-ring exaggerates application of the analog the tendency for flexion. An additional source of variation in the The F-lll crew escape module is a radi- data plotted in Figure 4 is the difference in cal departure from previous escape systems. the cushions used with the various ejection The crew module is an integral part of the seats. Use of the modeling approach also per- forward fuselage of the aircraft, encompassing mits depiction of the mechanical response the pressurized cabin and forward portion of characteristics of components between the the wing glove. During ejection the crew ejectee and the acceleration source which module is severed from the aircraft fuselage might modify the imposed acceleration.10 Re- by a shaped charge train and then propelled cent ejection tests using the F-4 ejection seat away from the aircraft by a solid-propellant have illustrated this point. In these tests the rocket motor. After separation the module inertial response of the human subject was stabilization glove provides stability and aero- measured by placing force transducers be- dynamic lift. A parachute provides additional tween the seat and the subject. Figure 5 com- stabilization and deceleration of the module. pares the measured force with the computed The recovery parachute is forcibly deployed,

Figure 5. Comparison of computed and measured Figure 6. Comparison of computed and measured force with subject sitting on a rigid seat pan force with subject sitting on a seat cushion

force which would have been measured had and opening shock is minimized by reefing the the subject been a rigid mass. Figure 6 com- parachute for 2.5 seconds. Landing impact on pares the measured force and computed force ground or water is attenuated by controlled when a seat cushion was placed between the gas expulsion from an impact-attenuation bag seat pan and the subject. with blowout plugs. During development test- Using the analog as a tool, the equipment ing of the crew module it became apparent designer finds it feasible to design the escape- that the acceleration environment produced from a rocket sled at rocket airspeeds: equivalent two a sled from 250 knots (above) and 450 knots (below) F -lll crew -lll F escape module during ejection Figure The first acceleration pulse, occurring in the the in occurring pulse, first acceleration The pro- acceleration The density. air and speed occelcrotion «— -fG * acceleration however, predicted; pulse been duration had longer-second, tests.The or wind-tunnel egress systems. The acceleration data obtained obtained data acceleration The systems. egress indicated that theacceleration experienced + air- the by (+ Gz)influenced is significantly the the to appeared thanmagnitude greater be studies computer development the in all either sequence would be unlike that of previous previous of that unlike be would sequence escape the of phase catapult the during in ejections from a high-speed rocket sled rocket ahigh-speed from in ejections in the axis parallel to the vertebral column column vertebral to the parallel axis the in initial 0.05-second period, was not apparent at was apparent period, not 0.05-second initial effect. the illustrate 7 filesinFigure shown 46 governingthe procurement of previous escape parameter, limit acceleration traditional the to the “popgun”effect,arepresented challenge first The topulse,anticipated. as referred the rate of onset of acceleration. Specifications onset acceleration. of theof rate 7. AIR UNIVERSITY AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Comparison of acceleration of the of acceleration of Comparison

systems limited the maximum allowable rate rate allowable maximum the limited systems mately 1000 g/sec. Even though the popgun1000 g/sec.Even mately pulse established exceeded design limits, data of onset inthis direction to 300 g/sec. The tionduring with human subjects the develop- experimenta- andcontractor Air Force from rate of onset of the popgunpulse isthe of approxi-onset of rate escape module and computed analog response analog computed and module escape Figtire 8. Acceleration recorded fromcrew -lll F that the inertial responses within the human the within responses inertial the that show results these column, vertebral the of vides a reasonable prediction of the response system. With the acceleration-time history system.the acceleration-time With computation results are shown in Figure 8. are in Figure shown results computation Assuming that use of the spinal analog pro- analog spinal the of use that Assuming DRi-timethe tion, history wfls The computed. (feqiaivalentknots airspeed]* th§ as func- input that such a pulse shape might be tolerable. asuch that might pulse tolerable. shape be The alternative wasThe redesign of the escape recorded ^rom the track test ejection at 250 ment of the B-58 escape capsule indicated capsule escape B-58 ment of the application of the analog might prove fruitful. prove fruitful. might analog the of application that apparent it program became development injury analog provided a theoretical basis for this belief. At this point in the crew-module in At the this crew-module point belief. this work analytical withFurthermore, the spinal-

probability of injury (%) 1-^* paces paces at testHolloman high-speed track. The F -lll escape -lll The F module is putthrough its

48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW do not correspond proportionately to the ac- eccentricity. The simplest concept employs a celeration input function. They reveal that the bridle and drag line that introduce opposing time duration of the popgun pulse is so brief moments. A more complex system involves in terms of the dynamic response characteris- the use of a gyro-controlled vernier rocket tics of the analog that the response is sig- assembly.11 nificantly reduced. The spinal-injury analog has since been more thoroughly explored and has been incorporated into the design guid- ance for the F-lll crew escape module as F or two reasons this discussion of aeromedi- well as all future escape-system development cal efforts to support the development of aero- efforts. space escape systems has concentrated largely The modeling approach is also being ap- on defining spinal-injury limits. First, spinal plied to the problem of describing the influ- injury has traditionally concerned potential ence of the motion of the ejectee’s center of users of escape systems because that risk has gravity upon escape-system trajectories. When been associated with the use of escape systems the rocket catapult was introduced, its pur- ever since their inception. Second, the techni- pose was to extend the length of the ejection cal approach used to investigate and define acceleration stroke beyond the limits of the the causative factors and to quantify the prob- cockpit depth. This enabled the escape system ability of this injury mode is illustrative of to clear the aircraft vertical stabilizer at ex- the technical approach currently being used tremely high speeds without increasing the to investigate human tolerance to short-dura- acceleration magnitude. Unfortunately, with- tion acceleration applied in other directions. out the constraint of the rails, the rocket cata- Furthermore, this approach will be used to pult thrust vector must be directed through define more completely man’s response to the center of gravity of the seat/man com- other environmental hazards associated with bination, else adverse pitch or roll moments emergency escape, such as windblast, para- will result. With high-impulse rockets, the chute-opening shock, angular motion, and condition results in rotation of the seat during the combination of such stresses as are still rocket burning. This unstable condition in- inadequately understood. The increased per- creases the possibility of seat/man/parachute formance capability of advanced aircraft de- interference and limits the trajectory height mands that these definitions be provided if at low airspeeds. injury and fatality rates are to be maintained It is difficult to design for the center of at or below current levels. gravity of the seat/man combination in the In the past the development of each new operational circumstance, since its position is escape system has disclosed the inadequacies not fixed. First, the center of gravity varies as of our knowledge of the human being. As a a function of the anthropometric characteris- result much of our research has been com- tics of the ejectee. Second, the weight and mitted to solving these problems as they have position of equipment worn by the crewman appeared. Hopefully the lesson has been will add to the overall variability. Finally, learned. Additional emphasis is being placed during the catapult firing the human body will on the problems of advanced systems. The slump and the equipment will be displaced, need to develop operational escape systems so that the target for the thrust vector, the for space vehicles adds urgency to this re- seat/man center of gravity, becomes a moving quirement. A more comprehensive evaluation target. Laboratory study of the motion of the of the probability of injury or fatality must be center of gravity of the human body during provided and related to the likelihood of short-period acceleration shows that the mo- occurrence of a given stress, so that the basic tion can be predicted by a simple mechanical feasibility of space escape systems may be analog. Several systems have been developed determined. The analog provides a powerful to counteract the effect of the center-of-gravity tool in this task, but the fundamental biologi- DEVELOPMENT OF AEROSPACE ESCAPE SYSTEMS 49

cal properties that limit man’s capability must research effort if the analog is to be maxi- be more precisely defined by an increased mally useful. Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories

Notes 7. F. Latham, “A Study in Body Ballistics: Seat Ejection," 1. R. H. Shannon and C. H. Sawyer, “Man/Seat/Chute Proceedings of the Royal Society, B, Vol. 147, 1957. Interference in USAF Ejections,” SAFE Engineering, Vol. 1, 8. R. R. Coermann, The Mechanical Impedance of the No. 4. October/November 1967. Human Body in Sitting and Standing Positions at Low Frequen- 2. S. Ruff. "Brief Acceleration: Less Than One Second,” cies, ASD Technical Report 61-492, Aerospace Medical Research German Aviation Medicine in World War II, Chap. IV-C, Vol. Laboratories, September 1961. The sources of data and model- I, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1950. ing techniques have been more thoroughly described by E. L. 3. D. T. Watts, A. B. Mendelson, H. N. Hunter, A. T. Stech and P. R. Payne in Dynamic Models of the Human Body, Komfield. and J. R. Poppen, "Tolerance to Vertical Accelera- AMRL-TR-66-157, in press. tion Required for Seat Ejection,” Aviation Medicine, December 9. G. C. Mohr, J. W. Brinkley, L. E. Kazarian, and W. W. 1947. Millard, "Variations of Spinal Alignment in Egress Systems and 4. J. M. Frankland, Effects of Impact on Simple Elastic Their Effect," to be published in Aerospace Medicine. Structure, Navy Department, David Taylor Model Basin, Wash- 10. P. R. Payne, Personnel Restraint and Support System ington, D.C., Report 481, April 1942. Dynamics, AMRL-TR-65-127, October 1965. 5. J. P. Stapp, Human Exposures to Linear Deceleration, 11. H. R. Moy, B. Nichols, Jr., and R. G. McIntyre, “A AF Technical Report No. 5915, Part 1, June 1949, and Part 2, Rotation and Trajectory Control System for Rocket Catapult December 1951. Ejection Seats," SAFE Engineering, Vol. 1, No. 1, March/April 6. Frankland, op. cit. 1967. POST-VIETNAM ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN FOREIGN POLICY

G en er a l iM axwell D. T aylor, USA (Ret)

N KEEPING with our intense concern these broad fields bearing upon foreign policy about Asia in general and Southeast Asia and national security and then draw some con- I in particular, it has occurred to me that clusions with regard to the probable or possible it might be of interest to reflect on the condi- effects on the role of the armed forces. tion of the armed forces after termination of To start from fundamentals, let us first re- the Vietnam conflict and the effect of that con- mind ourselves that the role of the armed forces flict on the role of the armed forces in foreign as presently stated in official literature is to policy. A unique requirement is placed upon support and defend the Constitution of the the military profession to anticipate change in United States against all enemies, foreign and time and to adapt thereto the conduct of its domestic; to insure by timely and effective primary business, national security. The im- military action the security of the United portance of quick perception and adaptation States, its possessions, and areas vital to its derives from the vital nature of national secu- interest; to uphold and enhance the national rity and the disasters which may ensue from policies and interests of the United States; and, gross error in adjusting to its evolving needs. finally, to safeguard the internal security of the Unhappily, the timely anticipation of change United States. In short, the armed forces exist is not easy because of the many variables which to defend our form of government and the con- enter into the national security equation. Na- stitutional principles upon which it stands, to tional security is both a state of mind and a guarantee our physical security and the safety power relationship based upon the interna- of our material possessions, and, in general, to tional distribution of resources of all kinds, advance our national interests wherever found. upon attitudes and policies of governments, I would call your attention to at least two upon personalities of leaders, upon economic characteristics of this mission. The first is that cycles, and upon the ebb and flow of ideologies. the mission is not solely the responsibility of National security is affected by human emo- the armed forces. In its overseas aspects, the tions and motives arising from greed, fear, and mission that I have described is a reasonably fervor. Finally, in its narrowly military con- complete statement of the goals of our entire notations, it is affected by changes in strategy, foreign policy, supported by the totality of our tactics, and weaponry. national power, of which the armed forces are It is with these thoughts in mind that I merely the military component. As such, they have undertaken to identify some of the must work in combination with other compo- changes which appear to be taking place in nents—political, diplomatic, economic, moral, POST-VIETNAM MILITARY ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY 51

and psychological—in order to carry out the abrogates the peacetime roles, alters the rela- foreign policy objectives of our government. tions of a citizen to his government, and sur- The second characteristic I would mention renders the conduct of war and large parts of is the round-the-clock aspect of the military the related foreign policy into the hands of mission in foreign policy. There was a time the military. when most people considered the armed forces In World War I, the French political lead- an institution of importance only in time of ers liked to quote Talleyrand to the effect that war. There is an old English saying that the war is too serious a business to be left to the soldier in time of peace is like a chimney in military—a fact which indicated that, in the summer. I can recall when, shortly after World view of these French leaders, most people con- War I, I returned as a second lieutenant to visit sidered that the soldiers were, or perhaps my old grandfather, a Civil War veteran, that should be, in charge in time of war. I would say I had great difficulty in explaining to the old that most of the officers of my generation gentleman really how I was earning my pay. would have been inclined to agree with this He could not understand what an army did concept and to have labeled as political inter- when there was no shooting war in progress. ference the intervention of civilian authority And I must say his questioning attitude was in time of war—in any field other than the justified by the conditions faced by the armed broadest aspects of foreign policy. Also, all the forces between World Wars I and II. officers in this same era were taught in the In that period we had solemnly outlawed military schools that the mission of the armed war as an instrument of policy; we were brand- forces in time of war was the destruction of the ing our munitions makers as “merchants of armed forces of the enemy. That destruction death,” and it was taking ambitious second equated to the military victory for which Gen- lieutenants nearly twenty years to become a eral MacArthur proclaimed there is no sub- captain. Today, this isolation of the armed stitute. forces from the realities of life in time of peace I have mentioned these past concepts be- is a thing of the past. It is a hard fact of the cause I feel that significant changes are occur- present that the armed forces are on duty ring which bear importantly upon them and around the clock, and in a sense they never upon the future role of the armed forces. enjoy holidays or Sundays. But if most of our In pursuing this subject for completeness citizens recognize a continuing peacetime role I would like to review the means and methods for the armed forces, I think that many would available to the armed forces in performing still make a sharp distinction between their their role in foreign policy. Then I shall discuss role as discharged in peace and in war. In spite the new factors arising which bear upon the of the teachings of Clausewitz as to the kin- choice of means and methods and, hence, upon dred nature of war and policy, many of us still the role of the armed forces in the support of feel that the transition to war in some way foreign policy. The armed forces exert their influence through various forms of military force, either potential or actual, derived from the men, The second series of General Thomas weapons, organization, and discipline which D. W hite Lectures began at Air University are their primary sources of strength. This mili- tary force in its various configurations provides on 29 February 1968, the subject area for a means by which the leaders of government this year being Asia. General Maxwell D. may bend the will and influence the conduct Taylor was the distinguished speaker, and of adversaries in conformity with the require- his presentation has been adapted for inclu- ments of the national interest as interpreted at sion in thus issue of the Review. a given time and place. To these leaders falls

T he Editor the choice of methods in using this military force. Even without an exercise of choice, the 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

mere existence of the armed forces contributes So much, then, for the means and methods to the support of foreign policy, serving as a of the armed forces in support of foreign pol- mute Big Stick that adds persuasiveness either icy. Now let me move to the subject which I to quiet talk or to noisy threats. But if mere think is the most pertinent to the theme of this force in-being does not suffice, the civilian presentation. What new factors are arising leaders may then call the armed forces into which bear upon the choice of means and action at varying levels of controlled violence. methods in the future? In limited war, the armed forces may be used to impose limited damage and limited loss on the enemy, to obtain concessions that X would single out three factors are likely to be something less than vital to which have arisen or are arising and which either party. In total war, they may undertake unquestionably will affect the future role to render the enemy helpless and defenseless of the armed forces in foreign policy. The by the destruction of his armed forces, of his first is the fear of World War III, which is a leaders, of his government, of his economy, and primary preoccupation of the political leaders even of his entire people. Following victory, of all nations. The second is the multipolar dis- they may then be called upon to occupy con- tribution of power which has followed the dis- quered territory and to join in repairing the ruption of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The third is the damages of war to which they have contrib- aftermath of the experience of the Vietnam uted. All such actions take place within and as war, with its many lessons which, if understood a part of foreign policy in its broadest meaning, and heeded, are sure to affect our future use not as a substitute or replacement for that pol- of military power. icy. Clausewitz made this point long ago, and First, there are the effects of the general I think it is still valid. fear of World War III. This fear dates back In addition to the military means and to the use of nuclear weapons in World War methods available to the armed forces, there II and expresses itself today in many ways. are also nonmilitary ways for them to support One is the emphasis on the deterrent role of foreign policy. They do so by participating in the armed forces as the primary justification peace-keeping operations, generally under in- for their existence. The fear of World War III ternational control, as in the Congo or in the has made all responsible leaders cautious and Western Hemisphere as the agent of the Orga- inclined to examine their every move in rela- nization of American States. Through the ad- tion to the possibility of World War III. ministration of military aid programs, they It is a curious thing, however, in consider- exert an important influence in the field of for- ing the deterrent effect of the armed forces, eign relations. I have often thought that our that, in a sense, we can undermine this effec- military school system, in accepting thousands tiveness by talking too much about it. The of foreign officers and soldiers for instruction, more one stresses the purely deterrent role is perhaps the most effective single instrument of the armed forces, the less convincing that of foreign policy for broadly influencing for- deterrent tends to become. This paradox arises eign attitudes toward the United States. from the nature of the elements which make The performance of the armed forces in for effective deterrence. Deterrence requires civic action is well known. That term, I believe, strong armed forces in-being, directed by res- was coined at the end of the Korean War, when olute leaders clearly ready to use them and in a relatively short time the armed forces of served by a command and control system the United States, later assisted by those of which will assure getting their orders to the Korea, quickly brought aid to the devastated right place at the right time. Thus, the unques- countryside and performed miracles of quick tioned will and the clear capability to use force restoration, doing things impossible in the become the strongest guarantee of not having short run for the long-term programs of eco- to use it at all. Any suggestion that it is only for nomic aid. deterrence and somehow only for show and POST-VIETNAM MILITARY ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY 53

