PRUSSIA AND THE OTHER GERMAN STATES

Peter H. Wilson (University of Hull)

It has been customary to examine ’s relations to the rest of in the eighteenth century through the lens of its rivalry with Austria. This dualist approach largely ignores the wider framework of the Holy Roman which historians customarily dismissed as ineffective and increasingly irrelevant after 1648. 1 Concentration on Austria and Prussia reduces the rest of the Empire to a ‘third Germany’, seemingly an inchoate patchwork of petty statelets ( Kleinstaaterei ) which were incapable of effective autonomous action. This view raises numerous methodological and interpretative problems, not least whether German political development has somehow deviated from an alleged European norm along a dangerous ‘special path’ ( Sonderweg ), as well as whether concepts like ‘state’ and ‘nation’ can be applied to this stage in its history. 2

These issues cannot be addressed here. Rather, I wish to draw attention to how the Empire’s constitutional framework influenced Austro-Prussian rivalry. This can be explored in three ways. One approach would be to examine Prussia’s relations with other German rulers according to the formal hierarchy defined by the imperial constitution. The Empire was a ‘mixed monarchy’ in which the emperor shared the exercise of key functions with the governing authorities of the numerous territories collectively known as the imperial Estates ( Reichsstände ). These ranged from the nine electorates, of which Brandenburg was one, through a multitude of larger and smaller secular and ecclesiastical to around 50 imperial cities. A second approach would be to study the methods Prussia employed to interact along this status hierarchy, through formal institutions, such as the Reichstag and the Empire’s regional subdivision into ten ‘circles’ ( Kreise ), as well as the semi-official Protestant lobby group known as the corpus evangelicorum .3 Interaction with these institutions was supplemented by a host of direct political, military and dynastic ties to individual territories, particularly medium- sized Protestant principalities like Württemberg and Hessen-Darmstadt.

Both approaches are useful for charting change across time and I have employed them elsewhere 4. This paper will focus instead on variations across space by examining Prussia’s interactions with the Empire’s political geography. A major reason why the Empire appears so confusing is that it was never a uniform structure, but one which varied considerably across space as well as time. 5 Peter Moraw divides the Empire’s into four categories depending on their political rather than physical proximity to the late medieval emperors. 6 Moraw’s categories can be adapted for Prussia by transposing his references to imperial authority to apply to the influence of the newly-minted Prussian after 1701.

1 A view still expressed by some today: H.A. Winkler, Germany. The long road west , vol.I (Oxford, 2006), pp.4-46. 2 For these debates see M. Schnettger (ed.) Imperium Romanum - Irregulare Corpus - Teutscher Reichs-Staat (Mainz, 2002); P.H. Wilson, ‘Still a monstrosity? Some reflections on early modern German statehood’, The Historical Journal , 49 (2006), 565-76. 3 A. Schindling, Die Anfänge des immerwährenden Reichstags zu Regensburg (Mainz,1991); W. Dotzauer, Die deutschen Reichskreise (1383-1806) (Stuttgart, 1998); G. Haug-Moritz, ‘Corpus evangelicorum und deutscher Dualismus’, in V. Press (ed.), Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung? (Munich, 1995), pp.189-208; A. Kalipke, ‘The corpus evangelicorum : A culturalist perspective on its procedure in the eighteenth-century Holy ’, in P. Coy/B. Marschke/D.W. Sabean (eds.), The reconsidered (New York, 2010), pp.229-47. 4 P.H. Wilson, ‘Prussia’s relations with the Holy Roman Empire, 1740-86’, The Historical Journal, 51 (2008), 337-71, and ‘ and Imperial politics, 1740-56’, in J. Luh/M. Kaiser (eds.), Friedrich 300 -. Eine perspektivische Bestandsaufnahme (http://www.perspectiva.net/content/publikationen/). See also V. Press, ‘Friedrich der Große als Reichspolitiker’, in H. Duchhardt (ed.), Friedrich der Große, Franken und das Reich (, 1986), pp.25-56. 5 Further discussion in P.H. Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire 1495-1806 (2 nd ed., Basingstoke, 2011), pp.11-20. 6 P. Moraw, ‘Franken als königsnahe Landschaft im späten Mittelalter’, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte , 112 (1976), 123-38 and his ‘Landesgeschichte und Reichsgeschichte im 14. Jahrhundert’, Jahrbuch für westdeutsche Landesgeschichte , 3 (1977), 175-91.

The first of Moraw’s categories is that of ‘’s country’ ( Königslandschaft ), in our case denoting Prussia’s direct possessions where its king could influence political, social, economic and religious structures with relatively little external interference. The development of Prussia from a patchwork of north-German lands to a more consolidated state is already well documented 7, and we only need to note its growth relative to that of the total ‘German’ political sphere of both the Empire and Habsburg and Hohenzollern lands beyond imperial frontiers.

The Hohenzollern Monarchy as a Proportion of Total ‘German’ Power

Aspect 1648 1714 1748 1792

Territory (km2) Hohenzollerns 107,429 (13.6) 115,432 (10.5) 161,852 (15.4) 203,652 (17.3) Total 785,975 1,101,253 1,050,412 1,178,277

Population (millions) Hohenzollerns 0.87 (4.3) 1.73 (7.1) 3.48 (11.0) 5.67 (12.9) Total 20.15 24.5 31.77 43.84

Army Hohenzollerns 700 (1.4) 46,100 (15.2) 135,000 (27.7) 195,000 (24.4) Total 48,750 303,400 488,000 798,700

NB the 1792 figure for military strength is distorted by the Habsburg mobilisation for the Turkish War. If their establishment for 1787 is used (221,600), Prussia maintained 37.3% of a total ‘German’ establishment of 522,600 in the late 1780s.

