Parliamentary Elections in Eastern Hungary and Transylvania (1865–1918)

Judit Pál, Vlad Popovici, Andrea Fehér, Ovidiu Emil Iudean (eds.)

Szilárd Ferenczi, Edina Gál, Sandra Hirsch, Alexandru Onojescu (collaborators for data collection)

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available online at http://dnb.d‐nb.de.

Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.

This book was published within the framework of the project CNCS‐UEFISCDI PN‐II‐PCE‐2011‐3‐0040 (The Political Elite from Transylvania 1867–1918)

English translation: Adina Pop‐Coman Cover image: Rajz az országgyűlésből (Drawing from the Parliament), Vasárnapi Újság, 15 (1868), no. 48, 29 November, p. 577, courtesy of ‘Lucian Blaga’ University Library in Cluj‐Napoca Cover Design: © Olaf Gloeckler, Atelier Platen, Friedberg

ISBN 978‐3‐631‐69731‐3 (Print) ∙ E‐ISBN 978‐3‐631‐76259‐2 (E‐PDF) E‐ISBN 978‐3‐631‐76260‐8 (EPUB) ∙ E‐ISBN 978‐3‐631‐76261‐5 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/ © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2018 All rights reserved. Peter Lang – Berlin ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com Table of Contents

A. Introduction

Foreword (J. Pál)...... 11

Parliament and the Political System in Hungary During the Dualist Period (J. Pál)...... 15 Overview...... 15 The political parties...... 17 The Parliament...... 20 The electoral system ...... 25 a) Electoral laws and the right to vote...... 25 b) Elections ...... 30 c) Constituencies...... 35 d) Deputies...... 40

Research Sources (V. Popovici)...... 45 1. Electoral results...... 45 1.a. The press...... 45 1.b. Sources published by Parliament or with Parliament’s approval...... 47 1.c. Election maps...... 49 2. Methodology of data collection and processing...... 50

The Structure of the Book (J. Pál, V. Popovici)...... 53 1. Tables explained...... 54 1.a. Parliamentary election results in Eastern Hungary and Transylvania (1865−1918)...... 54 1.b. Party structure...... 58 2. The Composition of constituencies for parliamentary elections at 1900...... 59 3. Evolution of the number of voters...... 61

5 Table of parliamentary parties’ acronyms and evolution...... 62 Scheme of parliamentary parties’ acronyms and evolution...... 71 Map of the parliamentary constituencies in Transylvania and Eastern Hungary (1876–1918)...... 72 List of toponymic abbreviations...... 73

B. Parliamentary election results in Eastern Hungary and Transylvania (1865–1918)...... 75 I. Transylvania (1866–1878)...... 75 1. Counties and districts...... 75 2. Székely seats...... 85 3. Saxon seats and districts...... 89 4. Urban constituencies...... 100 II. Transylvania (1878–1918) ...... 108 1. Counties...... 108 2. Urban constituencies...... 152 III. The Banat...... 167 1. Counties...... 167 2. Urban constituencies...... 202 IV. Eastern Hungary...... 207 1. Counties and districts...... 207 2. Urban constituencies...... 259

C. The Composition of constituencies for parliamentary elections at 1900...... 265 I. Transylvania...... 265 1. Counties...... 265 2. Urban constituencies...... 286 II. The Banat...... 287 1. Counties...... 287 2. Urban constituencies...... 297 III. Eastern Hungary...... 297 1. Counties...... 297 2. Urban constituencies...... 311

6 D. Evolution of the number of voters...... 313 I. Transylvania (1869)...... 313 1. Counties and districts...... 313 2. Székely seats...... 313 3. Saxon seats and districts...... 314 4. Urban constituencies...... 314 II. Transylvania (1878–1914)...... 315 1. Alsó-Fehér county...... 315 2. Beszterce-Naszód county...... 316 3. Brassó county...... 317 4. Csík county...... 319 5. Fogaras county...... 320 6. Hunyad county...... 321 7. Háromszék county...... 323 8. Kis-Küküllő county...... 324 9. Kolozs county...... 325 10. Maros-Torda county...... 326 11. Nagy-Kükülő county...... 328 12. Szeben county...... 329 13. Szolnok-Doboka county...... 330 14. Torda-Aranyos county...... 331 15. Udvarhely county...... 332 16. Urban constituencies in Transylvania...... 334 III. The Banat (1869, 1878–1914)...... 337 1. Krassó-Szörény county ...... 337 2. Temes county...... 339 3. Torontál county...... 340 4. Urban constituencies in Banat...... 342 IV. Eastern Hungary (1869, 1878–1914)...... 344 1. Arad county...... 344 2. Bihar county...... 345 3. Csanád county...... 347 4. Máramaros county...... 349 5. Szatmár county...... 350

7 6. Szilágy county ...... 351 7. Urban constituencies in Eastern Hungary...... 352

Sources and referenced literature...... 355

Name index of the MPs and the opposing candidates...... 367

8 A. Introduction

Foreword

This book draws on a research project that kick-started in autumn 2011, its main objective being the study of the political elite in Transylvania between 1867 and 1918.1 The project was financed by the Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Education (UEFISCDI) Romania and was thought out as a three-year project but eventually it was extended to five years, while keeping the initial budget. In the beginning, the geography and chronology of the research referred to “Tran- sylvania” during the Dualist period. Without wanting to delve into further details, we do, however, wish to mention the fact that in the initial title of the project, the toponym “Transylvania” was used in its larger sense, referring both to the area of the former Principality, an autonomous province within the Habsburg Empire until the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, and the Eastern territories of the Kingdom of Hungary, which came under the administration of the Kingdom of Romania after 1918. In order to maintain the coherence of our research, we also included those parts of the counties East of the river Tisza which remained part of Hungary after 1918. Out of similar reasons we extended our research to Banat and the county of Torontál, the latter having largely come under the administration of the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom after 1918. That is why the title of the book refers to Eastern Hungary and Transylvania, thus reflecting the state of affairs in the beginning of the studied era. The chronological extension from 1867 to 1865 is based on the fact that at the time of the Compromise there already was an ongoing electoral cycle in Hungary that had started two years earlier: thus, some of the constituencies included in our research had already elected their deputies in 1865, and those in the Principality of Transylvania did so the following year. We believe that the end of the period needs no further justification, for it coincides with the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the self-dissolution of the Parliament in Budapest on 16th November 1918 following the Aster Revolution. Moving on to the players, the definition we give to the term “political elite” within this project is a functionalist one, with its members being categorised and becoming subjects of our research according to the public position they held throughout the studied time span, namely: the elected members of the Hungarian Parliament (more precisely, of the Chamber of Deputies), plus the opposing candidates who lost in the parliamentary elections. We have decided to give heed to the latter category, too, whilst knowing all too well that their political status as a group and partially as individuals is considerably lower, although some of them made it to Parliament, before or after the failed candidature. The lack of interest that has been shown in their respect so far in the specialised literature, as well as their prosopographical potential have convinced us to include them in our research. For the time being, we only do it by way

1 Project PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0040: The Political Elite from Transylvania (1867−1918), project director: Prof. Dr. Judit Pál. Project members: Prof. Dr. Nicolae Bocșan († 2016), dr. Andrea Fehér, dr. Sandra Hirsch, dr. Ovidiu Iudean, dr. Alexandru Onojescu, dr. Vlad Popovici. Collaborators: Szilárd Ferenczi, Edina Gál. All public information on the project, members, financing and results can be accessed at: http://elite-research. eu/transylvanian_political_elite.html, last accessed 13.03.2018.

11 of nomination, but with a view to putting together an analysis in the future, hoping that thus we can contribute to a better understanding of the selection of deputies, to a more accurate description of the political elite/s of the Dualist period and their evolution in time. Initially, the main objectives of the project were: to draw up a catalogue of the political elite in Transylvania between 1867 and 1918 (a catalogue comprising the results of parliamentary elections, as well as a set of prosopographical data) and to analyse the prosopographical data. The study of election dynamics, which benefits from better coverage in the specialised literature, was not a purpose in itself and was only going to be carried out just to support the accurate interpretation of the results. From a historiographic point of view, the project continues and complements the works about the studied area by Adalbert Toth2 and the team led by Gabriella Ilonszki.3 These are the two large sets of data about the deputies of Hungary in the Dualist era that have been published as a prosopography. They are, of course, doubled by other research that focused on a certain geographic area, a short time period or that just provided an analysis, without publishing the prosopographical data – in some cases because the research is still ongoing.4 The work of A. Toth offers information about the elections between 1848 and 1849, 1861 and 1892, as well as a relatively sketchy prosopographical catalogue of the deputies of the time in Hungary. The more recent book written by G. Ilonszki covers the period 1884−2006 and offers an extended set of prosopographical data based largely on information from parliaments’ almanacs (this being what helped her choose the starting year for the study). As for the quality of information, the set of data provided by G. Ilonszki, in spite of its impressive size, has many gaps and inaccuracies for the period 1884−1918, largely caused by an uncritical collection of information from the sources and a lack of complementary sources. As a matter of fact, a quick analysis of the quality of parliaments’ almanacs of the era as prosopographical sources was carried out by József Pap,5 and this experience has taught us that they should be approached with utmost caution and constantly cor- roborated with other types of sources. Taking into account all these premises and the general state of this topic’s historiography, we hope that our project has managed to give more depth to the research of the history of parliamentarism in Transylvania and Eastern Hungary during the Dualist period, and that its results – the set of data focused on elections, included in this volume, and the prosopography and analytical conclusions to be published separately – justify the time and effort invested. Alongside the data gathered about election results, the biographies and careers of MPs, the geography of elections and the state of the body of voters, several studies covering various more particular aspects of the topic have been published throughout the project. We mention them hereinafter because, until we finish the next book that will comprise the prosopography and the related analysis, they remain the most important analytical contributions of our research so far. The most numerous were

2 Toth 1973. 3 Ilonszki 2009. 4 There is a similar ongoing project in Hungary, led by József Pap from the University of Eger (OTKA K 112429), which pulls together information about all the deputies and members of the House of Magnates; the information will be published in a series of biographic lexicons of the Dualist era MPs. See Pap 2017. 5 Pap 2017, 11−14.

12 prosopographical studies, made according to certain territorial and administrative,6 (a distinctive category consisting in those dedicated to urban constituencies),7 ethnic,8 or generational delimitations.9 The election process studies have touched upon topics such as: corruption,10 election speeches and publications,11 and the behaviour and attitude of the players involved.12 Less well-represented, but still present are biographical studies13 and studies concerning the activities of the deputies during WWI.14 Another line of inquiry, opened by Ovidiu Emil Iudean, followed the Romanian deputies elected on the lists of Hungarian parties, the so-called “outcasts”. The biographical recoveries and the prosopographical analyses led by the author have yielded a great deal of information regarding this category of MPs, previously virtually ignored, into the historiographic circuit.15 Overall, the project has attained its main objective to put together a catalogue and a set of analyses of the political elite in Transylvania during the Dualist period. Thus, it has contributed to a better understanding of the topic, a more in-depth analysis of older research topics, a revision of commonplace information perpetuated throughout the centuries and, last but not least, it has opened new possible lines of inquiry (such as opposing candidates who lost in the elections).

Judit Pál

6 Iudean−Onojescu−Popovici 2014; Popovici 2014; Popovici 2014a; Pál 2015. 7 Pál 2011; Pál 2013; Pál 2014; Pál 2014a. 8 Popovici−Iudean 2011; Iudean−Onojescu 2013. 9 Pál−Popovici 2017. 10 Pál 2014b. 11 Fehér 2013; Popovici−Iudean 2014. 12 Iudean 2010; Pál 2016; Iudean 2016. 13 Păcățian 2012; Bocșan 2013; Iudean 2014. 14 Iudean 2015; Iudean 2016a; Popovici 2016. 15 Iudean 2016b.

