The Hugo Valentin Centre
Master Thesis in Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Syrian Kurds amid Violence
Depictions of Mass Violence against Syrian Kurdistan in Kurdish Media, 2014–2019
Student: Abdulilah Ibrahim Term and year: Spring 2021 Credits: 45 Supervisor: Tomislav Dulić Word count: 28553 Table of Contents List of tables ...... 2
List of figures ...... 2
Abstract...... 3
Acknowledgment ...... 4
Introduction ...... 5
Aims and Research Questions ...... 6
Structure of the thesis ...... 7
Research overview ...... 7
Theory and method...... 14
Empirical analysis ...... 20
Historical overview ...... 20
Kurdish media ...... 24
Analysis ...... 28
Conclusions...... 92
List of tables
Table 1. Frequencies and percentages of media documents with codes representing images of mass violence...... 29 Table 2. Frequencies and percentages of media language assessments...... 33 Table 3. Frequency of documents with actors coded in media articles...... 34
List of figures
Figure 1. An integrated process model of framing...... 15 Figure 2: Political parties in the Kurdish regions ...... 21 Figure 3. De facto cantons of Rojava ...... 24 Figure 4. Percentages of mass violence-coded segments in Rudaw articles...... 30 Figure 5. Percentages of mass violence-coded segments in ANF articles...... 31 Figure 6. Percentages of Rudaw language and frame assessments...... 33 Figure 7. Percentages of ANF language and frame assessments...... 33 Figure 8. Percentages of actors coded in Rudaw articles...... 34 Figure 9. Percentages of actors coded in ANF articles...... 35 Figure 10. Language tone of both Kurdish media organizations, Rudaw and ANF. ....36 Figure 11. A Venn diagram of the impact of ideology on media representation of mass violence...... 69
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Abstract
This thesis investigates depictions in the Kurdish media (Rudaw and Firat News Agency (ANF)) of mass violence perpetrated against Kurdish civilians in northern and northeastern Syria – an area known to Kurds as Rojava – in recent years. Articles from two media organizations were subject to mixed-method text analysis (quantitative and qualitative) to uncover how mass violence was portrayed. The theory of framing in the media is used to show how violence is committed and what role ideology plays in this process. It is subsequently used in order to uncover commonly used frames for the roles played by various actors involved in mass violence. Hence, a comparison is made between the contents of the two media institutions. The results primarily relate to the role of ideology in the coverage of mass violence by the selected Kurdish media outlets, which are affiliated with two major Kurdish political parties, one left-leaning and one right-leaning. Findings revealed different aspects of mass violence, governed principally by nationalist and partisan orientations. Nationalist agendas played a significant role in Rudaw’s content and a smaller one in ANF’s. Partisan agendas had roughly the same magnitude in both, and the two outlets clashed politically but met nationalistically in many areas. The research questions were addressed through a content analysis of tens of stories disseminated by both Kurdish media organizations during the same time-space.
Keywords: Ideology, Kurds, mass violence, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Rudaw, Firat News Agency.
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Acknowledgment
I would like to express my gratitude to my family and friends for their encouragement and guidance during my master’s degree. I would like to thank my wife, who inspired me and boosted my morale during my study. I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Dulić for his supervision, feedback, and conversations, which simplified the task for me.
4 Introduction
The prolonged and complex conflict in Syria which remains ongoing at the time of writing began to escalate after peaceful protests were made against the government of Bashar al-Assad in March 2011. Thereafter, mass violence– conducted by the conflicting parties, terror groups (Islamic State (ISIS) and other extremist groups), international and regional interference (the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, etc.) – appeared to reach the Kurdish regions,1 where civilians were attacked by various actors.2 The conflict in Syria was dynamic, as it involved many parties. On the one hand, the Syrian regime allowed the deployment of its allies on the ground, namely Russia, Iranians and the Lebanese Shiite militia of Hezbollah. The opposition factions, on the other hand, were supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The worsening of the conflict coincided with the rise of the terrorist group of ISIS, which posed a significant threat to the Western world and the Kurdish regions, principally after capturing large swaths of Syria and Iraq in 2014.3 Syrian Kurds aimed at protecting their regions and establishing autonomy4 to avoid a possible security vacuum following the withdrawal of Syrian government troops in 2012.5 Yet, since then, the Kurdish region in northern and northeastern Syria – known as Western Kurdistan, Syrian Kurdistan, and, in Kurdish, Rojava – has remained under constant attack from an array of actors, including ISIS, Turkey, and its Syrian militia proxies (see Figure 3).67 The Syrian civil war has received a great deal of scholarly attention across the world in journals, books, articles, and news reports, including the involvement of and impact
1 Cengiz Gunes and Robert Lowe, “The Impact of the Syrian War on Kurdish Politics Across the Middle East,” n.d., 20. 2 “Children Among 10 Kurdish Civilians Killed in Shelling from Turkish-Controlled Area in Syria,” Voice of America, December 03, 2019. 3 Galang, “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” 1. 4 Loqman Radpey, “Kurdish Regional Self-Rule Administration in Syria: A New Model of Statehood and Its Status in International Law Compared to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 17 (September 9, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109916000190. 5 “Analysis: Syrian Kurds Sense Freedom, Power Struggle Awaits,” Reuters, August 31, 2012. 6 “Syrian Kurdistan,” The Kurdish Project (blog), accessed May 15, 2021, https://thekurdishproject.org/kurdistan-map/syrian-kurdistan/. 7 Jiyar Gol, “‘The World Has Closed Its Eyes on Us,’” BBC News, October 27, 2019, sec. Middle East, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50181855.
5 on the Kurdish region, which throughout this thesis will also be referred to by its Kurdish name, Rojava.8
Aims and Research Questions
The aim of this thesis is to examine how mass violence in Syria’s Kurdish regions was presented through the lens of the Kurdish media outlets Rudaw and Firat News Agency (ANF) between 2014 and 2019. Principally, these news media focused on military attacks launched by various actors involved in Syria’s crisis; thus, the study analyzes the frames created by both media outlets to represent the violent actions of ISIS and Turkey, through its Syrian militia proxies. Following the Syrian uprising in March 2011, the Syrian regime withdrew its troops from the Kurdish regions, mobilizing its entire military power in the areas targeted by Syrian opposition militants. In the meantime, Syrian Kurds established their own military wing of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Rojava. ISIS, as well as Turkey and its Syrian militias, were engaged in occasional battles against Kurdish fighters after 2011 during which mass violence was committed against civilians in many areas covered by various Kurdish media organizations, including Rudaw and ANF. This study of the perceptions and representation of mass violence committed by the concerned actors against Syrian Kurds in Rojava through the lens of these media outlets tests the hypothesis that both portrayed violent events against Kurds from an ideological perspective. The study questions specifically address the following points: • How did Kurdish media outlets depict mass violence against Syrian Kurds between 2014 and 2019? • How was ideology reflected in the depictions of mass violence created by Kurdish media outlets in Rojava? • How did Kurdish media render the role of various actors respecting mass violence in Rojava?
8 Afp, “We Are Killed in Cold Blood by Turkish Proxies: Syrian Kurds,” The Hindu, December 6, 2019, sec. International, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/we-are-killed-in-cold- blood-by-turkish-proxies-syrian-kurds/article30218873.ece.
6 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided into three sections. The first section aims to give a general historical background to the study case. The section provides a study of previous research on media reporting of mass violence. It also presents a discussion of theory, in particular framing theory in relation to representations of mass violence and as a measuring tool in the current thesis. Then it discusses the methodology selected for this study, addressing the mixed-methods approach selected for data collection and analysis. The second section, which constitutes the bulk of the study, aims to give a historical context and overview of relevant events in Rojava, shedding light on the circumstances that led to the creation of its autonomy, including the development of political and military systems in Syria’s Kurdish regions, as well as a political background of both media outlets dealt with during the study. It also delves into the research undertaken, including text interpretation of the news articles selected for empirical investigation. Finally, concluding comments, remarks, and proposals for potential future study are made.
Research overview
Having undertaken an initial overview of related work, I narrowed my search to an examination of some specific prior work on media reporting of violence. In the database, the search term selected for the study scope was “media reporting violence.” The results showed three major interrelated areas: media reporting on war, conflict, and violence. Other relevant titles with different wordings were also found. As a field of research and part of a broader domain of war or conflict coverage, media reporting of violence has been broadly addressed by scholarly debate over the past few decades. There is ample literature about how the media report wars, political campaigns, widespread demonstrations, and social movements in Western democracies, as well as certain violent struggles in non-democratic states and democratizing nations. Below, I briefly highlight some key debates in this review. Media, as a term, entails two major components: the traditional mass media, such as TV, radio, and newspapers, and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and online blogs. The two components have become intertwined as means of producing news and
7 digital communication.9 Hence this field of research, as a subject of scholarly investigation, is categorized as follows for the purpose of this review.
Peace and War Media
Scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the role of media in generating war or promoting peace. Since the Cold War, as Collins G. Adeyanju observed, and even more recently, the strong intrusion of media has become a vital tool in warfare, changing the world through its scope and effect.10 Its position can be constructive and deconstructive. In violent conflict conditions, such as the Rwandan genocide,11 military violence in Nigeria and Kenya, and the Balkan wars, the media’s positions, roles, and ethical obligations were highly debated. The mass media played a venomous role in such cases and thus it is not only a powerful propaganda machine to support the defense of the government, but it can also turn the narrow interest of the political power into the interest of the people.12 In the same vein, Andrew Puddephatt stressed the two major roles of media in reporting conflicts, pointing out that they can be positive or negative. Mass media, he argued, either plays an active role and becomes part of the conflict, thus exacerbating it; or it plays a role of neutrality and is a peace-oriented instrument for future conflict settlement.13 Likewise, the role of the media is determined by many complex factors, including its interaction with the different players embroiled in the conflict and its freedom from the ruling forces of society.14
9 “How Media Can Be an Instrument of Peace in Conflict-Prone Settings,” accessed October 9, 2020, https://r.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=AwrP4o4hYoBfgAEA3C_UEYpQ;_ylu=Y29sbwNpcjIEcG9z AzEEdnRpZAMEc2VjA3Ny/RV=2/RE=1602278050/RO=10/RU=https%3a%2f%2fwww.undp .org%2fcontent%2fdam%2fnorway%2fundp- ogc%2fdocuments%2fUNDPOGC_Media_conflict%2520roundtable%2520background%2520p aper.pdf/RK=2/RS=o2a9CrkguFxVQ15Ks9TIQL6AYfk-. 10 Collins G Adeyanju, “The Mass Media and Violent Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa” 4, no. 3 (2018): 73. 11 In 1994, the ethnic Hutu racists killed nearly 800,000 people from the minority Tutsi community in Rwanda. 12 Adeyanju, “The Mass Media and Violent Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 73. 13 Andrew Puddephatt, “Voices of War: Conflict and the Role of the Media,” 4, accessed August 4, 2020, https://www.mediasupport.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ims-voices-of-war- 2006.pdf. 14 Ibid., 4.
8 Gadi Wolfsfeld questioned whether new technologies had altered the role of the media in wars and conflicts. He found proof that the modern era has bolstered the capacity of weaker competitors to compete against stronger adversaries. In his opinion, the rise of the digital age is a boon for the promotion of hate and bigotry, and an almost complete consensus on this matter has been reached between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders.15
Media Manipulation and Impact on Public
The book Language Wars offered a good interpretation of how language generates violence. Linking any violent act to any doctrine or political agenda shows how so- called language wars are formulated and motivated.16 For instance, the reporting of deaths in a school in the Russian city of Beslan, where over 330 people, including children, were killed by Chechen militants in 2004, needs to be set against the estimated 100,000 non-combatants killed by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2004. The Beslan massacre and the narrative and dramatic events around it reached global media audiences who were, however, denied access to information about the Iraqi deaths.17 Thus, media can have a crucial contribution in shaping the language wars as they are a conduit of discourse, directions, and force of impact.18 “Language wars,” then, is the best term to describe the use of good against evil, West against East, Christianity against Islam, etc.19 Language Wars illustrates how language plays a crucial role in leading the media reports of conflict, involving actors including the audience, producers, distributors, and
20 regulators, that may contribute to shaping the meanings of concepts and contexts. It directly connects culture to global terror, warfare, and political violence. Culture can
15 Gadi Wolfsfeld, “The Role of the Media in Violent Conflicts in the Digital Age: Israeli and Palestinian Leaders’ Perceptions,” Media, War & Conflict 11, no. 1 (March 2018): 107, https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635217727312. 16 Jeff Lewis, Language Wars: The Role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Pluto Press, 2005), 3, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uu/detail.action?docID=3386523. 17 Ibid., 5. 18 Ibid., 5. 19 Ibid., 5. 20 Ibid., 6.
9 always override context and thus connects the subject to social knowledge, modes,
21 politics, and history. Interestingly, biased language seems to change attitudes in the long run. Although journalists try their best, their wording frequently supports one party over the other in political conflicts. An analysis of the reporting of U.S. 2008 Republican Vice- Presidential candidate Sarah Palin showed how biased language can shift relationships. The results showed that unbalanced reporting does not emerge from the likely secure personal ideologies of journalists.22 The author of the analysis claimed his model of framing biases was the first step towards a hypothesis that had been empirically verified and showed the major differences that exist in the study of media framing, bias, and political influence.23 Kais Amir Kadhim showed that ideology plays a crucial role in manipulating the language of the media to frame the characters involved in the discourse in particular ways. With political conflicts, media becomes one tool to gain local and international support by reporting events from a particular point of view to make one party into the villain and the other into the victim. If we take the Syrian case, for instance, the pro- government news agency Cham Press used various linguistic techniques to represent the Syrian uprising as illegitimate, direct the audience’s attention to certain events rather than others, and show the rebels as terrorists, thus gaining the public’s support against them. The Cham Press used terms and arguments earlier used by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his speeches and interviews to support the government’s actions. Hence, it served government ideology, leaving no room for other opinions. The actions of the Cham Press illustrated Kadhim’s assertion that politics plays a key role in shaping the cultural vocabulary to frame the aspects engaged in the discourse. Ideology is used to benefit the government by leaving brief space for other viewpoints.24
21 Ibid., 9. 22 Robert M. Entman, “Media Framing Biases and Political Power: Explaining Slant in News of Campaign 2008,” Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism 11, no. 4 (August 2010): 389, https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884910367587. 23 Entman, 404. 24 Kais Amir Kadhim, “The Representation of the Syrian Conflict in the Syrian Online News: A Critical Discourse Analysis,” ed. S.L. Chong, SHS Web of Conferences 53 (2018): 9, https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20185302003.
10 In the same vein, the West and Russia have been divided over the Syrian conflict. Their media outlets, too, have seemed to back their governments’ major policies towards the Syrian adversaries. An analysis of three major Russian newspapers vis-à- vis those of three Western counterparts, with an emphasis on the regime violence and the nature of the opposition factions, showed that the Syrian conflict appears different to the Russian audience, for instance, the language used in the Russian media frames
Al-Assad’s forces as legitimate.25 One major aspect of the media reporting of conflict is propaganda. In the Rwandan case, the media was used to mobilize Hutus against Tutsis in an organized campaign by Hutu-Power extremists – officials from the Hutu tribe who had power in the country. Propaganda played an active, supporting role in promoting the atrocities, wrote Peter Bergen, who also stated that a free press is a sine qua non to hold those in power accountable, but that responsibility comes with freedom.26 In future conflicts, he suggested, alternative sources of information should be provided, and hate speech should be blocked.27 Indeed, he stated that the Rwandan genocide showed that lives can be spared if media sources inciting violence are neutralized. In 1994, Roméo Dallaire, former head of the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda, ordered the jamming of radio waves, which could have potentially minimized the number of casualties.28 Likewise, the U.S. media’s coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a live example of propaganda, particularly when the American mainstream media do not examine the implications of U.S. support for Israel in their analysis of the conflict and thus all conferences of the last decade and a half have failed to reach a solution.29 The U.S. Department of Defense, for instance, has deliberately embedded journalists in war zones in consultation with media organizations, thus being able to control them and win the hearts of the public.30 Thus, all these factors – the government, the elite, the news
25 James D J Brown, “‘Better One Tiger than Ten Thousand Rabid Rats’: Russian Media Coverage of the Syrian Conflict,” International Politics 51, no. 1 (January 2014): 45, https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.45. 26 Matthew Lower and Thomas Hauschildt, “The Media as a Tool of War:,” 2014, 5–6. 27 Ibid., 5–6. 28 Ibid., 5–6. 29 Marda Dunsky, Pens and Swords, How the American Mainstream Media Report the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 369, http://www.degruyter.com/viewbooktoc/product/465335. 30 Howard Tumber and Jerry Palmer, Media at War: The Iraq Crisis (London, UNITED KINGDOM: SAGE Publications, 2004), 2, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uu/detail.action?docID=254826.
11 media, and public opinion – seem to be inextricably linked and contribute to outcomes.31 Media’s connection to political powers is another area into which the literature has delved extensively. In a study about reporting on electoral violence, the authors Leila Demarest and Arnim Langer argued that, although Nigeria has a dynamic news environment, there is only partial news freedom, largely because of political impact on media reporting. Still, the degree to which these considerations affect the standard of news in Nigeria remains inadequately considered. The authors researched three articles with varying political affiliations on violence in the run-up to the 2015 elections and showed that news biases were small. However, since political influences were significant, they appeared in editorial versions of reporting.32 As politicians owned newspapers, partisan differences in covering election violence were more pronounced.33 Hence, when the freedom of the press is described as partly open by the Freedom House Index in many African countries, including Nigeria, it rarely means that local newspapers are excessively biased, and educated analysis of political conflict as reported in African news media may open up useful new areas of research. Yet, it remains the case that it is necessary to be aware of the potential preferences of the analyzed news source and the editorial policies taken by the newspaper should always be examined.34 Similarly, nationalism is deeply rooted in political and ethnic groups; thus, nationalist biases affect the narratives of journalists in reporting particular events, particularly about national collective identities and national “others.”35 One important media tool used to shape specific narratives for certain groups, creating a national identity for them, is addressing ethnic minorities by TV broadcast. Media is not the
31 Francesco Olmastroni, Framing War: Public Opinion and Decision-Making in Comparative Perspective, Routledge Studies in Global Information, Politics and Society 6 (New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2014). 32 Leila Demarest and Arnim Langer, “Reporting on Electoral Violence in Nigerian News Media: ‘Saying It as It Is’?,” African Studies Review 62, no. 4 (December 2019): 83, https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2018.150. 33 Demarest and Langer, 105. 34 Ibid., 105-106. 35 Nicolas Demertzis, Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, and Antonis Armenakis, “Media and Nationalism: The Macedonian Question,” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 4, no. 3 (June 1999): 26, https://doi.org/10.1177/1081180X99004003004.
12 causal effect behind the current nationalistic orientations, but it is deemed to be one of the requirements to facilitate its creation and distribution.36 The key topic of inquiry in the present case study addresses the hypothesis that when the victim country and media host country share the same religious or ideological interests, the media frames (narratives of terror) become less negative. In contrast, “when the media host country shares the religious affiliation of the attacker group, a less negative news frame for the attack appears. However, the results of the previous study show that proximity of ideology between the media host country and victim country was not revealed in the expected explanatory power of the media frames.”37 Yang and Chen used representative media and cases to analyze the extent to which international media frames are altered by factors such as politics, religion, and international relations.38 One factor, perhaps the most influential, by which media frames are distorted is ideological proximity. As Yang and Chen pointed out,
The analysis in this vein examines the representations terrorism and counter-terrorism are often examined in the media through the lens of specific ideologies, such as ‘orientalism’ or ‘cold war’, between the Western and Eastern world (…) For example, the US-backed Western news media portrayed the 9/11 events as ‘terrorist’ attacks against democracy and described the following ‘war on terror’ as ‘rational’ vs. ‘irrational’ and ‘modernity’ vs. ‘anti-modernity’. In contrast, they were reluctant to define an attack that occurred in a ‘rival’ country as terrorism. Hence, some Eastern scholars argue that the Western media’s coverage of terrorist attacks in non-democratic countries is ‘hypocritical’ and ‘irresponsible’.39 Yang and Chen’s analysis took a multiple proximity approach through which the authors examined political, religious, and bilateral relations as well as ideological proximity. It aimed to combine these associated predictors with various variables to assess media frames and offer a much wider view of international news coverage.40 In summary, the literature shows conflicting results as regards the effect of ideology on framing of mass violence in the media. Although many studies found it to be the most dynamic variable in media frames, Yang and Chen did not. Therefore, despite substantial scholarly debate on ideological dominance in media frames, further research
36 Ibid., 28. 37 Liu Yang and Huailin Chen, “Framing Terrorist Attacks: A Multi-Proximity Model,” International Communication Gazette 81, no. 5 (August 2019): 395, https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048518802245. 38 Ibid., 396. 39 Ibid., 397–98. 40 Ibid., 401.
13 supported with empirical cases is necessary to investigate the extent to which ideology plays a role, among other variables, in media frames concerning the reporting of mass violence. This thesis explores this empirical question with the help of Kurdish news outlets to answer the research questions and add to current knowledge. The thesis discusses Kurdish media frames and variables in light of Entman’s definition of framing theory: “selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and highlighting them in a communicating text in order to promote a certain problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment suggestion.”41 Consequently, the current study tests the hypothesis that there is a constant shifting between Kurdish national aspirations and ideological narratives, allowing us to quantify the significance of ideology, determine its magnitude, and connect it to the study topic of how Kurdish media represented mass violence in Rojava.
Theory and method
Framing theory
The best theory to operationalize the hypothesis presented in the study seems to be framing theory, given the study’s research area and selection of media text analysis. Framing theory, as a measuring tool, enabled me to outline the scientific relevance of the theme, analyzing data on violence in the primary sources and answering the primary research question of how the Kurdish media portray mass violence in Rojava. The theory of framing in the media used in this study familiarizes the reader with the notion of frames and concepts. “The major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations. Framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue.”42 Erving Goffman was among the first to present the concept of framing in his popular book Frame Analysis: An essay of the organization of experience, published in 1974. He aimed to develop some essential frameworks of comprehension in society in order
41 Ibid., 396. 42 Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “Framing Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 10, no. 1 (2007): 103–26, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054.
14 to make meanings out of events, analyzing certain vulnerabilities to which these frames belong and aiming to delineate how people organize their understandings of society.43 Framing, as Claes H. de Vreese put it, is a concept by which we focus on the communicative processes. Communication is a dynamic process that entails both frame building and frame-setting. The term “frame-building” refers to the process through which a frame develops, whereas “frame-setting” refers to the interplay between what the media present and what the audience sees.44 The major locations in framing theory are the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. Framing ends with a conclusion at both individual and societal levels.45 Frame-building (see Figure 1) denotes the factors that affect the structural qualities of the news frames: the internal and external factors that lead journalists and media organizations to frame issues or events. It takes place in a constant interaction between journalists, elites, and social powers and results in the appearance of the frames built in the text.46 Framing-setting (see Figure 1) refers to the interplay between media frames and previous knowledge of people. Thus, frames may influence the perception of individuals and their evaluation of events. Framing-setting has been extensively discussed by researchers whose goal is to determine to what extent and under what conditions the audience mirrors the events prepared for them, that is, news.47
Figure 1. An integrated process model of framing.
Source: de Vreese, 2005, 52.
43 Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, Northeastern University Press ed (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986), 10. 44 Claes H de Vreese, “News Framing: Theory and Typology,” n.d., 51. 45 Ibid., 51–52. 46 Ibid., 52. 47 Ibid., 52.
15 As regards the conclusions developed after the interaction of media and audience, Vreese wrote that:
The consequences of framing can be conceived at the individual and the societal level. An individual-level consequence may be altered attitudes about an issue based on exposure to certain frames. On the societal level, frames may contribute to shaping social level processes such as political socialization, decision-making, and collective actions.48 The current study adopts Robert Entman’s method of theorized framing, which “essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”49 Thus, “framing defines problems, diagnoses causes, makes moral judgments, and suggests remedies in some areas. Interestingly, a single sentence may perform more than these four framing functions, while many sentences may perform none of them. A frame may not include all the four functions in certain paragraphs or texts.”50 Entman pointed out that frames have at least four locations in the communication process. First, the communicator makes conscious and unconscious framing judgments, guided by schemata. Second, the text contains frames, including certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, and sentences that present themes of particular facts or judgments. Third, the receiver’s perception or conclusion is guided by frames that may not reflect those shown in the text or the framing intention of the communicator. Finally, culture is the stock of factually obvious common frames demonstrated in the discourse of most people or social groupings in society.51 Thus, framing has similar functions in all the mentioned locations selected and uses “the highlighted elements to construct an argument about problems, as well as their causation, evaluation, and/or solution.”52 Accordingly, it is interesting to see how ideology works in the Kurdish news media considered in this study and whether it is the most influential variable determining the frames of mass violence in Rojava, as suggested by many previous studies and as revealed in the
48 Ibid., 52. 49 Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (December 1, 1993): 52, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460- 2466.1993.tb01304.x. 50 Ibid., 52. 51 Ibid., 52. 52 Ibid., 53.
16 analysis section. As previous research has shown, there is no consensus on this topic, and further empirical studies, possibly illustrated by particular cases, are needed to offer a broader understanding of it. Yet, if the media’s framing of mass violence in Rojava was motivated by nationalist or partisan agendas, the public would probably perceive the events develop in the region differently, and thus for Kurdish political parties in Rojava to appear to control media orientations, which might be another subject of investigation.
