CHAPTER VI11 ARRAS, AND THE GENESIS OF THE BULLECOURT PLAN WHEN on March 17th the Germans withdrew their front from the salient between Arras and the Aisne, the r81e so long projected for the Fifth Army in the spring offensive had become impossible of performance. Its intended attack, originally a main stroke in the Allies’ thrust on the Sonime, had been reduced, under Nivelle’s plan, to an important pre- cursor of the British feint at Arras. When the Germans on February 22nd made their preliminary withdrawal, the prospect of General Gough being able to strike at all began to vanish by reason of the voluntary abandonment by the enemy of the points to be attacked. By timely retirements the enemy thrice placed himself out of range of a blow about to be de1ivered.l The final withdrawal had been so timed as to render it difficult for the Fifth Army-and even the right of the Third-to follow it up and come into effective action again before the commencement of the spring offensive. Time, however, was the enemy’s sole gain, so far as this particular stroke was concerned.2 His flank, running back at a sharp angle from the Arras front, would still offer a most tempting objective for a powerful stroke. The Fifth Army, when it came up against the Hindenburg Line, would be well to the left rear of the German front at Arras, and only eight miles distant. The Third Army’s attack, if successful, would sweep across Gough’s front, and a blow delivered by him-if one were permitted by the time avail- able and the strength of his artillery-would be more By the withdrawals on February ai, March 12, and March 17; the enemy had not eluded the stroke of the I1 Corps at Pys on February 17. which started the premature retirement, or that of I Anzac at Malt Trench (March 2). ’The enemy had of course attained his main object, the accumulation of reserves by shortening the line. 252 Mar.-Apr., 19171 ARRAS 253 dangerous to the Germans facing the main thrust, than would have been the attack originally planned farther south. It was no longer a case of a feint-to attract German reserves so close to the point of the main attack would be worse ! than useless. The object would be to threaten the rear and flank of an enemy already fighting for his life, and the most effective time for striking would be simul- taneous with the main attack or shortly after. Such an operation could, L.i however, only be considered if Gough's army could reach the Hindenburg Line in time to allow thorough preparation, and if it was furnished with sufficient artillery and ammuni- tion for that purpose. The wire entanglement of the Hindenburg Line was known to be the most formidable ever constructed : aeroplane photographs showed its broad belts, three deep, the last of them fifty yards out from the first trench, and a single strong belt before the second trench. The front wire was in many places triangular, so that machine-guns could fire along its edges, and an attack would split and lose direction.8 The wire alone-not to speak of the two well-dug trenches 150 or 200 yards apart, would require protracted bombardment ; and to any close reader of the records of this period it is evident that the sufficiency of time, guns, and ammunition was from the first so uncertain that G.H.Q. regarded the possibility of any stroke by the Fifth Army as doubtful, and tended to counter the German retirement by the alternative policy of withdrawing troops and guns from Gough's front and employing them to strengthen the main offensive elsewhere.' Except for a natural desire to assist the Third Army if opportunity arose, Gough 'See Vof. XII, plates 311.2. The trenches were also reputed to have numerous conarete emplacements and tunnels; and it was known that in some parts range marks had been placed on the ground in front of them. 4 By this means Haig also obtained reserves which could, if necessary, be used in repelling the German offensive anticipated by him, though on insufficient grounds. in Flanders. 254 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [ 11th-19th Mar., 1917 himself seem for the time being to have had no intention of proposing an attack; and when on March 11th General Allenby of the Third Army wrote: The Fifth Army, although at first not in a condition to assume a vigorous offensive, will probably be in touch with the Germans in front of the Hindenburg Line, so that we may expect help on our right flank as we advance with our right on the Hindenburg Line someone at G.H.Q. noted in the margin : Fifth Army may be weak. On the following day at a conference with his army com- manders Haig decided that, if the offensive was to take place, as intended, on April 8, it would be necessary to concentrate " all possible resources on the First and Third Armies." On March 16th the Fifth Army was directed to transfer to the First its XI11 Corps with three divisions; the transfer of the I1 Corps had already been ordered, leaving Gough with only two army corps, the V and I Anzac. On the other hand the importance of the Fifth Army's prospective position close on the flank of the offensive was much too evident to be ignored, and in the anticipatory arrangements made on March 16th for following up the German withdrawals Gough was directed to co-operate closely with the right of the Third and to establish his heavy artillery as soon as possible on the line Beugny-Mory-Hamelincourtd " so as to bring the German defences of the Hindenburg Line under fire from the south." It was estimated7 that fifteen siege batteries would suffice the Fifth Army for merely following the retreat, but Haig on March 18th allowed Gough to retain another twenty for assisting the offensive of the Third Army conditionally upon his proving that he could do so hy fire from the south. He was to keep G.H.Q. informed as to the dates when these twenty batteries were advanced within range of the Hindenburg Line, and as to the manner in which they could support the main attack." On the day following this decision Gough himself visited the forward area. No one loved such an excursion more than he. His heart was out in advance with the cavalry screen, ~ 6 See p. 140. sSee sketch on opposite )age. 'On hlarch 18. when the final withdrawal had occurred. ' C H (2. would then judge whether they could be more profitably employed in the E'llth Army or elsewhere Mar., 19171 THE BULLECOURT PLAN 255 and, had he commanded one of its squadrons, his impetuous, energetic spirit would have gloried in seizing each chance of pressing and outwitting the enemy’s rear-guard detach- ments. He believed strongly in personal reconnaissance, and in pushing all headquarters far enough forward to permit of it.e Such visits were all to the good in informing the com- mander and keeping subordinates up to their tasks.l” Gough’s siege batteries, other than those specially retained, were now leaving for the Arras front,ll but the Hindenburg Line was already within extreme range, and during this visit he resolved that the bombardment must begin at once. He forthwith ordered the I1 Corps to bring forward its six-inch howitzers and sixty-pounders to Sapignies “ and commence bombard- ment of the Hindenburg Line or any other points where action is required by the cavalry.” Early in the night a similar order was also given to I Anzac. Each battery on ‘ reaching position was, as its first action, to fire four rounds ’ into the Hindenburg Line. Unfortunately, although the I Anzac Corps was warned in good time that these guns would move vi&Bapaume, the corps staff does not appear to have informed its branch responsible for maintaining the roads. Its engineers and pioneers had by March 18th succeeded in rendering the Albert-Bapaume road fit for horse-transport; light cars and motor lorries with material for road repair were also permitted to travel on it. But, though the road was wide, the paved strip was narrow,” ‘Not long after this, Gough decided to advance part of his amy headquarters to FrCmicourt. The huts, however, were seen before completion and were destroyed by the German artillery. Their advantaaes were overwhelminr but they involved two risks-first, that the commander, if unduly exposing hihself. mi ht be hit and so temporarily dislocate the command; second, that he might tens to attach undue importance to what he saw. For example, when thrilled by the rare glimpse of some distant party of the enemy, he was usually inclined to question why this part was not instantly fired on, and even himself to call up the artillery. which migct be resting after plonged engagement of more important tar ets or intent on some other task. ven. however, if occasionally midirected. sucf goading was usually beneficial. =This day 37 heavy batteries were ordered north. Another 24 bad been ordered away on March IS. -On March 18 the commandqr of the lot Aust. Dit, Ammunition Sub-Park inspeclfd the road and noted that it was in fair order, but very narrow for double traffic. 256 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [ 19th-25th Mar., 1917 and, if heavy vehicles were to use it, strict traffic-control would be needed.