Parliament and the Political System in Hungary During the Dualist Period Judit Pál

Overview The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, created after the 1867 Compromise, was an interesting construction made up of two parts – composite themselves16 − which, despite facing the same challenges, acted as two quasi-independent states (for example, there was no common citizenship). There were obvious differences between the Austrian view and the Hungarian view, there were disputes about whether there was a “real union” between them or just a personal kind, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.17 Foreign policy, external trade, the customs and monetary systems and the army were common territory, but internal policy was each state’s own matter. There were three joint ministries (Foreign Affairs, War and Finance), supervised by the delegations made up of members from the two parliaments. The joint affairs of the two sides of the Monarchy remained to a great extent under the remit of the Monarch not least because the delegations could not actually control the joint ministers; that is how part of the Sovereign’s absolute power before the Compromise was perpetuated. Thus, the monarch’s person,18 who also represented the Monarchy, had a special significance. The monarch’s prerogatives were more marked in Cisleithania, but they were still quite encompassing in Hungary, as well. Although all throughout Europe monarchies theoretically kept several of their prerogatives from Medieval times, the tendency in Western and Northern Europe was to accept the principle of “rex regnat sed non gubernat” (the king reigns but does not rule). In the Austro-Hungarian Empire the monarch kept his unusually ample powers – with all the limitations of the constitution and the laws – and Francis Joseph was actively involved in governing. From the traditional prerogatives he maintained first of all those concerning the army and foreign policy: he had the power to declare war and make peace and was the head of the armed forces. For Francis Joseph having power over the army was essential, both during the talks with the Hungarian political elite leading to the Compromise and later, when the Hungarian parliamentary opposition raised claims with regards to the army. The Hungarian Parliament could only influence the affairs of the joint army by voting on the budget and the number of recruits,19 and its direct influence was only over

16 Following, or better still, as a condition of the Compromise, Transylvania’s autonomy was dissolved, and after long talks in 1868 a compromise was signed by Hungary and Croatia, which allowed the latter to keep its internal autonomy. See Ress 1998, 177–198; Pál 2010. 17 There are a great many books out there on this topic. See Rumpler–Urbanitsch 2000. 18 Francisc Joseph was the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary, but he had many other titles – real and imaginary –, such as the King of Bohemia and Great Prince of Transylvania, but also King of Jerusalem. 19 Szente 2011, 221−224.

15 the honvéd army. The Monarch received new rights in 1867 concerning internal policy, which were much broader than those stipulated in the legislation of 1848, which laid the modern basis of Hungary’s political system. He was the head of the state, the head of the executive power, and also had part of the legislative power. As King of Hungary, he appointed the Prime Minister and upon the PM’s proposal, he also appointed the ministers. He could summon, adjourn and dissolve the parliament. It was also him who appointed the high dignitaries, but only upon the government’s proposal, and had the supreme right of control.20 A hot topic in Hungarian historiography is the so-called “pre-sanctioning” (előszentesítés) of laws: the government’s draft bills had to first be presented to the ruler and only if they got his approval could they be sent to Parliament (of course, after the laws were voted in Parliament the King had to sanction them so they could enter into force). This was nothing but an extension to the traditional prerogative of the ruler to initiate laws.21 Francis Joseph very rarely opposed a bill, but he had this efficient tool at his disposal to deter the collapse of the dualist construction. While some experts believe that this prerogative together with control over the army and generally over the common affairs tipped the balance of power in favour of the Monarch and questioned parliamentarianism, others think that since there was a balance between the King and the parliament, “the true nature of governing was defined by the actual political and power relations and not the enactment by the cabinet council of the ruler’s prerogative to pre-sanction laws.”22 In the historical and legal literature there is an ongoing debate about whether Hun- gary qualifies as a parliamentary monarchy or a constitutional monarchy combined with a sort of semi- or “pseudo parliamentarianism”,23 but even the harshest critics agree that the “true centre of political life” was the Parliament.24 An even more categorical opinion was formulated by historians Jean Bérenger and Károly Kecskeméti. In their book about the Hungarian parliamentarian life, they call the Parliament of the Dualist period “the trustee of Hungarian power”, which, in their view, was also the state’s “central institution”.25 Even though at the end of the 19th century this same institution refused to shift to democratic rules, it held on to the liberal values of 1848, thus being a “notable exception” in central Europe.26 Although the Parliament, with

20 We cannot make here a thorough presentation of the ruler’s prerogatives, spanning from the old prerogatives such as granting titles of nobility, distinctions and orders, to the supreme right of control and organisation. He also held the ius supremae patronatus of the Catholic Church. A brief presentation: Csizmadia–Kovács–Asztalos 2003, 335−341. 21 Actually, the Hungarian historical literature mentions the “secret” presanctioning of laws, but Zoltán Szente is compelling in demonstrating that this is just a myth created after the Second World War and the presanctioning procedure was indeed known to contemporaries. Szente 2011, 226−233. See also Csizmadia–Kovács–Asztalos 2003, 346. 22 Szente 2011, 233. 23 A recent book on the topic, in which the author makes a comparative and critical analysis of the form of government during the Dualist period: Szente 2011. The book sparked controversy, see Cieger 2012, Szente 2013. As per American political scientist Robert Dahl’s typology, Hungary can be seen as a competitive oligarchy, since liber- alisation went hand in hand with restricted suffrage. Dahl 1971, 6−9, 33−47. 24 Péter 1998, 196. The study was also published in English in Péter 2012. 25 Bérenger–Kecskeméti 2008, 343. The book was initially published in French: Bérenger– Kecskeméti 2005. 26 Bérenger–Kecskeméti 2008, 429.

16 its centuries-old traditions and continuation of the Diets before 1848, truly was the centre of political life after 1867, parliamentarianism had its limitations, one of the most important being the monarch’s power and prerogatives. Power was divided between the monarch, parliament and the government. The monarch – as we have seen – shared the legislative power with the parliaments; he was also the source of the executive power, which he exercised via the governments, but could preside in person over the councils of ministers.27 Some experts even believe that the government depended more on the monarch than the parliament. On the other hand, the government answered before parliament as well as the monarch, but Szente thinks that the fact that the parliamentary majority did not have the necessary means to dismiss the government (such as a vote of no confidence) was a major flaw in the system.28 The government ran the administration via regional and local bodies, while at county level there was an interesting combination of self-administration and state- run administration,29 with a tendency to centralise it. Control was exercised first of all by Lord-Lieutenants (főispán), who were appointed by the government and whose remit was expanded on several occasions. For problem-solving, the Administrative Tribunal (Közigazgatási Bíróság) was set up in 1896. Following the 1867 Compromise the legal system was separated from the administration and restructured according to the principle of judicial independence in a centralised and hierarchic fashion and was headed by the Royal Curia (Királyi Kúria) in Budapest. For budget control and national wealth the State Audit Office was founded in 1870Állami ( Számvevőszék).

The political parties Most political parties in Dualist Hungary were elite-based parties (in Maurice Duverger’s view) and especially at the beginning of the period they acted as parliamentary parties, meaning they were made up of elected deputies and were organised in clubs or circles. The clubs were the most important political fora: it was where decisions were made and positions were allotted (for the ruling parties). At the same time, they provided a location for the social life of deputies. Somewhat of an exception were the parties of the nationalities, opposition parties and later extra-parliamentary parties. The need for

27 Together, the ministers made up the council of ministers, which set the general course of the government’s policies, discussed important matters and had power over several ministries and settled disputes between ministers. One important event was the council meeting on 17 March 1867, chaired by Francis Joseph, which set the procedures (statute) and the remit of the monarch and the government concerning important decisions, and in particular the matters that needed “pre-sanctioning”. The statute was revisited and modified in 1897. Csizmadia–Kovács–Asztalos 2003, 346. 28 Szente 2011, 303−309. 29 Counties – medium-sized administrative units − kept some of the self-administration rights, including the so-called political right, meaning that their officials could discuss political matters, get in touch with other counties and refer to parliament or the government. The county’s autonomy was limited by the government’s control and the responsibility of county officials to enforce laws and governmental decrees. Moreover, several state institutions were active at county level, such as the Tax Administration and the Gendarmerie (which was dissolved after the Compromise and restructured in 1881 in the rest of Hungary but maintained throughout the period in Transylvania). See Kozári 2005, 269−283.

17 organisation was felt among these parties, too, and particularly among the opposition, which wanted to build local networks from the beginning, but did not eventually do so. Locally (in counties, towns and constituencies) the parties usually organised themselves before elections, their only agenda being to have an election campaign and then their activity would cease, with the exception of political crises.30 The lack of a coherent organisation of the parties makes researchers’ work much more difficult. Apart from the Social Democrat Party and a few other exceptions, such as the Romanian National Party between 1881 and 1892, we basically have no written documents, there were no party members lists, no contributions were paid, there were no offices, the minutes of the meetings have not survived, so there is no archive of the parties during this era and often times it is unclear who belonged to a party. What is more, parties did not have official names.31 For a long time parties defined themselves not so much through ideology – most were Liberal parties –, but by their attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Compro- mise, or the so-called “question of the public law”. In fact, this cleavage between sides originated in the parliamentary disputes of 1861. This meant that the parties did not have homogenous agendas32 and nor were they homogenous from an ideological or a social point of view. The parties that did not accept the Compromise, at least not in its 1867 form, were basically excluded from power, so we can safely talk about a “dominant-(multi)party system”, as Dániel Szabó put it. Governments tried to hold on to power through various means, which quickly led to the weakening of the ruling party (Deák Party, Deák-párt). After in 1875 the most important opposition party (Centre- Left, Balközép), led by the future Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza, merged with the then ruling party, the newly-emerged party, the Liberal Party (Szabadelvű Párt) stayed in power for three decades. Both the Liberal Party and the opposing Party of Independence (Függetlenségi Párt) – which was also of Liberal orientation – had several groups or factions that many times resulted in dissidences or even new temporary parties. Although some parties wanted ever since the 1870s to leave behind the “question of the public law” as a reference point, the trend was unsuccessful and only starting with the following decade and particularly the 1890s did new parties emerge that either did not revolve around the Compromise at all or just marginally took it into consideration. Apart from the nation-wide parties, the nationalities – which were generally discontent with the Dualist system – founded parties based on ethnic grounds. These parties fought fiercely for the exclusive loyalty of their fellow countrymen and adopted various political strat- egies ranging from activism, to passivism and collaborations with the larger parties. The 1880s brought the short-lived success of anti-Semitic movements and even an anti-Semitic party, following the so-called Tiszaeszlár Affair (1882−1883).33 Another change was the fragmentation of the independentist opposition and the emergence of a moderate group that wanted to become an alternative to the ruling parties and

30 For more on parties see: Szabó 1999, 49−86. 31 Kozári 2005, 134. 32 For more on party agendas see: Mérei–Pölöskei 2003. 33 After the death of a young woman from the village of Tiszaeszlár, the Jews were accused of having murdered her as a ritual. The trial sparked great interest and was followed abroad as well. Although the charges were cleared, the wave of anti-Semitism was used to political ends and in 1883, Győző Istóczy founded the National Anti-Semitic Party (Országos Antiszemita Párt), which entered Parliament in 1884. See Kende 1995, Kövér 2011.