Method
Having decided upon the topic, research question, and theory, it was crucial to decide which method to apply to the current research, based on a study of the approaches described in the literature on methodology. The methods chosen are explained below. As concerns type of data needed for this study, I collected tens of news reports and articles from the digital databases of two renowned Kurdish news outlets. To explore how Kurdish media outlets, specifically Rudaw and ANF, portrayed mass violence in Rojava, stories were chosen according to the timespan in which crucial and bloody events occurred, namely 2014–2019. Because of technical constraints, and although I am acquainted with the Arabic and Kurdish languages, the English-language versions of the data were chosen for the following reasons. First, the content and message were almost identical in all versions, with slight variations at the semantic level. Second, the English versions’ messages were considered more sophisticated and coherent, as their audience was ethnically mixed and drawn from a diverse range of countries, organizations, and people, including the Kurdish diaspora and some Rojava locals. The data selected were saved as a URL in Zotero software for reference management and as Pdfs in Maxqda software for analysis purposes. As concerns Rudaw, 221 relatively brief articles were collected based on the critical moments in 2014, 2015, 2018, and 2019 when ISIS and other Turkish-backed Syrian militias attacked the Kobane, Afrin, and Sere Kaniye areas in Rojava. As concerns ANF, 175 articles and news reports were analyzed, covering the events in 2014, 2015, 2018, and 2019, during which mass violence was perpetrated by ISIS and Turkey through its Syrian militia proxies. A mixed-methods approach was taken in this study, whereby both qualitative (thematic) and quantitative (statistical) analysis was conducted. The qualitative content
17 analysis defines certain words or expressions as themes, thereby enabling the systematic analysis of different texts by discussing not only manifest content but also key ideas as primary content.53 I chose a mixed-methods approach because statistics might not have provided an adequate result where the quantitative approach has some limitations. I believe the two methods combined can best explain my topic since the quantitative method is a supportive mechanism for achieving the objectives of this study. In addition, the data collected were thoroughly examined and interpreted under the research questions and irrelevant data were removed.
Content Analysis
Having explained my selection of type of data and collection criteria, it is necessary to explain how the data was analyzed in order to answer my research questions. First, I selected data and media outlets after an initial analysis of the information, the originality of the data, and the perspective, context, audience, and motives it included or suggested. Second, I selected these data and outlets because of their usefulness, relevance, and reliability.54 Ultimately, I determined that an analysis of the chosen news reports would provide me with insights into how mass violence was seen through the lens of Kurdish media, thus addressing the study topic. Text analysis was chosen as the best method to make new findings in relation to Kurdish political and social life which would help answer my research questions. The communicators seemed to transmit messages to identify and enhance, albeit from an ideologically-led perspective, the concept of Kurdishness – what might also be called nationalist leanings – in Kurdish society. Originally, content analysis, as a term, referred only to those methods that focus on quantifiable aspects of text content. Later, the concept was significantly expanded to cover any techniques that work with syntactic or pragmatic categories and attempt to quantify them by a frequency survey of classifications.55 With the advent of qualitative content analysis, it became much more difficult to separate this approach from other forms of text analysis, most notably grounded theory
53 Drisko and Maschi, “Qualitative Content Analysis,” 2. 54 “Source Criticism,” History Skills, accessed November 17, 2019, http://www.historyskills.com/source-criticism/. 55 Titscher et al., Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis, 55.
18 and ethnographic methodologies. Hence, content analysis is strongly intertwined with other methodologies in some way.56 The most important objective that must be considered to understand the methods of content analysis is to derive pieces from some quotations: In content analysis, we examine some statements and signs in raw materials, summarizing them in a bid to show a) how the content impacts upon the audience, and b) the impact of control upon the content. Based on the above explanations, the content analysis approach seemed to be appropriate for my case study. However, it was exceedingly difficult to compile reports that fully interpreted the mass violence in Rojava as many actors were involved at various levels and across a range of time periods. This thesis addresses this topic by focusing on three major areas in Rojava within a specified time period. Thus, content analysis was a good technique to use, within a mixed-methods text analysis approach, as it made it easier to follow the communicative units that had to be carefully identified in these articles.
Units and Categories
The next step in data analysis is to define the units and categories. In this study, inductive and deductive coding techniques were applied to define the categories. The inductive schemata of categories is based on a previous text interpretation while the deductive one is derived from established theories.57 I used a mix of techniques because preliminary existing codes are relatively limited. Therefore, the deductive coding technique could help generate more categories.58 First, examples of the primary units of analysis to be coded, along with their descriptions, were actors, YPG, Peshmerga, ISIS, Syrian regime, Turkey, US, Russia, Islamists, mercenaries, and gangs. Second, the set of categories needed primarily (aim characteristics chosen inductively) were words or phrases such as ideological agendas, nationalist leanings (prioritizing being Kurdish or enhancing Kurdishness), partisan agendas (favoring the agendas of a particular political party or figure), demonizing (opponents), mass violence, propaganda, etc.
56 Titscher et al., 55. 57 Titscher et al., 59. 58 James W. Drisko and Tina Maschi, Content Analysis, Pocket Guides to Social Work Research Methods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 43.
19 After defining these units of analysis and categories, it was crucial to code and allocate every unit of analysis to one or more categories according to certain rules that applied to the research questions59 as a schema of categories should be stated precisely.60 Thereafter, the coding of the texts began with the help of the computer software Maxqda, a code-and-retrieve program.61 The simplest method of analysis or evaluation was to count the numbers of occurrences per category which “concentrated on assessment on the basis of frequency analyses.” This quantitative orientation was criticized because it “neglected the particular quality of texts - their meaning content.” Thus, “particular attention had to be paid to the reconstruction of contexts.”62
Empirical analysis
Historical overview
Kurds are the world’s largest non-state population, numbering about thirty million people. They live in Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey as well as an international diaspora. Over the last century, Kurdish communities throughout the region have fought for equal citizenship rights and the expression of their national culture and identity. Some have also called for the creation of an independent Kurdish state or, at the very least, autonomous Kurdish regions within existing states.63 The Syrian crisis provided an incentive for Syria’s Kurds to claim their rights. The withdrawal of the Syrian army from Kurdish-populated areas in the country’s north in July 2012 played a major role in empowering a Kurdish nationalist project. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the YPG, have both played a key role in this project.64 There have been Syrian Kurdish parties, mostly from the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS), which was established in 1957. However, they were tiny and
59 Titscher et al., Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis, 58. 60 Ibid., 60. 61 Ibid., 58. 62 Ibid., 62. 63 Vittoria Federici, “The Rise of Rojava: Kurdish Autonomy in the Syrian Conflict,” The SAIS Review of International Affairs; Baltimore 35, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2015): 82, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1764138153/abstract/D6379E824F284A3BPQ/1. 64 Ibid., 82.
20 dispersed, partially because of political persecution by the government. Indeed, their very existence was illegal under Syrian regime headed by both Bashar and Hafez al- Assad since 1970s.65 Kurdish politics in Syria cannot be interpreted without considering the enormous influence of the two major political actors, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (See Figure 2). On the one hand, the KRG, a de facto autonomous region in Iraq’s north, was formed and approved by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani emerged to campaign for Kurdish interests in Iraq. The PKK, founded by Abdullah Ocalan in the late 1970s, originated as an armed faction in 1984 after Turkey’s brutal repression of the Kurdish population. It emerged from a guerrilla war against Turkish army forces in the country’s southeast, which escalated in the 1990s, leading to the death of nearly 30,000 people, mass displacement, and political polarization. The PKK, which works from northern Iraq, was funded by the Syrian regime until 1998 and has an Iranian affiliate military group (the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK)) (See Figure 2).66
Figure 2: Political parties in the Kurdish regions
Sources: The Kurdish Project and Council on Foreign Relations
65 Ibid., 83. 66 “Syria: the Kurdish view,” Bechev, June 24, 2013.
21
Given the void left by Assad’s grip on Kurdish-populated regions in July 2012, these two Kurdish powers jockeyed for dominance in Syria. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) – linked to Ocalan’s PKK – took control of major areas in Rojava with the help of its armed wing, the YPG.67 On 19 July 2012, the YPG took control of government buildings in Kobane, Afrin, and Jazeera cantons68 (see Figure 3), where Assad’s forces left without offering any resistance.69 Despite its dominance, the KDP is challenged by the so-called Kurdish National Council (KNC), an umbrella coalition of 16 Syrian Kurdish political parties whose most influential members are closely affiliated with Barzani’s KDP. Whereas the KNC is sponsored by Barzani, “the PYD is seen as supported by his KRG’s opponent, Talabani’s PUK, reflecting an extension into Syria of their domestic KRG rivalry.”70 Major political schisms within the Syrian Kurdish community and their respective regional and political patrons, may, however, jeopardize their prospects for autonomy. Rivalries between Syria’s main Kurdish groups are fierce, preventing the creation of a joint vision for the future. These divisions represent intra-Kurdish rivalries throughout the region. As a result, the agendas of these groups perpetuate the divided political allegiances of Syria’s Kurdish parties.71 Despite the Kurdish divisions, the dynamics of the Syrian crisis provided an additional incentive for Syria’s Kurds to claim their rights and gain de facto autonomy in Rojava in late 2013. Before the Syrian revolt erupted in March 2011, the possibility of Kurdish autonomy in Syria was unlikely. By late 2013, territorial self-governance by Syrian Kurds had become a viable option.72 Because of the YPG’s battle against ISIS, especially during the liberation of the Kurdish town of Kobane in 2015, this nationalist project gained more visibility and support. Yet, a variety of major problems threatened Rojava’s survival, including highly fractured local politics, strained relations with the Sunni Arab opposition, and direct hostilities with neighboring Turkey, which considers the YPG to be the Syrian branch of the outlawed PKK, operating in Turkey. If Syria’s Kurds are to capitalize on
67 Ibid. 68 In Kurdish: Efrîn, Kobanê, and Cizîrê Cantons. 69 Radpey, “Kurdish Regional Self-Rule Administration in Syria.” 70 “Syria: the Kurdish view,” Bechev, June 24, 2013. 71 “Obstacles to Kurdish Autonomy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November, 07, 2013. 72 “The Rise of Rojava,” 83.
22 advances and stabilize the areas they rule, they must take serious measures to unite their ranks and cultivate stronger ties with their non-Kurdish neighbors. Failure to do so risks escalating ethnic tensions and violence both inside and outside Syria’s borders.73 Concurrently, the YPG’s expansion in northern Syria infuriated Ankara. However, the Afrin offensive, led by Turkey and its Syrian militia proxies, came after the US announced it would train an army to patrol Syria’s borders, with the YPG as a primary force, which Turkey described as a “national security concern.” As a result, on 20 January 2018, Turkey conducted airstrikes on tens of Afrin positions as part of the strategic campaign known as Operation Olive Branch. The attack, however, took place after Ankara had gained Russia’s permission, with that country sending its head of intelligence and army chief of staff to Moscow.74 Similarly, the Operation Olive Branch ignited a fiery debate within Syria’s opposition, which had long relied on Turkish support. “Some saw it as a diversion from the Syrian regime’s battle against Idlib, the last province under rebel control, with Syrian rebel factions taking part in the offensive labeled as ‘mercenaries’ working for Turkey. Others saw the offensive as a necessary counter-offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed Arab-Kurdish alliance founded in 2015 and led by the YPG, which they accused of attempting to carve out a statelet in northern Syria by displacing local Arabs and of supposedly collaborating with the Assad regime.”75 On October 9, 2019, Turkey started its operation in Sere Kaniye to remove Kurdish forces from the border area and create a “safe zone” to resettle the Syrian refugees camped on Turkish soil. Ankara had been in talks with the US for months prior to the operation to establish a jointly-controlled “safe zone,” and it blamed Washington for delaying the effort, which it claimed was “crucial” for Turkey’s survival.76 In a surprising move days before the Olive Branch offensive, the US withdrew its troops from the Kurdish-controlled territory that would be threatened by the attack, greenlighting Turkey to carry out the offensive. The operation attracted harsh international disapproval from Turkey’s NATO allies because the Kurdish-led SDF had been a staunch ally of the US-led coalition fighting ISIS and had played a crucial role
73 Ibid., 83. 74 “Turkey Starts Ground Incursion into Kurdish-Controlled Afrin in Syria,” the Guardian, January 21, 2018. 75 Ibid. 76 “Turkey’s Syria Operation,” al-Jazeera, November 8, 2019.
23 in crushing the group in Syria.77 This was Turkey’s third operation in Syria, and it was motivated by both security concerns and nationalist sentiment. Still, it was the U.S. that ignited the offensive when President Donald Trump declared the departure of U.S. troops stationed in northeastern Syria, potentially enabling Turkey’s proposed incursion with the help of Turkish-backed Syrian Arab militias.78
Figure 3. De facto cantons of Rojava
Source: the Kurdish Project, 2014.
Kurdish media
Prior to the 2011 uprising, Kurdish journalism was virtually nonexistent in Syria. Kurdish publications were restricted to political leaflets and newspapers. As the use of the internet in Syria became more widespread in the mid-2000s, news blogs describing themselves as Kurdish emerged. These websites were frequently just forums recycling news from other outlets rather than competent media organizations.79 The Syrian uprising which began in 2011 significantly altered Syria’s media environment. Media activists generated news and videos on a wide scale and distributed them via social media outlets such as YouTube and Facebook. Since 2012, the same media critics and journalists have founded new media institutions such as radio broadcasts, magazines, journals, and local news services. The rise of the Kurdish media must be regarded within the framework of Syrian journalism as a development of its own past and collection of circumstances. The “independent” Kurdish media established a resilient reporting identity as a product of a diverse collection of
77 Ibid. 78 “Turkey’s Invasion of Syria Explained,” POLITICO, October 15, 2019. 79 Yazan Badran, “‘Independent’ Kurdish Media in Syria: Conflicting Identities in the Transition,” n.d., 436.
24 conditions, enabling them to respond to an especially complex and ambiguous context. They believed that the professional identity of independent media in Rojava was founded on three main elements: the decision to differentiate themselves from partisan media, the use of several languages other than Kurdish, and the promotion of a multi- sectarian view of society. The policy was intended to allow for the expression of Kurdish national identity while also ensuring the longevity of these media outlets in an uncertain future. Similarly, the Kurdish parties grabbed the opportunity to activate their own platforms as well as updated new media outlets.80 Independent Kurdish media sources seemed to support the Syrian identity rather than a pan-Kurdish one. They broadcast or wrote in Arabic rather than in Kurdish and in other languages. The PYD-led administration exerted pressure on independent (or antagonistic to party) media. Some local journalists backed the PYD because they claimed that not doing so would be controversial in a conflict-torn climate where PYD protects their areas. Others were detained, and many more were assaulted and harassed by unidentified gunmen. Lack of funding, and the continuing fight for financial stability, limited the coverage’s coherence, scope, and depth. Rojava’s independent media played a part in covering developments in Rojava, although on a very local scale. They had ties to PYD authorities on a state level. Some media outlets, such as Buyer, relied entirely on local advertising sales to survive.81 Notwithstanding, Kurdish party media, particularly between 2012 and 2019, appeared to have the upper hand over the “independent” media.82
ANF: political background
ANF83 is the Firat News Agency, as it defines itself on its official website. It broadcasts news from the Middle East, mainly focusing on Kurdish matters, and publishes news in Kurdish (Kurmanji and Sorani dialects), Arabic, English, Persian, Spanish, and Russian. Its headquarters is in the Netherlands, and it is directed by Celil Demiralp.84 Several media sources, including Turkish- and Kurdish-affiliated outlets and blogs,
80 Ibid., 435–37. 81 “Journalism in Rojava (II): Independent Media between Freedom and Control,” openDemocracy, accessed March 27, 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa- west-asia/journalism-rojava-ii-independent-media-between-freedom-and-control/. 82 Badran, “‘Independent’ Kurdish Media in Syria: Conflicting Identities in the Transition,” 342. 83 the acronym stands for the Kurdish name: Ajansa Nûçeyan a Firatê. 84 “ANF | Contact,” accessed May 22, 2021, https://anfenglish.com/contact.
25 reported the arrest of Demiralp by Belgian authorities in 2016 on the grounds of an INTERPOL notice issued by Turkey.85 The reason for his arrest was, apparently, that ANF had released the names of those found responsible for the killings of some PKK militants. Turkish authorities viewed the release of the names as “interference” in their own investigation into the suspects.86 The director, who was released on bail, is thought to have changed his name from Celil Demiralp to Maxime Azadi after acquiring French citizenship.87 The European Federation of Journalists issued a statement in which it complained about the arrest, describing it as a “dangerous precedent”, and urged European countries, including Belgium, to not be involved in the Turkish-led crackdown against its opponents, particularly journalists.88 ANF has 43,116 Facebook followers at the time of writing,89 whereas on Twitter the number varies because its accounts have been locked several times, particularly the English-language ones, in violation of Twitter rules.90 The outlet accuses Turkey of cyberattacking its main website and Twitter accounts sporadically since its foundation in 2005.91 ANF content obviously supports the PKK group. Also, some giant media outlets, such as the BBC and CNN, have repeatedly described the ANF as a pro-PKK or PKK-affiliated media organization.92
Rudaw: political background
85 “Statement on the Arrest of ANF News Director in Belgium,” Firat News Agency, December 21, 2016. 86 European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, “Turkey Gets Head of Kurdish News Agency Arrested in Belgium,” European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, accessed March 28, 2021, https://www.ecpmf.eu/news/threats/turkey-gets-head-of-kurdish-news-agency-arrested-in- belgium. 87 “Belgium Releases PKK-Affiliated ANF’s Director on Bail,” Daily Sabah, December 24, 2016. 88 “La Belgique arrête un journaliste kurde sur requête de la Turquie,” Fédération européenne des journalistes, December 20, 2016. 89 “(10) ANF English | Facebook,” accessed March 28, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/ANF- English-231900660225424. 90 ANF English New, “Back Here after Having Our Main Account Suspended by Twitter. Please Share Widely! #TwitterKurds Https://T.Co/OamVgrqTHJ,” Tweet, @anf_english (blog), December 8, 2020, https://twitter.com/anf_english/status/1336416047646257153. 91 “ANF’s Twitter Account Issued 10th Ban from Ankara,” ANF News, accessed March 28, 2021, https://anfenglish.com/freedom-of-the-press/anf-s-twitter-account-issued-10th-ban-from-ankara- 29572. 92 By Gul Tuysuz and Ivan Watson CNN, “Kurdish Rebels to Start Withdrawing from Turkey in May,” CNN, accessed March 28, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25/world/meast/turkey- kurdish-rebel-withdrawal/index.html.
26 Rudaw, which defines itself as a media network93, is a Kurdish media organization funded by the Rudaw Company and based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Its publications are available in Kurdish (Sorani and Kurmanji), English, Arabic, and Turkish. It also has a website in Kurdish, English, Arabic, and Turkish, along with a satellite TV channel that broadcasts about Kurdistan and the Middle East. It claims that it does not pursue profit but considers access to accurate information and participation in laying the foundations of freedom of expression to be more important than achieving material benefits. It also does not see itself as bound by a defined geographical boundary in the distribution and delivery of its content, having a global vision for the business.94 In 2016, the PYD-led Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, a variant name of Rojava founded in late December 201695, banned Rudaw temporarily from covering areas in Rojava under the control of the YPG, accusing it of “partisan reporting” and alleged slander campaigns against Kurdish political parties that criticized the KDP, the ruling political party in Iraqi Kurdistan.96 Daily Sabah, a Turkish-linked media source, reported that Rudaw was also banned by the Turkish authorities, following the Kurdish Regional Government’s referendum in September 2017. The channel was accused of broadcasting violations during the referendum.97 Rudaw’s English Facebook page had 633,356 followers,98 whereas the Kurdish (Sorani) and (Kurmanci) Facebook pages exceeded 3,886,219 and 1,667,553 followers respectively, at the time of writing. While it claims neutrality, describing itself as an “independent” media outlet, Rudaw has close relations with prominent political figures, such as Nechirvan Barzani, the KDP’s deputy president and the current president of the Kurdistan Region.99 The Kurdish journalist Kamal Chomani associated the name of
93 It is described in Kurdish as: Tora Mîdyayîya Rûdaw. 94 Staff, “Syrian Kurds Ban Iraqi Kurdish Rudaw TV in Kobani.” 95 Tom Perry, “Syrian Kurds, Allies Set to Approve New Government Blueprint,” Reuters, December 28, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-constitution- idUSKBN14H0X3. 96 Ibid. 97 “3 TV Channels, Including KRG’s Rudaw, to Be Removed from TurkSat over Broadcasting Violations,” Daily Sabah, September 25, 2017. 98 “(18) Rudaw English | Facebook,” accessed March 28, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/RudawEnglish/. 99 “Nechirvan Barzani’s Association with Media Corruption | CHMK,” accessed March 28, 2021, https://chmk.org/nechirvan-barzanis-association-with-media-corruption/.
27 Rudaw with corruption by political funding when USD 30,000,000 was provided to it from oil revenues.100 Drawing on the data above, it is not unexpected to see biased language that carries nationalist and partisan orientations in the content of both media outlets. The Peshmerga or the YPG, for instance, were likely to be seen as “national heroes” from the nationalist perspective, while they might be, at best, described as the “military wings” of specific parties from a partisan perspective and objects of blame in other cases, depending on the framing created.
Analysis
In this section, I present the quantitative and qualitative findings. To answer the research questions posed, I take a chronological approach, first delineating the results statistically and then thematically monitoring major differences and similarities between the views of Rudaw and ANF as primary sources. Thus, this section sheds light on how Kurdish media portrayed mass violence against Syrian Kurds, and how the roles played by ideology and actors were represented in articles covering mass violence in Rojava.
Quantitative analysis
Images of mass violence statistically
Answering the primary research question of how Kurdish media outlets depicted mass violence against Syrian Kurds, the study has captured various aspects of mass violence in the content of both outlets studied, albeit with relative symmetries in some analyzed areas. First, the study used the inductive and deductive approach to code various images of mass violence, including displacement of civilians, accusations of genocide, oppression/persecution/ransoms/bargaining, ethnic cleansing, gender/sexual violence, etc. (See Table 1). The two outlets depicted these matters differently on some occasions but identically on others, according to the impact of governing ideology. Second, the study assessed the language and messages developed in the content of both outlets,
100 Ibid.
28 based on Entman’s understanding of framing theory, such as positive and negative tone, as well as the mobilization (propaganda) through which solutions were advanced for the Rojava problem. Third, the study evaluated the role of various actors dealing with the violent events of Rojava. I illustrate the depictions presented by Rudaw (affiliated to the KDP – the ruling party in KRI) and ANF (affiliated to the PKK – the Kurdish Marxist militant group operating in Turkey.) As shown in Table 1, the analysis detected the frequency and percentage of aspects of mass violence coded in Rudaw and ANF’s articles side by side.
Table 1. Frequencies and percentages of media documents with codes representing images of mass violence.
Source: Rudaw, ANF, 2014–2019
Findings of quantitative analysis showed various records concerning the frequency of aspects of mass violence in both media outlets, with the frequency of categories sorted in descending order. The charts below (see Figures 4 and 5), which present the coded images of mass violence in both outlets, may not show a big difference concerning the percentages. However, the tiny differences between the order and percentages do not, at any cost, affect the argument of the study i.e., the ideology-driven images of mass violence. In Rudaw, for instance, we find that highest percentage of
29 documents was coded as “civilian displacement”, which represents a valid frequency101(meaning missing values are excluded) of 55.6% of 221 analyzed documents and 18.4% of the segments coded in the documents, meaning that half the documents covered civilian displacement. The second most-highlighted image in Rudaw is civilian deaths/killings, which had the same place in the segment codes. In ANF, the highest percentage was for civilian deaths/killings, which recorded a valid frequency of 30.28% of 175 documents, and the second most-highlighted code, at 11.9%, as segments with code in the documents. Although there is a tiny difference – which is perhaps linked to the drawbacks of the quantitative analysis per se – between the first and second recorded codes in ANF, it apparently does not affect the argument of the study and makes little difference to the order between the codes, whether within one outlet or both, as many images represent the same order and percentages with minor differences. Figure 4. Percentages of mass violence-coded segments in Rudaw articles.
Source: Rudaw, 2014–2019.
101 MAXQDA, “Frequency Tables and Charts for Variables.”
30
Figure 5. Percentages of mass violence-coded segments in ANF articles.
Source: ANF, 2014–2019.
It is interesting to observe in the segments with code (see Figures 4 and 5) that civilian displacement was what Rudaw mostly highlighted and reported on, whereas it came fourth for ANF, which perhaps reflects the different ideological proximity of the organizations towards the perpetrators despite the tiny differences between the code percentages. PDK’s relations with Turkey were different from those of the PKK, which could be the reason for this difference in image order between the organizations. Likewise, the silver-colored codes (see Figures 4 and 5) come in approximately last place for both media outlets. Yet, close observation of the percentages shows that, albeit they have minor differences, the low percentages in Rudaw vis-à-vis the relatively higher ones in ANF may demonstrate a direct connection with the left- and right-leaning ideologies which dominate the content of the two organizations and their different frames for the perpetrators. As such, the high percentages of codes in ANF symbolizes the degree of harsh language with which it addresses the perpetrators and its relationship to the ideological proximity between the political patron of the outlet on the one hand (and thus the outlet per se) and the perpetrators on the other. As a result, the partisan ideology proximity determined the level of language the outlets employed in their content. Anyway, despite minor differences between the descending order of images of mass violence and their percentages, the major differences between the
31 outlets’ views lay in the descriptive language they used to depict the perpetrators of these images of mass violence, as clearly shown in the qualitative analysis section. Similarly, the moderate critique in Rudaw’s content echoed the ideological proximity, which is significantly partisan, between the political patron of Rudaw (and thus the outlet as such) and the perpetrators. Although these tiny differences in percentages may refer to the different ideological views of ANF and Rudaw, which I interpret in the qualitative comparative analysis section, they are far clearer when addressed thematically than statistically.