never for use works in a contrary way on the ism in the use of military force, which also effectiveness of deterrence. Thus, it is not arises from the fear of World War III. This enough to talk a good game of deterrence; it trend has been encouraged by our experience is quiet, unruffled readiness to perform that in the Cuban missile crisis, which is often really counts. cited as a successful example of the use of So, then, my first point regarding this fear restrained, graduated force. Although our gov- of World War III is to note the increasing em- ernment did not get all that it might have phasis on the deterrent role of the armed wanted in this confrontation with the U.S.S.R., forces. Growing out of this same concern is a it got all that was essential—and without tendency toward greater and more detailed World War III. That success, as interpreted civilian control of the armed forces. This tend- by many observers, resulted from the fact that ency feeds on the fear that World War III will we remained in constant communication with happen through mistake, through the error of Moscow, that we moved carefully, slowly, ex- a field commander, or through some other form plaining what we were doing and why we of military miscalculation and is encouraged were doing it, at the same time preserving by the efficiency of our telecommunications a posture of unquestionable determination to which allows authorities in Washington to see the thing through. This experience en- communicate almost instantaneously with couraged the gradualism which has charac- commanders in any quarter of the globe. terized our strategy in Vietnam and which Historical examples of the past prompt has often been disparaged by military critics. our civilian leaders to feel that they should I shall return to this point later. assume a greater responsibility for intervening The second new factor which bears upon in military affairs. The example of General the future role of the armed forces in foreign MacArthur as a field commander who changed policy is the fragmentation of the Sino-Soviet the objective of an entire war in midstream bloc. We should remind ourselves from time is a case in point often cited in justification to time how the world looked to us ten years of the need of greater civilian control. ago during the eyeball-to-eyeball confronta- President Kennedy was greatly impressed tion of the Western and the Sino-Soviet blocs, by Barbara Tuchman’s book, The Guns of when the great and overriding fear was of August, which, as he interpreted it, exposed general nuclear war. Since then, the grow- the pre-1914 generals to the charge of having ing split between the Soviet Union and Red made mobilization plans so rigid that politi- China, beginning with the withdrawal of the cal leaders in the critical days of 1914 were Soviet technicians from China in 1960, has deprived of all options in making decisions drastically changed the political balance of affecting the destinies of their nations. The power throughout the world. That split may President was inclined to attribute to the gen- well be recorded by historians as the most erals the fault for this—a criticism which led significant political event of the postwar me to fight back as best I could, maintaining period. that it was the politicians at fault, because One result of it has been the growing they never should have let the generals plan possibility of a Soviet-U.S. detente, a prospect without political guidance. At any rate, this which some of us may regard as premature feeling of the need for options is very much and perhaps illusory. It has also resulted in on the minds of our civilian leaders today, replacement of the former bipolarity of the who do not want to find themselves boxed power confrontation by a multipolar distri- into a comer by military imperatives in a bution of power and the creation of new time of crisis. We can expect them to insist foci of power in many quarters of the world. on maintaining options and alternatives, and Consequently, we now have to concern our- to demand greater flexibility in military selves with parts of the world which in the planning. past were considered neuter in a strategic Next, there is the trend toward gradual- sense. Our experiences in Cuba, the Domini- 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

can Republic, the Middle East, Laos, and deterred at all costs. But, at least prior to now in Vietnam remind us that multipolarity Vietnam, we had not been inclined to reject —while reducing the danger of a great nuclear limited war as a form of military force which war—carries with it challenges which are new might be used in the national interest un- and in some ways more difficult to cope with der certain circumstances. However, current than the grim simplicity of the former con- events in Vietnam are causing us to re- frontation with the Sino-Soviet bloc. examine our views on this subject. President Let us now consider the third factor James Perkins of Cornell, in a recent article, which has arisen since World W ar II which has posed the problem very clearly. He points bears upon the role of the armed forces in out the great difficulty in rallying this country foreign policy. It is the Vietnam experience, behind a foreign issue involving the use of which is a case study of the consequences of armed force which does not provide an iden- the multipolarity to which I have alluded. It tified enemy posing a clear threat to our is hard at this point in time to draw all the homeland or to the vital interests of long-time lessons of Vietnam; even to attempt to do so friends. As many of our citizens view the is to invite debate, since anyone who seeks to situation, Vietnam does not meet these criteria identify lessons undertakes to interpret and —hence their dissatisfaction with our growing to assess praise or blame for motives and involvement. For the future, Dr. Perkins con- actions. But at least we can say without fear cluded that of contradiction that our experience with the We now have to give more attention to the so-called “war of liberation” technique in Viet- public understanding, to the importance of nam will have a bearing on the future parti- international support and cooperation, and to cipation of the armed forces in support of the need for increased development assistance foreign policy. It is a challenge which I per- as a more effective way of forestalling the cir- sonally believe to be serious, in spite of efforts cumstances that invite aggression. In the end in some quarters to depreciate the sincerity we may feel as restrained in invocation of lim- of Lin Piao in describing how the “war of ited deterrence as we earlier did in the applica- liberation” technique would, in the future, tion of massive retaliation. be the favorite device for the expansion of One finds much in the Vietnam experience to militant Communism. He emphasized in his justify these views of Dr. Perkins. famous speech on the subject that after the Because of the tendency to move cau- successful application of this technique in tiously to avoid the risk of World War III, South Vietnam it would be applied not only as a matter of deliberate policy we have ex- in Asia but in Latin America and Africa as ercised extreme prudence in applying military well. Further, he went on to explain why the pressures in Vietnam. But however praise- Communist leaders had concluded that the worthy this restraint may be from some as- “war of liberation” should be the preferred pects, this slow application of military force technique. He pointed out that general nu- is antithetical to the American disposition. clear war was universal suicide and that, It requires too much time and patience to since even limited nonnuclear war could so obtain results. And we are finding in Vietnam, easily expand to general nuclear war, limited as in former episodes of our history, that these war also is too dangerous. Hence, the “war are national virtues in short supply. of liberation,” which tunnels under the con- A perceptive British critic, The Economist, ventional defenses of a country, was to be the observes that what the Americans may run preferred way for expanding Communism. out of is not material resources to continue This feeling by the Communists that to prosecute the war but patient public sup- limited war is too dangerous for indulgence port for the whole idea of limited war. As in is very interesting, since it parallels up to long as the Vietnam experience is fresh in our a point our own thought on this matter. We minds, it is safe to say that the United States also believe that general nuclear war must be for a long time will be slow to engage in new POST-VIETNAM MILITARY ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY 55 military adventures far from home where the whether we are prepared to do better in national interest is not more easily discerned choosing our course when similar situations than in the present Southeast Asian involve- arise in the future. The means taken to assure ment. better selectivity are likely to react on the role That leaves us, of course, with the ques- of the armed forces in their support of the tion of how to cope with a “war of liberation.’ ultimate decision. Can we make no military' response between a Another derivative of our Vietnam ex- Lebanon-scale demonstration and a massive perience is the realization of the tremendous intervention in force to resist this threat? It importance of the home front in support of is true that we can hope to anticipate situa- foreign policy. We are learning how different tions where “wars of liberation” may occur and it is, as Dr. Perkins has mentioned, to rally by nonmilitary civil means attempt to change our people behind a distant cause which has the local conditions and eliminate the causes no clear relationship with our immediate in- of political disintegration. But anticipation, of terests. We are seeing the effects of the mis- course, does not answer the entire question. givings of our people with regard to our grow- We cannot afford to lose the deterrent effect ing involvement in Vietnam and to our appar- of our forces in discouraging small aggres- ent assumption of the role of gendarme of the sions. This is a point to which I will refer later. universe. These misgivings among our people Another point which is arising from the provide us with a forceful reminder of the Vietnam experience is our growing resistance essentiality of the support of the home front as a people to the role of world policeman if we are to continue to use our military which seems to be thrust upon us. We did strength effectively in support of foreign policy not seek it, we do not want it, we do not like —particularly if the scene of action is far from it. But, at the same time, our conscience re- home. It is not an exaggeration to say that the minds us of our responsibility to contribute outcome in Vietnam will be influenced as in accordance with our means to the mainte- much by the attitude of the home front as by nance of worldwide peace and stability. But the conduct of our men who are fighting the not wishing this task, we are inclined to look battles. about in the hope of finding some way out Apart from other factors, our difficulties of our predicament. Can’t someone else take in closing ranks in support of this undeclared over? war are compounded by the competition for At the same time that we are looking for resources between the requirements of Viet- outside help, we are experiencing a growing nam and our domestic programs—by racial disillusionment with the capabilities of inter- issues purporting to find some linkage be- national organizations. We have tried to get tween the Vietnam war and racial discrimina- the United Nations to help us in Vietnam, and tion, by conflicts between liberals and con- we have been rejected. We have seen the servatives, by contention between the execu- great difficulty of peace-keeping efforts on the tive and legislative branches of government, part of international bodies in Africa and the and then by just plain politicking with the Middle East. So as we look at the problems Vietnam issue. This division at home has been of the emerging nations, we are at a loss to furthered by the behavior of the publicity decide how to cope with the many focal media. Free from any form of censorship in points of unrest. We do not want to be the Vietnam which would be normal under con- world policeman, but there seems to be no ditions of war, they have reported the situa- one else to do the job. tion in such volume and profusion as to create The dilemma urges us to greater wisdom much of the confusion that exists in the minds and selectivity in deciding where our true of those of us who depend upon press, tele- interests lie in the worldwide scene. We find vision, and radio for our information. In the ourselves asking whether we have interpreted aftermath, we are going to have to think very correctly our national interests in Vietnam and hard about the proper role of these media as 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW an influence upon the outcome of foreign He reminded them of their duties as the ad- policy. visers to the Commander in Chief and ex- I come now to the end of the discussion pressed the hope that their advice would of the new factors bearing upon the role of always come to him directlv and unfiltered. the armed forces in their participation in He also stated explicitly his view that this foreign policy. I would now like to speculate advice of the Chiefs could not and should a bit—though speculation is always dangerous not be purely military, since most of the prob- —as to possible changes in the role of the lems with which he was concerned were shot armed forces which these factors may produce. through with political, economic, and psycho- logical factors as well as military, and that he as President must take all factors into I would not expect any signifi- account. While he expected the Chiefs to cant change in the formal statement of the present the military factor without fear or roles and missions of the armed forces which hesitation, he wanted them to know that he I cited at the start. That mission is stated in regarded them as more than military special- broad terms which seem adequate to continue ists and looked to them to help him in fitting to guide the armed forces in their support of military requirements into the overall context foreign policy. But without any change in the of anv situation because he recognized that stated role of the armed forces, I would cer- the most difficult problem in government is tainly expect the trend towards increased to combine all assets in an integrated, effective civilian control over military operations to be pattern. This verbal statement to the Chiefs a phenomenon which is here to stay. I think was recorded in National SecuritvJ Action it is here to stay because the reasons for it Memorandum 55 of June 1961. To anyone not which I enumerated are likely to remain valid familiar with it, I suggest it would make inter- for a long time to come. esting reading. If in making this statement I may have President Johnson has also acknowledged distressed some of my military friends, I now the growing importance of the military con- bring them compensating good tidings. In my tribution to foreign policy. He did so in the judgment, the armed forces in the future will decisions contained in National Security Ac- have the opportunity to participate to a much tion Memorandum 341 of March 1966. This greater degree than ever before in the formu- is the document which charged the Secretary lation of foreign policy. Just as Talleyrand of State, as the agent of the President, with said that war is too serious a thing to be left the overall direction of all interdepartmental to the military, I would say that the deter- activities overseas and directed him to set up rence of war and the maintenance of peace a series of interdepartmental committees to are matters too serious to be left either to help him carry out this new mandate. The the military or to the civilians, but must be most important of these committees is called the result of an integrated effort of all parties. the Senior Interdepartmental Group, chaired I see signs which encourage me to believe by the Under Secretary of State and including that our civilian leaders accept this fact and as a member the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can be expected to act in consonance with it. of Staff. At the level of the Assistant Secretary To illustrate this point, I should like to of State, National Security Action Memoran- mention something that may or may not be dum 341 directed the establishment of Inter- generally known. President Kennedy, follow- departmental Begional Groups, chaired by an ing the disastrous Bay of Pigs affair, took a Assistant Secretary of State and including a significant step in recognizing the need for representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. greater military participation in foreign policy Thus, for the first time, the Joint Chiefs formulation. On 27 May 1961 he called in organization has been fitted by executive au- person upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the thority into the planning and implementation Pentagon and discussed their relation to him. process of foreign affairs, and the military POST-VIETNAM MILITARY ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY 57

voice has been given a forum in which it can effect of reducing the armed forces. be heard and its influence exercised in an The first obvious one is that after every emironment conducive to effective integrated war there is an immediate move to reduce action. military spending; and, because of the high This new place at the national council cost and unpopularity of Vietnam, I would table offers a great opportunity to the armed expect this urge to be even stronger than in forces and should end the myth that the the past. Furthermore, the needs of our do- militarv voice is not being heard at the top mestic programs which have been delayed or level of government. I olten have occasion to set aside by the requirements of Vietnam will chuckle as I read some of the Washington demand attention and provide added argu- columnists. It seems to me that one morning ments for a reduction in military spending. one of them produces a column which proves Monetary policy may also contribute to conclusively that President Johnson has sold a cutback of military spending and of all over- out to the military; the next day I read a seas activities and thus work at odds with our column that is just as convincing in proving foreign policy objectives. Some economists are that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are being ignored convinced that the continuation of a fixed ex- and the civilians are making all the military change rate will eventually make it impossible decisions. It seems to me that the number of for the U.S. to finance overseas activities at articles on both sides of the issue are so nearly past levels without serious domestic conse- equal that it suggests we are striking not a bad quences. They argue that as we run out of balance in Washington in accommodating the gold we must bring our balance of payments role of the military in the formulation of into equilibrium or pay our overseas accounts policy. with dollars saved by deflationary austerities Now let us give some thought to the at home. The alternatives to this unattractive future size of the armed forces and the effect prospect would be to raise the dollar price of that size on their role in foreign policy. It of gold, to supplement gold by some form of is possible to make a good case for the need international currency such as the special for larger armed forces after Vietnam and an drawing rights which are now being consid- equally good case that they should be smaller. ered, or to adopt a flexible exchange rate In favor of bigger forces, one can point to the independent of gold. All these measures raise increased needs of deterrence in a world of objections of varying degrees of seriousness multipolar power where there will be many which make unlikely the early adoption of any calls to many parts of the world requiring one of them. strong, highly mobile, ready forces. Further- In the meantime, we may run the risk of more, the reluctance to call up reserve forces having the present monetary policy impose to meet the needs of Vietnam has made us restrictions on foreign policy which will w'ork uncertain of their availability in future emer- against our genuine national interests. Thus, gencies. Thus, there is the question in our in the final analysis, we will have fiscal, eco- contingency planning whether we can safely nomic, and domestic reasons for limiting our count on the reserves in the future. The ques- overseas commitments after Vietnam. In com- tion is heightened by the civil unrest at home bination, these factors are likely to exert a which may require the retention of the Na- depressive effect on the size of the forces tional Guard in its state role and its exclusion which the Congress will be willing to support. from overseas missions. Such considerations There is considerable uncertainty as to as these argue for larger regular forces in- the combined effect of these various factors being in the post-Vietnam period. with regard to the composition and strength But if it is possible to make the case for of the post-Vietnam armed forces. But if I an increased establishment, I can also make were asked to guess, I would expect that we a strong case for the opposite view. At least will have smaller forces, at least in the imme- I can point to tendencies which will have the diate post-Vietnam period, characterized by 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW greater emphasis on quality, mobility, and real difficulty of suggesting practical measures. professionalism. There is likely to be every I do think that we can help by word and deed effort to do away with the draft and to depend in setting forth to our fellow citizens the legiti- entirely upon volunteers to maintain the armed macy of the military role in a democratic forces, but with greater expenditures in pay society and the indispensability of military of personnel. This reduction in size may be power as a part of national power in support offset by a reduction in overseas responsibili- of our foreign policy. ties, because one consequence of our Vietnam In so doing, we must show that we of the experience is certainly going to be a review military have a sincere respect for the respon- of all worldwide commitments with military sibilities of our civilian leaders and under- implications. stand the supporting role of the military to that leadership. We must demonstrate in our behavior that we do not think exclusively in L et me mention one last aspect terms of force in solving the world’s problems, of the role of the armed forces in support of that we can and do act not just from the mili- foreign policy which we seldom think about tary interest but from the national interest. but which is of tremendous importance. It is Such a posture, faithfully sustained, will go the need for the armed forces to do their part far, I believe, in convincing our citizens that in assuring the support of the home front for the military voice speaks with a competence the foreign policy of our government. I revert and a responsibility which deserve close at- to our experience in Vietnam and the great tention in the councils of government. Respect difficulty we are having in aligning our people for the character and competence of the armed solidly behind that policy. But having said forces is one part—and a most important part that the armed forces should do something —of respect for the competence of government about the home front, I recognize the very and for the soundness of its policies.

