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Country of Origin Information Report Syria June 2021
Country of origin information report Syria June 2021 Page 1 of 102 Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021 Publication details City The Hague Assembled by Country of Origin Information Reports Section (DAF/AB) Disclaimer: The Dutch version of this report is leading. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands cannot be held accountable for misinterpretations based on the English version of the report. Page 2 of 102 Country of origin information report Syria | June 2021 Table of contents Publication details ............................................................................................2 Table of contents ..........................................................................................3 Introduction ....................................................................................................5 1 Political and security situation .................................................................... 6 1.1 Political and administrative developments ...........................................................6 1.1.1 Government-held areas ....................................................................................6 1.1.2 Areas not under government control. ............................................................... 11 1.1.3 COVID-19 ..................................................................................................... 13 1.2 Armed groups ............................................................................................... 13 1.2.1 Government forces ....................................................................................... -
Fifth Report to Monitor the Spread of the Corona Epidemic in Syria
Fifth report to monitor the spread of the Corona epidemic in Syria April 17, 2020 Even as no confirmed cases of Covid-19 have been recorded thus far, there is a general unease and fear in the northwest and east of Syria about the pandemic and its possible effects on people in the region. There are precautions being taken in the northeast where awareness campaigns have been launched and curfews have been imposed. However, people in the northwest are not practicing any particular precautionary measures, with the exception of organizations working on the ground and local authorities. This report monitors the general situation of the epidemic and precautionary measures in all Syrian regions during the period of 10-17 April 2020. First: Northwest: The Northwest region is considered the most exposed to a possible outbreak of the Coronavirus epidemic which could result in dangerous consequences for the residents. Until the time of this report, no confirmed cases of Coronavirus have been recorded as the results of the total 133 tests conducted were all negative. The procedures in place in the region can be summarized as follows: - The suspension of work continued in schools and universities in Idlib and its countryside, and the Directorate of Education followed the method of distance education through the creation of groups and rooms on WhatsApp to follow up on students. Prayers in mosques also remained suspended for the second Friday in a row. - The Ministry of Health in the Provisional Government issued instructions for the medical staff to wear muzzles for the entire period of work and stop anyone not wearing masks from entering to any health facilities. -
Al-Qamishli the Syrian Kurdish Rebellion
Cities in Revolution Al-Qamishli The Syrian Kurdish Rebellion Researcher: Sabr Darwish Project leader: Mohammad Dibo Translator: Lilah Khoja Supported by Cities in Revolution حكاية ما انحكت SyriaUntold Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Chapter One: The Uprising 5 I. The First Steps of the Uprising .............................................................5 II. Committees and the Parties .................................................................8 III. Challenging the City’s Elders ................................................................9 IV. The Weekly Demonstrations ...............................................................11 V. The Popular Movement’s Setbacks .....................................................14 Chapter Two: Recovery of Civil Society Organizations 19 I. Birati: Fraternity Foundation for Human Rights ...................................19 II. Shar for Development .........................................................................20 III. Other organizations .............................................................................22 Chapter Three: Autonomy in Al-Qamishli 25 I. Introduction ........................................................................................25 II. Democratic Self-Rule Project ..............................................................27 III. Fledgling Democratic Institutions ........................................................28 IV. Self-Rule and the Lack of Democracy ................................................30 V. Silencing -
Turkey-Continues-To-Weaponize-Alok
www.stj-sy.org Turkey Continues to Weaponize Alok Water amid COVID-19 Outbreak in Syria Turkey Continues to Weaponize Alok Water amid COVID-19 Outbreak in Syria Turkey hampers the urgent response to Coronavirus Pandemic by cutting off water to over 600.000 population in northeast Syria Page | 2 www.stj-sy.org Turkey Continues to Weaponize Alok Water amid COVID-19 Outbreak in Syria 1. Legal analysis a) International Humanitarian Law Water is indispensable to civilian populations. It is not only essential to drink, but also for agricultural purposes and sanitation, all the more important in the wake of the COVID-19 sanitary crisis. Although at first neglecting the significance of water and food for civilian populations caught in armed conflicts, drafters of the Geneva Conventions’ Protocol remedied the gap by including, in Article 54 Additional Protocol I and in Article 14 Additional Protocol II for International and Non-International Armed Conflicts (IACs and NIACs) respectively, the protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Involving two states, that of Syria and that of Turkey, the ongoing conflict currently taking place in northeast Syria is of international character. As a result, and in application of these provisions, in IACs: It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive. -
