The Dark Side of Alliances: Lessons from Volvo– Renault
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European Management Journal Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 136–150, 1998 Pergamon 1998 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain PII: S0263-2373(97)00083-2 0263-2373/98 $19.00 + 0.00 The Dark Side of Alliances: Lessons from Volvo– Renault ROBERT BRUNER, Darden Graduate School of Business, University of Virginia ROBERT SPEKMAN, Darden Graduate School of Business, University of Virginia This article explores sources of failure in strategic alliance managers and senior executives of corpor- alliances drawing on field research into one of the ate allies. 1998 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. most prominent alliance collapses in recent years. All rights reserved The alliance of Volvo and Renault married the two largest enterprises in their respective countries for The strategic alliance towers over the corporate land- economic objectives that virtually all industry scape of the mid-1990s. These innovative organiza- experts applauded. Three years after its founding, tional structures stretch our vision for inter-firm col- the allies split apart in a bruising argument that left laboration. In the view of Quinn (1992) and Gomes- observers reassessing the future of alliances and of Casseres (1994), alliances herald the arrival of the net- European integration. We believe that an expla- worked or ‘intelligent’ enterprise, a disaggregated nation of the paradox of ‘good motive–unhappy organization concentrated around a core set of outcome’ here is to be found in the ‘dark side’ of knowledge or skills. The rising tide of alliances1 alliances that invites managers to make fatal errors. announced each year suggests a boom in organiza- We identify six factors that undermined the Volvo– tional invention and experimentation. The motives Renault alliance: misalignment of senior and and high expectations for alliances form a steady operating managers, path dependence, alliance mantra: to gain production efficiencies and the result- recontracting, leadership style, cultural differences, ant lower costs; to expedite access to technology, and time. Alliances are vulnerable to these and markets, and/or customers; to promote organiza- other errors. Lessons about them are relevant to all tional learning; to expand strategic competencies; 136 European Management Journal Vol 16 No 2 April 1998 THE DARK SIDE OF ALLIANCES: LESSONS FROM VOLVO–RENAULT and to launch a strategic response to a much larger, finally, the alliance consummated the efforts and out- or more nimble, competitor (see, for example, Powell, look of two business leaders who were praised in the 1987 and Lorange and Roos, 1993) These and other highest terms: ‘visionary,’ ‘charismatic,’ and ‘deeply motives represent the bright side of alliances. respected.’ The ultimate demise of this alliance starkly illuminates the darker side of these combi- In the midst of this euphoria it is stunning to find nations, embracing special issues of strategy, leader- that the track record for alliance success is rather low, ship, culture and control. with some estimates stating that more than 60% of all alliances fail.2 Some executives explain that many alliances are formed to promote corporate develop- ment and that what is nominally a failed alliance is Founding the Alliance really a very valuable acquisition of knowledge or expertise. Others argue that alliances are similar to taking options on the future. Like an R & D project, In 1990 Volvo and Renault agreed to establish a stra- failure is inherently part of the process and should tegic alliance through a complicated scheme of cross- be expected. share holdings, joint production and R&D agree- ments, and supervisory boards. The allies knew each To be sure, alliance success is often tough to measure. other well through 20 years of industrial cooperation. Organizations learn at different rates and one partner In 1971 they initiated a cross-supply agreement might be a slow learner. Certainly, this is the case at involving the swapping of gasoline engines for gear- NUMMI; GM has not learned as quickly as Toyota boxes. Renault invested in Volvo shares in 1980 (and has. Or, the intended goal of the alliance is not achi- sold them in 1985, during Renault’s close-call with eved but one partner reaps windfall profits by virtue bankruptcy). Volvo’s Executive Chairman, Pehr Gyl- of its brief, albeit profitable, association. For example, lenhammar, approached Renault’s CEO, Raymond executives at AT&T point to the millions gained in Le´vy, in 1986 with a proposal for Volvo to purchase their sale of Olivetti stock and their subsequent order Renault’s truck manufacturing business. The pur- for telecommunications equipment from the Italian chase would have solidified Volvo’s lead in the Euro- PTT as measures of alliance success, although by all pean truck market. Le´vy demurred then, but in 1989 external accounts the AT&T–Olivetti alliance never opened discussions with Gyllenhammar for a more accomplished its intended goals. For many more far-ranging alliance. Le´vy drew a parallel between firms, the gains are illusory and such education can the Volvo–Renault partnership and the founding of be quite expensive. Executives who wish to avoid the the Royal Dutch Shell Group: as the Dutch and Brit- dustbin of failed alliances must begin by understand- ish organizations came together in a marriage of ing the causes of failure and their possible remedies. equals, so would Volvo and Renault. The timing of these discussions was important: both allies were Our own research highlights six key points of vulner- financially healthy. By the end of 1989, Renault could ability for alliances which should be the focus for spe- solidly assert that it had recovered from its distress cial attention by executives of corporations and man- of the mid-1980s, and could point to its successful agers of alliances. We illustrate these vulnerabilities new products, Clio, Espace, and Renault 25 as indi- through an in-depth case study of the failed strategic cators of a promising future. Volvo, too, could look alliance between AB Volvo and Renault S.A. Our back on several years of dramatic prosperity, fueled study draws on 20 interviews in Europe and the largely by its sales growth in North America. United States of senior executives at Volvo and Renault, as well as knowledgeable observers in fin- The strategic alliance founded in 1990 was motivated ance and business journalism who followed the by two primary considerations. First was the desire alliance closely. to exploit sizable potential synergies in joint product development, purchasing, quality and manufactur- The Volvo–Renault alliance is an exemplar for senior ing. Volvo and Renault estimated that the undis- executives. First, it was one of the largest and most counted value of scale economies available through prominent alliances in Europe. The two companies the alliance would amount to Swedish Kronor (SEK) were the largest enterprises in their respective home- 14 billion between the years 1991 and 2000. The lands. The combination of Swedish and French giants second was to combine complementary firms in seemed to model the future of European business order to ‘create a firm of sufficient size, breadth and integration and could have symbolized the best depth as to be able to compete effectively in the glo- intentions of pan-European cooperation. The alliance bal industry.’ As Figure 1 shows, a fusion of Volvo promised to shift the strategic paradigm in Europe, and Renault was part of a longer-term process con- creating a muscular world-class competitor out of solidation in the automobile industry within Europe. two smaller producers. For Volvo particularly the Finally, the sharing of key competencies of each firm alliance was seen as its key to survival. Auto industry might lead to other, less tangible, benefits. The two experts questioned Volvo’s go-it-alone strategy. The firms had complementary competencies in market industrial motives for the alliance were impeccable: positions, geographic regions, and core com- indeed, to this day they remain unchallenged. And petencies, as illustrated in Table 1. However, that European Management Journal Vol 16 No 2 April 1998 137 THE DARK SIDE OF ALLIANCES: LESSONS FROM VOLVO–RENAULT Figure 1 Changing Competitive Structure of Industry. Table 1 Elements of Difference and Complementarity between Volvo and Renault Volvo Renault Home country/region Swedish; Scandinavian; Anglo-Saxon French; Latin; Continental European Language Swedish; (English dominant second French language) Ownership Investor-owned State-owned Size/position Small niche-player in cars. Dominant in Large, broad product line player. Weak in heavy trucks heavy trucks Core values and competencies Safety Styling Engineering Cost management Management structure Decentralized; easy flow of information Centralized; formal flow of information Market orientation Scandinavia, North America, Asia Continental Europe 138 European Management Journal Vol 16 No 2 April 1998 THE DARK SIDE OF ALLIANCES: LESSONS FROM VOLVO–RENAULT table also shows the huge challenge facing the part- minate the alliance. Three years later, Volvo paid ners: bridging the cultural gulf between both firms. Renault SEK 5.2 billion under the terms of the pill. The ownership and control aspects of the alliance A schematic diagram of the alliance is given in Figure created a path dependency for the two partners that 2. Key features of the alliance terms were: later would narrow the range of possible responses to unanticipated problems. ❖ Substantial cross-share holdings by each firm in ❖ Equality. This was evident in the equal division of the other, and a poison pill to discourage any management appointments to the joint operating attempt to unwind the alliance. Renault and Volvo committees, the creation of two alliance head- would hold shares in each other’s parent com- quarters (Paris and Gothenburg), and in the choice pany, thus permitting their CEOs to sit on each of neither company’s native language as the other’s board of directors.