Arlington, Virginia

N these trying times when the frustrations ows on the international scene. The role to and pent-up emotions concerning the be played by these weapons in the newly I course of the war in Vietnam exacerbate evolved policy of containment was cloaked in relations among Government officials, politi- continuous searching debate. More than ever cians, academicians, friends, neighbors, and before, war now presented itself as sterile and families, it is essential that we in the military brutal, yet the adversary insisted upon war- profession not lose sight of the fact that a fare as a means to achieving a Communist- basic consistency in the objective and stakes dominated society. For the moment, war as involved in Vietnam has existed since the Ad- an instrument to be used in direct confronta- ministration of President Truman. Our present tion with the adversary was considered un- involvement in Vietnam stems from decisions thinkable. However, war waged on a limited made in the aftermath of the Second World basis and without causing the adversaries to War, not from incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin. confront one another became an accepted The scope of that great war left the United tactic in achieving the overthrow of non- States with political and moral commitments Communist societies. Under the labels of in Asia as well as on the continent of Europe. “just” wars or wars of “national liberation,” The conclusion of the Second World War was the Communists sought to neutralize the effect really the beginning of a protracted struggle of atomic and nuclear weapons while relying on behalf of two diametrically opposed ideol- on guerrilla techniques which were to be ogies for the “minds and hearts” of the peoples known as “unconventional” in later references of the world. The United States became the to the conflict in Vietnam. For war to be con- champion of national independence, and in doned or utilized as a means to an end, the this role she was compelled to accept the con- United States was compelled to rationalize the comitant role of the guarantor of the freedom questions of political utility and morality so as of independent states from intrusion by un- to provide that war, at any level of intensity, welcome “aggressors.” would serve a major purpose in both spheres. In the course of evolving United States In view of the foregoing, our concern for postwar policy, the concept of containment Vietnam is not predicated upon any singular was broached, entertained, and applied. The proposition, nor is it a product of irrationality. freedom and independence of less fortunate The U.S. involvement has evolved from the and less powerful nations became essential desire to prevent disastrous results in Asia and bulwarks to the maintenance of U.S. freedom to make possible constructive and progressive and independence. U.S. policies, of necessity, trends in an area of the world that is strain- were founded on calculations of national ing for advancement and recognition. Unfortu- interest as well as international morality. nately, time and events have focused attention Containment allowed the United States to on the territory of Vietnam rather than on the prevent what had to be prevented while whole of Southeast Asia. New and immensely making possible constructive and progressive promising trends are available in the area, but trends toward a world order which would be these are in danger of being lost by virtue of conducive to free societies. our lack of knowledge of history, with a re- Within the U.S., though, postwar reac- sultant narrowed view of the meaning and tions in the form of insular or isolationist purpose of Vietnam. By dwelling upon the tendencies became noticeable. National com- postulations of the uninformed and the mis- mitments to such organizations as the North informed, we are in danger of abdicating our Atlantic Treaty Organization ( nato) and role in Asia through being panicked into de- Southeast Asia Treaty Organization ( sea t o ) fending a position which excludes all relevant supposedly dispelled any notions of our turn- factors other than Vietnam. ing inward, i.e., returning to the bankruptcy The route from Tokyo Bay to the Gulf of prewar isolationism. The advent of atomic of Tonkin has by no means been serene or weapons had cast numerous unfamiliar shad- without frustration. Our current mood con- VIETNAM: OUR WORLD WAR II LEGACY 61

ment came even in the face of the harshness and arrogance of the Communist aggression in Korea. On the other hand, Vietnam presented an entirely different problem. The decision to be- come irrevocably committed in Vietnam was a product of nearly fifteen years’ concern and policy development. Although the U.S. com- mitment proceeded very subtly, the public w'as well aware that the national interest dictated a continuing U.S. presence in Asia. It was hoped that those agencies which possessed the capability to combat insurgency operations would be sufficient to thwart Communist aims. This hope rapidly dissolved, however, as the Communists escalated their efforts to a level akin to open warfare. It became apparent that the U.S. w'as faced with the possibility of a major and quite disastrous shift in the balance of power in Asia if Vietnam were to be ignored. Thus, in February 1965, the decision was made to continue to pursue U.S. national interests in Asia by meeting the stepped-up Communist aggression in Vietnam. In essence, U.S. policy relative to Southeast Asia had not changed General Van Tien Dung, Vietminh leader of truce talks since the introduction of llie containment pol- at Trung Gia, after the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 icy in 1946 and its application to Berlin in 1948 and Korea in 1950. earning Vietnam is highly suggestive of the It should be apparent that our involve- prevailing mood in 1951-52 concerning Korea. ment in Vietnam is symptomatic of our com- Up to that period, no war in U.S. history had mitment to foster and preserve freedom and created such a disturbance of conscience and independence in Southeast Asia, and in Asia national resolve. The indecisiveness of the as a whole. Not only the peace and security of situation had caused the American people to Asia but also the future of the world would be become frustrated with the course of the war in serious jeopardy if the U.S. w'ere to lose and the mounting casualty- lists. The American interest in places such as Korea or Southeast people felt that the United States had carried Asia (Indochina). It was this determination to the economic and military burdens for world keep Asia free that caused the U.S., French, peace throughout the Second World War, and and British delegates in the United Nations now in the early 1950’s, a twilight of “no w ar- Assembly, on 28 January 1952, to issue a joint no peace,” they found themselves engaged in warning against Chinese Communist aggres- a most searching and bitter national debate on sion in Southeast Asia. The three nations de- the foreign policy of the postwar years. clared that any attempt at aggression would The debate, ranging over a wide area of “be a matter of direct and grave concern which postwar foreign policy, had emotional roots would require the most urgent and earnest and overtones deriving from the sweep of consideration by the United Nations.”1 On the American history in the Far East and from the eve of the Korean armistice in July 1953, Brit- tensions and cross-currents of the Cold War. ain joined France and the United States in a The Korean War was considered an aberration statement declaring that the Indochina strug- by many Americans. American disenchant- gle "is essential to the free world.”- 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

These two policy statements by the three not be confined to Indochina. I say this soberly Western powers left little doubt as to the posi- in the interests of peace and in the hope of tion these nations took in regard to the threat preventing another aggressor miscalculation.3 of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. President Eisenhower had added his voice to The Korean War had been a very unstabilizing the increasing concern over the war in Indo- factor in Asia. The Chinese Communist annies china when a month earlier, speaking in Seattle, had joined battle with the Western powers, he stressed the need to hold Indochina as the and for a time it looked as though the United key to Southeast Asia.4 Nations forces were going to be driven out of The United States had by this time become Korea. The situation was reversed, however, deeply involved in supporting French military bv earlv May 1951, and a stalemate occurred operations in Indochina. When the Eisenhower which was to last until the armistice was signed Administration took office, the United States on 26 July 1953. was giving more aid to the anti-Communist If it could be said that there was a “win- forces in Indochina than the aid received by ner” in this “strange" war, then the fact that the pro-Communist forces from Red China. Communist China had shown her prowess and Economic and military aid totaling $785 mil- forced the Western powers to negotiate a set- lion had been allocated during fiscal 1954, and tlement was sufficient to qualify the former as a planned $1.13 billion was provided for Indo- having gained at least a greater prestige among china in the fiscal 1955 budget. In February the Asian nations. United States policy did not 1954 it was announced that additional B-26 “surrender” Korea. On the contrary, the real bombers were being sent to the French in damage had been done on 25 June 1950, when Indochina and that the United States Military- the North Korean attack began. The Eisen- Assistance Advisory Group of some 400 per- hower Administration was faced with an irrec- sonnel was being joined by 200 “volunteer" oncilable situation the heavy expense in- technicians sent to service the nearly two hun- volved in manpower and resources to unite a dred fighting aircraft the United States had country that had been divided since 1945. supplied. “Without engaging in combat.” writes Merlo Pusev, “these men notably enhanced the striking power of the French air force and dem- WITH the conclusion of the Ko- onstrated the eagerness of the Eisenhower ad- rean War, the stability of Southeast Asia re- ministration to give all the help it could short mained as uncertain as ever. The grim issue of of actual participation in the war.”5 Indochina became readily apparent after the In September 1953 the ill-fated Navarre truce. Would the Chinese Communist troops, plan was announced (named after the French released from the Korean fighting, be used commander in Indochina, General Henri- against the French in Indochina? Was there to Eugene Navarre). The purpose of this French- be a second Communist aggression on another developed plan was to intensify the prosecution Asian country? These and other questions of the war in order to break up and destroy the caused intense concern within the Eisenhower regular enemy forces. An additional sum of Administration. How could the promises of no $385 million in U.S. aid for supplies and equip- war, balanced budgets, tax cuts, and a better ment was included in the plan. The French life for all be fulfilled if war erupted again in were to train and direct the establishment of a the Far East? strong Vietnamese army. This plan was never In an attempt to deter this possibility. fulfilled; by March 1954 it had collapsed, and Secretary of State Dulles used the occasion of the military situation in Indochina was nearing an address to the American Legion convention the danger point of a French defeat. Chinese on 2 September 1953 to warn: Communist aid to the Vietminh was increasing The Chinese Communist regime should in volume, and France was fast approaching a realize that such a second aggression could not domestic political crisis as a result of a public occur without grave consequences which might demand, similar to that raised by Americans VIETNAM: OUR WORLD WAR II LEGACY 63

during the Korean War, calling for an end to mated two days earlier that Southeast Asia lay the fighting.6 “on the fringe or the periphery of our inter- The increasing participation of the United ests.” In all respects it looked as if the impor- States in the Indochina war, based on the tance of Indochina in U.S. policy was being policy that Indochina was the key to South- downgraded and the idea of intervention east Asia, created some alarm in Congress. completely discouraged. The question of intervention arose in many With the arrival of General Paul Ely, quarters. The excitement was partially alle- French Army Chief of Staff, on 20 March 1954, viated on 10 February 1954, when the Presi- the tone of official comment underwent an dent said that he was “bitterly opposed to ever abrupt transformation. President Eisenhower, getting the United States involved in a hot war at his 24 March press conference, viewed in that region”; that he could not “conceive Southeast Asia as being “of the most trans- of a greater tragedy for America than to get cendent importance” to the United States and heavily involved . . . in an all-out war” in the free world. Secretary Dulles “after con- Indochina.7 sultations with Congressional leaders of both Nevertheless, the subject of intervention parties, and after having advised our principal remained very much the talk of official Wash- allies” revealed the Administration’s feelings ington. On 19 March Secretary Dulles tried to concerning the Indochina crisis in an address dampen the talk of intervention further when to the Overseas Press Club of America on 29 he stated that the “New Look” policy of deter- March 1954: rent or retaliatory action had no application Under the conditions of today, the impo- to Indochina, where there had been no “open” sition on Southeast Asia of the political system aggression. President Eisenhower had inti- of Communist Russia and its Chinese Com- munist ally by whatever means would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that the possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might have serious risks, but these risks are far less than would face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today.* What had caused this sudden return to view- ing Indochina as the “key to Southeast Asia”? General Ely had come to Washington with desperate news. He frankly told Ameri- can officials that Indochina was lost if the United States did not intervene decisively.9 On the same day, Marquis Childs, in an inter- view with Rene Pleven, the French Minister of Defense, was told that the French needed “an additional one thousand bombers and at least three more paratroop divisions” to bring about a victory in Indochina; that France could not provide them—only the United States could provide such a sizable force.10 The in-

Colonel Marcel Lennuyeux, French representative to the negotiations at Trung Gia, about 25 miles north of Hanoi 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tervention requested by General Ely involved would agree to see the finish of the war; (2) an air strike against the Communist forces that the French government would take steps beleaguering Dien Bien Phu. to grant full independence to Vietnam, Laos, The impact of General Ely’s request had and Cambodia; and (3) that Britain, Australia, been electric. The Pentagon advised that an and New Zealand would join in collective air strike by itself would be wholly inadequate. defense. The plan was never effected. France General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Chief of did not have the will to mobilize all its own Staff, was thoroughly opposed to the air strike resources and fight for victory. The British principle because he believed ground troops opposed the American plan both politically sooner or later would have to be committed. and militarily; they preferred to await the To him intervention would have been a “tragic outcome of the imminent Indochina confer- adventure.”1* General Nathan Twining, Chief ence at Geneva and not implement a plan that of Staff of the Air Force, and Admiral Robert would imperil the diplomatic negotiations.13 Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, both On the other hand, the British military leaned somewhat toward the Ridgway view. opposed intervention on the grounds that an Only Admiral .Arthur Radford, Chairman of air strike would not be enough. They held the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly supported an that an immediate, large increment of ground air strike. forces would be necessary to prevent a rout Secretary Dulles, in turn, insisted that the in the Hanoi-Haiphong area in the north. United States should not allow itself to be They declared that ground forces were not drawn into the war in any manner that would available in numbers necessary unless the make it appear as an ally of French colonial- United States was prepared to take three or ism. Therefore, if the French would promise four divisions out of Korea at once. Since two Vietnam independence, then Dulles would divisions had already been removed from favor intervention with air power. Lastly Korea for economy purposes by the Eisen- President Eisenhower insisted that it would hower Administration, this added withdrawal exceed his constitutional powers to enter the would have exposed South Korea if a general Indochina war without Congressional consent. war started.14 However, American interests in the Pacific While the debate concerning intervention would be deeply affected by the loss of Indo- continued in this country, the French made china to Communist forces, so both Eisen- two last desperate pleas for air support, the hower and Dulles sought a way to bring last request being made in late April. By this United States power to bear in Indochina time the situation at Dien Bien Phu had so which would be both militarily effective and deteriorated that both Dulles and Radford politically acceptable. ruled out an air strike. Now the question of On 4 April 1954 President Eisenhower, initial intervention with ground troops was Secretary Dulles, and Admiral Radford met in added to the Administration’s dilemma. the President’s study upstairs at the White No less an authority than Vice President House to discuss the crisis in Indochina. The Nixon, in an off-the-record statement that very threat of imminent French military disaster quickly found its way into the newspapers, confronted the President with the difficult warned that the United States “as the leader question of whether the United States should of the free world cannot afford further retreat intervene with its own armed forces to halt in Asia” and might even have to send “troops" the Communists in Indochina as it had in there.1'* Admiral Radford, the champion of Korea. The final decision was made: If a intervention tlmwghout the Indochina crisis, collective defense in Indochina could be man- in a speech on 15 April also called for meas- aged, the United States would participate in ures to prevent the loss of Indochina to the the fighting.l- Communists.16 They were firm believers in The decision to participate had been the “falling dominoes concept, which was first based on three conditions: (1) that the French described by Eisenhower on 7 April 1954: VIETNAM: OUR WORLD WAR II LEGACY 65

modus vivendi in the Indochina situation. You have a row of dominoes set up, you Many people assumed that diplomatic knock over the first one and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go frustration with the British and the French over very quickly. So you could have a begin- was the controlling reason for the decision to ning of a disintegration that would have the abandon the idea of intervention in Indochina. most profound influences.17 However, the impact of the military thinking of the British chiefs of staff as well as the Indochina was the first domino, and if powerful argument presented by General it fell, the next to collapse might be Burma, Ridgway more than likely settled the question Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia. It was be- in the President’s mind. There was little doubt lieved that the “falling dominoes” could even that the United States would have had to topple into America’s island defense chain of supply the preponderance of men and equip- Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, and then ment even if France and England joined in southward, threatening Australia and New a collective effort.19 Given the low state of Zealand. its ground forces, the United States could not The sharp division among the Joint have successfully undertaken a ground war Chiefs of Staff concerning intervention in in Indochina without increasing its mobiliza- Indochina became known to the President in tion base. one of the National Security Council meet- On 7 May 1954, Dien Bien Phu was cap- ings. He managed to have General Ridgwav tured by the Vietminh forces. Free world make his own presentation at a later Council forces had retreated reluctantly from another meeting. In his memoirs General Ridgwav re- confrontation in Asia. The prospect of a new lated how with charts, tables, and figures com- Korea, with higher defense spending, higher piled from an on-the-spot evaluation of the taxes, and revived economic controls had Indochina situation by a team of Army experts caused many Americans to look with dread —engineers, signal and communications spe- upon the prospect of intervention. The cialists, medical officers, and experienced com- retrenchment of the initial two years of bat leaders who knew how to evaluate terrain the Eisenhower Administration had left the in terms of battle tactics—he documented his United States without a versatile and flexible argument that intervention with air and naval military establishment. Yet, even as prudence power would inevitably be followed by the dictated that the United States refrain from necessity for American ground troops. He unilateral involvement in Southeast Asia, the estimated that seven or eight divisions would fundamental policy of guaranteeing the free- have to be committed; and under the then dom and independence of nations in Asia existent manpower conditions, the United remained viable. In the words of some ob- States military structure would have been far servers, military involvement in Southeast Asia out of balance, thus leaving the U.S.S.R. an in 1954, although justified, “would be the opportunity to strike, possibly in Western wrong wrar, at the wrong place, at the wrong Europe or South Korea, as the British mili- time.”-0 tary' chiefs had reckoned.ls Following abandonment of the interven- tion idea by the National Security Council, S outheast Asia continued to con- a directive was issued by the Secretary of cern United States policy-makers throughout Defense forbidding the service chiefs, the the late 1950s and into the early 1960s. With civilian secretaries, and assistant secretaries the shift in emphasis from massive-retaliation from writing any newspaper or magazine to limited-war strategy in the 1960s, the na- articles. It looked as if General Ridgway’s tional strategy was reoriented towards conven- presentation had caused President Eisenhower tional limited war. The ever present concern to direct a strategic retreat from the advanced for Indochina became of increasing impor- position of intervention to one of seeking a tance in the early 1960s with the increase of 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

insurgent activity in South Vietnam. By late nothing less than major military measures 1964 it was apparent that the U.S. would could possibly hope to stem and reverse the have to become more markedly involved in tide which had been rising since 1950. Vietnam if the concern expressed in earlier W hen one ponders the historical develop- years for the freedom and independence of ment of our military participation in Southeast Asia as a whole was to be quieted. In line Asia, particularly in Vietnam, it is rather ob- with the basic premises of the three preceding vious that without U.S. military involvement Presidents, President Johnson in 1965 was “at the right place and at the right time” compelled to implement the policy decision to Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese intervene: a decision reaffirmed in 1954 but domination would have occurred throughout not implemented by Eisenhower. Southeast Asia to the point where a greater Where the Eisenhower Administration conflict under worse circumstances could have had withheld implementation because of the resulted. Our presence in Vietnam is histori- lack of a proper mix of military forces, Presi- cal, inevitable, and an inspiration to the free dent Johnson’s Administration acted on the people of Asia, as well as to the world. History basis that possession of a requisite military will judge us as to our success or failure in capability now afforded the U.S. the oppor- coping with our most significant legacy from tunity to prevent a North Vietnamese take- World War II. over of South Vietnam. It was decided that Hq United States Air Force

Notes 1. New York Times, 29 January 1952. 10. Marquis Childs, The Ragged Edge: The Diary of a 2. Ibid., 15 July 1953. Crisis (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), p. 95. 3. New York Times, 3 September 1953; also United States This interview would seem to lend credence to Chalmers Department of State Bulletin, XXIX (14 September 1953), p. Roberts's account of the Indochina crisis. 342. 11. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier (New York: Harper & 4. New York Times, 5 August 1953. Brothers, 1956), p. 277. 5. Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the President (New York: 12. Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 147. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 261. 6. Miriam S. Farley, United States Relations with South- 13. Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the east Asia: With Special Reference to Indochina, 1950—1955 Brink (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1955), p. 7. 117-18. 7. Report of President Eisenhower’s news conference, New 14. Childs, pp. 130-31. York Times, 11 February 1954. 15. New York Times, 17 and 18 April 1954. 8. John Foster Dulles, "Indo-China and the Chinese Com- 16. Roberts, p. 32; Childs, p. 159; New York Times, munist Regime,” Vital Speeches, XX (15 April 1954), p. 387. 16 April 1954. 9. Chalmers M. Roberts, “The Day We Didn’t Go to 17. New York Times, 8 April 1954. War,” The Reporter, XI ( 15 September 1954), pp. 31—35. The 18. Childs, pp. 154-57; Ridgway, pp. 276-77. events of the next few weeks following General Ely’s visit are 19. Childs, p. 95. recorded in this article by Mr. Roberts. The author based his 20. James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age article on facts and circumstantial evidence. It is the only (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 217. This same account of this period that has been widely acclaimed as sub- argument was as prevalent throughout the Pentagon in 1954 stantially correct. as it was in 1951. STRATEGIC STABILITY