Turkish Military and Islamic Groups Invasion in Northeast Syria
30.10.2019 Turkish military and Islamic groups invasion in Northeast Syria: On October 9, 2019 the Turkish army with Islamic allies started an offensive targeting mainly the area between Sere Kaniye and Tell Abiad. SDF in turn started to defend it. After few hours a massive displacement of population started toward south areas of Hasake, Raqqa, Ein issa and Tel Tamir. Below the detailed report day by day with photos and the casualties recorded. 25th- 30th of October,2019 Tiltamir people are fleeing as the heard Turkish army and Turkish backed group are close to the city. Situation of IDPs The number of counted IDPs just in Hassakeh City contains almost 3.000 families and around 11.500 individuals, from this number we have at least: 23 unaccompanied children, more than 5000 children between the ages 0-13, and more than 400 pregnant or breastfeeding women. Those IDPs are currently divided into around 60 schools. Many more families and individuals are displaced in and around Raqqa, Tabqa and Qamishli, and elsewhere. Many displaced families were able to find temporary accommodation at their relatives' or friends' houses. Some thousands arrived to northern Iraq to a formal camp of Mosul IDPs. This camp was not prepared to receive this high number of IDPs and is missing tents, WASH facilities as well as Health Care services and the provision of food and water. The biggest deficit for IDPs in Hassakeh is the lack of water, as well as WASH facilities and toilets, we are expecting outbreaks of diarrhea in the near future. -
Interpreting the PKK's Signals in Europe
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume II, Issue 11 Interpreting the PKK’s Signals in Europe By Vera Eccarius-Kelly ince the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) unexpectedly abducted three German hikers near Mt. Ararat in Turkey on 8 July 2008, and then released them on 20 July, intelligence sources in Europe have in- tensified their surveillance of PKK operatives among members of the particularly numerous Kurdish S Diaspora in Germany.[1] According to German newspaper reports, the PKK demanded that in ex- change for the release of the hikers “Berlin stop its hostile politics towards the Kurds and the PKK in Ger- many”.[2] While the exact purpose of the abduction requires further analysis, it is clear that it was the armed branch of the PKK, known as the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), that kidnapped the German hikers at their Mt. Ararat encampment at 10,500 feet in the evening hours—only to release them unharmed some two weeks later.[3] Questions Related to an Abduction Several questions preoccupy security analysts in relation to this abduction. How should this event be inter- preted in Europe, and particularly in Germany? What signals did the PKK send? And, most importantly, is the PKK entering a renewed phase of high intensity activism and terrorism in Europe? This essay aims to provide a brief analysis of the often confusing and contradictory messages sent by European Kurdish circles.[4] Despite convoluted interpretations of Kurdish demands that are linked to a lack of unity among the many Kurdish organizations in Europe, it is possible to disentangle the underlying messages. -
Protesting As a Terrorist Offense RIGHTS the Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey WATCH
Turkey HUMAN Protesting as a Terrorist Offense RIGHTS The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey WATCH Protesting as a Terrorist Offense The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey Copyright © 2010 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-708-6 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org November 2010 1-56432-708-6 Protesting as a Terrorist Offense The Arbitrary Use of Terrorism Laws to Prosecute and Incarcerate Demonstrators in Turkey I. Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1 Key Recommendations ..........................................................................................................6 Methodology ........................................................................................................................ -
Kurds Kidnapped the Day While Maintaining the Ban on Its Civil Servants
INSTITUT KURDDE PARIS E Information and liaison bulletin N°425 AUGUST 2020 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture & City of Paris ______________ This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: [email protected] Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 425 August 2020 • IRAQ: TWO OFFICERS OF THE IRAQI BORDER GUARDS KILLED BY A TURKISH DRONE • ROJAVA: KIDNAPPING, TORTURE, RAPE, MURDER... EVIDENCE OF THE CRIMES OF THE TURKISH OCCUPATION FORCES IS ACCUMULATING • TURKEY: EXACTIONS AGAINST WOMEN ARE MULTIPLE • IRAN: MASS TWITTER CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ASSASSINATION OF KOLBARS, CALL FOR THE ACQUITTAL OF A KURDISH TEACHER • KURDISH LANGUAGE, PUBLICATIONS IRAQ: TWO OFFICERS OF THE IRAQI BORDER GUARDS KILLED BY A TURKISH DRONE ince the reopening of the to the Region from several Health called on cured patients to borders with Iran last countries, while conversely, donate their plasma for patients May, both Iraq and Turkey stopped flights to the developing severe forms of the Kurdistan are Region. Passengers leaving the infection. After more than twenty experiencing a dramatic Region must show a negative cases appeared, two villages in S increase in the figures of COVID test of less than 48 hours Akre district (Dohuk) were placed the pandemic.. -
Study the Democratic Union Party's Political Project for Syria 0