Percentages of media language assessments
This section presents a quantitative analysis of the data from both primary sources, shedding light on ideology’s role in the depictions of mass violence made by Kurdish media outlets in Rojava. By scrutinizing the table and charts below (see Table 2, Figures 6, 7), we may conclude that both Rudaw and ANF were constantly driven ideologically, particularly because of the high percentages and frequencies both ideologies recorded. However, they seem to have been driven by two types of orientation: nationalist and partisan. Rudaw had a high frequency of nationalist leanings, with 93.20% documents under this code of a total of 221, whereas 32.7% segments under this code suggest it was substantially driven by nationalist leanings. For the partisan agendas, it only recorded 52.91% documents under this code but 6.7% segments, meaning it was moderately controlled by partisan orientations. Hence, Rudaw was substantially driven by nationalist leanings and moderately governed by partisan agendas. Likewise, ANF seems to have been moderately controlled by both nationalist and partisan ideologies. The percentages regarding the codes of nationalist and partisan leanings show only minor differences: 46.25% documents are coded as representing nationalist leanings whereas 45.63% are coded as representing partisan agendas. Similarly, the segments under this code recorded 19.9% for nationalist orientations and 15.6% for partisan agendas, which reflects that ANF was moderately governed by both nationalist and partisan leanings. The words and expressions referring to nationalist and partisan leanings were quantified in the texts of both outlets to measure numerically the role of ideology in depicting the mass violence committed against the Kurds of Rojava. Several words and expressions, such as “Kurdish,” “Western Kurdistan,” “Kurd(s),” “Syrian Kurdistan,” “Syrian Kurds,” and “Rojava,” were deemed to be references to nationalist leanings.
32 Therefore, they were counted and given a specific percentage in the coded documents of both media outlets. The political ideological references were also counted in the documents coded in the study, such as the names of PKK and PDK politicians shown in a positive light and biased themes coded in the articles covering Rojava. Table 2. Frequencies and percentages of media language assessments.
Source: Rudaw, ANF, 2014–2019.
Figure 6. Percentages of Rudaw language and frame assessments.
Source: Rudaw, 2014–2019.
Figure 7. Percentages of ANF language and frame assessments.
Source: ANF, 2014–2019.
33 As a result, the role of ideology, as reflected in images of mass violence, varied between the outlets. Rudaw was dominated substantially by nationalist leanings but moderately by partisan agendas. ANF was moderately controlled by both nationalist and partisan leanings. Here, the term “moderately” does not mean the type of language used to describe the perpetrators but, rather, reflects the extent to which ideology was employed in the articles. The statistics also confirm these results despite the relative difference between the percentages of “documents with code” and those of “segments with code” which can be easily attributed to the difference between the number of documents coded and the number of segments coded.
Frequency of actors in articles
To observe how the two Kurdish media organizations described the role of actors involved in mass violence in Rojava, we must quantify their frequencies in the analyzed documents with code and segments with code (see Table 3, Figures 8, 9).
Table 3. Frequency of documents with actors coded in media articles.
Source: Rudaw, ANF, 2014–2019. Figure 8. Percentages of actors coded in Rudaw articles.
Source: Rudaw, 2014–2019.
34
Figure 9. Percentages of actors coded in ANF articles.
Source: ANF, 2014–2019.
To inspect the percentages and frequencies of actors above, we may conclude that ISIS and Turkey were the major actors repeatedly addressed by both outlets. Thus, the documents and segments with code seem to reflect the importance of these actors’ involvement in the mass violence in Rojava. In the documents with code, both Rudaw and ANF have the same order regarding Turkey and ISIS, respectively recording a frequency of 89.81% and 60.40% for Turkey and 61.11% and 62.42% for ISIS. In the segments with code, the order changes: While Turkey remains first in Rudaw, with a frequency of 51.5%, it drops to second for ANF with a frequency of 36.6%, after ISIS, which recorded a frequency of 44.2%. The difference here is perhaps linked to the difference between the number of documents and the number of segments coded, which does not affect the general result and argument. These results can be connected logically to the argument which states that the ideological agendas or proximity of the media outlets determined the high percentage of both actors in both outlets, albeit with tiny differences. When it comes to the other actors, namely the US, Russia, the Syrian regime, Syrian opposition, and Iran, what matters is the descriptive language and negative tone both outlets employed toward these actors in relation to Rojava. In other words, Rudaw and ANF followed a unique style of criticism of the actors involved in the mass violence. Similarly, the way they described the actors’ positions stemmed from ideological perspectives. Both insights are explained in the qualitative comparative analysis.
Qualitative comparative analysis
35 Depictions of mass violence
In this section, the study delves into key images of mass violence qualitatively, providing the reader with thematic illustrations of how both media outlets framed these images. Thus, the primary research question – how mass violence in Syria’s Kurdish region was presented through the lens of Kurdish media outlets Rudaw and ANF between 2014 and 2019 – will be the center of this analysis. The role of the ideology and actors represented in the images of mass violence is also addressed. The section considers the images used by both outlets chronologically, based on Rudaw’s descending order and starting with civilian displacement. The negative and positive tones of the language used by both media outlets are shown accordingly (see Figure 10), along with the theoretical functions observed in the messages addressing their audience; thus, similarities and differences are highlighted as we proceed, and a brief interpretation is given thereafter.
Figure 10. Language tone of both Kurdish media organizations, Rudaw and ANF.
Sources: Rudaw, ANF.
Civilian displacement In depicting civilian displacement, Rudaw, covering events in Kobane, blamed ISIS for the mass displacement of Kurds from their villages around the Kurdish town. Most
36 Kurdish civilians ended up in a refugee camp in Turkey.102 The mass exodus of Kurdish civilians was due to ISIS’ renewed attacks on populated areas with heavy weapons.103 Rudaw’s emotional language about the people of Kobane was couched in the words of a KRI Peshmerga soldier and based on nationalist leanings or the proximity between the victims and the communicator, Rudaw.
Siud, a Peshmerga soldier, said he will never forget the day the people of Kobane who had fled to Turkey received him and his fellow soldiers as their convoy crossed through Turkey on route to Kobane… When ISIS attacked Kobane last September and controlled a number of villages, the majority of the city’s population fled the onslaught and settled in a refugee camp across the border in Turkey.104 In Afrin, too, the Turkish offensive had huge consequences, one of which was the displacement of thousands of civilians. In the following text, based on nationalist proximity, Rudaw showed sympathy for Kurdish civilian victims, with particularly emotional language used in words and expressions like “children, women and men have undertaken harrowing journeys.” In contrast, it highlighted the hostility of certain actors, namely Turkey and its Syrian militias, albeit indirectly by quoting third-party sources.
Humanitarian agencies are struggling to meet the health and aid needs of the civilian population of Afrin as the number of people recently displaced due to Turkey’s offensive climbs to an estimated 167,000… An estimated 167,000 people have been displaced due to hostilities in Afrin… Children, women, and men have undertaken harrowing journeys to flee Afrin and need urgent health assistance.105 It did, however, underline the persecution of other minorities, such as the Yezidis in Afrin, warning of their extinction as a result of forced displacement.106 In Sere Kaniye and its outskirts, the situation sounded almost the same. Rudaw depicted the mass displacement of civilians due to the Turkish incursion into the region, warning of the return of ISIS and violations by Syrian militias. It criticized Turkey indirectly by citing the UN. Again, we see nationalist proximity in the text’s background. Citing the UN, Rudaw stated,
102 “Kobane Has Become Another Stalingrad,” Rudaw, January 19, 2015. 103 “Thousands of Kurdish Refugees Returning to Kobane,” Rudaw, September 24, 2014. 104 “Kobane Has Become Another Stalingrad,” Rudaw, January 19, 2015. 105 “Urgent Help Needed as Afrin IDP Numbers Top 167,000,” Rudaw, March 23, 2018. 106 “Kurdish Forces Continue to Defend Afrin against Turkish Assault,” Rudaw, January 23, 2019.
37 The United Nations says around 100,000 people have been displaced.107 The Kurdish administration accuses Turkey of trying to “ethnically cleanse” their towns and villages, which are also home to Arab and Assyrian communities.108 Also, the positive sides of the KRI, and thus the PDK, were pronounced in relation to the Kurds of Rojava. The following text, with statistics cited from the UN, gave indirect criticism of Turkey on the one hand and a positive image for the KRI on the other. As such, partisan agendas were pronounced:
Over 10,000 refugees have now crossed into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, fleeing the Turkish offensive in northeast Syria, according to the UN refugee agency UNHCR.109 ANF’s coverage of events in Kobane framed ISIS as the major actor in the displacement of thousands of Kurds from Kobane, a theme almost identical to that of Rudaw. However, it highlighted that most of those displaced people had headed to Turkey without referring to the KRG’s share of the displaced Kurds. This showed a favoring of partisan agendas of both sides. The displaced civilians were facing tough conditions, ANF reported. However, its language was stronger than Rudaw’s regarding criticism of the perpetrator, namely ISIS; in particular, we see the term “savage” in the text, as well as the term “Kobanê,” reflecting a thin nationalist-leaning policy, whether prepared by the reporter him-herself or the editorial board as part of the communicator, ANF.
Out of 180,000 people from Kobanê who had to leave their town following the savage attacks of ISIS, which began on 15 September, some 48,000 have arrived in the border district of Suruç in Urfa province.110 In Afrin, ANF framed the suffering of thousands of civilians displaced by the Turkish army and its “mercenaries,” pointing out they were separated from the outside world but “dreaming” of returning to their homes one day.111 Also, these groups had resettled the Arabs already displaced from Damascus’ Ghouta and Homs in Syria, granting them the houses and properties of the displaced Kurds. Similarly, the Kurdish
107 “She’s Very Depressed, Crying All the Time,” Rudaw, October 13, 2019. 108 “Syria Kurds Retake District of Ras Al-Ain from Turkish-Backed Militias: Monitor,” rudaw.net, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/131020191 Rudaw, October 13, 2019. 109 “10,000 Syrians Cross into Kurdistan Region Fleeing Turkish Offensive,” Rudaw, October 25, 2019. 110 “Urgent Call for Aid for 180 Thousand People from Kobanê,” Firat News Agency, Novermber 14, 2014. 111 “Explosion in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, July 29, 2019.
38 families were denied access to their villages.112 Obviously, the article, entitled The Turkification of Afrin, carried a nationalist ideology that led ANF’s narrative. Still, the language was strong: for example, the term “mercenaries” was a severe criticism of Turkish-backed Syrian militias. In addition, like Rudaw, ANF showed that diverse people inhabited the areas attacked by the Turkish army and its “mercenaries” in Sere Kaniye, such as Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, and Christians. The message from ANF seemed to be that Turkey was killing and displacing multicultural ethnicities in Rojava.
Killing civilians Depictions of civilians being killed came first among all those recorded in ANF’s articles, which could be a key sign of its strong critique of the perpetrators. However, this depiction came second for Rudaw, after civilian displacement, as we have seen above (see Figure 4). In Kobane, Rudaw depicted the death of Kurdish activists by Turkish border guards dispersing protestors against the policies of Turkey towards Kobane’s fall to ISIS. By highlighting the death of protesters, Rudaw put Turkey in a negative light; it also enhanced the nationalist leanings in its text by declaring the ethnic identity of the victims to be that of “Kurdish activist”:
We have already seen large protests in Turkish cities, where the police have shot dead more than a dozen protesters.113 “Turkish military killed a Kurdish activist after she crossed into Syria in an attempt to reach the besieged border town of Kobane,” local witnesses said.114 In Afrin, Rudaw depicted the death of civilians by citing third-party sources such as locals, PYD-linked sources, human rights organizations, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), health officials, and eyewitnesses. Data obtained from various sources referred to Rudaw’s indirect criticism of Turkey and thus it could be as moderate criticism. As such, Rudaw directed criticism towards Turkey by citing the YPG, framing its presence in Rojava as “occupation” which is reason behind the attacks. The mass killings caused through the bombing of residential areas by Turkish airstrikes was a live example of the theme. Citing the YPG, Rudaw stated:
112 “The Turkification of Afrin,” Firat News Agency, May 9, 2018. 113 “Will Kobane Be Saved?,” rudaw.net, accessed April 29, 2021, https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/131020144 Rudaw, October 13, 2014. 114 “Turkish Troops Kill Kurdish Activist at Kobane Border,” Rudaw, November 7, 2014.
39 Turkish airstrikes have killed 6 civilians and 3 fighters and injured another 13 civilians as they struck at least 100 targets in Afrin, its surrounding areas and a refugee camp, the YPG said… “The same way we hold responsible the occupation of the Turkish state for these attacks, we also hold Russia responsible for these attacks,” the Kurdish force added.115 Also, citing the SOHR, Rudaw apparently employed emotional language that showed the victimhood of Kurds versus the aggression of the attackers, namely Turkey and its Syrian proxies. Highlighting the death of women and children reflected Turkey’s hostile intention towards Kurdish civilians, thereby creating a negative image of Turkey in the readers’ consciousness:
At least six civilian casualties have been reported since Turkey started to carry out strikes about a week ago, including two children and one woman, the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported… US has already expressed its concern over the Turkish aggression in Syria, supposed by Ankara-backed Syrian rebels.116 By considering the way the reports are written by the SOHR, one can observe how Rudaw described the victims’ nationality in its editorial policy, particularly to demonstrate that Kurds had been humiliated and targeted because they were Kurds. However, the SOHR only employed the word “civilians.” Rudaw seemed to make certain themes salient, framing them within a nationalist leaning approach and putting Turkey in a negative position by employing emotional language such as the word “aggression.”
Turkish airstrikes have killed at least 18 civilians since the launch of the military aggression against Afrin, including 8 people on Saturday, the UK- based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights that follows the events reported Sunday evening.117 In Sere Kaniye and its surroundings, the airstrikes, bombings, and shelling of residential areas were the major themes of civilian death or killing during the so-called Operation Peace Spring led by Turkey and its Syrian militias in 2019.118 Also, one can observe nationalist agendas in coverage of the Turkish shelling on the border city of Qamishli, which Rudaw described as Kurdish.119
115 “Turkey Launches Deadly Military Operation against Afrin in Rojava,” Rudaw, January 20, 2018. 116 “Turkey Launches Deadly Military Operation against Afrin in Rojava,” Rudaw, January 20, 2018. 117 “Turkey Continues Its Assault on Kurdish Afrin in Syria,” Rudaw, January 21, 2018. 118 “Civilians Killed, Injured as Turkish Shelling Restarts in Northeast Syria,” Rudaw, October 10, 2019. 119 “Girl, 8, Loses Leg, Brother Killed in Turkish Shelling of Qamishli,” Rudaw, October 11, 2019.
40 As illustrated in the theory section, the communicator was suggesting solutions for certain issues or problems. Rudaw’s representation of the human rights violations conveyed its objection to humiliating Rojava’s Kurds, thus pressuring Turkey, the EU, and the international community to intervene to stop such abuses. Suggesting a solution for the problem of Rojava bears out Entman’s theory of framing, particularly when Rudaw selected the reality of the Turkish operation and made it more salient, evaluating the events morally to suggest certain solutions for the defined problem, labeled as “putting an end to the Turkish aggression against Syrian Kurds.” Rudaw’s employment of emotional language appeared again in the use of the word “proxies” to describe the Syrian militias supported by Turkey while showing the victimhood of displaced Kurds in the same text.
Over 200,000 Kurds were displaced, with Syrian Arabs from Eastern Ghouta and elsewhere resettled in their place. The practices of the Syrian proxies of Turkey looks very similar to what they have been doing in the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in Northwestern Syria.120 Under the theme of killing civilians, the ANF made considerable allusion to civilian deaths at the hands of the perpetrators discussed in the study, namely ISIS and Turkey with its Syrian militia proxies. Like Rudaw, ANF described how ISIS had killed civilians in Kobane, targeting them with multiple weapons, including mortar shells and explosions. The depiction of civilian killings includes nationalist leanings represented in the term “West Kurdistan.” ANF was governed here by nationalist leanings, as shown by its decision to call the north and northeastern areas of Syria “West Kurdistan”, indicating the western part of the Great Kurdistan and the Kurdish historical dream of an independent state. In the same text, ANF employed emotional language to put ISIS in a very negative light by describing its members as “gangs.”
As fierce clashes continued all night long in the besieged town of West Kurdistan, ISIS gangs have targeted thousands of Kobanê residents in Tîl Sheir region… The explosion of the mortars caused the death of two civilians and the injury of 4 others, including a 3-year-old child.121
In Afrin, ANF showed the death of civilians at the hands of Turkish-backed Syrian militias. The majority were killed by bombings and shelling, while many others were
120 “Turkish-Backed Groups Continue Looting, Lawlessness in Sari Kani,” Rudaw, November 14, 2019. 121 “2 Killed, 4 Wounded as ISIS Target Civilians in Kobanê,” Firat News Agency, November 8, 2014.
41 abducted or murdered on suspicion of belonging to the PKK.122 Indeed, the language of ANF seems tougher than Rudaw’s, particularly when it refers to the suicide cases of women because of the Turkish forces and allied “terrorists” as it called them. ANF framed the suffering Kurdish women under “Turkish occupation”. In an article entitled Afrin: 29 women were abducted, more committed suicide in 2 months, ANF framed Turkey and its militias as “terrorists,” blaming them for the death and abduction cases among civilians, particularly women:
According to the same report, many women have committed suicide and taken their own lives because of war crimes like abduction, torture and rape. Suicides have remarkably increased in the last two months yet there is no clear tally on suicide cases yet… According to Hawar News Agency (ANHA), the Turkish forces and allied terrorists have kidnapped as many as 140 people during the past two months.123 Furthermore, unlike Rudaw, ANF highlighted the large numbers of civilians being killed by Turkey and its Syrian “mercenaries.” The focus on number of mass killings revealed a powerful language and stance towards the Turkish army and its “mercenaries.” In one article, ANF stated that the death toll exceeded 500 civilians. This mass murder of hundreds of civilians was termed a “genocide”:
Over the past 58 days, the Turkish army has killed more than 300 people from the civilian population. Hundreds more civilians were injured… The war crimes inactively observed by the world community have reached the city center and taken on the dimension of genocide. In the past three days alone, dozens of civilians have been killed in arbitrary attacks on the Avrin hospital, residential areas and civilian convoys.124 Hundreds of civilians were killed as a vehicle convoy carrying the civilians who were escaping from invasion attacks were targeted by Turkish warplanes on Saturday.125
In Sere Kaniye, the same scenario was repeated. However, ANF zoomed in on individual suffering by framing the killing of Kurdish civilians, including aid workers at the hands of Turkish militias when trying to return to their homes and properties.
122 “Afrin Shepherd Abducted, Army Says ‘PKK Member Caught,” Firat News Agency, February 27, 2018. 123 “Afrin: 29 women were abducted, more committed suicide in 2 months,” Firat News Agency, September 21, 2019. 124 “Genocide in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, March 18, 2018. 125 “Hundreds of Civilians Killed in Turkish Airstrike,” ANF News, accessed March 4, 2020, https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/hundreds-of-civilians-killed-in-turkish-airstrike- 25563 Firat News Agency, March 18, 2018.
42 ANF framed the death of Kurdish civilians by these (Arab) militant groups based on ethnicity, picturing Kurds being targeted while Arabs not.
Factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA), a Syrian non-state armed group backed by Turkey in northeast Syria, have summarily executed civilians and failed to account for aid workers who disappeared while working in the ‘safe zone,’ Human Rights Watch said today… In another case the group’s forces killed three Kurdish men who had been trying to return to the city of Ras al-Ayn, witnesses and relatives said, and prevented another Kurdish man from returning while allowing Arab residents to return.126
Populated areas bombed Although the major event in Kobane was the fight between the Kurdish forces and ISIS, the depiction of “populated areas bombed” was clearly attached to Turkey, particularly when the Turkish military bombed residential areas in Kobane during the ISIS–Kurd battle. Rudaw depicted indirectly that Turkey facilitated the movements of ISIS, showing inaction towards fighting terrorism, and thus that its position was problematic compared to the Kurdish fight on terrorism despite its pretension of attacking ISIS. Rudaw built a negative picture of Turkey by stating that the “Under the pretense of stopping an ISIS attack on Turkey the Turkish army bombarded the center of Kobane with tanks and artillery,” Anwar Muslim, co-chair of the Kobane canton told Rudaw.”127 While Rudaw indirectly accuses Turkey of facilitating the attacks on Kobane, it stated:
Kurdish leaders accused Turkey of facilitating the attack on the city, but the office of Turkish Prime Minister dismissed the accusation, saying the vehicles used in the car bombings had not crossed from Turkey.128 In some texts, Rudaw combined several messages, as in the article entitled Thousands Flee IS Onslaught in Kobane, Peshmerga Ministry Vows to Help. The emotional language is apparent through the victimhood of Kurds under the attacks of
126 “HRW: Civilians Abused by Turkish-Backed Groups in ‘Safe Zones,’” ANF News, accessed March 8, 2020, https://anfenglishmobile.com/human-rights/hrw-civilians-abused-by-turkish- backed-groups-in-safe-zones-in-39671. 127 “Fighting Continues in Kobane, Turkish Bombardment Wounds Many,” Rudaw, November 30, 2014. 128 “Fighting Continues in Kobane, Turkish Bombardment Wounds Many.”
43 ISIS, which shelled residential areas with heavy weapons. We see a Kurdish woman carrying her baby, fleeing towards the Turkish border, and thus emotional language was employed to trigger sympathy. Interestingly, the adjective “Kurdish” used to raise the national spirit of the Kurdish audience. Also, the nationalist agenda was strongly present in the title of the previous article, which highlighted the Peshmerga’s readiness to help.129 ANF’s coverage of “bombing populated areas,” unlike that of Rudaw, criticized the Turkish “invasion”, highlighting the number of attacks, on populated areas, to which Kurdish people were subjected by the Turkish army and its Syrian “gangs”: “The Turkish state launched an invasion operation against Afrin Canton of Northern Syria on January 20…The Turkish army bombed civilian settlements 1026 times in 47 days and targeted civilian areas with heavy weaponry 3307 times.” ANF frames the Turkish backed militias as “remnants of Al-Qaeda and ISIS.”130 Thus, the language carried strong criticism of the perpetrator. In the case of Sere Kaniye, ANF addressed Turkey’s violations with harsher language than Rudaw. It described the Syrian militias as “gangs/mercenaries” and the Turkish incursion as “genocidal invasion,” which is not seen in Rudaw’s version: “The Turkish invasion army and allied mercenaries continue targeting the civilian population since the launch of their genocidal invasion campaign on October 9,” ANF stated.131 It also employed emotional language, which can be seen in terms like “help” “lost contact,” framing the sufferings of civilians vis-à-vis the “genocidal invasion” of AKP regime (in reference to Turkish ruling party) and its “gangs” or “jihadist militia” or “SNA troops” (in reference to Syrian opposition factions of the Syrian National Army). ANF stated:
Hundreds of thousands of people were driven into flight by the invasion of the AKP regime and its SNA troops. Artillery shells were fired at the area… I went home and once again waited for our children. Then they bombed again. I went out of the house and left the city with the help of my
129 “Thousands Flee IS Onslaught in Kobane, Peshmerga Ministry Vows to Help,” Rudaw, September 20, 2014. 130 “Hundreds of Invaders Killed in Afrin in Four Days,” Firat News Agency, March 9, 2018. 131 “Three Civilians Murdered in Ongoing Attacks on Serekaniye,” Firat News Agency, October 28, 2019.
44 neighbors. I have lost contact with my three sons. I haven’t heard from them yet.132
Demographic change This depiction of mass violence was not seen in Rudaw’s articles about Kobane. However, many depictions of demographic change were seen in articles on Afrin and Sere Kaniye where the nationalist agendas can be broadly seen. For instance, the outlet showed the demographic change in Afrin, raising concerns about Kurdish identity being lost and damaged over time because of Turkish policies in the region. Rudaw stated:
Arab families who moved to the northwest Syrian canton of Afrin after its fall to Turkish-backed militants last year are being granted official residency, angering Kurds who fear its Kurdish identity could be lost.133 Regarding Sere Kaniye, Rudaw promoted two major concerns in its articles. On the one hand, it highlighted its concerns about resettling three million Syrians in Kurdish regions. In an article entitled Syria Kurds dispute Turkish plans to resettle ‘non- indigenous’ refugees,134 Rudaw framed the return of those indigenous Syrians to their areas based on SDF’s vision “for refugee resettlement, insisting only Syrians indigenous to SDF areas, and those not affiliated with ‘terrorist groups’, would be permitted.”135 Similarly, quoting the SOHR, it pointed to the “intentional intimidation” of the remaining Kurdish residents in Sere Kaniye and its surroundings, framing the persecution of Kurds undertaken to push them out of their areas and thus wreak demographic change. “According to SOHR, Turkish-backed groups are intentionally intimidating the remaining residents to push them out of Sari Kani.”136
132 “Rojava: Lives Lost on the Run,” ANF News, accessed March 8, 2020, https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/rojava-lives-lost-on-the-run-40180. 133 “Afrin Begins Registering Arab Families, Cementing Demographic Change,” Rudaw, January 14, 2019. 134 “Syria Kurds Dispute Turkish Plans to Resettle ‘Non-Indigenous’ Refugees,” Rudaw, September 17, 2019. 135 “Syria Kurds Dispute Turkish Plans to Resettle ‘Non-Indigenous’ Refugees.” 136 “Turkish-Backed Groups Continue Looting, Lawlessness in Sari Kani,” Rudaw, November 14, 2019.