Amoretta M. Hoeber

INCE the end of the United States use of nuclear weapons but also against the monopoly of nuclear weapons four use of the threat of nuclear weapons in vital S years after World War II, the defini- circumstances. tion of strategic stability has revolved pri- Throughout history, the major military marily around the development of a relation mode of achieving deterrence has been to of mutual deterrence between the United build a military force large enough to establish States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- the credibility of threatened punishment if publics. Strategic stability is neither simple vital interests are impinged upon. If deter- nor static, but it can be viewed broadly as rence is adequate, vital interests will not be the result of effective deterrence. challenged, and stability will be established and maintained. The problems arise in deter- mining the kind and amount of forces that stability as two-sided deterrence will achieve the desired deterrence. Two op- Although no one has accurately measured posite views of the forces that will achieve deterrent balance, it is clear that a small deter- deterrence and thus promote stability are the rent may be effective against a larger one, disarmament view and the massive retaliation provided the smaller deterrent can threaten doctrine.1 An understanding of the assump- the infliction of an unacceptable level of dam- tions, aims, and limitations of these two views age. This depends not only on an assessment is important in evaluating the current U.S. by each opponent of the other’s subjective deliberate, selective, controlled (dsc:) response evaluation of unacceptable damage but also policy. on the offensive capabilities of the small deterrent relative to possible defensive capa- W ould a disarmed world be stable? bilities of the opponent. Deterrence in the nuclear age has been First is the hypothetical instance of an thought of as prevention of the opponent’s use unarmed world. The assumption that arms of nuclear weapons through the threat of re- make war, that weapons are tension-inducing taliation, but deterrence can be more fully rather than tension-reflecting, results in the defined as the maintenance of such a posture conviction that stability is possible only in a that the opponent is not tempted to take any disarmed world. The extreme of this view is action which significantly impinges on his the advocacy of general and complete dis- adversary’s vital interests. The concept of de- armament (ccd). Less extreme is the advocacy terrence is aimed, then, not only against the of arms limitation by agreement, either as a 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

progressive lowering of force levels or force it was thought that the United States needed growth rates or as the abolition of a type of only to maintain its clear superiority in offen- force, usually new, such as anti-ballistic-missile sive nuclear forces and threaten to use them. ( abm) defense. (The proposition that stability' Stability was sought from the one-sided im- may be inversely proportional to the destruc- position of terror. tive potentials of weapons results in opposition As the Soviet Union acquired a significant to technological advances; if weapons are de- deterrent threat, the use of terror became bal- stabilizing in themselves, it is argued, then not anced in a “mutual suicide pact,” in the sense only more but also better weapons are more that any transgression would result in the destabilizing.) catastrophic war. The major defect of this It has never been demonstrated that “pact” was that it was simply not credible, either general and complete disarmament or certainly not with respect to minor transgres- arms limitation produces a stable condition. sions.- The massive retaliation strategy fixed It is not clear why, if ccd were stable, devel- the form of military reaction, leaving no op- opment and production of weapons ever oc- tions open to the deterring power. It was a curred. But more important is the question policy geared to meet the one improbable of stability if an agreement for arms reduction type of warfare, but it was weak in its ability or limitation at various levels were effected. to meet the more probable types of threats. Reductions in the current force levels—for Its aim was to deter nuclear attack on major example, to the small number of offensive interests, and, being organized for this, it weapons advocated in the minimum deter- raised the question of defining what aggres- rence doctrine—could be destabilizing if tech- sions against which interests could be con- nological advances in missile kill capabilities sidered sufficiently “major.” It forced a choice or large-scale violation of the agreement made of either yielding to local small aggression or one side more certain of its destructive power. applying the threatened massive nuclear de- Stability depends on both sides. No sources struction; and the ultimate threat is neither of conflict would be eliminated simply by an credible nor usable as punishment for less agreement between the United States and the than ultimate cause. Hence, depending on Soviet Union to disarm, and the destabilizing massive retaliation encouraged destabilizing potentials of third powers would be enhanced. “nibbling” aggressions. It also left the terrify- The disarmament proposed is of nations, not ing prospect of accidental or unintended war, of the world, and hence is neither general nor including not only war as a result of a “short complete. For these and other reasons, it is circuit” or the act of a berserk general but also very difficult to postulate how the end state war as the outcome of miscalculation of intent of ccd could be reached. or the misreading of enemy actions.

the threat of massive destruction a third view—the current DSC policy At the opposite pole is the doctrine of The fact that massive retaliation might be massive retaliation, which held sway during disproportionate to the most likely threats led the fifties. The objective of containment of the the United States to broaden its options. The Soviet Union was asserted to be more im- resultant concept of deliberate, selective, con- portant than the avoidance of nuclear war. trolled response enhances stability in ways Massive retaliation was based on the central that massive retaliation did not. One of its strategic concept of a short, extremely destruc- major contributions to stability was that its tive war and depended on the potential use development required, first, more precise def- of strategic nuclear weapons against popula- initions of what it is desirable to deter, in tion as the sole threatened retaliatory punish- terms of both the full spectrum of conflict and ment to deter all aggressions, large or small, the definition of our vital interests. against the United States or its allies. Hence, It is clear, of course, that it is desirable STRATEGIC STABILITY 69

to deter general nuclear war. This aim has so which, regardless of scale, might be contrary far been achieved; not only have nuclear to U.S. interest. Implementation of the dsc weapons not been used since World War II policy has included building up conventional but there has been no strategic use of forces, forces as well as further development of tac- although an increased alert such as that during tical nuclear weapons, with a view not only the Cuban crisis could possibly be considered to their deterrence capabilities at the middle a type of strategic use.° On the other hand, levels of the spectrum of conflict but also to the effectiveness of deterrence of general nu- their counteroffensive potentials if deterrence clear war is not static; the fact that it has fails. This has amounted to a reappraisal of worked so far does not ensure against its the utility of nuclear forces for deterring as failure in the future. The deterrent balance well as opposing transgressions of various needs constant reappraisal. The current U.S. intensities against less-than-major vital na- mode of deterring general nuclear war is by tional interests. The development of small maintaining a strategic nuclear force sufficient nuclear weapons created a wider range of to make credible a threat of “assured destruc- retaliatory options. The belief that tactical tion”; that is, certain destruction of something nuclear weapons are destabilizing because of of such value to the enemy that its loss would escalation possibilities overlooks the differ- be unacceptable. In this assured-destruction ences between a small nuclear attack on over- mode, the force must be of sufficient magni- whelming military forces and a strategic attack- tude to retain credibility even in a second- on population, as well as the difference be- strike position; that is, even if deterrence fails tween defensive use of nuclear weapons— and the enemy strikes first, using some or all initially perhaps on one’s own soil—and offen- of his first-strike weapons in a counterforce sive use of such weapons. It is not clear that role, to limit damage to himself by destroying escalation is inevitable, and it does seem clear some of our offensive weapons before they that a capability to oppose aggression at lower could be used. This posture is based on the conflict levels increases the protection of vital view that strategic stability exists when each interests and hence increases stability. side deems the second-strike retaliatory capa- The evaluation of vital interests interacts bility of the other to be as claimed—survivable, dynamically with both the world situation and reliable, and effective. the changing leadership of the major powers. It is also clear that the United States has There is general agreement that the forced not been and does not hope to be able to conversion of any European nation today to deter (as distinguished from oppose) small, alignment with the Communist bloc would be local guerrilla wars through the threat of as- against the U.S. vital interest. However, de- sured destruction. This is so for two reasons. spite the post-World War II strategic superior- First, the threat of assured destruction is in- ity of the U.S., at that time we allowed the commensurate with the scope of guerrilla war- U.S.S.R. to make satellites of the eastern Euro- fare; and, second, guerrilla war appears as pean nations. The U.S.S.R.’s maintenance by either civil war, which we may have no right conventional military means of the alignment to deter, or war by proxy, which always of Communist bloc countries was not viewed appears too ambiguous to deter by threaten- as sufficiently contrary to U.S. vital interests ing either the guerrilla forces or the apparently to provoke reaction to the 1956 Hungarian supporting country. uprising, and the same inaction would prob- Between these two extremes on the spec- ably result today. Use of nuclear weapons by trum of conflict are small nuclear attacks, con- the Soviet Union for the purpose of retain- ventional aggressions that might threaten ing power, however, might bring a different escalation, and various conventional attacks reaction. Strategic stability, then, is a dynamic •The use of strategic weapons in a tactical mode should be viewed as a change in weapon mission, not a change from a balance, dependent on the two-sided effec- tactical conflict into a strategic one. tiveness of deterrence in achieving its pur- 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW poses. This balance should be constantly quires use of the so f , the stabilizing effects, re-examined; the alternatives in both assured- if any, can only become applicable with the destruction and damage-limiting capabilities use of the so f on enemy forces, that is, after need to be considered with a view to their deterrence has failed; and at that point in a contributions to stability. second strike there may not be significant There are several alternative postures of enemy forces remaining on the ground. Anti- the strategic offensive force (so f). Currently, ballistic-missile defense can be a direct pro- the so f has been given a dual mission: the tection for both the so f and the population, primary mission of deterrence through assured and its effect on the stability of deterrence is second-strike destruction capabilities and the by virtue of its existence, not its use;3 i.e., its secondary mission of limiting damage through effect on stability is not dependent on deter- counterforce capabilities, should deterrence rence failure. fail and the opportunity for counterforce use Anti-ballistic-missile defense increases the remain. The U.S. assured-destruction require- effectiveness of deterrence through injecting ment has been approached in two ways: first, uncertainty into the enemy’s calculations through building a force numerically large about the result of use of his forces. In the enough so that a counterforce attack by a pre-ABM world, with the two major countries smaller Soviet missile force could not destroy —the United States and the Soviet Union— enough of our so f to lower the retaliatory both possessing large numbers of offensive damage to the Soviet Union to a level accept- missiles, the outcome of scenarios where de- able to them; and second, through develop- terrence fails could be predicted with con- ment of various protections for the so f to siderable reliability. The introduction of an accomplish the same survival goal as would abm system on either or both sides alters the numerical increases. picture. Passive protections are stabilizing because Predictions of assured-destruction capa- they increase the deterrent value of a given bility in the face of any defense can no longer missile force through introduction of factors be as accurate. The assured-destruction poten- o’f uncertainty into the enemy’s calculations tial of the so f is replaced by an “uncertainty of the effectiveness of his offensive forces in of outcome.” An attack against a target with- degrading the U.S. so f . The current deterrent out defenses involves some uncertainty about policy of “win second strike” becomes sounder its being killed, but, with each additional with the increasing probability of survival of shot, the uncertainty of kill decreases in a the U.S. so f. Stability is also increased by predictable way; thus, forces can be pro- various active defensive modes, which intro- grammed so that the uncertainty of kill of duce an additional measure of uncertainty of any set of targets can be lowered to an accept- the outcome of an attack. able degree. With a defense of the target, the predictability of assured destruction is no longer as simple, since the outcome of an role of ABM systems in strategic stability attack would depend on the interaction of the One of the principal dynamics of the offensive and the defensive systems, and the process of maintaining strategic stability is effectiveness of neither the offensive counter- technological progress. As is well known, measures nor the defensive capabilities can be technology has had and is having a significant predicted with high accuracy. The effective- effect on the role of the bomber. A more im- ness of penetration aids to counter a defensive portant recent trend is the development of system ought always to be treated as un- feasible defense against missiles. Damage lim- certain, since it is to some extent dependent iting has, until recently, been the secondary on doctrine. Each side would have to rely on mission of the missile portion of the so f . But available intelligence about the performance the counterforce role of the so f is an indirect characteristics and operating doctrines of the method of damage limiting, and, since it re- other side’s defensive system, and this infor- STRATEGIC STABILITY 71

mation could hardly be regarded as 100 per- but this is somewhat beside the point. The cent complete. But even if one had 100 percent important point here is that, with a balanced intelligence, tactics are subject to alteration offense-defense, they will retain the same between the time of intelligence collection and degree of certainty of their assured-destruction of conflict—indeed, even during an engage- capabilities as against an offense-only U.S. ment. posture, while we, if we rely on an offense- Consequently, with deployment of a de- only posture, cannot establish the same cer- fensive system, assessment of the capability to tainty for our own forces. threaten a defended target becomes more It is this situation of certainty versus un- complex. An additional element of risk is certainty which is destabilizing. The country introduced into the use of the deterrent in whose destruction potentials are uncertain either first or second strike. The additional will be under a great deal of pressure to do risk of uncertainty of the outcome of an something to establish certainty again. If this attack presumably results in less likelihood of is attempted through an increase of offense, an attack (on either protected so f or protected it is not clear that certainty can ever really cities), and stability is increased.® be achieved in the same sense as that allowed The historical Soviet emphasis on strategic before ballistic missile defense ( bm d ). And it defense has led to a beginning of some deploy- seems logical that a large increase in offensive ment of an abm system. General Talensky forces by the uncertain side would provoke states the Russian argument that such a sys- a reaction and, hence, would spiral both sides tem would be not only efficient but also into the very arms race they are attempting to stabilizing: control or avoid. It is said that the international strategic On the other hand, introduction of bm d situation cannot be stable where both sides on both sides not only restabilizes the situation simultaneously strive for deterrence through but results in a greater stability than that of nuclear rocket power and the creation of de- the pre-BMD standoff by reducing the impor- fensive anti-missile systems. I cannot agree tance of the counterforce role of offensive with this view. . . . From the viewpoint of forces. In an soF-onlv confrontation, the dam- strategy, powerful deterrent forces and an age-limiting role of the so f can be applicable effective anti-missile defense system, when only if a significant number of the opponent’s taken together, substantially increase the sta- forces are caught on the ground. Hence, there bility of mutual deterrence.4 is a definite premium on time, which tends The argument that the most effective to result in a preference for pre-emption. This means of countering the U.S.S.R. defensive preference does not exist where damage limit- potential is an increase of offensive forces, ing is predominantly self-protective. Thus, either in number or sophistication, overlooks bm d lowers the overall probability of deter- the basic fact that deterrence depends on the rence failure through the addition of uncer- Soviets’ assessment of our military power tainty on both sides and also tends to decrease (versus their own defensive capabilities); and the probability of a large-scale pre-emptive they may not regard the effectiveness of our attack. This contribution of bm d to stability is military power—at any level—as so certain. It overlooked in the argument that the protection is always possible that they may be correct, which an abm system would afford to the population in the event o f . an all-out war “The planned U.S. thin deployment of Xike-X (the Sentinel ABM system>, with its announced capability against the Chinese, would not be significant. The effects of bm d alters the picture between the U.S. and China but only mar- on stability and on the level of fatalities are ginally affects the U.S.—Soviet relationship, since it "would in effect be no adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack.** two entirely different measures of its value, (R. j>. McNamara, quoted in The New York Times, 19 September and its impact on the first is not dependent 196 < i It must be noted, however, that the planned thin deploy- ment may provide a growth capability for rapid expansion to on its effectiveness in terms of the second. meet a Soviet threat at some later time. It is the potential Although technological advances with a view capability of the system which affects the U.S.-U.S.S.R. rela- tionship. toward negating bm d would probably con- 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tinue to be pursued, it seems unlikely that an ances, despite the continuing debate over increase in numbers of offensive weapons whether alliance treaties were mere scraps of would appear attractive, since the marginal paper. It is hard to see how alliances could effectiveness of the additional missiles would play the same sort of role in a nuclear strategic be highly uncertain. balance, one reason being the shortness of A deliberate all-out nuclear war, however, time in a strategic nuclear exchange for diplo- may be the least likely scenario. Thus a fur- matic maneuvering to establish alliance sup- ther stabilizing result of an effective abm sys- port. But more important is the difference in tem is important: the potential lessening of the degree of risk involved. Before nuclear weap- effect of military demonstrations; accidental, ons, a country could discharge its alliance inadvertent, or unauthorized “psychotic com- obligations with much less risk of its own mander” attacks; and wars of miscalculation. destruction than at present. Hence, the degree These need not necessarily lead to holocaust, of alliance commitment becomes more ques- since an effective defense would allow time to tionable. The questioning of commitments of assess the situation, and the possibilities of nuclear guarantees has clearly been one moti- political settlement are always enhanced by vation for development of independent nuclear an increment of time. forces in France and Communist China. The value of an abm system is also, to The assumption that any level of nuclear- some extent, an emotional one, dependent on weapon possession acts to close the gap be- personal and national views of the value of tween an nth country and the superpowers damage limiting per se, especially with respect has some validity if the superpowers cannot to human lives. If it could be assumed with effectively deny penetration to unsophisti- certainty that the possibility of future conflicts cated weapons. This establishes a clear case involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons for some bmd deployment, as was recognized were zero, then there would, perhaps, be less by Secretary McNamara,r' since it is likely of an argument for damage-limiting measures. that nth-countrv attacks could be effectively But this assumption cannot be made for the interdicted for the foreseeable future. The reason, among others, discussed next. argument that a large offensive military force will dampen the ambitions of nth countries overlooks the fact that even a small nuclear n-sided stability force when targeted countervalue may be an A factor that must enter into calculations adequate deterrent against a larger, offense- of strategic stability in the future is the im- onlv force. Certainly the damage to an nth pact of external influences—basically, the nth- country resulting from retaliation would be countrv problem. While possession of nuclear greater than the damage any nth country is weapons and crude delivery systems (bombers likely to be able to inflict for some time, but or missiles) does not vault an nth country into this remains true whether the nth country is great-power status, the earlier belief that ac- allowed penetration or not. The combination tions of peripheral countries could not alter of urban and so f protection could probably the strategic balance can no longer be held deny both counterforce and countervalue roles valid. Proliferation of nuclear weapons has to an nth country. Thus, effects of the actual occurred and will probably continue for many use of nth-country nuclear power would be political and strategic reasons, ranging from degraded, and the poUtical threat value of prestige to traditional enmity, over which the such a force would be diminished. major powers are not likely to have much con- It is not clear that introduction of bm d trol. One motivation has been the change in would discourage proliferation, for nth coun- the nature of alliances. In historical deterrence tries might still have strong local, regional, postures, before the advent of nuclear weap- and prestige motivations for acquiring nuclear ons, a major factor in the balance of power forces. The deployment of defenses would, was the constant struggle for favorable alli- however, deny the effectiveness of nth-country STRATEGIC STABILITY 73

power against the protected countries and and political framework within which conflicts would strengthen the credibility of nuclear are to be adjusted. The important question is guarantees, particularly to those countries what basic policy is to be followed: who is which might consider themselves threatened to be deterred, from what are they to be by nth countries. In these ways, bm d would deterred, and by what threats are they to be reduce the range of possible destabilizing acts deterred? These questions must be viewed by nth countries. within the context of the simultaneous evalua- Stability, then, is the dynamic situation of tions of all opponents, since deterrence is a mutual deterrence—“mutual” not necessarily relation whose maintenance is dependent on confined to pairs. Deterrence depends on the the state of mind of all parties. interaction resulting from constant reapprais- Falls Church, Virginia als by both sides of the changing technical

