CHAPTER XIX 1917 (I)-BULLECOURT WITH Russia half defeated, 1916 had begun with the Allies in a serious position. The Gallipoli Campaign had failed, and the situation on the Western Front was be- lieved by many to be an unbreakable stalemate. In 1916 the plan of the chief of the German General Staff, von Falkenhayn, had been merely to hold the ground, 125- 250 miles deep, gained from Russia in 1915, and try to drive France out of the war while the Navy’s submarines attacked British supplies. But the submarine campaign had quickly been given up through the American protest, and the Verdun attack, though it placed the French under extreme strain, had been stopped by the Somme Battle. Indeed in October and December 1916, by two bril- liant strokes, the French general, Nivelle, had regained a fair part of the ground originally lost at Verdun. And though the immense cost of the Somme effort had shocked the Allied peoples, nevertheless to the British, who had borne its main burden, that battle gave hope for the future: at least their new army was forcing the Germans to give ground. The Russian part of the general attack on Germany, begun in June, had, on the front south of the Pripet marshes, regained about half of the area lost in 19 15, but had not saved Rumania, which joined the Allies in August but was crushed by December. The Italians had been attacked by, and had attacked, the Austrians, who were hard pressed by the Russians; but, fighting on the difficult Alpine front, neither side achieved much. The Salonica campaign made progress in October, when the Serbs advanced thirty miles in Macedonia. The Dec. igi6-Jan. 19171 BULLECOURT Turks had failed in Sinai, and had not followed up their success at Kut. They were still wasting vast effort against Russia, whose Caspian oilfields they coveted. Thus at the end of 1916, while neither side had succeeded in its plans for that year, the Allies’ position seemed to have improved, though at great cost. The Germans had called off their first unrestricted submarine campaign, and had achieved little on land. They were now under intense strain, and the Allies’ plan of great blows from every direction in the spring of 1917 seemed likely to test them to the utmost. But in December the plan for the spring attack on the Western Front had suddenly been changed. The French Parliament and people were profoundly dissatisfied with JofEre and the Somme operations; and the Premier, Briand, was forced to replace “Father” Joffre by the hero who had re-won so much ground at Verdun, General Nivelle. There was a cry of “No more Sommes!” Nivelle believed he had devised the method for victory, and the French political party behind him believed that in his tactics they had a quick and cheap means to that end. He would make a whirlwind attack and drive deep-and he chose to attack the main German “bulge” not from where Johe had intended, from the west beside the British, but from the south. Haig would still attack it from the west, between Arras and the Somme. Haig at once agreed to the change, but also clung to a secondary part of the old plan to which he attached great importance-by which at a later stage the British were to strike the Germans in Flanders and drive them from the Belgian coast. Needing reserves for this, he refused to take over as much of the French line as Nivelle desired. Nivelle felt that his own stroke, destined (he believed) to decide the war would thus be imperilled. The French government appealed to the British and at a conference in London on January igth-16th Nivelle so impressed Mr Lloyd George, the vital Welshman who in 515 ANZAC TO AMIENS [Aug. 1916-Jan. 1917 December 1g 16 had forced his way to the prime minister- ship of Britain, that Haig was ordered to conform to Nivelle’s plan. The battle was to begin on April 1st. To support the supreme effort of 1917 all the Dominions were asked to supply additional troops; the request to Australia, for a 6th Infantry Division, was agreed to by the Australian government with some embarrassment, and the division began to be formed in England from men recovered from wounds. Unknown, of course, to the Allies the German plan had been even more fundamentally changed. In August 1 g 16 General Falkenhayn had been superseded, and the victorious German leaders on the Russian front had been brought to the west, Hindenburg as commander and Ludendorff as chief-of-staff. On reaching the Western Front in August 1916 they decided that Germany could no longer launch a land offensive there-she would need her reserves for defence against the Allied attacks which were certain to come. Ludendorff, who henceforth had by far the most powerful influence in the German con- duct of the war, agreed that the Navy should again return to unrestricted submarine warfare in a final effort to reduce Britain by starvation; meanwhile, an Austrian suggestion, that a “peace offer” be made, was also agreed to. The hopes of its supporters lay partly in the fact that President Wilson of the United States, through whom it was made, and who was known to be devoted to peace, had just been re-elected for his second term. Rut Ludendorff insisted that the “peace offer” should not “give the impression of weakness”. It did not. Indeed it issued in terms so bombastic that it was almost laughed out of serious consideration by the Allies. Neither then, nor at any time, did Ludendorff offer to consider even the return of Belgium to complete freedom, which neces- sarily was the first requirement of Britain and France. As the “peace offer” failed, on 3ist January 1917 Germany’s notice of unrestricted submarine warfare was 316 Sept. 1916-Mar. 19171 BULLECOURT published to neutrals-with one almost immediate result expected by its authors: on April 6th the Congress of the United States on the recommendation of President Wilson declared war. Ludendorff’s plan was defensive: he would hold fast on land while the submarines-in six months, according to the German naval staff-were to reduce Great Britain. One of the first orders given by Hindenburg and Luden- dorff in September 19 16, after surveying the Western Front, had been for the construction of a defence line in rear, across the “bulge” of the German front in France, from Arras to near Laon. By retiring, if necessary, to this much shorter line-which was called the “Siegfried” s y s t e m -t h e Germ a n Army could save a num- ber of divisions. The local German “bulge”, south of Arras, caused by the wedge driven farther south by the British and ‘ French in the First Somme Battle, offered a flank favourable for a British attack. But if the Germans retreated at the right moment to the Sieg- fried Line that offensive would have to be post- poned. To avoid a battle, and gain time for the U-boat campaign to have effect, was considered vital. Accordingly on February 4th Ludendorff ordered the withdrawal to begin on March 16th, and preparations for it on February 9th. If the British pressed, the retreat could begin earlier. The British intelligence had heard from prisoners about the Siegfried defence line; it was referred to by the Allies as the “Hindenburg Line”. It lay ten to thirty 317 ANZAC TO AMIENS [Feb. 1917 miles behind the German front, and airmen had sighted parts of it. Prisoners had spoken of its immense strength, particularly of its brnad, boldly planned wire entangle- ments. It was assumed to be merely a new reserve line. In the 5th British Army, under General Gough, the early spring offensive was already planned. All four divisions of the I Anzac Corps were now in line, having sideslipped slightly northwards in order to form the right of that army when it attacked. As a preparatory measure, the corps was ordered to place the enemy under strain by small assaults. One of these, at Stormy Trench, completely succeeded at the second attempt on February 4th, largely through the bold, untiring leadership of the same Captain Harry Murray who had distinguished himself at Mouquet Farm (and who now won the Victoria Cross). The ground here gained was being much extended by constant nibbling, when the month of bright freezing weather ended in thaw. The battlefield had again become a scene of mud and fog when, on February 24th, all troops were electrified by news that German front trenches at the northern end of the old battlefield had been found abandoned; a prisoner there said that the Germans were retiring towards Cambrai-evidently to the Hindenburg Line which ran west of that town. Australians in some parts noted that the enemy flares on their front also rose farther back. Patrols sent into the fog presently found that the Germans were retiring on most of the I Anzac front also, leaving, however, a thin screen of small posts and patrols. Opposite the southern flank of I Anzac, and farther south, they held their positions for the time being unchanged. It was conjectured that the prisoner was right, but that the Germans were retiring by stages. This would entirely dislocate the impending spring offensive of 5th Army, but not of 3rd Army, farther north at Arras. But the news had magic effect. The German Army was with- drawing! Already, in the improved condition of the 318 zqth Feb.-13th Mar.