www.jusoor.co Study 0 The Democratic Union Party’s Political Project for Syria www.jusoor.co Study 1 The Democratic Union Party’s Political Project for Syria www.jusoor.co Study 2 Contents Preface ........................................................................................................ 3 PYD’s Ideology towards Syria ................................................................... 4 PYD’s Project ......................................................................................... 4 The Decisions Related to the Founding Conference .............................. 6 2007 Amendments .................................................................................. 7 Amendments of 2012 .............................................................................. 9 Amendments of 2015 ............................................................................ 10 Amendments of 2017 ............................................................................ 10 Indications of Changes in the PYD’s Ideology .................................... 11 The PYD’s Policy and Activities towards Syria ...................................... 12 The Media Discourse ............................................................................ 12 Mass Demonstrations............................................................................ 16 The Possible New Trend of the PYD ....................................................... 17 The Outcomes .......................................................................................... -
Video: Military Escalation: Syrian Army Enters YPG- Held Part of Aleppo, Turkey Strikes Convoy Entering Afrin
Video: Military Escalation: Syrian Army Enters YPG- held Part of Aleppo, Turkey Strikes Convoy Entering Afrin By South Front Region: Middle East & North Africa Global Research, February 24, 2018 Theme: Militarization and WMD, Terrorism, South Front 23 February 2018 US NATO War Agenda In-depth Report: SYRIA On February 22, units of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) entered into and established a full control of the YPG-held neighborhoods of Aleppo city, according to pro-government sources. A representative of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) confirmed the SAA deployment to the Kurdish HAWAR news agency. According to the released statement, YPG units from the city of Aleppo had moved to the Afrin area to combat Turkish forces. However, some sources say that some YPG units will remain in the neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsuud. On the same day in the morning, a third group of pro-government fighters entered the Afrin area. In the evening, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) struck another convoy, which was entering Afrin. According to the Turkish General Staff, the TAF attacked a convoy of 30-40 vehicles belonging to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and even to ISIS. The claim that the convoy was in any way belonging to ISIS is nonsense. However, claims about some ISIS presence is common to almost all TAF statements on its Operation Olive Branch. Separately, Kurdish sources released info that it was an aid convoy, which had been about to enter the Afrin area through the Ziyarah crossing. -
University of Peloponnese Kurdish
University of Peloponnese Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Department of Political Studies and International Relations Master Program in «Mediterranean Studies» Kurdish women fighters of Rojava: The rugged pathway to bring liberation from mountains to women’s houses1. Zagoritou Aikaterini Corinth, January 2019 1 Reference in the institution of Rojava, Mala Jin (Women’s Houses) which are viewed as one of the most significant institutions in favour of women’s rights in local level. Πανεπιστήμιο Πελοποννήσου Σχολή Κοινωνικών και Πολιτικών Επιστημών Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Διεθνών Σχέσεων Πρόγραμμα Μεταπτυχιακών Σπουδών «Μεσογειακές Σπουδές» Κούρδισσες γυναίκες μαχήτριες της Ροζάβα: Το δύσβατο μονοπάτι για την απελευθέρωση από τα βουνά στα σπίτια των γυναικών. 2 Ζαγορίτου Αικατερίνη Κόρινθος, Ιανουάριος 2019 2 Αναφορά στο θεσμό της Ροζάβα, Mala Jin (Σπίτια των Γυναικών) τα οποία θεωρούνται σαν ένας από τους σημαντικότερους θεσμούς υπέρ των δικαιωμάτων των γυναικών, σε τοπικό επίπεδο. Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved brother, Christos, who left us too soon but he is always present to my thought and soul. Acknowledgments A number of people have supported me in the course of this dissertation, in various ways. First of all, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisors, Vassiliki Lalagianni, professor and director of the Postgraduate Programme, Master of Arts (M.A.) in “Mediterranean Studies” at the University of Peloponnese and Marina Eleftheriadou, Professor at the aforementioned MA, for their assistance, useful instructions and comments. I also would like to express my deep gratitude to my family and my companion; especially to both my parents who have been all this time more than supportive. -
The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria
Flight of Icarus? The PYD’s Precarious Rise in Syria Middle East Report N°151 | 8 May 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. An Opportunity Grasped .................................................................................................. 4 A. The PKK Returns to Syria .......................................................................................... 4 B. An Unspoken Alliance? .............................................................................................. 7 C. Brothers and Rivals .................................................................................................... 10 III. From Fighters to Rulers ................................................................................................... 12 A. The Rojava Project ..................................................................................................... 12 B. In Need of Protection ................................................................................................. 16 IV. Messy Geopolitics ............................................................................................................. 18 A. Turkey and