Notes et al., A Forward Strategy for America (New York: Harper and 1. A detailed analysis of these and other schools of Brothers, 1961), and General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret), thought concerning nuclear weapons has been made by John The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959). H. Morse and W. R. Van Cleave in Problems Posed by Con- 3. Richard B. Foster has developed several of these con- flicting Views Concerning Nuclear Weapons ( Menlo Park. cepts in The Impact of Ballistic Missile Defense on Arms Con- California: Stanford Research Institute, August 1965). trol Prospects (Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research 2. For a discussion of the credibility of disproportionate Institute, June 1966) and in other papers. responses, see Thornton Read, Military Policy in a Changing 4. Major General N. Talensky, “Anti-Missile Systems and Political Context ( Princeton, New Jersey: Center of International Disarmament,” International Affairs, October 1964, pp. 15-19, Studies, December 1964). For detailed analyses of the massive reprinted in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1965. deterrence policy and its limitations, see Robert Strausz-Hupe, 5. New York Times, 19 September 1967. ON CLAUSEW ITZ AND THE APPLICATION OF FORCE

Dr . R obert D. Miew a l d

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O lOOO Mci-rp; HE departure of Secretary' of Defense most provocative and realistic of nineteenth Robert S. McNamara from the Penta- century commentators on administrative Tgon, after a remarkable seven years in matters. office, will produce appraisals of his perform- Therefore, I shall attempt here to view ance from all manner of analysts. In the the McNamara administration of the Depart- nature of such things, much of the criticism ment of Defense from the Clausewitzian per- will be about as productive as the kibitzing spective. The attempt seems all the more of Sisyphus’ technique of rolling stones; it timely because of the apparent rehabilitation will fail to ask the basic questions of whether of the reputation of Clausewitz by modem the Department of Defense is in fact a man- strategists. That popular diversion among stu- ageable organization and whether any one dents of war which determines after the fact man or any one team could impose compre- “what Clausewitz really meant” has taken an hensive administrative reforms within such a abrupt change in direction. No longer is he mammoth complex. But certainly two fields seen as the prophet of Krieg an sich, as the of study are obligated to make a mighty ef- intellectual force behind the military excesses fort to overcome any parochial distortions in of several generations of European officers. order to put the McNamara phenomenon into We are now informed by such knowledgeable broader perspective. For students of the art authors as Herman Wolk and Wesley Posvar and science of administration and students that limited warfare is Clausewitzian warfare.1 of military affairs, the Secretary has symbol- Such an evaluation follows naturally from an ized a revolution, the dimensions of which emphasis upon his most famous dictum: War we can still only dimly perceive. is the continuation of politics by other means. This business of placing men and events But one dictum does not a theory of warfare in perspecti\'e would be much easier if there make: any war, limited or otherwise, has to were an identifiable discipline called military be executed, has to be administered; and it administration. To be sure, one does come thus becomes necessary to take into account across that term in the literature, but the idea all that Clausewitz had to say about the actual is seldom backed up with substance; there is conduct of war. not a truly harmonious blending of the knowl- By its nature, limited war presents a edge of civilian and military experts about large number of administrative problems. administrative problems. Despite the periodic Essentially, it entails the application of an calls for a separate science of military' admin- appropriately tailored military response. Such istration, the great void still exists. How, then, delicate application of force demands much do we assess the contributions made by forbearance and restraint; it involves careful such a pioneering military administrator as measurement and calculation. In contrast, tra- McNamara? How do we respond to the in- ditional warfare, at least since Napoleon, has sinuation that his regime was administratively been shot through with nonadministrative fac- correct and militarily deficient? Perhaps there tors; it has been more in the nature of an is a worthy substitute for a venerable schol- emotional crusade against an inherently evil arly tradition in the writings of Karl von enemy who must be destroyed. At the other Clausewitz. Certainly there are few who extreme, all-out nuclear war, in its operational would dispute this Prussian’s premier position phases, does not require prolonged adminis- among theorists, if not philosophers, of war. trative consideration, its essence being a one- What is not so often recognized is that Clause- time, highly nonroutine response. witz had a great deal to say about the man- Our present experience with limited war- agement of the large organization. Indeed, fare seems to bear out this point about the much of On War is—to use the modem socio- administrative character of such conflict. Viet- logical phrases—a dissertation on the problems nam is surely our most bureaucratic war. Our of decision-making in the nonprogrammed goal there is not a victory parade through the situation. In my opinion, Clausewitz is the enemy’s capital; instead, it is a matter of ap- 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW plying the right amount of persuasive power. decreased the sphere of operation for a thor- Indeed, as Amrom Katz of rand has pointed oughly bureaucratized military unit. But he out, success in Vietnam, in the absence of a could not bring himself to defy the impon- front line, is measured by that lifeblood of any derability of violence by producing a handy, hardy bureaucracy—a deluge of statistics. Kill “by-the-numbers” manual of rules and regu- ratios, defection rates, and other esoteric items lations. are the pale substitutes for captured colors Such scrutiny of the violence unleashed and famous victories. Of course, this bureau- by war exposed so much uncertainty that a cratization of war is often difficult for partici- fundamental characteristic of bureaucratic be- pants and observers to appreciate. To a man havior-dealing with reality in terms of easily in mortal fear for his life or to worried parents manageable but artificially constructed cate- at home, administrative restraint may appear gories—was no longer possible. For Clause- to be inexplicable. In the heat of passion, witz, warfare was an interconnected mass of injunctions against “going all the way” are individual events, and an overly rigid set of hard to follow. But bureaucracy, by definition, guidelines for action would prevent the com- is the denial of passion. mander from assimilating several unique Limited war is bureaucratic war, but cases. Therefore, if the military profession was Clausewitz is no friend of a rigid military instructed by Clausewitz as to the violent na- bureaucracy. His counsel cannot be comforting ture of war, it was also forced to recognize the to anyone who craves stability and predicta- innumerable variables that could come into bility in the administrative environment. In play in the application of force. He did not contrast to Jomini, his more rationalistic con- allow the rational student of war to ignore all temporary, Clausewitz plunged into the inves- the immaterial moral forces that could deter- tigation of the characteristic irrationality of mine the outcome of an encounter no matter war. What he accomplished was a breath- how well the tangible contingencies had been takingly stark view of the nature of war, a provided for. view so revealing that it must shake one’s confidence in the predictability of that activ- For the administrator, civilian or military, ity. Clausewitz stripped war of all its baroque Chapter 7 of Book I is the core of On W ar; adornment, of the polite assumptions with this potent antidote to excessive rationaliza- which the bureaucrats of the eighteenth cen- tion in warfare deserves to be appended to all tury had surrounded the subject. He con- formal administrative codes. Here Clausewitz centrated on the pure essence: war is the identified all those intangible factors which application of violence. could make a mockery of the best-laid plans It is not easy to accept this fundamental as “friction”: premise and still insist that the engines of war Friction is the only conception which in can be operated according to rational calcu- a general way corresponds to that which dis- lation. “There is no human affair,” wrote Clau- tinguishes real War from War on paper. The sewitz, “which stands so constantly and so military machine, the Army and all belonging generally in close connection with chance as to it, is in fact simple, and appears on this War,” for it is largely an act of primitive account easy to manage. But let us reflect that emotion.-’ A realization that war deals with no part of it is in one piece, that it is composed the effect of violence upon human beings, entirely of individuals, each of which keeps both friend and foe, demands that the student up its own friction in all directions. Theoreti- cally all sounds very well. . . . But it is not so of military administration consider those dark in reality, and all that is exaggerated and false elements which even today are not quite ex- in such a conception manifests itself at once plained away by the most sophisticated theory in War. The battalion always remains com- of psychology. By striking at the heart of the posed of a number of men, of whom, if chance matter, Clausewitz, as he well knew, vastly so wills, the most insignificant is able to occa- increased the area of the unknown and thus sion delay and even irregularity.3 ON CLAUSEW1TZ AND THE APPLICATION OE FORCE 77

Clausewitz then summed up his definition of application of violence. The decisive element friction in one of his most graphic descrip- in war could be provided by that sphere of the tions, a description valid not only for the mind outside the purely rational domain of officer but for any administrator who must science, by that “field of genius, which raises react quickly in an uncertain environment: itself above rules.”r' It is probable, then, that Clausewitz would Activity in War is movement in a resistant not be altogether comfortable with recent medium. Just as a man immersed in water is trends in the Office of the Secretary of De- unable to perform with ease and regularity the fense, even among those experts who are en- most natural and simplest movement, that of gaged in the conduct of a Clausewitzian war. walking, so in War, with ordinary powers, one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity.4 The systems analysts and other staff aides to the executive, whose function, so it is often Because of this friction, Clausewitz had said, is only to sharpen the intuition of the little faith in principles of war or their ex- decision-maker, would not have been enthu- pounders. Nor was he excited by the possibil- siastically embraced by a man for whom ity of discovering some theoretical lubricant intuition, sharpened or otherwise, was the for improvement of the connection between most basic ingredient of military success. Time the will of the commander and the action of after time Clausewitz denounced those who, the soldier on the line. Too many imponder- through their obsession with “time and space, able and intangible factors would inevitably and a few lines and angles,” would turn war- disrupt this vital connection, this link between fare into a matter of geometrical precision.6 policy making and policy execution. Such ad- He reserved his harshest censure for the the- ministrative theory as he presents, therefore, orists of warfare who desired to make it a is not an imposing edifice composed of en- science by taking into consideration only those during principles. Theory could only furnish elements which were quantifiable and leaving the commander with an understanding of the out the incalculable, although crucial, factors. unpredictable nature of war; it could not In describing the practitioners of this common illuminate all the unknown factors before they bureaucratic failure, he wrote: occurred. They strive after determinate quantities, Had Clausewitz continued in this vein, he whilst in War all is undetermined, and the might eventually have reached the extreme calculation has always to be made with varying statement of administrative helplessness de- quantities. scribed by Tolstoy in War and Peace. But They direct the attention only upon ma- Clausewitz was too much of a soldier to admit terial forces, while the whole military action that his profession was fit only for the pro- is penetrated throughout by intelligent forces vision of presiding officers over meaningless and their effects. chaos. He found hope in the form of a special They only pay regard to activity on one type of decision-maker, namely, the com- side, whilst War is a constant state of reciprocal action, the effects of which are mutual.7 mander with genius. He suggested that a commander who was unfettered by predeter- In short, Clausewitz placed himself in mined rules and who possessed the gift of opposition to the tendencies toward the rou- the coup d’oeil, combined with a sense of tinization, the bureaucratization of the appli- resolution, could cut through the fog of un- cation of force. In doing so, he was only certainty that envelops the scene of combat. In emphasizing the military reality which all other words, he valued the heroic and, con- successful officers, before and after him, have sequently, nonbureaucratic leader. A bureau- recognized to one degree or another. As has cracy, being the haven of ordinary men with been argued elsewhere, Jomini and Clause- ordinary minds, could not respond quickly or witz were not diametrically opposed on the resolutely enough to make sense out of the issue of rationality in war.s Their differences disorder and confusion which result from the were a matter of emphasis: Jomini denied 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW any attempt to create a geometry of war, and analysts who have rejected this flimsy stuff Clausewitz, for all his pessimism, did not give called intuition when it is patently nothing up the search for sources of stability in mili- more than the fustian prejudices of a veteran tary administration. Neither these Napoleonic campaigner. Even Clausewitz would have re- commentators nor their successors were will- jected the notion that time-serving somehow ing to reduce armed conflict to a series of imparted that genius needed for command. determinable patterns. But by devaluing this intangible element, Clausewitz’s writings, dramatic as they civilian leadership perhaps has also overlooked are, must be seen within this mainstream of that dark but fruitful view of the world which military thinking on administrative problems. characterizes the intelligent military percep- In the long tradition of military managerial tion of man in the environment of conflict. doctrine, he centered his analysis on the inevi- Therefore, the present discussion is not tability of what Amitai Etzioni has identified meant to be taken as an attack on the admin- as the “organizational dilemma”: the constant istrative reforms instituted by Secretary Mc- tension between the rational and nonrational Namara or on the concept of limited warfare. factors within the organization.9 Thus, Clause- The reasonable citizen must surely pray that witz could suggest formal measures for in- the Department of Defense can be managed creasing the degree of reliability of response and that, for the sake of the survival of the within the military machine. He was not will- planet, limited war can remain limited. Clau- ing, however, to allow any military manager to sewitz did not deny the possibility of such forget the existence of friction, of that un- warfare, but his impressions of the turbulent expected happening which would cause the environment of violence must provide a strong plan to fail. This organizational dilemma is warning to anyone who supposes that its the theoretical center around which Clause- implementation follows automatically. And witzian administrative doctrine revolves. therein lies the greatest value of a thorough Returning to the problem at hand, it reading of Clausewitz: he tried to delineate would appear that the recent developments the realm of the possible in war by repudiat- in the Department of Defense have been on ing those who would minimize the great diffi- the rationalistic side of the equation. A con- culty of the administration of force. It might cern with the quantifiable may have led to thus be helpful if his most famous words con- an underestimation of the intangible; and this, cerning the relationship between politics and in turn, may have resulted in the lack of com- war could always be followed by yet an- munication between civilian and military ex- other pregnant Clausewitz dictum: “In War perts which has been so often publicized. everything is simple, but the simplest thing Certainly one can sympathize with systems is difficult.”10 Long Beach, California

Notes 4. Ibid., p. 79. 1. Henman S. Wolk, “The New American Military,” Air 5. Ibid., p. 100. Force and Space Digest, April 1966, p. 87; Wesley Posvar, “The 6. Ibid., p. 167. Political Environment for Military Planning,” Air Force and 7. Ibid., p. 99. Space Digest, December 1966, p. 45. 8. Robert D. Miewald, “Military Managers," Military 2. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Vol. I, trans. J. J. Graham Review, July 1967, pp. 40-45. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner and Company, 1908), 9. Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood p. 19. Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 41. 3. Ibid., p. 7 8. 10. Clausewitz, p. 77. SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND LOGISTICS

M ajor Graham W. Rid er

N an earlier issue of Air University Review, that might serve as a suitable framework for I defined logistics as the creation and analysis and possible improvement of Air Force I sustained support of combat forces and logistics. weapons.1 How this task is accomplished was explained in terms of three kinds of logistics: the system management concept strategic logistics—determining the structure required to accomplish national objectives; We in the Air Force tend to think of support logistics—acquiring the assets needed systems in terms of weapon systems or com- for the structure; and operational logistics- mand and control systems, and w hen w'e think distributing and applying those assets in of managing such systems, the system program direct support of the combat forces and director or system support manager comes to weapons. I pointed to possible organizational mind. These, however, are rather special ex- problems within the Department of Defense, amples of the system management concept. particularly within the Air Force, as reflections Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzw'eig of the Uni- of our general misunderstanding of logistics. versity of Washington, pioneers of this mod- There is no easy way to resolve organiza- ern theory, define a system as “an array of tional problems, especially in an organization components designed to accomplish a particu- with the massive size and complexity of the lar objective according to plan.”3 Air Force logistic operation. Further, it Is This definition is significant in that an hardly possible to analyze Air Force logistics array indicates interrelated functions, that the if a suitable framework for the analysis is not system has a purpose, and that inputs to the available. However, such a framework does system must be acted upon according to a exist in the theory' and management of sys- plan. In that way the authors explain their tems, which is the modem approach to man- definition. It follows that to manage according agement of formal organizations.- The purpose to this concept the manager must see his of this article is to propose a system concept organization as a system of interrelated and 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW interfunctioning parts. The system reacts to solution through viewing the firm as a mar- its inputs in a manner calculated to enable it keting system. Admittedly, this viewpoint is to accomplish its objective or objectives. new, but it appears to be successful. In the The human body is a system, but it is also past, civilian management has borrowed ideas composed of subsystems, like the nervous sys- from the military to solve its problems. Per- tem and the digestive system. So, too, can haps the Air Force can reciprocate by ap- organizations be thought of as systems com- plying the marketing-system concept to the posed of subsystems. However, organizations management of logistics. The concept is cer- rarely function as smoothly as does the human tainly worthy of our consideration. body, so management must consider “the means for interrelating and coordinating these the firm as a marketing system various subsystems.”' We can distinguish between closed phys- Not too long ago the average American ical systems and open living systems. An open firm was oriented to either sales or production; system, like the human body, lives by ex- marketing was not considered to be a major changing materials with its environment. It function. In fact, the American Marketing imports, converts, and exports materials in Association defined marketing as “those ac- order to live. On the other hand, closed tivities which direct the flow of goods and physical systems are self-sufficient and need services from production to consumption.”6 not exchange materials with their environment Thomas A. Staudt and Donald A. Taylor in order to live/’ of the Marketing Department of Michigan In traditional organization theory, orga- State University were not satisfied with this nizations have generally been thought of as definition. Their empirical research in the closed physical systems. It has been assumed business world convinced them that the firm that problems which the organization en- is an integrated production-marketing system. countered would be solved with reference to They say that: the internal or hierarchical structure. Essen- . . . for managerial purposes, there is no tially, traditional theory has not considered other appropriate way to conceive of a firm inputs from and outputs to the organization’s except as a market entity . . . we recognize the environment to be significant except as they firm as a means-end system. It has resources affected the internal structure of the organiza- and it seeks market ends. In fact, we can think tion. The relationship which the organization of the firm as a target-seeking mechanism, con- has with its environment, for the most part, tinuously striving to adapt and adjust itself to has been ignored. the attainment of its end purposes/ Those who specialize in logistics have Their managerial concept reads quite well, long been aware of the impact of such inputs but to thoroughly understand it, further illu- as national objectives, the state of the econ- mination is required. A system model of the omy, and capabilities of the defense industry. firm shows the firm as a marketing system They are especially aware of the output de- (Figure 1)/ The model can be understood by mands made by their customers, the using starting at the upper left with corporate ob- commands. If our present logistic structure is jectives. These objectives are affected by ex- based upon traditional theory, then it is the ternal inputs from the firm’s environment: for gross impact of these inputs and outputs, these example, government regulations, investor de- environmental forces, which is creating the mand, and social pressures. The corporate current demand for a better concept of logis- objectives are also affected by the firm’s mar- tics management. The better concept may well keting objectives and marketing knowledge, be system management. which might be expressed as sales volume, The Air Force is not alone with this prob- profit, or some other criteria such as percent lem. Private industry is experiencing similar of market. Of course, marketing objectives difficulties but apparently has discovered a affect the internal operation of the entire SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND LOGISTICS 81 system. They, combined with corporate objec- mental to the marketing system. It provides tives and market knowledge, enable the firm inputs and consequently acts as a constraint to select a market. upon the system. Market selection is a critical component The next step in the system is to develop of the market system. For example, an elec- marketing strategies. We consider four strate- tronics firm may choose to produce compo- gies in this model. First, the product strategy nents only or to produce finished units of reflects the mix of product offerings. Let us equipment. If its choice is the former, then assume that the firm’s strategy is to offer an its product offerings may be limited and spe- integrated line of electronic components. Sec- cialized. as in the production of transistors. ond, the distribution strategy considers not On the other hand, the firm may choose to only transportation but also alternatives in