Moraw’s second category is that of regions ‘near to the king’ ( Königsnahe ), where he exercised considerable influence, but could not alter existing structures. There were two of these for eighteenth- century Prussia and the following will use discussion of the first of these to illustrate trends common to both. moved ‘near’ to Prussia as it acquired land there in three stages between 1609 and 1702. 8 These possessions have generally been regarded as a strategic liability. A large part of Prussia’s initial acquisitions were occupied by Dutch troops between 1614 and 1679, while all fell to its enemies during the Seven Years War. 9 They were also more deeply embedded in the web of imperial jurisdictions than Brandenburg which enjoyed considerable exemptions as an electorate since 1356. Frederick William, the Great Elector, did bully the Estates of his Westphalian provinces into granting permanent military taxation after 1649, but it proved difficult to re-negotiate these arrangements in response to changes in circumstance later. 10 Yet, these lands were twice as densely populated as Hohenzollern Prussia, and far more productive. 11 Not only did they provide recruits for the Prussian

7 W. Neugebauer, Die Hohenzollern (2 vols., Stuttgart, 2003). 8 The first saw the Hohenzollerns obtain a significant slice of the Jülich-Cleves inheritance: Cleves and Mark (1609) plus Ravensberg (1614). The second entailed the acquisition of the former bishopric of Minden in the (1648). The third involved smaller enclaves obtained through the Orange inheritance: Lingen and Mörs (1702) and Obergeldern (1715), plus the county of Tecklenburg purchased in 1707. A fourth stage followed in 1744 when Frederick II acquired East . 9 M. Kaiser, ‘Die vereinbarte Okkupation. Generalstaatische Besatzungen in brandenburgischen Festungen am Niederrhein’, in M. Meumann/J. Rogge (eds.), De besetzte res publica (Münster, 2005), pp.271-314; H. Carl, Okkupation und Regionalismus. Die preußischen Westprovinzen im Siebenjährigen Krieg (Mainz, 1993). 10 M. Kaiser/M. Rohrschneider (eds.), Membra unius capitis. Studien zu Herrschaftsauffassungen und Regierungspraxis in Kurbrandenburg (1640-1688) (, 2005); M. Kaiser, ‘Nähe und Distanz. Beobachtungen zum Verhältnis zwischen den Landsständen von Kleve und Mark und ihrem Landesherren im 17. Jahrhundert’, Westfälische Forschungen , 53 (2003), 71-108. 11 Ducal (East) Prussia had 38.4% of the monarchy’s population, but produced only 16.4% of its taxation in 1697, compared to the Westphalian territories which produced 17.4% of the tax revenue, or just above their proportion of the population: K. Breysig, ‘Der brandenburgische Staatshaushalt in der zweiten Hälfte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts’, Schmollers Jahrbuch , 16 (1892), 449-545 at 458, 461. army, but they served as bases from which to recruit more widely in Westphalia. 12 The dramatic expansion of the Prussian army after 1713 could not be sustained solely from native conscription. Prussia recruited around 1,150 men annually from other German territories between 1713 and 1740, or 22% of its total requirement. This annual quota increased to 2,500 during the 1750s and around 3,000 after 1763, despite growing opposition from Austria and some other princes. 13

However, the value of the Westphalian territories went beyond these direct material benefits. The Empire’s constitution and political culture ensured that each territorial acquisition brought additional status, rights, and claims which could be used to extend influence well beyond the boundaries of the new possession. The Westphalian provinces initially brought little in terms of formal rights, because only Minden was represented in the Reichstag. 14 Prussia faced considerable local opposition to its attempts to obtain a share in the single collective vote of the Westphalian counts at the Reichstag, only securing a minor stake in this in 1732. 15 However, other territorial acquisitions in Upper and Lower in 1648 brought the Hohenzollerns additional representation in the college of princes for Magdeburg, Cammin, Halberstadt, and Further Pomerania, giving it more votes than any other . Furthermore, Magdeburg was formally the most senior Protestant , allowing Prussia to lead debates and influence voting. This strong presence redressed the geographic concentration of Hohenzollern possessions and influence in the north-east. The Reichstag remained the principal ‘national’ , forum for asserting status, legitimating policy, gathering information and negotiating with foreign powers. 16 Despite his well-known disdain for the imperial constitution, Frederick II continued his predecessors efforts to use his influence in the Reichstag and other institutions to advance Hohenzollern policy.

The Westphalian provinces had far more weight through their representation in the Kreis assembly which performed the same coordinating and legislative functions as the Reichstag, but on a regional level. 17 Influence in the Kreis structure gave Prussia a stake in the selection of judges to the , one of the Empire’s two imperial courts, as well as a chance to act as imperial commissioner to execute court verdicts and carry out other official tasks in that . 18 These were privileges rather than burdens, since they allowed Prussia to influence situations to its advantage or that of its allies, and to cloak its policies as conforming to imperial law. Prussia gained further opportunities through the reform of imperial defence in 1681-2 which entrusted oversight of resource mobilisation to the Kreise. Prussia could use its influence in the Kreis assembly to shape the speed, size and composition of regional military activity, and so gained leverage over the region’s military-fiscal resources. 19

Prussia’s influence in the Westphalian assembly grew after it overcame local opposition by compromising with Pfalz-Neuburg in 1667. The Hohenzollerns and Pfalz-Neuburg dynasty had been at loggerheads over conflicting claims to the Jülich-Cleves inheritance, a complex of five duchies and