18 that gave rise to the conservative National Party (Nemzeti Párt) in 1892. The heated parliamentary arguments in the 1890s about civil marriage and the takeover of vital registration by the state made the programmatic differences between Liberals and Conservatives take temporary precedence over the question of the public law. In this context, the importance of the state–church cleavage – one of the major cleavages in the opinion of Lipset and Rokkan34 – led to the reshaping of the party system, but only temporarily. Following the adoption of the laws, the political scene basically went back to what it looked like before. The arguments gave rise to the Catholic People’s Party (Katolikus Néppárt), which set out to review the laws. Thus, the political parties at the end of the 19th century can be divided according to two criteria: acceptance of the Dualist system and being either Liberal or Conservative. During this same period another important distinction appears, namely the rural–urban cleavage, together with an attempt by the so-called agrarians to have a political party. If we stick to the typology put forward by Lipset and Rokkan, the parties of the nationalities can be seen as a consequence of the centre–periphery cleavage: following the process of nation and state building, the nationalities went on to found parties in the view of protect- ing their identity and language and of activising and controlling the nationality in question. In the 1890s several other social democratic, Christian democratic, socialist and peasants’ parties that had various social and political reforms on their agendas, among which the universal suffrage, emerged. Among them the most important was the Social Democrat Party of Hungary (Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt), founded in 1890; it was truly a mass party, with a cohesive structure. The larger context, however, remained unchanged, meaning that the parties that did not accept the Compromise were not allowed to rule. This would lead to the political crisis of 1905−1906, following which Francis Joseph – after a failed attempt to impose a government against the majority in Parliament – agreed to name a government consisting of members of the former independentist opposition, but only after the leaders of the coalition accepted his terms, that is to say they silently accepted the Compromise. The political crisis at the turn of the 19th century also affected the party system by multiplying disputes and mobility within and between parties. The Liberal Party, which had been ruling for three decades, self-dissolved in 1906 after losing the elections. The ruling coalition of 1906 did not amount to much either and eventually weak- ened the parties that composed it. The last elections of the studied period, which took place in 1910, were won by the National Party of Work (Nemzeti Munkapárt), made up largely by the members of the former Liberal Party. During the First World War various shifts generated a new independentist party led by count Mihály Károlyi and also mobilised all the forces that wanted an electoral reform against the Party of Work – an important role starting February 1918 was played by the Constitutional Party of Forty- Eigthers (48-as Alkotmánypárt), which supported the government of Prime-Minister Sándor Wekerle. An overhaul of the political scene came after the Aster Revolution at the end of October 1918 and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Besides parties, there were also political associations, most of them in the opposition. They got involved in communities and their number increased at the beginning

34 Lipset–Rokkan 1967, 1−64.

19 of the 20th century.35 The activity of hundreds of such associations was quite varied, ranging from political activities to organising celebrations and balls or informal circles that met on various occasions. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between political and non-political associations, since politics was discussed even in casinos and since the members of the associations were often the same. A new phenomenon emerged at the end of the 19th century: pressure groups, which played an increasingly important role in politics. Among the most prominent were the Hungarian National Economic Association (Országos Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület), founded before the 1848 Revolution and representing the interest of those who lived off agriculture in general and of great landowners in particular. The so-called “agrarians” were also active in politics and in 1896 they founded the Association of Hungar- ian Farmers (Magyar Gazdaszövetség), which had hundreds of branches all across the country and tried to put forward a political agenda. The most important association of the “mercantile” was the National Alliance of Industrialists (Gyáriparosok Országos Szövetsége), a very influential association, with county branches. They tried to influence economic policies in particular, through surveys and expert studies, as well as with the help of deputies.36

The Parliament The Monarch, as king of Hungary, summoned and opened Parliament. The official -open ing took place at the Royal palace in Buda. The king’s speech, prepared by the government and delivered on the occasion, was in fact the description of the governing agenda. Parliament’s reply was a letter, which was always formulated by the parliamentary majority; the letters of the opposition, as well as the parliamentary debates around the letter were, however, good opportunities to disseminate knowledge about the agendas of the opposition. After the new Parliament was summoned, the two chambers elected their presidents, vice-presidents and notaries. Appointing the Prime Minister also rested with the King; generally, he came from the party that had a majority in Parliament, but since this custom was not mentioned in the law, it was ignored by the ruler after the 1905 elections, which were won by a coalition between independentist and moderate parties, and also during the war, in 1917 and 1918.37 The documents issued by the ruler had to be countersigned by the ministers. The Prime Minister nomination document was usually signed by his predecessor and only the nomination of Gyula Andrássy, the Prime Minister who perfected the Compromise, was signed by himself.38 The members of the government were nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the Monarch. The government answered before the ruler as well before Parliament. Parliament could be postponed or dissolved by the Monarch on a proposal from the Prime Minister. Only once, in February 1906, did this happen

35 Only between 1899 and 1909 about 350 political associations were founded (Szabó included in his database only those whose names referred to politics). Szabó 1999, 74−84. 36 Szabó 1999, 82−84. 37 Zoltán Szente considered this a major drawback of parliamentarianism. Others thought that the main problem was a lack of alternation in power, as we have seen in the first sub-chapter, but we cannot go into further detail here. Szente 2011, 303−309. 38 Szente 2011, 287−288.

20 against the will of the majority in Parliament and the armed forces had to intervene so that the dissolution could be followed through, which led to a profound political crisis. According to the laws of 1848, the Monarch could only dissolve the Parliament if it had already voted for the following year’s budget, but this condition no longer existed during the Dualist period. Towards the end of the period, on several occasions the opposition blocked the meetings of the Chamber and hindered the voting of the budget. In such cases, governments generally requested indemnity, but failed four times and a state of ex lex was entered, which was later sorted out.39 We have seen that, although the government answered before Parliament, the latter did not have efficient means to dismiss the government and the Monarch was an essential player when it came to major issues. Francis Joseph expected prime ministers and governments to direct the Parliament. Parliament’s prestige – although fading towards the end of the period – was considerable, its remit was almost unconfined in matters of domestic affairs (and it also passed external treaties), constitutional ruling was not possible without it, and the fact that it voted on taxes, budget, the balance sheet and the number of recruits gave it actual power. What is consequential is that during the First World War, while the Austrian Parliament was suspended for years, the Hungarian Par- liament remained active, with a few breaks, all throughout. Members of the government had to appear before Parliament, answer during question times and give explanations; the presence of prime ministers and ministers in Parliament was something common. Parliament could also impeach members of the government, but this never happened. On the other hand, defining the political agenda and initiating bills fell under the remit of the government, although deputies also had this right and in fact, the central committee and the other committees of the Chamber of Deputies were usually doing actual legislative work.40 The Parliament was bicameral, although we could call it an asymmetric bicameral system, where the main role was played by the Chamber of Deputies. The relationship between the two chambers was not regulated by law. According to László Péter, although the two chambers made up a single body, they were independent and theoretically equal, in spite of the fact that ever since the reform period (1830−1848) the importance of the Chamber of Deputies had grown so much that after 1867 it had clearly overtaken the House of Magnates.41 Still, seldom did the two chambers “fight” or did the House of Magnates hamper or postpone the approval of a legislative proposal. The House of Magnates became more active at the beginning of the 1890s in particular, with the start of the “Kulturkampf” in Hungary.42 Deputies were elected, while virtually all the 24-year-old (the legal age of majority) male members of the aristocracy (barons, counts, dukes and archdukes), the bishops and archbishops of the Catholic (Roman and Greek Catholic alike) and Orthodox Churches, as well as the country’s main dignitaries – who in fact had titles of honour – and the Lord-Lieutenants were members of the House of Magnates. After the 1885 reform, the wealth qualification was introduced in the House of Magnates (a minimum land tax of

39 Such cases occurred in 1899, 1903−1904, 1905−1906 and 1910, and following the outbreak of the war no budget was voted on, and the governments asked for indemnity every six months. Kozári 2005, 92−93. 40 No draft bill initiated by deputies became law. Kozári 2005, 89, 98. 41 Péter 2000, 418. 42 Szabó 1999, 96.

21 3,000 Gulden),43 but an amendment made it possible for 50 old members who had been elected by the House of Magnates to stay, although they did not qualify. Transylvanian aristocrats, who had considerably smaller fortunes than their Hungarian counterparts, would have completely disappeared from the upper Chamber had it not been for this measure. The aristocrats who also had land in other parts of the Dual monarchy had to choose where they wanted to exercise their political rights. Lord-Lieutenants were no longer lawful members of the upper Chamber, while the heads of Protestant churches were included – just three bishops and chief curators of the Reformed and Evangelical Churches and one representative of the Unitarian Church.44 Also, upon the recommenda- tion of the government, the ruler could name 50 lifetime members from the ranks of the intellectual, social and economic elite. If a member of the upper Chamber was elected deputy, his membership in that Chamber was suspended throughout the mandate.45 Even after the reform, the upper Chamber was more conservative, which was especially poignant at the end of the 19th century with the talks concerning civil marriage and the other laws challenged by the Catholic Church. Generally, however, debates were considerably more moderate, and many members did not even attend the meetings.46 The situation differed in the Chamber of Deputies, where heated debates took place. This Chamber was considered to be the nation’s representatives’ highest forum and regulations concerning its activity bore the mark of the Forty-Eighters. In 1848 lawmakers wanted to exclude any external intervention and ensure the freedom of expression within Parliament. Deputies could speak freely, but could only take the floor once during a debate, unless they were challenged. Exceptions from this rule were ministers and the initiators of the draft bill under consideration. The official language of the debates was Hungarian, and no other language was allowed, except in the case of Croatian deputies.47 Officially, the role of parties in Parliament, namely the existence of parliamentary groups of the parties, was not acknowledged, but in reality the larger parties controlled their members and did not allow them to initiate draft bills or question sessions on their own. Party discipline was introduced under Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza, who managed to control the ruling party – the members of which were nicknamed “Mamelukes” – through various methods such as patronage, highly criticised by his political opponents. He also initiated the habit for important draft bills to be first discussed within party

43 After the reform, only about a third of the old members fulfilled the criteria: in 1884, 698 aristocrats (29 dukes, 435 counts and 234 barons) from 206 families were invited, while in 1913 there were 204 magnates (8 dukes, 158 counts, 38 barons) from 89 families. Szabó 1999, 98. 44 Besides the 32 Catholic hierarchs, there were also 10 Orthodox and 13 Protestant representatives. Szabó 1999, 98. 45 https://net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=88500007.TV, last accessed 14.03.2018. 46 Usually, 30–40 members were present, and only debates about more important draft bills brought more people in the room. Kozári 2005, 107. 47 In December 1868, when the law regulating the union of Transylvania was under debate, Romanian deputy Ilie Măcelariu started his speech in Parliament demonstratively by speaking Romanian, but was interrupted; another Romanian deputy was exception- ally allowed to read out his speech, as he did not speak Hungarian, so he could not deliver it freely and thus abide by the rule. KN 1865–1868, XI, 330 (01.12.1868).

22 meetings, which can be considered the precursor of the meetings of parties’ parliamentary factions.48 The decisions ensuing from these meetings were later supported in Parlia- ment by the deputies. Upon voting, nobody could abstain, everyone had to cast either a positive or a negative vote; voting was done by standing up or by remaining seated. Plenary debates were deemed the most important, but, following the Belgian and French models, nine “classes” were set up by lot, where draft bills (compulsory) or other materials (optional) were discussed. These could end up in a central committee, made up of the class referents and steered by the president of the Chamber. Subsequently, the report was presented in the plenary session of the Chamber, along with the opinion of the minority if the decision had not been unanimous. The class system also helped to mutually validate mandates. Although the class system was not repealed, the di- versification of work and the need for specialisation imposed changes in the view of making parliamentary activity more efficient. So, from the mid-1870s onwards the role the classes had played was gradually taken on by specialised committees. The shift to a commission-based system was also facilitated by the increasing assertion of parties in Parliament. There had been special da hoc committees before, and in 1868 the first permanent committees emerged, while the amendments brought to the House Rule in 1874 created 11 permanent committees. Moreover, there was also the possibility to form further ad hoc committees if the need arose. By the end of the studied period, various such committees were established. Whereas within the classes deputies were distributed by drawing lots, they were elected to the committees, which means they were unequally spread: some were part of several committees, others were part of none, which disadvantaged the opposition deputies, who were severely under-represented.49 Delegations enjoyed the highest prestige and a special status. The delegation of the Hungarian Parliament met annually with the delegation of the Austrian Parlia- ment in order to vote on the budget for the joint ministries and they were the ones who, theoretically, controlled the joint ministers; both delegations had 60 members each. After the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise of 1868, the Hungarian delegation also comprised the representatives of the Croatian Sabor, who delegated 40 members to the Chamber of Deputies and 2 members to the House of Magnates, where they participated in talks about common challenges. Work itself was regulated by the House Rules, established ever since 1848, and largely based on the Belgian model. The process of draft bills preparation, debate and voting methods, as well as many other issues were regulated. The required quorum for debates and decision-making was also set. While at the beginning of the Dualist period, in 1868, both processes required the attendance of 100 deputies, for debates the number was reduced in 1875 to 40, and for decision-making the number became 60 in 1913.50 Because of incomplete regulation by the House Rules, work was sometimes hindered by the obstructions of opposition parties, which was a common situation particularly starting with the end of the 19th century. While previously obstruction meant never-ending interventions, at the turn of the century a technical kind of obstruction emerged: the opposition would bring countless amendments to an undesired draft bill

48 Pesti 2002, 278−283. 49 Since, theoretically, party factions were not allowed in Parliament, a seat distribution could not be established, which led to the dominance of ruling parties over committees. Szabó 1999, 87−88; Pesti 2002, 195−211. 50 Pesti 2002, 105−106; Kozári 2005, 126.

23 and ask for a recorded vote for each one. Parliamentary obstruction was accompanied by newspaper propaganda and even street demonstrations sometimes.51 So as to avoid large-scale obstructions of the works of the Chamber, István Tisza tried to introduce the cloture in 1904 and thoroughly regulate turns and speech duration through new temporary House Rules (the so-called “Lex Daniel”, after the deputy who made the proposal).52 The vote on the new regulation was tweaked, which led to a sizeable scandal – the deputies of the opposition even destroyed the furniture in the Chamber −, after which Parliament was dissolved. The newly-summoned Parliament repealed the regulation. While trying to regulate the duration of speeches, the duration of meetings was extended. In the beginning, they lasted between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. (except on Sundays), but with the 1908 regulation they could last for 10 and even 16 hours. The last regulation, that of 1913, is again connected to István Tisza, who was Prime-Minister once more. Following a period of eleven months of obstructions, obstructionist deputies were removed by force and the House Rules were changed. In the heat of debates a deputy from the opposition committed suicide after a failed assassination attempt on Tisza. The new regulation introduced the cloture procedure, but only for budget debates and the number of interventions for non-draft bill debates was reduced. In addition, the remit of the president of the Chamber was extended and the parliamentary guard was established.53 Subsequent to these negative changes and the increasingly aggressive tone used in Parliament, tougher disciplinary rules were enforced. The disturbance of peace, offending someone or straying from the topic were liable to sanctions ranging from warning to a ban on interventions, fines or a definite ban on participation in meetings. The president of the Chamber of Deputies was responsible for maintaining the order and he could adjourn the meeting for an hour until calm was restored. Another important role was played by the Immunity Committee, which enforced the sanctions. All these rules had already been toughened during the revision of the House Rules in 1887, but were only enforced at the beginning of the 20th century and, in spite of being further toughened in 1913, they did not yield the expected results.54 At the beginning of the Dualist period, the Chamber of Deputies held its meetings in a building close to the National Museum, which was supposed to be its temporary headquarters and which was built in record time during the talks that led to the Com- promise, before Francis Joseph summoned the Hungarian Parliament in December 1865.55 However, even at the time there was a wish to move to a more appropriate location. The new building had to be at the same time representative and roomy enough to host both chambers, for the House of Magnates was holding its meetings at the National Museum. Although the necessary actions began under Prime Minister Kálmán Tisza, through law no. LVIII:1880, the construction work only began in 1892, and the first meeting held in the new building (the current building of the Hungarian Parliament) was held in 1896, the year of the Hungarian Millennium. Designed by

51 Szabó 1999, 89−90. 52 Allegedly, the modification was in place for one year only. Further reading: Pesti 2002, 115−132. 53 Pesti 2002, 139−148. 54 Kozári 2005, 124−126. 55 Today, the building hosts the Italian Institute in Budapest.

24 architect Imre Steindl, the building was only finished in 1904, and its two symmetrical wings were home to the two Chambers.56

The electoral system a) Electoral laws and the right to vote The right to vote was regulated by law no. V:1848 in Hungary and law no. II:1848 in Transylvania, which were modified through law no. XXXIII:1874.57 The other amendments – which we mention below – did not change the regulation concerning voter qualification, so all throughout the period census and capacity voting were in place. In mid-19th century the political elite’s idea to connect the right to vote with census and capacity was consistent with the spirit of the principles of classical lib- eralism, by which citizens needed to have a certain level of education and wealth in order to be able to make responsible decisions about political matters.58 However, this liberal electoral system underwent no further changes after its implementation, which stressed its anachronism towards the beginning of the 20th century. Another issue was the fact that in spite of law no. XLIII:1868, which regulated the union between Transylvania and Hungary, law no. II:1848 adopted by the Diet in Cluj remained in place until the end of the period, with the amendments brought in 1874 – despite the fact that the lawmakers of 1848 had adopted it as a temporary law for the elections for the Parliament of Pest in the summer of 1848 – so, there was a difference between Transylvania and the rest of Hungary with regard to qualification for voting. Thus, a paradoxical situation emerged where the census was higher in Transylvania than in Hungary proper, although the inhabitants of the area were poorer. Being able to vote was connected to owning property in 1848 (land, house or capital), as well as having an independent profession or conducting trade, having at least one apprentice and higher education (intellectuals, including teachers and priests,59 enjoyed the right to vote without having to fulfil the other criteria). In Hungary, the minimum amount of property in towns was a house or a piece of land worth at least 300 silver Gulden, and in rural areas the equivalent of a quarter of an urbarial session (sessio).60 Those who had a steady income of at least 100 silver Gulden from owning land or capital were also entitled to vote. In Transylvania directives concerning towns were identical, but because urbarial sessions were not regulated, a census of 8 Gulden was introduced in rural areas. The census included all the direct taxes apart from the head tax. In the communes where nobody met the criteria, for every 100 households, two voters could be delegated, whereas smaller communes had no voters – the so-called “voting by

56 http://www.parlament.hu/parl/hun/leiras.htm, last accessed 08.03.2018. 57 https://1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3¶m=5645, last accessed 07.03.2018. 58 Pesti 2002, 22. 59 In Transylvania, only urban dwellers until 1874. 60 In Hungary, following Maria Theresa’s urbarial reform (1767), allodial lands were separated from serfs’ session, the latter being registered and systematised, and serfs’ duties were regulated according to the size of their sessions. A similar reform was not introduced in Transylvania; the “Certa puncta” patent (1769) was much smaller in scope and the serfs’ sessions had not been systematised and standardised.

25 households” (füstök után). This category, which secured a sort of indirect vote – but with very low impact – to the poorer part of the population, only existed in Transylvania.61 According to the laws of 1848, there was yet another category of voters, those who enjoyed the “old right”. Lawmakers kept the right to vote of those who had it before 1848,62 namely the persons with nobiliary status and the bourgeoisie of privileged towns, among whom many did not meet any of the above-mentioned criteria (wealth, education, etc.). However, this right was not inheritable, so the number of people enjoying it dropped naturally towards the end of the Dualist period. Although in Hungary and Transylvania the percentage of nobles was among the highest in Europe (around 5%, and 3.5% of the population respectively), the ratio of those who voted by virtue of their former nobiliary status was only considerable in Transylvania, where it had a great impact on the composition of voters. The right to vote was not granted to: women, individuals who had been convicted, individuals who did not have citizenship or were under tutelage, servants and active soldiers. The most important change introduced by law no. XXXIII:1874 was giving prece dence to the tax qualification rather than the wealth qualification. Since session quarters differed in size and across regions, the law specified that in rural areas voters had to own the equivalent of a quarter of a session, for which the tax would reach at least the level of the lowest tax paid up until that point within the commune for a quarter of a session. Regional differences remained significant. As mentioned above, Transyl- vania did not benefit from the urbarial reform of Maria Theresa, lacking systematised urbarial sessions; in Banat, on the other hand, taxes were very high, unlike those in northern Hungary for example.63 In Transylvania, one would qualify as a voter only if they paid a land tax according to a minimum net land income of 84 Gulden, which was a greater requirement than in most communes in Hungary, although the land was generally less fertile. For towns, the law stipulated that the house in property had to have at least three rooms, and if they were within the built-up area, they had to pay a tax according to a minimum net income of 16 Gulden. Craftsmen, merchants and manufacturers were given the right to vote if their annual taxable income was at least 105 Gulden;64 the amount was the same for those who had an income from property or capital.65 A controversial paragraph stipulated that

61 For a concise presentation see: Szabó 1999, 126–128. Regarding suffrage in Transylvania see also: Ruszoly 2002, 67−83; Pap 2014a, 239−269. 62 In Transylvania, the “old right” was enjoyed by those who, as per law no. XII:1791, had had the right to participate in municipal assemblies, even if they did not meet the census requirements of the new election laws. 63 In 1904, the biggest tax on session quarters (over 87 Kronen, that is over 43.5 Gulden) was paid in a commune in the county of Temes, while in a commune in the county of Zemplén the tax was of only 68 kreuzer, but in 15% of communes the tax was of under 4 Kronen (2 Gulden), and in 13% of over 20 Kronen (10 Gulden). Szabó also presents the situation of a township in the county of Csanád, where the poorest voter had 10.5 yokes for which he paid a total tax of 73.34 Gulden, whereas in a poor village in the county of Bereg one could vote even if one only had 5 yokes for which he paid 2.74 Gulden in tax. Szabó 1999, 127. 64 Before 1874, in Transylvania, only urban dwellers fell into this category, and from then on the regulation was standardised for the whole country. 65 Here, too, there were differences before 1874: in Transylvania, only urban dwellers could be in this category. Szabó 1999, 128.

26 those who had not paid their direct taxes for the previous year had to be erased from electoral lists.66 Thus, the government wanted to stimulate on-time payments, since the budget was lean, but the side effect was that the electorate decreased. There was also a standardisation and extension of the category of voters that benefited from capacity voting.67 Finally, §2 extended the validity of the “old right” until 1872, mentioning that it concerned all those who “were on a voting list for parliament issued between 1848 and 1872 based on the old right”.68 In time, more and more people asked for a broadening of the right to vote. Law no. XV:1899, however, only brought a few amendments concerning procedure and first and foremost regulated electoral judgment. The law did away with electoral abuse judg- ments, namely the decision concerning the validity of a mandate won as a result of abuse, which was under the remit of the Chamber of Deputies, so these cases were tried by the Royal Curia (the supreme court).69 The provision was at first envisaged for a period of eight years, but subsequently became definitive. Another important aspect was the modification of law no. XXXIIII:1874, which cancelled the right to vote of those who had not paid their taxes. As mentioned before, this paragraph contributed to a shrinkage of the electorate, so that in 1896 it reached the lower threshold (5.6% of the population). As a consequence, this provision was repealed through §141 of law XV:1899, and following the repeal the number of voters went up by around 120,000. Whereas in 1848 and at the beginning of the Dualist period these electoral laws were liberal and in line with the spirit of the era, towards the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th regulation in Hungary became increasingly conservative by comparison with other states, and the voter quota was one of the lowest. While in 1848 about 9−10% of the population had the right to vote, during the Dualist period an average of only 6% (5.5%−7.5%) and 20–27%, respectively, of the male population of over 20 could vote.70 In Transylvania, the quota was even smaller: by the end of the 19th century it had reached about 3.2%.71 Moreover, the average languished or even slightly decreased, while in 1907, on the other side of the Monarchy, the universal suffrage for men was introduced, after having been already in place in many other European countries. The biggest hindrance to extending the right to vote was the fear of the Hungarian political elite that nationalities, socialist and radical movements might gain political ground, given the fact that even at the beginning of the 20th century Magyar ethnics only made

66 A modification was brought shortly after by law no. VI:1875, which changed the dead- line for the ongoing year. 67 In Transylvania, as with the previous category, before 1874 only urban dwellers had the right to resort to this paragraph. The category of intellectuals still included notaries public, forest rangers, graduates from agriculture academies and the other categories listed by the law, but for priests, teachers, professors and communal notaries, the righ to vote depended on whether they were employed or not. Szabó 1999, 128. 68 See §2 of law XXXIII:1874 here: http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3¶m=5645, last accessed 07.03.2018. 69 https://1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3¶m=6743, last accessed 07.03.2018. 70 In 1869, out of the 13.2 million inhabitants, with a little over 900.000 had the right to vote (6.7%), in 1910 out of the 18.2 million inhabitants with a little over one million (1.16 million, or 6.4% of the population). Kozári 2005, 132; Szabó 1999, 129. 71 Révész 2000, 1024.

27 up a little over half of the population.72 Towards the end of the Dualist period, the spread of democratic ideas was a challenge for the Hungarian ruling class, because of its political traditions, social composition and the widening gaps within the Hungarian society. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, the issue of the electoral law was becoming more urgent. The Social Democratic Party, as well as other organisations, pressed for universal suffrage. The parliamentary opposition also requested it,nolens volens, but for the time being just for men.73 In a strategic move, József Kristóffy, the Ministry of the Interior of Fejérváry’s government – appointed by the ruler following the elections of 1905 by ignoring the parliamentary majority −,74 drew up a draft bill that granted the right to vote to every man who was at least 24 and could read and write. The government thus wanted to put pressure on the opposition, but when finally a compromise was reached by Francis Joseph and the leaders of the opposition coalition, Fejérváry’s government was dismissed and with it the electoral draft bill. Coming to power in 1906, the coalition of the former opposition parties was forced to do something about this. The coalition’s Minister of the interior, Gyula Andrássy – bearing the same name as his father, who had been the Prime Minister after the Com- promise and later became the Monarchy’s Minister for Foreign Affairs – drew up a bill to extend the right to vote based on plural voting: each male citizen who was at least 24 and could write and read would receive the right to vote, but would benefit from one, two or three votes, according to the tax paid and the level of education.75 The bill was completed in 1908, but did not receive the support of the majority and was written off the government’s agenda. A new electoral law was drafted and adopted during the rule of the National Party of Work (Nemzeti Munkapárt) in 1913. Law no. XIV:1913 – an “electoral law to stop the time”76 – used a very thorough and intricate system to delimitate voters. While up until that point the minimum age was 20, according to the new law, for those with no higher education the age would be 30 and for higher education graduates, 24 (§2).77 The law was never enforced, however, because of the outbreak of the First World War. During the war the issue of extending the vote came up again and, after heated debate, the parliament adopted a modified version of the bill drafted by the Social Democrat deputy Vilmos Vázsonyi. The bill provided that the right to vote would also be extended to women, but the majority of deputies did not find the proposal appropriate. Although the National Party of Work, which had the majority in parliament, narrowed the initial provisions and maintained the tax and intellectual qualifications, the criteria were lowered (e.g. 6 elementary grades, a minimum direct tax of 10 Kronen, etc.). Even so,

72 „Das Wahlrecht garantierte letzten Endes die Suprematie des Magyarentums.“ – is the categorical statement of Révész. Révész 2000, 1025. 73 The question of women’s vote had been raised sporadically before, but was only seri- ously debated in the years running up to WWI, especially by the Social Democratic Party and the Feminists’ Association, and was first implemented by law no. I of the Károlyi government in autumn 1918. See Simándi 2009. 74 The government was declared unconstitutional by the coalition that had won the elections and had a parliamentary majority, so it started what was called a “national resistance”. 75 See Csik 2014. 76 Bérenger–Kecskeméti 2008, 407. 77 https://1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3¶m=7210, last accessed 07.03.2018.

28 according to the law, the number of voters allegedly went up by over 100%. Neverthe- less, law no. XVII:1918 never entered into force.78 The universal and secret suffrage was only introduced after the Aster Revolution, through law no. I of the new Republic, only to be later confined again in the inter-war period. Finally, let us take a quick look at the electorate during the Dualist period. In 1904, 57% of the electorate was made up of ethnic Hungarians, while the overall proportion of Magyars was approximately 50%. If we take into account the criterion of exercis- ing one’s right to vote, most voters could do it due to owning property or due to their income: 61% in 1869 (land and house together), and 67% in 1910. At the first elections after the Compromise, craftsmen and merchants made up 8%, and intellectuals 5%; in 1910 those who voted based on their income were 23%, and intellectuals 7%. The difference lay in the almost complete disappearance of the category that voted by virtue of their “old right”: at country level the number dropped from 19% in 1869 to 2% in 1910, which is understandable given the fact that the “old right” was not inherited and that those who benefited from it had grown old and died.79 The regulations concerning the right to vote favoured the rich and middle class peasantry, but even some of the small peasantry enjoyed this right, alongside a large part of the bourgeoisie, while only 4% of workers were voters.80 There were, however, great differences between Transylvania and the rest of Hun- gary in this respect. According to József Pap’s estimates, in 1848, only 17−18% of the voters in Transylvania had the right to vote out of reasons different to the “old right”, while in Hungary the percentage was almost 80.81 This gap continued, albeit less marked, all throughout the period. In 1908, the composition of voters in Transylvania according to voting criteria was the following: 23.2% by virtue of the “old right”, 28% by virtue of their property, 30.2% by virtue of income, 13.8% intellectuals and 4.8% “by households”. In Hungary, 6.2% of the population had the right to vote in 1908 (in 1880, 6.0%), whereas in Transylvania only 3.2% (4.1%)82 did. Great differences could be observed within Transylvania, too, across regions and eth- nicities: while for the Saxons the so-called “old right” played virtually no role, in Székely Land83 most voters owed their right to it; at the beginning of the 20th century two thirds of the Transylvanians who exercised their right to vote and owed it to the “old right” right were Székelys, as were over half (51.8%) of the similar category in the whole of Hungary. In the county of Csík, the percentage was 63.9% in 1908, while those who voted by virtue of owning land made up a meagre 0.1%, and not even the aggregate number

78 https://1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3¶m=7409, last accessed 07.03.2018. 79 Szabó 1999, 129. 80 Szabó P. 1986, 91−92. 81 Pap 2016. 82 Data source: KI 1906−1910, XXVIII, 926, 214−215. 83 Székelys were a Hungarian-speaking ethnic group, who had benefited from privileges ever since the Middle Ages due to their military duties and who later reclaimed the status of “collective nobility” they used to have in the Middle Ages. During the autonomous principality (16th–17th centuries) part of the Székelys became serfs – these were no longer deemed to be Székelys –, but the others maintained their freedom. Under the rule of Maria Theresa, Székely border regiments were organised from the ranks of free peasants, but the militarised area did not cover the whole of Székely Land. In 1848, by virtue of their old status, they benefited from the “old right”, as did the Romanian boyars from the district of Fogaras.

29 of those who owed their right to property (land and/or house) reached 9%. Because of the high qualification standards, even if those with an “old right” were slowly dying and they were not replaced by others, their percentage among voters remained well over the national average even at the beginning of the 20th century. While in Hungary the number of voters went up by 136.6% between 1880 and 1908, in Transylvania it slightly decreased (98.6%), and in Székely Land it dropped to 64.9% of the initial number, but even so it was a little over the Transylvanian average. Data from the counties of Brassó,84 with a mixed population of Saxons, Romanians and Magyars, and Hunyad, which was mostly Romanian, clearly illustrate the flaws of the right to vote in Transylvania. Not even the rising figures in Brassó, a comparatively well-off county (from 4% to 4.8%), reached the country average by 1908. The county of Hunyad started from a very low level (2.5% in 1880) and then, following a modest increase (3.4%), managed to go over the country average just a little, at the beginning of the century.85 b) Elections As per law no. XXXIII:1874, single-member constituencies were set up where individual candidates, and not parties, were voted for. Therefore, this was a majoritarian, two- round system, meaning that if no candidate accumulated an absolute majority of the votes, namely fifty percent plus one, a second round of elections was held with the two candidates who had the most votes. The winner-take-all system hindered the position of non-governmental parties. The open ballot86 would be expressed orally before the election committee. There was no participation limit and the validity of the results was not influenced by the voter turnout.87 Furthermore, 1848 saw the dissolution of the bind- ing mandate, which meant that deputies received instructions from county and town levels. After this date deputies were considered to represent the whole nation, and not just the constituencies where they had been elected. They now had a “free” mandate, which meant that they could freely change their political orientation or switch parties, even if this would affect their chances of being re-elected. In Hungary, general elections were at first held every three years, and from 1887 every five years. A total of 13 general elections were held during the Dualist period (if we do not take into account the ongoing cycle at the time of the final touches to the Compromise). The meetings of the parliament elected in 1905 were postponed,

84 Throughout the study we will refer to administrative units (counties, districts, seats) by using their 19th century official Hungarian name, while localities, including towns and cities, will be referred to by using their current name (in Romanian) followed by the Hungarian/German version between brackets. 85 Pál 2016, 45−75. Data source: KI 1906−1910, XXVIII, 926, 210−211. 86 The law of 1848 did not clearly state this, so until 1874 several constituencies held secret ballots. It was only the law of 1874 that clearly provided that the ballot would be open. The governing elite justified the adoption of the open ballot through liberal values, and in particular manifest political participation, independence, propriety, integrity and honour. In reality, however, this increased the chances of electoral influence and corruption. 87 For instance, in 1869, due to the passivity and boycott of the Romanians, there were only eight voters in the first round in the district of Naszód, and when the person elected turned down the mandate, only two people voted in the by-election; however, this was an extreme case.

30 then the parliament was dissolved, with new elections being held in 1906, while there were no general elections during 1915 because of the war, so the cycle that started in 1910 was protracted until 1918.88 Before elections, an electoral committee was chosen for each constituency, the polling date and place were set and the lists of voters were brought up to date – in the beginning, this was only done before elections, but after 1874 it happened on a yearly basis. Before the 1899 law, there was also a yearly check of the required land tenure for being a voter in the local elections. Elections did not all take place on the same day, but each constituency set its own polling day/days within the established period of time (even a month, in the beginning, and then ten days at most, as per law no. XXXIII:1874). The polling place was not always situated in the geographical centre of the constituency. Ballots were cast in a public building designated by the election committee. Generally, preparations for and the elections themselves fell under the remit of the local administrative units, namely counties and towns.89 An important role was played by the Lord- Lieutenant, who was the supervisor as well as the most important tool governments had to put pressure and influence the outcome. Candidates could be nominated by parties at central level, by local branches, or could run independently. They were not checked beforehand to see if they were suit- able for being elected to parliament; this issue was only raised at the beginning of the 20th century, with socialist and peasant’s parties candidates. They had to be able to vote and be at least 24 years of age, but besides that there were no other criteria to run for election (financial deposit, collecting a number of supporters or being officially backed by a party). The tendency was that especially the large parties would centralise the selection of candidates as much as possible, so those who wanted to obtain or maintain a mandate had to entertain a good relationship with the party leadership. Especially in the beginning – but also later, on occasion – there were instances when two or more candidates from the same party would fight for one mandate.90 Given the single-member constituencies system, personality played a paramount role, and “at local level the election campaign often played out around the local issues and/or local candidates”.91 The party leadership tried to provide senior members with secure and prestigious constituencies and the costs for these members were covered partially or entirely by the party. There were no clear regulations for campaign funding, the sources do not spare too much information about this aspect,92 but generally parties had a special election fund collected from wealthy members and supporters – and, of course, governing parties were considerably advantaged from this point of view as well. In the opinion of contemporaries, the generous contributions of private capital were repaid

88 Elections were organised during WWI just to fill the free positions due to death or other causes. 89 A very thorough description of the process in Szivák 1901. 90 At the general elections of 1869 in 60% of the constituencies there were two, and in 6% there were three candidates, but in only 5% of cases were there two governmental candidates, and in 6% two opposition candidates. Szabó 1999, 137. 91 Szabó 1999, 135. 92 According to sources close to the government, in the election campaign of 1872 the governing party spent 2.6 million Guldens (an exaggerated amount, by all accounts), without achieving a landslide victory (only 20 mandates separated it from the opposition). Cieger 2008, 327–328.

31 in the form of economic advantages, advantageous state contracts, official positions, distinctions and ennoblement.93 Electoral corruption is tackled a little further on. The less important candidates or those who announced their unsolicited candidature, had to cover their own costs. In spite of the slim chances, at the beginning of the 20th century non-parliamentary parties, primarily the Social Democrats, took the opportunity to ring their own bell.94 Once the election campaign started, candidates needed first of all professional agents (kortes), who would take care of their PR campaign – political agendas were usually printed, as well as posters and other publicity materials, and flags bearing the candidate’s name were handed out – and then would try to mobilise voters in the candidate’s favour. Candidates usually turned up at the end of the election campaign, but especially notabilities sometimes did not turn up at all. A tour throughout the constituency would be organised, consisting of rallies and speeches followed by feasts paid for by the candidates. Depending on their political preferences, newspapers also took an active part in the election campaign.95 Elections were a momentous event in the life of a community, in which not only voters were involved, but also the community as a whole, including women and children. On election day, voters had to go to the centre of the constituency. Because distances could be significant, voters were liable to receive an amount of money to cover travel expenses; the amount was subject to county regulation and took into account the dis- tance.96 Voters would generally travel festively, by carriages pulled by adorned horses, bearing the flags and electoral signs of their favourite candidate, and accompanied by music. The voters living in farther away communes came one day earlier. So as to avoid bickering between opposite camps, each candidate used to rent a whole inn or tavern, where voters were served food and drink, under the supervision of the kortes, who made sure the opposing party did not “steal” voters. These measures notwithstanding, violence at the polls was a common thing. There was a wide range of behaviours, from verbal aggressiveness (jeering at the opposition) to physical aggressiveness (throwing stones, getting into skirmishes, sometimes mass fights and even killings). This is why the Gen- darmerie as well as the army were at the disposal of the heads of election committees and quite often, as a preventive measure, the head of the committee or the Lord-Lieutenant would ask that the troops be present to maintain the public order.

93 Gerő 1988, 96. One of the biggest scandals at the beginning of the 20th century was sparked by revelations that at the 1910 elections an agreement was reached by a representative of the National Bank of Austria–Hungary and the then-Minister of Finance, László Lukács. The Bank provided the governing party with 4.5 million Kronen and in return was awarded a series of very lucrative public contracts. After the outbreak of the scandal, Lukács, who had become prime minister in the meantime, was forced to resign. Gerő 1988, 100−102. 94 Szabó asserts that in 1905 the 78 candidates who entered the election got under 10% of the votes, and 46 of them even under 1%. In 1901, for instance, out of the 440 candidates of the Liberal Party (the ruling party), 277 became deputies, out of the 166 candidates of the largest party of the independentist opposition 79 became deputies, within the People’s Party (Néppárt) the ratio was 74:25, and out of the 43 Socialist candidates, none won. Szabó 1999, 147, 150. 95 For more on the elections see: Szabó 1999, 132−135. 96 Szivák 1901 published in appendices regulations from various counties (604−1002).

32 Voters used to turn up at the polls in organised groups (usually according to the commune they came from), led by the canvasser (kortes). The order of voting according to communes or boroughs was displayed before the casting of the votes. In the beginning, the head of the committee invited those present to make candidate proposals. Whereas until the beginning of the 1870s proposing a candidate by any voter on the spot and orally would suffice, after amendments brought to the law in 1899, the proposal had to be given in writing and signed by at least ten voters. Electors voted in turn before the election committee, which was rounded off with the candidates’ “persons of trust”. Also present were the designated representatives from the commune/borough where the voter was living, who were meant to acknowledge their identity. In the beginning, a vote was validated only if the voter pronounced the whole and correct name of the candidate.97 Following countless complaints, the law of 1874 stipulated that the vote would be taken into account, unless it was absolutely unclear who the person voted for was.98 If there was a single candidate – and voting was not called for −, he was elected by “general acclamation”.99 On several occasions voting spread over a few days, which is why the law of 1874 required that a vote collection delegation be established for every 1,500 voters.100 In 1913, the new law provided that several polling stations be set up, preferably one for every 1,000 voters.101 The number of voters was generally low, and the voter turnout was even more so: it steadily dropped until 1905 (from around two thirds of the total number of voters in 1875 to below half that number in 1901 and 1905), only to go up again in 1910 to about two thirds. Henceforth, over the entire period studied, out of various reasons, about 30% of voters did not turn up to vote.102

97 Otherwise, votes were considered invalid. For a peasant, it was difficult to remember and pronounce complicated foreign names correctly, which is why many complaints were made that the votes thus cancelled could sometimes even change the outcome. 98 The vote had to be accepted even if the first name was omitted or mispronounced and even if the whole name was mispronounced, if it was clear beyond the shadow of a doubt who the voter was referring to (Law no. XXXIII:1874, para. 78). 99 Such cases were rather common, with variable proportions (20% of constituencies in 1872, 46% in 1906, 18% in 1910). Szabó 1999, 135−148. In 1905, in historical Tran- sylvania, in 30.6% of the constituencies there were no opposing candidates. This was more widespread in Saxon constituencies, which consistently voted for their own candidates, and when these candidates held the majority there was no point for opposing candidates to venture. Hence, at the 1905 elections in the counties of Brassó, Beszterce-Naszód, Nagy-Küküllő and the town of Sibiu (Nagyszeben, Hermannstadt) there were no opposing candidates. Pál 2016, 61. 100 If the number of voters was over 1,500 two vote-collecting delegations had to be set up, and for over 3,000, even three delegations could be established (Law no. XXXIII:1874, §59). https://net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=87400033.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev- torvenyei%3Fkeyword%3D1874%2BXXXIII, last accessed 16.03.2018. 101 The new distribution of polling stations and sub-constituencies within constituencies, made by the Minister of the Interior as per law XIV:1913 §23, can be found in: KI 1910–1918, XLIII, 1093, I, 123−280. 102 Révész 2000, 1029. Voter turnout varied in time and across regions: while in 1869 only a quarter (26.4%) of the voters did not turn up, in 1906 already 38% didn’t, and in 1910 absenteeism was back to 28%. In towns, voter turnout was even lower. In 1901 in Budapest, over half (54%) of those who had the right to vote did not use it, while in Transylvanian towns, for example, voter turnout was around 60% at the beginning

33 After the vote count, the winner was announced and handed a copy of the minutes. If none of the candidates won an absolute majority, a runoff election was held: before 1874 during the same day or the following ones, according to the new law in two to three weeks.103 However, such cases were uncommon; for example, at the 1910 elections, there were only 23 ties.104 Candidates were free to try their luck in several constituencies and it wasn’t unusual for a well-known candidate to be elected in more than one. When this happened, he had to choose one of the constituencies and new elections were held for the other/s, allowing for new combinations to occur. The majority obtained by the ruling parties that favoured the Compromise (Deák Party, the Liberal Party and the National Party of Work) moved from 55.9% in 1869 to 80.4% in 1875, after the merger of Deák Party with the largest opposition party. In 1905, the Liberal Party got only 39.9% of the mandates, and following this failure it self-dissolved. In 1906 the Party of Independence and ’48 (Függetlenségi és 48-as Párt) got 61.2% of the mandates, and together with the other coalition parties it formed an overwhelming parliamentary majority. In 1910, the National Party of Work (Nemzeti Munkapárt) got 61.9%, and the independentist opposition only managed to win a quarter of the mandates.105 Deputies of the parties of the nationalities made up just a feeble minority (between 3 and 8%).106 The authorities’ interference with elections and election graft were commonplace and are mentioned in the newspapers of the era and the writings of contemporaries, as well as the literature.107 “In Hungary [...] one of the most efficient instruments of government influence on the elections was the administrative apparatus, or in other words, the governmental system was the principal ‘campaigner’, led by Lord-Lieutenants who supervised local governments as well as the administrative organs of the ministries.”108 The ways in which the administrative apparatus could be used to influence elections were manifold, from voter registration and the setting of minimum land tenure to nam- ing the election committee and choosing the polling place. It was also common to put direct pressure on civil servants and county officials, but also on constablesszolgabíró ( ), who came into direct contact with the voters. Constables could also disrupt the election campaign of an undesired opposing candidate.109 Nevertheless, we need to bear in mind that the positions in the administrative apparatus – apart from the Lord-Lieutenant – were elected, so they ultimately depended on the local elite.

of the period. Szabó P. 1986, 77. In Székely Land there was a reverse trend: in the beginning voter turnout was low (41.8% in 1869), but then it skyrocketed (74.5% in 1901) as the number of voters decreases. Data concerning Transylvania: Pál 2014, 228; Pál 2016, 59−61. However, we do need to take into account that all these figures are approximations, since for an only candidate, voting was done by “acclamation” and the newspapers do not mention the number of those who voted. 103 Between 14 and 24 days (Law no. XXXIII:1874, §57). 104 Szabó 1999, 134. 105 Szabó 1999, 149−150. 106 Some joined other parties as a group, such as is the case of Saxon deputies. 107 András Gerő analysed the whole range of election graft practices in Gerő 1988. See also Cieger 2011. 108 Gerő 1988, 103. 109 See Gerő 1988 and Pál 2014b, 107−126.

34 Offering voters food and drink was a common practice – in spite of the fact that it was forbidden by law −,110 which was perpetuated partly due to the fact that voters sometimes travelled long distances of tens of kilometres to get to the polling place, thus wasting two or three days. While the food did not basically influence the election outcome,111 the true corruption lay in vote buying, an increasingly widespread phenomenon at the time.112 As well as directly buying votes, candidates also frequently donated various amounts of money to charitable and public interest purposes (for instance, schools or public buildings in a commune). Still, the number of complaints was low, especially when compared to the Western European countries. Whereas in England over half of the elections were challenged in mid-19th century, in Hungary the percentage was around 12 over the whole period. The difference lies in the high cost as well as the low success rate, since corruption was difficult to prove − between 1887 and 1906, only 5.1% of elections were cancelled, mostly on grounds of corruption.113 Law no. XV:1899 changed the procedure and the electoral jurisdiction went from Parliament under the remit of the Royal Curia (the supreme court).114 According to the law, bribery, putting pressure on voters and even offering them food and drinks could all be punished by outcome cancellation. These cases were thoroughly recorded, but still the law did little in radically changing the practice. As for the consequences of corruption and electoral pressure, opinions differ. András Gerő posits that the system itself was corrupt and that the “myth of a gen- eralised corruption” had become reality, while Dániel Szabó says that, in spite of the corruption and illegal practices, no electoral victory in the Dualist period was decided by “money, or the system of bureaucratic or economic dependency”.115 c) Constituencies In Hungary, constituencies were designated by law no. V:1848. Previously, every county and free royal town, regardless of its size or number of inhabitants, would send two delegates to the Diet. In accordance with the law, several constituencies were organised within the counties, but the larger context was still the municipality (the administrative unit) which – as we have seen –, played a major role in the preparation and organisation of elections. Paragraph 5 of the law stipulated that besides the Transylvanian deputies116 – Transylvania was still an autonomous province within the Monarchy – the

110 Paragraphs 96 and 97 of law no. XXXIIII:1874 stipulated a fine of up to 1,000 Gulden or a jail sentence of 6 months and the suspension of the right to vote for three years for cases of voter bribery or treat; the same held true for those who took bribes. 111 A similar phenomenon is described by Frank O’Gorman in England, before the Re- form Bill of 1832 (O’Gorman 1991, 142). Gerő 1988 mentions many cases of corruption, drawing on the newspapers and memoirs of the time. 112 Transportation allowances were often used as a pretext. 113 The amount was 1,000 Gulden until 1899 and as per law no. XV:1899, 1,500 Gulden (3,000 Kronen), which was a large sum of money. For example, some of the Lord- Lieutenants had annual wages of 3,000 Gulden (6,000 Kronen). 114 Ruszoly 1980, 491−502. 115 Szabó 1999, 135; Gerő 2017, 138−139. 116 Their previously established number was 69.

35 Chamber of Deputies would have 377 seats,117 it broke down the number of deputies according to counties and towns, but did not separate constituencies from a territorial point of view and left it to the counties and towns to do so. A committee headed by the Deputy Lieutenant (alispán) had to delineate the constituencies and designate their centre, namely the polling place, thus allowing for political games at local level. In Transylvania, where law no. II:1848 did not regulate the methodology of voting, during the first decade of the Compromise the same tradition was in place for administrative units that ranked as municipalities (counties, seats, districts118 and privileged towns) to send two deputies to Parliament and to decide each time whether they would organise elections in one or two constituencies.119 After 1874 there were only single-member constituencies in Transylvania, too.120 In Transylvania, law no. II:1848 established 73, and then 75 constituencies121 [out of which 20 belonging to the counties and districts, 22 to the “King’s Land”122 (Saxon seats, districts and towns), 10 to Székely seats and 23 to privileged towns], and following the reorganisation of 1877, there were 74 constituencies (55 in counties and 19 in towns). The territorial and administrative reform of 1876 brought about major changes particularly in Transylvania, where the biggest anomalies were to be found: the administrative units were disproportionate, some counties stretched over hundreds of kilometres, and the Felső-Fehér county was scattered into small territorial blotches interlaid with several counties and seats.123 Through law no. XXXIII:1876 several small and scattered administrative units were dissolved or joined together and were then reorganised as homogenous counties. Concurrently, the rank of city that several towns had was rescinded (law no. XX:1876). The following year, a new law (no. X:1877) reorganised the election constituencies in the said administrative units, namely the number of deputies was redistributed. At the same time, the delineation of the constituencies and polling places – apart from the few cases mentioned by the law – was left to the devices of county or town assemblies, with the note that, once designated, they could only be modified by law (§3).124 Initially, the idea was to cre- ate constituencies of around 30,000 inhabitants – since there was no statistics of the

117 The number also includes Croatia and the military border, so the actual number of constituencies in Hungary proper was 338. The military border area of Banat was only demilitarised in 1873. 118 Territorial units had different names, depending on historical developments; they were unified following the administrative reform of 1876. 119 For situations where two deputies were to be elected in one constituency, a double election was organised, where all the voters who were present took part, and each voter nominated two candidates. At the end, the first two candidates who got the most votes were awarded the mandates. 120 Law no. XXXIII:1874, §111. 121 §7 of law no. II:1848 mentions 73, but after the demilitarisation of Naszód district, two more seats were added through §4 of law no. XLIII:1868. 122 “King’s Land” (Königsboden) refers to the areas inhabited by the Saxons in Transyl- vania, enjoying royal privileges and the right to self-administration. After several attempts at reorganisation, these areas have been merged into the newly organised counties after the administrative reform of 1876. 123 See Pál 2008, 103–116. 124 Toth lists the most important territorial adjustments: Toth 1973, 84−85, footnote no. 15.

36 number of voters –, but other factors were also taken into consideration; for instance, it was ensured that every county had at least two deputies and that towns – at least most of them – kept their right of representation.125 There was a total of 413 constituencies in Hungary (including Transylvania, but not Croatia), out of which 332 in counties, 41 in townships and 40 in other towns. Their number remained unchanged until the end of the Dualist period.126 The adoption of law no. XIV:1913 sparked talks about the need to reorganise the constituencies, but the only thing stipulated was that a new law would regulate the situation. Reorganisation was done through law no. XV:1914, which raised the number of constituencies to 435 and abolished the status of stand-alone constituencies of several towns, only maintaining this status for cities.127 The law stipulated that the division of localities according to constituencies would be established by the Minister of the Interior by decree, which happened in 1914. The division was also made for towns, which were thoroughly delineated by streets,128 and the following year sub-constituencies were set up within constituencies – but, as mentioned before, these laws and decrees were never enforced. Due to the fact that in the beginning constituencies had the same delimitations as the administrative units, their huge disproportionality was blatant, and this paradoxical situation lasted partially all throughout the period. The situation was the same for the former privileged towns of Transylvania – the so-called loca taxalia129 – which had had the right to be represented in the Diet ever since principality times. Among them were townships with a very small number of inhabitants, which in time lost their significance. These “rotten boroughs” were typical of Transylvania. After the first elections following the Compromise, in 1869, about 6,000 voters and 7,000 respectively, were registered in the two constituencies of the seat of Csík, in total over 13,000 voters, while in the small market town of Miercurea Ciuc (Csíkszereda), with a total number of only 1,247 inhabitants, there were 223 voters. In other words, the voters in one of the seat constituencies – thirty times more numerous than those in Miercurea Ciuc – also sent just one deputy to Parliament. Similarly, the approximately 6,900 voters of the Belső-Szolnok county elected two deputies, just like the small Saxon seat of Újegyház, which had 205 voters, or the former free royal town of Dumbrăveni (Erzsébetváros), founded by Armenians, which had 231 voters. The disparities among constituencies clearly favoured voters from towns, thus their vote was more valuable than that of voters from rural areas. In urban Transylvanian constituencies an MP represented on average 4,500 citizens, in Saxon seats 16,000, and in Székely seats 41,000 people on average. The constituencies of these “rotten boroughs” were awarded as “repayment” by the ruling party to its own supporters, but they were also preferred by the members of the economic elite in Budapest.130 As the

125 Szabó 1999, 131−132. 126 For a more detailed description of the legislation see Toth 1973, 81−88. 127 https://net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=91400015.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev-torve nyei%3Fkeyword%3D1914%2BXV.%2Bt%25C3%25B6rv%25C3%25A9ny, last accessed 16.03.2018. 128 KI 1910–1918, XXXIX, 1014, 273−419. 129 Loca taxalia were townships outside the “King’s Land” that had various privileges and local autonomy ever since the times of the Principality; they paid their taxes in a lump-sum and had the right to be represented in the Diet. See Pál 1999, 10−16. 130 Pál 2014, 225−248; Pál 2013, 46−67.

37 contemporaries would say: “These Transylvanian rotten boroughs were only and exclu- sively good for the competent people who were not members of the gentry to win an easy mandate – obviously out of the Government’s ’generosity’ or for a given price.”131 The abolishment of such anachronistic privileges was the subject of heated debate in Parliament. Some of these small tows even lost this right from 1877 onwards,132 but maintaining other towns’ privileged position was meant to strengthen the Magyar electorate in Transylvania, where the absolute majority was made up of Romanians. Contemporaries also viewed the protraction of such anachronisms as an intention to strengthen the ruling party with easy mandates. Following the passing of the law of 1877, 24 lower-tier towns (the so-called “towns with an organised council”), alongside cities, made up stand-alone constituencies, out of which 13 in Transylvania, and only Sibiu (Nagyszeben, Hermannstadt) and Brașov (Brassó, Kronstadt), the two Transylvanian Saxon cities that had been important ever since the Middle Ages, were able to elect two deputies.133 Among the maintained town constituencies were Sic (Szék), which completely lost its urban look following the deser- tion of the salt mine in the 18th century, and Vlăhița (Oláhfalu), made up of two privileged villages totalling a little over 3,500 inhabitants. The most serious issue – constituency disproportionality – was, therefore, not solved by the end of the period. In 1901 there were eight constituencies in Hungary where the number of voters was under 500, 32 constituencies with 4,000–7,000 and 5 constituencies with over 7,000 voters.134 In some of Transylvania’s “rotten boroughs” the number of voters was in constant decline, so that at the last elections of the studied period, in 1910, there were 137 voters in Sic (at the beginning of the period there were over 700), and in Brețcu (Bereck) there were 185 voters, while in the two constituencies of the city of Cluj (Kolozsvár) there were over 2,700, and over 2,500 respectively, Timișoara (Temesvár) had over 4,700, Oradea (Nagyvárad) over 4,600 voters, not to mention some of the constituencies of Budapest (in Terézváros, for example, there were over 17,000 voters).135 In accordance with law no. X:1877, permanent centres for the constituencies had to be designated; before that, several controversies were sparked by polling places being moved, as parties would accuse each other of influencing the elections by making it harder for the opposing camp to reach the polling place. As mentioned before, voters often had to travel 20–30 kilometres and sometimes more – there were also more extreme cases of 40–50 and even 100 kilometres –,136 and if the road went through villages of different political views, the journey could be rather unpleasant and possibly even dangerous. The situation got even worse when the two sides were of different nationalities or religious denominations. Such an example is the district of Fogaras,

131 Halász 1911, 345. 132 As per law no. XX:1876, 47 townships lost their city status, but only some of them were stand-alone constituencies. 133 https://net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=87700010.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev- torvenyei%3Fkeyword%3D1877%253AX, last accessed 13.03.2018. 134 Varga 2010, 24. 135 See the book section: Evolution of the number of voters. 136 Szabó P. 1986, 81.

38 where, at the 1872 elections, the preparations were halted because of a dispute concerning the polling place.137 The literature circulates the idea that even electoral geography was used against the various nationalities and the opposition.138 This statement needs further investigation, however. What is certain for the time being is that it is partially confirmed by the fact that some small towns in Transylvania maintained their right to be stand-alone constituencies, but we also need to bear in mind that the above-mentioned aims were in fact contradictory. While we will not delve into detail about electoral geography, we do mention the well-known fact that the opposition was favoured in the territories with a majority of Magyar ethnics, while most support for the ruling parties came from mixed territories or those dominated by other nationalities.139 On the other hand, even if such had been the intentions, given the small number of voters in rural areas and the mixed population of most areas, moving a few villages from one constituency to another could not have influenced the election outcome significantly. Only the incorporation of a town – in most towns those speaking Hungarian made up the majority of the population – into a mixed constituency or where another ethnicity made up the majority could have had a bigger impact.140 The division of constituencies was indeed unequal, but the truly serious issues are the ones we have mentioned above. Pap’s research also shows that the division of constituencies corresponded by and large to the ethnic structure and that there were even 7.6% more constituencies in the territories inhabited mostly by Romanians and 21% more in the territories inhabited by Slovaks; however, there were 2–3 fewer constituencies in the territories inhabited by Serbians, Croatians and Ruthenians.141 Another question refers to the extent to which the ethnic composition of the voting population corresponded to that of the general population in the constituency. The estimations of Pap have demonstrated no major differences, but from lack of research, we do not possess exact information about the ethnic composition of the voters according to constituency.142 As regards inequality among the various nationalities, in 1910 most had a voter percentage consistent with the number of inhabitants. A slight difference was observed in the case of the Slovaks (-0.8%) and the Germans (+1.3%), while more considerable differences were recorded for the Magyars (+5.1%) and the Romanians (-5.5%),143 which

137 Szabó 2010, 373−390. Of course, the dispute in Fogaras cannot be reduced to the controversy over the central office of the constituency alone. Behind it was also the political passivity of the Romanians and their attempt to boycott the elections, similarly to 1869. 138 See Révész 2000, 1029; Csaba P. Szabó speaks about a deformed electoral geometry, where constituencies of many voters were created for the supporters of the opposition in the Great Hungarian Plain, while on the outskirsts the constituencies were considerably smaller. Szabó P. 1986, 80. 139 Toth 1973 makes a thorough analysis of the situation and tendencies in the various regions. 140 For instance, the town of Făgăraș (Fogaras), which could only be put together with the surrounding villages anyway, or the town of Zalău (Zilah), which was in the same constituency as part of Kraszna county, which was mostly Romanian. Toth 1973, 87. 141 Pap 2014, 150−151. 142 Research is hindered by a lack of sources and by methodological issues (the basis for ethnicity attribution). 143 Szabó P. 1986, 97.

39 was mainly a consequence of the fact that the regulations in place for Transylvania were different. This becomes apparent if we take a look at the data from Transylvania. The statistics made before the 1913 electoral law reveals that among the voters here, 56.2% were Magyar ethnics, while their percentage among the general population of the area was only 34.3. Saxons, too, were over-represented, with 15.3% as opposed to their proportion of 8.7 in the general population. Transylvanian Romanians, with a less numerous and wealthy elite, but a much higher rate of illiteracy, were blatantly disadvantaged by the electoral law: they were only 28.2% of the voters although they made up the absolute majority of the population of the former Principality (55%).144 To eliminate or minimise these differences would have meant to have a fundamental reform of the system. d) Deputies As we have shown, any Hungarian citizen who was at least 24 years of age and a voter could become a deputy. The elected deputies had to speak Hungarian, which was the language of the debates in Parliament. They could initiate laws, bring amendments or proposals, question the members of the government and submit requests. In 1848, in an attempt to make the institution more democratic, per diems were introduced to make it easier for the less well-off to join Parliament. Besides, deputies were also entitled to a flat amount for accommodation expenses totalling 800 Gulden145 in 1870, while the per diem brought them around 2,100 Gulden annually, then 2,400 (4,800 Kronen) from 1893. These incomes – no others added – ensured a decent standard of upper middle class living.146 However, deputies were obliged to attend meetings and ungrounded absences were punished by withholding the per diem, though it must be said that attendance checking was only done for voting. If the deputies had two ungrounded absences from the committees, they could be replaced.147 Deputies also enjoyed parliamentary immunity, which could only be suspended by the Chamber of Deputies. Deputy standards were regulated, besides the afore-mentioned electoral laws, by incompatibility laws. Law no. I:1875 was approved after long debates. The opposition had obstructed the adoption of the new electoral law in 1872, on the grounds that, among other flaws, it did not regulate incompatibility cases.148 In 1875 the general opinion had become favourable, since there had been a reconciliation between the ruling party and the largest opposition party. The future law was the result of a compromise. The aim of the law was to ensure that the deputies were independent from the government, to contain the possibilities of their having illegal gains and to avoid the interference of economic circles in the legal activity. Deputies were not allowed to be state officials appointed by the ruler, with the exception of ministers, certain secretaries of state, university professors and heads of certain institutions. County or city officials, the

144 Pap 2014, 279. 145 The currency of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy was the Gulden (Hung: forint) until 1892 when, along with the introduction of the gold standard, it was replaced by Kronen (Hung: korona). One Gulden equals two Kronen. The Gulden remained in use until 1900, after this date the only legal currency of the Monarchy being the Kronen. 146 Gerő 1988, 161−163. 147 Pesti 2002, 328−329. 148 Szabó 1999, 94−95.

40 active members of the army or the members of monastery orders could not, however, hold both positions simultaneously. Economic incompatibility was also regulated; for instance, deputies were not allowed to be entrepreneurs with state contracts, heads or members of the boards of companies or banks that had business connections with the government, or part of the management of state-subsidised private railway companies until the construction work was over.149 The law had loopholes, however, and it was not efficient enough. Thus, from the 130 incompatibility cases in the cycle 1897/1901, only in seven instances did the deputies lose their mandate.150 A new regulation was obviously needed, and it was established through Law no. XXIV:1901, which complemented and detailed the cases of incompatibility. Among others, §11 stipulated that the deputy was forbidden to broker somebody’s cause with the government in return for favours or money, including the acquisition of ranks, orders or medals, and §13 forbade brokerage for the acquisition of certifications for railway construction, public buildings, the sale or rental of state buildings, etc. The elected deputies were given 30 days to solve incompatibility issues.151 Nevertheless, the law could not put an end to the influence of economic circles, which continued to manifest itself indirectly.152 As we have seen, deputies were considered to be the representatives of the whole nation. The existence of parliamentary groups of the parties was not acknowledged, but they existed de facto. Since their mandates were individual, deputies were free to shift their political orientation,153 but in practice, they only stood a chance of getting results as part of a stronger group, as a politician of the era said: „One may well be excellent, but in the absence of a party, he bears little weight in parliamentary life.”154 Consequently, independent deputies gradually disappeared, to only make up 2–3% of the total; it was only in the 1910/1918 cycle that their percentage increased considerably. Besides Parliament, political party clubs were the most important place for the social lives of deputies. That was where important decisions were made and social capital was built up. Theesprit de corps also resided in everyone being on first name terms, regardless of their previous social status. Deputies had consistent continuity. Newcomers to Parliament would make up a little over one third (37.4% in the period 1884−1918). The strong continuity reflects the strengthening and professionalization of the political elite, as well as its rather closed character. New deputies came from the same social background as all the others.155 There also existed an “elite of the elite”, namely deputies who stayed in Parliament for more than six cycles, and a small group even managed to last for over eight cycles. Among the latter were the most well-known politicians, party leaders, individuals who

149 https://net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=87500001.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev-torv enyei%3Fkeyword%3D1875%2BI.%2Bt%25C3%25B6rv%25C3%25A9ny, last accessed 15.03.2018. 150 Gerő 1988, 175−179. 151 https://net.jogtar.hu/ezer-ev-torveny?docid=90100024.TV&searchUrl=/ezer-ev-torv enyei%3Fkeyword%3DXXIV%253A1901%2B, last accessed 15.03.2018. 152 Pölöskei 2001, 222−229. 153 Between 1887 and 1905, 9% of the deputies changed their party preference. Pap 2014, 92. 154 Pál Móricz quoted by Pesti 2002, 281. 155 Ilonszki 2009, 107−115.

41 were also members of the Hungarian parliamentary delegation and the most presti gious committees in Parliament.156 The average was of 2.6−3 parliamentary cycles, for members of the government about 3 cycles, while for the independentist opposition the average was of about 2.5 cycles.157 There was a difference between ruling parties and opposition parties with regard to continuity, but the statistical data about them are highly inconsistent.158 We will only briefly touch upon the social and professional composition of the body of deputies, as this will be detailed in the next book together with the bulk of the prosopographical analyses. One aspect, discussed by contemporaries and analysed early on, was the social background of the deputies, and implicitly the continuity of the traditional elite. A. Toth, like many other researchers, reached the conclusion that the two strata of the nobility, namely the aristocracy and the gentry, maintained their dominance all throughout, and that the Compromise meant the “victory of the gentry”, through which the former landed nobility maintained its dominance over the political arena.159 We also need to remember that the number of the petty nobility in Hungary was very high before 1848. They made up about 5% of the population, but represented a much higher percentage of the deputies. The percentage of the aristocracy oscillated between 10 and 16%. At the beginning of the studied period it was of about 10% (9.3 in 1875), then went up to about 15 in 1887, and following a temporary fall, it reached its peak after the last elections of the period envisaged: 16,3% in 1910.160 The data used by Toth for the gentry come from Ernő Lakatos, 1942, and need to be double-checked. According to Lakatos, among the ruling parties that accepted the Compromise (Deák Party, the Liberal Party, the National Party of Work), nobles made up about 40% of the total, while among independentist parties, they made up about 50% before 1900. Interestingly enough, Ilonszki’s calculations reveal a different reality: the percentage would have gone up from 41 in 1884 to 54 in 1897 and, following a drop to 28 in 1906, it would have reached 45 again in 1910 among all the deputies; if we were to break it down, the Liberal Party would have had 50% (oscillating between 44.8% and 57.4%), and the Party of Independence around 33−34%, except in 1897 (49.1%). The average over the period covered is of 45.7%.161 The lowest percentage lies with the parties of the nationalities, the anti-Semitic parties and the People’s Party (with conservative and Catholic views). Lakatos posits that aristocracy has perpetuated its increased political influence all throughout the period.162 Although this opinion is not shared by historians, the question still remains about what conclusions we can draw from the data. Confining the voting population by wealth and intellectual limitation has surely contributed to the continuity of the political elite, which benefited from education, experience, prestige, connexions and partly the necessary wealth, too, thus having cultural, social and partially economic capital that provided it with a clear advantage over the other social strata.

156 Kurtán 2005, 51−73. 157 Ilonszki 2009, 84. 158 Ilonszki 2009, 116. 159 Toth 2000, 1061, 1065. 160 Toth 2000, 1063−1072. 161 Ilonszki 2009, 60−62. 162 Lakatos 1942, 52.

42 What was the typical profile of a deputy in the Parliament of Budapest during the Dualist period? The average age of the deputies was 45−47 and even if they came from various ethnic backgrounds, most of them considered themselves or were considered to be part of the Hungarian nation, not just politically but also culturally. As for religious denomination, the Protestants were over-represented, while the Orthodox were under-represented, considering the demographic situation.163 According to Ilonszki, the vast majority of deputies (90%) had higher education studies, while a mere 0.3% had basic studies only. The differences between the Hungarian MPs and Western European MPs are considerable and reflect the small pool that the parliamentary elite was re- cruited from.164 Among those who had higher education studies, two thirds (sometimes three quarters) had Legal Studies. The role lawyers played in politics was pinpointed by Max Weber already and confirmed by the results of similar European studies.165 A third of them were landowners, which is consistent with what we have shown about the continuity of the traditional elite. Entrepreneurs made up 5–7%.166 Toth calculated the percentage of the middle class, where he included officials, teachers, lawyers, independent professionals and other categories, to have been somewhere between 40 and 50%.167 There are however inconsistencies between his calculations and Ilonszki’s. According to the former, the percentage of officials was 10, while Ilonszki’s figures are considerably higher (30−40% within the larger parties). Another discrepancy concerns the distribution by parties: whereas Toth says that county officials were numerous among the independentist opposition, Ilonszki considers that before 1906 the ruling parties managed to considerably widen the gap that had been there all along for this segment of professionals (local and county officials within the ruling parties made up 42.3% in 1897).168 Of course, we also have a series of regional analyses by cycles and generations,169 but that is beyond the scope of this paper. Being a deputy, therefore, meant having an elitist status all throughout the period concerned. Ilonszki concludes that, although there was an ever-growing tendency for professionalization, compared to Western Europe, the modern Hungarian politician appeared considerably later.170

163 Pap’s data are rather different from those of Ilonszki’s team; since his are the more complete and he used several sources, not just almanacs, it is likely that his data are closer to reality. That said, the Protestants were over-represented. Pap 2014, 34−39, 122. 164 Ilonszki 2009, 67−68, 85. 165 Cotta–Best 2000, 510−511; Adlgasser 2014. 166 Ilonszki 2009, 65−67. 167 Toth 2000, 1081−1088. 168 Toth 2000, 1090; Ilonszki 2009, 84. The figures need to be double-checked, because they are contradictory. 169 For English see: Pap 2017; Pál–Popovici 2017. 170 Ilonszki 2009, 143−147.