government Figure 1. The firm as a marketing system regulations investor corporate demand objectives social pressures

marketing

a quality V. competition o E - * tastes

offer a line of components which might in- warehousing, wholesaling, retailing, and direct clude resistors, capacitors, inductors, and so selling to customers. We might assume that forth. What the system may offer is affected the electronics firm chooses to direct sell only by inputs from the rest of the firm, such as to industrial customers, will centrally ware- manufacturing capability or new discoveries house its products, and will use air transporta- from the research department. Thus, we see tion to fill orders expeditiously. the interrelationships between three compo- The third strategy, communications, pro- nents in the system array: market selection, vides product information to persons within product offerings, and rest-of-firm. An impor- the system as well as to customers. However, tant point to remember is that the rest-of-firm, the strategy primarily involves choosing an shown in Figure 1 as a rectangle, is environ- appropriate mix of advertising messages and 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the media through which they may be carried by starting with objectives. As with corporate to potential customers. Based upon the other objectives, national objectives are also affected strategies, the electronics firm would probably by environmental inputs. Foreign policy, mili- limit its advertising to trade and professional tary' intelligence, and economic constraints are journals. shown, but there may be many others which Fourth, the services strategy for this elec- from time to time will affect national objec- tronics firm would probably involve pricing tives. Both operational and logistic objectives and guarantees as well as engineering assist- are based upon national objectives. ance to customers using the products. The Notice that operations and logistics over- quality of its products would determine the lap in the determination of military strategy. range of alternatives which the company might This has not always been true. In previous enjoy for this strategy. wars, logistic objectives have preceded opera- Finally, in the market the firm receives tions objectives because of the necessity for inputs from still other environmental forces, first building up a logistic base. Historian a form of exchange for the firm’s outputs. The James A. Huston states: forces (shown in the model) may take the form of quality improvement demands from To the question of whether there can be customers, or of competitive actions by other a strategic decision distinct from a logistical firms, or, conceivably, of changing customer decision the answer must be no, for virtually all considerations entering into the major de- tastes. Of supreme importance to the market cisions of war are logistical. Logic would sug- system is the intelligence network that feeds gest—and military planners would prefer to this information back to the firm in the form believe—that logistic plans stem from strategic of market knowledge. Without feedback, the plans; that first there must be strategic deci- system would be incomplete and unable to sions and plans, with logistic plans drawn as react to its inputs in a manner designed to a consequence of them to provide support at achieve its objectives.9 the right place and the right time. World War With this very brief view of the marketing II turned out to be somewhat the reverse of model in mind, let us apply the same concept this logical sequence of events . . . high-level of system management to Air Force logistics. strategic decisions generally were based on logistical limitations more than on any other If the firm can be thought of, from a mana- consideration.1:! gerial viewpoint, as a marketing system, then perhaps the Air Force can similarly be con- However, that situation has changed over sidered as a logistic system. time. By maintaining large forces in a combat- ready status, our nation has enabled the mili- tary to maintain an effective and ready logistic the Air Force as a logistic system base. Now, at the highest decision-making There is a rational basis for this considera- levels, operational and logistical objectives can tion. The current Air Force mission is to pro- be accomplished concurrently, for the most vide trained and equipped combat forces to part, through military strategy. This part of the unified commands.10 Therefore, our overall the model illustrates what was earlier de- mission is primarily logistical, and it provides scribed as strategic logistics. the basic justification for viewing the Air Of course, logistic objectives affect logis- Force as a logistic system. A model of the tic requirements and the logistic substrategies logistic system designed to accomplish that which are derived from military grand strat- purpose is shown in Figure 2.n Certainly, egy. Asset requirements are transmitted to the there are basic similarities between the mod- logistic base which is external to the Air Force els in Figures 1 and 2, but there are significant system. The base is primarily the national differences as well. economy, represented for the most part by We shall investigate these relationships in defense industry, but it also includes other the same way we analyzed the first model. sources such as the Defense Supply Agency, SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND LOGISTICS 83

the Army, and the Navy. As in the marketing it can be repaired and returned to use, versus model, this model reacts to inputs from the making it expendable or “throw away" at time base, like new technology, and to limitations of first failure. Another is the use of automatic from the base, like production capacity. The or “push” resupply versus “pull" supply in base is an environmental force which provides response to requisitions. A number of these inputs to the logistic system. choices might be combined to form a supply The five logistic substrategies shown in strategy. the model can be thought of separately or in Second, in development of the services combination. For example, the several strate- strategy to accomplish logistic system objec- gies are interrelated in the weapon system tives, a basic decision concerns where equip- management concept. Logistic requirements ment is repaired—in the using organization, are the essence of what was earlier described the depot, or a contractor’s facility. One alter- as support logistics. It follows that the logis- native would be partial use of all three. An-

bose

tic strategies bridge the gap to operational other is to send contractor or depot teams to logistics, which can generally be regarded as the using organization to render assistance on organic to the using commands. Let us turn site. Finally, we could contract all services to now to a brief analysis of those strategies. a civilian agency. This has been done several First, the supply strategy determines what times on a temporary basis when the Air Force is provided to the customer and the form it lacked the needed skills. Again, the size and takes. Alternative choices of strategy range complexity of the logistic system would neces- from individual item control, as with mechan- sitate a mix of these alternatives to form ic’s tools, to furnishing a unit with thirty days’ a services strategy which will meet system supply of rations, fuel, and munitions. Another requirements. choice might be the design of an item so that Third, the distribution strategy involves 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the delivery of logistic assets to the using com- uals, and other forms of communication are mands. However, this strategy involves more, used to tell the customer how to use and much more, than the apparent choice between service his equipment in order to derive the air and surface transportation. The distribu- best benefit from it. Another part of this strat- tion network involves the depot, the whole- egy is the communication of supply status to saler, and base supply, the retailer. Decisions the using commands as is now being done by about the number of depots and their loca- computer. Occasionally, more informal meth- tions are interlocked with decisions regard- ods, such as newsletters, are used to “adver- ing transportation systems. Finally, the entire tise’ available logistic services and to discuss depot-base supply network can be bypassed mutual problems. Finally, in addition to com- through direct shipment of supplies from the puter networks, other sophisticated commu- contractor to the using organization. Here, nications systems may be built to ensure the again, a mix of these alternatives would be continuous flow of logistic information be- developed so that the system could meet the tween support and operational logistics, espe- varied demands of its market, the using cially in periods of military crisis. As with the commands. preceding strategies, all the chosen alterna- Fourth, the personnel strategy poses sig- tives are combined to form a communications nificant and difficult decisions. It is dependent strategy. upon other strategies. For example, a “throw The alternatives chosen by decision- away" supply strategy simplifies training down makers are mixed to form a substrategy. Then, to the removal and replacement of compo- the substrategies are mixed to form logistic nents. But sophisticated equipment that must strategy.13 The system concept in the model be repaired by personnel of the operational enables one to proceed in analysis from logistics function organic to the using com- objectives to substrategy or in the opposite mand demands sophisticated training. Another direction with equal ease. These strategies can decision to be made is the choice between never remain static. They must adjust as the military and civilian personnel in certain system adjusts to act upon new inputs. jobs. In sum. all these decisions, and prob- If we consider the substrategies as system ably others, to meet the quantitative and outputs, then they are conditioned by inputs qualitative personnel requirements for logis- to the system which take the form of logistics tics, would dictate the training program. An- knowledge. This knowledge has to be derived other part of personnel strategy is personnel from the Air Force market, the using com- service in the form of recreation facilities for mands. The knowledge is constrained and leisure-time activities. Finally, medical serv- conditioned by forces which are pressing upon ices, hospitalization, and care and evacuation the using commands; these forces are, pri- of the wounded in combat are an important marily, the assigned missions. Logistics knowl- part of the overall personnel strategy. All of edge, gathered by information systems like the these, and many more, are personnel functions Maintenance Data Collection system and the that would be mixed into a logistic strategy Unsatisfactory Report system, or gathered to meet system needs. from statements of operational requirements Fifth, the communications strategy is an and similar sources, completes the system. essential part of the logistic system. Definite Logistics knowledge acts as a feedback to similarities exist between the other logistic confirm or modify existing logistics objectives substrategies and those seen in the marketing or to create new ones. model. In communications, the similarity is quite limited because the logistics market, the system management for logistics using commands, hardly needs to be con- vinced to use the product. However, much Undoubtedly there is room for improve- remains to be communicated to the customer ment in the logistics model. Nevertheless, it regarding the product. Technical orders, man- is the concept which supports both models SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND LOGISTICS 85

that is of immense value. Management should this concept “involves the structuring of plan- view the Air Force as a logistic system, an ning-, decision-, and control points to insure open, living system which interacts with its that those responsible for market [logistic] environment. This managerial concept pro- results have the requisite tools and resources vides the framework for organizational analysis to fulfill that responsibility.”14 and design. The potential involved in this managerial Organization creates the array of compo- approach to logistics seems extremely valuable. nents, the people, facilities, and functions This logistic system concept, borrowed from necessary to accomplish objectives according marketing, could prove to be the most suc- to plan. It would enable the Air Force, when cessful management innovation that the Air viewed as a logistic system, to improve its Force has ever adopted. focus on the logistic requirements of the using Arizona State University commands. According to Staudt and Taylor,

Notes Seminar on Marketing at Arizona State University on 2 October 1. Graham W. Rider. “Logisties—The Bridge,” Air Uni- 1967 and subsequent conversations with him. versity Review, XIX, 1 ( Xovember-Deeember 1967), 93—97. 9. Johnson, ct al., pp. 61—62. 2. Rocco Carzo, Jr., and John N. Yanouzas, Formal 10. U.S. Government, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, Organization, A Systems Approach (Homewood. Illinois: National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Richard D. Irwin, Inc., and The Dorsev Press, 1967), pp. 11. Figure 2 has been derived from Professor Downing’s 527-35. model of the firm as a marketing system, but I assume full 3. Richard A. Johnson. Fremont E. Kast. and James E. responsibility for the design of this adaptation. Rosenzweig, The Theory and Management of Systems (New 12. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 308. 1775-1953, Vol. II of the Army Historical Series, ed. Stetson 4. Ibid., p. 56. Conn, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army ( Wash- 5. A. K. Rice, The Enterprise and Its Environment: A ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 424. System Theory of Management Organization ( London: Tavistock 13. Martin L. Bell, Marketing Concepts and Strategy Publications Limited, 1963), p. 183. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 345—54. It is 6. Thomas A. Staudt and Donald A. Taylor, A Manager- this reference which gave the writer the idea of applying the ial Introduction to Marketing (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: mix, composed of chosen alternative courses of action and of Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 10. strategy composed of mixes, to logistics management. This book 7. Ibid., p. -542. is recommended to any reader who svishes to probe more deeply 8. The entire discussion of the marketing model is based into the concept proposed in this article. on a lecture by Professor George Downing given to a Doctoral 14. Staudt and Taylor, p. 505. In My Opinion 4

WHY THE VTOL FIGHTER?

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Kennith F. H it e

ISTORY credits the Chinese with de- by the military of the first vtol type, the heli- velopment of the first vertical takeoff copter, is now part of aviation history. Cur- Hand landing (vtol ) vehicle some 2000 yearsrently, the military focus of attention is on ago. Called the Chinese top, the device was a new vtol type, the vtol tactical fighter really a toy consisting of a short stick with two aircraft. or more feathers inserted at the top to serve Progress in the development of a practical as rotor blades. When the stick was spun be- and capable vtol fighter has been exceedingly tween the hands and released, the toy would slow over the years, largely due to propulsion rise vertically like a helicopter, then descend limitations and related problems. Among the slowly in the autorotation mode. Although first and most interesting of the vtol fighter this simple Chinese device was not referred to forerunners was the Chance Vought V-173 as a vtol , the term today includes, technically, conceived in 1933 and first flown in 1942. a wide range of such vehicles, from the now Called the “Flying Pancake,” the V-173 was commonplace helicopter to exotic space sys- a tail-sitter intended to rise vertically, then tems such as the Gemini and Manned Or- transition to normal flight attitude. Unfortu- biting Laboratory. In more general terms, nately, however, the airplane weighed 3000 however, the vtol is thought of as a conven- pounds and had only 2000 pounds of propeller tional type of aircraft with special features thrust. As a result, the Flying Pancake never added to enable it to rise vertically during made a vertical takeoff or landing, although takeoff and to land from a vertical descent. it made some 210 successful flights in the con- The successful and imaginative employment ventional aircraft takeoff and landing mode. IN MY OPINION 87

The project was canceled by the Navy in Triservice testing of a later version of the 1948 when its partial successes were over- British P.1127, called the Kestrel in the United shadowed by conventional fighter aircraft Kingdom and designated the XV-6A in the powered by the newly developed turbojet United States, has recently been completed engine. Interest waned, and efforts toward at Ft. Campbell, Kentucky; Patuxent nas, further development of this type of aircraft Maryland; and Eglin afb, Florida. Four over the succeeding decade were sporadic. P. 1127’s are now under test by usaf at Ed- Today, however, resurgent interest in the wards afb, California. Tests have included vtol fighter is in evidence. The aircraft in- extensive Navy aircraft carrier qualification dustries of some six or more major countries flights as well. are currently active in the testing, develop- Although these examples represent only ment, or production of vtol aircraft. For ex- a partial survey of world aviation industries ample, West Germany and Italy are presently presently engaged in the design, development, engaged in a joint venture in the development testing, or production of vtol fighter aircraft, of a vtol fighter. This project is now in the widespread interest some 34 years after its early stages and the prime contractors, the conception of the Flying Pancake is sig- Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werke (vfw) of nificant. But how did industry arrive at this Bremen, Germany, and Fiat Aircraft Com- point in vtol development? Why this sudden pany of Turin, Italy, have established a de- intense international interest? Of what prac- velopment program that will result in the tical application is the vtol fighter today? initial construction and testing of six proto- Historically, three basic types of propul- type V-191B tactical fighters by mid-1969. sion have been used to power vtol fighter air- In Great Britain, the Hawker Siddeley craft: propeller, ducted fan, and turbojet. A Company has designed, developed, and placed fourth type of propulsion, the rotor, although into service the world’s first production vtol used as the prime lifting means for the heli- strike fighter, the P.1127 Kestrel. copter, has never been seriously considered In France, a version of the well-known for vtol fighter application because of its mach-2 strike fighter, the Mirage III, has been relatively low efficiency in forward flight and converted for vtol operations. resultant low forward speed capability. In the Soviet Union one model of the There are two factors basic to vtol fighter MIG-21 jet fighter, which is now making a operations. First, in order to attain hovering dubious history over North Vietnam, has been flight, sufficient thrust must be directed down- converted for vtol operational tests. The vtol ward to exceed the w'eight of the aircraft. performance of this and two other converted Second, there must be a means of transition Soviet fighters was demonstrated in the July to normal flight attitude and aerodynamic 1967 U.S.S.R. Domodedovo Air Show. At this flight speed. Of course this transition to nor- same air show a Soviet fighter designed by mal flight requires a means of control during Yakovlev specifically for vtol operations also hovering and low-speed flight. The old V-173 performed. Flying Pancake possessed all these capabilities In the United States interest in vtol has except sufficient power to rise vertically. been demonstrated by all three military serv- As with the V-173, a majority of the sub- ices. Most recently Ryan Aircraft, a pioneer sequent vtol efforts in the United States have in the vtol field, has been engaged in tests been subsidized by military contracts. A few of its XV-5A Vertifan vtol , developed for the years after the Navy’s cancellation of the Army. The U.S. Air Force recently signed a V-173, two more Navy contracts were let for contract with North American Aviation to tail-sitter vtol fighters—the Convair XFY-1 gather data utilizing the Lockheed-developed and Lockheed XFV-1. Both these aircraft were XV-4B Hummingbird vtol fighter. North powered by the Allison 5000-horsepower tur- American has subsequently scheduled more boprop engine, both made their first flight in than 300 flights in fulfillment of this project. 1954, and both were terminated in 1956 fol- tary tactical fighter. Additionally, the tail- sitting takeoff and landing attitude of these two aircraft required the pilot to perform these most critical flight maneuvers from a position flat on his back with his feet up in the air and looking over his shoulder—a some- what less than optimum position for aircrew safety and comfort. Experiments with ducted-fan propulsion for vtol fighter aircraft have been somewhat more rewarding. The ducted-fan propulsion principle incorporates a propeller imbedded Chance Vought V-173 “Flying Pancake” (1942) within a shroud or duct. The propeller or fan may be powered by either a reciprocating piston engine or a gas turbine. One of the more successful aircraft of this type, which lowing two years of testing plagued by engine is still undergoing service testing, is the Ryan and propeller problems. Flight control of both XV-5A Vertifan. This aircraft rises vertically was exercised during hovering and transition while retaining a level-flight position. The Bight through the use of conventional aero- Vertifan is powered by two J-85 turbojets of dynamic controls, inasmuch as the wings and about 4300 pounds’ thrust each, which operate tail surfaces were bathed by a high-velocity three ducted fans through a diverter valve for flow of air provided by the large propeller vertical operations. Two fans are imbedded during takeoff, transition, and landing. The in the wing roots and one in the nose of the Convair XFY-1 was successful to the degree low-wing aircraft. Control during vtol is that it was the world’s first propeller-driven achieved through variable louvers. Once air- aircraft to make a successful vertical takeoff, borne, the louvers covering the ducted fans transition to conventional flight, and land ver- are deflected to produce sufficient forward tically. As later described by witnesses: thrust to attain sufficient speed for aero- dynamic flight. When flying speed is reached, It was truly a magnificent performance, the the fans are covered over, and the full thrust first time in history that any vtol aircraft ex- cept the helicopter had accomplished the com- plete vtol operation.1 The XFY-1 had a cruciform “sitter” plat- form with a very wide tread, whereas the less successful XFV-1 had such a narrow tread there was concern that it might tip from its tail-sitter position during takeoff or landing. As a result the XFV-1 never made a vertical * takeoff or landing, but it was used to gather data during airborne transitions to vertical flight utilizing conventional takeoff and land- ing technique. State-of-the-art engine power- to-weight limitations required both aircraft to be equipped with propeller blades longer than optimum for efficient cruising, in order to pro- vide adequate thrust for vertical takeoff. This of course compromised in-flight speed and maneuverability, two factors so vital to a mili- IN MY OPINION 89

