PRUSSIA AND THE OTHER GERMAN STATES Peter H. Wilson (University of Hull) It has been customary to examine Prussia’s relations to the rest of Germany in the eighteenth century through the lens of its rivalry with Austria. This dualist approach largely ignores the wider framework of the Holy Roman Empire which historians customarily dismissed as ineffective and increasingly irrelevant after 1648. 1 Concentration on Austria and Prussia reduces the rest of the Empire to a ‘third Germany’, seemingly an inchoate patchwork of petty statelets ( Kleinstaaterei ) which were incapable of effective autonomous action. This view raises numerous methodological and interpretative problems, not least whether German political development has somehow deviated from an alleged European norm along a dangerous ‘special path’ ( Sonderweg ), as well as whether concepts like ‘state’ and ‘nation’ can be applied to this stage in its history. 2 These issues cannot be addressed here. Rather, I wish to draw attention to how the Empire’s constitutional framework influenced Austro-Prussian rivalry. This can be explored in three ways. One approach would be to examine Prussia’s relations with other German rulers according to the formal hierarchy defined by the imperial constitution. The Empire was a ‘mixed monarchy’ in which the emperor shared the exercise of key functions with the governing authorities of the numerous territories collectively known as the imperial Estates ( Reichsstände ). These ranged from the nine electorates, of which Brandenburg was one, through a multitude of larger and smaller secular and ecclesiastical principalities to around 50 imperial cities. A second approach would be to study the methods Prussia employed to interact along this status hierarchy, through formal institutions, such as the Reichstag and the Empire’s regional subdivision into ten ‘circles’ ( Kreise ), as well as the semi-official Protestant lobby group known as the corpus evangelicorum .3 Interaction with these institutions was supplemented by a host of direct political, military and dynastic ties to individual territories, particularly medium- sized Protestant principalities like Württemberg and Hessen-Darmstadt. Both approaches are useful for charting change across time and I have employed them elsewhere 4. This paper will focus instead on variations across space by examining Prussia’s interactions with the Empire’s political geography. A major reason why the Empire appears so confusing is that it was never a uniform structure, but one which varied considerably across space as well as time. 5 Peter Moraw divides the Empire’s regions into four categories depending on their political rather than physical proximity to the late medieval emperors. 6 Moraw’s categories can be adapted for Prussia by transposing his references to imperial authority to apply to the influence of the newly-minted Prussian kings after 1701. 1 A view still expressed by some today: H.A. Winkler, Germany. The long road west , vol.I (Oxford, 2006), pp.4-46. 2 For these debates see M. Schnettger (ed.) Imperium Romanum - Irregulare Corpus - Teutscher Reichs-Staat (Mainz, 2002); P.H. Wilson, ‘Still a monstrosity? Some reflections on early modern German statehood’, The Historical Journal , 49 (2006), 565-76. 3 A. Schindling, Die Anfänge des immerwährenden Reichstags zu Regensburg (Mainz,1991); W. Dotzauer, Die deutschen Reichskreise (1383-1806) (Stuttgart, 1998); G. Haug-Moritz, ‘Corpus evangelicorum und deutscher Dualismus’, in V. Press (ed.), Alternativen zur Reichsverfassung? (Munich, 1995), pp.189-208; A. Kalipke, ‘The corpus evangelicorum : A culturalist perspective on its procedure in the eighteenth-century Holy Roman Empire’, in P. Coy/B. Marschke/D.W. Sabean (eds.), The Holy Roman Empire reconsidered (New York, 2010), pp.229-47. 4 P.H. Wilson, ‘Prussia’s relations with the Holy Roman Empire, 1740-86’, The Historical Journal, 51 (2008), 337-71, and ‘Frederick the Great and Imperial politics, 1740-56’, in J. Luh/M. Kaiser (eds.), Friedrich 300 -. Eine perspektivische Bestandsaufnahme (http://www.perspectiva.net/content/publikationen/). See also V. Press, ‘Friedrich der Große als Reichspolitiker’, in H. Duchhardt (ed.), Friedrich der Große, Franken und das Reich (Vienna, 1986), pp.25-56. 5 Further discussion in P.H. Wilson, The Holy Roman Empire 1495-1806 (2 nd ed., Basingstoke, 2011), pp.11-20. 6 P. Moraw, ‘Franken als königsnahe Landschaft im späten Mittelalter’, Blätter für deutsche Landesgeschichte , 112 (1976), 123-38 and his ‘Landesgeschichte und Reichsgeschichte im 14. Jahrhundert’, Jahrbuch für westdeutsche Landesgeschichte , 3 (1977), 175-91. The first of Moraw’s categories is that of ‘king’s country’ ( Königslandschaft ), in our case denoting Prussia’s direct possessions where its king could influence political, social, economic and religious structures with relatively little external interference. The development of Prussia from a patchwork of north-German lands to a more consolidated state is already well documented 7, and we only need to note its growth relative to that of the total ‘German’ political sphere of both the Empire and Habsburg and Hohenzollern lands beyond imperial frontiers. The Hohenzollern Monarchy as a Proportion of Total ‘German’ Power Aspect 1648 1714 1748 1792 Territory (km2) Hohenzollerns 107,429 (13.6) 115,432 (10.5) 161,852 (15.4) 203,652 (17.3) Total 785,975 1,101,253 1,050,412 1,178,277 Population (millions) Hohenzollerns 0.87 (4.3) 1.73 (7.1) 3.48 (11.0) 5.67 (12.9) Total 20.15 24.5 31.77 43.84 Army Hohenzollerns 700 (1.4) 46,100 (15.2) 135,000 (27.7) 195,000 (24.4) Total 48,750 303,400 488,000 798,700 NB the 1792 figure for military strength is distorted by the Habsburg mobilisation for the Turkish War. If their establishment for 1787 is used (221,600), Prussia maintained 37.3% of a total ‘German’ establishment of 522,600 in the late 1780s. Moraw’s second category is that of regions ‘near to the king’ ( Königsnahe ), where he exercised considerable influence, but could not alter existing structures. There were two of these for eighteenth- century Prussia and the following will use discussion of the first of these to illustrate trends common to both. Westphalia moved ‘near’ to Prussia as it acquired land there in three stages between 1609 and 1702. 8 These possessions have generally been regarded as a strategic liability. A large part of Prussia’s initial acquisitions were occupied by Dutch troops between 1614 and 1679, while all fell to its enemies during the Seven Years War. 9 They were also more deeply embedded in the web of imperial jurisdictions than Brandenburg which enjoyed considerable exemptions as an electorate since 1356. Frederick William, the Great Elector, did bully the Estates of his Westphalian provinces into granting permanent military taxation after 1649, but it proved difficult to re-negotiate these arrangements in response to changes in circumstance later. 10 Yet, these lands were twice as densely populated as Hohenzollern Prussia, and far more productive. 11 Not only did they provide recruits for the Prussian 7 W. Neugebauer, Die Hohenzollern (2 vols., Stuttgart, 2003). 8 The first saw the Hohenzollerns obtain a significant slice of the Jülich-Cleves inheritance: Cleves and Mark (1609) plus Ravensberg (1614). The second entailed the acquisition of the former bishopric of Minden in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The third involved smaller enclaves obtained through the Orange inheritance: Lingen and Mörs (1702) and Obergeldern (1715), plus the county of Tecklenburg purchased in 1707. A fourth stage followed in 1744 when Frederick II acquired East Frisia. 9 M. Kaiser, ‘Die vereinbarte Okkupation. Generalstaatische Besatzungen in brandenburgischen Festungen am Niederrhein’, in M. Meumann/J. Rogge (eds.), De besetzte res publica (Münster, 2005), pp.271-314; H. Carl, Okkupation und Regionalismus. Die preußischen Westprovinzen im Siebenjährigen Krieg (Mainz, 1993). 10 M. Kaiser/M. Rohrschneider (eds.), Membra unius capitis. Studien zu Herrschaftsauffassungen und Regierungspraxis in Kurbrandenburg (1640-1688) (Berlin, 2005); M. Kaiser, ‘Nähe und Distanz. Beobachtungen zum Verhältnis zwischen den Landsständen von Kleve und Mark und ihrem Landesherren im 17. Jahrhundert’, Westfälische Forschungen , 53 (2003), 71-108. 11 Ducal (East) Prussia had 38.4% of the monarchy’s population, but produced only 16.4% of its taxation in 1697, compared to the Westphalian territories which produced 17.4% of the tax revenue, or just above their proportion of the population: K. Breysig, ‘Der brandenburgische Staatshaushalt in der zweiten Hälfte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts’, Schmollers Jahrbuch , 16 (1892), 449-545 at 458, 461. army, but they served as bases from which to recruit more widely in Westphalia. 12 The dramatic expansion of the Prussian army after 1713 could not be sustained solely from native conscription. Prussia recruited around 1,150 men annually from other German territories between 1713 and 1740, or 22% of its total requirement. This annual quota increased to 2,500 during the 1750s and around 3,000 after 1763, despite growing opposition from Austria and some other princes. 13 However, the value of the Westphalian territories went beyond these direct material benefits. The Empire’s constitution and political culture ensured that each territorial acquisition brought additional status, rights, and claims which could be used to extend influence well beyond the boundaries of the new possession. The Westphalian provinces initially brought little in terms of formal rights, because only Minden was represented in the Reichstag. 14 Prussia faced considerable local opposition to its attempts to obtain a share in the single collective vote of the Westphalian counts at the Reichstag, only securing a minor stake in this in 1732. 15 However, other territorial acquisitions in Upper and Lower Saxony in 1648 brought the Hohenzollerns additional representation in the college of princes for Magdeburg, Cammin, Halberstadt, and Further Pomerania, giving it more votes than any other dynasty. Furthermore, Magdeburg was formally the most senior Protestant principality, allowing Prussia to lead debates and influence voting.