For later tax revenues, see the assessments during the French occupation in 1757: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna, Kriegsakten Fasz.366 (neu). 12 J. Kloosterhuis, Bauern, Bürger und Soldaten. Quellen zur Sozialisation des Militärsystems im preußischen Westfalen (2 vols., Münster, 1992), I 282-302 13 P.H. Wilson, ‘The politics of military recruitment in eighteenth-century Germany’, English Historical Review , 117 (2002), 536-68. 14 Prussia did receive an additional vote in the college of princes for East Frisia in 1744. 15 J. Arndt, Das Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichsgrafenkollegium und seine Mitglieder (1653- 1806) (Mainz,1991), pp.22-4 16 S. Friedrich, Drehscheibe Regensburg. Das Informations- und kommukationssytem des Immerwährenden Reichstags um 1700 (Berlin, 2007). For the importance of status and legitimation in imperial politics, see B. Stollberg-Rilinger, Des Kaisers alte Kleider. Verfassungsgeschichte und Symbolsprache des Alten Reiches (Munich, 2008). 17 A. Hanschmidt, ‘Kurbrandenburg im System des Reiches während der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrunderts’, in O. Hauser (ed.), Preußen, Europa und das Reich (Cologne, 1987), pp.47-64. 18 S. Jahns, ‘Brandenburg-Preussen im System der -Präsentationen 1648-1806’, in H. Weber (ed.), Politische Ordnungen und soziale Kräfte im Alten Reich (Wiesbaden,1980), pp.169- 202; W. Sellert (ed.), Reichshofrat und Reichskammergericht (Cologne, 1999). 19 P.H. Wilson, German armies: War and German politics 1648-1806 (London, 1998), pp.58-67. counties on the lower Rhine which formed the main block of secular territory in Westphalia. 20 By defusing their mutual hostility, Prussia and Pfalz-Neuburg were able to displace the bishop of Münster as sole Kreis Director, or official convenor of the assembly and principal leader of the region. Continued coincidence of interest between Prussia and Pfalz-Neuburg allowed them to use Westphalian mobilisation in the wars against France to entrench their regional influence after 1672. Many of the smaller Westphalian imperial Estates struggled to raise sufficient troops and contracted Prussia or Pfalz-Neuburg through ‘treaties of substitution’ ( Vertretungen ) to provide the soldiers instead. Several of them were also bound by long-standing ‘protectorates’ ( Schutz- und Schirmverträge ) for the same purpose. Often these two kinds of arrangement overlapped, forming a double-bond from which it was often difficult for the weaker partner to escape. Prussia secured such arrangements with East Frisia, the county of Limburg, the city of Dortmund and the imperial abbeys of Essen, Werden and Herford. All were obliged to pay Prussia far more than the actual cost of the soldiers, which in any case served Prussian interests elsewhere. More significantly, Prussia saw the agreements as a first step to full acquisition, for instance claiming its rights over Herford meant that the abbess was not a full member of the Westphalian Kreis. 21

Prussia’s manipulation of imperial defence stirred a local backlash which Austria supported once it realised that the gift of a royal title to the Hohenzollerns had been a mistake. The smaller Westphalian territories renounced their arrangements with Prussia at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Neither Frederick William I, nor Frederick II could persuade them to renew them, except in East Frisia where an internal conflict allowed Prussia to play the local Estates against their prince. The Prussian military presence in the East Frisian port of provided the basis for both the Brandenburg African Company and Frederick II’s later commercial ventures. It also ensured that Prussia excluded other possible claimants and was ready to annex the principality when its ruling family died out in 1744 22 . Nonetheless, the setbacks elsewhere in Westphalia indicate that there was no linear inevitability to Prussia’s ‘rise’.

Prussia had less direct ties to which was the second of the two regions ‘near to the king’. The decision of the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns to partition their possessions in 1603 perpetuated the presence of junior branches in the Franconian margraviates of Ansbach and Bayreuth. These two principalities were the largest secular members of the Franconian Kreis and counter-balanced the leadership of the bishop of Bamberg who shared the directory with them. Franconia was the most active Kreis alongside Swabia to the south west. The two established an Association, or alliance, in 1691 which formed the principal framework for the lesser imperial Estates to oppose the growing influence of larger, ‘Armed Estates’, like Prussia, in the Empire. 23 Emperor Leopold I reached a modus vivendi with the Association movement in the later seventeenth century, trading intermittent backing for the interests of the lesser Estates, as in Westphalia, in return for strong military assistance organised through the Kreis structure. Thus, the Habsburgs regarded Franconia and Swabia as regions ‘near to the emperor’ and viewed any Prussian interference with deep suspicion.

Prussia policy concentrated on rectifying the mistake of 1603 by ensuring Ansbach and Bayreuth would revert through inheritance to the main Hohenzollern line. A secondary goal entailed using both margraviates as bases from which to recruit soldiers throughout Franconia. 24 Both objectives required

20 A.D. Anderson, On the verge of war: International relations and the Jülich-Kleve succession crises (1609-14) (Boston, 1999). 21 Landesarchiv Münster, A230, Nr.90, 98. Further examples in K. Hüsgen, ‘Die militärische Vertretung des Stifts Essen durch Brandenburg-Preußen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert’, Beiträge zur Geschichte von Stadt und Stift Essen , 30 (1909), 1-92. 22 B. Kappelhof, Absolutistisches Regiment oder Ständeherrschaft? Landesherr und Landstände in Ostfriesland im ersten Drittel des 18. Jahrhunderts (Hildesheim, 1982). 23 K.O. Frhr. v. Aretin (ed.), Der Kurfürst von Mainz und die Kreisassoziationen 1648-1746 (Wiesbaden, 1974); M. Plassmann, Krieg und Defension am Oberrhein. Die Vorderen Reichskreise und Markgraf Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden (1693-1706) (Berlin, 2000); P.H. Wilson, ‘The Holy Roman Empire and the problem of the armed Estates’, in Peter Rauscher (ed.), Kriegführung und Staatsfinanzen. Die Habsburgermonarchie und das Heilige Römische Reich vom Dreißigjährigen Krieg bis zum Ende des habsburgischen Kaisertums 1740 (Münster, 2010), pp.487-514. 24 B. Sicken, ‘Die preußische Werbung in Franken’, in Duchhardt (ed.), Friedrich der Große , pp.121- 56. the agreement of the Franconian relations who were rarely willing tools of Berlin’s policy, not least because Prussian recruitment caused considerable friction with their immediate neighbours. The primary goal of securing the inheritance also required agreement from the emperor who, as feudal overlord, had to sanction all such exchanges even in the eighteenth century. 25 Finally, Prussia also required the acquiescence of Bamberg and the other Franconians who were not willing to see the two junior Hohenzollern branches replaced by the much more powerful main line, since this would clearly transform how their Kreis functioned and deprive them of much of their influence.

Prussia’s influence in Franconia followed roughly the same trajectory as in Westphalia. The emergency of the War of the Spanish Succession provided an opportunity to station troops in Bayreuth and convince the Franconian Hohenzollerns to agree an eventual Prussian take-over. Habsburg and Bamberg pressure forced first the evacuation of the Prussian garrison in 1707 and then the annulment of the inheritance pact in 1722. Meanwhile, Prussia failed to convert carefully and expensively cultivated claims to the counties of Geyer, Wolfstein and Limpurg into full possession and abandoned these by 1742. 26 Frederick William adopted less confrontational policies by arranging the marriages of two of his daughters (Frederick II’s sisters) to the heirs of both margraviates in 1726. This provided the basis for Frederick II to broker the Pactum Fridericanum in 1752, arranging for mutual inheritance between both Franconian branches with eventual reversion to the Prussian line when they died out. This arrangement ruled out a repeat of 1603 by prohibiting the creation of new junior lines. Though Frederick’s brother Henry agreed, he later regretted his decision to forego becoming an imperial prince. 27 It is significant that Frederick wanted the agreement kept secret to avoid antagonising Austria. It failed to prevent either margraviate from drifting back towards the Habsburgs and both initially mobilised against Prussia at the start of the Seven Years War. 28 Their margraves’ catastrophic financial situation left them open to Habsburg and Franconian influence. The Franconian ecclesiastical princes even paid half a million florins to Margrave Friedrich V (r.1735-63) for him to remarry after Wilhelmine’s death in the hope he would produce a legitimate heir to forestall a Prussian inheritance.29 All Frederick’s efforts to secure recognition of his claims after 1763 foundered on Joseph II’s insistence that Prussia allow Austria to take equivalent ‘compensation’ elsewhere in the Empire. In this sense, Prussia’s relations to Franconia reflect the underlying situation after 1763 when Joseph’s disregard for the imperial constitution and political culture raised the spectre of a ‘Polish future’ for the Empire through possible Austro-Prussian partition. Frederick realised that this would not redress the wider imbalance between Austria and Prussia, and he came to see preservation of the Empire as essential to his security.

Experience in Westphalia and Franconia indicates that the relative contraction in Prussia’s regional influence by the 1730s was not made good after Frederick II’s accession, and that both regions risked slipping into the third category of areas merely ‘open’ rather than ‘near to the king’. These were regions where Prussia had interests, but lacked any significant presence and could not count on consistent support. There are four in this category, including two physically close to Prussia. Upper Saxony was Brandenburg’s own region, but its influence there reflected the Hohenzollerns’ relatively junior status in the sixteenth century when the Empire’s regional political geography assumed its basic shape. Electoral Saxony held an exclusive directory of the Upper Saxon assembly, and consolidated its influence through a network of protectorates and substitution treaties with most of the other members. In addition, as the heartland of the Lutheran , Saxony dominated the corpus evangelicorum which emerged after 1653 as the semi-official framework to coordinate all Protestant imperial Estates.

These positions were endangered by the conversion of the Saxon elector, Augustus, to Catholicism when he became king of Poland in 1697, and his subsequent involvement in the Great Northern War (1700-21) against Sweden which obliged him to reduce his commitments in the Empire. Prussia was the

25 J.F. Noel, ‘Zur Geschichte der Reichsbelehnungen im 18. Jahrhundert’, Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs , 21 (1968), pp.106-22. 26 R. Endres, ‘Preußens Griff nach Franken’, in Duchhardt (ed.), Friedrich der Große , pp.57-79. 27 Pactum Fridericanum in H. Neuhaus (ed.), Deutsche Geschichte in Quellen und Darstellung Vol.V (Stuttgart, 1997), pp.185-91; M. Hanisch, ‘Friedrich II. und die preußische Sukzession in Franken in der internationalen Diskussion’, in Duchhardt (ed.), Friedrich der Große , pp.81-91. 28 E. Meissner, ‘Die südwestdeutschen Reichsstände im Siebenjährigen Krieg’, Ellwanger Jahrbuch , 23 (1971), pp.117-58 at 143-4. 29 Endres, ‘Preußens Griff’, pp.75-6. principal beneficiary of the ’ urgent need for financial and political support. Augustus quickly accepted the new Prussian royal title, though his Polish subjects continued to object until 1764. 30 He also sold his protectorates over the city of Nordhausen and the abbey of Quedlinburg. Prussia seized the opportunity to usurp Saxony’s regional leadership. It dropped its policy of obstructing the Kreis assembly and now backed the smaller members’ desire to escape Saxon domination by fielding their own contingents in the War of the Spanish Succession. Prussia was beaten back at every turn. Austria allowed Saxony to remain Kreis director, despite the adverse consequences for the region’s effectiveness within imperial defence. 31 Meanwhile, Saxony retained leadership of the corpus evangelicorum, skilfully exploiting Prussia’s tactical errors and growing rivalry with Hanover to discredit it as a reliable champion of Protestant interests. 32

Saxony’s success encouraged it to regard Prussia as an inferior junior partner, rather than serious rival. 33 Prussia’s victories after 1740 obscures Saxony’s continued potential at that point when it was still mustered a considerable army. This fact was not lost on Frederick II who, on receiving news of Emperor Charles VI’s death, immediately saw the need to pre-empt a possible Saxon annexation of . 34 Saxony was aware of this possibility, but prioritised relations with Russia whose agreement was essential for any changes in Poland. Saxony subsequently placed its faith in Austria, only to be bitterly disappointed in the defeats of 1745 which ended any hopes of establishing a land bridge to Poland. Nonetheless, Frederick continued to regard Saxony, along with Hanover, as his principal European threats after Austria until the Seven Years War. 35 That conflict, together with the end of the personal union with Poland, removed Saxony as a significant factor in Prussian calculations. Saxon policy henceforth centred on preserving its neutrality through the imperial constitution. However, it lacked the will or the means to strengthen the Empire against the threat posed by the emergence of Austria and Prussia as distinct European great powers. 36 Instead the reform agenda fell to other, primarily Upper Saxon territories like Sachsen- and Anhalt-Dessau. The latter had been closely tied to Prussia since the 1690s, but its rulers became increasingly disillusioned with the cost of Prussian military service, both to themselves and their subjects whom Frederick treated as little more than a recruitment pool. Prince Leopold III of Anhalt-Dessau already resigned his Prussian command in 1758. 37 From the early 1770s, he was pushing for a league of princes to protect the constitution against Austrian and Prussian manipulation. Frederick’s success in not only hijacking this league, but persuading both Saxony and Hanover to join him in 1785, shows his growing skill in cloaking Prussian goals in the language of constitutional legitimacy. He achieved his goal of blocking Joseph II’s plans, but only by sacrificing the league’s intended reforms to a sterile policy of constitutional stasis. 38

Lower Saxony presents a similar picture as the other of the physically close ‘open region’. Here, Prussia’s influence was determined in relation to another Lutheran elector, in this case the Brunswick Guelph line in Hanover. Hanover’s rise was meteoric, climbing from duke to king between 1692 and 1714. Though the Hanoverian succession remained contested in Britain into the 1740s, it brought the Guelphs an established crown, rather than the newly fabricated one obtained by Prussia. Hanover had long been a dominant factor in Lower Saxon politics, especially after the contraction of Danish

30 K. Friedrich/S. Smart (eds.), The cultivation of monarchy and the rise of Berlin. Brandenburg- Prussia 1700 (Farnham, 2010). 31 T. Nicklas, Macht oder Recht? Frühneuzeitliche Politik im obersächsichen Reichskreis (Stuttgart, 2002), pp.315-30. 32 J. Vötsch, Kursachsen, das Reich und der mitteldeutsche Raum zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts (/M., 2003), pp.45-169. See also A. Thompson, Britain, Hanover and the Protestant interest (Cambridge, 2006). 33 F. Göse, ‘Nachbarn, Partner und Rivalen: die kursächsische Sicht auf Preußen im ausgehenden 17. und 18. Jahrhundert’, in J. Luh/V. Czech/B. Becker (eds.), Preussen, Deutschland und Europa (, 2003), pp.45-78. 34 J.G. Droysen et al (eds.), Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Großen (47 vols., Barlin, 1879- 1939), I 90-1. 35 Political Testament of 1752 in O. Bardong (ed.), Friedrich der Grosse (Darmstadt, 1982), pp.208-9. 36 D. Petschel, Sächsiche Außenpolitik unter Friedrich August I. (Cologne, 2000). 37 L. Arndt, ‘Friedrich der Große und die Askanier seiner Zeit’, Anhaltische Geschichtsblätter , 13 (1937), 21-57. 38 M. Umbach, Federalism and Enlightenment in Germany 1740-1806 (London, 2000); K.O. Frhr. v. Aretin, Das Alte Reich 1648-1806 (3 vols., Stuttgart, 1993-7), III 299-344. influence by the 1650s. 39 By contrast, Hohenzollern influence dated only from gains made in the Peace of Westphalia which brought it Halberstadt and, by 1680, the former archbishopric of Magdeburg which entailed a share in the Kreis directory. Prussian influence was initially balanced by the continued Swedish presence, with Sweden pursuing a pro-Habsburg policy after 1681 as the best guarantee for its north German possessions. 40 Sweden’s loss of most of these territories during the Great Northern War benefited Hanover which obtained the largest share, while Prussia was obliged to return most of its Pomeranian conquests by 1720. Hanover’s rapid territorial expansion appeared to demonstrate both its own dynamism and the benefits of its personal union with Britain. 41

There were close dynastic ties between the Guelphs and Hohenzollerns: both Frederick I and Frederick William I married Hanoverian princesses, and a similar marriage was planned for Frederick II, only for this to be dropped for a Brunswick match as part of Prussia’s temporary alliance with Austria in 1733. Thus, relations mirrored those between Prussia and Saxony. Hanover and Prussia had important common interests, but primarily remained rivals. Both clashed over attempts to dominate smaller Lower Saxon territories like Hildesheim and Nordhausen through protection and substitution treaties, as well as competition for recruits for their armies. The pattern of Westphalia, Franconia and Upper Saxony was repeated as Prussia imposed a garrison on Nordhausen (1703) and secured claims to the duchy of Mecklenburg (1708), only to see its influence contract with the end of the War of Spanish Succession. Meanwhile, Hanover established a permanent garrison in Hildesheim and political influence in not just Mecklenburg, but East Frisia as well. 42 Tensions peaked with the threat of war in 1729/30.43 Though this subsided, Frederick placed a second army at Magdeburg to deter Hanoverian intervention when he invaded Silesia in 1740.

Hanover’s personal union with Britain meant that it was no longer free to shape its policy in the Empire to suit its particular interests. Georgian policy was never a simple choice between a British ‘blue water strategy’ of overseas colonial empire versus a Hanoverian ‘continental commitment’, but rather a choice of several ‘German’ strategies intended to advance goals in both and the world. 44 As is well known, this contributed to the famous ‘reversal of alliances’ of 1756 which placed Hanover-Britain and Prussia on the same side in the Seven Years War. 45 This was immense benefit to Prussia, not least through Britain’s wider network of alliances with Hessen-, Brunswick, Gotha and other principalities which provided most of the troops who kept France from effectively assisting Austria. 46

Arguably, this alliance was not in Hanover’s best interests since its continued autonomy increasingly depended, like that of Saxony, on preserving the imperial constitution. This led it to reject the possible secularisation of Hildesheim and other north German prince-bishoprics proposed by Prussia in 1761 for the same reasons that Frederick rejected Joseph’s plans to trade inheritance of Ansbach and Bayreuth for Austrian compensation elsewhere: the suggestion would not alter an underlying balance that was now decidedly against Hanover. Nonetheless, unlike Saxony, Hanover still had its personal union and retained considerably more influence. For example, George III disrupted the tentative Austro-Prussian rapprochement of the late 1760s by renewing Hanover’s bid to lead the corpus evangelicorum.

39 V. Press, ‘Kurhannover im System des Alten Reiches 1692-1806’, in A.M. Birke/K. Kluxen (eds.), England und Hannover (Munich, 1986), pp.53-79. 40 K.R. Böhme, ‘Die Krone Schweden als Reichsstand 1648 bis 1720’, in H. Duchhardt (ed.), Europas Mitte (Bonn, 1988), pp.33-9. 41 B. Simms/T. Riotte (eds.), The Hanoverian dimension in British history 1714-1837 (Cambridge, 2007); N. Harding, Hanover and the British Empire 1700-1837 (Woodbridge, 2007). 42 G. Schnath, Geschichte Hannovers im Zeitalter der neuten Kur und der englischen Sukzession 1674- 1714 (5 vols., Hildesheim, 1938-82), III 543-606; H. Silberborth, Preußen und Hannover im Kampf um die Reichsstadt Nordhausen 1697-1715 (Nordhausen, 1936); H.J. Adamski, Der welfische Schutz über die Stadt Hildesheim (Hildesheim, 1939); M. Hughes, Law and politics in 18 th -century Germany. The Imperial Aulic Council in the reign of Charles VI (Woodbridge, 1988). 43 H. Schilling, Der Zwist Preußens und Hannovers 1729/1730 (, 1912). 44 As argued strongly by B. Simms, Three victories and a defeat. The rise and fall of the first British empire (London, 2009). 45 L. Schilling, Kaunitz und das Renversement des alliances (Berlin, 1994). 46 R. Savory, His Britannic Majesty’s army in Germany during the Seven Years War (Oxford, 1966). Frederick was obliged to drop his support for Joseph’s reform of the Reichskammergericht when Hanover presented this as an attack on Protestant constitutional rights. 47

Swabia and the Upper Rhine were the remaining two ‘open regions’ and were much further from Prussia both geographically and confessionally. Both contained a significant number of Catholic territories, including the two Hohenzollern junior branches in Sigmaringen and Hechingen in Swabia. These lines had joined Bayreuth in acknowledging Prussia as the leader of the family in 1695 and 1707. 48 However, their Catholic faith, geographic location and long tradition of serving the Habsburgs removed them as viable partners in this corner of the Empire. Prussia initially had closer relations with the Upper Rhine, thanks to dynastic and political ties to the Calvinist ruling families in Waldeck and Hessen-Kassel. These relations cooled in the 1730s and were only partly off-set by better ties to the Lutheran dynasty in Hessen-Darmstadt whose Landgrave Ludwig IX (r.1768-90) already defied his father in accepting command of a Prussian regiment whilst crown prince, and later achieved notoriety as one of Frederick II’s most ardent admirers. 49 Prussia also established ties to Lutheran Württemberg after 1709, thus gaining indirect influence in Swabia. 50

Prussia’s relationship with each of these middling territories ran a similar course. It encouraged Hessian and Württemberg ambitions of obtaining electoral titles without doing anything substantial to advance these. 51 Further influence was secured through agreements with the Württemberg and Hessian Estates when their princes converted to Catholicism (respectively in 1733 and 1754). These arrangements enabled Prussia to pose as honest broker protecting Lutheran rights, whilst covertly promoting the careers of local officials who subsequently influenced princely policy. 52 Additional pressure was exerted by sponsoring regional rivals; Hessen-Darmstadt when Kassel proved uncooperative, and Baden-Durlach to counter Württemberg’s alignment with Austria in the Seven Years War. 53 These strategies kept these principalities generally favourable towards Prussia, and ensured a large number of additional recruits from Württemberg as well. However, Prussia’s success depended partly of factors beyond its control, notably Britain’s long-standing practice of hiring Hessian auxiliaries. While this was helpful to Prussia in the Seven Years War, it was opposed by Frederick II thereafter for making recruitment for his own army more difficult. He was unable to prevent Hessen-Kassel and other principalities from supplying 30,000 troops to Britain during the American war (1776-83), and even secretly encouraged his Franconian relations to participate as a way of improving their catastrophic finances. 54 Likewise, Prussia was unable to retain Württemberg’s allegiance in the Seven Years War when geographic logic compelled it to side with France and Austria after the reversal of alliances in 1756. 55 Moreover, neither Württemberg nor Hessen-Kassel were able to dominate their respective Kreise which retained considerable vitality thanks to a rough balance amongst their diverse memberships. The bulk of the smaller south-western territories remained beyond Prussia’s political reach, though not that of its recruiting officers.

The final category consists of regions ‘distant from the king’ ( Königsfern ) which were largely closed to Prussian influence and, indeed, potentially hostile. In addition to the obvious case of the Habsburg lands which will not be covered here, these distant regions comprised the Bavarian and Electoral Rhenish Kreise and the ecclesiastical principalities collectively known as the ‘imperial church’ (Reichskirche ). A common characteristic was the predominantly Catholic composition of these regions

47 Aretin, Das Alte Reich , III 139-48; Simms, Three victories , 586-7. 48 Treaties in T. v. Moerner (ed.), Kurbrandenburgische Staatsverträge von 1601-1700 (Berlin,1867), p.607; V. Loewe (ed.), Preußens Staatsverträge aus der Regierungszeit König Friedrich I (Berlin,1923), pp.81-3. 49 Geheimer Staatsarchiv Berlin, I HA Rep.96 Nr.104 Lit A containing correspondence with Ludwig IX and his father. 50 D. Hohrath, ‘“Verwandte - Feinde -Vorbilder”: Aspekte der militärischen Bezeihungsgeschichte Preußens und Württembergs im 18. Jahrhundert’, in Luh et al, Preußen , pp.385-98. 51 L. Pelizeaus, Der Aufstieg Württembergs und Hessens zur Kurwürde 1692-1803 (Frankfurt/M., 2000). 52 G. Haug-Moritz, Württembergischer Ständekonflikt und deutscher Dualismus (Stuttgart, 1992). 53 H. Gerspacher, Die badische Politik im Siebenjährigen Kriege (Heidelberg,1934). 54 E. Städter, Die Ansbach-Bayreuther Truppen im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg 1777-1783 (, 1956). 55 P.H. Wilson, War, state and society in Württemberg, 1677-1793 (Cambridge, 1995), pp.209-26. and religion was certainly a factor in closing the imperial church to Prussia. The imperial church still encompassed one-seventh of the Empire in the eighteenth century, and held 37 of the 107 votes in the electoral and princely colleges of the Reichstag, including three of the four electorates which comprised the bulk of the Electoral Rhenish Kreis. Rule of all these imperial Estates was reserved for Catholics, except for Osnabrück, which alternated between Catholic bishops and Hanoverian princes, Lübeck, which was entirely dominated by the dukes of -Gottorp, and three imperial abbeys. 56 Thus, the Hohenzollerns could not obtain additional territory by advancing the careers of younger sons in the imperial church, unlike the Bavarian Wittelsbachs who succeeded in consistently placing one of their family as elector of Cologne between 1583 and 1761, or their Pfalz-Neuburg relations who controlled several bishoprics around 1700. 57

Having benefited substantially from the last wave of secularisation in 1648, Prussia regarded the ecclesiastical territories as pawns to be redistributed amongst the more powerful secular rulers. This unsubtle attitude not only alienated Catholics generally, but alarmed some Protestant princes who increasingly saw the small church lands as partners in preserving the Empire’s constitutional hierarchy. It was not until after the Seven Years War that Frederick II appreciated the value of cultivating good relations to the imperial church whose cooperation made it easier to block Habsburg measures in the Reichstag. He now copied methods long employed by Austria, France, and the Dutch Republic and promoted favourable candidates in the episcopal elections in important church territories. Prussia achieved some success, notably in the election of Karl Theodor von Dahlberg as coadjutor in Mainz 1785-7, but as this example also shows, preferred candidates often proved unexpectedly independent and, overall, the imperial church remained a ‘distant region’. 58

Religion was not necessarily a barrier to cooperation with the two Wittelsbach lines ruling the Palatinate, the remaining principal member of the Electoral Rhenish Kreis, and Bavaria, which dominated but did not directly control its smaller neighbours in the Bavarian Kreis. 59 The accession of the Catholic Pfalz-Neuburg line to the Palatinate in 1685 did nothing to lessen that territory’s rivalry with Bavaria. The Habsburgs had punished Palatine opposition during the Thirty Years War by transferring both its electoral title and half its territory (the Upper Palatinate) to Bavaria. The Palatinate had been compensated in the Peace of Westphalia by a less prestigious electoral title, ranked last among the then eight electors. 60 Bavaria’s decision to oppose Austria during the War of the Spanish Succession gave the Palatinate an opportunity to recover its land and title. This played to Prussia’s advantage, as the elector Palatine traded recognition of the Prussian royal title and claims to the Franconian margraviates in return for political support. 61 Palatine ambitions were dashed by the Utrecht-Rastatt peace settlement of 1713-14 which restored Bavaria to its full status within the Empire. Relations to Prussia cooled rapidly as old antagonisms resurfaced over the disputed Jülich-Cleves inheritance which both parties still hoped to acquire in its entirety.

Bavaria had similarly been disappointed by the outcome of the War of Spanish Succession, but unlike the Palatinate, still harboured ambitions to match the European standing achieved by Saxony, Prussia and Hanover. Bavaria’s relations to Prussia remained a ‘hidden rivalry’ which did not preclude periods of uneasy cooperation. 62 Prussia secured Bavaria’s recognition of its royal title in return for supporting Bavarian restoration in 1714; a factor obviously contributing to deteriorating Prusso-Palatine relations.

56 These were Gandersheim which was mainly dominated by the Guelphs, and Herford and Quedlinburg over which Prussia acquired some influence during the eighteenth century. 57 K. Jaitner, ‘Reichskirchenpolitik und rombeziehungen Philipp Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg von 1662 bis 1690’, Annalen des historischen Vereins für den Niederrhein , 178 (1976), 91-144. 58 H.E. Feine, Die Besetzung der Reichsbistümer vom Westfälischen Frieden bis zur Säkularisation 1648-1803 (Stuttgart, 1921), esp.125-43; K.O. Frhr. v. Aretin, ‘Die Koadjutorswahl Dahlbergs’, in K. Hausberger (ed.), Carl von Dahlberg (Regensburg, 1995), pp.25-34. 59 W. Dotzauer, ‘Der Kurrheinische Reichskreis in der Verfassung des Alten Reiches’, Nassauische Annalen , 98 91987), 61-104; P.C. Hartmann, Der bayerische Reichskreis (1500 bis 1803) (Berlin, 1997). 60 J. Steiner, Die Pfälzische Kurwürde während des Dreißigjährigen Krieges (1618-1648) (Speyer, 1985). 61 For these agreements, see Loewe (ed.), Preußens Staatsverträge , pp.1-3, 84-5, 101. 62 M. Kaiser, ‘Die verdeckte Konkurrenz. Bayern und Preußen 1701-1871’, in Luh et al, Preußen , pp.90-127. Having both emerged empty handed by 1714, the two Wittelsbach branches drew together in a family compact in 1724 which eventually provided the basis of cooperation in Bavaria’s bid to obtain the Austrian succession after 1740. 63

Frederick II’s agreement with the Bavarian elector, Carl Albrecht, in 1741 is usually treated as a footnote in Prussia’s manoeuvres to gain support after its unilateral invasion of Silesia. Yet, this arrangement was fundamental in Prussia’s future relations to the Empire and other imperial Estates. Prussia finally renounced claims to Jülich and Berg and agreed to vote for Carl Albrecht in the forthcoming imperial election, as well as later providing indirect military support during his ill-fated reign as Emperor Charles VII 1742-5. 64 In return, Charles VII conceded virtually all Prussia’s long- standing demands in the Empire. Prussian titles of nobility were now valid throughout the Empire, while its judicial system was effectively insulated against intervention from the imperial courts. Prussian possessions formally remained imperial fiefs, but their king was given special exemptions from much of the investiture ceremonial. These privileges did not detach Prussia from the Empire, nor prevent it from continuing to exercise influence through imperial institutions: for instance, the king could still promote cases involving his subjects in the imperial courts against people elsewhere in the Empire. Prussian victories over the Habsburgs compelled them to accept these concessions as valid once they regained the imperial title in 1745. Thus, Prussia emerged from the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-8) not only with possession of the valuable province of Silesia - which was formally ratified by the Reichstag in 1751- but also an enhanced position in the Empire. Prussia’s privileges placed it on par with Austria, clearly elevating it above the other electorates, including Hanover and Saxony despite their personal unions with European monarchies. These distinctions underpinned Frederick’s assertion of Prussia as equal to Europe’s other great monarchies.

The abject failure of Bavaria’s brief imperial rule left it politically and financially bankrupt. Frederick now regarded it as an object rather than actor in imperial politics; an impression reinforced by the inability of either Wittelsbach brand to pursue an independent policy after 1745. 65 Bavarian and Palatine troops fought alongside French and against Prussia in the Seven Years War, but Frederick’s popularity amongst ordinary Bavarians grew, despite his clumsy attempts to present the conflict as a religious war. 66 Enthusiasm mounted as Prussia was seen as Bavaria’s saviour when it successfully opposed Joseph II’s attempt to force Karl Theodor of the Palatinate to forgo his Bavarian inheritance in 1777 and accept the richer, but strategically vulnerable Austrian instead. This intervention required brief military action in the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-9), but Frederick subsequently employed more peaceful methods through the League of Princes to frustrate Joseph's attempt to revive the exchange plan. 67 Yet, the Wittelsbachs remained unnatural partners for Prussia. Despite renouncing claims to Jülich-Berg in 1741, Frederick was still prepared to seize them in 1776 as the Bavarian succession crisis loomed and only dropped this once he realised that any redistribution of territory would not alter the underlying balance in Austria’s favour. 68

It is customary to interpret Frederick’s reign as a decisive stage in the rise of Prussia, combining internal enlightened, state-strengthening reforms, and external expansion through conquest and annexation. 69 Prussia’s physical growth is indisputable. Its territory increased by 62% to total 196,000 km2 by 1786, while the population doubled to 4.76 million inhabitants. The bulk of this increase was at Poland’s expense in 1772 and shifted Prussia eastwards, making it less ‘German’, both culturally and

63 P.C. Hartmann, Geld als Instrument europäischer Machtpolitik im Zeitalter des Merkantilismus 1715-1740 (Munich, 1978). 64 P.C. Hartmann, Karl Albrecht, Karl VII. Glücklicher Kurfürst, unglücklicher Kaiser (Regensburg, 1985). 65 A. Schmid, Max III. Joseph und die europäischen Mächte. Die Außenpolitik des Kurfürstentums Bayern von 1745-1765 (Munich, 1987); M. Olbrich, Die Politik des Kurfürsten Karl Theodor von der Pfalz zwischen den Kriegen (1748-1756) (Bonn, 1966). 66 Schmid, Max III. , pp.503-5. 67 Aretin, III 183-212, 306-15; P.P. Bernard, Joseph II and Bavaria (The Hague, 1965). 68 K.O. Frhr. v. Aretin, Heiliges Römisches Reich 1776-1806 (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1967), I 111-12. 69 P.M. Hahn, Friedrich der Große und die deutsche Nation. Geschichte als politisches Argument (Stuttgart, 2007). politically in the sense that 37% of its territory was now outside the Empire. 70 This trend became more pronounced with two further partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795. The problems of digesting these annexations fatally weakened Prussia and forced it to abandon the war against Revolutionary France after 1792 in the separate Peace of Basel in 1795. This effectively partitioned the Empire between a neutral north under Prussian occupation, and a weakened Austrian-led south. The consequences were felt in the four months from July 1806 which saw the Empire’s dissolution and Prussia’s dismemberment by .

Prussia’s fate underscores its position as the weaker of the two German great powers. Though spectacular, Frederick’s gains failed to match those of the Habsburgs who doubled their territory between 1683 and 1718, making Austria a European power distinct from its possession of the Holy Roman imperial title. At Frederick’s death in 1786, Austria was three and a half times larger than Prussia with four times as many subjects. It was the only ‘German’ imperial power, both through its retention of the actual title and the public perception of its status. 71 By 1786 Prussia and Austria together held about half the Empire’s land and had four times as many soldiers as the other territories combined. The Empire had accommodated the growth of the Habsburgs, since its hierarchical structure always accorded first place to the emperor. Prussia’s emergence as a second great power distorted this system, making it more difficult to manage and reducing the options of the other German rulers. However, other factors contributed to these developments, not least the underlying shift in European relations to a system based on sovereign states which threatened to reduce the German princes to the ranks of mere aristocrats. The reversal of alliances in 1756 also curtailed their ability to extract benefit from Franco-Austrian tensions. 72 This process weakened the Empire and while it did not condemn it to inevitable demise, it certainly made it more dependent on Austro-Prussian relations. The Empire nonetheless remained the basic framework for these relations. The Prussian representative was one of the last to leave the Reichstag in 1806 and most Germans continued to regard the Empire as a blueprint for their future political organisation. 73

The Empire appears so confusing because it combined three partially contradictory political elements simultaneously. In addition to the established hierarchical order, there remained the potential of both greater centralising, monarchical authority based on the emperor, and a looser, more federal structure resting on the larger electorates and The relative balance between these elements varied over time and space,

70 This proportion rises to 56% if Silesia and Glatz are included in the lands outside the Empire. Frederick secured these as a fully sovereign possessions in 1742, but the Reichstag ruled these remained part of the Empire in 1751: J.J. Moser, Neues teutsches Staatsrecht (20 vols., Frankfurt/Main, 1766-75), I 32-7. 71 P.H. Wilson, ‘Bolstering the prestige of the Habsburgs: the end of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806’, International History Review , 28 (2006), 709-36, and ‘The meaning of Empire in Central Europe around 1800’, in A. Forrest/P.H. Wilson (eds.), The Bee and the Eagle: Napoleonic France and the end of the Holy Roman Empire, 1806 (Basingstoke, 2009), pp.22-41. 72 E. Buddruss, Die französische Deutschland Politik 1756-1789 (Mainz, 1995); S. Externbrink, Friedrich der Große, Maria Theresia und das Alte Reich. Deutschlandbild und Diplomatie Frankreichs im Siebenjährigen Krieg (Berlin, 2006). 73 W. Burgdorf, Reichskonstitution und Nation. Verfassungsreformprojekte für das Heilige Römische Reich deutscher Nation im politischen Schriftum von 1648 bis 1806 (Mainz, 1999), and his Ein Weltbild verliert seine Welt. Der Untergang des Alten Reiches und die Generation 1806 (2 nd ed., Munich, 2009).