of the two turbojets is diverted and ejected long-range, higher-payload operations requir- out the aft tailpipe in a conventional manner. ing the conventional takeoff and landing mode. This propulsion principle, with its mechanical The real breakthrough in jet vtol opera- advantage, shows considerable promise for tions came, however, with the development certain applications. of the vectored-thrust turbojet designed spe- cifically for vtol aircraft installation. Since the fans deal with a much larger airmass than the engines, the [Vertifan] system pro- The vectored thrust principle was originated duces about three times more thrust than the by the French designer, Michel Wibault, who basic engines, reducing the usual requirement conceived the idea of deflecting the thrust for very powerful engines for vtol operation.-' from centrifugal compressors, driven by the Bristol Orion engine. This idea w'as further A major problem that detracts from the developed by Dr. Stanley Hooker and resulted potential of the Vertifan for vtol fighter ap- in the first vectored-thrust turbofan, the Bristol plication, however, centers around the struc- Siddeley 53 Pegasus 5. This engine is basically tural weakness inherent in the louvered wing a turbojet driving a ducted fan. A part of the design, which tends to restrict the G-forces relatively cool compressed air of the ducted that can be applied. Of course wing loading fan is expelled through the front pair of eas- and G-forces are directly proportional to maneuverability, a key factor in tactical fighter performance. The third and most promising type of pro- pulsion utilized in vtol fighters is the pure turbojet. There are two systems of turbojet vtol propulsion in common usage today. The first involves the use of small, vertically mounted turbojets of the J-85 type, installed either in the fuselage behind the pilot or on booms attached to the fuselage aft of the cockpit. These vertically mounted engines provide the thrust for vertical takeoff, hover- ing flight, and vertical landing. The air- craft is maintained in a level flight attitude throughout vertical operations and transition maneuvering. Aircraft control during vertical operations is provided by small jet outlets, powered by compressor bleed air. installed in each wingtip and in the aft section of the air- frame. Forward speed for aerodynamic flight is provided by a separate conventional turbo- jet, exhausting from the rear of the aircraft. When aerodynamic flight speeds are reached, the vertical jets are shut down, retracted if necessary, and covered over in a streamlined manner for normal flight operations. The French Mirage III-V used this propulsion sys- tem to enable it to become the world’s first mach-2 vtol in 1966. Although the vertical- thrust engines are dead weight wrhen vtol operations are not required, the engines can be removed and replaced with fuel cells for eaded nozzles; the rest of the air is passed on to the compressor of the turbine. After com- Wing Commander David Scrimgeour and bustion the exhaust gases are expelled through composed of United States, United Kingdom, the aft pair of nozzles.3 and West German air force pilots. The pro- duction P.1127 is a swept-wing vtol fighter The Pegasus engine also incorporates a twin- equipped with the latest version of the Bristol spool contrarotating compressor that mini- Siddeley Pegasus 6 turbofan, producing a mizes the gyroscopic coupling effect inherent thrust of about 19,000 pounds. Takeoff weight in some early vtol engine installations. is in the neighborhood of 14,000 pounds, To date the most significant application which gives the aircraft a payload of about of this new engine design concept has been 5000 pounds or, in military terminology, six attained by the British in the development 750-pound bombs. This payload is comparable and subsequent production of their P.1127 to that of several first-line jet-powered military Kestrel. As noted by one observer: fighters in use today, including the well-known The decision of the [United Kingdom] Ministry F-100 and F-104 aircraft. The maximum speed of Defense, taken in November 1966, to start of the Kestrel is reported to be just under mass production of the Kestrel was however mach 1. In recent trials this aircraft demon- a milestone in v / st o l history, as it was the strated the capability to land day or night in first time a v / st o l project had resulted in an a 150' x 300' clearing surrounded by 60-foot- operational aircraft. Finally the v / st o l concept high trees. The only special equipment re- had reached maturity.4 quired was an aluminum mat 50' x 40' in size, Operational test and evaluation of the Kestrel upon which to touch down. The purpose of were accomplished by a special Tripartite the pad was to prevent the jet exhaust from Evaluation Squadron, commanded by raf blowing up debris or high-speed pellets and IN MY OPINION 91

rocks that could damage the aircraft skin or lems to solve in the development of concepts be ingested into the jet engine, with resultant for employment and logistic support; but the compressor damage. military applications of this type of aircraft The British have indeed made a break- are many, and the potential for further devel- through in turbojet engine design with their opment and improved performance is great. vectored-thrust Pegasus. At the same time, Let us consider one example of vtol applica- United States jet engine technology and state- tion: of-the-art advances are producing some out- The problem of developing an economical standing results. For example, Pratt & Whitney and flexible manned tactical weapon system is now marketing a high-bypass-ratio conven- that can survive a surprise air attack and con- tional turbojet engine designated the JT9D, tinue to operate effectively against the enemy which has a takeoff rating of 42,000 pounds has long been of paramount military impor- thrust and has a growth potential to 47,000 tance. During the June 1967 Israeli-Egyptian pounds’ thrust. The application of United air campaign, the use of air power by the States technology to the vectored-thrust prin- Israeli Air Force ( ia f ) was classic. The first ciple could undoubtedly provide some truly wave of ia f attack aircraft flew in low, under- amazing vtol power plants. neath the radars, and used a newly developed What are United States intentions? The lightweight “dibber” bomb to interdict Egyp- Commander, United States Air Force Aero- tian runways. According to one on-the-spot space Systems Command, General James Fer- report: guson, has stated: . . . this bomb has retrorockets to brake it almost instantly upon release. The bomb tilts We plan to press for solutions to the current downward and another rocket blasts it verti- problems and generally stay ahead of the cally into runway surfaces to blow a hole sev- expressed needs of operational commanders eral feet deep. . . . in every case the first by demonstrating v /st o l systems that will be attacks were passes along the runways. Only practical for their purpose.5 a few craters, judiciously placed, put them out of action.6 T he vtol has finally come of age and appears to be here to stay. There remain many prob- Following interdiction of the runways, the 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Israelis then strafed the grounded Egyptian sight, supporting aerospace technology, and a aircraft with withering accuracy at will, thus well-dispersed and adequate force of vtol tac- reducing the Egyptian Air Force to relative tical fighters, independent of the requirement impotence within a breathtaking and decisive for long concrete runways, the outcome of the three-hour time period. Six days later orga- Arab-Israeli campaign could well have been nized Arab military opposition to the advance reversed. of Israel’s armed forces ceased. And so it could be with other farsighted How would a vtol tactical fighter have nations on another day. helped Egypt? With sufficient military fore- Ramstein, Germany

Notes 4. Ibid., pp. 59-60. 1. John P. Campbell. Vertical Takeoff and Landing Air- 5. General James B. Ferguson, “Providing the Means to craft (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962). Meet Aggression—at Any Level,” Air Force and Space Digest, 2. “VTOL Ups and Downs,” NATO’s Fifteen Nations, No. November 1967, p. 92. 12, June-July 1967, p. 57. 6. Robert R. Rodwell, “Three Hours—and Six Days." Air 3. Ibid., p. 59. Force and Space Digest, October 1967, p. 58.

Additional references The following useful sources supplement those cited in the Interavia, September 1967. notes. “The P.1127 Goes into Production,” Interavia, November 1966. Riccius, Rolf, and Guira, Franco. “VFW /FIAT VAK-191B,’’ “VTOL Aircraft 1966,” Flight International, 26 May 1966.

ON LEARNING FROM THE SOVIETS

M ajor Robert H. K el l ey

N the last few years American economists allowing the factories to make contracts with I have reported—not without a touch of both their suppliers and their wholesale out- smugness—that the U.S.S.R. is adopting capi- lets. The experiment apparently succeeded talist methods to improve its sagging growth because these reforms have since been ex- rate. Moreover, the facts support their con- tended to about half of all the factories in the clusions rather well. After several years of Soviet Union. In addition, Soviet managers discussion in Soviet economic journals by can now negotiate loans for capital invest- academicians such as Liberman, Nemchinov, ment, for which they pay interest charges. and Leontev, the Soviets in 1965 conducted an Such changes certainly do not represent experiment in two clothing factories, using a return to private enterprise, but they do profit as the primary measure of success and show the willingness of the present Soviet IN MY OPINION 93

regime to use capitalist techniques to improve ministries, which operate autonomously once their system. The Communist hierarchy has resources are assigned to them. This pattern sound historical precedents for these moves: coincides roughly with our Department of Khrushchev in 1962 proposed the use of inter- Defense, which operates under the executive est charges on invested capital, quoting Lenin branch and administers vertically organized himself as having said. “We should be able, functional commands. if necessary, to leam from the capitalists, to During the Khrushchev era the Soviets adopt whatever they have that is sensible and tried a system of horizontally organized eco- advantageous. ’ nomic units which directed geographic areas Now suppose we put the shoe on the (sovnarkhozy). While these units proved easier other foot. If we in the United States should to administer, there was excessive redundancy find Soviet methods that we could profitably in services and research. In addition, each use, would we be willing to “eat a little crow" unit attempted to become self-sufficient, and and adopt their methods? American devotion this resulted in uneconomical production. In to economic efficiency and our reputation as the dod, we had already learned these lessons pragmatists both argue that we would change during the development of strategic strike most readily. For this reason, I believe it forces and in space operations. We shifted would profit the U.S. to examine current to a functional (mission) organization several Soviet economic reforms for possible applica- years before the Soviets reached the same tion in the Department of Defense. Although conclusion. our national economic systems are very un- Incentives for managers. The dod and the alike, there is a striking resemblance in the Soviet Union face a similar problem in mo- structure, operation, and problems of the U.S. tivating managers to use resources economi- Department of Defense and the Soviet econ- cally. The absence of personal monetary profit omy. This may seem rather startling at first and precise measurement of returns on in- glance, but closer examination reveals many vested resources greatly complicates efforts parallels between the two. to identify and reward effective management. One of the main weaknesses for both systems parallels has been the lack of some means to place a real value on the amount of capital invested or Planning and budgeting. Both the dod the length of time before investment becomes and the Soviet economy operate from gen- productive. Without these measures of per- eralized five-year plans or goals. Each goes formance, the only reference available is com- through an annual budget cycle, beginning parison with previous performance. Thus we with general guidelines from above and in- see reports of Soviet production as being 105 creasing in detail at each lower echelon. The percent of previous year or cost per unit as proposed budgets then return up the com- being 96 percent of the norm. In dod we have mand ladder for validation, coordination, and cost reduction programs and zero defect cam- reclama action. Finally, the overall program is paigns, but we can only compare our per- approved by the political decision-making formance with our own previous efforts. Since authority and put into effect. there are no profits, rigorous cost accounting Command structure. While the great dis- yields no real measure of performance. parity in size lessens the value of organiza- Resource allocation. In the absence of a tional comparisons somewhat, there are close market system to allocate goods, both dod and parallels in the forms of organization that have the Soviets use a plan. The primary difficulty been tried. The Soviet economy is directed by is in achieving optimum input of goods to a politico-technical center (Gosplan), which maximize output and maintain desired pro- receives basic policy from the highest political duction. Just as the Soviets found in 1965 that source, the Council of Ministers. Gosplan they had failed to develop their plastics in- administers vertically organized functional dustry sufficiently, the U.S. found that it had 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

overautomated defense supply systems for suit factory in Moscow. Their managers were combat units. The lack of direct competition given local authority to determine the prod- often allows uneconomical methods to persist uct mix and to contract for their supplies and long after a better way has been discovered. output. They worked on the basis of orders Common service functions. Such services from wholesalers and stores. Their primary as transport, communications, supply, and measure of success was the net profit on sales. housekeeping are common to all military or- In September 1965 Premier Kosygin an- ganizations and governmental ministries. Both nounced that the experiment had succeeded of the systems we are considering have and that some 400 to 600 additional plants grappled with the problem of providing these would rapidly shift to the new system. The services efficiently without a large amount of changes really amounted to (1) an increase slack and redundance in facilities or procure- in economic autonomy for managers, (2) de- ment. Neither has found a really effective velopment of automatic or market-type meas- solution. ures of performance, and (3) the adoption of Product evaluation. Because they have motivating devices more closely tied to end traditionally rewarded industry on a basis of results. quantity of goods produced, the Soviets have Many Western observers predicted that constantly encountered difficulty in establish- the reforms would quickly degenerate into ing quality controls. Inspection systems sel- just one more bureaucratic reshuffle of the dom worked because inspectors usually had centrally directed command economy. How- a vested interest in high production results. ever, it now appears that considerable de- Our Defense Department faces a similar prob- centralization has actually occurred in the lem because inspectors are usually members planning system. Practical necessity appar- of the organizations they inspect. In addition, ently outweighed ideological resistance to the our inspection system is primarily method- changes. Current reports indicate that all oriented rather than output-oriented. Soviet industry will be operating under the new system by 1969.

So u'hat? some lessons for DOD Assuming that the parallels I have sug- gested are valid, what is to be gained by In the Defense Department we hear many studying the Soviets? They certainly have not of the same complaints and problems as those achieved any fame in the last ten years as voiced by Soviet economists and managers. management experts or as innovators in allo- For many years there have been recurring cation or evaluation. However, they are op- complaints of wasted and unused resources erating a much larger system than our dod in the military. Air Force units do not manage and have far more people working on these their own budgets for fuel, so they often use problems than we have. Further, in the past airplanes to save airline fares, which are three years the Soviets have shown a growing dollar-budgeted. Navy ships have frequently willingness to innovate and increasing atten- been used in commercial movie making. tion to management as a key to improved Quartermaster supplies are often stockpiled performance. Thus, the similarity between to protect against uncertain delivery. Units the Soviet and dod systems, coupled with the of all services try to spend all appropriated increasing pragmatism of Soviet leaders, funds by the end of the accounting year in strongly suggests that we should carefully June, possibly to avoid the appearance of evaluate their programs. Perhaps we could having excessive budgets. benefit from their experience. Another area in which the military has The first Soviet experiment involved only been notoriously lacking in economic effi- two apparel factories, the Mayak ladies gar- ciency is in the negotiation and administration ment factory in Gorki and the Bolshevichka of contracts. A report by Joseph C. Goulden IN MY OPINION 95

in the Philadelphia Inquirer of 14 January distress, with no rental income and no hous- 196S pointed to a number of contracts in ing market. Had the project been evaluated which military buyers were grossly over- originally on its economic merits, it seems charged compared with commercial custom- obvious that the commander would have ers. The author blamed inept management found an investment with better expected and noncompetitive bidding. In response, a returns. Defense Department official, Thomas D. Morris, pointed out that Defense makes 15 possible applications million transactions per year and cannot be expected to do well on all of them. Both men For obvious reasons the Defense Depart- were correct. Centralized control of such im- ment could not apply all the practices which mense numbers of contracts cannot be effec- the Russians have adopted, nor could it apply tively maintained. The Soviets learned this these practices to all facets of dod operations. in the early 1960s, and it is one of the main Some operations might be unnecessarily in- reasons for Soviet decentralization. If both hibited by fiscal accountability. In other units control and accountability could be decentral- there is no quantifiable product to measure. ized throughout the Department of Defense, But these units probably constitute the ex- the product user would then become the con- ception rather than the rule. tract administrator. Some of the Air Force functions that Still another major dod inefficiency stems might most readily be economically decen- from the manager’s lack of accountability for tralized are the service and support units, such invested capital. Funds appropriated for con- as communications, transport, training, base struction or new equipment are treated as housekeeping, weather service, supply, food sunk costs and do not necessarily require a service, and housing. As a starter, a controlled compensating increase in performance or pro- experiment might be conducted by several ductivity. Thus, each commander continually relatively stable units in the training or trans- seeks more funds to improve the appearance, port commands. Under the experiment the convenience, or importance of his operation. unit would pay for all its inputs and operate Again, the Soviets faced an identical problem against target costs per unit of output. A in their command economy, and they have charge for invested capital would also be introduced a charge for invested capital in included. After a period of time, the unit their profit measurement, dod could certainly would begin to “sell” its product as the new benefit from such a system. system was extended to more units. Consider one simple example. In 1963 a Eventually, a base commander would family housing project was completed at an have complete independence in applying his Air Force base in the South for about 550 budget. He would determine his personnel families at a cost of approximately $17,000 needs, contract with training units for new per unit or $9,350,000 total construction cost. people, pay (and receive) bonuses for in- Assuming an average annual savings of $1000 creased productivity, and sell his support per unit in military housing allowance, the services to the combat units on the base. In investment would be recouped in 17 years if short, his operation would be almost identical the invested capital was free. If the going cost to that of an independent division in a large of Treasury borrowing in 1963 (about 4 per- corporation. cent) is added, the payout period of the Limited attempts in this direction have project extends to nearly 30 years. But the already been made in dod. The industrial needs of the military are transitory, so that funding system for purchasing airlift from by 1967 the base population had dwindled to Military Airlift Command is one example. A the point that the quarters could not be filled. second step is the Resource Management Sys- In addition, many military homeowners in tem currently being implemented. But these the adjacent community were in economic applications are too timid and incomplete to 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW achieve really significant results, since the that must have accompanied such suggestions charges are not realistic and the manager has in a Communist economy. Nevertheless, eco- no monetary stake in lowering expenses or nomic pressure finally forced their acceptance. increasing “sales.” Too many of the costs of The rising cost of military operations and military operations are simply accepted as continued balance-of-payments squeeze have “given” rather than as factors in the overall placed Defense in a similar position today. task of the manager. Until a means is found to With current military expenditures run- give the manager a personal stake in cost- ning at $200 million per day, it would be effective operations, there is little hope of worth a lot of extra effort to reverse the up- making major improvements in the manage- ward trend of operating costs. Who knows, ment of military units. If such a system seems maybe we could learn something from the impractical or unrealistic, consider the uproar Soviets. Air Command and Staff College Books and Ideas CIVIC ACTION- A WEAPON FOR PEACE

Major Laun C. Smit h , J r .