45 Rudaw also used emotional language when framing the tough conditions experienced by children who had been left without their parents.137 It put Turkey, which endeavored to end the aspirations of Syrian Kurds, in a negative light. Moving to ANF’s frames of demographic change, it did not record cases of this in articles about Kobane but did so about Afrin and Sere Kaniye. In Afrin, for instance, this frame served as an umbrella under which the invaders committed crimes against civilians, confiscating their houses and properties, kidnapping them and asking for ransoms to release the hostages. In this way, the demographic change was framed as a “systematic process” carried out by persecuting the original inhabitants of the region. ANF stated:
Since the invasion, war crimes have been systematically committed in the region. The demographic structure of the region is being changed and crimes such as seizure of local people's properties, kidnapping of civilians for ransom, torture or executions have been going on a daily basis.138 It is evident that a clear harsh language is present in ANF’s discourse concerning the frames of mass violence against Syrian Kurds, compared to Rudaw’s more moderate criticism. This can be seen in terms like “Ankara regime and its mercenary allies,” “resettling mercenary families in the house of local people,” “Turkish regime occupation,” “mercenaries linked to Turkey.”139 Severe criticism appeared in ANF texts concerning the intentions of Turkish president Erdogan in Rojava. The outlet criticized Turkey’s incursion into Rojava by lashing out at Erdogan, describing him as a “fascist” who allowed “mercenaries” to resettle in Kurdish regions140 and framing him as seeking to replace the Kurds with Sunni Muslims. ANF stated:
MSD Co-chair stressed that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan wanted to expel the Kurds from the region and to settle Sunni Muslims in their place, warning of the risk that thousands of people could lose their lives as violent attacks against the region continue.141
137 “28 Children Left without Their Parents Following Turkish Offensive in NE Syria,” Rudaw, November 10, 2019. 138 “600 Civilians Kidnapped in Afrin in One Week,” Firat News Agency, July 4, 2019. 139 “Explosion in Afrin: dead among Turkey-linked mercenaries,” Firat News Agency, April 28, 2019. 140 “Autonomous Administration: Turkey Must Leave Our Lands,” ANF News, accessed March 8, 2020, https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/autonomous-administration-turkey-must- leave-our-lands-39400 Firat News Agency, November 17, 2019. 141 “MSD’s Ehmed Warns of Resurgence of ISIS Caliphate in Syria,” ANF News, accessed March 8, 2020, https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/msd-s-ehmed-warns-of-resurgence-of-isis- caliphate-in-syria-38549.
46 Partisan leanings are repeatedly seen in ANF texts, particularly when it echoed the PKK’s discourse towards Erdogan, describing him as a “fascist.”142 To conclude, ANF showed that Turkey and its intelligence apparatus were working systematically to bring about demographic change in Rojava as seen in the article entitled Turkish MIT Works on Resettlement from Central Asia to Rojava.143 Furthermore, unlike Rudaw, it depicted Turkey as bringing people from other countries of central Asia, like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan, to implement its expansionist policies.144
Properties confiscated, looted, and damaged In the case of Kobane, no reports of properties confiscated were depicted by Rudaw. In the same vein, Rudaw framed civilian properties as being confiscated, looted, and damaged by the Turkish-backed Syrian militias; however, it also mentioned Ankara’s pledge to punish those who violated human rights in Afrin. Rudaw’s promotion of the town’s Arabization was coupled with a “moderate” line of criticism against Turkey. It stated that:
Elements of the FSA were photographed looting shops and homes in Afrin. Ankara has pledged to punish those who commit looting, and a pro-FSA news agency has reported that a battalion has been expelled from the force because of looting.145 The area has since witnessed acts of looting, Arabization and its original inhabitants prevented from returning home.146 Indeed, Rudaw seemed to mobilize against the human rights abuses, pressuring Turkey and the EU to stop these “inhumane violations.”147 It also focused on the olive plantations seized by Syrian militias backed by Turkey. The image of Afrin’s olive plantations being confiscated was made salient in the content of Rudaw by quoting a refugee from Afrin, and thus a very negative picture of Turkey and its Syrian proxies was created, especially in terms like “opportunist thieves”, “robbers”. Rudaw stated:
A refugee who fled Afrin with his family to the Kurdistan Region told Rudaw in the spring that the Syrian militias are opportunist thieves… “They
142 “PKK: Every house and street will be a battlefield,” Firat News Agency, October 10, 2019. 143 “Turkish MIT Works on Resettlement from Central Asia to Rojava,” Firat News Agency, November 10, 2019. 144 “Turkey Uses Turkmen ISIS Members,” Firat News Agnecy, December 5, 2019. 145 “Afrin Civilians Claim Targeted by Turkey-Backed Militias When Returning,” Rudaw, March 30, 2018. 146 “VIDEO: Armed men torture Afrin civilians in public,” Rudaw, May 27, 2018. 147 “Afrin Loot Is Legitimate Spoils of War, Leaked Transit Document Shows,” Rudaw, August 23, 2018.
47 would even loot chickens and goats. There are videos and pictures of them looting goats. In fact, they don’t care about anything. They are robbers and thieves, nothing more than that,” said Ahmad Battal.148 In Sere Kaniye, Rudaw depicted the situation there as “dire” after the Turkish- backed Syrian militias took control of the city and looted and confiscated civilian properties. Rudaw used the word “invasion” in its depiction of the situation. “Sari Kani and Gire Spi (Tel Abyad) have borne the brunt of Turkey’s Spring invasion of Kurdish- controlled Northern Syria, dubbed ‘Operation Peace Spring’ which was launched on October 9,” Rudaw stated.149 ANF’s narrative of “confiscated properties” reported many stories of looting, damaging, and confiscating civilian properties. In Kobane, ANF, using emotional language, describing ISIS militants as “gangs” damaging Kurdish public institutions and properties in the area. “After this, the ISIS gangs burned down the humanitarian aid store of the Kurdish Red Crescent on the Aleppo road,” ANF stated.150 It also depicted ISIS setting fire to vehicles near the Turkish border, sponsored by Turkey.151 By using the word “sponsored” by Turkey, ANF suggested the message that cooperation continued in Kobane between Turkey and ISIS; hence, Turkey was directly involved in the mass violence committed by ISIS against the people of Kobane. ANF also described how Turkish-linked militant groups set fire to hundreds of trees near Afrin and over 300 acres of wheat near Sherawa district. Thus, the words of “mercenaries” and “gangs” attached to the groups damaging civilian properties suggested a strong and direct criticism to the perpetrators by ANF.152 “Turkish army allied gangs also cut down thousands of olive trees that were at least 60 years old around Kafr Jana,” ANF stated.153 Again, harsher language was used by ANF than Rudaw in the texts, particularly when depicting Syrian militiamen as “mercenaries” working to Turkey’s agendas.154 Although Rudaw moderately criticized Turkey, it mostly framed Syrian militiamen as
148 “Turkey’s Syrian Proxies Seize 75% of Afrin’s Olive Trees,” Rudaw, September 20, 2018. 149 “Turkish-Backed Groups Continue Looting, Lawlessness in Sari Kani,” Rudaw, November 14, 2019. 150 “ISIS Gangs Burn down Kurdish Red Crescent Building,” Firat News Agency, October 13, 2014. 151 “ISIS Sets Fire to Hundreds of Civilian Vehicles at Border,” Firat News Agency, December 1, 2014. 152 “300 Civilians Abducted in Afrin in 20 Days,” Firat News Agency, July 24, 2019. 153 “10 More Civilians Abducted by the Occupation Forces in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, July 2, 2019. 154 “Explosion in Afrin: dead among Turkey-linked mercenaries,” Firat News Agency, April 18, 2019.
48 to blame. In contrast, Turkey and its Syrian militia “mercenaries” were viewed by ANF as two sides of the same coin.155 In addition, sarcastic language was used, particularly when ANF reported the Turkish president’s statement that 300,000 people had returned to their lands and properties. It responded, quoting SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi, with “YES! That’s right! But those who returned are other people who have replaced the original people of the region.”156 ANF depicted Turkey and its militias as “invaders” and “pillagers” who had stolen historic artifacts from Afrin after taking over the region, running all resources dry in the areas they occupied. “The Turkish state has pillaged through all economic resources in the occupied zones…Turkish state allied gangs also dug up the Avraze mound in the Mabata district,” stated ANF.157 The same scenario was depicted in Sere Kaniye of Syrian militias forcibly confiscating civilian properties and preventing their Kurdish owners from returning.158 Thus, harsher criticism and language is present towards the perpetrators in ANF’s representation of “Properties confiscated, looted, and damaged.”
Oppression/ransoms/bargaining In Kobane, Rudaw pictured the persecution of Kurdish children by ISIS. They were tortured by ISIS militants while in captivity for four months in an area close to Kobane. ISIS bargained with Kurdish forces for the release of the children in exchange for captured ISIS fighters. Emotional language appeared again when Rudaw referred to the “horrors of detention” and the torture the Kurdish children suffered. Rudaw mobilized against ISIS’s inhumane actions, quoting Human Rights Watch:159
“Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, children have suffered the horrors of detention and torture, first by the Syrian Bashar Al-Assad
155 “Genocide in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, March 18, 2018. 156 “SDF Commander General: We will not accept Erdoğan’s threats,” Firat News Agency, September 20, 2019. 157 “Turkish State Steals Thousands of Artifacts from Afrin,” Firat News Agency, July 18, 2019. 158 “HRW: Civilians abused by Turkish-backed groups in ‘safe zones’,” Firat News Agency, November 27, 2019. 159 “Kurdish Children Tortured by ISIS near Kobane, Says Human Rights Watch,” Rudaw, November 4, 2014.
49 government and now by ISIS,” said Fred Abrahams, special advisor for children’s rights at Human Rights Watch.160 Rudaw showed the oppression of Kurdish civilians in Afrin by reporting that civilians could not call each other via smartphone for fear of being accused of spying for Kurdish YPG forces by Turkey-backed militias. The word “afraid” suggests the persecution people are subjected to. “People in the city are afraid to use their phones because they will be accused of spying for the Kurdish YPG forces,” Rudaw stated.161 Persecution of other religious minorities, like Yezidis, was also depicted by Rudaw. This is apparent in this segment which includes words like “concerned” and “safety”: “Yezidi leaders have repeatedly expressed concern about the safety of the minority community in Afrin,” Rudaw stated.162 In the same context, Rudaw pictured the Syrian opposition militias as persecuting Kurds not only for their ethnicity but for their faith. From Rudaw’s perspective, these groups had forced many Yezidis to convert to Islam. Indeed, it continued to employ the nationalist agenda by describing the villages as Kurdish, viewing “Kurdishness” as an extended umbrella for all the religious communities with Kurdish ethnicity, so to speak.163 As for Sere Kaniye, once again, Rudaw put the mass violence against civilians in a nationalist framework by showing the persecution of Kurds. The term “Kurdish” was substantially employed by Rudaw in the text. The Kurdish persecution and oppression were made salient so that they could be easily remembered by the audience, supporting Entman’s understanding of framing theory.164 One of the major themes Rudaw focused on was persecution of Kurdish civilians in the form of having to pay protection money to Turkish-backed militias to protect their shops and belongings after they were allowed to return.165 ANF depicted oppression and portrayed Turkish border guards persecuting Kurdish civilians, including a child from Kobane. ANF used words like “hit” and “made him say one Turkey” as signs of
160 “Kurdish Children Tortured by ISIS near Kobane, Says Human Rights Watch.” 161 “Afrin Civilians Claim Targeted by Turkey-Backed Militias When Returning,” Rudaw, March 30, 2018. 162 Ibid. 163 “Yezidi Woman Reportedly Killed by Turkish-Backed Group in Syria’s Afrin,” Rudaw, November 18, 2019. 164 “Turkish-Backed Groups Continue Looting, Lawlessness in Sari Kani,” Rudaw, November 14, 2019. 165 Ibid.
50 persecution based on ethnic discrimination”. “Every time they hit him, they made him say ‘one Turkey, two Turkey, three Turkey’. Then the soldiers released him and by 5 in the morning it was all over,” ANF stated. ANF depicted Kurdish “persecution and prevention” from crossing the border vis-à-vis “cooperation” with ISIS members. The article’s title Turkish soldiers met gangs on Kobanê border last night suggests a clear depiction of “cooperation” between ISIS and Turkey.166 In Afrin, ANF focused on the “mercenaries’” action of persecution and torturing: forcing civilians to collaborate and subjecting those who refused to abduction and torture.167 They did not only aim at annihilating the Kurds but also other minority groups, such as Arabs, Christians, Armenians, and Chechens. In an article entitled The Turkification of Afrin, the terms “annihilation,” “occupying Turkish state,” and “its allied mercenaries” are examples of ANF’s representation of persecution of Kurds, entailing other minorities. It stated:
The occupying Turkish State and its mercenary allies are walking over people’s rights showing once again the true aim of the occupation of Afrin was to continue the annihilation of Kurds. And this entails also the oppression of other nations, namely Arabs, Turkmen, Chechen, and Armenians.168 ANF underlined the “fascist,” “religious,” and “racist” mentality of the Turkish state while reporting on Afrin’s mass violence, publicizing the Turkification project led by Turkey in the occupied areas. However, it put the Rojava’s administration in a positive light through using words like “progressive” in the text. “The racist, nationalist, religious and doctrinal state which the fascist forces seek to establish to replace the autonomous, progressive, all-inclusive administration set up in Rojava, denies the history and identity of the native peoples of the region, while threatening to annihilate their existence and eliminate their culture,” ANF stated.169 Reporting on Sere Kaniye, likewise, the ANF claimed that Turkish-backed “mercenaries” raided the area and oppressed civilians. “When the gangs came, we had to flee. They had already killed two of my sons before my eyes before. Now me and my man are left alone with these toddlers. When I recently went back to see how things
166 “Turkish Soldiers Met Gangs on Kobanê Border Last Night,” Firat News Agency, October 3, 2014. 167 “Gangs in Afrin Torture Civilians Refusing to Collaborate,” Firat News Agency, February 9, 2019. 168 “The Turkification of Afrin.” 169 “The Turkification of Afrin” Firat News Agency, May 9, 2018.
51 were there, I saw that they had plundered everything in our house,” ANF stated, quoting a civilian victim.170 In short, ANF’s language and criticism was much harsher than Rudaw’s despite the latter’s obvious criticism of persecution against Kurds.
Civilians wounded In Kobane, for instance, Rudaw mentioned the injury of civilians by Turkish border guards, indirectly accusing Turkish authorities of targeting Kurds for the benefit of ISIS. By quoting Kurdish officials in Kobane, Rudaw indirectly showed the Turkish army was the major perpetrator of injury to civilians in Kobane.171 Since Rudaw quoted a third-party source, we see a moderate or indirect criticism compared to the radical criticism launched by ANF. Expressions like “under the pretense of stopping ISIS” suggested Turkey’s “intention” of attacking Kobane where causalities recorded among civilians.
“Under the pretense of stopping an ISIS attack on Turkey the Turkish army bombarded the center of Kobane with tanks and artillery,” Anwar Muslim, co-chair of the Kobane canton told Rudaw. “A number of civilians and fighters have been wounded.”172 Similarly, the image of civilians wounded by mine explosions inside Kobane after ISIS retreated before the joint Kurdish forces, the YPG and Peshmerga, was another theme chosen by Rudaw to present how civilians were wounded.173 This was coupled by emotional language that described the death and injury of Kurdish civilians by mine explosions and included nationalist leanings under the title 40 returning Kobane residents killed by mines and booby traps since liberation. The word “liberation” suggested sympathy with Rojava’s Kurds. Additionally, the expression “symbol of Kurdish resistance” in the paragraph underneath indicates an emotional and biased tone toward Kobane. Thus, we perceive victimization and triumph through the lens of Rudaw putting Kurds under one banner in Kobane.
170 “People from Gire Spi Want to Return to Their Old Lives,” Firat News Agency, November 13, 2019. 171 “Fighting Continues in Kobane, Turkish Bombardment Wounds Many,” Rudaw, November 30, 2014. 172 “Fighting Continues in Kobane, Turkish Bombardment Wounds Many.” 173 “40 Returning Kobane Residents Killed by Mines and Booby Traps since Liberation,” Rudaw, March 29, 2015.
52 An estimated 40 people have been killed by mines and booby traps in Kobane in the two months since Kurdish forces evicted ISIS from the city in Syria’s Kurdish region (Rojava), a local official told Rudaw…The city has become a symbol of Kurdish resistance, after a combined force of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and some 150 Peshmerga troops – backed by coalition air power – forced ISIS to retreat and abandon efforts of capturing the city.174 Quoting the YPG media center and Rojava administration sources, Rudaw showed how Turkey killed and injured many Kurdish civilians on the border between Kobane and Turkish territories as they were protesting the Turkish policies towards the battle of Kobane. Thus, the outlet suggested that Kurds were subjected to various injuries because of the Turkish crackdown on protesters. Expressions and terms like “revolt” “occupation,” “soul of resistance” and “sacrifices” and martyrs” suggested emotional language in depicting Kurdish injuries.175 Rudaw stated:
The number of Kobane residents injured by the Turkish military as they protested at the border has risen to 40 and one people… “We appeal to our people in Kobane to revolt in the face of this occupation and renew the soul of Kobane resistance, embodying the fortress of resistance and the sacrifices of our martyrs.”176 Rudaw appears to have associated the injured people in Afrin mostly with death reports. It kept track of the attacked territories, perpetrators, and victims. As previously noted, Rudaw tended to obtain information from a variety of sources, which explains why it periodically quoted from human rights groups, UN reports, local and international sources, and even those with whom it disagreed ideologically, such as Turkish-, Syrian-, and PKK-affiliated platforms.177 Again, nationalist leanings were present in Rudaw’s reporting of civilian injury when the victims were described as from the Kurdish component. The outlet also attached the term “Kurdish” to the canton of Afrin, putting it in a nationalist framework.178 This is not seen in ANF texts concerning civilian injuries, despite its harsh criticism of the perpetrators. In Sere Kaniye, the perpetrators were again identified as the Turkish army and its Syrian militia proxies, with the victims being mainly civilians, including Kurds,
174 “40 Returning Kobane Residents Killed by Mines and Booby Traps since Liberation.” 175 “UPDATED: Turkish forces open fire on protesters in Kobane, 2 killed, 40 injured,” Rudaw, September 2, 2016. 176 “UPDATED.” 177 “Civilian Death Toll in Afrin Nears 200,” Rudaw, February 27, 2018. 178 “Turkey Launches Deadly Military Operation against Afrin in Rojava,” Rudaw, January 20, 2018.
53 Christians, and Yezidis. Rudaw’s depiction of the wounded was often coupled with death accounts but also intertwined with the nationalistic undertones which played a significant role in its overall content. More than half the injured were referred to as Kurdish victims. In an article entitled Protect Sari Kani from genocide: Syria Kurds, the terms “protect,” and “genocide” suggested the magnitude of humiliation the people of Sere Kaniye exposed to.179 The text below illustrates Rudaw’s poignant writing about a child wounded seriously in the “Kurdish” border city of Qamishli during the Turkish- led Operation Peace Spring on Sere Kaniye. It attached the term “Kurdish” to the city despite its diversity of ethnic and sectarian components as part of its nationalist strategy of depicting mass violence.
Two civilians were killed and three other injured on Thursday when Turkish forces shelled Syria’s Kurdish city of Qamishli. Among those killed in the bombardment was an 11-year-old boy… Mohammed’s eight- year-old sister, named by the Red Crescent Society as Sara Yousef, was badly injured in the attack, losing her right leg. The children’s mother was also injured in the attack.180 Once again, we see mobilization against the Turkish invasion by Rudaw. For instance, it showed the wounded civilians as being stuck due to the Turkish bombardment, thus mobilizing for the opening of a humanitarian corridor for wounded civilians trapped inside and accusing Turkey of using all kinds of weapons against civilians in Sere Kaniye. This supports the framing theory of treating particular problems, evaluating them, and providing remedies. From Rudaw’s nationalist perspective, the perpetrators were Turkey and its Syrian proxies while the victims were mostly Kurds. Interestingly, moderate or indirect criticism appeared in this theme when Rudaw discussed a letter issued by Rojava’s administration.
The Kurdish-led administration in Northern Syria issued a letter on Thursday asking the relevant humanitarian organizations to help evacuate the wounded civilians who have been targeted by the Turkish bombardments and are trapped in Sari Kani… Urgent actions are needed to evacuate the wounded civilians inside Sari Kani,” the letter reads. “Turkey uses all kind of weapons including the internationally prohibited ones and our medical teams are unable to evacuate the civilians inside Sari Kani.”181
179 “Protect Sari Kani from Genocide: Syria Kurds,” rudaw.net, accessed April 11, 2021, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/171020194. 180 “Boy, 11, among Casualties of Turkish Shelling on Syria’s Qamishli,” Rudaw, October 10, 2019. 181 “Protect Sari Kani from Genocide,” Rudaw, October 17, 2019.
54 ANF framed the wounded civilians as targeted by ISIS and Syrian militias on the one hand and by the Turkish army on the other. In Kobane, for instance, it described how ISIS “gangs” shelled populated areas, killing and wounding many civilians. What distinguished ANF’s depictions of injured civilians is that it reported the names of victims, as well as their age and gender182 and focused on the number of wounded. An article entitled Casualties delivered from Kobanê, for example, reported that around 40 wounded civilians had been transferred to Kobane in Rojava and Suruc in Turkey for treatment.183 ANF also covered the protests inside Turkey due to the battle of Kobane between ISIS and Kurdish forces. The protesters were faced by security forces who injured scores of Kurdish youths. Many others were taken to the hospitals because of teargas.184 One theme that provoked ANF’s sharp criticism was that some of the injured who were treated in hospitals in Turkey were arrested by the Turkish authorities and taken to an unknown destination. The ANF framed this story by claiming that the doctors were “threatened at gunpoint.”185 Hence, although the ANF covered the deadly events in Kobane, it also monitored Turkish actions, whether in Turkey or in Rojava. This proves the premise of sharp criticism, particularly when it framed the wounded in Afrin the same way as in Kobane, whether the perpetrators were a NATO member state, Turkey, or its Syrian militias. It also highlighted women and children among the injured civilians.186 Quoting the Kurdish Red Crescent, it stated that some women were in a critical condition and others had lost their limbs. The language seems emotional, particularly when ANF emphasized that “the civilians are the real victims of its (Turkey’s) illegal war,” thereby putting Turkey in a very negative light and pressuring it to end its abuses of civilian Kurds.187 “To end Turkey’s abuses” supports the framing theory concept of “suggesting remedies” for certain problems.
182 “2 Killed, 4 Wounded as ISIS Target Civilians in Kobanê,” Firat News Agency, November 8, 2014. 183 “Casualties Delivered from Kobanê,” ANF News, accessed March 8, 2020, https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/casualties-delivered-from-kobane-9496 Firat News Agency, October 6, 2014. 184 “People Shot with Live Ammunition at Kobanê Border,” Firat News Agency, September 22, 2014. 185 “Police Raid Hospital and Arrest Wounded Person from Kobanê,” Firat News Agency, October 10, 2014. 186 “Turkish Army Kills 17 Women and Wounds 44 in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, February 21, 2018. 187 Ibid.
55 The ANF depicted the same scenario in Afrin, documented the names of the injured during the invasion of Sere Kaniye, and covered the injury reports in other cities bordering Turkey such as Qamişlo (Qamishli) and Girê Spî (Tal Abyad). Reporting the death toll, it used religious terms like “martyred” to show sympathy with civilian victims.188 ANF’s sharp criticism of Turkey also appeared in its coverage of the attacks on Qamishli during the invasion of Sere Kaniye. In one news report, it highlighted the injury of two Christians by describing the attack as “aggression”, sending a message to the international community and Western world that Turkey did not differentiate between Kurds and other components of the region: they even attacked Christians.189 It added that the violent attacks by the Turkish state and its “mercenaries” in the northern regions of Syria had left dozens dead and many more injured during Turkey’s invasion of Sere Kaniye and the surrounding area,190 using a constantly harsh language towards the perpetrators.
Ethnic cleansing From Rudaw’s perspective, ISIS was the major actor kicking Kurds out of their homes in Kobane. The following text shows the nationalist agenda used by Rudaw, particularly when using the term “Kurds” and classifying them as a community subjected to “ethnic cleansing.” Rudaw stated that:
Almost 2,000 refugees from Kobane have arrived in Iraqi Kurdistan… after Islamic State (ISIS) militants drove them out of their homes… During the course of the Syrian civil war, 220,000 Syrian refugees have entered into semi-autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan—the vast majority arriving after massacres of ethnic Kurds.191 Rudaw also recorded ethnic cleansing in Afrin. It showed that thousands of Kurds, including other Syrians who had already been displaced from areas surrounding Damascus and resettled in Afrin, were being targeted. Rudaw’s portrayal of demographic change and ethnic cleansing was dominated by nationalist leanings, and
188 “SDF Balance Sheet of War and Resistance for 2019,” Firat News Agency, January 3, 2020. 189 “Turkish Attacks against North and East Syria - LIVE BLOG,” Firat News Agency, October 9, 2019. 190 “Urgent Call for a ‘Humanitarian Corridor’ in Serêkaniyê,” Firat News Agency, October 17, 2019. 191 “First Kobane Refugees Arrive in Kurdistan Region,” rudaw.net, accessed May 23, 2021, https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/151020142.
56 this can be understood from the context even though there was no mention of the Kurds.192 Interestingly, Rudaw did not blame Turkey directly; however, it accused Turkish-linked Syrian groups of launching ethnic cleansing in the region, and thus its criticism seems more balanced, moderate, or even indirect. For example, citing the Yezidi-linked organization Yazda, Rudaw called for mobilization for accountability against those who might have been involved in a potential violation of human rights. Its themes might carry warning messages as well.193 Rudaw clung to light criticism by using a third-party text in its frames, such as a Yazda statement or statements from other humanitarian or political organizations. Indeed, Rudaw echoed the diplomatic policies of the PDK towards the Turkish authorities and their agendas in the Syrian Kurdish region. Once again, Rudaw detached itself from direct reporting of Turkish violence, namely the ethnic cleansing of Kurds. Quoting the PYD-led administration – described as Kurdish by Rudaw – it highlighted the Turkish violations against Syrian Kurds who coexisted with other minorities, such as Arabs and Assyrians.194 Obviously, readers were able to understand that Kurds were being attacked and persecuted by the Turkish government and its Syrian militia proxies even though the criticism was light or indirect. In an article entitled Stop the Turkish invasion of northeast Syria, say Yezidi activists, Rudaw pushed the message that Turkey had invaded northern Syrian under the banner of Operation Peace Spring, a name which ironically contradicted the term “invasion,” which carries negative connotations. Turkey “invaded” our land and called it “peace spring”, from Rudaw’s perspective.195 Thus readers, particularly Kurds, would understand that Turkey was planning to replace the Kurds of Sere Kaniye with three million Syrian refugees already based in Turkey – a perception in which cultural connotations might play a role. Still, detachment from “direct” criticism appeared in Rudaw’s texts,196 as it consistently employed reported speech or indirect language in
192 “Five Dead in Afrin Blast,” Rudaw, October 31, 2019. 193 “Kurdish Forces Continue to Defend Afrin against Turkish Assault,” Rudaw, January 23, 2018. 194 “Syria Kurds Retake District of Ras Al-Ain from Turkish-Backed Militias,” Rudaw, October 13, 2019. 195 “Stop Turkish Invasion of Northeast Syria, Say Yezidi Activists,” Rudaw, October 20, 2019. 196 Ibid.
57 its critique as a means of achieving detachment, a technique it might have referred to as pure “professionalism.” ANF, in contrast, sharply criticized ethnic cleansing. Although it reported no ethnic cleansing in Kobane, its language was still directed to and hostile towards Turkey and its president, Erdogan, in its coverage of mass violence against Rojava’s people. For instance, many of the ethnic cleansing reports it carried concerned operations carried out by Turkey and its Syrian militias in Afrin. In an article entitled Genocide in Afrin, ANF stated that “Erdoğan has completed his announced ethnic cleansing.” So, we have a strong word “genocide” in the title and another sign of direct involvement of Turkey’s Erdogan in the ethnic cleansing process.197 Another sharp criticism is seen in the use of the term “barbaric” when ANF described the massacres carried out by “gangs,” which can be seen as a form of ethnic cleansing.198 It described the murdering and mass displacement as alarming messages of potential ethnic cleansing in Sere Kaniye. We also observe emotional language represented in terms like “criminal invasion” and “ethnic cleansing of Kurds”. ANF stated:
This criminal invasion has led to hundreds of deaths and a further wave of mass displacement. Most alarming are the indications of plans for full-scale ethnic cleansing of Kurds.199 Still, the difference between Rudaw and ANF’s depictions of mass violence, including ethnic cleansing, is obvious in the sharp and light criticism shown in the language and messages of the two outlets.
Airstrikes The airstrikes were pictured as another form of mass violence against Rojava’s Kurds, particularly when Kurdish media reported scores of death casualties because of Turkish airstrikes. However, no reports were recorded in the articles covering mass violence in Kobane, apparently because the focus was on the battle against ISIS and Turkey’s direct military involvement in Rojava did not start yet. Still, Rudaw adopted the same strategy of depicting mass violence concerning Turkish airstrikes against Rojava. For instance, quoting the SOHR, it described the death of civilians in Turkish airstrikes as a
197 “Genocide in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, March 18, 2018. 198 “15 People, including 6 Ezidis, Kidnapped in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, April 22, 2018. 199 “KNK: Stop the Turkish invasion of South Kurdistan,” Firat News Agency, June 6, 2019.
58 “massacre” in an article entitled Turkey commits ‘massacre’ in Afrin, 13 civilians killed, thus indirectly criticizing Turkish involvement in the mass violence of Rojava.
Turkish planes carried out several airstrikes in the town in southwestern Afrin “which resulted in the death of 13 civilians at least, including 2 children and 3 women,” the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights stated, describing it as a “massacre.”200 Thus, Rudaw indirectly described how Turkish airstrikes killed civilians, using emotional language by describing its operations as “aggression” against Afrin and its people.
Turkish airstrikes have killed at least 18 civilians since the launch of the military aggression against Afrin including 8 people on Saturday, the UK- based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights that follows the events reported Sunday evening.201 Despite describing the airstrikes as a “massacre,” Rudaw’s criticism was inevitably lighter than ANF’s. Quoting SOHR, Rudaw highlighted the humanitarian situation, publicizing Turkish violations against civilians as part of its strategy to put pressure on the Turkish government and the EU to put an end to these abuses.202 Interestingly, Rudaw even quoted ANF in depicting the Turkish-led airstrikes on the city of Afrin, stating that “Turkish planes targeted the outskirts of Afrin city on Sunday morning, hitting several houses, according to YPG-linked media ANF.”203 Thereby, it appeared to follow two major trajectories: First, it was driven by ideological agendas (nationalist and partisan); second, it distanced itself from addressing Turkish violations directly, albeit relatively. Rudaw attempted to put Turkey in a negative light and pressure it, along with the EU, to mobilize the international community to put an end to this devastating offensive, which might also have risked civil coexistence in the region. It highlighted the death of other components beside the Kurds204 and mentioned that even medical teams were attacked by Turkish airstrikes, thus preventing the evacuation of the wounded.205 So, once again, it quoted the SOHR to pass its criticism indirectly.
200 “Turkey Commits ‘Massacre’ in Afrin, 13 Civilians Killed: Monitor,” Rudaw, March 5, 2018. 201 “Turkey Continues Its Assault on Kurdish Afrin in Syria,” Rudaw, January 21, 2018. 202 “Turkey Commits ‘Massacre’ in Afrin, 13 Civilians Killed,” Rudaw, March 5, 2018. 203 “‘Tragic’ Situation in Afrin as Turkish Forces Close In,” Rudaw, March 11, 2018. 204 “UN Security Council Must Intervene, Stop Turkish War in Syria,” Rudaw, October 10, 2019. 205 “Protect Sari Kani from Genocide,” Rudaw, October 17, 2019.
59 It also used emotional language by picturing the condition of a family which had just lost a father in the Turkish airstrikes and whose son had previously been killed by ISIS. In so doing, Rudaw indirectly compared images of violence to deliver a message that Turkey and ISIS were two sides of the same coin. Thus, it highlighted the victimhood of the displaced Kurds through the Turkish mass violence, including airstrikes, by quoting the family members of victims, human rights organizations, and other sources, including YPG-linked ones. “He was killed in a Turkish airstrike…his father was a volunteer who wanted to help his fellow Kurds displaced by the Turkish invasion,” Rudaw stated.206 Moving to ANF’s depiction of airstrikes, none against Kurds were recorded in Kobane since the attacker, ISIS, only used heavy and light weapons and had no air forces. In Afrin, ANF described the Turkish airstrikes as targeting YPG fighters and civilians. For instance, it reported the death of a YPJ (female) foreign fighter during Turkish airstrikes. Quoting from an affiliated media source, it reported that hundreds of civilians were killed in an airstrike by the Turkish air forces, putting Turkey in a negative light through sharp criticism while supporting partisan agendas. For instance, reporting the death of a YPJ foreign fighter seemed to serve the partisan ideology of the PKK/PYD which included feminist agendas that “actively promote(d) a subversion of traditional gender structures.”207 In direct reporting, ANF also recorded that 300 civilians fleeing Afrin were targeted by Turkish airstrikes, and most were killed.208 Emotional language is present in terms like “invasion” and “massacred”. ANF stated that:
Hundreds of civilians were killed as a vehicle convoy carrying the civilians who were escaping from invasion attacks were targeted by Turkish warplanes on Saturday… Sources inside the Afrin city center also say that several civilians were massacred by the Turkish bombing.209 On the other hand, Turkish warplanes targeted scores of civilians in Sere Kaniye during Operation Peace Spring. Quoting a victim’s family member, ANF described a heartbreaking theme: that the torn bodies of civilians were lying on the ground because
206 “Family Mourns Father Killed in Turkish Airstrike 4 Years after Son Slain Fighting IS,” Rudaw, October 22, 2019. 207 Novellis, “The Rise of Feminism in the PKK: Ideology or Strategy?,” Zanj: The Journal of Critical Global South Studies 2, no. 1 (2018): 115, https://doi.org/10.13169/zanjglobsoutstud.2.1.0115. 208 “Hundreds of Civilians Killed in Turkish Airstrike,” Firat News Agency, March 18, 2018. 209 “Hundreds of Civilians Killed in Turkish Airstrike.”
60 of Turkish airstrikes on their vehicles.210 As a result, ANF’s language was still sharper than Rudaw’s, which was governed to a smaller extent by partisan ideology and a greater one by a nationalist ideology. The ANF was governed by both agendas with approximately the same levels of dominance.
Genocide hints In Kobane, there was only one sign of the possibility of committing genocide against Kurds. Rudaw, quoting PYD co-chair Saleh Muslim, mobilized for the intervention of the international community to prevent a potential genocide by ISIS against Kurds in Kobane.211 Thus, Rudaw’s message was supportive and carried a nationalist agenda that entailed Kurdish solidarity on the one hand while calling for the international community to intervene before Kobane fell to ISIS. Unlike ANF’s direct and sharp language, it showed indirect hints of possible genocide against Kurds. As concerns Afrin, a Rudaw article entitled Afrin civilians claim targeted by Turkey- backed militias when returning showed the victimhood of other religious minorities in Afrin following the Turkish military operation in the region. Rudaw aimed to deliver a message that Turkey might be involved in a possible genocidal action, particularly by recalling the Yezidi genocide in Iraq.212 The key aim, however, seemed to be to pressure Turkey and the West, albeit coupled with indirect criticism, to put an end to the conflict in the Kurdish region. Rudaw, citing the Yezidi genocide survivor and UN Goodwill Ambassador Nadia Murad, mobilized the world against Turkish invasion of Afrin. It apparently quoted various sources claiming that Kurds were being attacked, and this can be understood within the nationalistic framework despite the moderate criticism of Turkey. Yet, quoting Murad’s statement could have been a means of exerting pressure as it lashed out at the Turkish mass violence in Rojava, whether against Kurds or other minorities, including the Yezidis. Rudaw used emotional language in terms like “horror,” “ethnic cleansing,” “genocide,” and “to heal wounds”:
“This horror is reminiscent of the initial actions of ISIS in Iraq… This situation foreshadows ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide,” she stated,
210 “Occupation Troops Send Father Photo of His Murdered Son,” Firat News Agency, December 23, 2019. 211 “Kurdish Leader Calls for US Airstrikes around Kobane,” Rudaw, October 27, 2014. 212 “Afrin Civilians Claim Targeted by Turkey-Backed Militias When Returning,” Rudaw, March 30, 2018.
61 stressing that now is the time “to heal wounds” and prevent violence in Iraq and Syria.213 We still find nationalist leanings in the background of Rudaw’s coverage of genocide hints. For instance, it connected Afrin with Shingal – where the Yezidis were exposed to genocide in 2014 – in its themes, creating a sense of solidarity with Afrin and raising warning messages that it faced the same destiny. Therefore, Rudaw put Turkey and its Syrian militia proxies on the same level as ISIS as perpetrators while presenting the people of Afrin and the Yezidis on the same level as victims. Still, criticism was indirect, by means of quoting YPG-linked sources, meaning lighter criticism of the violators, namely Turkey, than that of the ANF.214 As for Sere Kaniye, Rudaw, citing a Kurdish protester, indirectly depicted the Turkish incursion as a future genocide for Kurdistan. As a result, the negative images created for Turkey concerning the mass violence in Rojava could be put under the banner “pressuring Turkey to stop its military operations in Rojava.” One protestor showed full support for Rojava through Rudaw: “Turkey’s operation against Kurdish forces there is the ‘next genocide for Kurdistan,’ said one protester.”215 This again supports the framing theory of Entman, as Rudaw defined a problem, evaluated it ethically, and then provided a solution. Rudaw also hinted at the Armenian genocide. It created a picture of the Turks having annihilated the Armenians and now possibly repeating history by attacking the Christians dwelling in the areas surrounding Sere Kaniye by citing the spokesman of the Assyrian militia, Nabil Warde. This can be labeled indirect criticism and mobilization against the Turkish incursion into Rojava.216 ANF made no genocide hints in its Kobane coverage but mentioned the term “genocide” in two ways in relation to Afrin. First, it directly termed the mass violence against Kurds a genocide. Second, it mentioned the term within a sentence or an expression that referred to the act of genocide by citing pro-PKK/PYD or anti-Turkey opinions. In other words, it hinted at genocide in two ways: the term was explicitly and directly used by attaching it to the actions of the Turkish army and its Syrian militias and indirectly used by citing anti-Turkish opinions.
213 “Hundreds of Civilians Flee Afrin,” Rudaw, March 12, 2018. 214 “Turkey Commits ‘Massacre’ in Afrin, 13 Civilians Killed,” Rudaw, March 5, 2018. 215 “Kurds in Erbil Protest Turkish Invasion of Northeast Syria for Second Time in Three Days,” Rudaw, October 12, 2019. 216 “In Northeast Syria, Last Assyrians Fear Turkish Advance,” Rudaw, November 19, 2019.
62 Reactions are growing against the Turkish state’s genocidal attacks against Afrin Canton of Northern Syria, as well as solidarity with the historic resistance in Afrin… Selay Ghaffar continued; “We wish we could hold a demonstration here in Kabul in support of Afrin resistance movement and condemn the fascist regime of Erdogan and other imperialistic countries who are just watching this genocide but unfortunately due the security reason we are not allowed to do any action on the street.”217 As a result, ANF’s language and criticism were more direct and harsher than those of Rudaw. When covering mass violence in Sere Kaniye, it attached the term genocide to the Turkish president Erdogan218 and cited the expression “genocidal campaign,” used by SDF-allied Christian militant group the Syriac Military Council.219 Similarly, ANF quoted the PKK executive leader, Murat Karayilan, saying that the Turkish “barbaric genocide” policy was being implemented in sight of the entire world.220 Finally, it cited Cemil Bayik, the top field commander of Turkey’s PKK, who said that the Turkish state intended to commit genocide in northeastern Syria.221 Thus, ANF launched either direct accusations of genocide against Turkey or indirect ones by citing PKK/PYD figures or sources from allied groups.
Civilians arrested Rudaw reported no arrest records in its articles covering violence in Kobane. However, many of its articles covering the mass violence in Afrin encompass reports of the arrest of Kurdish civilians. In an article entitled Syrian militias arrest, kill Kurds accused of YPG ties in Afrin, for instance, Rudaw cited the SOHR to show the arrest of dozens by Turkish-backed Syrian militiamen. Still, Rudaw followed its nationalist agenda by transmitting specific nationalistic messages through which it enhanced the concept of Kurdishness, as in the title.222 Rudaw, citing Amnesty International, also revealed the arrest of scores of civilians by Turkish-backed militias in Afrin. Thus, it put them in a negative light and, thereby,
217 “Attack on Afrin Is a War Crime, Doomed to Fail,” Firat News Agency, March 4, 2018. 218 “Call for an International Inspection of Weapons Used by Turkey,” Firat News Agency, October 20, 2019. 219 “Five Fighters of the Syriac Military Council Fell in Battle,” Firat News Agency, November 15, 2019. 220 “People’s Resistance: DAY 5 - LIVE BLOG,” Firat News Agency, October 13, 2019. 221 “People’s Resistance: DAY 12 - LIVE BLOG,” Firat News Agency, October 20, 2019. 222 “Syrian Militias Arrest, Kill Kurds Accused of YPG Ties in Afrin,” Rudaw, April 13, 2018.
63 as an implied message and a suggested solution, pressured Turkey and the world to end abuses against Rojava’s Kurds.223 Again, Rudaw’s criticism of Turkey and its proxy militias seems to be indirect, and light compared to ANF’s. By revealing the stories of captives arrested by the Turkish-backed militants, Rudaw undertook to prove the offenses in a more sentimental style, depicting Turkey as an “occupying power” and its actions through its proxies are “dirty” ones. Rudaw stated that “As the occupying power, Turkey must provide full reparation to those whose homes have been confiscated, destroyed, or looted by security forces or by their allies… Amnesty documented at least 86 cases of arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance… It cannot evade responsibility by using Syrian armed groups to carry out its dirty work.”224 The theme implied a perpetrator, namely Turkey and its militia proxies, on the one hand, and victims, who were civilians, on the other. The details of a man’s transfer from a detention to another one and the terms “screaming echoed through the building,” “beaten,” and “tortured” reflected sympathy with victims in the text, which was taken from Amnesty International, thus again representing an indirect criticism of Turkey’s presence in Rojava.225 Quoting an arrest victim, Rudaw stated that:
“I was taken to the al-Ra’i prison in Azaz operated by Sultan Mourad. I wasn’t tortured, but I saw men being beaten in front of me by members of Sultan Mourad just for fun, and at night the sound of men screaming echoed through the building. I was released without seeing a judge. I thought I would never make it out of there,” he added.226 Rudaw interviewed a local journalist to show Sere Kaniye was in a dire situation as perpetrators had looted, destroyed, and burned properties. This image was coupled with the theme of displaced civilian returnees being arrested for interrogations lasting for several days. We still observe nationalist leanings in Rudaw’s text as it employed the term “Kurdish” in its depiction of these abuses.227 Therefore, Kurdish persecution was
223 “Turkish-Backed Rebels Violating Human Rights in Afrin,” Rudaw, August 2, 2018. 224 Ibid. 225 “Turkish-Backed Rebels Violating Human Rights in Afrin.” 226 “Turkish-Backed Rebels Violating Human Rights in Afrin.” 227 “Turkish-Backed Groups Continue Looting, Lawlessness in Sari Kani,” Rudaw, November 14, 2019.
64 made salient by Rudaw, albeit with indirect criticism, and thus became easily remembered by the audience. ANF “directly” reported the arrest of Kurdish civilians from Rojava inside Turkey, severely criticizing Turkey for arresting civilians because they supported Kobane’s battle against ISIS.228 Again, therefore, ANF, unlike Rudaw, criticized the perpetrators directly with more extreme language. No depictions of arrests by ANF are recorded; however, several cases were witnessed in Sere Kaniye.229
Explosions, car bombs/booby traps In Kobane, Rudaw depicted how explosions targeted Kurdish civilians when they were returning to their homes after the battle ended between the Kurdish forces and ISIS. The mines planted in Kobane’s roads, abandoned houses, and schools by ISIS before their withdrawal led to the death of scores of civilians.230 Yet, the language used towards the perpetrators remained critical but indirect; we see no words such as “gangs” or “mercenaries,” as we do in ANF’s coverage. The case of Afrin seems identical in some ways; however, it differs in terms of the identified perpetrators, namely Turkish-backed Syrian proxy militias. When several civilians were killed in a car bomb attack in the city of Afrin,231 Rudaw depicted the victimhood of Kurdish civilians indirectly again by citing the SOHR. Rudaw stated— using terms like “proxies” and “occupation” that suggest criticism of Turkey — that “They reported a car bomb had exploded. The city is currently occupied by the Turkish military and its proxy loyalists… At least nine people were killed, including five civilians.”232A year after Turkey’s Syrian proxies had taken over Afrin, Rudaw’s implied message read: “Since the Syrian proxies backed by Turkey are controlling the region, there will be no stability and security!” Hence, it implied that the instability experienced was absolute evidence of the serious mistake Turkey had made by
228 “13 People from Rojava Taken into Custody in Amed,” Firat News Agency, October 21, 2014. 229 “HRW: Civilians abused by Turkish-backed groups in ‘safe zones’,” Firat News Agency, November 27, 2019. 230 “40 Returning Kobane Residents Killed by Mines and Booby Traps since Liberation,” Rudaw, March 29, 2015. 231 “UPDATE: Car bomb kills 9 in downtown Afrin: monitor,” Rudaw, December 16, 2018. 232 “UPDATE.”
65 occupying Afrin.233 Rudaw thus implicitly criticized Turkey’s incursion into Afrin and supported the SDF from a nationalist perspective. The perpetrators, Syrian militias backed by Turkey, were also depicted negatively and indirectly in Sere Kaniye. Thus, the notion of “villains” vs “victims” was enhanced, albeit indirectly, in the texts. Citing a rights group, Rudaw put these Turkish backed militias in a negative light, using terms like “invade” and “proxies”. Rudaw stated that:
A car bomb exploded Thursday afternoon in the northern town of Sari Kani (Ras al-Ain), killing at least one civilian and injuring one other. A rights group reported a second explosion in the town – recently taken from Kurdish forces by Turkey and its Syrian proxies … Turkey was able to invade both Sari Kani and Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) in its ‘Operation Peace Spring’234 As for ANF, depicted the mines planted by ISIS in the town of Kobane and some areas outside which led to the death and injury of dozens of civilians, including children.235 Unlike Rudaw, however, ANF criticized ISIS perpetrators severely, using the descriptive term “gang.” Thus, although both outlets negatively depicted the perpetrators, they differed in their descriptive language. ANF depicted the explosions taking place in the areas occupied by Turkey and its “mercenaries” gave the impression that the remaining people were living in a hell where chaos and instability spread everywhere.236 Rudaw stated:
The explosion occurred in the city center. It was reported that there were dead and wounded in the explosion… The Turkish state launched its attacks against Afrin on 20 January 2018 and occupied the city on 18 March. Since then, war crimes have been committed systematically in the region.237 So, ANF referred to the violence, explosions, and chaotic situation in Afrin, blaming Turkey’s “occupation” of the area but simultaneously avoiding naming the groups who stood behind the explosion.238 This can be categorized under the partisan banner. The same strategy was applied by both media outlets to other depictions of mass violence, such as massacres, torture and abduction of civilians, war crimes accusations,
233 “Kurds Call on World Not to Forget Afrin a Year after Turkish Invasion,” Rudaw, January 20, 2019. 234 “Deadly Car Bombs Target Turkish-Held Town in North Syria,” Rudaw, December 5, 2019. 235 “2 People Wounded in ISIS Attacks Die,” Firat News Agency, September 28, 2014. 236 “Explosions in Afrin: dead among Turkey-linked mercenaries,” Firat News Agency, July 29, 2019. 237 “Explosion in Afrin.” 238 “Explosion in Afrin: dead among Turkey-linked mercenaries,” Firat News Agency, April 28, 2019.
66 prohibited weapons being used, gender/sexual violence, etc. The same results for the same reasons were present in the texts. To conclude, the sole rationale for the differences found in the views of the media outlets – whether harsh language, criticism, or direct and indirect discourse – is the ideologically governed media texts. Rudaw’s rightist nationalist ideology was clearly and significantly promoted by enhancing Kurdishness in most of its texts, whereas its partisan agendas showed an obvious bias towards the KRG, including the KDP, with a clear ideological proximity which its political patron, PDK, shared with Turkey, most likely, for geopolitical and economic reasons.239 On the other hand, ANF’s leftist nationalist ideology is emphasized in the texts, promoting simultaneously both nationalist and partisan agendas which are essentially attributed to the very socialist- Marxist leanings inherited by its patron, the PKK – which shared a decades-long insurgency with Turkey – and its various branches in the region, including Syria.
Assessment of media language and attitude
As noted above, some variables in the text assessed for both outlets detected in the analysis, such as nationalist leanings, mobilization, negative language, positive language, partisan agendas, media propaganda, and victimhood, are among the variables of text analysis generated through the deductive approach (see Table 2). They are illustrated in this section based on their relevance to the research questions. These variables or parameters, I would say, are detected quantitatively and qualitatively for the frequency of words and themes. As noted above, Rudaw and ANF depicted violence from both partisan- and nationalist-agenda perspectives. Yet, the way they portrayed violence seems different, although identical in some respects. Obviously, Rudaw carefully referred to the Turkish involvement in the mass violence against Rojava. Rudaw’s careful presenting of Turkish mass violence was considerably different from that of the ANF. We conclude that the ideologically-governed texts are the rationale behind the differences in language tone and discourse. To observe how ideology is reflected in the content of both outlets, we should refer to the quantitatively analyzed texts, in which the frequency and percentage of both
239 “Turkey and the KRG,” The Washington Institute, March 16, 2015.
67 partisan and nationalist orientations are recorded. The results show that both outlets were ideologically driven. Rudaw was substantially driven by nationalist leanings but moderately by partisan agendas, whereas ANF was moderately driven by both nationalist and partisan agendas. The study has classified ideology as partisan and nationalistic based on the inductive method. Addressing the definition of ideology per se is outside the scope of this thesis; for our purposes, both nationalist and partisan leanings/agendas are simply seen as ideologies. Hence, both outlets used two types of agenda during their coverage of the mass violence in Rojava, which can be simply attributed to their patronship of the Kurdish leftist PKK and rightist PDK political parties. Still, based on the text analysis, the two forms of ideology were interwoven to some extent. With Rudaw, nationalist ideology recorded a frequency of 93.2% compared to a frequency of only 50.5% for partisan ideology. Still, both nationalist and partisan ideologies were interwoven in coverage of developments in the three regions of Rojava studied. Indeed, the nationalist agenda focused on the solidarity and fraternity between Kurds, and the use of adjectives and terms referring to Kurdishness enhanced this premise, whereas the partisan ideology played a role in boosting the positions of the PDK/KRG and PKK/PYD as political parties. Simultaneously, both ideologies, the nationalist and partisan, are seen to be interwoven on many occasions during the process of text analysis (see Figure 11). The qualitative analysis illustrates thematically the above findings. In the case of ANF, the partisan and nationalist ideologies were identified moderately in its articles. Both forms of ideology seem to appear to approximately the same degree in ANF articles (see Figure 11). It seems that ANF occasionally accused the PDK of having relations with Turkey, the major enemy of Kurds, from the perspective of the PKK (with which ANF is affiliated); it seems that Rudaw, in contrast, mobilized against PKK policies, urging the Syrian Kurdish PYD to distance itself from the PKK.
68 Figure 11. A Venn diagram of the impact of ideology on media representation of mass violence.
Sources: Rudaw, ANF, 2014–2019.
The role of ideology in Kurdish media
Rudaw showed nationalist leanings in multiple contexts in content covering mass violence in Kobane, Afrin, and Sere Kaniye. It highlighted the concept of solidarity between the Peshmerga and YPG forces as part of such leanings, framing the joint fight of these Kurdish forces against ISIS, which attacked Kobane in 2014.
Meanwhile, a combined force of Peshmerga and Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) fighters continued fighting in the city’s south and along a key road to Aleppo, where they have recently begun offensive operations.240 We can also see Kurdishness in many themes created by Rudaw covering developments in Afrin. For instance, it used the adjective “Kurdish” for the enclave of
240 “Huge Explosions in East Kobane,” Rudaw, November 17, 2014.
69 Afrin, which can be perceived as a nationalist-leaning approach and one not seen in ANF’s editorial policy.
At least five people were killed in a dawn bombing in the Turkish- controlled Kurdish enclave of Afrin in northwest Syria on Thursday, according to several sources.241 Use of the word “Kurdish” is seen strongly in the editorial policy of Rudaw. It was repeatedly attached to the YPG, which put it in a nationalist framework but implicitly combatted the ideological inheritance of the PYD and PKK, which controlled the YPG’s decision making as a Kurdish military force. Indeed, Rudaw professionally described the YPG as Syrian Kurds or Kurdish forces who should distance themselves from the PKK and its agendas. Yet, Rudaw’s utilization of particular themes might have aroused the national spirit of its Kurdish audience, especially by putting the struggle of the YPG in Kobane, Sere Kaniye, and Afrin against the “invaders” in a positive light despite its criticism of the YPG’s links to the PKK. For example, we can see Kurdishness or nationalist leanings in the following text, where the adjective “Kurdish” was used twice in a brief passage:
The Kurdish YPG force has vowed to stage “resistance” in response to the Turkish military aggression against the Kurdish canton of Afrin, as it warned that the latest development will pave the way for the revival of ISIS.242 In addition, Kurdish nationhood and symbols were highlighted as Turkey destroyed the symbolic statue of Kawa the Blacksmith (“a symbol of resistance, as Kawa is a Kurdish hero famous for having led a revolt against a murderous king”243). This is not a symbol of the PYD or PKK; rather, it carries an extraordinary meaning for Kurdish people across the globe. Thus, emphasizing nationhood and Kurdish symbols fostered the national spirit of the audience and boosted their identity as Kurds.244 Rudaw’s interwoven nationalist and partisan ideology was also present in its text. An example was its report of the request of the KRG president, Nichirvan Barzani, to Moscow to pressure Turkey to halt its attacks on Syrian Kurds. The expression “to protect Syrian Kurds” implied nationalist leanings and sympathy with Syrian Kurds
241 “Five Dead in Afrin Blast,” Rudaw, October 31, 2019. 242 “Turkey Launches Deadly Military Operation against Afrin in Rojava,” Rudaw, January 20, 2018. 243 “Kawa the Blacksmith: Kurdish Symbol of Resistance,” France 24, March 19, 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180319-kawa-blacksmith-kurdish-symbol-resistance. 244 “From Afrin to Erbil: One refugee family’s journey,” Rudaw, May 2, 2018.
70 while a political figure (Barzani) seemed to be put in a positive light. Thus, we see both ideologies interwoven to address mass violence in Rojava (see Figure 11). In other words, Rudaw boosted the Kurdish national spirit on the one hand while fostering the KDP’s political stance on the other.
Barzani reportedly called on Russia, the Syrian regime’s main foreign backer, to protect Syria’s Kurds from Turkish attack when Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Erbil on October 7. Lavrov has said Russia is trying to kick-start talks between Damascus and the SDF to reach a settlement.245 The nationalist leanings in ANF’s content can be detected in its editorial policy, which focused on the Kurdish language, in particular by writing the names of people and towns in its articles. The following text, for instance, is evidence of the ANF’s stylebook of editing an English text while keeping Kurdish letters for the majority of terms and words referring to the name of individuals and places: “YPG Commander Mahmud Berxwedan said… into Kobanê,” states ANF.246 Still, not all the names were captured fully in Kurdish; for instance, the name “Mahmud” should have been “Mehmûd”, and the name Kobane is “Kobanê” in Kurdish (Kurmanji script). Of course, this can be attributed to the editor him/herself, who was likely one of many Kurdish editors working at this media organization, or it could be simply the stylebook agreed upon by the ANF editorial board. Still, Kurdish names written in pure Kurdish may allude to nationalist leanings in the text in some way, as Kurds were officially banned from writing in Kurdish for decades, paralleling the theme’s nationalist tone. As a result, we observe that ANF presented names and locations in Kurdish rather than transliterated into English as in Rudaw. The context revealed a clear nationalist agenda, which perhaps echoed Rudaw’s coverage of the Kobane battle between ISIS and Kurdish forces. The text below shows solidarity between both Kurdish forces, which belong to political parties with almost opposing ideologies, namely the KDP and PYD/PKK. Thereby, solidarity in the text might have raised the Kurdish people’s national aspirations and thus changed their perception of events.
245 “UN Security Council Must Intervene, Stop Turkish War in Syria,” Rudaw, October 10, 2019. 246 “YPG Acting with the Peshmerga like a Single Army,” Firat News Agency, November 4, 2014.
71 In an article entitled YPG Acting with the Peshmerga as a single Army, ANF followed a national-leaning approach by praising the coordination between Kurdish forces, represented in the expression “like a single army”:
Commander Mahmud Berxwedan said after the Peshmerga forces crossed into Kobanê they have acted like a single army, rather than in coordination. We were delighted to welcome a Kurdish force to Kobanê. It has created national feeling throughout Kurdistan.247 ANF raised the national spirit of the Kurds when it quoted the revolutionary sentences chanted by YPG fighters. Chanting in Kurdish, also written in Kurmanji script, brought the text close to the Kurdish reader, who might perceive the picture differently: it would be memorable and hence change his/her perception of Kobane’s battle, enhancing his/her national spirit. The following text shows the ANF’s portrayal of Kurdish motivation for struggle in Kurdistan:
… the YPG fighters who are continuing to sing a patriotic song: “Keç û xortên şoreşvan şer dikin ji bo Kûrdîstan… (Revolutionary women and men are fighting for Kurdistan).”248 An article entitled French senator: It is absurd to maintain the PKK in the terrorist list, ANF showed a clear overlapping between the national aspirations and the PKK’s positive role and shed light upon the latter’s fight against ISIS terrorists. It is apparent that ANF was putting the PKK in a positive light, and the message from the text seems to imply a call for the international community to drop the PKK group from the terror list. Also, we see the word “Kurds,” which indicates the text’s nationalist orientation. The following text thus contains the interwoven partisan and nationalist agendas observed in ANF’s content:
The struggle of the PKK against ISIS hasn’t only saved the life of tens of thousands in both Sinjar and Kobanê, but also not allowed the gangs to succeed in their plan to capture the regions inhabited by Kurds and other minorities and communities by means of savage massacres.249 In an article on Afrin, entitled YPJ fighter from Turkey: Rojava was an inspiration to us all, both nationalist and partisan ideologies came to the surface. The analysis captured nationalism by emphasizing the freedom of the Kurdish people while the partisan ideology – which stemmed from the ideas of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan
247 “YPG Acting with the Peshmerga like a Single Army,” Firat News Agency, November 4, 2014. 248 “Botan Operation Initiates Victory Phase in Kobanê,” Firat News Agency, December 9, 2014. 249 “French Senator: It is absurd to maintain the PKK in the terrorist list,” Firat News Agency, November 18, 2014.
72 – represented the concept of “democratic confederalism” theorized by Ocalan himself. This is apparent when the text spoke about the freedom of other peoples: an idea, from Ocalan’s perspective, that could be the best alternative to achieve peace and stability outside the monopolization of nation-state systems.
The revolutionary winds have blown in Rojava since 2011. The Rojava Revolution continues to grow and includes eastern and western Syria and taken on the responsibility of the freedom of Kurdish people, women and other Middle Eastern peoples in the area.250 Another key theme presented by Rudaw was the demand for the PYD to distance itself from the PKK. This theme echoed the KDP’s and Barzani’s political demands.251 KRG wanted the PYD/YPG to copy the KRG’s political experience with Turkey. However, the PYD/YPG’s deep connection with the PKK’s ideology seemed to prevent such an option. This text shows the request for detachment from the PKK: “Ankara is opposed to the PYD because of its close links to a Kurdish militant group in Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),” Rudaw stated.252 Consequently, Rudaw seemed to boost the position of the KDP against the PKK as a clear partisan play. To conclude, partisan ideology has been detected variously and in many Rudaw articles. However, the theme in which partisan agendas were most clearly seen is the YPG’s links to the PKK, where Rudaw repeatedly boosted the argument put forward by KDP/KRG, namely the need for YPG to keep a distance from the PKK. This theme can be seen throughout Rudaw’s coverage of the mass violence in Rojava.
President of the Kurdistan Region Nechirvan Barzani said on Tuesday that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had previously warned Syrian Kurdish authorities to distance themselves from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), adding that the PKK’s struggle for legitimacy in the area led to the Turkish invasion.253 On the other hand, ANF mobilized against ISIS and gave an indirect message about Rojava’s revolution based on Ocalan’s “democratic confederalism” system, thus enhancing the viability of the PKK’s partisan views in Rojava.254
250 “YPJ Fighter from Turkey: Rojava was an inspiration to us all,” Firat News Agency, July 20, 2019. 251 “Turkey and the KRG,” The Washington Institute, March 16, 2015. 252 “Kobane’s Defenders Ally with Syria’s Mainstream Opposition,” Rudaw, October 19, 2014. 253 “President Barzani: PKK struggle for legitimacy led to Turkish operation at expense of Syrian Kurds,” Rudaw, November 5, 2019. 254 “Urgent Call for Aid for 180 Thousand People from Kobanê,” Firat News Agency, November 14, 2014.
73 The international community and all the democratic powers must urgently take concrete steps to stop the ISIS gangs attempting to throttle the Rojava Revolution.255 Moreover, ANF showed the negative role of capitalism when it connected the US withdrawal from northern Syria with global capitalism, which is known historically as the sole opponent of the socialism from which the PKK’s ideology stems. It suggested that the US wanted to preserve the Sykes-Picot agreement by engaging the UK and France in the region while it withdrew. This might constitute the basis of the conflict in the Middle East, from ANF’s perspective.
So, what will happen? It appears that global capitalism is a sort of “effort to update the Sykes-Picot Agreement” as the US tries to further engage France and Britain with its withdrawal of military forces from Syria.256 ANF provided a theme that depicted the PKK’s revolution as establishing a Middle Eastern confederation as the only way to end conflict and instability in this corner of the world, as promoted by Ocalan.257 Another important theme concerned putting KDP in a negative light. In an article about Afrin, ANF connected the Turkish policies in Rojava with the KDP’s policies in Basur (a variant name of the Kurdish region in northern Iraq). In its coverage of certain events happening in the KRI, ANF created frames concerning the relation of the KDP with the Turkish state against the PKK. It also mobilized against the KDP’s policies, which was likely a partisan agenda in which it tried to boost the PKK’s position while undermining the KDP’s, because it apparently believed the PKK might govern all the Kurds instead.
The Turkish state has launched a new invasion operation. They invaded the Lelikan Hill in Xakurke last year with KDP’s support and now they want to invade the Ciyaye Sekif in Xakurke, with KDP support once again. In tandem with the Turkish state attacks, the KDP has sent the Peshmerga and heavy weapons to guerrilla zones, which shows they have a dirty plan in place. The KDP starting a de facto invasion against guerrilla zones during the AKP-MHP fascist alliance’s invasion operation is reminiscent of the KDP-Turkish state relationship in the 1990s. Remember, the KDP attacked the guerrilla alongside the Turkish state in 1996, 1997 and 1998. In 1992, the KDP and YNK attacked the guerrilla together, in a separate period.258
255 Ibid. 256 “Middle East: A complex scenario,” Firat News Agency, April 24, 2018. 257 Ibid. 258 “Turkey Attacks, KDP Wants to Lay Siege,” Firat News Agency, June 5, 2019.
74 ANF put Murat Karaiylan, a high-ranking PKK official, in a positive light by covering his call to the US to impose a no-fly zone on Rojava to prevent any attack by Turkey on the region. This was a clear pro-PKK perspective concerning Rojava.259 Thus, Turkey opposed and attacked any democratic project in Syria, particularly the democratic autonomous administration in Rojava, from ANF’s perspective, which was led by the PKK ideology.260 To shed light upon Ocalan’s idea of “democratic confederalism”, it is necessary to understand the transformation of the PKK’s radical socialist-nationalist ideology into a more advanced vision of a viable solution for the decades-long conflict with Turkey. In short, in his book Democratic Confederalism, Ocalan stressed the failure of the nation- state system as a paradigm of the capitalist modernity in the 1970s to provide coexistence and stability in the region.261 Hence, his suggested solution stemmed from a new vision based on the concept of “democratic confederalism,” which Ocalan defined as “a kind of rule or administration that can be called a non-state political administration or a democracy without a state. Democratic decision-making processes must not be confused with the processes known from public administration. States only administrate while democracies govern.”262 He added:
Democratic confederalism is open towards other political groups and factions. It is flexible, multi-cultural, anti-monopolistic, and consensus- oriented. Ecology and feminism are central pillars.263 This new vision came after Ocalan’s arrest in 1999 – during which many thought the PKK was weakened – and continued until the peace talks initiated between Turkey and the PKK in the 2000s finally resulted in a ceasefire in 2013. However, as seen in the discussion above, Kurdish outrage at the Turkish government’s lack of assistance for Kurds in Kobane in 2014 undermined these talks. An ISIS-linked explosion in the largely Kurdish city of Diyarbakir in June 2015 also intensified tensions between Kurds and the Turkish government.264 As a result, the Turkish occupation of Afrin and Sere Kaniye followed in 2018 and 2019. Since then, Turkey has introduced a new approach in its battle against the PKK since the collapse of the peace talks between them, an
259 “People’s Resistance: DAY 5 - LIVE BLOG,” Firat News Agency, October 13, 2019. 260 “PKK: Every house and street will be a battlefield,” Firat News Agnecy, October 10, 2019. 261 Öcalan, Democratic Confederalism, 8. 262 Ibid., 21. 263 Ibid., 21. 264 “Turkey Is Being Torn Apart by ISIS Bombings and Kurdish Clashes,” Huffington Post, January 14, 2016.
75 approach bolstered by the state of emergency. The stated objective is the destruction of the PKK.265 On the other hand, Turkey’s relations with KRG and the KDP are strong for geopolitical and economic reasons. The Turkish government and KRG are deeply engaged in economic agreements because both sides enjoy security and prosperity through this alliance. This relationship is much complex than it sounds because Turkey’s dealings with the KRG give it high levels of control, partial ownership, and proximity, enhancing its position as a regional patron as well as proposing new strategies for dealing with one of the biggest threats: the dispute with the PKK and the recent emergence of the PKK-affiliated group of YPG in neighboring Syria.266 The deployment of Turkish military points in Kurdistan region recently proves all these analyses.267 To conclude, all these factors seem to interact and thus reshape the partisan ideologies of both major Kurdish political parties which, in turn, are seen in the Kurdish media organizations of Rudaw and ANF.
The role of actors through media lens
To qualitatively analyze and explore the role of multiple actors respecting Rojava’s mass violence, we should scrutinize the themes created and the language employed by both Kurdish media outlets, taking Rudaw’s descending order as the basis for a comparison of their views.
Turkey
From Rudaw’s perspective, Turkey’s role was negative respecting developments in Rojava. In Kobane, for instance, Turkey’s inaction regarding participation in the fight against ISIS268 and its construction of a wall separating Kurds on both sides of the border are considerable issues.269 By quoting multiple sources, including statements
265 Wasilewski, “Turkey’s New Anti-PKK Strategy: Consequences and Feasibility,” 1-2. 266 Till F. Paasche and Howri Mansurbeg, “Kurdistan Regional Government–Turkish Energy Relations: A Complex Partnership,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 55, no. 2 (March 4, 2014): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2014.942339. 267 “Ankara Has Built Nearly 40 ‘Military Points’ in Kurdistan Region,” Rudaw, July 6, 2020. 268 “Kurdish Leader Calls for US Airstrikes around Kobane,” Rudaw, September 27, 2014. 269 “UPDATED: Turkish forces open fire on protesters in Kobane, 2 killed, 40 injured,” Rudaw, September 2, 2016.
76 and reports from the YPG and its affiliated media outlets, such as ANHA and Jinha, Rudaw indirectly criticized Turkish “aggression” against Kurdish areas of Rojava.270 However, other aspects of Turkey’s role were seen as relatively positive, particularly its hosting of wounded men and women from the YPG and Peshmerga fighters in its medical units or hospitals during the battle of Kobane.271 Besides, thousands of civilians were hosted on its territories, wherein Turkey facilitated the work of humanitarian organizations.272 Rudaw showed that Turkey also gave passage to the Peshmerga forces through its land, coordinating with the KRG, which can be deemed an indirect support for Kobane’s fighters against ISIS, from Rudaw’s perspective.273 So, Rudaw depicted both the positive and negative role of Turkey in its coverage of Kobane. Indeed, its editorial policy seemed far more balanced in its criticism of Turkey than ANF’s, albeit through indirect discourse. The same strategy was adopted in covering Afrin and Sere Kaniye; however, no positive role was detected, and it used indirect language to make criticism. Quoting from Reuters, the relatively balanced discourse of Rudaw reflected the pragmatic policy the KRI followed in neighborly relations with Turkey, especially since the latter represented a big economic regional power that shared deep economic relations with the KRG. This may explain the moderate criticism of the Turkish role, compared to that of the ANF. Generally, Rudaw’s editorial policy seems more balanced in its criticism of Turkey. ANF directly depicted Turkey as the major factor leading to mass violence against civilians and the destruction of the “democratic project” of Syrian Kurds. Turkey was seen by ANF as holding meetings with ISIS “gangs,” transferring ammunition, and providing them with advanced weapons.274 Turkish media supported ISIS by launching media propaganda against the YPG forces, boosting ISIS while weakening YPG’s morale.275 Turkey, from ANF’s perspective, sought to bargain with the anti-ISIS coalition, stopping helping the Kurds, and thus endeavored to destroy the “democratic project” – based on Ocalan’s views – in Rojava. As a result, Turkey used ISIS to further
270 “YPG Claim They Killed 2 Turkish Soldiers near Kobane,” Rudaw, December 13, 2017. 271 “Peshmerga Commander: Kurdish forces control 85 percent of Kobane,” Rudaw, January 14, 2015. 272 Ibid. 273 “First Batch of Peshmerga Forces Return from Kobane,” Rudaw, December 4, 2014. 274 “Turkish Soldiers Met Gangs on Kobanê Border Last Night,” Firat News Agency, October 3, 2014. 275 “Turkish Media Lies Exposed,” Firat News Agency, September 22, 2014.
77 its goals in Rojava, and it is not surprising that the ANF was deeply critical of Turkey, accusing it of playing a dubious part in the battle of Kobane.276 Similarly, Turkey employed Syrian paramilitary proxies with the same mentality as ISIS, according to ANF; the only distinctions between the two groups were their names and clothing. Indeed, Turkey’s position seemed “malevolent” to the “democratic project” of Syrian Kurds, in ANF’s framings. Also, in the intertwined themes of nationalist and partisan leanings in its text, particularly when Turkey targeted the Kurds and the “democratic project” for which they strove, ANF clarified in an article entitled Ankara’s only goal in Syria is exterminating Kurds that Erdogan’s primary aim in northern Syria was to prevent any Kurdish autonomy by quoting his comment.277 This was an admission on Erdogan’s part of a hostile stance towards Syrian Kurds, preventing them from building autonomy, from ANF’s perspective. ANF also showed Turkey’s endeavor to transfer millions of Syrian refugees into war zones, which it described as demographic change. However, ANF made use of international media in its criticism of Turkey to change or pressure Turkey and the EU and put an end to the Turkish incursion into the Syrian Kurdish regions.278 To conclude, Turkey’s role, in ANF’s view, was to end any Kurdish autonomy or “democratic project” in Syria, namely the democratic autonomous administration in Rojava. Indeed, ANF was led ideologically by the harsh PKK discourse against Turkey. Still, Rudaw depicted Turkey’s role in a more balanced and moderate way than ANF, showing instead the dark and bright sides of Turkey, that is, both positive and negative images, albeit indirectly.
ISIS
The role of ISIS was only depicted during the coverage of Kobane by both media outlets when the group’s massive offensive started in late 2014. However, its name was mentioned substantially during the coverage of Rojava, particularly in connection with the events in Kobane. Rudaw mainly depicted its aggressive role in capturing Kobane, where it was later defeated by the joint Kurdish forces of YPG and Peshmerga. The
276 “Who Is Planning What in Kobanê - Amed Dicle,” Firat News Agency, September 26, 2014. 277 “Ankara’s Only Goal in Syria Is Exterminating Kurds,” Firat News Agency, January 17, 2019. 278 “Turkey Forcibly Deported Refugees to Syria, Human Rights Organisations Say”, Firat News Agency, October 25, 2019.
78 ISIS offensive led to the destruction of the city and mass displacement of thousands of civilians, who fled to Turkey during the battles, from Rudaw’s perspective.279 Rudaw, governed by nationalist and partisan agendas, mostly depicted ISIS as an opponent of Kurds and their security forces, referring to them as the Islamic State or ISIS in its coverage. However, the term “terror group” was mentioned on several occasions, as in the quoted statement from KDP’s Barzani concerning Kobane’s reconstruction.280 Although it positively portrayed the Kurdish advancement over ISIS, Rudaw did not call ISIS a “gang” or “mercenaries,” as ANF did. Still, it gave the group various other names when citing third-party sources, such as “religious fanatics” when quoting the Peshmerga commander Ahmed Gerdi in Kobane.281 Two major actions by ISIS militant members were depicted by Rudaw. On the one hand, the group’s mining of civilians’ houses before its defeat caused many civilian casualties. On the other hand, ISIS besieged the city of Kobane for almost four months before launching its major offensive inside the city.282 So, while not belittling the group’s mass violence or use of heavy weapons, Rudaw regarded ISIS’s most deadly role, perhaps, as inserting mines in the residential areas of Kobane, which killed tens of civilians after the Kurdish forces drove them out of town, according to Rudaw.283 Rudaw finally recalled the genocide of Yezidis in Shingal which was committed by ISIS in early 2014. The comparison between ISIS in Kobane and Shingal gave an impression of the “aggressive” nature of the group towards Kurds, including Yezidis. So, Rudaw highlighted the threat of ISIS to the town of Kobane and warned the international community and its audience that a second Shingal was looming, particularly when the group took control of almost 75% of Kobane before the Peshmerga joined the fight alongside their fellow Syrian Kurds in the YPG.284 ANF, like Rudaw, depicted ISIS as the main perpetrator in displacing thousands of civilians and destroying Kobane. However, ANF portrayed ISIS as a “gang” which targeted the Internally displaced people (IDPs), mostly children and women who fled
279 “Kobane Has Become Another Stalingrad,” Rudaw, January 19, 2015. 280 “President Barzani: rebuilding Kobane is duty of all Kurds,” Rudaw, March 6, 2015. 281 “Peshmerga Commander: ISIS degraded in Kobane but gains are slow,” Rudaw, November 21, 2014. 282 “‘Kobane Has Become Another Stalingrad’: Peshmerga soldier,” Rudaw, January 19, 2015. 283 “40 Returning Kobane Residents Killed by Mines and Booby Traps since Liberation,” Rudaw, March 29, 2015. 284 “Kobane Kurds Warn of ‘Second Shingal’,” Rudaw, September 22, 2014.
79 Kobane.285 One of the main findings concerning the role of ISIS in the study is ANF’s depiction of them as “tools in the hands of the Turkish authorities,” a theme observed in several locations and occasions in the ANF data analyzed. Hence, the strong involvement of Turkey, as a state, was depicted as “facilitating ISIS presence” in the violence perpetrated in Rojava.286 ANF also depicted the role of ISIS in besieging Kobane and targeting thousands of civilians to break YPG’s resistance and be able to control the border town at the wishes of Turkey. Indeed, we cannot separate the visions of ANF from those of the PKK, which reflected Turkey’s hostility towards any Kurdish autonomy in Rojava.287 It obviously depicted ISIS as a transborder terrorist group that surpassed the limits of Kobane. For instance, when covering Afrin, ANF showed the relationship between Turkish attacks on Afrin and ISIS’ reemergence in Iraq (i.e., Mosul) and other Syrian areas (Raqqa and Tabqa). The coincidence between the eradication of ISIS and the start of Turkish attacks on Afrin showed an implied message that read: “there is a will by the Turkish government and its proxies to maintain chaos by reviving ISIS and thus put more pressure on the Kurdish forces, which may prevent ISIS from rearranging its ranks and relaunching attacks on Kurds.” Thus, ISIS’s cooperation with Turkey and their support for each other to implement their secret plans, including the eradication of the “democratic project” of Syrian Kurds, is what ANF attempted to convey.288 Simply, the Turkish state and ISIS were two sides of the same coin, according to the PKK’s message and thus ANF’s. ANF echoed the role of Turkey and ISIS, which might aim at destroying the “democratic project” of Syrian Kurds derived from the philosophy of Ocalan.289 With Sere Kaniye, ANF showed that ISIS had changed its clothes and was wearing those of the Turkish-backed Syrian “mercenaries” and had come to invade. So, its role surpassed the limits of Kobane, from ANF’s perspective; however, the focus on its activities in Rojava remained.290
285 “2 Killed, 4 Wounded as ISIS Target Civilians in Kobanê,” Firat News Agency, November 8, 2014. 286 “Asya Abdullah: ISIS reinforcements to Kobanê should be prevented,” Firat News Agency, October 26, 2014. 287 “Bayık: ISIS attacks on behalf of certain states,” Firat News Agency, October 1, 2014. 288 “ISIS Revived after Turkey’s Attacks against Afrin,” Firat News Agency, March 19, 2018. 289 “PKK Salutes the 7th Anniversary of the Rojava Revolution,” Firat News Agency, July 19, 2019. 290 “Ankara’s Only Goal in Syria Is Exterminating Kurds,” Firat News Agency, January 17, 2019.
80
US
Rudaw content depicted the US as playing a very direct positive and helpful role while also conveying some resentment. The US, for instance, pressured Turkey to allow the KRG’s Peshmerga to cross Turkish land into Kobane to assist their fellow Kurds in YPG fighting ISIS. The US’s positive role, along with the efficient role played by the KRG under Barzani in managing the plan, was present in Rudaw’s themes. Its texts reflected cooperation between the Kurdish forces, namely the YPG and Peshmerga, aligned with the anti-ISIS US-led coalition. In Kobane, two primary messages were presented by Rudaw. The first was: “Our victory as Kurds is in our unity!”, thus highlighting a nationalist agenda. The second was: “We have the greatest partner ever, i.e., the US.” So, Rudaw’s attitude to the US was clearly positive and friendly but it showed resentment frequently towards the U.S. policy (seen as relatively negative) of possibly withdrawing from Syria, which Rudaw predicted would have devastating consequences for Syrian Kurds. Under Trump, who became president of the US in 2016, Afrin and Sere Kaniye became live examples of Rojava’s occupied areas following the green light given by both Russia and the US to Turkey. We see an implied criticism of the US in Rudaw’s citing of a third-party statement, portraying the negative role of the US, albeit moderately.291 As for Afrin, Rudaw depicted that the US has explained occasionally that it urged Turkey not to invade the city, backing Turkey’s legitimate concerns regarding national security, particularly as the Syrian Kurdish groups organically linked to the PKK which has been labeled a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US, and the EU.292 Regarding Sere Kaniye, on the one hand Rudaw mentioned the US’ intention to pull its forces out of Syria, putting its Kurdish allies in a vulnerable position. On the other hand, the US had been depicted as a significant ally for years, helping to eliminate ISIS extremists from the region.293
US President Donald Trump appeared to greenlight a long-threatened Turkish operation against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
291 “Turkish Aggression against Kurdish Afrin Continues,” Rudaw, January 22, 2018. 292 “Turkey Launches Deadly Military Operation against Afrin in Rojava,” Rudaw, January 20, 2018. 293 “Civilians Killed, Injured as Turkish Shelling Restarts in Northeast Syria,” Rudaw, October 10, 2019.
81 in northern Syria on Sunday night, despite the SDF’s role as America’s key ally in the ground war against the Islamic State group (ISIS).294 In the same context, however, Rudaw stressed the later position of the US in resolving the problem by sending a delegation to Ankara and finding consensus.295 No ANF report of the US in Kobane was detected, possibly because of the focus on ISIS and Turkey in the battle between ISIS and the YPG. However, in Afrin and Sere Kaniye, ANF depicted both the positive and negative role of the US, largely because of developments on the ground. The negative role of the US was highlighted when the latter gave the green light to Turkey and its Syrian “mercenaries” to invade Sere Kaniye in agreement with Russia and Turkey.296 The positive role of the US appeared in ANF’s narratives when President Trump threatened Turkey, in a tweet, with economic destruction if it crossed the US’s red line and entered Rojava. Despite the green light to take over some border areas, like Sere Kaniye and Gire Spi, the US laid down red lines for Turkey concerning its presence inside Rojava.297 Likewise, in Afrin, ANF showed the US playing a mediatory role between the SDF forces and the Turkish authorities; the result was an agreement put into practice after nearly eight months of indirect talks. The agreement included joint patrols, with U.S. involvement from the air and on the ground. ANF, citing YPG’s commander-in-chief, showed that if the agreement were fully implemented, it would help ease the concerns of both parties.298 Yet, the US indirectly supported the invasion of Afrin by Turkey and its Syrian “mercenaries”, from ANF’s perspective.
For the same reason, they also attacked Afrin, forcing hundreds of thousands of Kurds to migrate. Unfortunately, the world forces closed their eyes to the attack on Afrin, Russia directly supported it, the US indirectly did the same.299 In regard to Sere Kaniye, the role of the US was negative and ambivalent according to the ANF, which showed that the US and EU, among others, provided the YPG with
294 “Syria Kurds, Assad Regime Hint at Partnership against Turkish Threat,” Rudaw, October 8, 2019. 295 “Turkish Opposition Calls for ‘Peaceful Approach’ in Northern Syria,” Rudaw, August 7, 2019. 296 “YPJ: We are ready to do whatever work or sacrifice is necessary,” Firat News Agency, October 23, 2019. 297 “Trump Said He Would Soon Issue Sanctions to Turkey,” Firat News Agency, October 14, 2019. 298 “SDF Commander General: We will not accept Erdoğan’s threats,” Firat News Agency, September 20, 2019. 299 “Ankara’s Only Goal in Syria Is Exterminating Kurds,” Firat News Agency, January 17, 2019.
82 military equipment to eradicate the ISIS terror group but denied political self- determination to Rojava. So, the message from this frame could be understood as the US having a double-standard position concerning the Rojava’s administration, supporting and approving Turkey’s intervention in Rojava.
The people of Rojava and North and East Syria, who have paid the greatest price in the fight against ISIS, are today under the attack of the invading Turkish state with ISIS and al-Nusra remnant fascist mercenaries with the approval and encouragement of the US and Russia, and they continue to pay heavy price.300 To conclude, both Rudaw and ANF depicted the US as playing both positive and negative roles in Rojava.
Syrian opposition militias
The role of Turkish-backed Syrian opposition militias was seen as negative by both outlets, echoing the Turkish perspective on YPG as the Syrian offshoot of the PKK. Rudaw’s portrayal of the role of Syrian opposition militias was the same across all three regions observed in the study. Killing and displacing thousands of civilians were the major images Rudaw associated with the Syrian opposition militias, as well as looting the properties and lands of Kurdish displaced civilians. To begin with how the role of the opposition militias was depicted concerning Kobane, one leading figure, Zahran Alloush, who spearheaded an army of approximately 45,000 rebel troops, vowed to “liberate” Kobane from “occupiers,” including Kurdish forces. His argument was identical to Turkey’s propaganda against the YPG.301 As such, Rudaw created a picture of these militias, albeit indirectly, as being mere “tools” in the hands of the Turkish intelligence, implementing its agendas heedlessly.
The leader of Syria’s Islamic Front rebels says he intends to “liberate” the besieged border town of Kobane from its occupiers, including the Syrian Kurdish fighters currently defending it.302 In Afrin, Rudaw highlighted that the primary aim of the Syrian opposition was to push the YPG forces from the city, which was controlled by opposition militias in early
300 “Autonomous Administration: Turkey must leave our lands,” Firat News Agency, November 17, 2019. 301 “Syrian Islamic Rebel Leader Brands Kobane’s Kurdish Defenders as Enemies,” Rudaw, November 10, 2014. 302 “Syrian Islamic Rebel Leader Brands Kobane’s Kurdish Defenders as Enemies.”
83 2018 following Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch.303 As a result, the Syrian opposition was driven entirely by the Turkish agenda, according to Rudaw, which created an image of them as a “hostile Arab militia” driven by Turkey to kill and displace Kurds from their hometown, instigating great demographic changes in the region.304 These groups played the same role in Sere Kaniye, where depictions of killing civilians and damaging and confiscating their properties were presented widely by
Rudaw.305 ANF showed the Syrian opposition as having a very negative role in mass violence in Rojava, describing them as “mercenaries” and “gangs” which were differentiated from ISIS only by names and clothes. Hence, their major role was represented as implementing the Turkish agenda of destroying the “democratic project” led by Syrian Kurds in Rojava. ANF made no reference to the Syrian opposition militias in Kobane since the focus, as we have seen, was then on ISIS and the inaction towards the Kobane battle by which Turkey showed its resentment of the U.S. support for YPG, which it considered the Syrian branch of the outlawed PKK. In Afrin, these “gangs” were shown to be strongly involved in killing, torturing, persecuting, violating human rights, looting civilian properties, abducting civilians, large-scale displacement, etc.306 For instance, ANF showed the Syrian militias (mercenaries) backed by Turkey abducting civilians under the pretext of being PKK members.307 These “gangs” were able to settle their families in Afrin as well as families already displaced from Ghouta. ANF showed the role of these gangs as complementary to Turkish plans, mainly to prevent democratic autonomy run by the SDF/YPG in Syria. Concurrently to the families of these “gangs” being resettled and paid for by the Turkish government, the ANF referenced the Turkish agenda of expelling Kurds by changing the demography of the region.308 Moreover, it wrote,
303 “Ankara Using ‘Legitimate Right of Self-Defense’ in Afrin, Turkish FM Tells MSC,” Rudaw, February 19, 2018. 304 “Afrin Loot Is Legitimate Spoils of War, Leaked Transit Document Shows,” Rudaw, August 23, 2018. 305 “Turkish-Backed Groups Continue Looting, Lawlessness in Sari Kani,” Rudaw, November 14, 2019. 306 “10 More Civilians Abducted by the Occupation Forces in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, July 2, 2019. 307 “Afrin Shepherd Abducted, Army Says ‘PKK Member Caught,” Firat News Agency, February 27, 2018. 308 “Turkish-Backed Gangs and Families Settled in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, April 22, 2018.
84 Reports say the gangs also dug up historic sites in Afrin on the same day and smuggled several historic artifacts to Turkey. Turkish army-allied gangs also cut down thousands of olive trees that were at least 60 years old around Kafr Jana.309 In summary, Syrian militias (supported by Turkey) were seen through the prism of Rudaw as Turkey’s tools, murdering, displacing, and abducting Kurdish civilians and seizing their property. As such, they were regarded as agents enforcing Turkey’s policies in Rojava. ANF, on the other hand, criticized them more directly and harshly, describing them as “mercenaries” and their position as hostile and inhumane toward Syrian Kurds and their “democratic project.”
Syrian regime
Rudaw typified the Syrian regime’s response to ISIS-led mass violence in Kobane as non-supportive. The Syrian regime was unambiguously endorsed by the Iraqi regime (shared sectarian identity), whereas Syrian Kurds were supported by the Iraqi Kurds against any threat to their existence (shared nationalist identity). As a result, the Syrian government would oppose any Kurdish project in Syria, regardless of its shape.310 No positive role could be expected from the Syrian regime, from Rudaw’s perspective. As concerned Afrin, Rudaw transmitted a message of criticism of both the Syrian regime and Russia, which were taking advantage of the Turkish attacks on Syrian Kurds and thus taking strategic areas away from Kurds. It also showed the negative role of both actors concerning the Turkish attacks on Afrin. Thus, a plain manipulative and deceitful role by Russia and the Syrian regime, from Rudaw’s perspective, is shown in the text.311 In the same vein, Rudaw connected the comments made by Erdogan to the potential deployment of Assad regime forces in the Afrin district. “Erdogan’s comments come amid a reported deployment of forces by Bashar al-Assad’s regime to Syria’s northwestern district of Afrin.”312 This may be an additional hint by Rudaw that both regimes were fighting to gain strategic and political credits at the expense of Afrin’s actual people, the Kurds.
309 “10 More Civilians Abducted by the Occupation Forces in Afrin,” Firat News Agency, July 2, 2019. 310 “KRG’s Military Help to Kobane from International Relations Perspective,” Rudaw, January 28, 2015. 311 “Five Dead in Afrin Blast,” Rudaw, October 31, 2019. 312 “Erdogan to Lay Siege to Afrin City Center ‘to Ensure Safety,” Rudaw, January 20, 2018.
85 Despite framing the non-supportive and manipulative role of the Syrian regime toward developments in Rojava, Rudaw seemed to make use of the regime’s propaganda, for example “vowing to shoot down any Turkish fighter jets which violate the Syrian airspace.” Rudaw probably mobilized to stop the Turkish operation against Afrin by boosting the Syrian regime’s statements as a type of propaganda to put pressure on Turkey. Hence, the text may imply a positive role for the Syrian regime in terms of the latter’s threat to the Turkish air forces.313 Terms like “vowed” and “retake” suggested strong intention of recapturing areas occupied by Turkey. Rudaw seemed to back this “threat,” against Turkey through recycling it as stating:
Damascus has repeatedly called on both the US and Turkey to withdraw their forces from Syria and vowed to retake every inch of territory from the Kurds and the remaining armed opposition in Syria’s northwest.314 However, the Syrian regime was not only manipulative but also, under the sponsorship of Russia, supportive of Turkish-backed militias, particularly when it contributed to resettling Arab families from East Ghouta in Afrin in indirect agreement with the Syrian opposition.315 Simply put, the Syrian government, the opposition, and Turkey – operating under Russian auspices – contributed significantly to the demographic change in Afrin, according to Rudaw.
This Arab resettlement campaign in Afrin gained momentum after many families from East Ghouta were transported according to an agreement between the Syrian regime and the opposition under Russian auspices.316 In Sere Kaniye, the Syrian regime’s position remained unchanged; this is clear from Rudaw’s depiction of KRI’s efforts in convincing the international community and Russia for protection of Rojava’s Kurds. Russia’s position, on the other hand, appeared to be negative and manipulative, as evidenced by the leverage it exerted on SDF forces to hand over lands populated by Kurds to the Syrian regime, from Rudaw’s viewpoint.317 By highlighting the KRG’s concerns over Rojava, Rudaw achieved two objectives: The first one is implementing nationalist agenda represented in solidarity
313 “Turkey Launches Deadly Military Operation against Afrin in Rojava,” Rudaw, January 20, 2018. 314 “Syria Kurds, Assad Regime Hint at Partnership against Turkish Threat.” 315 “Afrin Refugees Share Stories of Demographic, Ethnic Cleansing,” Rudaw, December 2, 2018. 316 “Elderly Afrin Woman Dies after Being Prevented from Returning Home by Syrian Rebels,” Rudaw, May 23, 2018. 317 “Syria Kurds, Assad Regime Hint at Partnership against Turkish Threat,” Rudaw, October 8, 2019.
86 and fraternity with fellow Kurds in Rojava and the second is putting Barzani and PDK in a positive light, which can be labeled as pro-partisan agenda. Rudaw stated:
Nechirvan Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), issued a statement on Thursday urging the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the wider international community to pressure Turkey to halt its operation in Syria.318 Interestingly, Russia and Turkey collaborated on a variety of occasions and made use of the developments on the ground. Russia, the Syrian regime’s primary backer, consistently used Turkey’s threats against the SDF to compel it to hand over areas it occupied to regime troops, including Afrin. The SDF repeatedly resisted, and as a result Turkey was given permission to take over the canton in 2018. Russia and Turkey seem to have repeated the same tactic against Syrian Kurds in Sere Kaniye, with the US failing to intervene actively to deter Turkey’s invasion or to end Russia’s and the Syrian regime’s exploitation of Rojava’s future. Terms like “deal” “take over territories” and the meaning beyond the lines explained Rudaw’s representation of the “manipulative” policies carried by these regional powers against Syrian Kurds. Rudaw stated:
Despite a Turkish deal with Russia and the US, and the subsequent withdrawal of Kurdish fighters from the border, Turkish-backed groups continued their offensive into northern Syria, especially around the town of Tel Tamr. While Turkish-backed fighters are fighting to take over Kurdish- controlled territories, the Syrian regime and the Russian air force have been trying to take over the hills of Kabani in northwestern province of Latakia, in a bid to gain strategic high ground against Idlib.319 ANF made no reports on the Syrian regime in relation to Kobane. However, its reports covering Afrin showed the regime’s stubborn mentality, which rejected any SDF suggestion to solve the Syrian crisis. ANF’s viewpoint was to agree with Damascus over national issues and the rights of Kurds, Arabs, and Christians to run their regions in Rojava, an option the regime did not accept, represented in ANF’s quotation of SDF commander Mazloum Abdi.320 Surprisingly, the Syrian regime appealed to the United Nations to state that the SDF was a “terrorist” organization and had committed “war crimes” in Syria, vowing to recapture the areas under its control. Thus, ANF, using terms like “terrorist” and
318 “UN Security Council Must Intervene, Stop Turkish War in Syria: KRI President,” rudaw.net, accessed April 30, 2021, https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/101020191. 319 “Five Dead in Afrin Blast.” 320 “SDF Commander General: We urge all parties to dialogue,” Firat News Agency, July 20, 2019.
87 “vowing,” showed the Syrian regime’s “hostile” intention towards the Kurdish region if geopolitical conditions allowed.321 As regards Sere Kaniye, the Syrian regime was silent over the Turkish invasion of north and northeast Syria although it rejected Turkey’s violation of international law.322 ANF, quoting a high-ranking official in Rojava administration, stated that:
The Syrian regime is yet to speak out against Turkey’s threats of invasion as it did in the occupation of Afrin, al-Bab, Jarablus and Azaz. This silence helps Turkey invade more parts of Syrian lands.323 In brief, despite their direct and indirect strategy of reporting, both Kurdish media outlets concluded that the Syrian regime seemed to be opportunistic and manipulative, even siding with its adversaries against Syria’s Kurds. It also showed a malicious motive to invade Rojava. Ultimately, it was primarily responsible for executing Russia’s decisions on Syria’s future.
Russia
In its articles covering Kobane, Rudaw only depicted the historic negative role of Russia since the division of the region in the late 19th century following World War I and the emergence of modern states after the collapse of the Ottoman empire. “Britain and Russia, in particular, sought to manipulate the Kurds for their own benefit,” Rudaw stated.324 However, Rudaw touched upon the role of Russia in its articles covering Afrin, particularly when it agreed with Turkey, as seen above, to run the area against the will of the Kurds. Turkish incursion into Afrin was apparently a bargain between Russia and Turkey. Rudaw showed that Kurdish forces were adhering to the US-, Russia-, and Turkey-agreed deal to withdraw from the frontier in the manner expected by Turkey and Russia. However, Syrian opposition militias supported by Turkey continued to target northern Syria, particularly in the areas surrounding Tel Tamr.325 As a result, Russia’s role often seemed ambivalent and deceptive, from Rudaw’s perspective.
321 Ibid. 322 “MSD Co-Chair: Every threat by Turkey is a danger for Syrian lands,” Firat News Agency, October 8, 2019. 323 “MSD Co-Chair.” 324 “Peshmerga in Kobane Write Another Page of Kurdish History,” Rudaw, November 1, 2014. 325 “Five Dead in Afrin Blast,” Rudaw, October 31, 2019.
88 From Rudaw’s quotation of Yasin Aktay – senior adviser to Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan – we can deduce that Russia seemed eager to work with Turkey and understood Turkey’s positions, complaining about the U.S. support for the Kurdish forces. This meant Russia sought to take Turkey as an ally by taking advantage of the latter’s recently tense relationship with the US, particularly concerning arming Syrian Kurds. Thus, Rudaw seemed to compose these themes to build an image of the relation between Turkey and Russia over Rojava.326 In the same vein, it showed that Russia agreed with Turkey over the latter’s incursion into Rojava’s Afrin. This came after an understanding over deploying some Turkish checkpoints in the Idlib province northern Syria.327 Rudaw stated:
In answer to a question from Rudaw, Lavrov said that Russia is working with Iran and Turkey to reduce tensions in the area but noted that Turkey’s presence is necessary as terror threats still exist.328 In Sere Kaniye, Russia’s role remained as it was in Afrin despite its attempts to mediate between the Syrian regime and SDF to reach a sort of agreement as the Turkish operation on Sere Kaniye loomed.329 Remarkably, in September 2019, Turkey, Russia, and Iran agreed to plan a constitution committee to solve the Syrian civil war. The agreement seemed to satisfy the three chief actors operating in Syria. In an article entitled Russian, Turkish, Iranian leaders say political solution for Syria ‘in our power’ at Ankara summit, Rudaw showed that Russia and Iran sought to amend the Syrian constitution. However, they demonstrated relative openness towards other active actors in Syria, mainly Turkey while little attention was given to Kurds.330 Rudaw stated that “The current Syrian constitution has been in place since February 2012 — adopted a few months after the continuing civil war broke out.”331
326 “Fear and Defiance under Turkish Bombardment in Afrin,” Rudaw, January 19, 2018. 327 “Russia Has Not Withdrawn from Afrin Area,” Rudaw, January 19, 2018. 328 “Russia Has Not Withdrawn from Afrin Area.” 329 “Russia to Push for SDF–Damascus Talks as Turkish Operation Looms,” Rudaw, October 9, 2019. 330 “Russian, Turkish, Iranian Leaders Say Political Solution for Syria ‘in Our Power’ at Ankara Summit,” Rudaw, September 16, 2019. 331 “Russian, Turkish, Iranian Leaders Say Political Solution for Syria ‘in Our Power’ at Ankara Summit.”
89 Still, Russia had an important role in managing the complex geopolitical situation in northern Syria, from Rudaw’s perspective.332 Finally, coordination between Russia and Turkey was highlighted by Rudaw, particularly when Turkish-backed Syrian opposition factions captured several soldiers of Assad’s forces in the areas surrounding Sere Kaniye. Turkey and Russia brokered an agreement to hand them over to the regime within a short time. This confirmed Russia’s manipulative role respecting Syrian Kurds and their regions, according to Rudaw.333 No themes are detected in ANF’s coverage of Russia’s role in Kobane. However, Russia directly supported the Turkish invasion in Afrin, from ANF’s perspective.334 Also, the role of Russia was ambivalent towards the plans prepared by the regional and international powers.335 ANF stated:
It is clear that the AKP-MHP fascist plan to occupy the entire Kurdistan territory, starting with Rojava and Başûr. Tayyip Erdogan's administration is trying to replicate Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s Administration in the past… In all this Russia's attitude is a problem.336 Moreover, Russia wanted the SDF forces to help the Syrian regime in Idlib, but they did not agree because they had no business there and were more concerned with Afrin, as claimed by ANF. Quoting Mazloum Abdi, SDF commander-in-chief, ANF showed how Russia tried to implement its agenda by using the SDF forces in the regime’s favor against Turkish-backed Syrian militias who were already in control of Idlib.337
Russia and the regime asked for our help, but we didn’t accept. We have conditions. We have no business in Idlib, our issue is Afrin… Russia favors the regime… Russia didn’t have an approach for the solution. In the matter of Afrin that is still where they stand… Russia is a power that will have a role in determining the future of Syria.338 Thus, ANF depicted Russia’s manipulative role in Afrin. Russia, thus, was the major power allowing Turkey to occupy Afrin, from ANF’s perspective. Its relationship with the Syrian government, Turkey, and the US showed unequivocally that it preferred
332 “If Erdogan Invades Northern Syria, Could Its Airspace Be Closed to Turkish Jets?” Rudaw, August 6, 2019. 333 “Syria Deploys More Troops to the North to Reverse Turkish Gains,” Rudaw, November 1, 2019. 334 “Ankara’s Only Goal in Syria Is Exterminating Kurds,” Firat News Agency, January 17, 2019. 335 “Middle East: A complex scenario,” Firat News Agency, April 24, 2018. 336 “Middle East.” 337 “SDF Commander General: We urge all parties to dialogue,” Firat News Agency, July 20, 2019. 338 “SDF Commander General.”
90 them. However, the SDF’s alliance with Russia would continue because Russia would be a significant part of Syria’s future at all costs despite its position towards Rojava.339 Likewise, in Sere Kaniye, ANF showed Russia as being totally in agreement with Turkey’s policy by creating a safe zone as defined by Turkey despite the fact it would force refugees to return to an unsafe war zone.340 ANF, quoting the executive Council of the PKK, accused the Western world of being responsible for any massacre or genocidal action against Kurds by Turkey and its Syrian “mercenaries” because of the incursion into Sere Kaniye.341 In summary, Rudaw and ANF demonstrated that Russia maintained an ambivalent, deceptive, manipulative, and maneuvering role in Syria, however gaining momentum toward resolving many geopolitical issues, including Rojava.
Iran
The role of Iran in the mass violence in Rojava was hardly apparent as the significant violent events were mainly attributed to Turkey with its Syrian militia proxies and ISIS. Rudaw depicted the role of Iran as a mere defense of Syrian sovereignty by calling on Turkey to stop its operation against Afrin. Rudaw gave the impression that Iran’s only concern was preserving the Assad regime’s sovereignty over Syria and not acknowledging the terrible humanitarian situation in Afrin. As such, Iran seemed negative towards Rojava and clearly backed the Syrian regime, from Rudaw’s perspective.342 Another picture of Iran framed by Rudaw, quoting Hediye Yusuf, a founding member of the self-declared Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria (a variant name for Rojava and the areas under the SDF), recalled the fall of the Mahabad Republic in Iran, thus lashing out at both Russia and Iran for their shameful and “irresponsible” historic position towards the Kurds. By highlighting Yusuf’s statement, it created a negative image indirectly for both states about the just rights of the Kurds.343 Also, Rudaw highlighted the arrest of several activists by Iranian authorities for protesting Turkey’s incursion into Afrin. This returns us to the Iranian objection to
339 Ibid. 340 “Amnesty: Turkey forcibly deported Syrian refugees into war zone,” Firat News Agency, October 25, 2019. 341 “PKK: Every house and street will be a battlefield,” Firat News Agency, October 10, 2019. 342 “Turkey Continues Its Assault on Kurdish Afrin in Syria,” Rudaw, January 21, 2018. 343 Ibid.
91 Turkey’s operation in Afrin, emphasizing the paradox of the Iranian position concerning the treatment of Kurdish issues. Citing the France-based Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN), Rudaw showed Iran’s double standards in calling on Turkey to stop its operations in Afrin. Still, this perhaps reflected and enhanced Iranian position of defending the Syrian regime’s sovereignty over the Syrian land while excluding Kurds from their political plan.344 The ANF, on the other hand, made no comments on Iran’s role in its articles on Kobane. However, covering Afrin, it showed that the Iranians were thinking they would be attacked by the SDF on the request of the US. However, this was not true, ANF claimed, showing that Iran had made mistakes without identifying them.345 To conclude, ANF showed that Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime were pushing Turkey to enter the northern parts of Syria, and their major objective was to pressure the SDF into leaving the areas it controlled for the Syrian regime, a theme seen in Rudaw’s perspective as well. This tactic was deployed in Afrin and attempted in Sere Kaniye when the U.S. president announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria. Iran supported the pressure on SDF to hand over lands to the Syrian regime because, like Turkey and the Syrian regime, it was afraid of the “democratic project” of the Syrian Kurds, ANF stated, quoting the SDF commander.346 Rudaw, in turn, demonstrated Iran’s central position as a supporter of Assad’s regime, opposing Rojava’s future. It also highlighted Iran’s historic “irresponsibility” toward the Kurds.
Conclusions
This thesis has sought to explore how mass violence against Syrian Kurdish civilians was depicted in articles from two Kurdish media organizations spanning the years 2014 to 2019. Also, the study discussed how the role of ideology and actors was reflected in the analyzed articles. In the light of framing theory in the media, the analysis of the articles has shown how mass violence images were portrayed and what language and framings were used. The quantitative and qualitative comparative analyses of the articles show certain trends in how the mass violence and the role of ideology and actors
344 “Iran Arrests 9 for Protesting Turkey’s Afrin Offensive,” Rudaw, March 13, 2018. 345 “SDF Commander General: We urge all parties to dialogue,” Firat News Agency, July 20, 2019. 346 “SDF Commander General: We will not accept Erdoğan’s threats,” Firat News Agency, September 20, 2019.
92 were depicted. Drawing on the aims and research questions posed at the outset of the thesis, the analysis has shown several images of mass violence committed by some actors from two major Kurdish media perspectives, such as killing, displacing, and abducting civilians. Based on the assessments of media language and ideology, the analysis demonstrates that media articles were governed ideologically in portraying the images of mass violence. Moreover, the Kurdish left- and right-leaning ideologies dominated the content of both organizations and their relatively different presentations of the perpetrators. As such, the analysis shows that both media outlets depicted several images of mass violence from 2014 to 2019 and were largely ideologically driven. First, ANF was governed by the PKK, which has a Marxist ideology but more recently developed toward embracing a form of “democratic confederalism” after the PKK leader’s arrest by Turkey. ANF shows a moderate percentage of nationalist and partisan orientations in its coverage of mass violence images. Yet, its harsh language against the perpetrators and against its own patron’s rival, KDP, stemmed from its partisan ideological proximity, which determined the level of criticism it employed in its content, whether against Turkey or KDP. In particular, the PKK has been engaged in bloody insurgency with Turkey for decades. ANF’s nationalist ideology, albeit presented moderately, is pronounced as framing Kurdish fraternity and unity between the YPG and the Peshmerga against ISIS, raising the Kurdish national spirit. In some themes, nationalist and partisan agendas intertwined. Rudaw, on the other hand, showed a substantial percentage of nationalist leanings versus moderate partisan agendas. Despite its criticism of perpetrators, Rudaw’s language remained moderate, particularly towards Turkey, with which its patron, KDP, has political and economic agreements. Thus, the ideological proximity between KRG and Turkey restricted Rudaw’s depictions of mass violence, albeit relatively. Similarly, ideological proximity affected the role of perpetrators, namely ISIS, Turkey, and its Syrian militias. Consequently, the premise of a constant overlap between the Kurdish nationalist and partisan agendas is borne out by the findings of this study. Both media outlets were governed by nationalist and partisan ideologies. The nationalist one seemed to focus on fraternity and unity between the Kurds, whereas the partisan one confirmed rivalry between the Kurdish political parties and their positions towards certain issues. Thus, ideological proximity, mainly partisan, played a key role in shaping Kurdish media discourse. For instance, Turkey’s hostile relations with the
93 PKK – and thus with Syrian Kurds – versus its strategic and economic relations with the KRG – and thus with the KDP – is clearly present in the results. In short, the rightist media outlet, Rudaw, made light and indirect criticism of perpetrators, particularly Turkey. This was also true of the media’s views concerning the role of actors during the timeframe of mass violence. In comparison to Rudaw’s views, reports of mass violence in ANF were harsher as expressions, words, and more direct criticism were stronger in relation to mass violence images. Importantly, the depictions of mass violence, as discussed in the theory section, demonstrated that the outlets were defining problems, evaluating them, and suggesting solutions, emphasizing Entman’s explanation of framing theory’s functions. One major solution suggested by both media outlets for the problem of Rojava was to deter Turkey and its Syrian militias from invading Kurdish regions. The concept of victim versus villain was also used to represent the sufferings of Kurds and the hostility of the perpetrators, mainly ISIS and Turkey with its militias. Yet, this method of demonization was used differently by the two outlets, as ideological proximity restricted their texts. The quantitative analysis lends further support to the above conclusions, as it shows quantitatively which categories were more frequent in relation to media outlet, ideology orientation, and perpetrators. By listing the words, expressions, and language used in the categories as well as the roles of actors during the mass violence, it can be clearly seen where the differences between Rudaw and ANF lie. Considering previous studies on ideological proximity, the focal point which makes a difference in the findings of this thesis is that the Kurdish case shows the partisan leanings as dynamic power of ideological proximity – which entirely changes the views of media outlets – while the nationalist ones mostly enhance the concept of fraternity and unity, whether among the Kurds in general or the Syrian Kurds in particular. Consequently, unlike the findings of other studies, ideological proximity in the Kurdish case seems to be unique in how it impacts types and roles of ideology in media reports of violence. The empirical analysis shows how the viewpoints of both major Kurdish media outlets delineated the mass violence perpetrated against Kurdish civilians in Syria. This has given further insight into how these depictions were created and to what extent ideology played a role in their creation. Further research can be undertaken by simply exploring other timeframes and regions in which Kurds were attacked by other militant
94 groups, including the YPG forces themselves, who also committed violations against Kurds, albeit relatively, in areas like Amuda in 2013.347 An interesting expansion for future research could also be the inclusion of other religious and racial minorities in the Syrian Kurdish regions, such as mass violence or abuses against Assyrians or Yezidis in Rojava.348 This way, one may see a difference over time, contributing to a better understanding of the widespread abuse perpetrated against various communities in the Kurdish territory of Rojava.
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99 ogc%2fdocuments%2fUNDPOGC_Media_conflict%2520roundtable%2520ba ckground%2520paper.pdf/RK=2/RS=o2a9CrkguFxVQ15Ks9TIQL6AYfk-. ANF News. “HRW: Civilians Abused by Turkish-Backed Groups in ‘Safe Zones.’” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/human-rights/hrw- civilians-abused-by-turkish-backed-groups-in-safe-zones-in-39671. rudaw.net. “Huge Explosions in East Kobane.” Accessed April 18, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/17112014. rudaw.net. “Hundreds of Civilians Flee Afrin.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/120320181. ANF News. “Hundreds of Civilians Killed in Turkish Airstrike.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/hundreds-of-civilians-killed- in-turkish-airstrike-25563. ANF News. “Hundreds of Invaders Killed in Afrin in Four Days.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/hundreds-of-invaders-killed- in-afrin-in-four-days-25377. rudaw.net. “If Erdogan Invades Northern Syria, Could Its Airspace Be Closed to Turkish Jets?” Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/06082019. rudaw.net. “In Northeast Syria, Last Assyrians Fear Turkish Advance.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/19112019. rudaw.net. “Iran Arrests 9 for Protesting Turkey’s Afrin Offensive: Rights Group.” Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/13032018. ANF News. “ISIS Gangs Burn down Kurdish Red Crescent Building.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/isis-gangs-burn-down-kurdish- red-crescent-building-9627. ANF News. “ISIS Revived after Turkey’s Attacks against Afrin.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/features/isis-revived-after-turkey-s- attacks-against-afrin-25579. ANF News. “ISIS Sets Fire to Hundreds of Civilian Vehicles at Border.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/isis-sets-fire-to-hundreds- of-civilian-vehicles-at-border-10155. openDemocracy. “Journalism in Rojava (II): Independent Media between Freedom and Control.” Accessed March 27, 2021. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north- africa-west-asia/journalism-rojava-ii-independent-media-between-freedom- and-control/. France 24. “Kawa the Blacksmith: Kurdish Symbol of Resistance,” March 19, 2018. https://www.france24.com/en/20180319-kawa-blacksmith-kurdish-symbol- resistance. ANF News. “KNK: Stop the Turkish Invasion of South Kurdistan.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/kurdistan/knk-stop-the-turkish-invasion- of-south-kurdistan-35443. rudaw.net. “‘Kobane Has Become Another Stalingrad’: Peshmerga Soldier.” Accessed April 11, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/19012015. rudaw.net. “Kobane Kurds Warn of ‘Second Shingal.’” Accessed April 11, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/220920141. rudaw.net. “Kobane’s Defenders Ally with Syria’s Mainstream Opposition.” Accessed April 30, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/191020141. rudaw.net. “KRG’s Military Help to Kobane from International Relations Perspective.” Accessed April 14, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/27012015.
100 rudaw.net. “Kurdish Children Tortured by ISIS near Kobane, Says Human Rights Watch.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/04112014. rudaw.net. “Kurdish Forces Continue to Defend Afrin against Turkish Assault.” Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/230120181. rudaw.net. “Kurdish Leader Calls for US Airstrikes around Kobane.” Accessed April 8, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/27092014. rudaw.net. “Kurds Call on World Not to Forget Afrin a Year after Turkish Invasion.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/20012019. rudaw.net. “Kurds in Erbil Protest Turkish Invasion of Northeast Syria for Second Time in Three Days.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/12102019. Lewis, Jeff. Language Wars: The Role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence. London, UNITED KINGDOM: Pluto Press, 2005. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uu/detail.action?docID=3386523. Lower, Matthew, and Thomas Hauschildt. “The Media as a Tool of War:,” 2014, 7. ANF News. “Middle East: A Complex Scenario.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/kurdistan/middle-east-a-complex-scenario- 26271. ANF News. “MSD Co-Chair: Every Threat by Turkey Is a Danger for Syrian Lands.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/msd-co- chair-every-threat-by-turkey-is-a-danger-for-syrian-lands-38178. ANF News. “MSD’s Ehmed Warns of Resurgence of ISIS Caliphate in Syria.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/msd-s-ehmed- warns-of-resurgence-of-isis-caliphate-in-syria-38549. “Nechirvan Barzani’s Association with Media Corruption | CHMK.” Accessed March 28, 2021. https://chmk.org/nechirvan-barzanis-association-with-media- corruption/. Novellis. “The Rise of Feminism in the PKK: Ideology or Strategy?” Zanj: The Journal of Critical Global South Studies 2, no. 1 (2018): 115. https://doi.org/10.13169/zanjglobsoutstud.2.1.0115. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Obstacles to Kurdish Autonomy.” Accessed March 27, 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/53535. Öcalan, Abdullah. Democratic Confederalism. London [u.a: Transmedia Publ., 2011. Olmastroni, Francesco. Framing War: Public Opinion and Decision-Making in Comparative Perspective. Routledge Studies in Global Information, Politics and Society 6. New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2014. Paasche, Till F., and Howri Mansurbeg. “Kurdistan Regional Government–Turkish Energy Relations: A Complex Partnership.” Eurasian Geography and Economics 55, no. 2 (March 4, 2014): 111–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2014.942339. ANF News. “People from Gire Spi Want to Return to Their Old Lives.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/people-from-gire- spi-want-to-return-to-their-old-lives-39281. ANF News. “People Shot with Live Ammunition at Kobanê Border.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/people-shot-with-live- ammunition-at-kobane-border-9275.
101 ANF News. “People’s Resistance: DAY 5 - LIVE BLOG.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/people-s-resistance-day-5-live-blog- 38346. ANF News. “People’s Resistance: DAY 12 - LIVE BLOG.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/people-s-resistance-day-12-live- blog-38602. Perry, Tom. “Syrian Kurds, Allies Set to Approve New Government Blueprint.” Reuters, December 28, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- crisis-syria-constitution-idUSKBN14H0X3. rudaw.net. “Peshmerga Commander: ISIS Degraded in Kobane but Gains Are Slow.” Accessed April 11, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/21112014. rudaw.net. “Peshmerga Commander: Kurdish Forces Control 85 Percent of Kobane.” Accessed April 30, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/14012015. rudaw.net. “Peshmerga in Kobane Write Another Page of Kurdish History.” Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/01112014. Petti, Matthew. “Christian Communities in Northeast Syria Are the Target of a Turkish Attack for the First Time in Over a Century.” Text. The National Interest. The Center for the National Interest, October 11, 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/christian-communities- northeast-syria-are-target-turkish-attack-first-time. ANF News. “PKK: Every House and Street Will Be a Battlefield.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/features/pkk-every-house-and-street-will- be-a-battlefield-38238. ANF News. “PKK Salutes the 7th Anniversary of the Rojava Revolution.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/kurdistan/pkk-salutes-the-7th- anniversary-of-the-rojava-revolution-36357. ANF News. “Police Raid Hospital and Arrest Wounded Person from Kobanê.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/police-raid- hospital-and-arrest-wounded-person-from-kobane-9586. rudaw.net. “President Barzani: PKK Struggle for Legitimacy Led to Turkish Operation at Expense of Syrian Kurds.” Accessed April 30, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/051120193. rudaw.net. “President Barzani: Rebuilding Kobane Is Duty of All Kurds.” Accessed April 11, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/060320151. rudaw.net. “Protect Sari Kani from Genocide: Syria Kurds.” Accessed April 11, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/171020194. Puddephatt, Andrew. “Voices of War: Conflict and the Role of the Media.” Accessed August 4, 2020. https://www.mediasupport.org/wp- content/uploads/2012/11/ims-voices-of-war-2006.pdf. Radpey, Loqman. “Kurdish Regional Self-Rule Administration in Syria: A New Model of Statehood and Its Status in International Law Compared to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 17 (September 9, 2016). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109916000190. ricardo. “La Belgique arrête un journaliste kurde sur requête de la Turquie.” Fédération européenne des journalistes. Fédération européenne des journalistes, December 20, 2016. https://europeanjournalists.org/fr/2016/12/20/la-belgique-arrete-un- journaliste-kurde-sur-requete-de-la-turquie/.
102 Robins-Early, Nick. “Turkey Is Being Torn Apart By ISIS Bombings And Kurdish Clashes.” HuffPost, 33:41 500. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/turkey-terror- attacks_n_5695131ce4b05b3245da60dc. ANF News. “Rojava: Lives Lost on the Run.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/rojava-lives-lost-on-the-run-40180. rudaw.net. “Russia Has Not Withdrawn from Afrin Area: Lavrov.” Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/190120181. rudaw.net. “Russia to Push for SDF–Damascus Talks as Turkish Operation Looms: Russian FM Lavrov.” Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/09102019. rudaw.net. “Russian, Turkish, Iranian Leaders Say Political Solution for Syria ‘in Our Power’ at Ankara Summit.” Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/16092019. sabah, daily. “3 TV Channels, Including KRG’s Rudaw, to Be Removed from TurkSat over Broadcasting Violations.” Daily Sabah, September 25, 2017. https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/2017/09/25/3-tv-channels-including-krgs- rudaw-to-be-removed-from-turksat-over-broadcasting-violations. ———. “Belgium Releases PKK-Affiliated ANF’s Director on Bail.” Daily Sabah, December 24, 2016. https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on- terror/2016/12/24/belgium-releases-pkk-affiliated-anfs-director-on-bail. ANF News. “SDF Balance Sheet of War and Resistance for 2019.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/sdf-balance-sheet-of-war-and- resistance-for-2019-40551. ANF News. “SDF Commander General: We Urge All Parties to Dialogue.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/features/sdf-commander-general- we-urge-all-parties-to-dialogue-36385. ANF News. “SDF Commander General: We Will Not Accept Erdoğan’s Threats.” Accessed March 3, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/features/sdf- commander-we-will-not-accept-erdogan-s-threats-37759. rudaw.net. “‘She’s Very Depressed, Crying All the Time’: Girl, 8, Wounded in Turkish Shelling Doesn’t Know Brother Is Dead.” Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/13102019. History Skills. “Source Criticism.” Accessed November 17, 2019. http://www.historyskills.com/source-criticism/. Staff, Editorial. “Syrian Kurds Ban Iraqi Kurdish Rudaw TV in Kobani.” Kurd Net - Ekurd.Net Daily News (blog), February 27, 2016. https://ekurd.net/syrian- kurds-ban-rudaw-kobani-2016-02-27. ———. “Turkey Forcibly Deported Refugees to Syria, Human Rights Organisations Say.” Kurd Net - Ekurd.Net Daily News (blog), October 25, 2019. https://ekurd.net/turkey-forcibly-deported-refugees-2019-10-25. ANF News. “Statement on the Arrest of ANF News Director in Belgium.” Accessed March 28, 2021. https://anfenglish.com/freedom-of-the-press/statement-on- the-arrest-of-anf-news-director-in-belgium-17691. rudaw.net. “Stop Turkish Invasion of Northeast Syria, Say Yezidi Activists.” Accessed April 11, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/201020193. rudaw.net. “Syria Deploys More Troops to the North to Reverse Turkish Gains.” Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/311020194.
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104 rudaw.net. “Turkey Continues Its Assault on Kurdish Afrin in Syria.” Accessed April 15, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/21012018. rudaw.net. “Turkey Launches Deadly Military Operation against Afrin in Rojava.” Accessed April 14, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/200120181. the Guardian. “Turkey Starts Ground Incursion into Kurdish-Controlled Afrin in Syria,” January 21, 2018. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/21/turkey-starts-ground- incursion-into-kurdish-controlled-afrin-in-syria. ANF News. “Turkey Uses Turkmen ISIS Members.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/features/turkey-uses-turkmen-isis-members- 39874. POLITICO. “Turkey’s Invasion of Syria Explained,” October 15, 2019. https://www.politico.eu/article/8-questions-about-turkeys-incursion-into-syria- answered/. rudaw.net. “Turkey’s Syrian Proxies Seize 75% of Afrin’s Olive Trees: Monitor.” Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/200920182. rudaw.net. “Turkish Aggression against Kurdish Afrin Continues.” Accessed April 14, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/22012018. ANF News. “Turkish Army Kills 17 Women and Wounds 44 in Afrin.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/women/turkish-army-kills-17- women-and-wounds-44-25046. ANF News. “Turkish Attacks against North and East Syria - LIVE BLOG.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/attacks-against- north-and-east-syria-latest-news-38212. ANF News. “Turkish Media Lies Exposed.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/turkish-media-lies-exposed-9276. ANF News. “Turkish MIT Works on Resettlement from Central Asia to Rojava.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/features/turkish-mit- works-on-resettlement-from-central-asia-to-rojava-39194. rudaw.net. “Turkish Opposition Calls for ‘Peaceful Approach’ in Northern Syria.” Accessed April 14, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/07082019. ANF News. “‘Turkish Soldiers Met Gangs on Kobanê Border Last Night.’” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/turkish-soldiers-met-gangs- on-kobane-border-last-night-9444. ANF News. “Turkish State Steals Thousands of Artifacts from Afrin.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/turkish-state-steals- thousands-of-artifacts-from-afrin-36337. rudaw.net. “Turkish Troops Kill Kurdish Activist at Kobane Border.” Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/071120141. ANF News. “Turkish-Backed Gangs and Families Settled in Afrin.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/turkish-backed-gangs-and- families-settled-in-afrin-26246. rudaw.net. “Turkish-Backed Groups Continue Looting, Lawlessness in Sari Kani.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/141120191.
105 rudaw.net. “Turkish-Backed Rebels Violating Human Rights in Afrin: Amnesty.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/020820181. rudaw.net. “UN Security Council Must Intervene, Stop Turkish War in Syria: KRI President.” Accessed April 30, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/101020191. rudaw.net. “UN Security Council Must Intervene, Stop Turkish War in Syria: KRI President.” Accessed April 30, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/101020191. rudaw.net. “UPDATE: Car Bomb Kills 9 in Downtown Afrin: Monitor.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/161220181. rudaw.net. “UPDATED: Turkish Forces Open Fire on Protesters in Kobane, 2 Killed, 40 Injured.” Accessed April 30, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/020920161. Uras, Umut. “Turkey’s Syria Operation: How It Unfolded.” Accessed March 27, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/8/turkeys-operation-peace-spring- in-northern-syria-one-month-on. ANF News. “Urgent Call for a ‘Humanitarian Corridor’ in Serêkaniyê.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/urgent-call-for-a- humanitarian-corridor-for-serekaniye-38512. ANF News. “Urgent Call for Aid for 180 Thousand People from Kobanê.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/urgent-call-for-aid-for-180- thousand-people-from-kobane-10002. rudaw.net. “Urgent Help Needed as Afrin IDP Numbers Top 167,000.” Accessed May 16, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/230320181. rudaw.net. “VIDEO: Armed Men Torture Afrin Civilians in Public.” Accessed April 10, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/270520181. Vreese, Claes H de. “News Framing: Theory and Typology,” n.d., 12. Wasilewski, Karol. “Turkey’s New Anti-PKK Strategy: Consequences and Feasibility,” n.d., 2. ANF News. “Who Is Planning What in Kobanê - Amed Dicle.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/who-is-planning-what-in-kobane- amed-dicle-9319. rudaw.net. “Will Kobane Be Saved?” Accessed April 29, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/131020144. Wolfsfeld, Gadi. “The Role of the Media in Violent Conflicts in the Digital Age: Israeli and Palestinian Leaders’ Perceptions.” Media, War & Conflict 11, no. 1 (March 2018): 107–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635217727312. Yang, Liu, and Huailin Chen. “Framing Terrorist Attacks: A Multi-Proximity Model.” International Communication Gazette 81, no. 5 (August 2019): 395–417. https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048518802245. rudaw.net. “Yezidi Woman Reportedly Killed by Turkish-Backed Group in Syria’s Afrin.” Accessed April 30, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/18112019. ANF News. “‘YPG Acting with the Peshmerga like a Single Army.’” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/ypg-acting-with-the-peshmerga- like-a-single-army-9901. “YPG Apologizes for 2013 Protester Killing Incident in Northeast Syria.” Accessed April 26, 2021. https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/22698-YPG-apologizes- for-2013-protester-killing-incident-in-northeast-Syria.
106 rudaw.net. “YPG Claim They Killed 2 Turkish Soldiers near Kobane.” Accessed April 30, 2021. https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/131220171. ANF News. “YPJ Fighter from Turkey: Rojava Was an Inspiration to Us All.” Accessed March 4, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/rojava-syria/ypj- fighter-from-turkey-rojava-was-an-inspiration-to-us-all-36387. ANF News. “YPJ: We Are Ready to Do Whatever Work or Sacrifice Is Necessary.” Accessed March 8, 2020. https://anfenglishmobile.com/women/ypj-we-are- ready-to-do-whatever-work-or-sacrifice-is-necessary-38695.
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