HE term “military civic action” is rela- T tively new in the history of military strat- egy' and tactics, but the military has been used as a tool of government during peacetime and wartime since biblical times at least. The term has been given an official definition with broad application by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in jcs Publication 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, but civic action still faces staunch opposition by many hard-line hardware-type military com- manders today. Since the Korean conflict or even earlier, U.S. military leadership has been aware of the value of a good military civic action program as applied during wartime. More recently mili- tary civic action has been recognized as an excellent way to counter insurgency in under- developed or developing nations. One of our key civic action directives is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, mainly because Presi- dent John F. Kennedy cited civic action as one method of countering subversion. But military' civic action has a multitude of peacetime applications also. In fact, there are those who say that the most important phase of military civic action must occur during pieacetime so that insurgency or all-out war can be averted. Two books have been published on this 98 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW subject recently. Dr. Edward Bernard Glick experiences of the United States, Latin Amer- has written Peaceful Conflict, the Non-Military ica, Israel, Vietnam, and the Philippines. His Use of the Military,f and Mr. Hugh Hanning strongest chapters are the first, in which he has authored The Peaceful Use of Military defines terms and discusses conflict, counter- Forces.ft Dr. Glick is a professor of political insurgency, and civic action, and his last science at Temple University, and Mr. Han- chapter, in which he classifies civic action and ning is an Englishman with a background in discusses its problems and promise. both military and foreign affairs. Both books Hanning, on the other hand, treats more are recommended reading for young career extensively the civic action programs and re- officers in the Department of Defense as well settlement programs of a greater number of as the Department of State. countries, most of them in more detail than Both books are well written. To the pro- Glick, who devoted more space to a much- fessional they provide interesting reading and needed historical account on the subject. a valuable insight to the history, the uses, and Hanning coined an acronym, pu m f (peaceful the promises of military civic action in a world use of military forces), which is somewhat of either rudimentary or highly sophisticated distracting to the reader. military establishments involved in regional, The strength of Hanning’s book lies in the national, or international socioeconomic de- thoroughness of his research, the impressive velopment. And they stress the political and appendixes containing documents from seven diplomatic overtones as well as causes and countries to supplement his text, and his cen- effects. tral theme of using the military as a training Most U.S. military men are aware of the ground for future productive citizens through tremendous impact the services have on nearly proper prerelease and resettlement programs all aspects of civilian life today—from space after military obligations are met. To prove technology, to civil engineering, to transporta- his points he relied heavily on the experiences tion, to medicine, to marine research, to name of Israel. Peru, Colombia, Iran, and the United a few. One is impressed with the significance Kingdom. of such an impact after reading either Hanning The two authors are in agreement on or Glick. They both point to the military as most points. They make a strong point in having the most natural and widely applicable favor of military civic action, or peaceful use systems of training, education, and career de- of the military, properly applied. And both velopment to provide for the needs of devel- dwell on the dangers of military civic action. oping as well as developed nations. But they Glick, in particular, warns that it could be- caution that nations should try to assure that come a tool for power in the wrong hands. training provided while a man is in the mili- But to both men there are more favorable tary be used by him when he returns to aspects for civic action than there are un- civilian life. favorable ones against it. At least it is worth Glick treats the United States experience a try. more directly, comprehensively, and critically Glick says the civic action doctrine of the than does Hanning. His objective in writing United States “assumes that we should merely his book was to “present a concept [civic advise or support in what are essentially host action], to philosophize about it, to describe country programs.” The activity flow Ls from its historical and present workings, to evaluate the U.S. military to its foreign counterpart, and criticize it.” He accomplished his objec- then from the latter to its people. Armies, tive, using mainly the military civic action he says, should work with the civilians on

fEdward Bernard Glick, P eaceful Conflict, the Non-Military Use of the M ilitary (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1967), 223 pp. ffHugh Hanning, The Peaceful Uses of Military Forces (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), xxvi and 325 pp. Natives of Chimdn Republic of Panama, welcome the first aircraft to land on the airstrip they hacked out of the jungle with hand tools. The USAF Southern Command U-10 had assisted them from the air by loudspeaker instructions. Soon commercial flights from Panama City were landing there. 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW projects the civilians want and need. Armies with greater effectiveness, through her two should never work for civilians. He points out most important civic action institutions, Gadna that nearly all experts agree that civic action and Nahal. Other nations are following suit. endeavors of the armed forces should never A strong feature of Glick’s book is the nine be permitted to degrade their military use- pages of text he devoted to the civic action fulness. memorandum of Lieutenant Colonel John T. Hanning expresses much the same philos- Little, former chief of the White Star Mobile ophy. Both writers agree that military support Training Team in Laos. Little’s memorandum of a civic action project should end when a contains a basic formula for the conduct of a civilian agency becomes capable of carrying civic action program, and it is recommended it through. In other words, peaceful uses of for study by those who are planning such a the military should help establish an economy program for the first time. but should never take from civilian industry, Another point that the authors agree upon business, or labor the livelihood that is justly and stress is the need to select the in-service theirs. training that will most benefit the man and his To both men, training is the key. Hanning society when he leaves the service. Too many points out that training incorporates the vital developing nations stress industrial skills and principle of self-help which is really the core omit agricultural training entirely, with the of the military civic action or pu m f philosophy. result that too often the trainee wanders back Training while in the military by the military to his fann highly skilled as a mechanic but “is the greatest economic boon which any with little if any added skill as a farmer. defense establishment can confer on the com- Finally, both Glick and Hanning point out munity; and it is one which embodies few of that military civic action, or the peaceful use the overtones of the more controversial func- of military forces, is not the answer to all the tions of PUMF.” ills of a nation, especially in a counter-insur- The intangible results of military civic- gent situation. Glick says that “counterinsur- action can be even more important than the gency cannot succeed through civic action concrete ones. Both authors stress this in one alone, neither can it be lastingly successful way or another. The attitudes and manners of without it.” Hanning writes that the “correct those performing the civic action can do more counter-insurgent posture is two-handed—the harm or good than completion of the actual closed fist of military force and the open hand project—a road, bridge, schoolhouse, etc. As of friendship.” Hanning puts it, “ . . . one of the villager’s fun- Many mistakes have to be avoided to as- damental needs is to be treated with respect.” sure successful use of military forces in peace- This point has too often been overlooked ful pursuits. Both Hanning and Glick have by commanders in the field during wartime. It made a good case for civic action, but they has also been overlooked until recently by com- have also been quite objective in stating the manders in peacetime. To stress this point, both problems to be encountered. In a few instances Glick and Hanning use the recent experiences they have posed solutions to some problems of the United States and Israel. What they say that many in the armed forces will find difficult is that the best person to perform civic action to agree with. But they deserve consideration, is the man trained or educated for the job. The study, and alternate solutions at least, because United States now does this, they assert, by they are problems that are more demanding of sending specially trained men out as Mobile solution today than they have been in the past. Training Teams to perform civic action func- Quarry Heights, C.Z. tions. Israel is doing the same thing, probably Tbe Contributors

Aerospace Medical Sciences Division, USAF School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks AFB, Texas. He entered the Air Force in 1951 and was a resident in medicine, Brooke Army Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 1952—55. He received the master of science in internal medicine from Baylor Univer- sity, 1955. Other assignments have been at Johnson Air Base, Japan; at Scott AFB, Illinois, as Chief of Car- diology, 1959-62, and Chairman, De- partment of Medicine, and Chief, Cardiology Service, 1962-64; at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, as Dep- uty Commander and Chief of Hospital Services, 1964-66, and as Commander from June to August 1966. Colonel Cans is a Fellow of the American D r . H ubertus Struchold (Ph.D., College of Cardiology and the Ameri- University of Munster; M.D., Uni- can College of Chest Physicians and versity of Wurzburg) is Chief Scientist is certified by the American Board of and Professor of Space Medicine, Internal Medicine. Aerospace Medical Center, Brooks M ajor Gen er a l Charles H. R oad- AFB, Texas. A pioneer in aviation ma n iM.D., Northwestern University) medicine, he became director of the is Commander, Aerospace Medical Di- Aeromedical Research Institute in vision, Air Force Systems Command. Berlin, Germany, in 1935 and by 1945 After interning at Baylor University was a colonel in the German Medical Hospital, he entered the Medical Corps. After the war he was appointed Corps in 1940. He completed the Director of the Physiological Institute, School of Aviation Medicine in 1941 University of Heidelberg. In 1947 he and pilot training in 1942. During joined the USAF School of Aviation World War II he was assigned to the Medicine, where he served for nine Central Pilot Instructors School. Other years as Chief, Department of Space assignments have been as staff mem- Medicine, and five years as Adviser ber and Executive Officer, School of for Research before assuming his Aviation Medicine, 1946-49; student, present position in 1962. Dr. Strug- Air Command and Staff School; Com- hold is the author of Space Medicine mand Surgeon, Air University, to and The Green and Red Planet; is co- 1951; Air Attache, U.S. Embassy, author of Principles of Aviation Medi- Argentina, to 1954; student, Air War cine and an atlas on aviation medicine; College; Chief, Human Factors Divi- and has published numerous articles sion, Directorate of R&D, Hq USAF, on physiology, aviation medicine, and to 1960; Special Assistant, Office of space medicine. Life Sciences Programs for Aerospace Medicine, NASA, to 1961; Director of Aerospace Medicine, Manned D r . A nthony A. T homas (M.D., Spaceflight, NASA, to 1963; and University of Budapest) is Director, Command Surgeon, Air Defense Com- Toxic Hazards Division, Aerospace mand, until his present assignment in Medical Research Laboratories, 1966. Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Since 1956 he has developed a toxicological research program to support occupa- tional and aerospace medicine require- ments of the Air Force research and development program and has de- signed unique facilities for this re- search. He has been a USAF liaison member of the Committee on Toxicol- ogy. National Research Council; has served on the Tri-Service Steering Committee on Toxicological Research of the Advanced Research Projects Agency; and is a visiting lecturer (associate professor) in toxicology, Ohio State University. Dr. Thomas has published numerous papers on J ames W. B rinkley (B.S., Ohio State propellant and aerospace toxicology University) is a research scientist. Aer- and is a charter member of the Society ospace Medical Research Laboratories, of Toxicology. He was awarded the Air Force Systems Command, Wright- Exceptional Civilian Service Medal Patterson AFB, Ohio. Since his grad- C olonel Tim o t h y N'. C ams (M .D ., in 1967 for his pioneering work in uation in 1958 he has been involved Ohio State University) is Commander, aerospace toxicology. in the development of escape systems for the B-58, B-70, and F - l l l and in research in support of Projects Mer- cury, Cemini, Apollo, and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory. Mr. Brinkley hits written numerous technical papers and reports dealing with acceleration tol- erance, restraint systems, and impact attenuation. He was named AMRL Scientist of the Year in 1966.

M ajor John F. M c M ahon, J r . (M.A., D r . R obert D. M ie w a l d (Ph.D., University of North Carolina) is as- University of Colorado) is a member signed to the Applications Branch, of the Political Science Department, Special Warfare Division, Deputy Di- California State College, Long Beach. rectorate of Plans for Policy, Hq He served with the First Infantry Di- USAF. After completion of flying vision from 1961 through 1963. Dr. training in 1956, he served as a jet Miewald's primary interest is with instructor pilot at Creenville AFB, problems of military management, and Mississippi, and Craig AFB, Alabama. his doctoral dissertation (1966) was He was on the faculty, Department of on the development of managerial Political Science, U.S. Air Force Acad- doctrine in the United States Army. emy, from 1961 to 1963, when he joined the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing. He served in Vietnam as an F-4C aircraft commander. Major Mc- Mahon is a 1967 graduate of the Army Command and General Staff G en er a l Maxwell D. T aylor College. (USMA), USA (Ret), is President, Institute for Defense Analysis, Ar- lington, Virginia. During World War II he served as Chief of Staff and Commander, 82d Airborne Division, 1942; in the Sicilian and Italian cam- paigns, 1943—44; and Commander, 101st Airborne Division, Western Front, 1944—45. Subsequent assign- ments were as Superintendent, USMA, 1945-49; Chief of Staff, American Forces in Europe, 1949; Commander, American Military Covemment and Army forces in Berlin, to 1951; Dep- uty Chief of Staff, Operations and Administration, U.S. Army, to 1953; Commander, Eighth Army, Korea, 1953; Commander, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 1954; U.S. and U.N. Com- mander, Far East, 1955; and Chief M ajor Graham W. R id e r (USMA; of Staff, U.S. Army, until his retire- M.S., Air Force Institute of Technol- ment in 1959. He was recalled to ogy) is a doctoral student. College of active duty as military representative Business Administration, Arizona State of the President, 1961-62, and Chair- University. After graduation from man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-64. West Point in 1952, he attended the He was U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Airborne Communications Officer 1964-65. General Taylor is the au- Course, Keesler AFB, Mississippi. He thor of The Uncertain Trumpet (1960) has served as Armament and Elec- and Responsibility and Response tronics Maintenance Officer, 64th (1967). Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Elmen- dorf AFB, Alaska; staff officer. Arma- ment and Electronics, Hq 25th Air Division, McChord AFB, Washington; M rs. A moretta M. H oeber (B.A., Stanford University) is an analyst. Adviser to the Imperial Iranian Air Strategic Branch, Analytic Services Force, Teheran; Weapon Systems Of- Inc. (ANSER), Falls Church, Vir- ficer, Hq Air Defense Command; ginia. She was previously employed student. School of Systems and Logis- tics, AF1T; and faculty member. Grad- as a research assistant in the Strate- gic Studies Center, Stanford Research uate Logistics Management Studies Institute, Menlo Park, California, Department, AFIT, where he will resume duty upon completion of his 1963-66. present studies. ib a H M B K

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Kennith F. M ajor Robert H. K el l ey (M.S., M ajor Laun C. S mith, J r . (M .A ., H it e (USMA) is Chief, Attack George Washington University) is a University of Pennsylvania) is Region- Branch, Offensive Operations Division, member of the faculty, Air Command al Desk Officer for Central America, Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, and Staff College, Air University, Public Affairs Office, U.S. Southern Germany. After flying training in Maxwell AFB, Alabama. After com- Command. He served during World 1952, he flew 90 F-86 combat mis- pleting OCS in 1952 and navigator W ar II as an enlisted man and re- sions over North Korea. Other assign- training in 1953, he served as OIC, turned to active duty as an officer in ments have been as fighter weapons Navigator Section. 22d Troop Carrier 1952. His principal assignments have instructor, Nellis AFB, Nevada; in- Squadron, Tachikawa AB, Japan, un- been as Information Officer in Mo- structor in military studies, U.S. Air til 1956. After pilot training in 1957, rocco, 1954—56, and at Richards- Force Academy, 1957—60; student. his assignments have been with the Gebaur AFB, 1956—58; Assistant Air Command and Staff College; Plans 59th Weather Reconnaissance Squad- Professor of History, U.S. Air Force Officer, Kadena AB, Okinawa; in Op- ron, Kindley AFB, Bermuda, to 1961; Academy, 1958-62; Deputy Assistant erations Plans Division, Hq PACAF, as Flight Examiner, Chief of Stand- for Policy and Programs, SAF-OII, Hawaii, 1963-65; as Chief, 4520th ardization, 1371st Photomapping from 1962 until his present assignment Combat Crew Training Wing Com- Squadron, Turner AFB, Georgia, to in 1966. He has written extensively mand Post, and F-105 instructor, 1965; and as student, ACSC, 1966. on military subjects and has served Nellis AFB; and as squadron com- in several editorial positions, most mander, 388th Tactical Fighter Wing. recently as editor of the Supplement Thailand, flying 100 combat missions to the Air Force Policy Letter for over North Vietnam. Commanders. Brigadier Ceneral DeWitt S. Spain, DCS/PIans. Hq Tactical Air Command, presents the Best Article Award plaque to Lieutenant Colonel Edward O. Stillie, Chief, Concepts Division, DCS/PIans, Hq TAC, for his article “Tactical Air Employment—Current Status and Future Objectives,” in the Novemher-December 1967 issue of Air University Review.

AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AW ARDS PROGRAM

Lieutenant Colonel Edward O. Stillie, usaf, currently Chief of the Concepts Division, DCS/ Plans, Hq Tactical Air Command, has been selected by the Air University Review Awards Commit- tee to receive the award for writing the outstanding article to appear in the Review during fiscal year 1968. Colonel Stillie’s article, “Tactical Air Employment—Current Status and Future Objectives,” was previously chosen the outstanding article in the November-December issue. The Awards Committee has also announced the selection of “Our Space Venture and Our Role in the World” by Brigadier Ceneral Henry C. Huglin, usaf (Retired), as the outstanding article in the May-June 1968 issue of Air University Review. The awards program provides for individual awards to authors writing in each issue, a $50 award for the outstanding article in each issue, and a $200 savings bond for the yearly outstanding article written during off-duty time. Bimonthly and yearly award winners who are military or civil service employees writing on duty time receive a plaque. The bimonthly winners for the past year are Air Marshal F. R. Sharp, rcaf, “Reorganization of the Canadian Armed Forces,” July-August 1967; Colonel John R. Stoner, usaf, “The Closer the Better," September-October 1967; Lieutenant Colonel Edward O. Stillie, usaf, “Tactical Air Employment—Current Status and Future Objectives,” November-December 1967; Major Frank H. McArdle, usaf, “The KC-135 in Southeast Asia,” January-February 1968; Dr. Paul S. Holbo, “Isolationist Critics of American Foreign Policy—A Historical Perspective,” March-April 1968; and Brigadier General Henry C. Huglin, usaf (Retired), “Our Space Venture and Our Role in the World,” May-June 1968. EDITORIAL STAFF L ieu t en a n t Colonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF, Editor J ack H. Mooney, Managing Editor Major Robert C. Spa r k ma n , USAF, Chief, Acquisition Branch E dmund O. B arker. Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. W est c o t t . J r ., Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston, Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L . Mid o si May Patterson. Assistant Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W il l ia m J. Dk Paola, Art Editor and Illustrator F ir st Lieu t en a n t Jer r y R. Stringer, USAF, Editorial Project Officer

ADVISERS

C olonel Mer r itt G. Garner, Hq Military Assistance Command, Vietnam C olonel William H. Huntley, J r ., Hq Air Training Command C olonel Marvin M. Stanley, Hq Tactical Air Command C olonel Rea de F. T illey, Hq Aerospace Defense Commaiul L ie u t e n a n t C olonel Cec il G. F urbish, Hq Air Force Logistics Command L ie u t en a n t Colonel J ames F. S underman. Hq U.S. Strike Command Dr . H arold Hel ema n . Hq Air Force Systems Command L a V er n e E. Woods, Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION

Air University Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Deport- ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed.