Making Smart Security Choices The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex
Making Smart SecurityChoices The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex
Lisbeth Gronlund Eryn MacDonald Stephen Young Philip E. Coyle III Steve Fetter
OCTOBER 2013 ii UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS TS
© 2013 Union of Concerned Scientists All rights reserved
Lisbeth Gronlund is a senior scientist and co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) Global Security Program. Eryn MacDonald is an analyst in the UCS Global Security Program. Stephen Young is a senior analyst in the UCS Global Security Program. Philip E. Coyle III is a senior science fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Steve Fetter is a professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.
The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous, independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative, practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future.
More information about UCS and the Global Security Program is available on the UCS website at www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security.
The full text of this report is available on the UCS website at www.ucsusa.org/smartnuclearchoices.
D ESIGN & PRODUCTIO N DG Communications/www.NonprofitDesign.com
COVE R IMAGE Department of Defense/Wikimedia Commons Four B61 nuclear gravity bombs on a bomb cart at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.
Printed on recycled paper. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S iii
CONTENTS
iv Figures iv Tables v Acknowledgments 1 Executive Summary 4 Chapter 1. Introduction 7 Chapter 2. Extending the Life of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal 8 Life Extension Programs 10 Does the United States Need a New Facility to Produce Plutonium Pits? 15 Is the Uranium Processing Facility Appropriately Sized? 19 Is the High Explosive Pressing Facility Appropriately Sized? 21 How Much Tritium Does the United States Need? 24 Chapter 3. Stockpile Surveillance: Assessing the Reliability and Safety of Nuclear Weapons 25 A Modi!ed Surveillance Program 28 Chapter 4. Stockpile Stewardship: Acquiring a Deeper Understanding of Nuclear Weapons 29 Types of Experiments for Stockpile Stewardship 29 Experimental Facilities 35 Computing Facilities 37 Chapter 5. Retaining a Qualified Workforce 37 Anticipating Shortages of Key Personnel 38 Reexamining Personnel Challenges 38 Successful Strategies for Retaining Key Personnel 40 The Future of the Nuclear Weapons Workforce 41 Chapter 6. Minimizing the Security Risks of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material 41 Storing and Disposing of Plutonium 47 Storing and Disposing of HEU 52 Chapter 7. Dismantling Nuclear Warheads and Verifying Nuclear Reductions 52 Dismantling Nuclear Warheads 54 Verifying Reductions in Nuclear Warheads 56 References 64 Appendix: The Nuclear Weapons Complex 80 About the Authors iv UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS TS
F I G URES
9 Figure 1. Life Extension Programs for U.S. Nuclear Warheads 27 Figure 2. Funding for the NNSA’s Core Surveillance Program
T A B LES
7 Table 1. Life Extension Programs for the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal 12 Table 2. Replacing All Plutonium Pits by 2089, Assuming 50 Pits per Year and a Pit Lifetime of 100 Years 12 Table 3. Required Annual Pit Production Capacity, Assuming a Pit Lifetime of 100 Years 13 Table 4. Number of U.S. Warheads under Various Scenarios 20 Table 5. Sets of High Explosive Components Needed under Various Scenarios 30 Table 6. Facilities Used to Conduct Tests under Stockpile Stewardship 39 Table 7. Share of Total Budget Devoted to Directed R&D at Eight Nuclear Weapons Sites, FY 2012 42 Table 8. Sites with Plutonium, as of September 2009 48 Table 9. Sites Storing U.S. HEU, as of September 2004 50 Table 10. Status of Excess U.S. HEU M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S v
A C K NOWLEDG MENTS
This report was made possible through the generous support of the Colombe Foundation, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, The Prospect Hill Foundation, Telemachus: Foundation to Empower the Poor and End War, and members of the Union of Concerned Scientists.
The authors would like to thank David Crandall, Richard L. Garwin, Ivan Oelrich, Bob Peurifoy, and David Wright for their review of the draft manuscript; Sandra Hackman for editing; David Gerratt for design and layout; Bryan Wadsworth for proofreading and overseeing production; Teri Grimwood for proofreading; and Heather Tuttle for print coordination.
The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily re"ect those of the organizations that funded the work or the individuals who reviewed it. The authors bear sole responsibility for the report’s content.
M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 1
Executive Summary
he mission of the U.S. nuclear weapons com- plex is to ensure a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal. !e complex must be able to extend the life of nuclear warheads, assess their Treliability and safety, understand the impact of aging and modi"cations, and retain employees with essential scienti"c and technical expertise. Just as important for U.S. security, the complex should dismantle retired weapons in a timely fashion, and develop methods for verifying further reductions in nuclear weapons. !e complex must also minimize the security risks entailed in storing, transporting, and disposing of weapons- usable materials. !e complex must meet all these challenges with limited resources. Doing so will require making smart choices based on strict attention to priorities. An employee slides a tray of W76 neutron generator tubes into a !e administration and Congress will make key desiccator (drying) cabinet at the Explosive Components Facility at decisions on the nuclear weapons complex over the Sandia National Laboratory. next few years. Toward that end, this report examines the essential missions of the complex, considers its key t "TTVNJOHUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTNBLFTNPEFTUSFEVD- challenges, and suggests critical near-term and long- tions in its nuclear arsenal over the next 25 years, term steps. existing facilities can produce enough plutonium pits to sustain the arsenal, even when some life Extending the Life of Nuclear Weapons extension programs entail building new pits. !e The National Nuclear Security Administration Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement– (NNSA)—the semi-autonomous agency within the Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Department of Energy that oversees U.S. nuclear currently on hold, is not needed. !e administra- weapons activities—plans to replace the seven types of tion should cancel it, and develop a plan to mini- weapons in today’s arsenal with "ve di#erent weapons mize the number of sites that store and handle over the next 25 to 30 years. !e NNSA is planning plutonium. to construct new facilities to produce canned sub- t ɨF QMBOOFE 6SBOJVN 1SPDFTTJOH 'BDJMJUZ BU UIF assemblies and high explosive, and to allow an increase Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee in the production of plutonium pits. It is also planning may have more capacity than needed to produce to increase the amount of tritium in U.S. weapons, to new canned subassemblies. !at need depends on allow less frequent maintenance and increase weapon the ability to refurbish existing secondaries and reliability. other components, and on whether future life ex- t ɨF//4"TIPVMEHJWFTUSPOHQSFGFSFODFUPSFGVS- tension programs will entail newly produced com- bishing or remanufacturing existing weapon types. ponents. A careful examination of the need for Creating new weapon types—even if they only new canned subassemblies is in order. !e United use weapon components of existing designs— States should delay construction of the facility would be viewed by many as violating the admin- until the production capacity required to support istration’s pledge not to develop or deploy new the stockpile is clearer. nuclear weapons, and could generate concerns t ɨF//4"TIPVMEEFGFSCVJMEJOHBTFDPOEQSFTT about weapon reliability. JO UIF )JHI &YQMPTJWFT 1SFTTJOH 'BDJMJUZ BU UIF
Photo: Randy Montoya/Sandia National Laboratory 2 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS TS
1BOUFY 1MBOU JO 5FYBT VOUJM UIF BHFODZ EFNPO- complete accounting of the "nancial costs of dif- strates a need for it. ferent life extension programs should include the t ɨFOBUJPOIBTBSPCVTUDBQBDJUZUPQSPEVDFUSJUJVN associated stockpile stewardship costs as well. Existing facilities can supply the needed amount. t ɨF //4" IBT UISFF GBDJMJUJFT XIFSF TDJFOUJTUT t ɨF//4"TIPVMESFFWBMVBUFUIFSFRVJSFNFOUGPS conduct hydrodynamic tests. !e NNSA and a "ve-year tritium reserve, given that commercial Congress should assess the need to continue using reactors are producing tritium and that produc- UIF#JH&YQMPTJWF&YQFSJNFOUBM'BDJMJUZGPSTVDI tion can expand more quickly than in the past. tests. t 5PQSPWJEFBOZGVFMOFFEFEGPSUSJUJVNQSPEVDJOH t ɨF //4" BOE $POHSFTT TIPVME BMTP BTTFTT UIF reactors, the NNSA should down-blend some of OFFE UP CVJME UIF -BSHF #PSF 1PXEFS (VO GPS its large existing stockpiles of highly enriched ura- shock wave tests, given that two similar facilities nium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU). are already operating. t $POHSFTTTIPVMEOPUTVCTJEJ[F64&$UIFEPNFT t ɨF BENJOJTUSBUJPO PS $POHSFTT TIPVME BTL UIF tic uranium enrichment company—or its American JASON group to assess the utility of the hydrody- $FOUSJGVHF1MBOUUPQSPEVDF-&6UPGVFMUSJUJVN namic and shock-wave facilities for stockpile certi- producing commercial reactors. "cation, under various assumptions regarding changes made to weapons during life extension Ensuring Robust Surveillance programs. 6OEFSJUT4UPDLQJMF4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBN UIF//4" t ɨF //4" IBT UISFF GBDJMJUJFT UIBU BSF VTFE UP removes some of each type of warhead from the stock- conduct nuclear fusion experiments and to study pile each year, and subjects them to a wide variety of materials under conditions of high energy: the non-nuclear tests to assess their reliability, safety, and National Ignition Facility, the Z machine, and security. !e NNSA has not made this program a pri- 0.&("ɨFBENJOJTUSBUJPOPS$POHSFTTTIPVME ority, creating concern about the agency’s ability to ask the JASON group to assess the utility of these continue to certify the reliability, safety, and security UISFFGBDJMJUJFTUPUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SP- of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. gram. !e study should consider the extent to t ɨF //4" BOE $POHSFTT TIPVME EFWPUF UIF which the facilities provide unique information attention and funding needed to ensure a robust relevant to stockpile certi"cation, and the value of surveillance program, even in the face of budget such information for stockpile certi"cation under constraints. di#erent assumptions about changes made to t $POHSFTTTIPVMENPOJUPSUIF//4"TQSPHSFTTJO weapons during life extension programs. developing and implementing its corrective action t ɨF BENJOJTUSBUJPO PS $POHSFTT TIPVME BTL UIF plan for the surveillance program, and in complet- JASON group to assess the computing capacity ing baseline tests for key components of nuclear needed to support the stockpile, under di#erent weapons. assumptions about modi"cations made to weap- t #PUI$POHSFTTBOEUIF//4"TIPVMEHJWFTFSJPVT ons during life extension programs. consideration to recommendations from a forth- coming study of the surveillance program by the Retaining a Qualified Workforce JASON scienti"c advisory group. A highly skilled scienti"c and technical workforce is essential to the NNSA’s ability to maintain the stock- “Rightsizing” Stockpile Stewardship pile. !e nuclear weapons complex will continue to ɨF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBNIFMQTEFWFMPQB compete with other industries to attract quali"ed em- more in-depth understanding of how nuclear weapons ployees, and security requirements may make jobs at XPSL#VUTVDIVOEFSTUBOEJOHTIPVMEOPUCFBOFOE the complex less attractive for younger workers than in itself. Instead, this program’s facilities and experi- employment in private industry. ments should align with the priorities and needs of life t ɨF//4"IBTCFFOBCMFUPBUUSBDUBOESFUBJOQFP- extension programs for existing nuclear weapons, which ple with the needed expertise. No major change in will depend on the extent to which life extension pro- strategy is needed. !e agency and its contrac- grams entail aggressive modi"cations or replacement tors should continue to o#er competitive salaries weapons with newly designed nuclear components. and bene"ts. Not only will more aggressive life extension programs t 1SPHSBNTTVDIBT8PSLGPS0UIFST UIF-JWFSNPSF be more expensive to implement, they will also require Valley Open Campus, and Directed Research and greater computing and experimental resources. A Development allow technical workers to perform M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 3
research for other federal and nongovernmental The administration and Congress sponsors, and to connect with the broader scien- ti"c community. !e NNSA should expand these will make key decisions on the nuclear programs and encourage new ones. t ɨF //4" TIPVME FOTVSF UIBU JUT DPOUSBDUPST weapons complex over the next few make full use of funding for the Directed Research and Development programs, which support basic years. Toward that end, this report research. examines the essential missions of the t ɨF //4" BOE JUT DPOUSBDUPST TIPVME QSPWJEF working conditions with fewer bureaucratic complex, considers its key challenges, constraints. and suggests critical near-term and Minimizing the Risks of Storing and Disposing of Weapons-Grade Material long-term steps. !e United States has large amounts of plutonium and HEU that are not needed for military purposes. A key mission of the nuclear complex is to safely and securely Dismantling Warheads and Verifying store and dispose of these "ssile materials, which can Further Reductions in Nuclear Arsenals be used directly to make nuclear weapons, in order to !e United States has made major cuts in its deployed prevent their theft or diversion. and reserve stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and the t ɨF//4"IBTSFNPWFEëTTJMFNBUFSJBMGSPNTPNF Obama administration is pursuing further reductions sites, and plans to dispose of a large fraction of its linked to cuts in Russia’s nuclear stockpile. Such reduc- plutonium and HEU stocks from dismantled tions are just as important to the nation’s long-term XFBQPOT#VUBGUFSQMBOOFEEJTQPTBMJTDPNQMFUF security as maintaining the existing stockpile. the nation will still have enough "ssile material t ɨF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT TIPVME FOTVSF UIBU JU IBT UIF for some 13,000 weapons. !e United States capacity to dismantle retired weapons and verify should declare some of this plutonium and HEU future reductions in nuclear arsenals. to be excess to military needs, and dispose of it t 8IFOQMBOOJOHMJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNTGPSOVDMF- safely and expeditiously. ar warheads, the NNSA should include the need t ɨF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT TIPVME TQFFE VQ UIF EPXO to dismantle retired weapons expeditiously. blending of HEU already declared as excess to t $POHSFTTTIPVMEJODSFBTFGVOEJOHGPSSFTFBSDIPO LEU, which can be used to fuel reactors or pro- verifying deeper nuclear arms reductions, includ- duce medical isotopes. ing warhead-level veri"cation. t ɨF//4"TIPVMENPWFBOZ$BUFHPSZ*)&6 that is, all but the smallest amounts—still at the weapons laboratories and other sites to the Y-12 National Security Complex, and consolidate plu- tonium storage at the smallest possible number of sites. t ɨF//4"TQMBOOFENFUIPEGPSEJTQPTJOHPGQMV- tonium—using it to manufacture mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for use in commercial power reac- tors—entails signi"cant security risks. !e NNSA should cancel the MOX program and embed ex- cess plutonium in a stable glass or ceramic form suitable for disposal in a geologic repository. 4 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS TS
C HAPTER 1 Introduction
he United States seeks to maintain a nuclear A viable complex requires e#ective management arsenal that is reliable, safe from accidents, BOEPWFSTJHIU#FMJFGJTXJEFTQSFBEUIBUUIF/BUJPOBM secure from unauthorized use, and no larger Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—the semi- than needed to protect its security and that autonomous agency within the Department of Energy Tof its allies. Key to this enterprise is the nuclear (DOE) that oversees U.S. nuclear weapons—is not per- weapons complex: the set of laboratories and facilities forming its job well.2 In fact, the NNSA has been strug- that research, design, produce, and maintain nuclear gling to prioritize its work for some time. !e Obama weapons.1 administration’s initial plan for the nuclear weapons 8IBUUZQFPGDPNQMFYJTSFRVJSFEUPNBJOUBJOUIF complex was to build two major weapons facilities— U.S. stockpile and meet related goals? It should have the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement– the facilities and resources to extend the life of U.S. /VDMFBS'BDJMJUZ BOEUIF6SBOJVN1SPDFTTJOH'BDJMJ- warheads, assess their reliability and safety, understand ty—and a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to the e#ects of aging and any weapons modi"cations, dispose of plutonium from dismantled warheads. !e and retain key scienti"c and technical expertise. !e administration’s plan also included ambitious programs complex also requires the capacity to dismantle retired to extend the lifetime of several types of warheads. How- weapons in a timely fashion and to develop methods ever, skyrocketing costs and constrained budgets have led for verifying further reductions in nuclear weapons, the NNSA to reconsider its plans for all three facilities. re$ecting the nation’s longer-term goal of eliminating !e agency has delayed construction of the Chem- them worldwide. And the complex must minimize secu- istry and Metallurgy Research Replacement–Nuclear rity risks while storing, transporting, and disposing of Facility—intended to allow an increase in plutonium weapons-usable materials. pit production—by at least "ve years, and is develop- ing an alternative strategy for the interim period. !e NNSA recently revealed that after years of work on the The nation relies on its Stockpile EFTJHO UIF6SBOJVN1SPDFTTJOH'BDJMJUZXJMMIBWFUPCF Surveillance Program to assess the redesigned because it cannot accommodate the needed equipment, raising costs and delaying construction. reliability, safety, and security of And the agency just announced that it will slow con- struction of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility its nuclear arsenal. Although this and review other plutonium disposal strategies. .FBOXIJMF BQSPHSBNUPFYUFOEUIFMJGFPGUIF8 program is essential, the NNSA has warhead will not meet its schedule or budget. !e not given it the attention it deserves. estimated cost of the life extension program for the #CPNCIBTKVNQFEGSPNCJMMJPOUPCJMMJPO UPCJMMJPO"OEQMBOTGPSFYUFOEJOHUIFMJGFPGUIF Finally, the complex must meet all these challenges 8XBSIFBEFOUBJMFWFONPSFDPNQMJDBUFEBOEDPTUMZ in a time of limited resources. !e goal is to create modi"cations. a complex that is viable for as long as required, but !e administration and Congress will make key without unneeded capabilities or facilities. decisions on these and other programs over the next
1 Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia have traditionally been referred to as the nuclear weapons laboratories, and we do so in this report. They have been formally renamed the National Security Laboratories.
2 The new Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise is considering how to revise the NNSA’s governance structure. Although that effort is important, it is beyond the scope of this report. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 5
Scale model of a nuclear weapon resting on a diagnostic rack or “jewel rack” used for weapons testing at the Nevada National Security Site. The model was built by the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM.
few years. Making smart choices will require paying program, the NNSA removes some of each type of war- strict attention to priorities. head from the stockpile each year, and subjects those !is report examines the essential missions of the warheads to a wide variety of non-nuclear tests. !e U.S. nuclear weapons complex, considers its key chal- agency also tests weapons components and materials. lenges, and recommends critical steps for the admin- After removing the nuclear materials, the military also istration and Congress. !ese key challenges include: $ight-tests weapons of each type. Although this program is essential, the NNSA has Extending the life of the nuclear arsenal. U.S. weap- not given it the attention it deserves. In recent annual ons were not designed for a speci"c lifetime and do not reports on the reliability, safety, and security of the U.S. expire at a certain age, but some components degrade stockpile, the directors of the three national nuclear as they age. To ensure that they remain reliable, safe, weapons labs have consistently expressed concerns and secure for another 20 to 30 years, U.S. weapons about the overall direction of the surveillance program, have undergone or will undergo a life extension pro- as well as the limited number of surveillance tests they gram or will be replaced with a di#erent warhead. BDUVBMMZDPNQMFUF ("0D ɨF+"40/HSPVQ !e life extension program can also be used to mod- scienti"c experts who advise the federal government ify the warheads to increase their safety or security, and on security—also found that the surveillance program the nation’s weapons laboratories are eager to do so. is “becoming inadequate,” and that a “revised” program However, extensive modi"cations can actually reduce was required to ensure the continued success of the the reliability of the weapons, given that the nation no 4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBN +"40/Q longer uses explosive nuclear testing, and will make life In Chapter 3, we examine the steps the NNSA has extension programs more costly. taken to address these concerns, and consider critical Chapter 2 explores the facilities the nation actually actions that remain. needs to complete these life extension programs. “Rightsizing” stockpile stewardship. 8IFOUIF6OJUFE Ensuring robust surveillance. !e nation relies on its 4UBUFT FOEFE OVDMFBS FYQMPTJWF UFTUJOH JO JU 4UPDLQJMF4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBNUPBTTFTTUIFSFMJBCJMJUZ also stopped developing and deploying new nuclear safety, and security of its nuclear arsenal.3 Under that weapons, focusing instead on maintaining existing
3 While stockpile surveillance is used to evaluate security measures intrinsic to warheads, the United States ensures the security of its nuclear weapons primarily through extrinsic measures: guards, gates, and guns.
Photo: Mark Kaletka, taken in the National Atomic Testing Museum in Las Vegas, Nevada 6 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS TS
ones. To understand the e#ects of aging on these Minimizing the risks of storing and disposing of weapons, and any changes made to them during their weapons-usable material. The nuclear complex life extension programs, the DOE created the Stock- stores and handles large amounts of plutonium and QJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBN XIJDIJTEFWPUFEUPJODSFBT- highly enriched uranium (HEU)—which can be used ing the understanding of how nuclear weapons work. directly to make nuclear weapons—at several sites The twin pillars of the program are advanced across the United States. Some of this material is no computing facilities used to model the performance longer needed for nuclear weapons and will be disposed of nuclear weapons, and experimental facilities that PG *O $IBQUFS XF FWBMVBUF QMBOT BOE BMUFSOBUJWF provide data to validate these computer models. In methods for storing and disposing of these fissile $IBQUFS XFDPOTJEFSUIFTFGBDJMJUJFTBOEUIFJSVUJMJUZ materials. for di#erent types of life extension programs, from those that make only modest modi"cations to warheads Dismantling warheads and verifying further re- to those that are more extensive. ductions in nuclear arsenals. !e United States has made major cuts in its stockpiles of deployed and The national nuclear weapons labs reserve nuclear weapons, and now has a backlog of weapons awaiting dismantlement. !e facilities used have long pursued research on verifying to dismantle nuclear weapons are also used to disas- semble and reassemble weapons during life extension agreements to control nuclear weapons programs, and these two missions compete for space. and prevent their proliferation, but their *O$IBQUFS XFDPOTJEFSXBZTUPEJTNBOUMFSFUJSFE weapons more quickly while meeting the needs of life work on verification of further reductions extension programs. !e national nuclear weapons labs have long pur- should be strengthened. sued research on verifying agreements to control nuclear weapons and prevent their proliferation, but their work Retaining a qualified workforce. O%cials at the on veri"cation of further reductions should be strength- nuclear weapons labs and outside analysts have stressed ened. Such research will help inform U.S. policy the need to maintain the scienti"c and technical exper- makers about the value of potential nuclear weapons tise to extend the life of existing weapons, address any USFBUJFT*O$IBQUFS XFBMTPTIPXIPXUPCPMTUFSTVDI problems that may arise, and design modi"ed weapons research. as needed. Chapter 5 examines the NNSA’s e#orts to attract and retain quali"ed personnel. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 7
C HAPTER 2 Extending the Life of the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal
.S. nuclear weapons were not designed for a Current U.S. nuclear weapons generally have two speci"c lifetime, but some components need stages: a primary and a secondary. !e primary in- to be refurbished or replaced to ensure these cludes a plutonium pit and conventional explosive that weapons remain reliable, safe, and secure. implodes the pit, leading to a "ssion explosion. !e UTwo types of U.S. weapon have already completed life secondary is in a canned subassembly (CSA), a her- extension programs to extend their lifetime for another metically sealed container made of stainless steel. !e UP ZFBST UIF8 EFQMPZFE PO MBOECBTFE CSA also contains the “interstage”—a substance that NJTTJMFT BOEUIF#BOETUSBUFHJDCPNCT TFF channels energy from the primary to ignite the second- 5BCMF "UIJSEUZQFPGXFBQPOUIF8XBSIFBE ary. !e primary, secondary, and interstage constitute deployed on submarine-launched missiles—is in the the nuclear explosive package. production phase of its life extension program. Under 8IFOBXFBQPOJTEFUPOBUFE BNJYUVSFPGUSJUJVN current NNSA plans, the remaining types of weapons and deuterium gases is injected into the hollow core of will undergo a life extension program, be replaced with the plutonium pit just before the implosion begins. a weapon of a new design, or be retired. !is causes a higher percentage of the plutonium to
Table 1. Life Extension Programs for the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal
Current Weapons Planned Weapons Development Production W87 (ICBM warhead) Completed in 2005 B61-7 and -11 (strategic bombs) Completed in 2008 W76 (SLBM warhead) W76-1 FY 1998–FY 2009 FY 2009–FY 2019 B61-3/4/7/10 B61-12 FY 2009–FY 2019 FY 2019–FY 2023 (strategic/tactical bombs) W88 (SLBM warhead) W88-Alt 370 FY 2013–FY 2019 FY 2019–FY 2023 W-80 (ALCM warhead) ALCM warhead FY 2013–FY 2024 FY 2024–FY 2030 W78/W88-1 (ICBM/SLBM warheads) IW-1 FY 2011–FY 2021 FY 2025–FY 2036 W87/88-1 (ICBM/SLBM warheads) IW-2 FY 2021–FY 2031 FY 2031–beyond FY 2038 W76-1 (SLBM warhead) IW-3 FY 2027–FY 2037 FY 2037–beyond FY 2038 B61 (strategic/tactical bombs) FY 2033–beyond FY 2038 B83 (strategic bomb)
N OTES : According to the NNSA, B61-12 production is scheduled to run from FY 2019 to FY 2023 (NNSA 2013a). But according to the DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, production will begin in 2022 and end in 2028 (see Miller and Ho 2012; Young 2012). While the Nuclear Weapons Council has not determined the IW-2 and IW-3 warheads, the joint DOD/NNSA Enterprise Planning Working Group projects them to be the W87/88 and W76-1 life extensions, respectively. The B83 bomb will almost certainly be retired once production of the B61-12 is complete. (ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; IW = interoperable warhead) Source: NNSA 2013a.
4 Some U.S. weapons have more than one option for the size of the nuclear explosion, or yield. Options with small yields may use only the primary stage. 8 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS TS
"ssion, creating a larger primary explosion. Tritium- Life Extension Programs "lled reservoirs and some other components of a weap- Each life extension program the NNSA has under way on, including batteries, must be replaced regularly. or planned includes one or more of three approaches to A warhead also includes hundreds of non-nuclear the warhead’s nuclear components: components, such as those in the arming, "ring, and t refurbishment, in which nuclear components are fuzing mechanisms. !ese components can be fully refurbished or rebuilt; tested and replaced during life extension programs. !e t reuse, in which nuclear components are replaced ,BOTBT$JUZ1MBOUJO.JTTPVSJQSPEVDFTPSQSPDVSFT with surplus or newly built components from a more than 100,000 such components annually, while di#erent warhead that had previously undergone Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico designs nuclear explosive testing; and them and produces the remainder. !e NNSA is mov- t replacement, in which nuclear components are JOHBMMBDUJWJUJFTBUUIF,BOTBT$JUZ1MBOUUPUIF/BUJPOBM replaced with newly designed ones that have not Security Campus, a new facility nearby, over the undergone nuclear explosive testing. next year. It is important to note that under the reuse option, Whether new pits are needed for warhead each component would have previously undergone nuclear explosive testing but may not have been tested life extension programs depends on two together with other key components of the new design. And the new warhead would not have been tested in factors: the lifetime of plutonium pits, its complete con"guration. For example, the NNSA and whether existing pits are replaced could use a primary from one warhead type and a sec- ondary from another warhead type, as long as the com- with newly built pits from a different ponents were from weapons that previously underwent nuclear explosive testing. Such modi"cations to the warhead or with newly designed pits. nuclear explosive package that deviate from previously tested designs could reduce the reliability of the weap- !e NNSA also plans to revamp or build new facil- on. Making extensive modi"cations would also increase ities for producing plutonium pits at Los Alamos the cost of the life extension program. National Laboratory in New Mexico, CSAs at the Y-12 If the NNSA modi"ed a component that had pre- National Security Complex in Tennessee, and conven- viously been tested, that would constitute a replacement UJPOBMFYQMPTJWFTBUUIF1BOUFY1MBOUJO5FYBT*OUIJT strategy. Some types of modi"cations might make it chapter we discuss plans for life extension programs, di%cult to certify that the weapon is reliable. and analyze the need for these new facilities, as well as One reason the NNSA is interested in the reuse plans for increasing the production of tritium. and replacement options is to modify the warheads
The new National Security Campus at the Kansas City Plant, 2011. Construction is complete and the facility will be fully occupied in 2014.
Photo: NNSA News M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 9
Figure 1. Life Extension Programs for U.S. Nuclear Warheads Fiscal Year 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
W76-1 Production
WBB Alt 370 Development Production
B61-12 Development Production B61 Development
Cruise Missile Warhead Development Production
IW-1 (W78/88-1) Development Production
IW-2 Development Production
IW-3 Development
N OTES : The W87 warhead, deployed on land-based missiles, and the B61-7 and 11 bombs completed their life extension programs in 2005 and 2008, respectively. According to the NNSA, B61-12 production is scheduled to run from FY 2019 to FY 2023. But according to the DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, production will begin in 2022 and end in 2028 (see Miller and Ho 2012; Young 2012).
(Alt = alteration; IW = interoperable warhead) Source: NNSA 2013a.
to increase their safety or security. For example, using QJMF4UFXBSETIJQBOE.BOBHFNFOU1MBOTUBUFTUIBUUIF insensitive high explosive rather than conventional high “NNSA will not develop new nuclear warheads or pro- explosive to initiate the implosion of the primary would vide new military capability, except [emphasis added] decrease the risks of accidental plutonium dispersal and to improve safety, security and reliability” (NNSA nuclear detonation. To increase its safety, the life ex- 2013a p. 1–5). tension program for a warhead that uses a conventional ɨF/VDMFBS8FBQPOT $PVODJMB KPJOU %FQBSU- high explosive could therefore reuse an existing design ment of Defense (DOD) and DOE body that oversees of a primary with an insensitive high explosive. Again, the process for managing the stockpile and provides such modi"cations could lead to reduced reliability. policy guidance—has endorsed a “25-year baseline Some types of safety and security improvements plan” that “identi"es the path toward a long-term stock- would require a replacement strategy. For example, cur- pile end state” (Harvey 2013 p. 3). !is plan—dubbed rent weapons are not multi-point safe—a nuclear ex- 3+2—would replace the seven types of weapons in plosion would occur if the high explosive was detonated today’s arsenal with three “interoperable” ballistic mis- at two or more points simultaneously. Adding multi- sile warheads and two “interoperable” air-delivered point safety, if it were possible, would require a primary weapons (Figure 1). (An interoperable warhead would that was di#erent from those previously tested. have nuclear components that could be deployed on ɨF/VDMFBS1PTUVSF3FWJFXTUBUFEUIBUUIF both submarine-launched and land-based missiles, United States will give strong preference to the refur- whereas the interoperable air-delivered weapon would bishment and reuse options, and that any replacement have nuclear components that could be deployed on of nuclear components with newly designed ones re- cruise missiles and as bombs. !e non-nuclear compo- quires speci"c authorization from the president and nents would vary by delivery system [NNSA 2013a].) Congress. !e review also stated that the United States If the United States proceeds with the 3+2 plan “will not develop new nuclear warheads,” and that life and replaces existing warhead types with signi"cantly extension programs “will not support new military mis- modi"ed ones, this would $y in the face of its stated sions or provide for new military capabilities” (DOD intention to not develop new nuclear warheads, and CQYJW *ODPOUSBTU UIF//4"T':4UPDL- have negative international political repercussions. 10 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S
Four B61 nuclear gravity bombs on a bomb cart at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.
F INDING 8FBQPOT$PVODJMDBMMFEGPSBDIJFWJOHBDBQBDJUZPG QJUTQFSZFBSCZ BOEiVQUPQJUTQFSZFBS t $SFBUJOH OFX XFBQPO UZQFTFWFO JG UIFZ as early as 2030” (NNSA 2013a p. 1-2). However, only use weapon components of previously BDDPSEJOHUPDPOHSFTTJPOBMTUBê UIFHPBMPGQJUTQFS tested designs—would be viewed by many as year is not based on a speci"c requirement. violating the administration’s pledge not to *O SFDFOU UFTUJNPOZ CFGPSF $POHSFTT 1FOUBHPO develop or deploy new nuclear weapons, and o%cials said that the NNSA needed the capacity to could generate concerns about weapon reli- QSPEVDFQJUTBOOVBMMZCZUPGVMëMMUIF8 ability. 8 MJGF FYUFOTJPO QSPHSBN ɨF PïDJBMT DJUFE BO FWFOUVBMHPBMPGUPQJUTBOOVBMMZ CVUTFUOP R E C O MMENDATION date or rationale. !e o%cials also testi"ed that “we are t ɨF//4"TIPVMEHJWFTUSPOHQSFGFSFODFUP now con"dent that we can reuse plutonium pits as we refurbishing or remanufacturing existing implement these life extension programs” (U.S. Senate weapon types. BQ Until early 2012, the NNSA planned to acquire the Does the United States Need a New Facility DBQBDJUZUPQSPEVDFUPQJUTBZFBSCZDPNQMFUJOH to Produce Plutonium Pits?5 the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement ɨF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSPEVDFTQJUTBUUIF1MVUPOJVN'BDJM 1SPKFDUBU-PT"MBNPTɨBUQSPKFDUXBTEFTJHOFEUP ity at Los Alamos. Annual capacity is 10 to 20 pits, replace the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facil- BDDPSEJOHUPUIF//4""DDPSEJOHUPUIF':4UPDL ity, where scientists analyze materials used in nuclear QJMF4UFXBSETIJQBOE.BOBHFNFOU1MBO UIF/VDMFBS weapons, particularly plutonium.
5 This section draws on Gronlund and Young 2012.
Photo: Department of Defense/Wikimedia Commons M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 11
!e project consisted of two phases. !e "rst is the UIBUUIF1MVUPOJVN'BDJMJUZDPVMEBDIJFWFBQSPEVD DPNQMFUFE 3BEJPMPHJDBM -BCPSBUPSZ6UJMJUZ0GGJDF tion capacity of 50 pits per year by 2020, also before #VJMEJOHɨFTFDPOEXBTUIFQMBOOFE$IFNJTUSZBOE completion of the Nuclear Facility (Kniss and Korn- Metallurgy Research Replacement–Nuclear Facility, to SFJDI CFMPDBUFEOFYUUPUIFFYJTUJOH1MVUPOJVN'BDJMJUZɨPTF In April 2013, administration o%cials testi"ed two facilities would be connected by an underground before Congress about a possible alternative to the tunnel and would share a vault that could hold up to Nuclear Facility. Under a “modular” approach, the TJYNFUSJDUPOTPGQMVUPOJVNɨF1MVUPOJVN'BDJMJUZ NNSA would build several smaller, single-purpose would continue to produce all pits, but would move facilities—an approach that could be less costly, ac- some other activities to the Nuclear Facility, and move cording to Los Alamos Director Charles McMillan some materials to the shared vault, allowing pit pro- (U.S. Senate 2013b). As of mid-April, the DOD and EVDUJPOUPFYQBOEUPUPQFSZFBSɨF//4" UIF//4"XFSFQVSTVJOHBEBZiCVTJOFTTDBTFBOBM- estimated in 2010 that the Nuclear Facility would cost ysis,” but no information about the capabilities, costs, CJMMJPOUPCJMMJPOBTJYUPOJOFGPMEJODSFBTF or construction schedules of this strategy is publicly PWFSUIFNJMMJPOFTUJNBUFHJWFOUP$POHSFTTJO available (U.S. Senate 2013a). ': !e administration planned to simultaneously build Because both pit lifetime and the future BOPUIFSNVMUJCJMMJPOEPMMBSQSPKFDU UIF6SBOJVN1SP- DFTTJOH'BDJMJUZ 61' BUUIF:DPNQMFY CVUUIF size of the arsenal are uncertain, it makes "scal environment forced the administration to develop a new approach. After consulting with the weapons no sense to expand production capacity labs, the NNSA, and the DOD, the administration EFDJEFEUPQSPDFFEXJUIUIF6SBOJVN1SPDFTTJOH'BDJM- until it is needed. ity and delay the construction of the Nuclear Facility CZBUMFBTUëWFZFBST TBWJOHCJMMJPOPWFSUIFOFYU !e alternative strategy could allow outright cancel- "ve years. lation of the Nuclear Facility, although some members !e administration noted that the “NNSA has of Congress still want to build it. !e FY 2013 defense determined, in consultation with the national labora- authorization requires the facility to become fully op- tories, that the existing infrastructure in the nuclear FSBUJPOBMCZ CVUBMTPTFUTBCJMMJPOTQFOEJOH complex has the inherent capacity to provide adequate cap, and requires the DOE to provide a “detailed jus- support for these missions. Studies are ongoing to ti"cation” for projected costs above the cap (U.S. House determine long-term requirements. NNSA will modify QQo existing facilities, and relocate some nuclear materials” !e administration has o#ered no clear rationale for %0&CQ the number of pits it needs to produce annually over Administration o%cials say they can increase pro- UIFMPOHUFSN8IFUIFSOFXQJUTBSFOFFEFEGPSXBS- EVDUJPODBQBDJUZBUUIF1MVUPOJVN'BDJMJUZUPQJUT head life extension programs depends on two factors: annually without the Nuclear Facility (U.S. Senate the lifetime of plutonium pits, and whether existing 2013a). However, other documents suggest that the pits are replaced with newly built pits from a di#erent NNSA could raise the rate to 50 pits annually without warhead or with newly designed pits. the new facility. 'PSFYBNQMF XIFOUIF#VTIBENJOJTUSBUJPOQMBOOFE The Lifetime of Plutonium Pits to build signi"cant numbers of Reliable Replacement 1MVUPOJVNXBTëSTUQSPEVDFEJOTJHOJëDBOURVBOUJUJFT 8BSIFBET 338 XIJDIXPVMEIBWFSFRVJSFEOFXQJUT JOUIFT BOEJOGPSNBUJPOPOIPXJUTQSPQFSUJFT UIF':CVEHFUSFRVFTUOPUFEUIBU-PT"MBNPT DIBOHFXJUIBHFJTMJNJUFE1MVUPOJVNJTSBEJPBDUJWF would “work to increase the pit manufacturing capac- QMVUPOJVN UIFNBJOJTPUPQFJOOVDMFBSXFBQPOT JUZUPUPOFU338QJUTCZUIFFOEPG':w IBTBIBMGMJGFPG ZFBST XIJMFUIBUPGQMVUPOJVN well before construction of the Nuclear Facility (DOE JT ZFBST 1MVUPOJVN FNJUTBMQIB QBSUJDMFT C Q "OE B -PT "MBNPT EPDVNFOU TBZT which can cause microscopic damage to the crystalline
6 The NNSA removes weapons from deployment for surveillance and testing. For some types of warheads, testing involves destroying one pit per year and replacing the destroyed warhead with one from the reserve stockpile. Aside from the W88, many reserve warheads are available for such replacements. The NNSA recently completed a production run of W88 pits, including those it needs for destructive testing. Surveillance therefore does not require production of more pits. 12 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S
structure of the plutonium metal. !e accumulation In December 2012, Lawrence Livermore National of such damage could in principle cause a change in Laboratory in California announced that its research the material’s properties, and in how it behaves in a shows that plutonium has a lifetime of at least 150 nuclear weapon. years (Heller 2012). Los Alamos responded that “it’s #FGPSF UIF%0&FTUJNBUFEUIBUQMVUPOJVN important to note that this study of plutonium aging QJUTXPVMEIBWFBMJGFUJNFPGUPZFBSTɨFQJUT is only one area of many that could determine pit in today’s nuclear arsenal were produced almost entirely lifetimes. Extending the observations from plutonium GSPNUPNFBOJOHUIBUUIFZNJHIUOFFE aging as representative of pit lifetimes neglects to to be replaced as early as 2025. Concerns about how take into consideration all of the other factors and could long the pits would remain reliable was one of the pri- be easily misunderstood” (Clark 2012). !us, while mary reasons that the NNSA initially sought to expand plutonium remains stable for at least 150 years, fur- its ability to produce new ones, and a key justi"cation ther research is needed to make sure the same holds GPSUIFQSPQPTFE3FMJBCMF3FQMBDFNFOU8BSIFBE true for pits. !e NNSA is quickly accruing knowledge about the If pits last 150 years or more, there is no need to aging of plutonium and the lifetime of plutonium pits. replace aging pits for the foreseeable future, and no Scientists at the weapons laboratories have been con- rationale for expanding production capacity beyond ducting accelerated aging experiments that each year the existing 10 to 20 annually for this purpose. Even QSPWJEFEBUBPOZFBSTPGOBUVSBMBHJOHɨFTFFYQFSJ- if the NNSA "nds that pits will last only 100 years ments have found that the plutonium crystal structure BOEUIBUBMMOFFEUPCFSFQMBDFECZ QSPEVDUJPO repairs the damage caused by the alpha particles capacity of 50 per year would be adequate. through a process of “self-annealing.” ɨF//4"DPVMESFQMBDFBMMFYJTUJOHQJUTCZ *O UIF+"40/HSPVQBTTFTTFEUIFTFEBUBBOE JGJUTUBSUFEEPJOHTPJO CBTFEPOUIFBHFODZT according to the NNSA, found that “most primary conservative assumption that the U.S. stockpile will types have credible minimum lifetimes in excess of 100 remain at 3,500 warheads. However, the United States years as regards aging of plutonium; those with assessed is likely to reduce its arsenal in coming decades. In that minimum lifetimes of 100 years or less have clear miti- case, the NNSA could either wait longer to begin pro- HBUJPOQBUITUIBUBSFQSPQPTFEBOEPSCFJOHJNQMF- ducing replacement pits (Table 2) or reduce the annual NFOUFEw //4" *OPUIFSXPSET FYJTUJOHQJUT rate of production (Table 3). OFFEUPCFSFQMBDFEOPFBSMJFSUIBOɨBUTBNF !us, even under the most conservative assumptions year, the NNSA said it planned “to continue plutonium about pit lifetime and arsenal size, there is no need to aging assessments through vigilant surveillance and expand pit production capacity beyond 50 per year to scienti"c evaluation, and the weapons laboratories will SFQMBDFBHJOHQJUT#FDBVTFCPUIQJUMJGFUJNFBOEUIF annually re-assess plutonium in nuclear weapons, in- future size of the arsenal are uncertain, it makes no sense DPSQPSBUJOHOFXEBUBBOEPCTFSWBUJPOTw //4" to expand production capacity until it is needed.
Table 2. Replacing All Plutonium Pits Table 3. Required Annual Pit Production by 2089, Assuming 50 Pits per Year and Capacity, Assuming a Pit Lifetime of a Pit Lifetime of 100 Years 100 Years
Total U.S. nuclear Year that Total U.S. nuclear Required average warheads in 2089, replacement warheads in 2089, annual pit deployed and production deployed and production, reserve should begin reserve starting in 2019 100 2087 100 2 500 2079 500 8 1,000 2069 1,000 15 2,000 2049 2,000 29 3,000 2029 3,000 44 3,500 2019 3,500 50 M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 13
Table 4. Number of U.S. Warheads under Various Scenarios
After Life Extension After Life Extension Programs, with 1,000 Programs, under New deployed strategic Current Under New START START weapons Deployed Reserve Deployed Reserve Deployed Reserve Deployed Reserve W78 210 400 150 150–460 W88 384 0 384 0 W87 250 300 250 250–300 IW-1 & IW-2 784 400–760 ~500 ~300–500 Total IW-1 ~1,200–1,550 ~800–1,000 & IW-2 ALCM 200 328 200 200–328 200 200–328 ~130 ~130–200 Total ALCM ~400–500 ~250–350
(ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; IW = interoperable warhead) Source: Hans Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, private communication.
New Pits for Life Extension Programs SBOHFGSPNUPXFBQPOT4JODFPOFSBUJPOBMF As noted, life extension programs for nuclear warheads for the 3+2 plan is to allow reductions in the hedge, could entail reusing existing pits, or producing new the lower number is likely. pits based on an existing design or a new one. !e ɨF6OJUFE4UBUFTOPXIBTSPVHIMZ8XBS- //4"TMJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNTGPSUIF8BOEUIF IFBET PGXIJDIBSFEFQMPZFE BOEUIJTOVNCFSJT #FOUBJMSFGVSCJTIJOHFYJTUJOHQJUTSBUIFS likely to remain the same under New START. It de- than building new ones. (!e NNSA did not win QMPZT8XBSIFBETBOENBJOUBJOTBOPUIFS BQQSPWBM GPS NPEJGZJOH UIF #T OVDMFBS FYQMPTJWF in reserve. It will likely continue to deploy 250 under package signi"cantly, but would have used the existing New START, but could choose to reduce its reserve pits even if it had won approval.) GPSDFTUP 5BCMF 1SPEVDUJPOPGUIFXBSIFBEGPSBOBJSMBVODIFEDSVJTF !us, the NNSA might replace some 1,200 to 1,550 NJTTJMFBOEUIFëSTUUXPJOUFSPQFSBCMFXBSIFBET *8 8 8 BOE8XBSIFBETXJUIUIF*8BOE BOE*8 JTTMBUFEUPUBLFQMBDFPWFSUIFOFYUZFBST *8XBSIFBETBTTVNJOHOPGVSUIFSSFEVDUJPOTJO !ese programs could create a need for newly produced 64 OVDMFBS XFBQPOT CFZPOE /FX 45"35 #BTFE QJUTɨFëSTUJOUFSPQFSBCMFXBSIFBE *8 XJMMCFUIF POB%0%BOBMZTJT 1SFTJEFOU0CBNBSFDFOUMZEFUFS- 8MJGFFYUFOEFEXBSIFBE8IJMFUIF/VDMFBS mined that the United States needs no more than 1,000 8FBQPOT$PVODJMIBTOPUNBEFBEFUFSNJOBUJPOBCPVU to 1,100 deployed strategic weapons, rather than the UIF*8PS*8 UIFKPJOU%0%//4"&OUFSQSJTF 1,550 allowed under New START. !is suggests that 1MBOOJOH8PSLJOH (SPVQ BTTVNFT UIFZ XJMM CF UIF UIFUPUBMOVNCFSPG*8BOE*8XBSIFBETXJMMJO- 8BOE8MJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNT SFTQFD- TUFBECFUP tively (NNSA 2013a). In addition, the United States deploys 200 air- How many interoperable warheads would the United MBVODIFEDSVJTFNJTTJMFTBOENBJOUBJOTBOPUIFSJO 4UBUFTOFFEUPSFQMBDFUIF8 8 BOE8XBS- reserve. It will likely retain the 200 deployed weapons IFBET *UOPXEFQMPZT8XBSIFBETBOENBJO- under New START, but could cut the reserve force to UBJOTBOPUIFSJOSFTFSWF6OEFSUIF/FX GPSBUPUBMPGUPXFBQPOT*GUIF6OJUFE START agreement with Russia, the number of deployed States makes further modest reductions to 1,000 de- 8XBSIFBETXJMMMJLFMZGBMMUPCZ BMMPX- ployed strategic weapons, the total number of cruise JOHUIFSFTFSWFUPFYQBOEUP ,SJTUFOTFOBOE/PS- missile warheads might instead be 250 to 350. ris 2011). However, the United States could cut the !us, assuming further modest reductions in the SFTFSWFGPSDFPG8XBSIFBETBMPOHXJUIUIFEFQMPZFE U.S. nuclear arsenal during the next 25 years, the ones—to perhaps 150. !us, the reserve force could //4"NJHIUQSPEVDFTPNF UP *8 *8 14 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S
and air-launched cruise missile warheads. If all pits were if such a need emerged. Doing so would presumably newly produced, the NNSA would need an average take much less time than building new pits. BOOVBMQSPEVDUJPOSBUFPGSPVHIMZUPQJUT "TUIF/VDMFBS1PTUVSF3FWJFXOPUFT UIFiGVO- However, the NNSA is unlikely to require all new damental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will pits, so a lower production rate will su%ce. According continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter UPUIF':4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQBOE.BOBHF- nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and part- NFOU1MBO UIF//4"SFDFOUMZDPNQMFUFEBTDPQJOH ners” (DOD 2010b p. 15). An arsenal far smaller than study on interoperable warheads and “options focused the 1,550 nuclear weapons the United States will de- POEFWFMPQJOH UXPVOJRVF/&1T !e "rst phase of the Chemistry and Metallurgy 3FTFBSDI3FQMBDFNFOU1SPKFDU UIFBMSFBEZDPNQMFUFE Radiological Laboratory, is able to perform much of this work. Initially the lab was quali"ed to handle only TNBMMBNPVOUTPGQMVUPOJVN MJNJUFEUPHSBNTBU BUJNF //4"B #BTFEPOBSFFYBNJOBUJPOPG the current international safety standards, NNSA o%- DJBMTEFUFSNJOFEUIBUUIFMBCDPVMEIBOEMFUP grams of plutonium at a time (U.S. Senate 2012a). !e 1MVUPOJVN'BDJMJUZBTJUJTOPXDPOëHVSFEDBOBMTP handle some work on kilogram quantities of plutoni- um, and could potentially be modi"ed to expand its capacity for this work. If necessary, work involving kilogram quantities of plutonium could also take place at the Device Assem- bly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site, which Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building at Los Alamos is quali"ed to work on such quantities of "ssile mate- National Laboratory, 2013. rials and has plenty of available space. However, this option would bring plutonium to a site where there is #BTFEPO//4"QMBOOJOH BMMUISFFXBSIFBET none on a regular basis now. (Subcritical nuclear tests are unlikely to use newly built pits. In that using plutonium occur at the Nevada Site, but no more case, if the United States makes modest reduc- than once or twice a year.) tions in its nuclear arsenal over this time peri- !e NNSA is also considering using the Superblock od—to between 1,000 and 1,100 deployed facility at Lawrence Livermore for materials character- strategic weapons and a comparable reserve ization and analytical chemistry on plutonium samples. force—an annual production capacity of few- !e agency recently removed all signi"cant quantities er than 50 pits would be enough, and could of plutonium from Livermore in an e#ort to consoli- be attained without building a new Nuclear date weapons-usable "ssile material at fewer locations, Facility. so reintroducing plutonium there would undermine that e#ort. R E C O MMENDATION t ɨFBENJOJTUSBUJPOTIPVMEDBODFMQMBOTGPSUIF F INDINGS Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replace- t 1SPEVDUJPODBQBDJUZDPVMEFYQBOEUPQJUT ment–Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos National annually even without the new Chemistry Laboratory, and develop an alternative plan and Metallurgy Research Replacement–Nuclear for work with plutonium that minimizes the Facility, according to NNSA documents. number of sites that store and handle it. t 1MVUPOJVN QJUT MBTU BU MFBTU ZFBST BOE potentially much longer. Even under the con- Is the Uranium Processing Facility servative assumption that no further cuts in Appropriately Sized? the U.S. arsenal will occur, expanding pro- As noted, a canned subsassembly is a hermetically sealed duction capacity beyond 50 pits per year to container with a stainless steel shell that houses a war- replace aging pits is unnecessary. As both pit IFBETJOUFSTUBHFBOETFDPOEBSZ8BSIFBEMJGFFYUFOTJPO lifetimes and the future size of the arsenal are programs may entail replacing or refurbishing either uncertain, expanding production capacity or both components. beyond 10 to 20 pits per year makes no sense until there is a clear need. The Interstage t -PPLJOH BIFBE ZFBST UIF POMZ QMBVTJCMF 8IFUIFS UIF JOUFSTUBHF XBT SFQMBDFE PS SFGVSCJTIFE need to increase production capacity above EVSJOHMJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNTGPSUIF8XBSIFBEBOE the existing 10 to 20 pits per year is to sup- UIF#BOE#TUSBUFHJDCPNCTJTOPUQVCMJDMZ QPSUQSPEVDUJPOQSPHSBNTGPSUIF*8 *8 LOPXO"QPSUJPOPGUIFJOUFSTUBHFPGUIF8 DPO- and air-launched cruise missile warheads— taining a material with the codename Fogbank, is be- and then only if they use newly built pits. ing replaced during its life extension program with Photo: NNSA News 16 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S OFXMZNBOVGBDUVSFE'PHCBOLNBUFSJBMɨF8BOE GPSUIPTFXFBQPOT"OEUIFTFDPOEBSZGPSUIF8 8XBSIFBETBMTPSFQPSUFEMZDPOUBJO'PHCBOL XIJDI XBTOPUTFBMFEJOBDBO #POOFS -PUU BOE8PP will presumably be replaced during their life extension In any event, if a uranium hydride coating has formed, programs. UIF4UPDLQJMF4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBNXPVMEEFUFDUUIBU 'PHCBOLXBTJOJUJBMMZQSPEVDFEJO#VJMEJOH anomaly, as Y-12 workers dismantle and examine sev- BUUIF:/BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ$PNQMFY1SPEVDUJPO eral CSAs from deployed weapons each year. If they FOEFEJO BOEUIFCVJMEJOHXBTMBUFSEFDPNNJT- have detected such an anomaly, the labs must have TJPOFE5P NBOVGBDUVSF 'PHCBOL GPS UIF8 MJGF concluded that it does not degrade performance, be- FYUFOTJPOQSPHSBN UIF//4"CVJMUUIF1VSJëDBUJPO cause they have certi"ed U.S. nuclear weapons as reli- 'BDJMJUZBU: XIJDICFHBOPQFSBUJOHJOɨF BCMFFBDIZFBS1SFWFOUJOHGVSUIFSTVSGBDFIZESJEJOH NNSA initially had di%culties manufacturing Fog- could help sustain the continued reliability of the CBOL CVUUIFTFIBWFCFFOSFTPMWFE -"/- secondaries, and that would not require dismantling them: each CSA has a tube that can be opened for The NNSA expects that it will “reaccept” additional baking. However, a weapon undergoing a life extension at least some CSAs as part of their life program is expected to remain reliable for another 20 to 30 years. Even if no evidence suggests that uranium extension programs. hydriding will be a problem, proving that this will remain the case for another several decades may not be The Secondary possible. In other words, remanufacturing may not be !e secondary includes uranium, lithium hydride, and required now but may be a precautionary step to help lithium deuteride. Although uranium is radioactive sustain reliability for another two to three decades. and emits alpha particles, its main isotopes have very According to a Y-12 spokesperson, the life extension MPOHIBMGMJWFTUIPTFPG6BOE6BSFCJM- QSPHSBNTGPSUIF8 # BOE#JODMVEFE MJPOBOENJMMJPOZFBST SFTQFDUJWFMZ GPSFYBNQMF remanufacturing the uranium components (Munger so aging from radioactive damage is not a concern. 8IFUIFSUIBUXBTSFRVJSFE QSFDBVUJPOBSZ PS However, other aging mechanisms may be at play. !e unnecessary is not publicly known. Remanufacturing lithium compounds readily absorb moisture, and react CSAs might be unnecessary, but the NNSA may sim- with the water in humid air. !at reaction produces ply want to retain the capability to do so. free hydrogen, which in turn reacts with the uranium !e NNSA expects that it will “reaccept” at least and produces a surface coating of uranium hydride. some CSAs as part of their life extension programs, by To prevent these reactions, the secondary is baked assessing their components and reusing those that are in a vacuum to eliminate any moisture before the CSA in good shape. !at would not only obviate the need is sealed. If this process is inadequate, a uranium hydride for CSA production but would enhance security, coating forms on the uranium metal from remaining because the NNSA would not have to ship CSAs from NPJTUVSF #FDBVTF EFTJHOFST EJE OPU FYQFDU OVDMFBS 1BOUFYUP:GPSEJTNBOUMJOHBOESFGVSCJTIJOH1BO- weapons to remain in the stockpile for more than three UFYQMBOTUPSFBDDFQU$4"TGPSUIF# 8 BOE decades, they may not have speci"ed strict standards 8MJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNT #81BOUFY for moisture levels. Or Y-12 employees may not have paid careful attention to removing all the moisture The Uranium Capabilities Replacement Project from the CSAs before sealing them. And some second- !e United States produces all the secondaries and ary components outgas water molecules, so uranium $4"TGPSJUTOVDMFBSXFBQPOTJO#VJMEJOHBU: hydriding could occur even if moisture was initially ɨJT CVJMEJOH PSJHJOBMMZ EBUFT GSPN BOE UIF eliminated. %FGFOTF/VDMFBS'BDJMJUJFT4BGFUZ#PBSEIBTFYQSFTTFE !e extent to which uranium hydriding might a#ect concern about continuing its operations for another the performance of the secondary is not publicly decade. Uranium operations also occur in several other known. !e United States did not use CSAs in its "rst- aging buildings at Y-12. Annual production capacity and second-generation thermonuclear weapons, which at Y-12 is now 125 secondaries, assuming a single shift implies that uranium surface corrosion was acceptable and a "ve-day work week. 7 Production capacity of 125 secondaries refers to the “more difficult systems that have been produced in the past or could be produced in the future.” For “less difficult” secondaries, the capacity is about 160 secondaries (NNSA 2011b p. 1-12). M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 17 As part of its Uranium Capabilities Replacement 1SPKFDU UIF//4"QMBOTUPCVJMEBOFX61'BU: 1IBTF*PGUIFQSPKFDUXJMMDPOTPMJEBUFBDUJWJUJFTUIBU OPXPDDVSJOEJêFSFOUQBSUTPG#VJMEJOH JODMVE- ing uranium casting and uranium chemical processing. 1IBTF**XJMMJODPSQPSBUFUIFBDUJWJUJFTPG#VJMEJOHT BOE JODMVEJOH VSBOJVN NFUBMXPSLJOH NBDIJOJOH BOEJOTQFDUJPO1IBTF***XJMMBEEUIFDB- QBCJMJUJFTPG#VJMEJOH& JODMVEJOHSBEJPHSBQIZ assembly, disassembly, quality evaluation, and produc- tion certi"cation for secondaries. !at consolidation means that the high-security area will shrink from about 150 acres to 15 acres, reducing TFDVSJUZDPTUT"DDPSEJOHUPUIF//4" i8JUIUIFVTF of advanced security surveillance systems and a smaller security area, the EU [enriched uranium] protective GPSDFXJMMCFSFEVDFECZoQFSDFOUw //4"C Q 8IFOQMBOOJOHGPSUIF6SBOJVN1SPDFTTJOH'BDJM- JUZCFHBOJO UIFFTUJNBUFEDPTUPGDPOTUSVDUJPO XBTNJMMJPOUPCJMMJPO*O XIFOGPSNBM EFTJHOXPSLCFHBO UIFFTUJNBUFSPTFUPNJMMJPO The Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, converts uranium-235 UPCJMMJPO*O BGUFSIBWJOHDPNQMFUFE powder to metal discs or “buttons,” which are then manufactured percent of the facility, the NNSA reported a new esti- into weapons components. NBUFPGCJMMJPOUPCJMMJPO"OEBTUVEZ by the Army Corps of Engineers projected a cost of buildings would be the same size, because building even CJMMJPOUPCJMMJPO .VOHFS one secondary requires a minimum amount of equip- In October 2012, the NNSA announced that the NFOUBOEìPPSTQBDF"DDPSEJOHUPUIF(PWFSONFOU building will need signi"cant redesign to accommodate Accountability O%ce, “An independent study found all the needed production equipment. !e roof will be UIBUNPTUPGUIF61'TQMBOOFETQBDFBOEFRVJQNFOU raised about 13 feet, the concrete foundation slab will is dedicated to establishing basic uranium processing be one foot thicker, and the walls will be 30 inches capabilities that are not likely to change, while only a UIJDLSBUIFSUIBOJODIFT %/'4#B 1MBOT minimal amount—about 10 percent—is for meeting now call for the building to begin operating in 2021, DVSSFOU TUPDLQJMF TJ[F SFRVJSFNFOUTw ("0 D but the redesign will further delay the project and in- !us, once the equipment is in place, it is apparently crease its cost. And revised cost estimates likely re$ect BEFRVBUFUPCVJMEVQUPTFDPOEBSJFTBZFBS BTTVN- POMZ1IBTF* JOHPOFTIJGUGPSëWFEBZTBXFFL1SPEVDUJPODPVME presumably be doubled or tripled by adding shifts. Options for the Uranium Processing Facility In developing the second option, the NNSA assumed ɨF//4"SFRVJSFEUIBUUIF61'CFDBQBCMFPGQSP- a stockpile of about 1,000 deployed strategic nuclear ducing CSA components for two di#erent weapons warheads. If each secondary has a nominal lifetime of systems—and two life extension programs—simulta- UPZFBST BOBOOVBMQSPEVDUJPODBQBDJUZPG neously (DOE 2011b). !e NNSA considered three XPVMEBMMPX//4"UPQSPEVDF UP TFDPOE- PQUJPOT GPS UIF GBDJMJUZ UIF 61' "MUFSOBUJWF B aries during that time period—enough to support a TRVBSFGPPUCVJMEJOHXJUIBOBOOVBMDBQBDJUZ deployed strategic arsenal of 1,000 weapons and a com- PGTFDPOEBSJFT UIF$BQBCJMJUZ4J[FE61'"M- parable reserve force. ternative, a 350,000-square-foot building with a capac- According to the NNSA, the third option “would JUZPGTFDPOEBSJFT BOE UIF/P/FU1SPEVDUJPO QSPWJEFUIFNJOJNVNBTTFNCMZEJTBTTFNCMZDBQBDJUZ $BQBCJMJUZ4J[FE61'"MUFSOBUJWF B TRVBSF which NNSA thinks would meet national security foot building with a capacity of 10 secondaries. !e requirements” (NNSA 2011b p. 3-31). It would per- NNSA is proceeding with the second option. mit surveillance and dismantlement operations, and Although the third option would entail produc- “would be available to produce any required refurbished ing many fewer secondaries than the second one, the PSSFVTFETFDPOEBSJFTw //4"CQ #VU Photo: DOE 18 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S this alternative “would not support adding replacement Other Roles for the UPF or increased numbers of secondaries and cases to the 0ODFBMMQIBTFTPGUIF61'BSFDPNQMFUF UIFCVJMEJOH TUPDLQJMFw //4"CQ will also be used to dismantle excess CSAs and remove !at this alternative would meet national security the highly enriched uranium. Some of the HEU will requirements while producing only 10 new secon- be used to make fuel for the nuclear reactors that power daries a year suggests that remanufacture during life all U.S. submarines and aircraft carriers. !e NNSA extension programs will be unnecessary for the next has agreed to provide the Navy with HEU through ZFBSTUIFMJGFUJNFPGUIFQMBOOFE61'3PVHIMZ 2050, which commercial entities use to make the fuel. secondaries would be needed to replace those that are ɨF6OJUFE4UBUFTIBTEFDMBSFEUPOTPG)&6 disassembled each year as part of the NNSA’s surveil- excess to its defense needs, and will convert much of it lance activities that assess the continued reliability of to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for civil use. About the weapons in the arsenal. And even this modest level 10 percent of excess HEU is down-blended to LEU at of production would be unnecessary if stockpiles of Y-12 for use as fuel in research reactors, or to produce excess CSAs, or those from further cuts in the nuclear medical isotopes. Y-12 is the primary provider of LEU arsenal, could replace those destroyed for surveillance. for such reactors worldwide. Remaining excess HEU ɨF#MJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNXJMMOPUVTFOFXMZ is shipped to the Savannah River Site in South Caro- CVJMU $4"T CVU CVJMEJOH UIF DBQBCJMJUZTJ[FE 61' lina or a commercial facility in Lynchburg, Virginia, would maintain this option for future life extension to be down-blended for use as fuel in nuclear power programs. reactors. As noted, the NNSA is interested in building an in- UFSPQFSBCMFXBSIFBEUPSFQMBDF8TBOE8TɨF F INDINGS MJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNGPSUIF*8XBSIFBEJTOPXJO t ɨF//4"OFFETUPSFQMBDFUIFBHJOHVSBOJ- the development phase in which the NNSA will decide um facilities at Y-12. which options are feasible and which ones it wants to t "OBOOVBMQSPEVDUJPODBQBDJUZPGOVDMFBS pursue. !e NNSA is slated to complete that phase in secondaries would meet national security re- ': XIFOJUXJMMIBWFEFDJEFEXIFUIFSUPVTFB quirements, according to the NNSA. refurbished CSA, reuse an existing CSA from a dif- t 1MBOOFEQSPEVDUJPODBQBDJUZPG$4"TQFS ferent warhead, or use a newly built CSA of either an year would only be needed if the NNSA does FYJTUJOHPSNPEJëFEEFTJHOɨF/VDMFBS8FBQPOT$PVO- not use existing secondaries for life extension cil will then weigh in, endorsing some, all, or none of programs for nuclear warheads. the modi"cations the NNSA proposes. And Congress could accept or reject the changes endorsed by the R E C O MMENDATION /VDMFBS8FBQPOT$PVODJM"ëOBMEFDJTJPOPOUIFOFFE GPSOFX$4"TGPSUIF*8JTUIFSFGPSFTFWFSBMZFBST t ɨF6OJUFE4UBUFTTIPVMECVJMEUIF6SBOJVN away. !e same is true for the cruise missile warhead. 1SPDFTTJOH 'BDJMJUZ )PXFWFS UIF BENJOJT tration should delay construction until the Hedging against an Uncertain Future //4" UIF /VDMFBS8FBQPOT $PVODJM BOE As with plutonium pits, one rationale for an annual Congress determine and publicly explain how QSPEVDUJPODBQBDJUZPG$4"TJTUPQSPWJEFTVSHF much secondary-production capacity the nation capacity in the event of a “geopolitical surprise.” As needs to support the stockpile. noted above, such a surprise is not feasible, reserve weapons would allow a rapid increase in the deployed Is the High Explosive Pressing Facility nuclear arsenal if needed, and the U.S. deterrent would Appropriately Sized? remain robust even at far lower levels of deployed and Chemical high explosive is a crucial component of nu- reserve weapons. Acquiring a surge capacity is there- clear weapons. It is part of the primary and is also used GPSF OPU B SFBTPO UP CVJME B 61' XJUI BO BOOVBM in other small components of the weapons, such as QSPEVDUJPODBQBDJUZPG$4"T detonators and actuators. !e high explosive in the 8 Detonators ignite the high explosive surrounding the pit. The Detonator Fabrication Facility at Los Alamos produces detonators for the nuclear explosive package for the stockpile (NNSA 2010b). Actuators are part of the gas transfer valve in a nuclear weapon, which is part of the gas transfer system used to inject tritium into the imploding primary. These valves consist of a body, piston, and the actuator, which uses small amounts of high explosive that burns rapidly to create hot combustion gases to move the piston, releasing the tritium gas (Sandoval 2008). M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 19 primary of a nuclear weapon, called the main charge, is composed of two hemispheres that surround the plu- UPOJVNQJU -VOECFSH 8IFOBXFBQPOJTEFUP- nated, the initiation system ignites a booster charge of high explosive, which then sets o# the main charge )FMMFS 8IFOUIFNBJODIBSHFJTEFUPOBUFE JU implodes the pit, compressing the plutonium to create a supercritical mass that leads to explosion of the primary. ɨF6OJUFE4UBUFTQSPEVDFTJUTNBJODIBSHFTBU1BO- tex, which has a production capacity of 1,000 pounds of specialty high explosive and 300 hemispheres per year—enough for 150 weapons (NNSA 2010b). In August 2011, the NNSA broke ground on a new A newly installed lathe at the Pantex )JHI&YQMPTJWF1SFTTJOH'BDJMJUZ )&1' BU1BOUFYUP Plant in Texas, used to machine high produce hemispheres. !e facility is expected to cost explosive parts for use in weapon life extension programs, 2012. NJMMJPOBOEFOUFSTFSWJDFJO CFDPNJOHGVMMZ PQFSBUJPOBMCZ 64)PVTFPG3FQSFTFOUBUJWFT ɨF )&1' XJMM JODSFBTF 1BOUFY QSPEVDUJPO capacity to 2,500 pounds of high explosive per year. 1BOUFYBMTPQMBOTUPBEEBTFDPOEQSFTT FYQBOEJOHJUT will improve safety by reducing the need to move high hemisphere production capacity to 500 per year— explosive materials around the site. !ese activities will enough for 250 weapons. BMTPNPWFPVUTJEFUIFIJHITFDVSJUZ 1SPUFDUFE "SFB ɨFPSJHJOBMQMBOGPSUIF)&1'DBMMFEGPSB improving e%ciency because moving high explosive production capacity of 1,000 hemispheres per year. can require restricting other operations (CH2M HILL "DDPSEJOHUPJUT':1FSGPSNBODF3FQPSU 1BOUFY n.d.; NNSA 2012c). met its target of “developing proof-of-concept tooling *TUIFOFX)&1'BQQSPQSJBUFMZTJ[FE HJWFOQMBOT and procedures for pressing multiple main charge high for the U.S. nuclear arsenal and life extension programs? FYQMPTJWFTTJNVMUBOFPVT 9 Besides high explosive used in the main charge, Pantex also produces other small high explosive components for weapons. Los Alamos can also fabricate and process high explosive. The 1996 environmental impact statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management, which considered how to best configure the nuclear weapons complex for its new mission of maintaining the stockpile without nuclear testing, proposed Los Alamos as one location for the high explosive mission, asserting that no new facilities would be needed. The Los Alamos high explosive facilities were originally built to produce high explosive for nuclear weapons in the 1950s (DOE 1996c). Los Alamos has updated its capability to process high explosive and produce high explosive components for hydrodynamic and other tests, and has produced prototypes of complex high explosive components. The lab can produce high explosive main charges and other components using processes similar or identical to those used at Pantex (NNSA 2008). Photo: NNSA News 20 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S explosive in detonators and actuators occurs at Law- START II agreement, a “low case” of 1,000 deployed SFODF-JWFSNPSF -BSTPOBOE#JTIPQ XFBQPOT BOE B iIJHI DBTFw PG XFBQPOT " Testing measures the shape, density, and composi- START II–level stockpile would require the capacity tion of the charge to verify that they remain within to produce 150 sets of high explosive components each allowable limits, and checks that the high explosive year; the low case, 50 sets; and the high case, 300 sets. retains its structural integrity and mechanical strength. !is prediction assumed a stockpile lifetime of 30 Technicians also inspect high explosive removed UPZFBST CBTFEPOUIFLOPXOFêFDUTPGBHJOHPO from warheads for signs of chips, cracks, scratches, or IJHIFYQMPTJWF %0&D ɨF%0&BMTPBTTVNFE EJTDPMPSBUJPO -BSTPOBOE#JTIPQ 4DJFOUJTUTIBWF UIBUUIF4UPDLQJMF4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBNXPVMEEJTBT- observed a number of age-related changes, including semble and inspect 120 sets each year. Of these, 110 swelling, migration of the plasticizer, degradation of would be rebuilt, and the remaining 10 destroyed the binder and mechanical properties, and rupture of during testing would need replacement. !e low, base, BEIFTJWFCPOET 8BMUFS BOEIJHIDBTFTXPVMEUIFSFGPSFSFRVJSFBUPUBMPG BOETFUT SFTQFDUJWFMZ FBDIZFBS 5BCMF While work continues on how aging and !e DOE report found that the cost of the capacity to produce 310 sets per year did not di#er signi"cantly environmental conditions affect high GSPNUIBUPGVOEFSUIF45"35**CBTFDBTFɨF NNSA therefore decided to plan for a capacity of 310 explosive over the longer term, scientists UPBDRVJSFBDPOUJOHFODZDBQBCJMJUZ %0&E 6O- der New START, however, the United States will know it has a limited life span. reduce the number of deployed strategic weapons UP CZ(JWFO%0&FTUJNBUFTUIBUBOE 8IJMFXPSLDPOUJOVFTPOIPXBHJOHBOEFOWJSPO- 150 new sets of high explosive components would be mental conditions a#ect high explosive over the longer required for arsenals of 1,000 and 3,500 deployed term, scientists know it has a limited life span and will weapons, somewhat fewer than 100 new sets of com- need to be replaced at regular intervals, if weapons re- ponents would be needed per year for a stockpile of main in the stockpile longer than originally anticipated. 1,550 weapons under New START. !at means life extension programs will include replac- 8IBUTNPSF JO UIFZFBSUIFTUVEZXBTDPO- ing high explosive, and that the nuclear weapons com- EVDUFE UIF64BSTFOBMJODMVEFEUZQFTPGOVDMFBSXBS plex needs to maintain the capacity to produce it. heads (nine strategic and "ve non-strategic), while it now "%0&SFQPSUBOBMZ[FEQSPEVDUJPOOFFETGPS includes nine (eight strategic and one non-strategic), three sizes of arsenal: a base case of 3,500 deployed so the number of high explosive sets required to replace strategic nuclear weapons—the level allowed by the those destroyed during testing each year has likely Table 5. Sets of High Explosive Components Needed under Various Scenarios 1996 DOE 1996 DOE Base Case 1996 DOE Low Case (3,500 deployed High Case New START (1,000 deployed weapons under (6,000 deployed (1,550 deployed weapons) START II) weapons) weapons) New sets of high explosive produced 50 150 300 < 100 each year to maintain stockpile New sets produced each year to replace 10 10 10 <10 those destroyed during stockpile surveillance Total 60 160 310 <110 M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 21 dropped below 10. Annual production capacity required to maintain the New START arsenal will therefore be fewer than 110 sets of high explosive. Several types of warheads are scheduled to undergo MJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNTCFUXFFO XIFOUIF)JHI &YQMPTJWF1SFTTJOH'BDJMJUZJTTDIFEVMFEUPCFDPNFGVMMZ PQFSBUJPOBM BOE 'JHVSF Q ɨF8MJGF extension program will require some 1,200 warheads GSPN':UISPVHI': SFRVJSJOHSPVHIMZ 110 sets of high explosive each year. 4PNF#CPNCTBSFTMBUFEUPCFHJOQSP- EVDUJPOJO': BOEUIF//4"QMBOTUPSFQMBDF OP NPSF UIBO 8 BOE 8 MBOECBTFE XBSIFBET TFBCBTFE8 XBSIFBET BOE 8DSVJTFNJTTJMFXBSIFBETCZ': UIFTFBSFUIF numbers of weapons currently deployed and in reserve). 8IJMF UIPTF TDIFEVMFT XJMM MJLFMZ TMJQ UIBU NFBOT UIF//4"QMBOTUPQSPEVDF GFXFS UIBO MJGF extended weapons during that period—or fewer than 120 per year, on average. Workers at the Tritium Extraction Facility at the Savannah River *G1BOUFYOFFETUPQSPEVDFTFUTPGIJHIFYQMP- Site in South Carolina, 2005. sive for these life extension programs, and 10 sets to replace those destroyed during stockpile surveillance, it would need to produce a total of 130 a year. Yet the All warheads in the nation’s “active” stockpile )JHI&YQMPTJWF1SFTTJOH'BDJMJUZXJMMCFDBQBCMFPGNBL- DPOUBJOUSJUJVNɨJTTUPDLQJMFJODMVEFTTPNF JOHUPBZFBSGBSNPSFUIBOSFRVJSFE FWFO weapons, with roughly 2,000 deployed and 2,500 in assuming no further cuts in the arsenal. !at means reserve. there is no need to nearly double the amount of high !e amount of tritium needed for each type of war- explosive produced each year, or to build a second press. head depends partly on how often the tritium reservoirs are replaced—“usually” every “few years” according to F INDING the DOD (DOD n.d. a).10 DOD technicians perform these replacements in the field. Submarine-based t ɨFQMBOOFEDBQBDJUZGPSUIFOFX)JHI&YQMP warheads are less accessible than other types, and their TJWF1SFTTJOH'BDJMJUZJTHSFBUFSUIBOOFFEFE reservoirs may be replaced only every dozen years, when even assuming no further cuts in the U.S. nu- a submarine is overhauled. clear arsenal. Tritium requirements also depend on the desired R E C O MMENDATION performance margin for each weapon—the ratio of the primary yield at minimum tritium levels to the yield t ɨF//4"TIPVMEEFGFSCVJMEJOHBTFDPOEIJHI required to ignite the secondary. A higher performance explosive press until there is a demonstrated margin means greater reliability, up to a point. need for it. !e NNSA appears to be planning to increase the replacement interval and performance margin of at How Much Tritium Does the least some weapons during their life extension pro- United States Need? HSBNT"DDPSEJOHUPUIFBHFODZT':4UPDLQJMF A radioactive isotope of hydrogen that contains two 4UFXBSETIJQBOE.BOBHFNFOU1MBO GVUVSFHBTUSBOTGFS neutrons, tritium is rarely found in nature and must systems “will probably involve larger tritium loads than be produced arti"cially to provide an adequate supply. past weapons because they will be designed to last lon- Tritium also has a short half-life of about 12 years and ger” (NNSA 2013a p. 2-23), and tritium production decays at a rate of roughly 5.5 percent a year, so it must may need to increase by a factor of three to meet the be replaced regularly to maintain the required amount. new requirements. 10 Variable-yield weapons may include more than one reservoir, each containing the amount of gas needed for a desired yield. Photo: DOE 22 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S Moreover, some members of the administration to produce tritium, and building a new reactor or have suggested that the NNSA should move to a sys- purchasing a partially built one and dedicating it to tem of “15-year touches,” where all warheads are in- QSPEVDJOH USJUJVN *O UIF %0& EFDJEFE UIBU spected every 15 years, and all limited-life component producing tritium in commercial reactors would be replacements also occur on this schedule (UCS, AAAS, more economical. and Hudson 2011). In this case, the amount of tritium !e requirement for a "ve-year tritium reserve seems in reservoirs would need to be increased, to extend the to be an artifact of the earlier production method: "ve e#ective lifetimes of the warheads from “a few” to at years was the amount of time needed to restart a tri- least 15 years. Increasing the replacement interval by UJVNQSPEVDUJPOSFBDUPSBU4BWBOOBI3JWFS#VUOPX 12 years would require doubling the amount of tritium that commercial nuclear reactors are producing tritium, in each reservoir—and thus the amount produced each such a large reserve may no longer be needed. !e year. However, removing 1,000 weapons from the reserve requirements should be based on plausible active stockpile would provide some "ve years’ worth disruptions in current production methods. PGUSJUJVNGPSUIFSFNBJOJOH XFBQPOT To produce tritium, some rods used to control the "ssion reaction in a nuclear reactor are replaced with The requirement for a five-year USJUJVNQSPEVDJOHCVSOBCMFBCTPSCFSSPET 51#"3T In these, boron is replaced with an isotope of lithium tritium reserve seems to be an artifact that produces tritium during the neutron absorption QSPDFTT /3$ ɨF51#"3TBSFJOTFSUFEJOUP of earlier production methods: five the reactor core during refueling, and irradiated for years was the amount of time needed NPOUIT CFGPSF CFJOH SFNPWFE EVSJOH UIF OFYU refueling cycle. !ey are then shipped to the Tritium to restart a tritium production reactor Extraction Facility at Savannah River for processing and tritium extraction. at Savannah River. "MMJSSBEJBUJPOPG51#"3TIBTTPGBSPDDVSSFEBUUIF 5FOOFTTFF7BMMFZ"VUIPSJUZT 57"T 8BUUT#BSS6OJU #FTJEFTUIFUSJUJVNJOBDUJWFTUPDLQJMFXFBQPOTBOE 1 reactor. !e NNSA has a contingency plan to use the UIFQJQFMJOF BQSFTJEFOUJBMEJSFDUJWFSFRVJSFTUIBU TVA’s Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 to irradiate more the United States maintain a "ve-year reserve supply 51#"3T of tritium. !is requirement appears to still be in place. !e annual budget for tritium production—for re- Of course, this reserve is also decaying at a rate of 5.5 placing the 5.5 percent in weapons and the tritium percent a year, so it must be constantly replenished. SFTFSWFUIBUEFDBZTFBDIZFBSJTSPVHIMZNJMMJPO Roughly one-third of annual tritium production goes !ese costs do not scale linearly with the rate of tritium to maintaining the "ve-year reserve.11 QSPEVDUJPOɨFNBKPSDPTUTPGJSSBEJBUJOH51#"3TJO a reactor apply whether one or many are inserted, so Tritium Production Today irradiating more at that reactor does not greatly increase 6OUJM SFBDUPSTBUUIF4BWBOOBI3JWFS4JUFQSP- costs. On the other hand, costs could rise signi"cantly duced the tritium used in U.S. nuclear weapons. !e if another reactor is needed to expand production. MBTUQSPEVDUJPOSFBDUPSUIFSFXBTTIVUEPXOJO !e other major cost associated with tritium pro- because of safety concerns.12 As the United States duction is operating the Tritium Extraction Facility. SFEVDFEJUTOVNCFSPGOVDMFBSXFBQPOTJOUIFT #FDBVTF UIF //4" JT QSPEVDJOH MFTT USJUJVN UIBO it obtained su%cient tritium from retired weapons. planned, the plant is idle for about nine months a year. *O UIF%0&EFDJEFEUIBUUSJUJVNGSPNSFUJSFE Increasing tritium production would not greatly in- weapons would not provide an adequate supply, and crease costs at the facility, nor would decreasing tritium considered several alternatives. !ese included restart- production substantially decrease operating costs. ing a Savannah River reactor, using an accelerator 11 The reserve must be large enough so that at the end of five years, there is enough tritium to resupply the amount in weapons that has decayed during those five years. Thus, R (1 – f)5 = W [1 – (1 – f)5], where R is the amount of tritium initially in the reserve, W is the amount of tritium in weapons, and f is the decay fraction (f = 0.055). This yields R/W ≈ 1/3. 12 Reactors at the DOE’s Hanford Site in Washington also produced smaller amounts of tritium. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 23 Challenges with Tritium Production However, the United States produces plenty of LEU In theory, the existing system allows a great deal of $ex- fuel from its own stocks of HEU that are excess to its ibility in the amount of tritium produced. If more tri- XFBQPOTOFFET8IJMFNPTUPGUIJT)&6DBOOPUCF UJVNJTOFFEFE NPSF51#"3TDBOCFJSSBEJBUFEBUUIF used for any military purposes, about 50 metric tons 8BUUT#BS6OJUSFBDUPSPSUIFUXPSFBDUPSTBUUIF can be used for military purposes other than direct use TVA’s Sequoyah plant. in nuclear weapons, so fuel made from this HEU could In practice, however, the program has been plagued be used in tritium-producing reactors. (See more on by problems that have kept tritium production below UIJTJO$IBQUFS ɨF//4"DVSSFOUMZQMBOTUPDPO- planned levels. In particular, the amount of tritium tinue supplying HEU for tritium production until MFBLJOHJOUPUIFDPPMJOHXBUFSBUUIF8BUUT#BSSFBDUPS XJUIPVUUIFOFFEGPSBOZBEEJUJPOBMFOSJDINFOU is four times the expected level. Tritiated water is capability (DOE 2013b p. 2-25). radioactive, and can be released into public water sources only in small quantities. To keep the amount F INDINGS of tritium in cooling water below regulatory limits, the t ɨF//4"TQMBOTUPFYQBOEUSJUJVNQSPEVD- //4"IBTCFFOJSSBEJBUJOHGFXFS51#"3TUIBOPSJHJ- tion to allow longer replacement intervals and nally planned. greater performance margins will mean only "DDPSEJOHUPUIF("0 i*UJTVOMJLFMZUIBUBOZUIJOH marginally higher costs—unless a second or MFTTUIBOBDPNQMFUFSFEFTJHOPGUIF51#"3TXJMMTPMWF third reactor is needed, in which case costs the problem.” However, because the NNSA does not could rise signi"cantly. fully understand what is causing the larger-than- t ɨFSFRVJSFNFOUGPSBëWFZFBSUSJUJVNSFTFSWF predicted leakage, even a complete redesign may not dates from a time when the United States work. In the interim, existing supplies of tritium in the needed to restart a reactor to produce more stockpile and reserve “are unlikely to ful"ll require- tritium. Now that commercial reactors are pro- ments for the time a complete redesign would take” ducing tritium and production can expand ("0CQ ɨF("0RVFTUJPOFEXIFUIFSUIF more quickly, such a large reserve may no lon- NNSA could increase tritium production in time to ger be needed. Reducing this reserve would also avoid dipping into the reserve. reduce the need for a second or third reactor. !e NNSA responded that it could meet near-term t 'JGUZNFUSJDUPOTPG)&6BWBJMBCMFGPSEPXO SFRVJSFNFOUTCZJODSFBTJOHUIFOVNCFSPG51#"3T blending to LEU can be used for military JSSBEJBUFEUPQFSDZDMFVOUJM':"OEJOEFFE purposes other than directly in nuclear weap- UIF8BUUT#BS6OJUSFBDUPSJTOPXJSSBEJBUJOHUIBU ons, so fuel made from this HEU could be NBOZVQ GSPN JO UIF QSFWJPVT DZDMF %0& used in tritium-producing reactors. CQ 0WFSUIFMPOHFSUFSN UIF//4"TBJE t ɨFSFJTOPOFFEUPQSPWJEFëOBODJBMBTTJTUBODF UIBUJSSBEJBUJOHBCPVU 51#"3TQFSDZDMFXJMM UP64&$PSJUT"NFSJDBO$FOUSJGVHF1MBOUUP “meet the planned steady-state requirement needed in produce LEU to fuel tritium-producing com- ':w ("0CQ 5PGVMëMMUIBUOFFE UIF mercial reactors. agency is seeking approval from the Nuclear Regu- latory Commission to increase the amount of tritium R E C O MMENDATIONS JOUIFXBUFSSFMFBTFEGSPN8BUUT#BSBOE BTOPUFE above, has a contingency plan to use the Sequoyah t ɨF//4"TIPVMESFFWBMVBUFUIFSFRVJSFNFOU 6OJUTBOESFBDUPST %0&CQ for a "ve-year tritium reserve. Another potential complication is that fuel for com- t ɨF //4" TIPVME EPXOCMFOE TPNF PG JUT mercial reactors used to produce tritium for weapons large existing stockpiles of HEU to provide must come from domestic sources, to avoid restrictions any fuel needed for tritium-producing reac- on “dual-use” materials. !e DOE has used this ratio- tors, and Congress should not fund USEC or nale to support its decision to provide "nancial assis- JUT"NFSJDBO$FOUSJGVHF1MBOU tance to USEC, the domestic uranium enrichment DPNQBOZ BOEJUT"NFSJDBO$FOUSJGVHF1MBOUJO0IJP (DOE 2012f). 24 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S C HAPTER 3 Stockpile Surveillance: Assessing the Reliability and Safety of Nuclear Weapons he nuclear weapons laboratories have had care- BMSFBEZEFQMPZFEXFBQPOT +PIOTPO 13ɨFTF ful procedures for assessing the reliability and UFTUT DPOEVDUFEGSPNUP JODMVEFEPOFGPS safety of U.S. nuclear warheads and bombs, each type of weapon in today’s arsenal. and the viability of the security measures in- "MUIPVHI UIF UFTUT XFSF TVDDFTTGVM GBS NPSF Ttrinsic to the weapons, for more than 50 years. Nuclear would be needed to provide any statistically meaning- explosive testing has never played more than a minimal ful data on the reliability of weapons in the stockpile. role in this work. Using explosive nuclear testing to assess reliability has ɨF6OJUFE4UBUFTVTFEUIFHSFBUNBKPSJUZPGJUT therefore never been practical. Instead, the NNSA nuclear explosive tests to explore experimental designs, inspects and extensively tests a sample of deployed test and perfect designs for weapons to be deployed, XFBQPOTXJUIPVUVTJOHOVDMFBSFYQMPTJPOT8PSLFSTBMTP and study the e#ects of nuclear weapons. !e nation replace the "ssile material in some of the bombs and war- VTFEPOMZPGUIFTFUFTUTUPDPOëSNUIFSFMJBCJMJUZPG heads with non-"ssile material or diagnostic equipment, A B61 bomb being readied for a surveillance test at the Pantex Plant in Texas, 2006. 13 See also Gottfried 2000. Besides testing complete weapons, explosive nuclear tests also provided some data on the reliability of individual components. Fifty-one tests included one or more components from stockpiled weapons, and some tests used newly manufactured primaries. Photo: NNSA News M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 25 and the military drops them from an airplane or launches ɨF ("0 BOE UIF %0& JOTQFDUPS HFOFSBM CPUI UIFNPOBNJTTJMF8PSLFSTBMTPUFTUJOEJWJEVBMDPN- found that inadequate planning for safety studies and ponents. !ese methods form the basis of the Stockpile poor coordination between testing sites were the major 4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBN XIJDICFHBOJO factors leading to the backlog. !e NNSA also had 6OUJM UIF%0&DPOEVDUFE4UBHF0OFUFTUJOH di%culty coordinating $ight tests with the DOD. each year employees randomly selected a speci"ed According to the DOE inspector general: number of each type of deployed warhead and bomb GPSEJTBTTFNCMZBOEUFTUJOH#FHJOOJOHJOUIFNJE When tests are delayed or are not completed, the T UIF%0&SFNPWFEPGFBDIUZQFFBDIZFBS Department [of Energy] lacks critical information XIJDIQSPWJEFEQFSDFOUDPOëEFODFUIBUBEFGFDU on the reliability of the speci!c weapons involved. that occurred in 10 percent of the weapons would be Additionally, anomalies or defects within the detected within two years. weapon systems can go undetected since the like- ɨF%0&TFOUUIFTFXFBQPOTUP1BOUFY XIFSF lihood of detecting anomalies decreases when technicians disassembled and inspected them. Eight fewer tests are conducted. Without needed test or nine were prepared for laboratory testing, and the data, the Department’s ability to assign valid remaining two or three were used in $ight tests. Tech- reliability levels to some weapon systems is at risk. nicians also disassembled the nuclear explosive package (DOE 2001a p. 2) of one of each type of warhead each year, destroying one plutonium pit in the testing process. Remaining warheads not expended in $ight tests could be reas- The NNSA and the national nuclear sembled and returned to the stockpile. weapons laboratories do not fully !e requirement that one pit of each warhead type be destroyed each year was the driving factor behind value surveillance, and ensuring that UIFEFDJTJPOJOUIFNJETUPCFHJOQSPEVDUJPOPG QJUTGPSUIF8XBSIFBEBU-PT"MBNPT it is adequate will likely remain an ɨF3PDLZ'MBUT1MBOUJO$PMPSBEPIBEGPSNFSMZ produced all pits, but that facility was shut down in uphill battle. CFDBVTFPGFOWJSPONFOUBMBOEIFBMUIDPODFSOT ɨF%0&IBEJOUFOEFEUPCVJMETFWFSBMUIPVTBOE8 !e NNSA received extra funds in its FY 2001 budget XBSIFBETUPSFQMBDFUIF8T CVUNBOVGBDUVSFEPOMZ UPIFMQFMJNJOBUFUIFUFTUJOHCBDLMPH*OUIF%0& TPNFCFGPSFUIFDMPTVSF#FDBVTFUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT inspector general reported that, while the agency had EFQMPZFEBOFTUJNBUFE8XBSIFBET UIJTMFGU made some improvements, a significant backlog POMZBTNBMMBOETISJOLJOHSFTFSWF*O POMZPOF SFNBJOFE %0&B Laboratory tests for seven of 8QJUXBTBWBJMBCMFUPSFQMBDFUIFPOFEFTUSPZFE the nine weapons systems were behind schedule, as during testing that year. !e NNSA therefore decided were $ight tests for six. !e backlog of laboratory to develop the capacity to make pits at Los Alamos, and $ight tests for "ve weapons systems had actually XIJDICFHBOQSPEVDJOH8QJUTJOBGUFSTFWFSBM worsened. Testing of pits, secondaries, detonators, and years of e#ort. gas transfer systems was still behind schedule. #FHJOOJOHJOUIFFBSMZT UIF%0&BOEUIFO the NNSA fell signi"cantly behind schedule in con- A Modified Surveillance Program ducting both laboratory and $ight tests on nuclear *O UIF//4"DIBOHFEJUTQSPDFEVSFTGPSTVSWFJM- XFBQPOTBOEUIFJSDPNQPOFOUT ("0 "MUIPVHI lance testing, eliminating some of the backlog. Overall, JO UIF %0& EFWFMPQFE QMBOT GPS DPOEVDUJOH Stage One testing was a one-size-"ts-all approach to the delayed tests and returning to schedule, it failed stockpile surveillance: the number of weapons tested UPEPTP#Z ìJHIUUFTUTBOEMBCUFTUTGPSëWFPG and the types of testing were the same for every type the nine weapons systems in the U.S. arsenal were of warhead, regardless of how many were in the stock- signi"cantly backlogged (DOE 2001a). Testing of pile or what the NNSA already knew about it. !e new several key components—the pit, the secondary, the Stage Two testing is a more focused approach to assess- detonator sets, and the gas transfer system—was also ing warhead reliability and safety. !e NNSA deter- behind schedule. mines the number of weapons to test, and the types of 14 Before the mid-1980s, the United States required a higher level of confidence and tested more weapons annually. 26 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S tests, by considering what it needs to know about each ɨFCVEHFUGPSUIF$PSF4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBNTBXB system and its components, testing those with a known DPSSFTQPOEJOHQFSDFOUESPQJOSFBMUFSNTGSPN': or suspected problem more extensively. UP':*OBSFQPSU UIF+"40/HSPVQ !e NNSA determines these needs and the result- observed that “the surveillance program is becoming JOHTDIFEVMFBOOVBMMZ8BSIFBETVOEFSHPJOHMJGFFY inadequate. Continued success of stockpile steward- tension programs—in which modifications could ship requires implementation of a revised surveillance a#ect performance—receive particular attention. For QSPHSBNw +"40/Q ɨFMBCPSBUPSZEJSFD- FYBNQMF UIF//4"JTUFTUJOHNPSFUIBO8 tors also expressed concern about the limited number warheads annually because they have seen signi"cant of tests and the overall direction of the surveillance changes as part of their life extension program. !e QSPHSBNJOBOOVBMSFQPSUTGSPN':UP': TUPDLQJMFBMTPIBTNPSFUIBOFOPVHI8TUPBMMPX And the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command destructive testing. FYQSFTTFEDPODFSOJOIJT':BOE':BOOVBM #FDBVTF UIF BDUJWF TUPDLQJMF JODMVEFT POMZ B GFX BTTFTTNFOUSFQPSUT ("0C IVOESFE#CPNCT JODPOUSBTU UIF//4"NJHIU After an internal NNSA management review in test only four or "ve each year and refrain from destroy- 2010 identi"ed numerous problems with the Core JOHBOZPGUIFQJUT"TJEFGSPNUIF#BOE8 UIF 4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBN UIFBHFODZJODSFBTFEJUTGVOEJOH active stockpile includes a signi"cant number of reserve CZNJMMJPOJO': XIJDIBMMPXFEBTJHOJëDBOU warheads and bombs of other types, so their testing is increase in laboratory testing (DOE 2012a). And the not constrained by the availability of replacement budget for core surveillance is slated to grow slowly weapons. UPSPVHIMZNJMMJPOPWFSUIFOFYUTFWFSBMZFBST Stage Two testing is part of the NNSA’s Core according to the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and 4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBN BTXBT4UBHF0OFCFGPSFJUɨF .BOBHFNFOU1MBO 'JHVSF //4"E 5PJN- agency also began a separately funded Enhanced plement that plan, the agency will have to give priority 4VSWFJMMBODF$BNQBJHOJO UPJOWFTUJHBUFOFX to the surveillance program. ways to assess the aging of weapons components and Meanwhile the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign materials, and to develop computer models to help IBTBOBOOVBMCVEHFUPGSPVHIMZNJMMJPO //4" predict how these components and materials will age.15 2012b). !ese amounts are very modest compared with 8IFOUIFTFOFXTVSWFJMMBODFNFUIPETNBUVSF UIFZ the NNSA’s total annual weapons budget of more than XJMMCFDPNFQBSUPGUIF$PSF4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBN CJMMJPOɨFSFJTOPSFBTPOUIFBHFODZDBOOPUTVT- Under the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign, for tain or increase this level of support for surveillance. example, the weapons laboratories developed a way to After its 2010 internal review, the NNSA also arti"cially accelerate the aging of plutonium samples created the position of senior technical advisor for sur- and then measured their key properties (Heller 2010). veillance, to provide greater oversight of the program. As discussed above, these experiments led the NNSA Nevertheless, problems have continued. In 2012, the to conclude that “most primary types have credible ("0GPVOEUIBUUIFBHFODZIBEGBJMFEUPFTUBCMJTIDMFBS minimum lifetimes in excess of 100 years as regards measures and responsibility for implementing its own aging of plutonium; those with assessed minimum recommendations from the 2010 review and previous lifetimes of 100 years or less have clear mitigation reviews—even though the NNSA itself had identi"ed QBUITUIBUBSFQSPQPTFEBOEPSCFJOHJNQMFNFOUFEw BMBDLPGTVDINFUSJDT"DDPSEJOHUPUIF("0 XJUIPVU //4" ɨF FYQFSJNFOUT DPOUJOVF BOE JO a corrective action plan, “it is unclear how NNSA will December 2012 Lawrence Livermore reported that (1) ensure that the draft October 2010 management plutonium remains stable up to 150 years (Heller review’s recommendations are fully implemented and 2012). To allow early detection of aging, the NNSA is (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress also conducting tests to provide a baseline for 235 com- and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the ponents and key materials, and monitoring changes in TVSWFJMMBODFQSPHSBNw ("0C ɨF//4"IBT them over time. said it will develop and implement a corrective Despite these e#orts, the NNSA’s testing woes have BDUJPOQMBOɨF':4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQBOE continued under Stage Two testing. !e NNSA has .BOBHFNFOU1MBOOPUFTUIBUUIF//4"iJOTUJUVUFE reduced the number of tests and weapons removed a new surveillance governance model in FY 2011” GSPNUIFTUPDLQJMFGPSUFTUJOHFBDIZFBS %0&B //4"BQ 15 The Core Surveillance Program is funded under Directed Stockpile Work, whereas the Enhanced Surveillance Campaign is funded under the Engineering Campaign. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 27 Figure 2. Funding for the NNSA’s Core Surveillance Program $300 264 $250 254 259 239 239 249 $200 198 196 195 158 181 181 $150 $ Millions $100 $50 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Fiscal Year Source: NNSA 2011d p. 61. In another update on the surveillance program in scheduled for completion by October 2013. Imple- September 2012, the agency’s inspector general con- menting recommendations from that study will be tinued to "nd problems (DOE 2012a). In particular, important. the inspector general found that the NNSA measured UIFQFSGPSNBODFPGUIF&OIBODFE4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBN F INDING by the share of the overall budget the program spent, t ɨF//4"IBTOPUHJWFOUIF4UPDLQJMF4VS- rather than its actual accomplishments. !e NNSA has WFJMMBODF 1SPHSBN UIF QSJPSJUZ JU EFTFSWFT now instituted a system for measuring progress based Continuing on that path could lead to a lack on performance. of information on how the stockpile is aging. Despite these e#orts, there are still signs that the //4"JTOPUHJWJOHUIF4UPDLQJMF4VSWFJMMBODF1SPHSBN R E C O MMENDATIONS the priority it deserves. During a February 2013 con- gressional hearing, acting NNSA Administrator Neile t ɨF//4"NVTUHJWFUIFDPSFBOEFOIBODFE Miller stated that the agency would preserve some surveillance programs adequate attention and program budgets under sequestration, but that the funding. surveillance program would be among those to face t $POHSFTTNVTUFOTVSFUIBUGVOEJOHJTBEFRVBUF DVUT (VBSJOP "OEBMUIPVHIUIF//4"IBE to support a robust surveillance program, espe- originally planned to complete its baseline tests on the cially in the face of budget constraints. key components and materials of nuclear weapons by t $POHSFTTTIPVMENPOJUPSUIF//4"TQSPHSFTT JUOPXFYQFDUTUPUBLFVOUJM ("0C in developing and implementing its correc- !is long history indicates that the NNSA and the tive action plan, and in completing its base- national nuclear weapons laboratories do not fully value line tests for key components. surveillance, and that ensuring it is adequate will likely t #PUI UIF //4" BOE $POHSFTT TIPVME GVMMZ remain an uphill battle. Congress will need to be vigi- consider the recommendations in the forth- lant in its oversight of the program. coming JASON study. In its FY 2013 appropriations law, Congress required a JASON review of the surveillance program, which is 28 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S C HAPTER 4 Stockpile Stewardship: Acquiring a Deeper Understanding of Nuclear Weapons n response to the end of nuclear explosive test- is considering making more signi"cant modi"cations. ing and the ongoing cycle of development and 0OFQVSQPTFPGUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBNJT EFQMPZNFOUPGOFXOVDMFBSXFBQPOT JOUIF to assess whether these modi"cations could degrade a Department of Energy established the Stockpile weapon’s performance, reliability, or safety. I4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBNɨFXFBQPOTMBCPSBUPSJFT VTF As part of the program, the NNSA has invested in the program to increase fundamental scienti"c under- a range of experimental and computing facilities over standing of how nuclear weapons work. the past two decades. Experiments at these facilities !ere are two reasons the end of explosive testing have allowed laboratory scientists to develop sophisti- might require such an understanding. First, it might cated three-dimensional computer models of nuclear help resolve a problem with a warhead that would weapons, which they can use to predict how a problem otherwise require explosive texting. As noted, the United or a modi"cation would a#ect performance, reliability, States pursued most of its more than 1,000 explo- and safety. sive nuclear tests to prove that a new weapon would !ese e#orts have also led to a more detailed "rst- work as intended, explore new weapons concepts, principles understanding of how nuclear weapons work. or assess the e#ects of nuclear explosions. However, For example, a group of Livermore scientists recently the nation also occasionally used the tests to assess solved the longstanding “energy balance” problem. whether a potential problem in a weapon would Measurements during some nuclear explosive tests degrade performance, or to verify that a modi"cation suggested that they had violated the law of the conser- to address a problem would result in the desired vation of energy—which is not possible. Using data performance. from modern experimental facilities as well as previous nuclear tests, scientists modeled this outcome on high- The experimental and computational speed computers and came to understand its roots (Department of State 2012a; Ho#man 2011). facilities needed to maintain the current #FDBVTFPGUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBN UIF NNSA now believes its scientists can design and deploy arsenal may be very different from those new weapons without additional nuclear explosive that would be needed to implement the UFTUJOH"DDPSEJOHUPUIF//4"T':4UPDLQJMF 4UFXBSETIJQBOE.BOBHFNFOU1MBO i//4"DBOOPX NNSA’s “3+2” plan. assess and certify integrated designs to improve safety and security without underground nuclear testing. Second, a deeper understanding would enable the !ese capabilities allow NNSA to consider a much labs to maintain the reliability, safety, and security of broader range of options than previously possible” weapons as they modify them during life extension //4"BQ QSPHSBNT8JUIUIFFOEPGUIFDPMEXBS UIF6OJUFE 'PSFYBNQMF JO-PT"MBNPTBOE-BXSFODF States stopped developing and deploying new types of Livermore each developed a design for the Reliable OVDMFBSXFBQPOT8IJMFTDJFOUJTUTEJEOPUEFTJHOXFBQ- 3FQMBDFNFOU8BSIFBE 338 ɨF-JWFSNPSFEFTJHO ons to have a speci"c lifetime, they also did not speci"- was based on a previously tested weapon. !e Los cally design them for longevity, as the nation expected Alamos design, however, incorporated a primary and to replace them regularly. secondary that had been tested individually but not in Modi"cations to weapons during life extension the proposed con"guration, yet the lab had con"dence programs have been relatively minor so far, such as JUXPVMEXPSL$POHSFTTDBODFMMFEUIF338QSPHSBN SFQMBDJOHBQBSUXJUIBTJNJMBSPOF#VUUIF//4" JO TPOFJUIFSEFTJHOXBTCVJMU M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 29 8IJMFUIF//4"JTVOMJLFMZUPQSPQPTFCVJMEJOH an entirely new nuclear weapon, future life exten- sion programs could entail replacing components with those from di#erent types of weapons or with modi- "ed components. !e need for a more detailed under- standing of how nuclear weapons operate, and the SFTVMUJOHEFNBOETPOUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SP- gram, will therefore depend on the types of modi"ca- tions made during such programs. For example, the experimental and computational facilities needed to maintain the current arsenal may be very di#erent from those that would be needed to implement the “3+2” plan. It is important that Congress understand the indirect costs associated with aggressive life exten- sion programs. Types of Experiments for Stockpile Stewardship !e NNSA conducts three types of experiments to increase its understanding of nuclear weapons: hydro- dynamic tests, focused experiments, and subcritical UFTUT 5BCMF Q Hydrodynamic tests are used to study the compres- sion of the plutonium pit when the primary in a nuclear weapon implodes—the most critical step in that process. For these tests, technicians replace the QJUMBSHFMZQMVUPOJVNXJUIBOPOëTTJMFNFUBM XJUI TJNJMBS QSPQFSUJFT TVDI BT VSBOJVN ɨF other components in the primary, including the high explosive, remain unchanged. !e weapon is then Workers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Nevada detonated. Test Site lower the “cube” containing plutonium and chemical explosives into the confinement vessel to conduct a subcritical experiment, 2000. Scientists use these “integrated” tests to con"rm that the material behaves in the way that computer simula- tions predict. (!e tests are called hydrodynamic be- Experimental Facilities cause the metal $ows like a liquid under high heat and Facilities for Hydrodynamic Tests pressure.) If the compression is within speci"cations, Scientists conduct hydrodynamic tests at three facili- designers have high con"dence that the rest of the ties: the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test weapon will work properly. Facility (DARHT) at Los Alamos, the Contained Firing Scientists use focused experiments to measure the 'BDJMJUZ $'' BU-BXSFODF -JWFSNPSF BOE UIF #JH fundamental properties of materials, radiation, and &YQMPTJWFT&YQFSJNFOUBM'BDJMJUZ #&&' BUUIF/FWBEB plasmas, which they then use in computer simulations Site. !e utility of hydrodynamic testing depends on of nuclear weapons. Understanding and predicting the extent of changes made to the primary as part of a the behavior of a material requires determining the life extension program. relationships among its temperature, pressure, and density. Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Scientists use subcritical tests to measure the prop- DARHT uses X-ray radiography to produce snapshots erties of weapons-grade plutonium under high tem- of a mock primary as it is being explosively compressed. peratures and pressures. High explosive is used to 5XPIJHIFOFSHZ9SBZNBDIJOFTBSFPSJFOUFEBU implode the plutonium—but not enough plutonium degrees to each other, allowing two perspectives (hence to create a chain reaction. !ese tests occur under- “dual axis” in the name). One machine produces a sin- ground at the U1a Facility at the Nevada National gle X-ray pulse while the second produces four short Security Site. X-ray pulses in rapid sequence, allowing four distinct Photo: DOE 30 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S Table 6. Facilities Used to Conduct Tests under Stockpile Stewardship FY13 FY11 FY12 Q1–Q3 tests tests tests Subset of tests using Facility Location Type of Test plutonium in parentheses Hydrodynamic tests: Integrated experiments using full-scale mockups of nuclear primaries without fissile material. Dual-Axis Los Alamos Uses two X-ray machines to take snapshots of Radiographic National the implosion process. 35 3 Hydrodynamic Test Laboratory Facility (DARHT) Contained Firing Lawrence Uses a variety of detectors, including an X-ray Facility (CFF) Livermore machine, to measure properties of materials 73 6 Nat’l. Lab. during test. Big Explosives Nevada Uses high-speed optics and X-ray radiography Experimental National to measure properties of materials during test. 5 0 0 Facility (BEEF) Security Site Focused experiments: Used to measure the fundamental properties of materials, radiation, and plasmas. Joint Actinide Nevada Uses a two-stage gas gun to determine proper- Shock Physics National ties of metals (including plutonium) at high 4 (1) 10 (6) 9 (4) Experimental Security Site shock pressures, temperatures, and strain rates. Research (JASPER) TA-55 Los Alamos Uses a variety of platforms, including a one- National stage gas gun, to determine properties of metals 62 (58) 38 (33) 13 (5) Laboratory (including plutonium) at high shock pressures, temperatures, and strain rates. Large Bore Powder Nevada Will use a powder gun to determine properties Gun (LBPG) National of metals (including plutonium) at high shock 00 0 Security Site pressures, temperatures, and strain rates (in development). Proton Radiography Los Alamos Uses protons to study fundamental properties 45 40 23 (pRad)* Nat’l. Lab. of materials. Los Alamos Neutron Los Alamos Uses neutrons to study fundamental properties Science Center National of materials. 47 28 112 (LANSCE)* Laboratory High Explosive Lawrence Uses a variety of diagnostic tools to conduct Application Facility Livermore research on high explosives. 762 363 151 (HEAF) Nat’l. Lab. National Ignition Lawrence Uses powerful lasers to study radiation, plasmas, Facility (NIF)* Livermore and materials used in nuclear weapons. 275 159 166 Nat’l. Lab. Omega* University Uses powerful lasers to study radiation, plasmas, 1,729 1,852 1,354 of Rochester and materials used in nuclear weapons. Z machine Sandia Uses powerful X-rays to study the behavior of National secondaries, plasmas, and materials used in 118 (3) 152 (3) 112 (2) Laboratories nuclear weapons, including plutonium. Subcritical experiments: Conventional explosives used to measure the basic properties of plutonium at high pressures. U1a Facility Nevada National 2 (2) 1 1 (1) Security Site N OTE: * = national user facilities, which allocate some research time to scientists worldwide on a competitive basis. Source: NNSA n.d. b. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 31 The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) at Los Alamos, 1996. Inside the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) at Los Alamos. snapshots. Researchers use these snapshots to construct JOHT 4IBOHOE 8IJMFUIF$''IBTTFWFSBMEJBHOPTUJD a detailed three-dimensional picture of the implosion, tools, the primary one is a high-speed, high-power which allows them to observe whether it is symmetri- X-ray machine—the Flash X-Ray, or FXR, which takes cal enough for e#ective detonation. snapshots of the interior of an imploding mock $POTUSVDUJPOPO%"3)5TUBSUFEJO*OJUJBMMZ primary core. !is machine was the forerunner of FTUJNBUFEUPDPTUNJMMJPO UIFëOBMUBMMZXBTBSPVOE DARHT, but it is less powerful and has lower resolu- NJMMJPOBGPMEJODSFBTFɨFëSTUBYJTPQFS- tion. !e FXR has only one beam instead of DARHT’s BUFETVDDFTTGVMMZJO CVUUIFTFDPOEGBDFESFQFBUFE two, so it provides a two-dimensional rather than three- challenges that drove up costs. In a redesign during a dimensional image, but the FXR provides a substan- QBVTFJODPOTUSVDUJPOJO -PT"MBNPTPïDJBMT tially larger "eld of view. sought to greatly improve the facility’s potential by in- CFF began operating in 2000 and remains in use, creasing its energy and adding the four-pulse capabil- even though DARHT is up and running, according ity. However, that last change made operating DARHT to test records in FY 2011, 2012, and the "rst three much more challenging. Although it was declared quarters of 2013. (!e facility is also used to conduct operational in 2003, electrical breakdowns prevented explosives research for conventional weapons.) it from performing as required. After an extensive re- design and rebuild of its major components, successful !e Big Explosives Experimental Facility simultaneous tests along both axes began in 2010. *OUIFFBSMZT -BXSFODF-JWFSNPSF/BUJPOBM-BC- oratory could no longer conduct large experiments on Contained Firing Facility high explosive because of danger to the surrounding Scientists can use the CFF, made of reinforced concrete, community, which was growing quickly. !e lab suc- UPEFUPOBUFVQUPLJMPHSBNTPGIJHIFYQMPTJWFXJUI- cessfully argued that it needed a "ring facility at the out any appreciable release of material to the surround- /FWBEB 4JUF #&&' DSFBUFE BU BO FYJTUJOH GBDJMJUZ Photos: Los Alamos National Laboratory 32 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S consists of two earth-covered, steel-reinforced concrete behavior of nuclear weapons, which use explosive shock CVOLFST#&&'DBOIBOEMFEFOPUBUJPOTPGVQUP waves to implode and compress plutonium to begin pounds of explosive, and its diagnostic equipment the nuclear reaction. includes high-speed optics and X-ray radiography. !e three facilities produce di#erent conditions with ɨFGBDJMJUZCFHBOPQFSBUJOHJO*UXBTVTFE TPNFPWFSMBQ BDDPSEJOHUPUIF//4"ɨF-BSHF#PSF GPSPOMZUFTUTEVSJOHJUTëSTUNPOUIT BDDPSEJOH 1PXEFS(VOXJMMBMMPXUIFVTFPGMBSHFSUBSHFUTUIBO to the DOE inspector general, and all but three could +"41&3(JWFOCVEHFUDPOTUSBJOUT UIF//4"BOE have occurred at facilities at other sites (DOE 2001b). Congress should carefully assess the value of the Large !e inspector general recommended that the facility #PSF1PXEFS(VOCFGPSFQSPDFFEJOHXJUIDPOTUSVDUJPO no longer operate full-time, and that the Nevada Site QFSJPEJDBMMZSFWJFXUIF#&&'QSPHSBNUPEFUFSNJOF F INDING whether further operating cutbacks were possible. t ɨF//4"PQFSBUFTUXPTIPDLXBWFGBDJMJUJFT 4DJFOUJTUTVTFE#&&'UPDPOEVDUëWFUFTUTJO': BOEBUIJSEUIF-BSHF#PSF1PXEFS(VOJT but have conducted none since. !e NNSA and Con- in development. gress should assess whether continued operation of #&&'NBLFTTFOTF R E C O MMENDATIONS F INDING t ɨF //4" BOE $POHSFTT TIPVME BTTFTT UIF VUJMJUZPGCVJMEJOHUIF-BSHF#PSF1PXEFS(VO t ɨF//4"IBTUISFFGBDJMJUJFTXIFSFTDJFOUJTUT given that two similar facilities are already DPOEVDUIZESPEZOBNJDUFTUT BOE#&&'NBZ operating. be unnecessary. t $POHSFTTPSUIFBENJOJTUSBUJPOTIPVMEBTLUIF JASON group to assess the utility of shock R E C O MMENDATIONS wave facilities for stockpile certi"cation, under t ɨF //4" BOE $POHSFTT TIPVME BTTFTT UIF various assumptions about changes during life VUJMJUZPGDPOUJOVJOHUPVTF#&&'GPSIZESP- extension plans. !e study should be unclas- dynamic tests. si"ed, and include classi"ed appendices as t $POHSFTTPSUIFBENJOJTUSBUJPOTIPVMEBTLUIF necessary. JASON group to assess the utility of the hydro- dynamic facilities for stockpile certi"cation, High Energy Density/Fusion Facilities under various assumptions about changes The NNSA operates three facilities used to study during life extension plans. !e study should materials under conditions of high energy density, and be unclassi"ed, and include classi"ed appen- to conduct nuclear fusion experiments. !ese include dices as necessary. the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Liver- NPSF 0.&("BUUIF-BCPSBUPSZGPS-BTFS&OFSHFUJDT Facilities for Focused Experiments at the University of Rochester; and the Z machine at !e NNSA has nine key facilities where scientists Sandia. !e facilities use di#erent approaches to pro- DPOEVDUGPDVTFEFYQFSJNFOUT8FFYBNJOFTJYIFSF UIF duce fusion reactions, but they have not come close other three are relatively modest in scale. to achieving ignition: the self-sustained burning of fusion fuel. Shock Wave Facilities NIF uses the world’s largest bank of lasers to con- !e NNSA uses three shock wave facilities to deter- centrate energy on a small sphere of heavy hydrogen mine the properties of metals, including plutonium, at isotopes, compressing and heating them until they high shock pressures, temperatures, and strain rates fuse to form helium. !is approach to fusion is called (the rate at which the material deforms). !ese facili- “inertial con"nement,” because the material is held UJFTBSFUIF+PJOU"DUJOJEF4IPDL1IZTJDT&YQFSJNFOUBM together by its own inertia just long enough for the 3FTFBSDI +"41&3 'BDJMJUZBUUIF/FWBEB4JUF XIJDI reaction to proceed. is a two-stage gas gun; a one-stage gas gun at TA-55 !e hydrogen is in a small cylindrical container BU-PT"MBNPT BOEUIF-BSHF#PSF1PXEFS(VO JO DBMMFE B IPIMSBVN UIF (FSNBO XPSE GPS iDBWJUZw development at the Nevada Site. which has a small hole in one end that allows laser light In each facility, a gun is used to "re a projectile at to enter. !e laser beams are not aimed directly at the high velocity into a target made of plutonium or other hydrogen but at the inner walls of the hohlraum, which metal. !e resulting shock waves shed light on the are heated to such high temperatures that they emit M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 33 X-rays. !is indirect energy in the form of X-rays— report to Congress, the DOE stated that “it is too early rather than the laser energy itself—compresses the to assess whether or not ignition can be achieved at hydrogen fuel. NIF uses this process, called indirect- the NIF” (DOE 2012e p. v). !e NNSA now plans drive fusion, to produce energy densities some 20 times to reassess the prospects for ignition in 2015. And in HSFBUFSUIBOUIPTFBU0.&("PSUIF;NBDIJOF April 2013, Lawrence Livermore announced that 0.&("BMTPVTFTMBTFSTUPJOEVDFJOFSUJBMDPOëOF- NIF would transition to an “international science ment fusion, but does not use a hohlraum. Instead, the facility,” thus allocating some research time to scientists laser energy is focused directly on the hydrogen target, worldwide on a competitive basis, and press coverage in a process known as direct-drive fusion. indicated that the shift would deemphasize ignition as Like NIF, the Z machine relies on indirect-drive BOFBSUFSNHPBM 1FSMNBO inertial con"nement to induce fusion, but it uses in- tense pulsed currents rather than lasers to produce the Ignition may be necessary but not X-rays that compress the hydrogen fuel. !e X-rays are also used to determine how nuclear components and sufficient to allow aggressive life materials behave under conditions similar to those produced by nuclear weapons. Scientists can also use extension options because the the Z machine to study the behavior of plutonium under conditions of high energy density. parameters for inertial confinement Fusion is important during two steps in detonating a nuclear weapon: primary boosting and the secondary fusion differ from those important fuel burn. In principle, these facilities could provide to weapons design. some insight into both the primary and secondary fusion processes. A better understanding of boost could be needed to certify life-extended weapons that reuse !e failure to achieve ignition indicates that the primary or secondary components from other types computer programs developed to model inertial con- of warheads, or that use components that have been "nement fusion and to design the ignition targets do TJHOJëDBOUMZNPEJëFE +"40/ not incorporate all the essential factors (DOE 2012e). All three facilities are also used for research on According to the DOE, this failure does not threaten nuclear fusion ignition, and for fundamental science DPOëEFODFJOUIFFYJTUJOHTUPDLQJMF#VUJUNBZMJNJU research. In 2013, the NNSA will devote 50 percent the changes made to weapons during life extension PG/*'TUJNFUPTUPDLQJMFTUFXBSETIJQ QFSDFOUUP programs. For example, it may not be possible to have achieving ignition, and 10 percent to other national con"dence in some of the modi"ed weapons designs security missions and fundamental science. !e agency UIF//4"JTDPOTJEFSJOHGPSUIF88MJGFFYUFO- XJMMEFEJDBUFQFSDFOUPGUIF;NBDIJOFTUJNFUP sion program. stockpile stewardship, 25 percent to ignition, and 10 "DDPSEJOHUPUIF("0 percent to other national security missions and funda- NFOUBMTDJFODFɨFCSFBLEPXOGPS0.&("XJMMCF If ignition is achieved, experiments at NIF could 30 percent for stockpile stewardship, 35 percent for be used to study the potential e"ects of design ignition, and 35 percent for other national security changes, possibly [emphasis added] giving NNSA missions and fundamental science (DOE 2012e). greater con!dence to make changes to weapons in the stockpile. But, without ignition at NIF or National Ignition Facility some other facility, NNSA’s options for doing so NIF has had a long history of technical di%culties, would likely remain limited. ("0BQ cost overruns, and slipped schedules since construc- UJPOCFHBOJO*UXBTDPNQMFUFEJO ëWF !e DOE similarly noted in a December 2012 report years behind schedule, and its final cost—almost to Congress: CJMMJPOXBTGPVSUJNFTUIFJOJUJBMFTUJNBUFɨF GBDJMJUZTJOJUJBMPQFSBUJOHDPTUXBTSPVHIMZNJM- Con!dence in the present stockpile . . . is dependent MJPOBZFBS #SPBE upon the pedigree from a successful underground As its name implies, a primary goal for NIF is to test program and a continued Stockpile Steward- achieve ignition during the fusion process. However, ship Program to understand the impact of any the NNSA failed to meet its self-imposed deadline of changes from the as-tested con!guration. #e gaps September 30, 2012. Moreover, in a December 2012 in understanding demonstrated by the ignition 34 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S campaign are not at a level that would impact major changes to the nuclear explosive package as con!dence in the stockpile. Rather the question is part of life extension programs, and that it minimizes the extent to which NNSA will be able to rely such changes. upon codes and models as the basis for con!dence Increasing basic knowledge of nuclear weapons in modi!cations and alterations, as NNSA ex- NBZCFBHPBMGPSUIFTDJFOUJTUTXPSLJOHPO/*'#VU trapolates from as-tested con!gurations. (DOE NIF should also support the maintenance of a reliable, 2012e p. vi) safe, and secure stockpile. !e extent to which NIF can serve this role depends on the capabilities that it It is important to examine the claim that achieving demonstrates in the future. !e scienti"c knowledge ignition would allow validation of weapons design required to ful"ll that goal will depend on the changes codes. Ignition at NIF may be necessary but not suf- the NNSA makes to weapons during life extension "cient to allow aggressive life extension options, be- programs. Minimizing those changes might also make cause the parameters for inertial con"nement fusion any basic information provided by NIF less necessary. di#er from those important to weapons design. More- #FDBVTF/*'JTBDVUUJOHFEHFTDJFOUJëDJOTUSVNFOU over, some life extension options that could increase and the goal of achieving fusion ignition is intellec- safety and security may not be viable because they are tually compelling, the facility has attracted top-tier too expensive compared with the bene"ts, or because scientists. !e extent to which these scientists sub- sequently become involved in the nuclear weapons Requirements for high-performance program or other national security work is unclear. Moreover, as Chapter 5 will show, the NNSA has de- computing will not be as great if life veloped a range of other programs to attract and retain quali"ed personnel that appear to be e#ective. extension programs do not make F INDINGS substantial changes to nuclear warheads. t ɨF GBJMVSF PG /*' UP BDIJFWF JHOJUJPO NBZ preclude making some types of aggressive they would undermine con"dence in the reliability of changes to weapons as part of their life ex- BXFBQPO#PUISFBTPOTXFSFBQQBSFOUMZGBDUPSTJOUIF tension programs. On the other hand, even /VDMFBS8FBQPOT $PVODJMT EFDJTJPO UPGPSHP NPSF achieving ignition may not provide enough BHHSFTTJWFMJGFFYUFOTJPOPQUJPOTGPSUIF#CPNC con"dence in weapons design codes to allow 8IJMFJHOJUJPOJTBLFZHPBMGPS/*' UIF%0&BSHVFT aggressive changes to weapons. that the facility is also valuable because experiments t ɨF VUJMJUZ PG /*' UIF ; NBDIJOF BOE there “are testing codes and models that underpin stock- 0.&("UPUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SP- pile con"dence, are providing fundamental scien- gram will depend on the types of life exten- ti"c knowledge relevant to nuclear weapons, and are sion programs the NNSA undertakes. !ese attracting and retaining the scienti"c talent required facilities will be less useful if the NSSA makes for NNSA’s broad national security missions” (DOE only minimal changes to weapons. 2012e p. iii). NIF can produce unmatched laser power, plasma R E C O MMENDATION EFOTJUJFT BOE.&7 NFHBFMFDUSPOWPMU OFVUSPO $uxes that may be useful for validating nuclear weap- t ɨF BENJOJTUSBUJPO PS $POHSFTT TIPVME BTL POTDPEFT#VU/*'JTOPUOFFEFEGPSTUPDLQJMFDFS the JASON group to assess the utility of NIF, tification if life extension programs do not entail UIF;NBDIJOF BOE0.&("UPUIF4UPDL- major changes to weapons. As the JASON group con- QJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBNɨFTUVEZTIPVME cluded, “Lifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could consider the extent to which the facilities pro- be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss in vide unique information relevant to stockpile con"dence, by using approaches similar to those em- certi"cation, and the value of such informa- QMPZFE JO -&1T Sequoia supercomputer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2011. Computing Facilities of the agency’s O%ce of Research and Development for !e nuclear weapon laboratories were among the "rst /BUJPOBM4FDVSJUZ4DJFODFBOE5FDIOPMPHZ %0&C users of electronic computers and have remained at the !is work is occurring under the NNSA’s Advanced GPSFGSPOUPGDPNQVUJOH*O.BZ -PT"MBNPTT 4JNVMBUJPOBOE$PNQVUJOH1SPHSBN FTUBCMJTIFEJO Roadrunner became the "rst computer to attain a "DDPSEJOHUPUIF//4" JUTIBSEXBSFBOETPGU- quadrillion (1015) operations per second, known as a ware “must push the cutting edge of technology to sup- peta$op (LANL n.d. b). Of course, continuing ad- port deterrent systems.” And because “[t]echnology vances in computer speed mean that any ranking quick- obsolescence for computational system hardware and ly becomes dated, and Roadrunner stood at number software is rapid . . . [there is a] need to continually 22 as of November 2012 (Top 500 Supercomputer update the system in order to maintain the cutting Sites 2012). !e machine was decommissioned in FEHFw //4"EQ March 2013. "T XJUI UIF //4"T PUIFS DVUUJOHFEHF 3% !e NNSA now operates two of the world’s fastest requirements for high-performance computing will not computers: Cielo and Sequoia. Cielo was built at Los be as great if life extension programs do not make sub- Alamos from 2010 to 2011, and is jointly operated by stantial changes to nuclear warheads. According to the Los Alamos and Sandia (LANL n.d. a). It runs at 1.1 %FGFOTF4DJFODF#PBSE UIFESJWFSGPSUIF"EWBODFE peta$ops, and was the twenty-second-fastest computer 4JNVMBUJPOBOE$PNQVUJOH1SPHSBNJTiBHHSFTTJWF 16 Computer speeds are measured in floating-point operations per second, or flops. A floating point is a number containing a decimal point. An operation would be addition or subtraction, for example. Photo: NNSA News 36 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S F INDING R E C O MMENDATION t ɨF//4"HPBMPGBDPNQVUJOHDBQBDJUZPG t ɨF BENJOJTUSBUJPO PS $POHSFTT TIPVME BTL 100 exa$ops assumes that life extension pro- the JASON group to study the computing grams may include signi"cant modi"cations capacity required to support life extension to nuclear warheads. However, any computer programs, using di#erent assumptions about simulations will be inadequate to allow aggres- the changes those programs make to nuclear sive life extension options that diverge from warheads. designs that have previously undergone nuclear explosive testing. A portion of the preamplifier beam transport system in the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Liver- more National Laboratory. This system transports and resizes the laser beam prior to injection in the main laser. A view of a cryogenically cooled NIF target photographed through the hohlraum’s laser entrance hole. A two-millimeter-diameter capsule filled with a deuterium-tritium (DT) gas, surrounded by a few- nanometer-thick layer of DT ice, which is the target for the lasers of the National Ignition Facility. Photos: (top) NNSA News; (bottom left & right) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 37 C HAPTER 5 Retaining a Qualified Workforce workforce of quali"ed scientists, engineers, ɨFDPNNJTTJPOBMTPGPVOEUIBUUIFBWFSBHF and technicians is essential to maintaining a age of the technical sta# was higher than the national reliable, safe, and secure nuclear arsenal. !e average for such workers, but that had been the case nation’s nuclear weapons program employs during the cold war as well. !e commission also found roughlyA 20,000 people, of which some 13,000 are that the DOE, its laboratories, and its production classi"ed as having skills essential to maintaining the facilities did not have a clear plan for replenishing criti- arsenal. !e two areas of greatest need are nuclear cal personnel, and needed to expand hiring to avoid a engineering and computer science and engineering. gap in expertise. After nuclear testing and the production of new !e problem was not a national shortage of scien- UZQFTPGOVDMFBSXFBQPOTFOEFEJOUIFFBSMZT UIF tists and engineers but strong U.S. demand for such DOE needed fewer employees throughout the nuclear talent, according to the commission. !e DOE and complex, and hiring did not keep pace with retirements the contractors that run its nuclear weapons sites BOEPUIFSEFQBSUVSFT"GUFSQFBLJOHJOBUBCPVU needed to "nd ways to recruit and retain scientists and 50,000, employment in the nuclear weapons program technical specialists, such as by o#ering more competi- IBEESPQQFEUPIBMGUIBUCZ ("0 $IJMFT tive salaries and bene"ts. To allow contractors to be $PNNJTTJPO more agile in a tight labor market (most employees at the nuclear complex work for the contractors), the Anticipating Shortages of Key Personnel commission recommended that the DOE allow them As those cuts were occurring, members of Congress to make decisions on salaries and bene"ts without and other observers expressed concern about a poten- prior approval. tial lack of personnel with critical skills at nuclear weap- "GUFSTVSWFZJOHTPNF FOHJOFFST TDJFOUJTUT ons laboratories, production facilities, and test sites. and technicians in the complex, the commission found Acquiring such skills typically takes several years of that the most important factors for recruiting and on-the-job training, and experts need time to pass their retaining them included not only competitive salaries knowledge on to new hires before they retire. More- and benefits but also job security, respect on the over, new hires may need a year or more to obtain a job, and interesting and challenging work. !e com- security clearance. mission found that six organizations and labs doing In response, Congress established the Commission classi"ed defense work outside the complex typically PO.BJOUBJOJOH64/VDMFBS8FBQPOT&YQFSUJTFJO offered hiring bonuses, flextime, telecommuting, LOPXO BT UIF $IJMFT $PNNJTTJPO BGUFS JUT extra time o#, educational bene"ts, and career coun- DIBJS "ENJSBM)FOSZ($IJMFTUPSFWJFXUIF%0&T seling, and recommended that the complex follow those e#orts to maintain a quali"ed workforce. In its report, best practices. the commission found that the average age of the !e commission also identi"ed a lack of knowledge scientists, engineers, and technical staff had risen about job opportunities at the nuclear weapons com- GSPNUPZFBSTBU4BOEJB GSPNUPZFBSTBU plex among students at colleges that have historically -PT"MBNPT BOEGSPNUPZFBSTBU-BXSFODF-JWFS- supplied candidates. !e intern and co-op programs more over the previous decade (Chiles Commission o#ered within the complex are an e#ective tool to 17 Of course, total employment at the eight sites in the nuclear weapons complex is higher, because some employees work on environmental cleanup and other programs unrelated to nuclear weapons. Of 20,000 employees in the weapons program in 2007, 12,759 had essential skills for that program (DOD 2008). An earlier GAO report cited 10,000 critically skilled workers (GAO 2005). 18 The six organizations were the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory in Cambridge, MA; Commonwealth Edison Co. in Chicago, IL; the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, CA; Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in Laurel, MD; Lockheed Martin in Bethesda, MD; and the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, DC. 38 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S address that problem, according to the commission. Sandia—and a trend toward funding a greater number !e commission further recommended that the DOE of smaller projects has created an explosion of paper- make better use of its retired employees to help train XPSL /"1" 4PNFFNQMPZFFTBMTPGFFMUIBU new personnel, review work at the labs, and serve as a their work is micromanaged (National Research Coun- reserve force of experts who could be brought back cil 2012). !ese di%culties re$ect the NNSA’s larger should the need arise. challenge of balancing autonomy and accountability at the laboratories. Reexamining Personnel Challenges *OBOE UIF("0SFWJFXFEUIF//4"T Successful Strategies for Retaining e#orts to recruit and retain key skilled personnel, as Key Personnel EJEUIF%FGFOTF4DJFODF#PBSE5BTL'PSDFPO/VDMFBS Despite these challenges, the reviews also found that %FUFSSFODF4LJMMTJO ("0B %0% the NNSA and its contractors have responded to the ("0 ɨF /BUJPOBM 3FTFBSDI $PVODJM BMTP Chiles Commission report with strategies that have considered sta# recruitment and turnover during an allowed them to attract and retain critically skilled assessment of management and research at the three employees. !e 2012 NRC report found no increase NNSA labs (National Research Council 2012). in turnover among science and engineering sta# at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore after their transition In its 2012 report, the GAO found that UPNBOBHFNFOUCZQSJWBUFDPOUSBDUPSTJOBOE BQBSUGSPNXPSLGPSDFDVUTBU-JWFSNPSF /BUJPOBM the restrictive work environment posed 3FTFBSDI$PVODJM ɨF("0TJNJMBSMZGPVOE that the average age of critically skilled NNSA em- a challenge to recruiting employees to ployees had remained stable from 2001 to 2005, and work at weapons facilities—especially FYQFDUFEJUUPEFDMJOFCFHJOOJOHJO /PEBUBBSF readily available on whether that has occurred.) younger workers. Like the Chiles Commission, these reviews found that salary and bene"ts are the most important factors !ese reviews found that the NNSA and its con- in retaining employees at all eight major NNSA facili- tractors still face challenges in recruiting and retaining UJFT ("0B $POUSBDUPSTUIBUSVOUIPTFGBDJMJUJFT key personnel. In 2005, contractors cited four primary have used hiring and retention bonuses—along with di%culties: the amount of time required for employees higher base salaries in some specialty "elds—to recruit to obtain a security clearance; a shrinking pool of U.S. and retain skilled sta#. Congressional authorization of citizens educated in key science and technology "elds; three programs that allow the DOE to exempt up to the high cost of living near some facilities, particularly QPTJUJPOTGSPNOPSNBMTBMBSZDBQT BOEUIF//4" the weapons labs and the Nevada Site; and the isolated to exempt up to 300, have helped these agencies location of many NNSA facilities, which limits career IJSFBOESFUBJOIJHIMZTLJMMFEFNQMPZFFT*O opportunities for spouses, among other problems. QFPQMFIFMETVDIQPTJUJPOT ("0B *OJUTSFQPSU UIF("0GPVOEUIBUUIFSFTUSJD- Despite the Chiles Commission’s recommendation, tive work environment also posed a challenge to re- the NNSA does not allow contractors to make their cruiting employees to work at weapons facilities— own compensation decisions: they must obtain advance especially younger workers. Much of this work must approval for any changes in salaries or bene"ts. Even occur in secure areas without access to personal e-mail, so, to enhance employee quality of life, some contrac- personal cell phones, and social media, yet many young tors now o#er day care facilities, "tness centers, and people expect to stay more or less continuously con- $exible work hours. !e contractors have also created nected to their peers and family. Young candidates or expanded professional development programs, which with the right quali"cations are also often more inter- provide in-house training and allow employees to ested in improving the environment than in designing attend professional meetings or earn a bachelor’s or XFBQPOT ("0B advanced degree. Contractors have also created train- 8JUIGFXFSTVQQPSUTUBêCFDBVTFPGCVEHFUDVUT ing and mentoring programs that allow experienced technical personnel must now spend more time on sta# to transfer knowledge to new sta#. administrative work and fund-raising and less on in- NNSA contractors have active recruitment pro- dependent research (National Research Council 2012). grams, primarily targeting recent graduates. Intern- An increase in DOE budget reporting categories—there ships, fellowships, and summer jobs—particularly at are more than 100 for the nuclear weapons program at the nuclear weapons labs—have become a signi"cant M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 39 source of new hires. The number of postdoctoral XJUIUIF%0%UIFMBSHFTUTQPOTPS8'0BDDPVOUFE fellows at the labs, and the quality of their work as GPSBCPVUPOFUIJSEPGXPSLBU4BOEJB QFSDFOUBU measured by publications and citations, have risen over -JWFSNPSF BOEQFSDFOUBU-PT"MBNPTJO': UIFQBTUTFWFSBMZFBST1PTUEPDUPSBMQSPHSBNTBSFPOF /"1" 5P BUUSBDU UPQRVBMJUZ TDJFOUJTUT BOE of the most important sources of permanent scienti"c engineers, the labs must continue to develop expertise and engineering sta#: essentially all those hired to do and new programs in non-nuclear areas, according to basic research end up contributing to nuclear weapons the 2012 NRC report, and all are trying to do so. projects. Some become full-time employees in the !e three nuclear weapons labs are also part of the weapons program, while others continue to pursue DOE’s Laboratory Directed Research and Develop- basic research but spend part of their time on weapons NFOU1SPHSBN XIJDIBMMPXTUIFNUPTFUBTJEFVQUP projects (National Research Council 2012). To address percent of their budgets for basic non-nuclear research, longer-term needs and compensate for the declining awarded competitively (DOE n.d.). Overhead charged number of U.S. citizens graduating with science degrees, by each laboratory to both its DOE and non-DOE the contractors have developed outreach programs to sponsors funds this program. Nuclear weapons pro- promote science, math, and engineering at local middle duction plants and the Nevada Site can also use up and high schools. UPQFSDFOUPGUIFJSCVEHFUTGPSCBTJDSFTFBSDI VOEFS Like the Chiles Commission, these reviews also UIF1MBOU%JSFDUFE3FTFBSDIBOE%FWFMPQNFOUBOE found that challenging, meaningful work is a signi"- 4JUF %JSFDUFE 3FTFBSDI BOE %FWFMPQNFOU 1SPHSBNT cant factor in attracting and retaining key sta#. NNSA 5BCMF /POFPGUIFTJUFTVTFBMMUIFCVEHFUTBMMPUUFE DPOUSBDUPSTCFMJFWFUIBUUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SP- for these programs, so they have room to expand. gram o#ers many challenges in basic research that make !e labs are also exploring other ways to expand working at NNSA facilities attractive. !e NNSA also their work and allow researchers to collaborate across sponsors research on arms control, nonproliferation, the weapons complex and with colleagues in industry safeguards, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation, and academia. One example is the Livermore Valley which adds to the intellectual challenge. Open Campus (LVOC), a joint e#ort of Lawrence Employees at NNSA facilities also do cutting-edge Livermore and Sandia Laboratories’ California site work unrelated to the nuclear weapons program for MBVODIFEJO.PEFMFEBGUFS3%DBNQVTFTBU other parts of the DOE. Such work accounted for about major industrial parks and other DOE labs, the LVOC QFSDFOUPGBMMXPSLBU-PT"MBNPT QFSDFOUBU-BX- seeks to enhance national security by engaging with rence Livermore, and 10 percent at Sandia in FY 2011. the broader scienti"c community (LLNL n.d.). "OEVOEFSUIF8PSLGPS0UIFST 8'0 QSPHSBN FN- To make the best use of the expertise and facilities ployees at the national labs perform work for other at the labs, to focus their work on the highest- federal agencies and nongovernmental organizations, priority national security needs, and to facilitate Table 7. Share of Total Budget Devoted to Directed R&D at Eight Nuclear Weapons Sites, FY 2012 Directed R&D program Number of costs Total budget Percent Percent projects (millions) (millions) spent allowed Los Alamos 293 $142 $2,051 6.9% 8% Lawrence Livermore 159 $92 $1,646 5.6% 8% Sandia 433 $162 $2,425 6.7% 8% Nevada Site 40 $5.5 $404 1.4% 4% Kansas City Plant 102 $12 $634 1.9% 4% Pantex 19 $1.4 $555 0.3% 4% Savannah River 10 $2.2 $148 1.5% 4% Y-12 76 $24 $776 3.1% 4% Source: DOE 2013d. 40 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S long-term strategic planning, in 2010 the DOE, the colleagues outside the complex, such as the Livermore DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Valley Open Campus. !e NNSA should also continue director of intelligence established an Interagency UP TVQQPSU EJSFDUFE 3% QSPHSBNT BOE JOWFTUJ Council on the Strategic Capability of DOE National gate why its facilities are not making full use of the Laboratories as National Security Assets. funding available to them. The Future of the Nuclear Weapons F INDING Workforce t ɨF//4"BOEJUTDPOUSBDUPSTXJMMDPOUJOVF !e NNSA and its contractors will continue to face to face competition in attracting and retain- competition in attracting highly trained technical sta#. ing highly trained technical sta#. However, However, the strategies of o#ering competitive salaries today’s strategies of o#ering competitive sala- and bene"ts and providing interesting work are likely ries and bene"ts and providing interesting work to continue to be e#ective. Indeed, in the 15 years since are likely to overcome this challenge. the Chiles Commission report, retaining technical expertise has proved to be a manageable problem for R E C O MMENDATIONS the NNSA. !e economic environment has worked in the agen- t 5PNBLFXPSLJOHBU//4"GBDJMJUJFTJOUFSFTU- cy’s favor. In a poor economy, jobs at NNSA facilities— ing and challenging, the NNSA should expand seen as relatively stable compared with many private- UIF8PSLGPS0UIFSTQSPHSBNBOEDSFBUFNPSF sector jobs—have greater appeal, and fewer industry innovative programs such as the Livermore jobs may be available. As the economy improves, com- Valley Open Campus. petition may grow, particularly in high-demand "elds t ɨF //4" TIPVME FOTVSF UIBU JUT GBDJMJUJFT such as computer science. Salaries at NNSA facilities NBLF GVMM VTF PG GVOEJOH GPS EJSFDUFE 3% appear to be mid-range for comparable jobs nation- programs, which support basic research, and wide, so the agency and its contractors may need to investigate why they are not doing so now. o#er more "nancial incentives if the private sector t ɨF //4" BOE JUT DPOUSBDUPST TIPVME DPO CFHJOTUPDSFBUFNPSFKPCT (MBTTEPPSDPNOE tinue to o#er competitive salary-and-bene"ts To help ensure that NNSA facilities remain an packages. attractive career option for highly quali"ed personnel, t ɨF //4" BOE JUT DPOUSBDUPST TIPVME QSP- UIFBHFODZTIPVMEFYQBOEUIF8PSLGPS0UIFSTQSPHSBN vide working conditions with fewer bureau- and opportunities for such employees to engage with cratic constraints. Students in an annual summer workshop at the Livermore Valley Open Campus, 2013. Photo: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 41 C HAPTER 6 Minimizing the Security Risks of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material he nuclear complex stores and handles large quantities of weapons-usable "ssile materials— HEU and plutonium—at several sites across the United States. !ese materials should be Tstored and disposed of in a way that minimizes their security risks. !is chapter examines the sites in the United States that now store HEU and plutonium, considers plans to store and dispose of these materials, and suggests a more sensible path. Storing and Disposing of Plutonium Since launching the nuclear weapons program during 8PSME8BS** UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTIBTQSPEVDFENPSF than 100 metric tons of plutonium for military pur- QPTFT8IJMFTPNFPGUIJTIBTCFFODPOTVNFEJOOVDMFBS tests or discarded as waste, the U.S. inventory today FYDFFETNFUSJDUPOT20 !e federal government has Storage cask containing transuranic waste including plutonium EFDMBSFENPSFUIBONFUSJDUPOTPGUIJTQMVUPOJVN being put on a trailer at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico, 2002. as excess to military needs, and is examining ways to dispose of it. A simple implosion nuclear weapon requires some 1BOUFY1MBOUJO5FYBT BTFJUIFSTFQBSBUFEQJUTPSJO six kilograms of plutonium, whereas a sophisticated weapons awaiting dismantlement. Some of the pits at implosion design might use as little as two kilograms. 1BOUFYNFUSJDUPOTXPSUIBSFFYDFTTUPNJMJ- tary needs, while others are stored for potential reuse Storage Sites for Military Plutonium 5BCMF Q In recent years, the United States has consolidated plu- 1BOUFYJTBVUIPSJ[FEUPTUPSFVQUP QJUT BOE tonium at fewer sites in the nuclear weapons complex, IBEBCPVU BTPG+VOF PantexInfo enhancing security and reducing the costs of storing 1VCMJDMZBOOPVODFESBUFTGPSEJTNBOUMJOHOVDMFBSXFBQ- and guarding this material. About two-thirds of this ons suggest that the DOD added at least another 1,000 QMVUPOJVNNFUSJDUPOTJTJOQJUGPSN4PNF QJUTCZUIFFOEPG %0%B "-PT"MBNPT pits are in the nuclear weapons stockpile, controlled NBHB[JOFOPUFEJOUIBUQJUTUPSBHFBU1BOUFYJT by the DOD. !e remaining pits are stored at the “nearing capacity,” but whether that means it has nearly 19 Highy enriched uranium consists of 20 percent or more uranium-235, while low-enriched uranium consists of less than 20 percent U-235. Weapons-grade uranium consists of more than 90 percent uranium-235. Because all HEU can be used directly to make a nuclear weapon, anything other than small amounts requires strict security measures. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission classifies amounts of fissile material in three categories, based on their potential use in nuclear weapons. Category I material is HEU containing five or more kilograms of U-235. Category II is HEU containing one or more kilograms of U-235, or LEU enriched to 10 percent or more that contains 10 or more kilograms of U-235. Category III is HEU containing 15 or more grams of U-235, LEU enriched to 10 percent or more that contains one or more kilograms of U-235, or LEU enriched to less than 10 percent that contains 10 or more kilograms of U-235. 20 These figures do not include the 680 metric tons of plutonium in 68,000 metric tons of spent fuel from civilian reactors. Because this material is embedded in large, heavy, highly radioactive fuel rods, it is relatively invulnerable to theft. Photo: DOE 42 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S Table 8. Sites with Plutonium, as of September 2009 (in metric tons) Plutonium not in waste Military Plutonium Facility + excess Excess in waste Notes Pantex Excess plutonium is in the form of separated pits and pits in 23.4 0 Plant weapons awaiting disassembly. 67.7 Department Plutonium under the control of the DOD is in the form of pits 0 0 of Defense in deployed and reserve weapons. Savannah The amount of plutonium not in waste has likely grown since River Site 12.0 8.8 0.8 2009, as consolidation of excess non-pit plutonium from other sites was to occur through 2010. Hanford Plutonium remaining at Hanford is in spent fuel: four tons is in Site fuel from the N-reactor, and 2.6 tons is in fuel from the Fast Flux 6.6 0.3 2.1 Test Facility, part of the former U.S. breeder reactor program (IPFM 2010). Idaho Idaho stored four metric tons of fresh fuel for the Zero Power National 4.6 0 1.4 Physics Reactor, retained for potential future use, as of 2007 Laboratory (DOE 2007c). Los Alamos National 4.0 1.2 0.6 Laboratory Nevada This figure does not include plutonium contamination from National 0.01 nuclear tests. Security Site Oak Ridge National 0.03 Laboratory Other sites As of October 2012, 0.3 metric ton of plutonium had been transferred from Livermore to Savannah River. The remaining 0.2 0.5 metric ton includes DOE-owned material in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Other sites 0.7 Additional In 2007, the U.S. declared another nine metric tons of weapons- 9.0 grade plutonium excess to military needs, and that it would be removed from retired, dismantled weapons. Waste Isolation 4.8 Pilot Plant (WIPP) TOTAL The 43.4 metric tons of excess plutonium is weapons-grade (less than 7 percent Pu-240). There are 52 metric tons of military 95.4 43.4 9.7 plutonium, of which 37.9 are weapons-grade, 12.7 are fuel-grade (7 percent to 19 percent Pu-240), and 1.4 are power-reactor- grade (19 percent or more Pu-240). Source: NNSA 2012f. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 43 20,000 pits or that existing capacity is less than 20,000 also stores a small amount of plutonium in waste, plus pits is unclear (Dillingham 2012).21 unknown amounts left underground after hundreds of *O UIF//4"EFDJEFEUPDPOTPMJEBUFBTNVDI explosive tests. excess non-pit plutonium as possible—including ma- "TPG TPNFNFUSJDUPOTPGQMVUPOJVNJO UFSJBMUIFOBU)BOGPSEJO8BTIJOHUPO -PT"MBNPT BOE XBTUFGPSNIBECFFOEJTQPTFEPGBUUIF8BTUF*TPMBUJPO Lawrence Livermore—at the Savannah River Site 1JMPU1MBOU 8*11 JO/FX.FYJDP8*11 CBTFEJOB CZUIFFOEPG %0&D "TPG4FQUFNCFS dry rock salt bed, is a permanent repository for trans- 4BWBOOBI3JWFSTUPSFENFUSJDUPOT PGXIJDI uranic waste, which includes clothing, tools, rags, de- UPOTXFSFFYDFTT CVUUIFTFBNPVOUTIBWFMJLFMZ bris, residues, and other disposable items contaminated increased since then. with plutonium and other transuranic elements. !e In September 2012, the NNSA announced it had amount of plutonium mixed in with the waste is small removed all “signi"cant” amounts of plutonium from enough that it does not pose a security risk. Livermore, leaving it with fewer than 500 grams for research (NNSA 2012d). (!e Nuclear Regulatory After designating 43 metric tons of Commission classi"es amounts of "ssile material in three categories, based on their potential use in nuclear plutonium as excess to military needs, the weapons. For plutonium, Category I, II, and III amounts are two kilograms, 500 grams, and 15 grams United States now has roughly 52 metric PG1V SFTQFDUJWFMZ"iTJHOJëDBOUwBNPVOUSFGFST tons of plutonium for weapons, which is UP$BUFHPSZ*BOE**BNPVOUTPGNBUFSJBM 1PTUQPOF- ment of construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy enough for some 13,000 U.S. weapons— Research Replacement–Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos means that more work on characterizing plutonium many more than needed for the current will occur at Livermore. Shipments of Category III amounts of plutonium from Los Alamos to Livermore or future arsenal. for such work are scheduled to begin in 2015 (LLNL 2013a; Dillingham 2012). Plutonium Research at Lawrence Livermore Los Alamos stored four metric tons of plutonium 8IJMFUIF//4"IBTSFNPWFEBMM$BUFHPSZ*BOE** BTPG4FQUFNCFSɨF6OJUFE4UBUFTIBTEFDMBSFE quantities of plutonium from Lawrence Livermore, 1.2 metric tons of that to be excess, and has likely outside experts believe that the agency will send pits moved that amount to Savannah River. !e remaining or primaries to the laboratory for periodic testing at NFUSJDUPOTFOPVHIGPSNPSFUIBO QJUTJT JUT )BSEFOFE &OHJOFFSJOH5FTU #VJMEJOH #VJMEJOH available to produce new pits for nuclear warheads. 5S J 7B M M F Z $"3&4 ɨJT GBDJMJUZ IFBUT 8PSLFSTBU)BOGPSEQSPEVDFENJMJUBSZQMVUPOJVN cools, drops, and shakes components “to duplicate GPSNBOZZFBST BOENFUSJDUPOTJOTQFOUOVDMFBS as nearly as possible the likely environments for a fuel remains. It is considered a low security risk, weapon during its lifetime, known as its stockpile- because the spent fuel is radioactive and in large and UPUBSHFUTFRVFODFw 4FGDJLQ ɨFTFFYQFSUT heavy fuel assemblies, making theft di%cult. expect the NNSA to grant Livermore an exemption Idaho National Laboratory, which conducts research to handle Category I amounts of plutonium on an POOVDMFBSSFBDUPSTBOEGVFMT TUPSFTNFUSJDUPOTPG as-needed basis. However, the site is no longer set up QMVUPOJVNNPTUJOGSFTISFBDUPSGVFM8IJMFUIJTGVFM to handle such quantities of plutonium. According is not highly radioactive, the plutonium is again em- to the NNSA, Lawrence Livermore “may require bedded in large and heavy assemblies, so stealing it special security accommodations on a periodic basis would be di%cult. to support stockpile stewardship (NNSA 2013a Savannah River, Hanford, Idaho, Los Alamos, and p. 5–12). Oak Ridge National Laboratory also store material that (JWFOUIFTFDVSJUZSJTLTPGUIJTQMVUPOJVN JUXPVME has been contaminated with plutonium. !e Nevada make more sense to move the equipment in that build- National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site) ing to a location that already handles Category I 21 In 2008, the NNSA considered expanding its capacity to store pits, including by constructing a new building at Pantex. A 2008 report cited a “pinch point” between 2014 and 2022, when the number of pits stored at Pantex would exceed its capacity. However, the report also noted several alternatives to a new building, including improved storage (TechSource 2008). The fact that a Los Alamos publication says the lab is “nearing capacity” (Dillingham 2012 p. 23) suggests that a problem may still exist. 44 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S amounts of plutonium, and will continue to do so over the facility to allow it to store powdered plutonium UIFMPOHFSUFSN1BOUFYXPVMECFUIFNPTUTFOTJCMF safely and securely. More important, moving pluto- location, because technicians there disassemble weap- nium from Los Alamos to Nevada would undermine ons from the stockpile for surveillance and testing. the goal of consolidating it and introduce new security risks, because the Nevada Site does not now store F INDING signi"cant quantities of plutonium. Another approach to free up space at the Los Ala- t ɨF//4"TIPVMEBWPJETFOEJOH$BUFHPSZ* NPT1MVUPOJVN'BDJMJUZ JGOFDFTTBSZ JTUPTIJQTPNF quantities of plutonium to Lawrence Liver- material to the Savannah River Site, which already more, because doing so would introduce new stores a large amount of non-pit plutonium. security risks. F INDINGS R E C O MMENDATION t ɨFQSPQPTFEWBVMUUIBUXPVMECFCVJMUBMPOH t ɨF //4" TIPVME TUVEZ UIF GFBTJCJMJUZ PG with the Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos is un- moving the equipment in the Hardened En- necessary. HJOFFSJOH5FTU#VJMEJOHUP1BOUFYPSBOPUIFS t 5P NJOJNJ[F UIF DPTUT BOE TFDVSJUZ SJTLT PG site that will host plutonium over the longer storing plutonium, the NNSA should consol- term. idate the material at as few sites as possible. Plutonium Stored at Los Alamos R E C O MMENDATION !e proposed Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement–Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos includes t *GTPNFQMVUPOJVNOPXTUPSFEBUUIF-PT"MB- a vault for long-term storage of up to six metric tons NPT 1MVUPOJVN 'BDJMJUZ NVTU CF NPWFE UP of nuclear material. In the environmental assessment free up space, it should be transferred to the conducted for the facility, the only argument made for Savannah River Site. such a vault is that the existing Chemistry and Metal- lurgy Research Facility has a large one. However, this Disposing of Excess Plutonium is not a compelling argument. !e same assessment "GUFS EFTJHOBUJOH NFUSJD UPOT PG QMVUPOJVN BT noted that the existing vault was downgraded because excess to military needs, the United States now has of safety concerns, and contains only Category III or roughly 52 metric tons of plutonium for weapons. U.S. smaller quantities of plutonium or other radioactive primaries contain less than four kilograms of pluto- materials (NNSA 2003). nium, so 52 metric tons is enough for some 13,000 Most of the plutonium at Los Alamos is stored at U.S. weapons—many more than needed for the cur- JUT1MVUPOJVN'BDJMJUZɨFWBVMUUIFSFJTSFMBUJWFMZGVMM rent or future arsenal. CVUXBTUFXJMMCFQSPDFTTFEBOETIJQQFEUP8*11*G !e federal government has considered two meth- more space is needed, the “NNSA can stage plutonium ods for disposing of excess plutonium. !e "rst entails for future program use in the Device Assembly Facility immobilizing it (in metal or oxide form) with highly in Nevada,” according to the agency’s FY 2013 budget radioactive waste in rods made of glass or ceramic SFRVFTU %0&CQ material. !ese rods would be heavy, large, and so !e Device Assembly Facility was built to assemble radioactive that theft would be very di%cult. !ey the nuclear weapons tested underground at the Nevada would be disposed of in a permanent underground re- Test Site. !e facility was not completed until after pository for nuclear waste, once one is built. Alterna- XIFOUIF6OJUFE 4UBUFT CFHBO BNPSBUPSJVN tively, the rods could be placed in very deep boreholes. on such tests. It is built to be highly secure, and is The second method entails converting suitable underused, relatively new, and isolated from popu- plutonium into an oxidized form, and then mixing it lation centers. with low-enriched uranium oxide. !is process pro- "%0&TUVEZJEFOUJëFEUIFGBDJMJUZBTPOFPG duces “mixed oxide,” or MOX, which could be made several that could store plutonium pits—in this case, into fuel rods for use in commercial nuclear reactors. %0&C ɨFQMVUPOJVNBU-PT"MBNPTJT (U.S. commercial reactors use uranium oxide as fuel. in powdered form and easily inhaled, so it poses a As it burns, some is converted into plutonium, so all greater health risk than plutonium pits (NNSA 2011c). operating reactors already have plutonium in their Diverting some powder is also easier than stealing an core.) After use, this spent fuel would also be disposed entire pit. !e NNSA may therefore need to modify of in a geological repository. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 45 Although it contains plutonium and other "ssion- facture, transport, and storage of MOX fuel at reactor able material that could be used to make a nuclear sites would therefore increase the risk of nuclear weapon, spent fuel from commercial power plants is terrorism. not attractive to terrorists because the material is in Even worse, the theft of enough plutonium to build large, heavy fuel rods that remain too radioactive for one or more nuclear weapons from a MOX fabrication direct handling for decades. Moving the rods requires facility could go undetected for several years. Such a heavy machinery, and extracting weapons-usable facility would handle plutonium in solution or powder amounts of plutonium requires a major, industrial-sized form, so measuring the exact amount in the facility program. !ese barriers motivated the “spent fuel stan- would be impossible. For a facility with an annual dard” for plutonium disposal: !e National Academy throughput of several metric tons of plutonium, the of Sciences recommended that excess plutonium from measurement uncertainty would range from several defense purposes be rendered as inaccessible and un- kilograms to tens of kilograms. At a Japanese fuel pro- attractive as the growing stockpile of civilian spent fuel EVDUJPOGBDJMJUZJOUIFT UIFBNPVOUPGQMVUPOJVN /"4 OPUBDDPVOUFEGPSHSFXUPLJMPHSBNTPWFSëWFZFBST #PUIJNNPCJMJ[BUJPOBOEUIF.09PQUJPONFFU Determining how much material remained in pipes the spent fuel standard. Immobilization does so by mix- and elsewhere required shutting down and cleaning ing plutonium with highly radioactive material and out the entire facility. To account for that discrepancy, placing it in a large, heavy object. !e MOX option the Japanese operator eventually shut down the plant, does so by incorporating the plutonium into fuel and and found that the missing plutonium had accumu- irradiating it in a reactor. However, the MOX approach lated as dust on equipment inside. !e theft of tens of presents far greater security risks. kilograms—enough for several weapons—could have !at is because fresh MOX fuel does not contain gone undetected for years. the highly radioactive components that make spent fuel Yet to cut costs and make MOX more palatable for dangerous and di%cult to handle. Moreover, a straight- utilities that operate nuclear power plants, the NNSA forward chemical process can be used to separate has encouraged the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the plutonium in MOX from the uranium. !e manu- (NRC) to reduce safeguards and security requirements MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility under construction at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, 2012. Photo: NNSA News 46 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S for MOX fuel, which would otherwise need to be pro- #FDBVTF PG UIFTF DPTU JODSFBTFT BOE EFMBZT UIF tected like plutonium. !e NRC has already weakened Obama administration has decided to slow down con- security requirements for storing MOX fuel at reactor struction of the facility and consider alternatives to sites, and is considering across-the-board security .09*OJUT':CVEHFUSFRVFTU UIF//4"BTLFE SPMMCBDLTGPS.098FBLFOJOHTFDVSJUZVOEFSNJOFTB GPSNJMMJPOUPCVJMEUIF.09GBDJMJUZMFTTUIBO chief goal of plutonium disposition: reducing the like- UIFNJMMJPOCVEHFUJO':BOEUIFNJM- lihood of theft. lion budget in FY 2012. Out-year funding for construction has been zeroed out. It makes no sense U.S. Plans for Plutonium to continue building the MOX facility while the NNSA *O VOEFS1SFTJEFOUT$MJOUPOBOE1VUJO UIF6OJUFE considers other options. 4UBUFTBOE3VTTJBFBDIBHSFFEUPEJTQPTFPGNFUSJD If the Obama administration decides to continue the tons of plutonium excess to military needs, using either MOX approach, the DOE needs to "nd one or more or both approaches. Delays, disagreements, and pro- utilities that are willing to burn the plutonium-based gram changes have meant that the nations have since fuel in their reactors. Duke Energy signed a contract made no progress toward that goal. UPVTFUIFGVFM CVUBMMPXFEJUUPMBQTFJO/P At the time, the United States planned to use both other willing partners have emerged. disposal methods, while Russia was intent on the MOX #FGPSF BOOPVODJOH UIF SFDPOTJEFSBUJPO UIF BE option. Shortly after the initial agreement, Russian ministration’s preferred solution appeared to be to have o%cials argued that because immobilization would not the Tennessee Valley Authority, a federally owned change the isotopic composition of the plutonium, it corporation that provides power to the Southeast, use would not meet the spent fuel standard. Russia threat- the fuel in its nuclear reactors. !e TVA is studying the ened to withdraw from the agreement if the United idea but has not made a decision. !e fuel would States pursued immobilization. Meanwhile, the United require extensive testing before it could be used in the States grew increasingly concerned about the cost of TVA reactors. the dual-track approach. Although the DOE had con- cluded that immobilization would be less expensive A Better Alternative UIBOUIF.09PQUJPO UIF#VTIBENJOJTUSBUJPOFOEFE #FDBVTFEJTQPTJOHPGFYDFTTQMVUPOJVNCZDPOWFSUJOH the immobilization program in 2002 and focused solely it to MOX fuel poses greater security risks than immo- on MOX (NNSA 2002). bilization, the United States should cancel the MOX !e U.S.-Russian agreement, updated in 2010, now program and refocus on immobilization. !at would speci"es that both Russia and the United States will require renegotiating the 2010 plutonium agreement, use the MOX method.22 !e United States also plans but Russia would likely be willing to do so, given that to use it to dispose of all other excess plutonium that the United States recently agreed to change the origi- is in a form suitable to be made into MOX. All excess nal agreement to accommodate Russia’s desires. plutonium that is unsuitable for conversion to MOX— %FTQJUFUIFCJMMJPOBMSFBEZJOWFTUFEJOUIF.09 SPVHIMZUXPNFUSJDUPOTXPVMECFTIJQQFEUP8*11 program, immobilizing excess plutonium may be less in southeastern New Mexico (NNSA 2012a). costly. It may also be possible to convert the partially !e United States is building a MOX fuel fabrica- completed MOX facility for use in immobilization. tion facility at the Savannah River Site. !e initial 2003 How long it would take to restart the immobili- FTUJNBUFXBTUIBUDPOTUSVDUJPOXPVMEDPTUCJMMJPO zation program is unclear, but continued temporary BOECFDPNQMFUFECZ#Z4FQUFNCFS UIF storage of excess plutonium at Savannah River and UPUBMDPTUPGUIF.09QSPHSBNIBESJTFOUPCJM- 1BOUFYJTBTFDVSFBOETBGFPQUJPO$PODFSOTBCPVUUIF MJPO BOETUBSUVQIBETMJQQFEUP BDDPSEJOHUP vulnerability of Russian plutonium drove the relatively press reports (Jacobson 2012). !e plant’s expected rapid timelines initially proposed for the program. annual operating costs have also risen by nearly a half- billion dollars per year. 22 The 2010 update occurred in response to Russia’s request to use fast breeder reactors to burn excess plutonium. Such reactors can produce more plutonium than they burn. The U.S. State Department noted that the reactors will be “operating under certain nonproliferation conditions,” to ensure that they only burn plutonium and do not produce more of it (Department of State 2010). M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 47 F INDINGS of the most recent o%cial information, the U.S. inven- UPSZ DPOUBJOFE NFUSJD UPOT PG )&6 BOE t "GUFSEJTQPTJOHPGFYDFTTQMVUPOJVN UIF6OJUFE NFUSJDUPOTPG6 %0&C "TPGNJE States will retain enough for some 13,000 nu- UIF*OUFSOBUJPOBM1BOFMPO'JTTJMF.BUFSJBMTFTUJNBUFT clear weapons—much more than it needs. UIBU UIF 64 )&6 TUPDLQJMF XBT NFUSJD UPOT t %JTQPTJOHPGFYDFTTQMVUPOJVNCZDPOWFSUJOH It continues to shrink as more HEU is down-blended it to MOX and burning it in civilian nuclear to LEU. reactors would pose greater security risks than immobilizing the plutonium. Storing HEU t $POUJOVJOHUPCVJMEUIF.09GBDJMJUZXIJMF Most of the U.S. HEU inventory is stored at the Y-12 considering alternatives is not a good use of National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, TN; in funds. weapons awaiting dismantlement or undergoing life FYUFOTJPOBUUIF1BOUFY1MBOUJO"NBSJMMP 59 PSJO R E C O MMENDATIONS XFBQPOTBU%0%TJUFT 5BCMF Q *O UIF t ɨF//4"TIPVMEEFDMBSFNPSFQMVUPOJVN )&6BUUIFTFTJUFTUPUBMFENFUSJDUPOTNPSFUIBO to be excess to its military needs. QFSDFOUPGUIF64)&6JOWFOUPSZBUUIFUJNF t ɨF//4"TIPVMEDBODFMUIF.09QSPHSBN %0&C ɨJTNBUFSJBMJOXBSIFBETPSBGPSN and focus on immobilizing excess plutonium. that can easily be transported and used to make a bomb—is the most attractive to terrorists. Storing and Disposing of HEU Other HEU, most in the form of spent nuclear As part of a weapon’s secondary, HEU is a crucial com- reactor fuel, is stored at the Savannah River Site and ponent of all modern U.S. two-stage thermonuclear the Idaho National Laboratory. Spent naval nuclear weapons. HEU is also used as fuel in the nuclear reac- fuel is also shipped to Idaho for long-term storage or tors that power all U.S. submarines and aircraft carri- disposal. !is HEU is in heavy, highly radioactive spent ers. !ese reactors are fueled with weapons-grade HEU fuel rods that present an inherent barrier to theft. FOSJDIFEUPHSFBUFSUIBOQFSDFOU23 HEU is used in "TPG BMNPTUNFUSJDUPOTPG)&6XFSF some U.S. research reactors as well, but the number is stored at several other sites, including the three weap- declining, as their operators are replacing HEU with POTMBCPSBUPSJFT 0BL3JEHFBOE#SPPLIBWFOOBUJPOBM fuel made of LEU, which cannot be used directly in weapons. HEU presents a greater security risk than plutonium because it can be used to make a simple gun-type weap- on, whereas a plutonium-based weapon requires a more di%cult implosion design. In a gun-type weapon, con- ventional propellant such as smokeless powder or gun- powder slams together two subcritical pieces of HEU. Such a weapon can be made with about 50 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU, whereas an implosion-type weapon would require about 20 kilograms of weapons- grade HEU. HEU is also far less radioactive than plutonium, making it easier to handle and more di%- cult to detect. 8IJMF PQFSBUJOH JUT OVDMFBS XFBQPOT QSPHSBNT the United States produced or acquired HEU contain- JOHBCPVUNFUSJDUPOTPG64PNFPGUIJTIBT been consumed as reactor fuel and in nuclear tests, transferred to foreign countries, or down-blended— mixed with natural or depleted uranium—to make -&6GVFMGPSSFBDUPST*O4FQUFNCFS UIFEBUF The Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility at Y-12, 2012. 23 Naval reactors can be converted to use LEU, and France already uses LEU to power its submarines (Ma and von Hippel 2001). However, the U.S. military has recommitted to using HEU in future boats and submarines. Photo: Brett Pate/B&W 48 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S Table 9. Sites Storing U.S. HEU, as of September 2004 (in metric tons) Site HEU Form Y-12, Pantex, and the DOD 621.2 In deployed and reserve weapons, in weapons awaiting dismantlement or undergoing life extension at Pantex, and in secondaries undergoing life extension or stored at Y-12. This material is weapons-grade HEU. Idaho National Laboratory 26.8 Spent naval reactor fuel Savannah River Site 18.7 HEU solution from the site’s previous role as a reprocessing facility; spent fuel from foreign and domestic research reactors Other sites, including Oak Ridge, 19.9 Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Brookhaven national laboratories Total 686.6 laboratories, and the Hanford Site. Some of this mate- solidate facilities that handle signi"cant amounts of rial has since been consolidated at Y-12, including all HEU. According to the agency, that facility will Category I and II HEU previously stored at Lawrence BMMPXBQFSDFOUSFEVDUJPOGSPNUPBDSFT -JWFSNPSF'JOBMMZ /VDMFBS'VFM4FSWJDFT B#BCDPDL in the site’s “protected area,” which requires the highest 8JMDPYTVCTJEJBSZJO&SXJO 5/ NBOVGBDUVSFT)&6 MFWFMPGTFDVSJUZ #8: naval reactor fuel, and stores some of it before trans- 8IJMFDPOTPMJEBUJPOPG)&6JOUIF)JHIMZ&OSJDIFE porting it to the Navy. Uranium Materials Facility is intended to improve security, a recent event raised questions about pro- HEU Storage at Y-12 UFDUJPOBU:0O+VMZ UISFFBOUJOVDMFBS !e main repository for weapons-related HEU is a QSPUFTUPSTBOZFBSPMEOVOBOEUXPNJEEMFBHFE new facility at Y-12, the Highly Enriched Uranium men—used bolt cutters to slip through fences and Materials Facility. !is high-security facility, which entered the protected area surrounding the facility, the replaced several aging structures at Y-12 and across the highest-security area at Y-12. Although their intrusion country, stores HEU from throughout the nation’s set o# several alarms, the three were in the secured area nuclear complex. Often touted as the Fort Knox of long enough to put up banners and paint slogans on HEU, the facility is made of reinforced concrete and the outside of the building before being apprehended designed to withstand various kinds of disasters, in- CZ:TFDVSJUZGPSDFT8IJMFUIFUISFFEJEOPUFOUFS cluding $ooding, earthquakes, lightning strikes, torna- the building, their ability to reach it could have had does, and aircraft impact (DOE 2013b). Construction serious consequences if they had been terrorists. XBTCFHVOJOBOEDPNQMFUFEJOBUBDPTUPG After investigating the incident, the DOE inspector NJMMJPOɨFGBDJMJUZCFHBOPQFSBUJOHJO general found that multiple security measures, includ- and is planned for a lifetime of 50 years. ing video cameras, were not active at the time of the !e transfer of HEU from several other locations break-in, and that security personnel did not respond at Y-12 to the new facility was completed in August to several alarms that did function—partly because of BOEBCPVUQFSDFOUPG:T)&6JTOPX many past false alarms. One press report cited up to stored there (NNSA 2011e). !e other 32 percent is 200 false alarms per day, many triggered by squirrels in use elsewhere at the site to supply near-term needs. BOEPUIFSTNBMMXJMEMJGF 1SJFTU "OPUIFSDJUFE Shipments of HEU from other sites will go directly to GBMTFBMBSNTJOKVTUUIFGPVSEBZTMFBEJOHVQUPUIF the facility. break-in (Munger 2013). !e investigation also found As Chapter 2 noted, the NNSA also plans to build that personnel inside the facility did not react to the UIF6SBOJVN1SPDFTTJOH'BDJMJUZBU:UPGVSUIFSDPO- noise the protestors made while using hammers to hang M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 49 banners outside because maintenance workers had After planned down-blending is often arrived without advance notice (DOE 2012d). 8IJMFJOWFTUJHBUPSTTUVEJFEUIFCSFBLJO UIF//4" complete, the United States will retain suspended all nuclear operations at Y-12 and placed all enriched uranium in vaults for two and a half weeks. about 260 metric tons of HEU for One member of the Y-12 security force was "red, several others were disciplined, and all site employees weapons purposes, which is enough attended security training. !e NNSA also removed for 10,000 to 16,000 U.S. weapons— top officials at the site’s management contractor, #BCDPDL8JMDPY: BOEJUTTFDVSJUZDPOUSBDUPS or two to three times the size of 84*o0BL3JEHF BOEJTTVFEBiTIPXDBVTFwOPUJDFUP #8: HJWJOHJUEBZTUPFYQMBJOXIZJUTDPO- the current arsenal. USBDUTIPVMEOPUCFSFWPLFE84*o0BL3JEHF XIJDI had received a citation for exemplary performance just one month before the break-in, was ultimately "red as security contractor (Schelzig 2012). HEU Storage at Savannah River ɨF64JOWFOUPSZPGëTTJMFNBUFSJBMTMJTUFE metric tons of HEU stored in the L-Area Complex at 4BWBOOBI3JWFS 43/4 %0&C ɨJT)&6 is in multiple forms, including spent nuclear fuel from foreign and domestic research reactors. HEU Storage at Idaho 8IJMFOPUQBSUPGUIFOVDMFBSXFBQPOTDPNQMFY *EBIP National Laboratory also houses a signi"cant amount PG)&6JOJUT/BWBM3FBDUPST'BDJMJUZ*O *EBIP TUPSFETPNFNFUSJDUPOTPG)&6JOTQFOUOBWBM SFBDUPSGVFMɨF/BWZQSPKFDUTUIBUBUPUBMPGNFUSJD tons of HEU in spent fuel will be sent to the facility CZ XIFOJUTBHSFFNFOUXJUIUIFMBCFYQJSFT #3$ 2012). !e NNSA has no plans to reprocess this spent fuel; it will be stored until it can be disposed of in a HFPMPHJDBMSFQPTJUPSZ ("0B !is fuel is placed in pools until it has cooled enough for transfer to canisters designed for both dry storage BU*EBIPBOEMBUFSUSBOTQPSUBOEEJTQPTBM #3$ #FDBVTFUIF)&6JTJOIJHIMZSBEJPBDUJWFTQFOUGVFM JU is a less attractive target for terrorists than the material BU:BOE1BOUFY Disposing of Excess HEU *O UIF6OJUFE4UBUFTEFDMBSFENFUSJDUPOTPG )&6UPCFFYDFTTUPNJMJUBSZOFFET0GUIJT NFUSJD UPOTXFSFJOUIFGPSNPGXBTUF BOEUIFSFNBJOJOH metric tons were to be down-blended to LEU and used to make reactor fuel. In 2005, the United States withdrew another 200 metric tons of HEU from use in nuclear weapons, TFUUJOHBTJEFNFUSJDUPOTPGUIBUGPSVTFBTGVFMJO OBWBMOVDMFBSSFBDUPST ɨF//4"TVQQMJFTNFUSJD Graffiti and blood on the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility left tons of HEU to the Navy each year, and must provide by trespassers during the Y-12 break-in, 2012. Photo: U.S. government photo courtesy of Transform Now Ploughshares 50 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S Table 10. Status of Excess U.S. HEU Metric tons of HEU Notes Declared excess to 174 In 1994 military needs Withdrawn from use in 200 In 2005 nuclear weapons Total 374 Reserved for naval fuel 128 160 metric tons were originally set aside from the 2005 declaration, but 32 metric tons of this are anticipated to be unusable for naval fuel and will be down-blended. Reserved for space and 20 Set aside from the 2005 declaration. research reactor fuel To be down-blended by 208 Another nine metric tons of HEU in irradiated fuel from 2050 research reactors will be down-blended, for a total of 217 metric tons. About 130 metric tons have already been down-blended. Waste 18 From 1994 declaration amount HEU through 2050, under an agreement with the SFUBJOBCPVUNFUSJDUPOTPG)&6 DPOUBJOJOH %0% ɨF//4"BOUJDJQBUFTUIBUPGUIFNFU- metric tons of U-235, for an average enrichment level ric tons will be unsuitable for naval fuel, and will PGQFSDFOU JOXFBQPOTBOEGPSXFBQPOTQVSQPTFT instead be down-blended (NNSA 2011a). Another and another 130 tons of weapons-grade HEU for 20 metric tons of HEU were reserved for space and OBWBMSFBDUPSGVFM *1'. research reactors that now use HEU, and the remain- U.S. weapons contain roughly 15 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU in the secondaries, and some Weapons are dismantled at a lower weapons also contain about 10 kilograms of HEU in the primary. If each weapon contains 15 to 25 kilo- rate than in the past, and that HSBNTPG)&6FOSJDIFEUPQFSDFOU6 UIF NFUSJDUPOTPG)&6JTFOPVHIGPS UP slowdown also means a slowdown weapons—which is two to three times the size of the current arsenal. in disposing of HEU. "TPG+BOVBSZ NFUSJDUPOTPGTVSQMVT)&6 had been down-blended, and another 11 metric tons ing 20 metric tons will be down-blended (DOE 2005). had been delivered to commercial facilities for near- ɨVT PGUIFNFUSJDUPOTPG)&6UIBUUIF6OJUFE term down-blending (State Department 2012b). !e States has declared to be excess to nuclear weapons, it resulting LEU, used for fuel for research and power FYQFDUTUPEPXOCMFOENFUSJDUPOT 5BCMF reactors, has an estimated market value of several Nine metric tons of HEU from spent fuel from U.S. CJMMJPO EPMMBST 1FSTPO %BWJT BOE 4DINJEU and foreign research reactors are also slated to be down- Meeting the DOE’s goal would require down-blending blended. !us, the DOE’s Surplus Fissile Materials BOPUIFSNFUSJDUPOTCZ PSKVTUUXPNFUSJD %JTQPTJUJPO1SPHSBNBJNTUPEPXOCMFOEBUPUBMPG tons per year—much lower than previous rates of up NFUSJDUPOTPG)&6CZ ("0C "GUFS to 20 metric tons per year. this down-blending is complete, the United States will 24 As of July 2012, about eight metric tons from the naval fuel allotment had been returned as unsuitable (Person, Davis, and Schmidt 2012). M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 51 NNSA o%cials acknowledge that the 2050 target date is an arbitrary placeholder, and that down-blend- ing could be completed earlier. The reason for choosing a date so far in the future, according to the agency, is that the actual rate of down-blending de- pends on when the HEU—some of which will come from dismantled retired weapons—is received. All EJTNBOUMJOHPGXFBQPOTOPXPDDVSTBUUIF1BOUFY1MBOU where this operation competes for space and personnel with life extension programs. As a result, weapons are dismantled at a lower rate than in the past, and that slowdown also means a slowdown in disposing of HEU ("0C F INDINGS t ɨF//4"TEFBEMJOFPGGPSEJTQPTJOH of excess HEU is arbitrary, and disposal could Workers take highly enriched uranium acquired be completed much sooner. from Russian nuclear weapons and convert it into t "GUFS EJTQPTJOH PG FYDFTT )&6 UIF 6OJUFE low-enriched uranium for use in U.S. commercial nuclear reactors, 2004. States will retain enough HEU for 10,000 to OVDMFBSXFBQPOTNVDINPSFUIBOJT needed for the current and future arsenal. t ɨF //4" TIPVME EFDMBSF NPSF )&6 UP CF t #VJMEJOHUIFOFX6SBOJVN1SPDFTTJOH'BDJMJUZ excess to military needs, and dispose of it ex- would allow greater consolidation of the HEU peditiously through down-blending or direct in use at Y-12. disposal. R E C O MMENDATIONS t ɨF //4" TIPVME SFNPWF BOZ SFNBJOJOH Category I HEU at weapons labs and other t ɨF//4"TIPVMETQFFEVQUIFEPXOCMFOE- sites, and consolidate it at Y-12. ing of existing excess HEU. Some of the re- t ɨF//4"TIPVMEDPOTUSVDUUIF6SBOJVN1SP sulting LEU should be reserved for use in cessing Facility after assessing the need for commercial reactors to produce tritium. production of new secondaries (see Chapter 2). Photo: DOE 52 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S C HAPTER 7 Dismantling Nuclear Warheads and Verifying Nuclear Reductions IF 0CBNB BENJOJTUSBUJPOT /VDMFBS 1PTUVSF nuclear explosive package (or “physics package”), which Review notes the need for “a comprehensive contains both the "ssile material and high explosive, is national research and development program removed from the weapon’s casing. !is step—known to support continued progress toward a world as mechanical disassembly—also includes removing Tfree of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on other non-nuclear components. Once mechanical dis- veri"cation technologies and the development of trans- assembly is complete, the weapon’s physics package is parency measures” (DOD 2010b p. vii). !us, beyond disassembled, with the high explosive, secondary, and maintaining the nuclear arsenal, the nuclear weapons pit stored or disposed of separately. complex also requires the capability to dismantle U.S. nuclear weapons are dismantled in specialized retired weapons in a timely fashion, and to develop QSPUFDUJWFGBDJMJUJFTDBMMFECBZTBOEDFMMTBUUIF1BOUFY ways to verify reductions and disarmament. 1MBOU8FBQPOTUIBUVTFJOTFOTJUJWFIJHIFYQMPTJWFBSF disassembled in bays, which are more numerous but Dismantling Nuclear Warheads less protective than cells. !e physics package is then !e DOE de"nes dismantlement as the separation moved to a cell, where the pit and secondary are sepa- of a weapon’s "ssile material from its high explosive rated from high explosive and other components. For DPNQPOFOUT %0& #FGPSFUIBUDBOPDDVS UIF weapons that do not use insensitive high explosive, the Workers dismantle a B53 nuclear bomb at the Pantex plant, 2007. Photo: NNSA News M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 53 As part of the dismantlement of warheads at the Pantex plant in Texas, copper, aluminum, silver, gold, plutonium, and non-nuclear weapons parts are separated for recycling, 1992. entire dismantlement process occurs in cells, which past few decades, and now has a backlog of weapons provide the highest level of safety. XBJUJOHUPCFEJTNBOUMFE*O UIF//4"TUBUFE 1JUTGSPNEJTNBOUMFEXFBQPOTBSFQMBDFEJOTUPSBHF that it would dismantle all nuclear weapons retired BU1BOUFY XIJMFTFDPOEBSJFTBSFTFOUUP:GPSTUPS- CFGPSF':CZUIFFOEPG': BOEIBTEFWFM- age or further disassembly and disposal of the HEU oped directives to align planned and projected work and other components. Non-nuclear components are SBUFTBU1BOUFYBOE:XJUIUIJTHPBM %0&B either reused or disposed of according to their speci"c A recent review of the NNSA’s weapons dismantle- requirements. High explosive, for example, is burned ment and disposition program by the DOE inspector BU1BOUFYɨFDFMMTBOECBZTBU1BOUFYBSFBMTPVTFEGPS general found that the agency had met or exceeded its other operations, including the assembly and disassem- goals for FY 2010 and FY 2011 (DOE 2013a).25 How- bly of weapons undergoing surveillance or being up- ever, the report expressed concern that safety and secu- graded as part of a life extension program. These SJUZDIBMMFOHFTXJUIUIFBHJOHJOGSBTUSVDUVSFBU1BOUFY missions compete for limited space and sta# time with could undermine its ability to ful"ll dismantlement the dismantlement mission. BOEPUIFSNJTTJPOT1BOUFYJTCFIJOETDIFEVMFPOJUT !e only other location in the U.S. nuclear complex FY 2013 work in all areas, including dismantlement, that can dismantle nuclear weapons is the Device Assem- production, and surveillance, because of unexpected bly Facility at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), downtime for maintenance (Jacobson 2013c). originally built to assemble weapons for underground ɨF//4"SFRVFTUFENJMMJPOGPSEJTNBOUMF- UFTUJOH-JLF1BOUFY UIJTGBDJMJUZIBTCPUICBZTBOEDFMMT ment work in FY 2013, slightly less than its requests that can be used to disassemble weapons, including PGNJMMJPOBOENJMMJPOJO':BOE': those that contain conventional rather than insensitive 2011, respectively. !e agency indicated that it planned high explosive. However, the facility is smaller, with "ve to request a similar level of funding in upcoming years cells and seven bays, compared with 13 cells and (DOE 2011a). !e planned work does not include dis- CBZTBU1BOUFY1JUTXPVMEIBWFUPCFTIJQQFEUP NBOUMJOH XFBQPOT SFUJSFE BGUFS ': JODMVEJOH 1BOUFYGPSTUPSBHF QPTJOHNPSFTFDVSJUZSJTLT those removed under New START. Dismantling these !e United States has made major cuts in its de- weapons—as well as those subject to any follow- ployed and reserve stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the on agreement with Russia—would not begin until 25 The NNSA does not make public the exact number of weapons it dismantles each year, citing security concerns. Photo: DOE 54 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S FY 2023. !e NNSA says that weapons not retired by Analysts have suggested many technological solu- ':XJMMCFEJTNBOUMFECZ': BOEUIBUCBTFE tions to these challenges, including tags and seals to aid on current warhead numbers it will have the capacity in detecting whether items have been tampered with to meet this schedule (DOE 2013b p. 1-5). It is not or removed during dismantlement, and “information clear how the schedule would be a#ected if the United barriers” to allow inspectors to con"rm that an item States makes further reductions in its arsenal. is the correct type of warhead without observing it 8IJMFFYJTUJOH643VTTJBOBSNTBHSFFNFOUTDPWFS directly. More work is needed to move these ideas and only deployed arsenals, future bilateral and multilateral demonstration projects to workable systems. agreements will likely cover reserve weapons as well. In Dedicated facilities could ease the monitoring and that case, dismantling weapons in a timely manner— verifying of the dismantlement process. A nation with rather than allowing a 10- to 15-year lag—will become such a facility would not have to give inspectors access more important. to a facility where other sensitive operations also occur. !e design of a dedicated facility could also ease moni- F INDINGS UPSJOH (JWJOH JOTQFDUPST JOGPSNBUJPO BCPVU UIBU design would allow them to better plan their work and t %JTNBOUMFNFOUPGSFUJSFEXBSIFBETDPNQFUFT bolster con"dence that they could detect deception. for space with surveillance and life extension Some experts have suggested building identical facili- QSPHSBNTBU1BOUFY ties in the United States and Russia designed to make t *GGVUVSFBSNTBHSFFNFOUTDPWFSSFTFSWFXFBQPOT the process as transparent as possible without revealing UIFEJTNBOUMFNFOUDBQBDJUZBU1BOUFYNBZCF sensitive information. Such facilities could have limited inadequate. access points, and technologies such as closed-circuit UFMFWJTJPO %PZMFBOE.FFL R E C O MMENDATION t 8IFOQMBOOJOHMJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNT UIF U.S. Research on Verification NNSA should account for the need to disman- !e United States began investigating techniques to tle all retired weapons in a timely manner. solve the technical challenges of warhead-level veri"- DBUJPOBTFBSMZBT BOEQVSTVFEFWFSNPSFEFUBJMFE Verifying Reductions in Nuclear Warheads SFTFBSDITPNFUJNFTXJUIUIF4PWJFU6OJPO3VTTJB As the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals UISPVHI UIFT ɨFTFFêPSUT DVMNJOBUFE JOUIF below the New START level of 1,550 deployed war- Trilateral Initiative of the United States, Russia, and heads, they will likely reach a point where verifying the the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Cli#, number of delivery systems will no longer su%ce, and &MCBIUJNZ BOE1FSTCP ɨJTJOJUJBUJWF XIJDI they will want warhead-level veri"cation. Agreements SBO GSPN UP BJNFE UP DSFBUF B TZTUFN with other nuclear weapon states will also likely require through which nations with nuclear weapons could veri"cation of warheads as well as delivery systems. submit excess "ssile material to the IAEA for monitor- Verifying warheads poses greater technical challenges ing, to prevent reuse or diversion. !is work focused UIBOWFSJGZJOHEFMJWFSZTZTUFNT#FDBVTFXBSIFBETBSF on three areas: authenticating warheads, monitoring smaller and more easily concealed, “national technical inventory, and verifying the conversion of "ssile mate- means”—that is, remote surveillance—will not su%ce. rial from weapons to non-weapons forms. Instead, veri"cation may need to be relatively intrusive, !e United States has since moved away from tak- and some veri"cation techniques may be less accept- ing a lead role in research on veri"cation, leaving other able to participating nations. !e inspecting country nations to explore avenues for further progress. One or organization will want to determine whether an ob- TVDIFêPSU UIF6,/PSXBZ*OJUJBUJWF CFHBOJO ject to be dismantled is, in fact, a warhead, as well as and is a collaboration with the Veri"cation Research, the amount of "ssile material it contains and whether Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), a non- that material has been accounted for and secured at the governmental organization. !rough meetings and end of the process. exercises, the parties investigate new veri"cation tech- #FDBVTFUIFEFTJHOTPGBOBUJPOTOVDMFBSXFBQPOT niques and seek to encourage nations with and without are highly classi"ed, and access to such information nuclear weapons to collaborate on arms control. could allow other nations to develop or improve their All three U.S. nuclear weapons labs pursue some own weapons, veri"cation cannot reveal such sensitive technical research on arms control and nonprolif- information. Devising an acceptable veri"cation regime eration. In addition, the Cooperative Monitoring at the warhead level will therefore be di%cult. $FOUFSBU4BOEJB DSFBUFEJO QSPWJEFTiBGPSVN M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 55 for technical and policy experts from around the world 1BSUPGUIJTESPQNBZTUFNGSPNBTFSJFTPGSFPSHB- to explore how unclassi"ed, shareable technology could nizations that have diluted the mission of veri"cation IFMQJNQMFNFOUDPOëEFODFCVJMEJOHNFBTVSFT $#.T programs. At Livermore, for example, the Nonprolifer- USFBUJFTPSPUIFSBHSFFNFOUTw 4/-OE 8IBUGSBD- ation, Arms Control and International Security Direc- tion of their work the labs devote to verifying future torate was renamed the Nonproliferation, Homeland, arms cuts—and in particular, warhead-level veri"ca- and International Security Directorate, and reorganized tion—is unclear, because the NNSA’s budget request UPFNQIBTJ[FIPNFMBOETFDVSJUZBGUFS XJUIBOFX does not disclose such details. According to an division to counter chemical and biological attacks FY 2011 annual report from the NNSA’s O%ce of 8BNQMFS *O UIFQSPHSBNXBTBHBJOSF- Nonproliferation and International Security, the o%ce OBNFE UIJTUJNFBTUIF(MPCBM4FDVSJUZ%JSFDUPSBUF EJSFDUFEBCPVUNJMMJPOPGJUTNJMMJPOCVEHFU and its mission expanded still further to include energy UPOVDMFBSWFSJëDBUJPO0GUIBU BCPVUNJMMJPOXBT and environmental security. !e directorate is now di- dedicated to dismantling warheads and making the WJEFEJOUPGPVSNBJOEJWJTJPOTDIFNJDBMCJPMPHJDBM disposition of "ssile material transparent (NNSA 2012e). explosives security and infrastructure protection, energy *O': UIFQSPHSBNSFDFJWFEBCPVUNJMMJPO security and nonproliferation, intelligence programs, JOGVOEJOH XJUIBCPVUNJMMJPOPGUIBUHPJOHUP and nuclear counterterrorism (LLNL 2013b). !e ad- nuclear veri"cation (NNSA 2013b). !e FY 2012 re- dition of the homeland security and energy security port, however, does not break down these numbers any missions without a corresponding increase in funding further, so it is not possible to determine how much or sta# means that work on monitoring and verifying was devoted to verifying warhead dismantlement. arms control e#orts has declined. In 2010, the NNSA also established a new National National security includes the ability to achieve veri- Center for Nuclear Security, “to enhance the Nation’s "able reductions in nuclear weapons by other nations. veri"cation and detection capabilities in support of To meet these security needs and ful"ll its long-term nuclear arms control and nonproliferation through commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons, the United 3%BDUJWJUJFTBUUIF//44w $IJQNBO ,MJOHFO- States will want to understand the trade-o#s involved TNJUI BOE4OFMTPO 8PSLBUUIFDFOUFSGPDVTFT in technologies and strategies to verify further reduc- on technologies for verifying treaties and controlling tions and steps toward disarmament. !e NNSA should the spread of nuclear weapons, and on nuclear foren- ramp up its research on warhead-level veri"cation, and sics to determine the source of the "ssile material used the United States should seek to resume its collabora- in a terrorist weapon. Again, what part of the center’s tive veri"cation work with Russia, and to include other work—if any—is devoted to verifying arms reductions OBUJPOTJOUIJTFêPSU8JUIPVUBEFRVBUFSFTFBSDIPO is unclear. veri"cation, the United States could compromise its !e NNSA has also proposed creating an Inter- ability to move forward with treaties that would make national Center for Arms Control and Veri"cation it more secure. Technology, “to integrate the development, testing, and validation of technologies applied to control the F INDINGS spread of weapons of mass destruction” (DOE 2012c t 'VOEJOHBOETVQQPSUGPSSFTFBSDIPOWFSJGZ- p. 5-10). !e center would promote collaboration ing nuclear arms reductions has declined over among U.S. agencies and international partners, and the past decade. host exercises in on-site inspection and joint "eld train- t 'VUVSFSFEVDUJPOTJO64BOE3VTTJBOOVDMFBS ing. !e center would also have facilities for training stockpiles, and the inclusion of other nations *"&" BOE $PNQSFIFOTJWF /VDMFBS5FTU #BO5SFBUZ in this process, may require new warhead- JOTQFDUPST(JWFOCVEHFUDPODFSOT XIFSFUIJTQSPQPTBM level veri"cation techniques. OPXTUBOETJTVODMFBS#VUJUTNJTTJPOJTOPOQSPMJGFSB- t "TUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTGVSUIFSSFEVDFTJUTOVDMF- tion, not arms reduction. ar arsenal, it will need to develop the technol- Funding and sta%ng for research on verifying arms ogy and expertise to support such reductions. SFEVDUJPOTBQQFBSTUPIBWFEFDMJOFE"SFQPSUCZ two Los Alamos researchers notes that “over the past R E C O MMENDATION decade there has been an erosion of the technical and institutional base for veri"ed nuclear arms reductions. t ɨF//4"TIPVMEJODSFBTFGVOEJOHGPSSFTFBSDI !is is a key issue with respect to the national labs and on verifying nuclear arms reductions and dis- PUIFS%0&GBDJMJUJFTw %PZMFBOE.FFLQ armament, including at the warhead level. 56 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S References 1663 Los Alamos Science and Technology Magazine CH2M HILL. No date. High explosive pressing facility. DAHRT delivers. April. Online at http://www.lanl.gov/science/ Englewood, CO. Online at http://www.ch2m.com/corporate/ 1663/issues/april2007.pdf. markets/environmental/conferences/usace/ch2m-hill-pantex.pdf. #BCDPDL8JMDPY5FDIOJDBM4FSWJDFT1BOUFY #81BOUFY Chipman, V., A. Klingensmith, and C. 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Evaluation of 5FDI4PVSDF *OD BOE-.*(PWFSONFOU$POTVMUJOH NRC’s oversight of tritium production at commercial nuclear 5FDI4PVSDF *OEFQFOEFOUCVTJOFTTDBTFBOBMZTJTPG power plants.0*("8BTIJOHUPO %$0ïDFPG 1BOUFYTVSWFJMMBODFBOEFWBMVBUJPOGBDJMJUZBMUFSOBUJWFT QIBTF *OTQFDUPS(FOFSBM0OMJOFBUhttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ II. 8BTIJOHUPO %$//4" 0ïDFPG4USBUFHJD1MBOOJOH doc-collections/insp-gen/2011/oig-11-a-19.pdf. and Complex Transformation. Online at http://www.complex transformationspeis.com/RM_500%20-%20TechSource%20 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 2005. NRC’s envi- 2008c.pdf. ronmental impact statement on the construction and opera- tion of a mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility at the Savannah Top 500 Supercomputer Sites. 2012. Online at http:// 3JWFS4JUF 4PVUI$BSPMJOB WPM8BTIJOHUPO %$0ïDF www.top500.org/lists/2012/11/. 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M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 63 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee 644FOBUF3FQPSUUPUIF4FOBUFPOUIFBDUJWJUJFT on Strategic Forces (U.S. Senate). 2013a. Hearing to receive PGUIF$PNNJUUFFPO&OWJSPONFOUBOE1VCMJD8PSLTGPS testimony on nuclear forces and policies in review of the UIFTU$POHSFTT4FOBUFSFQPSU8BTIJOHUPO %$ EFGFOTFBVUIPSJ[BUJPOSFRVFTUGPSëTDBMZFBSBOEUIF $PNNJUUFFPO&OWJSPONFOUBOE1VCMJD8PSLT"WBJMBCMF GVUVSFZFBSTEFGFOTFQSPHSBN "QSJM8BTIJOHUPO %$ GSPN1SP2VFTU$POHSFTTJPOBM "OO"SCPS .*0OMJOFBU Online at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/ http://cisupa.proquest.com/ws_display.asp?!lter=Congressional 2013/04%20April/13-22%20-%204-17-13.pdf. %20Overview. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Ventura, J.S. 2012. Los Alamos National Laboratory weapons on Strategic Forces (U.S. Senate). 2013b. 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Newsline -BXSFODF-JWFSNPSF 0OMJOF .BSDI 8BTIJOHUPO %$ at https://newsline.llnl.gov/employee/articles/2006/03-31-06- newsline.pdf. 644FOBUFC3FQPSUUPBDDPNQBOZ4 &OFSHZ BOE8BUFS%FWFMPQNFOU"QQSPQSJBUJPOT#JMM 4FOBUF Young, S. 2012. Too much, too late: !e DOD’s assess- SFQPSU8BTIJOHUPO %$0OMJOFBUhttp://www.gpo. NFOUPGUIF#MJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNAll #ings Nuclear, gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112srpt164/pdf/CRPT-112srpt164.pdf. November 5. Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists. Online at http://allthingsnuclear.org/dod-on-the-b61-lep/. 64 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S APPENDIX The Nuclear Weapons Complex he U.S. nuclear weapons complex is the set of weapon components must be replaced on a regular facilities that researches, designs, produces, basis as long as the weapons remain in the stockpile. maintains, and dismantles the country’s nuclear Others are produced on an as-needed basis, as part of weapons. !ese eight facilities include the three programs to extend the life of the nuclear arsenal. So Tnational security laboratories (historically called weap- far, these life extension programs have simply refur- ons laboratories): Los Alamos National Laboratory, bished existing weapons, but in the future could en- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia tail modifying the weapons or replacing them with National Laboratories. !e facilities also include four di#erent, newly built ones. QSPEVDUJPOTJUFTUIF,BOTBT$JUZ1MBOU UIF1BOUFY ɨF1BOUFY1MBOUBOE:BSFBMTPSFTQPOTJCMFGPS 1MBOU UIF4BWBOOBI3JWFS4JUF BOEUIF:/BUJPOBM dismantling retired weapons, and store most of the U.S. Security Complex—and one test site: the Nevada stock of plutonium and highly enriched uranium out- National Security Site (formerly known as the Nevada side of weapons, respectively. Test Site). !e Nevada National Security Site no longer con- ducts nuclear explosive tests, but still maintains several facilities needed for other types of testing critical to the While the United States has not produced 4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBN*UBMTPSFNBJOTVOEFS new nuclear weapons or carried out a a presidential directive to maintain the capability to restart nuclear explosive testing within two to three nuclear explosive test since the end of years if directed to do so. !e complex is administered by the National Nuclear the cold war, the sites belonging to the Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), and complex still have a major role to play is directly managed by private contractors that oversee in maintaining the arsenal. each site. !e complex had an overall budget of about CJMMJPOJO':8IJMFUIF//4"IBTSF- named the complex the Nuclear Security Enterprise to 8IJMF UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT IBT OPU QSPEVDFE OFX re$ect a broadening of its mission, the bulk of the work nuclear weapons or carried out a nuclear explosive test done at the sites is still devoted to nuclear weapons, since the end of the cold war, the sites belonging to the BOEOFBSMZQFSDFOUPGJUTPWFSBMMCVEHFUJTBMMPDBUFE complex still have a major role to play in maintaining directly to weapons activities. the arsenal. The laboratories are responsible for Many of the sites within the complex date back to research related to evaluating and maintaining existing the early cold war, or even the original Manhattan weapons, such as studying how the materials used in 1SPKFDU BOETPNFCVJMEJOHTBOEGBDJMJUJFTBSFSFBDIJOH nuclear weapons age. !e labs use this information to or past their intended life spans. As the United States develop plans for extending the life of the arsenal, as makes decisions about the future of its nuclear arsenal, well as to inform the Annual Stockpile Assessment, a it must also make corresponding decisions about the yearly report required by Congress certifying that the future of these facilities, and the long-term capabilities U.S. nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reli- the nation needs. able. !e labs also undertake research related to nuclear !is appendix provides background information nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and veri"cation of on each of the sites in the complex, including basic arms control agreements. information on their history, mission, and budget, to !e four production sites still produce and assemble give an overview of their role in maintaining the U.S. materials and components for nuclear weapons. Some nuclear stockpile. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 65 KANSAS CITY PLANT IF,BOTBT$JUZ1MBOU ,$1 QSPEVDFTPSQSPDVSFT BCPVUQFSDFOUPGUIFOPOOVDMFBSDPNQPOFOUT Tfor U.S. nuclear weapons. !e remaining com- ponents are produced at Sandia National Laboratory. ɨFTJUF XIJDIEBUFTUP PSJHJOBMMZBTTFNCMFEBJS- DSBGUFOHJOFTGPS/BWZëHIUFSTEVSJOH8PSME8BS** CVUJOUIFGBDJMJUZXBTUBLFOPWFSCZ#FOEJY$PS- poration and began producing non-nuclear compo- nents for the Atomic Energy Commission. ɨF,$1JTDVSSFOUMZJOUIFNJETUPGBNPWFGSPN JUT PSJHJOBM MPDBUJPO BU UIF MBSHFS #BOOJTUFS 'FEFSBM Complex, in Kansas City, MO, to the new National Security Campus about eight miles south. !e NNSA decided to build the new site because of aging facilities and increasing maintenance and operations costs at the Kansas City Plant, 2012 old site. Construction on the National Security Cam- pus was completed in late 2012, and the initial transfer Budget of workers and equipment began in late January 2013. ɨF,$1TUPUBM':1 funding from the DOE is !e original facility will continue to operate through NJMMJPO PGXIJDIOFBSMZBMM NJMMJPO JTGPS ': XIFOUIFUSBOTGFSPGBMM//4"SFMBUFEQSP- XFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFT8JUIJOUIBUDBUFHPSZ UIFMBSHFTU duction will be complete. BNPVOU NJMMJPO JTGPSEJSFDUFETUPDLQJMFXPSL 5IF ,$1 BMTP IBT TBUFMMJUF PQFSBUJPOT JO /FX which includes evaluation, maintenance, and refurbish- Mexico and Arkansas to support other DOE organiza- NFOUPGUIFOVDMFBSTUPDLQJMF"OBEEJUJPOBMNJM- tions involved in nuclear weapons activities. lion in weapons activities funding is designated for readiness in technical base and facilities (that is, opera- The KCP Today tion and maintenance of NNSA program facilities). 8JUIUIFFOEPGUIFDPMEXBSBOEBNPSBUPSJVN !e remaining funds outside the weapons activities POOVDMFBSFYQMPTJWFUFTUJOH UIF,$1TNJTTJPOTIJGUFE category are largely for defense nuclear nonprolifera- from producing parts for new nuclear weapons to sup- UJPO NJMMJPO plying new components for existing weapons in sup- 'PS':UIF,$1SFRVFTUFEBUPUBMPGNJM- QPSUPGUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBNɨF,$1 MJPO XJUIOFBSMZBMM NJMMJPO PGUIJTUPUBMGPS produces or procures more than 100,000 parts annu- XFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFTɨF ,$1T': SFRVFTUGPS ally, including a wide range of mechanical, electronic, defense nuclear nonproliferation funding increased to electromechanical, metal, and plastic components. It NJMMJPO3BUIFSUIBOJOEJDBUJOHJODSFBTFEXPSL is also responsible for testing and evaluating the parts in this area, however, this is due to a reorganization of it produces. the NNSA budget that shifted funding for two nuclear *OBEEJUJPO UIF,$1QBSUJDJQBUFTJOMJNJUFEMJGFUJNF counterterrorism and counterproliferation programs component exchanges for stockpile weapons. No spe- from the weapons account to defense nuclear non- cial nuclear material (i.e., weapons-usable plutonium proliferation. !e jump in requested funding for site or highly enriched uranium) is kept on site. TUFXBSETIJQGSPNNJMMJPOJO':UPNJM- ɨF,$1JTPQFSBUFECZ)POFZXFMM'FEFSBM.BOV- MJPOJO':BMTPSFìFDUTBDIBOHFJO//4"CVE- facturing and Technologies. It employs a total of about geting categories. 2,500 workers across its locations, with about 2,300 of those at its Kansas City site. 1 Numbers for FY 2013 are based on the Continuing Resolution annualized for the full year. Photo: NNSA News 66 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY he Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LLNL’s main site in Livermore, CA, is about 50 --/- FTUBCMJTIFE JO BTUIF -BXSFODF miles east of San Francisco. A second site—Site 300, TRadiation Laboratory, was a spino# of the Uni- used for experimental tests—is between Livermore and WFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB3BEJBUJPO-BCPSBUPSZBU#FSLFMFZ Tracy, CA. Arising from work by physicists Edward Teller and Ernest O. Lawrence, the lab was created to aid the Lawrence Livermore Today United States in the research and development of 8IFO UIF 6OJUFE 4UBUFT FOEFE OVDMFBS FYQMPTJWF nuclear weapons, in part by competing with Los UFTUJOHJO --/-TQSJNBSZNJTTJPOTIJGUFEUP Alamos National Laboratory. LLNL designed the stockpile stewardship. LLNL conducts life extension "rst nuclear warhead for a U.S. submarine-launched QSPHSBNT -&1T POFYJTUJOHXFBQPOT XIJDIJOWPMWFT ballistic missile and the "rst warheads for multiple replacing components a#ected by aging with newly independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs).2 manufactured and sometimes modernized components. Today, LLNL is one of three privately managed 6OEFSDVSSFOU//4"QMBOT GVUVSF-&1TXJMMFOUBJM DOE facilities that conduct research and design on the replacing existing warheads with new ones. U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, along with Los Alamos In support of congressional requirements for an an- National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories. nual report certifying the safety, security, and reliability Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2011 2 MIRVs allow a single missile to carry multiple warheads that can each be assigned to separate targets, greatly increasing the destructive potential of a coun- try’s arsenal. MIRVs were a major technological advance during the cold war, but also increased instability because they were considered to increase the value of striking first in a nuclear confrontation. Photo: NNSA News M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 67 of the nuclear stockpile, LLNL conducts regular evalu- In addition to nuclear weapons work, LLNL also works BUJPOTPGXFBQPOTJUIBTEFWFMPQFEUIF8BOE8 to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, JOUFSDPOUJOFOUBM CBMMJTUJDNJTTJMFXBSIFBET UIF8 develop capabilities to counter terrorism and other ground-launched cruise missile warhead (now in the emerging threats, research new military technologies, JOBDUJWFTUPDLQJMF BOEUIF#CPNC--/-TTVSWFJM- better understand climate change and its impacts, and lance data, peer reviews, and results of experimental develop technologies for low-carbon energy. It houses and computational simulations inform the Annual some of the most powerful supercomputing capabili- Stockpile Assessment by the Departments of Defense ties in the world, which help carry out simulations for and Energy. LLNL is also the lead design lab for the UIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBN 8-&1 FWFOUIPVHIUIBUXBSIFBEXBTEFTJHOFEBU ɨFMBCIBTBCPVU FNQMPZFFTBUJUTNBJOTJUF Los Alamos. and Site 300. After decades as a nonpro"t managed by LLNL’s nuclear-weapons-related tasks include: the University of California, LLNL is now run by the Nuclear weapons research, design, and develop- for-pro"t Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ment. No new nuclear weapon has been produced ɨJTDPSQPSBUJPOXBTFTUBCMJTIFEJOBOEDPNQSJTFT TJODF5PEBZ--/-TEFTJHOXPSLJTGPDVTFE #FDIUFM /BUJPOBM UIF 6OJWFSTJUZ PG $BMJGPSOJB UIF PO-&1T #BCDPDL8JMDPY$PNQBOZ UIF8BTIJOHUPO%JWJ- Testing advanced technology concepts. “Advanced TJPOPG634$PSQPSBUJPO BOE#BUUFMMF technology concepts” refers to new ideas for the design or use of nuclear weapons; past examples Budget include improving the use control of nuclear --/-T ': CVEHFU JT CJMMJPO PG XIJDI weapons and examining using nuclear weapons to NJMMJPO QFSDFOU JTGPSXFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFT3 destroy chemical and biological agents. 8JUIJOUIBUDBUFHPSZ UIFMBSHFTUBNPVOUJTNJM- Plutonium and tritium research and develop- lion for the Inertial Con"nement Fusion and High ment. 1MVUPOJVNJTVTFEJOUIFQSJNBSZPG64 Yield Campaign, which funds the National Ignition nuclear weapons; tritium is used to boost the pri- Facility. !e Advanced Simulation and Computing mary’s yield. $BNQBJHOSFDFJWFENJMMJPO BOENJMMJPO Hydrotesting and environmental testing. Hy- went to directed stockpile work (which includes evalu- drotests experimentally simulate the conditions in ation, maintenance, and refurbishment of the nuclear an exploding nuclear weapon and environmental stockpile as well as weapons research and development). tests assess the e#ects of a nuclear detonation on After weapons activities, the next largest category in various materials. the LLNL budget is defense nuclear nonproliferation, High explosive research and development. !e GVOEFEBUNJMMJPOGPS': high explosive in a nuclear weapon surrounds the 'PS': --/-SFRVFTUFEBUPUBMPGCJM- plutonium pit; when it is detonated it compresses MJPO NJMMJPO QFSDFOU PGXIJDIJTGPSXFBQ- the nuclear material, leading to nuclear detonation. ons activities. 3 Numbers for FY 2013 are based on the Continuing Resolution annualized for the full year. 68 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY os Alamos, NM, is the birthplace of the U.S. the utility of nuclear weapons to destroy chemical nuclear weapons program, where the primary and biological agents. Lresearch, design, and production of the "rst U.S. t .BJOUBJOT QSPEVDUJPO DBQBCJMJUJFT GPS MJNJUFE nuclear weapons took place. Today, Los Alamos Na- RVBOUJUJFTPGQMVUPOJVNDPNQPOFOUT JF QJUT tional Laboratory (LANL) is one of three privately GPSEFMJWFSZUPUIFTUPDLQJMF LANL can produce managed DOE facilities that conduct research and 10 to 20 pits per year and eventually seeks to pro- design on the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, along EVDFUPQJUTQFSZFBS with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and t.BOVGBDUVSFTOVDMFBSXFBQPOEFUPOBUPSTGPSUIF Sandia National Laboratories. TUPDLQJMF LANL is the sole bulk producer of this key warhead component, which initiates detona- Los Alamos Today tion of the high explosive that, in turn, compresses 8JUIUIFFOEPGUIFDPMEXBSBOEUIFEFDMBSBUJPOPGB the plutonium pit. NPSBUPSJVN PO GVMMTDBMF OVDMFBS UFTUJOH JO t $POEVDUT USJUJVN SFTFBSDI BOE EFWFMPQNFOU LANL’s primary mission shifted from developing new 3% IZESPUFTUJOH IJHIFYQMPTJWFT3% BOE warheads to maintaining the safety, security, and reli- environmental testing. Tritium is used to boost ability of the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile without the yield of the primary; hydrotests experimentally nuclear explosive testing. LANL conducts life exten- simulate the conditions in an exploding nuclear sion programs on existing weapons, which involves weapon; and environmental tests assess the e#ects replacing components a#ected by aging with newly of a nuclear detonation on various materials. manufactured and sometimes modernized components. t $VSSFOUMZ NBJOUBJOT $BUFHPSZ *** RVBOUJUJFT 6OEFSDVSSFOU//4"QMBOT GVUVSF-&1TXJMMFOUBJM PG TQFDJBM OVDMFBS NBUFSJBMT RVBOUJUJFT UIBU replacing existing warheads with new ones. SFRVJSFUIFIJHIFTUMFWFMPGTFDVSJUZ For ease of In support of congressional requirements for an an- protection, the plan is for this material to be nual report certifying the safety, security, and reliability moved to a single consolidated location. of the nuclear stockpile, LANL conducts regular evalu- ations of weapons it has developed: the 8BOE8 In addition to work on the U.S. nuclear stockpile, submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads, the LANL performs work to reduce the threat of weapons 8JOUFSDPOUJOFOUBMCBMMJTUJDNJTTJMFXBSIFBE BOE of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation, and terror- UIF#OVDMFBSCPNC LANL’s surveillance data, peer ism, and conducts research on other defense, energy, reviews, and the results of experimental and computa- and environmental issues such as electricity delivery tional simulations inform the Annual Stockpile Assess- and energy reliability; energy e%ciency; nuclear, renew- ment, an initiative administered jointly by the DOE able, and fossil energy; and the cleanup of radioactive and Department of Defense that certi"es the stockpile and otherwise contaminated portions of the site. It is safe, reliable, and militarily e#ective, and meets per- also maintains some of the most powerful super- formance requirements. computing capabilities in the world, which help it to LANL performs the following nuclear-weapons- carry out the simulations used for the Stockpile Stew- related tasks: BSETIJQ1SPHSBN t $POEVDUTSFTFBSDI EFTJHO BOEEFWFMPQNFOUPG After decades of being managed by the University nuclear weapons. No new nuclear weapon has of California and run as a nonpro"t, LANL is now CFFOQSPEVDFETJODF5PEBZ-"/-TEFTJHO managed by a for-pro"t limited liability company, Los XPSLJTGPDVTFEPO-&1T Alamos National Security (LANS). !is corporation t %FTJHOT BOE UFTUT BEWBODFE UFDIOPMPHZ DPO- XBTFTUBCMJTIFEJOBOEJTNBEFVQPG#FDIUFM cepts. “Advanced technology concepts” refers to /BUJPOBM UIF6OJWFSTJUZPG$BMJGPSOJB #895FDIOPMP- new ideas for the design or use of nuclear weapons; gies, and URS Energy and Construction, Inc. !e lab past examples include considering ways to improve employs a total of about 10,300 people. the use control of nuclear weapons and examining M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 69 Los Alamos National Laboratory and town, 2006 Budget XFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFTCVEHFUSFRVFTU NJMMJPO JTGPS -"/-TUPUBM':CVEHFUJTSPVHIMZCJMMJPO directed stockpile work, part of the Stockpile Steward- 0GUIJT NPTUCJMMJPODPNFTGSPNUIF//4" TIJQ1SPHSBNUIBUTVQQPSUTDVSSFOUBOEGVUVSF-&1T for nuclear weapons activities, with additional NNSA and includes surveillance and maintenance activities. funding for nuclear nonproliferation e#orts. LANL ɨFTFDPOEMBSHFTUCVEHFUMJOF NJMMJPO XJUIJO also receives funding from the DOE for environmental the weapons program is for site stewardship (that is, management (cleanup related to defense nuclear pro- the operation and maintenance of NNSA program grams), site security, and energy programs. facilities; much of this funding previously fell under 'PS': -"/-IBTSFRVFTUFEBUPUBMPGOFBSMZ UIF3FBEJOFTTJO5FDIOJDBM#BTFBOE'BDJMJUJFTDBUFHPSZ CJMMJPOJOGVOEJOH XJUICJMMJPOPGUIJTGPSXFBQ- XIJDI//4"IBTEJTDPOUJOVFEJO': POTBDUJWJUJFTɨFMBSHFTUMJOFJUFNJO-"/-T': 4 Numbers for FY 2013 are based on the Continuing Resolution annualized for the full year. Photo: Los Alamos National Laboratory 70 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S NEVADA NATIONAL SECURITY SITE he Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is mission shifted from the explosive testing of nuclear where the United States carried out most of its weapons to maintaining the safety, security, and reli- Texplosive tests of nuclear weapons (the vast ability of the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile without NBKPSJUZ PG UIFN VOEFSHSPVOE 8IFO UIF 6OJUFE TVDI UFTUJOH 6OEFS B QSFTJEFOUJBM EFDJTJPO 4UBUFTTJHOFEUIFɨSFTIPME5FTU#BO5SFBUZJO directive, the site must maintain a state of readiness to it became the only U.S. nuclear weapons test site. Orig- resume nuclear explosive testing within two to three JOBMMZLOPXOBTUIF/FWBEB1SPWJOH(SPVOET BOEUIFO years if the president directs it to do so.) as the Nevada Test Site, the facility was renamed in !e NNSS is still a major test site for the U.S. nu- 2010 when its mission was expanded to encompass a clear complex, but the tests that take place there no broader range of activities related to nuclear weapons, longer involve nuclear explosions. Instead, it is home energy, and homeland security needs. to several unique facilities that contribute to its stock- ɨF//44JTMPDBUFEJOUIFEFTFSU BCPVUNJMFT pile stewardship mission. !ese include: northwest of Las Vegas. !e site itself covers more than t ǰF6B$PNQMFY (previously known as the Lyner 1,300 square miles and is surrounded by the federally Complex), an underground laboratory where sub- owned Nevada Test and Training Range that acts as a critical testing takes place. Subcritical tests, which bu#er, giving a total unpopulated area of more than use small amounts of plutonium but not enough TRVBSFNJMFTOFBSMZUIFTJ[FPGUIFTUBUFPG$PO- to generate a chain reaction, help improve under- necticut. Its remote location and large size were impor- standing of the dynamic properties of weapons parts tant factors in its selection as a testing site. or materials in an explosion and evaluate the e#ects of new manufacturing techniques on weapon The NNSS Today performance. 8JUIUIFFOEPGUIFDPMEXBSBOEUIFNPSBUP- t ǰF#JH&YQMPTJWFT&YQFSJNFOUBM'BDJMJUZ #&&' , rium on nuclear explosive testing, the NNSS’s primary where hydrodynamic testing using high explosives is performed. The term hydrodynamic is used Subsidence craters at Yucca Flat at the Nevada National Security Site, because the explosive material is compressed and where hundreds of full-scale underground nuclear tests were performed until the United States halted such testing in 1992. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 71 heated with such intensity that it begins to $ow In addition to its tasks supporting the Stockpile and mix like a $uid, and the equations used to 4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBN UIF//44BMTPQSPWJEFTBUFTU- describe the behavior of $uids—called hydrody- ing site to evaluate detection, monitoring, and veri"- namic equations—can be used to describe the be- cation technologies used in nuclear nonproliferation havior of this material as well. !is testing helps to and arms control applications, and helps manage the assess the performance of nuclear weapons and en- nation’s nuclear emergency response e#orts. Other fed- sure that they will not detonate accidentally; eral agency activities are supported by the NNSS as it does not involve any special nuclear materials well, such as remote imaging and training "rst respond- (e.g., plutonium or highly enriched uranium). ers to deal with nuclear or radiological emergencies. t ǰF+PJOU"DUJOJEF4IPDL1IZTJDT&YQFSJNFOUBM !e NNSS is operated by National Security Tech- 3FTFBSDI +"41&3 'BDJMJUZ, which simulates the nologies, LLC, which is a partnership of Northrup intense shock pressures and temperatures of a (SVNNBO "&$0. $).)JMM BOE/VDMFBS'VFM nuclear weapon using a two-stage gas gun. Data 4FSWJDFT ɨF TJUF FNQMPZT SPVHIMZ TDJFOUJëD GSPN+"41&3IZESPEZOBNJDFYQFSJNFOUTBSFVTFE technical, engineering, and administrative personnel. to develop equations that express the relationship between temperature, pressure, and volume of Budget the materials used in nuclear weapons and to vali- !e NNSS’s total FY 2013 funding from the DOE date weapons computer models. JT NJMMJPO50GUIJT UIFNBKPSJUZ NJM- t ǰF%FWJDF"TTFNCMZ'BDJMJUZ %"' , made up of lion—came from the NNSA for weapons activities, more than 30 buildings, including special structures XJUIBOBEEJUJPOBMNJMMJPOJO//4"GVOEJOHGPS (called bays and cells) for assembling and disassem- nuclear nonproliferation. bling nuclear weapons, and staging bunkers for *O':UIF//44SFRVFTUFEBUPUBMPGNJM temporarily storing nuclear components and high MJPOJOGVOEJOH XJUINJMMJPOPGUIJTGPSXFBQPOT explosives. In 2012, the DAF was upgraded to BDUJWJUJFT8JUIJOUIFXFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFTSFRVFTU UIF allow it to assemble the plutonium targets for the MBSHFTUMJOFJUFNJTNJMMJPOGPSTJUFTUFXBSETIJQ +"41&3'BDJMJUZ BUBTLQSFWJPVTMZEPOFBU-BXSFODF (that is, the operation and maintenance of NNSA Livermore National Laboratory. !e NNSA is also facilities; much of this funding previously fell under developing a capability at the DAF to dismantle UIF3FBEJOFTTJO5FDIOJDBM#BTFBOE'BDJMJUJFTDBUFHPSZ and dispose of damaged weapons or improvised XIJDI UIF //4" EJTDPOUJOVFE JO ': ɨF nuclear devices (such as “dirty bombs”) that might //44BMTPSFRVFTUFENJMMJPOGPSEFGFOTFOVDMFBS be made by terrorists. OPOQSPMJGFSBUJPOBOENJMMJPOGPSEFGFOTFFOWJSPO- t ǰF/BUJPOBM$SJUJDBMJUZ&YQFSJNFOUT3FTFBSDI NFOUBMDMFBOVQJO':ɨFKVNQJOUIFGVOEJOH $FOUFS /$&3$ , housed at the DAF, is the only request for nonproliferation re$ects another change in site in the United States where such experiments UIF//4"TPSHBOJ[BUJPOPGUIF':CVEHFU XIJDI UBLFQMBDF#ZCSJOHJOHBTNBMMBNPVOUPGQMVUPOJVN moved funding for the nuclear counterterrorism in- or highly enriched uranium into a chain reaction, cident response program, previously in the weapons these experiments help de"ne the limits of safe han- category, to nonproliferation. dling and allow testing of radiation detection equip- ment. Criticality experiments were previously carried PVUBU5FDIOJDBM"SFB 5" BU-PT"MBNPT National Laboratory. After the NNSA decided in UPDMPTF5"EVFUPDPODFSOTUIBUJUXPVME be di%cult to defend against armed attackers seek- ing to acquire nuclear materials, the capability was transferred to the NNSS. !e NCERC o%cially PQFOFEPO"VHVTU 5 Numbers for FY 2013 are based on the Continuing Resolution annualized for the full year. Photo: (left) NNSA Nevada Field Office 72 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S PANTEX PLANT IF1BOUFY1MBOU MPDBUFEOFBS"NBSJMMP 59 XBT 1BOUFYDPOEVDUTMJGFFYUFOTJPOQSPHSBNTPOFYJTUJOH PSJHJOBMMZB8PSME8BS**"SNZTJUFGPSMPBEJOH weapons. !is involves replacing components a#ected Tand packing artillery shells and building bombs. by aging with newly manufactured and sometimes 1BOUFY TIPSUGPSiQBOIBOEMFPG5FYBT wDMPTFEBGUFSUIF modernized components. One of its tasks is limited- XBS SFPQFOJOHJOBTBGBDJMJUZUPIBOEMFOVDMFBS life component exchange, in which warhead compo- weapons, high explosives, and non-nuclear component nents that age in predictable ways (e.g., power sources, BTTFNCMZ PQFSBUJPOT 4JODF UIF DMPTVSF PG UIF neutron generators) are replaced at regular intervals #VSMJOHUPO"UPNJD&OFSHZ$PNNJTTJPO1MBOUJO*PXB before their deterioration a#ects weapons’performance. 1BOUFYIBTCFFOUIFPOMZGBDJMJUZJOUIF6OJUFE4UBUFT 1BOUFYIBTDPOEVDUFE-&1TPO8XBSIFBETBOE where nuclear weapons are assembled and disassembled. TPNFUZQFTPG#CPNCTTPGBS BOEJTDVSSFOUMZDPO- 8JUIUIFDMPTVSFPG$PMPSBEPT3PDLZ'MBUTQMVUPOJVN EVDUJOHBO-&1POUIF8"EEJUJPOBM-&1T TPNF QMBOUJO 1BOUFYBMTPCFDBNFUIFJOUFSJNTUPSBHF more far-reaching than those done to date, are planned site for plutonium pits. for the rest of the warheads in the stockpile. In addition to its stockpile stewardship work, Pantex Today 1BOUFYTNJTTJPOTJODMVEF After the United States halted production of nuclear t%JTNBOUMJOH SFUJSFE XBSIFBET CZ TFQBSBUJOH UIF XFBQPOTJO 1BOUFYTNBKPSSFTQPOTJCJMJUJFTTIJGUFE high explosive from the plutonium pit from assembling nuclear weapons to refurbishing ex- t *OUFSJNTUPSBHFPGDPNQPOFOUTGSPNEJTNBOUMFE isting warheads to extend their lifetimes and disassem- warheads, including the pits bling retired weapons. Under the Stockpile Stewardship t i4BOJUJ[JOHw SFNPWJOH DMBTTJëFE JOGPSNBUJPO 1SPHSBN 1BOUFYJTSFTQPOTJCMFGPSBTTFNCMZ EJTBTTFN- and disposing of dismantled weapons components bly, maintenance, and surveillance of nuclear weapons t )JHIFYQMPTJWFSFTFBSDIBOEEFWFMPQNFOU and weapons components in the stockpile to ensure their t 1SPEVDJOHBOEUFTUJOHUIFIJHIFYQMPTJWFDPNQP- safety, reliability, and military e#ectiveness. nents for nuclear weapons Pantex Plant, 2007 Photo: NNSA News M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 73 5PDBSSZPVUJUTNJTTJPOT 1BOUFYNBJOUBJOT$BUFHPSZ PG1BOUFYTGVOEJOHJTGPSEJSFDUFETUPDLQJMFXPSL XIJDI ***RVBOUJUJFTPGTQFDJBMOVDMFBSNBUFSJBMT XIJDIDBO JODMVEFTCPUI-&1TBOEEJTNBOUMFNFOUPGSFUJSFEXFBQ- be used to make nuclear weapons and require the POT QFSDFOU JT GPS SFBEJOFTT JO UFDIOJDBM CBTF highest level of security. and facilities (that is, operation and maintenance of ɨFMBCIBTBCPVU FNQMPZFFT BOEJTNBOBHFE NNSA facilities); and 22 percent is for defense nuclear by a limited liability company formed solely for this security (for protection of the site). QVSQPTF #BCDPDLBOE8JMDPY5FDIOJDBM4FSWJDFT1BO- *OGPSNBUJPOBCPVUGVOEJOHGPS1BOUFYXBTOPUJO- UFY #81BOUFY ɨFDPNQBOZJTNBEFVQPG#89 DMVEFEJOUIF':-BCPSBUPSZ5BCMFTQVUPVUCZ 5FDIOPMPHJFT )POFZXFMM*OUFSOBUJPOBM BOE#FDIUFM the NNSA. However, the overall NNSA budget request National. JODMVEFT SPVHIMZ NJMMJPO JO GVOEJOH GPS 1BO UFYVOEFSUIF//4"1SPEVDUJPO0ïDF XJUIBCPVU Budget NJMMJPOPGUIJTGPSXFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFT#FDBVTFUIF 1BOUFYTPWFSBMMCVEHFUGPS':JTNJMMJPO request is not broken down further, it is not possible virtually all of which comes from the NNSA for weap- at this point to determine how much funding will go ons activities work.8JUIJOUIJTDBUFHPSZ QFSDFOU UPTQFDJëDXFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFTQSPHSBNTJO': 6 These include plutonium-239, uranium-233, and uranium enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235. Materials are classified as Category I to IV depending on how much is present and their ease of use for making nuclear weapons. 7 Numbers for FY 2013 are based on the Continuing Resolution annualized for the full year. 74 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES andia National Laboratories (SNL) is responsible Sandia’s main weapons-related tasks include: for the non-nuclear components and systems in- t 4ZTUFNTFOHJOFFSJOHPGOVDMFBSXFBQPOTSNL Stegration of U.S. nuclear weapons. Often called is responsible for the integration of the nuclear ex- the engineering laboratory of the U.S. nuclear weapons plosive package with the non-nuclear components complex, it grew out of Z Division, the ordnance de- of the warhead. sign, testing, and assembly branch of Los Alamos dur- t 3FTFBSDI EFTJHO BOE EFWFMPQNFOU PG OPO JOH8PSME8BS**;%JWJTJPONPWFEUP4BOEJB#BTF OVDMFBSDPNQPOFOUTPGOVDMFBSXFBQPOTSNL is outside Albuquerque, NM, to have easier access to an responsible for most non-nuclear weapons compo- air"eld and work more closely with the military. nents, and continues to conduct research on these, *O ; %JWJTJPOCFDBNF4BOEJB-BCPSBUPSZ especially on weapons surety (safety, access control, BOEJOBTFDPOE4BOEJBTJUFXBTFTUBCMJTIFEJO and use control) and on how component materials Livermore, CA; these two locations ensure proximity are a#ected by aging. to the other two U.S. nuclear weapons research and t .BOVGBDUVSFPGTPNFOPOOVDMFBSDPNQPOFOUT design facilities—Los Alamos and Lawrence Liver- ɨF,BOTBT$JUZ1MBOUJO.JTTPVSJQSPEVDFTNPTU more—that design the nuclear explosive packages for non-nuclear components, but SNL manufactures all U.S. weapons. some specialized components, like neutron genera- SNL also operates the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) tors (the “trigger” that initiates the "ssion reaction JO/FWBEBBOEUIF8FBQPOT&WBMVBUJPO5FTU-BCPSB- in a nuclear weapon) and microelectronics; it also UPSZ 8&5- BUUIF1BOUFY1MBOUJO5FYBT JUIBTëWF maintains a backup capability to produce batteries additional satellite sites around the country. and high explosive components. t 4BGFUZ TFDVSJUZ BOESFMJBCJMJUZBTTFTTNFOUTPG Sandia Today TUPDLQJMFXFBQPOT !e most high-pro"le element 8JUIUIFFOEPGUIFDPMEXBSBOEUIFNPSBUP- of this work is the annual report certifying that rium on nuclear explosive testing, SNL’s primary mis- warheads in the stockpile remain reliable, safe, and sion shifted from developing components for new secure. nuclear weapons to maintaining the safety, security, t )JHIFYQMPTJWF )& SFTFBSDIBOEEFWFMPQNFOU and reliability of the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile 4/- BMPOHXJUI1BOUFY JTSFTQPOTJCMFGPSSFTFBSDI without nuclear testing. and development on the HE material that sur- In support of congressional requirements for an an- rounds the "ssile core of a nuclear weapon and nual report certifying the safety, security, and reliability compresses the plutonium in the pit, leading to of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, SNL conducts nuclear detonation. regular evaluations of non-nuclear components of these t &OWJSPONFOUBM UFTUJOH Environmental testing weapons. SNL’s surveillance data, peer reviews, and assesses the e#ects of environmental conditions the results of experimental and computational simula- (e.g., shock, high temperatures, vibration) on nu- tions inform the Annual Stockpile Assessment by the clear weapons, to simulate the conditions they may Departments of Defense and Energy. be subjected to during delivery to their targets. To carry out its assessment, SNL relies on facilities Since the end of nuclear explosive testing, much MJLFUIF8&5- UIF;NBDIJOFBUJUT"MCVRVFSRVFTJUF of this testing at SNL has addressed the need to BOEUIF553ɨF8&5-FWBMVBUFTXFBQPOTTVCTZT- ensure that nuclear weapons components are tems to identify defects in the stockpile. !e Z machine su%ciently hardened to withstand the radiation helps scientists understand how plutonium reacts dur- of a nuclear explosion (e.g., from another weapon ing a nuclear detonation by generating powerful X-rays delivered to the same target). that mimic the high pressure and heat levels in a deto- nating nuclear warhead. At the TTR, drop tests are In addition to its nuclear weapons mission, SNL con- conducted with joint test assemblies—bombs pulled ducts research and development on nuclear nonprolif- from the stockpile that have had their nuclear material eration, nuclear counterterrorism, energy security, removed. On average, 10 such tests per year are defense, and homeland security. It also provides engi- conducted. neering design and support for the NNSA O%ce of M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 75 Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, 2009 Secure Transportation, which transports nuclear weap- comes from non-DOE sources for “work for others”— ons, components, and special nuclear materials (SNM). research or other work for private companies or other As part of the NNSA’s plan to consolidate weapons- government agencies. usable materials in the nuclear weapons complex, 4/-SFRVFTUFEBUPUBMPGCJMMJPOGPS': 4/-JOCFDBNFUIFëSTU//4"TJUFUPSFNPWFBMM PGXIJDISPVHIMZCJMMJPOXBTGPSXFBQPOTBDUJWJ- Category I and II SNM (the categories requiring the UJFTɨFMBSHFTUMJOFJUFNJO4/-T':XFBQPOT highest level of security). BDUJWJUJFTCVEHFUSFRVFTU NJMMJPO JTGPSEJSFDUFE SNL is operated by Sandia Corporation, a subsid- TUPDLQJMFXPSL QBSUPGUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SP- iary of Lockheed Martin Corporation. It employees gram that supports current and future life extension OFBSMZ XPSLFST BDSPTT BMM JUT TJUFT JODMVEJOH programs, and includes surveillance and maintenance BCPVU BUJUTNBJOTJUFJO/FX.FYJDP BOEBO- BDUJWJUJFTɨFTFDPOEMBSHFTUCVEHFUMJOF NJM- other 1,000 in California. lion) within the weapons category is for site steward- ship (that is, the operation and maintenance of NNSA Budget program facilities; much of this funding previously fell SNL’s total FY 2013 funding from the DOE is roughly VOEFSUIF3FBEJOFTTJO5FDIOJDBM#BTFBOE'BDJMJUJFT CJMMJPO0GUIJT UIFNBKPSJUZCJMMJPO DBUFHPSZ XIJDIUIF//4"EJTDPOUJOVFEJO': comes from the NNSA for nuclear weapons activities, 4/-BMTPSFRVFTUFENJMMJPOGPSUIF"EWBODFE with additional NNSA funding for nuclear nonprolif- Simulation and Computing Campaign, which funds eration. SNL also receives DOE funding for environ- high-end simulation capabilities for weapons assess- mental management (cleanup related to defense nuclear ment and certi"cation and to predict the behavior of programs), site security, and energy research and de- nuclear weapons. velopment. Unlike the other weapons labs, which are funded almost exclusively by the DOE, a large portion of SNL’s annual budget (about one-third in FY 2011, the last year for which data are currently available) 8 Numbers for FY 2013 are based on the Continuing Resolution annualized for the full year. Photo: NNSA News 76 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S SAVANNAH RIVER SITE he Savannah River Site (SRS) is located in South UIF5FOOFTTFF7BMMFZ"VUIPSJUZT 57"T 8BUUT#BSS $BSPMJOB OFBSUIF(FPSHJBCPSEFS'PSNPTUPG reactor in Tennessee. Tits history, it produced radioactive materials for !e SRS periodically replenishes the tritium reser- UIF 64 OVDMFBS XFBQPOT QSPHSBN 'SPN UP voirs in existing nuclear weapons as part of the Limited ëWFSFBDUPSTBUUIFTJUFQSPEVDFEQMVUPOJVN Life Component Exchange (LLCE) program. !e De- BOE USJUJVN B SBEJPBDUJWF GPSN PG IZESPHFO partment of Defense (DOD) sends tritium reservoirs %VSJOHUIJTQFSJPE UIF434QSPEVDFENFUSJDUPOT at the end of their useful life to the SRS to be emptied PGQMVUPOJVN BCPVUQFSDFOUPGUIFQMVUPOJVN and re"lled with a precise mixture of tritium and deu- produced by the DOE for use in nuclear weapons. terium gases, then sent back to the DOD or to the !e SRS sits on 310 square miles of land and has 1BOUFY1MBOUJO5FYBTGPSSFQMBDFNFOUJOXFBQPOT about 12,000 employees. It is owned by the DOE and As part of stockpile surveillance, the SRS also per- HJWFOUIFBNPVOUPGDMFBOVQSFRVJSFENJMMJPOHBM- forms reliability testing on the gas transfer systems that MPOTPGSBEJPBDUJWFMJRVJEXBTUFBSFTUPSFEJOVOEFS- inject the tritium-deuterium gas from the reservoir into ground tanks, leading to its declaration as a Superfund the plutonium pit as the "ssion reaction begins. site—the DOE O%ce of Environmental Management is the “site landlord.” !e NNSA operates the SRS Plutonium and HEU Disposal tritium facilities. Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, Two new facilities at the SRS are under construction LLC, a partnership including Fluor Daniel, Northrup to support plutonium disposition: the Mixed Oxide (SVNNBO BOE)POFZXFMM NBOBHFTBOEPQFSBUFTUIF 'VFM'BCSJDBUJPO'BDJMJUZ .''' BOEUIF8BTUF4P- SRS for the NNSA. MJEJëDBUJPO#VJMEJOH XJUIUIFMBUUFSOFBSMZDPNQMFUF "UIJSE UIF1JU%JTBTTFNCMZBOE$POWFSTJPO'BDJMJUZ The Savannah River Site Today has been canceled due to budget constraints and the 8JUISFEVDUJPOTJOUIF64OVDMFBSBSTFOBMBGUFSUIF availability of alternatives. end of the cold war, the SRS’s mission shifted to main- 1MBOTDBMMGPSNPTUTVSQMVTQMVUPOJVNBUUIF434UP taining the current arsenal, disposing of excess nuclear be converted to plutonium oxide and used to fabricate materials, and cleanup of the site. Today the SRS is a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for use in commercial nuclear LFZTJUFJOUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBN BQSP- SFBDUPST1MVUPOJVNUPPJNQVSFGPSVTFJO.09GVFM gram for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability XJMMCFTFOUUPFJUIFSUIF8BTUF*TPMBUJPO1JMPU1MBOUJO of U.S. nuclear weapons without nuclear testing). It is /FX.FYJDPPSUIFFYJTUJOH%FGFOTF8BTUF1SPDFTTJOH also the primary disposition site for most surplus weap- Facility at the SRS, where it will be “vitri"ed”—con- ons-grade plutonium and some surplus highly enriched verted to a glass form suitable for long-term storage. uranium (HEU). *OJUT':CVEHFUSFRVFTU UIF//4"IBTEF- cided to slow the MFFF project while the contractor Tritium Production reviews the program and provides updated cost and ɨF434TSPMFJOUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBN schedule estimates, and the administration conducts focuses on tritium and related weapons components. an assessment of alternative strategies for disposing of Tritium gas, used with deuterium gas (a nonradio- the excess plutonium. !is decision was based on con- active isotope of hydrogen) to boost the yield of tinually increasing cost estimates and delays. !e proj- U.S. nuclear weapons, decays over time and must be FDUJTOPXZFBSTCFIJOETDIFEVMF BOEJUTFTUJNBUFE periodically replenished to maintain the weapons’ PQFSBUJPOBMEBUFIBTDPOUJOVFEUPTMJQ GSPNUP FêFDUJWFOFTTɨF434TUPQQFEQSPEVDJOHUSJUJVNJO BDDPSEJOHUPUIFNPTUSFDFOU//4"BOBMZTJT To meet current needs, it now recycles tritium from Costs have also risen from the original 2002 estimates dismantled warheads and extracts tritium produced in PGMFTTUIBOCJMMJPOGPSEFTJHOBOEDPOTUSVDUJPOBOE 9 HEU contains greater than 20 percent uranium-235 (U-235) or U-233; low-enriched uranium contains less than 20 percent. In contrast, natural uranium contains less than 1 percent U-235. HEU comprising more than 90 percent U-235 is considered weapons- grade uranium, although all HEU can be used to make nuclear weapons. Weapons-grade plutonium is largely plutonium-239 (Pu-239) and contains less than 7 percent Pu-240. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 77 Savannah River Site, 2012 NJMMJPOQFSZFBSGPSPQFSBUJPOTUPCJMMJPO vannah River National Laboratory, which works on BOENPSFUIBONJMMJPOQFSZFBS SFTQFDUJWFMZɨF national and homeland security, energy security, and future of the project will depend on the outcome of environmental and chemical process technology. the contractor and administration reviews. !e HEU disposed of at the SRS comes from spent Budget fuel from domestic and foreign research reactors, as ɨF434T':CVEHFUJTBQQSPYJNBUFMZCJM- well as excess HEU-bearing materials from other DOE MJPO XJUICJMMJPOPGUIBUHPJOHUPEFGFOTFFOWJSPO sites. !e spent fuel is dissolved in acid to separate the mental cleanup to decontaminate areas of the site that HEU, which is blended with natural uranium to create were associated with nuclear weapons production.10 a low-enriched uranium solution that is sent to the TVA 'PS ': UIF 434 IBT SFRVFTUFE B UPUBM PG to be turned into fuel for its commercial reactors. CJMMJPOJOGVOEJOH CJMMJPOPGXIJDIJTGPS defense environmental cleanup. As noted above, the Other Missions .09QSPKFDUIBTCFFOTMPXFEGPS':BOEJUTGVOE !e SRS is involved in environmental stewardship, JOHSFEVDFE GBMMJOHGSPNNJMMJPOJO':UP environmental cleanup, and research on renewable and NJMMJPOJO': BSFEVDUJPOPGQFSDFOU other low-carbon energy sources. It also houses the Sa- 10 Numbers for FY 2013 are based on the Continuing Resolution annualized for the full year. Photo: NNSA News 78 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S Y12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX he Y-12 National Security Complex was part of U.S. thermonuclear weapons have two stages: a primary UIFPSJHJOBM.BOIBUUBO1SPKFDU QSPEVDJOHFO- and a secondary. !e secondary contains HEU and is TSJDIFE VSBOJVN GPS UIF i-JUUMF #PZw CPNC contained within a CSA. A uranium-lined radiation ESPQQFEPO)JSPTIJNBJOɨFTJUFUBLFTJUTOBNF case encloses both the primary and CSA. Y-12 is also GSPNUIF8PSME8BS**DPEFOBNFGPSUIFFMFDUSPNBH- the main U.S. site for processing and storing HEU for netic isotope separation plant at the Clinton Engineer nuclear weapons use. 8PSLTJO0BL3JEHF 5/%VSJOHUIFDPMEXBS : Y-12’s additional nuclear-weapons-related tasks enriched uranium through electromagnetic separation include: and later gaseous di#usion, and manufactured nuclear t 1FSGPSNJOH RVBMJUZ FWBMVBUJPO BOE TVSWFJMMBODF weapons components from uranium and lithium. activities on subassemblies and components !e site includes the Y-12 plant, Oak Ridge National t .BJOUBJOJOH $BUFHPSZ *** RVBOUJUJFT PG )&6 -BCPSBUPSZ BOEUIF&BTU5FOOFTTFF5FDIOPMPHZ1BSL which can be used to build nuclear weapons and #8: BQBSUOFSTIJQCFUXFFO#BCDPDL8JMDPY require the highest level of security $PNQBOZBOE#FDIUFM$PSQPSBUJPO NBOBHFTUIF: t %JTNBOUMJOHTFDPOEBSJFT SBEJBUJPODBTFT BOEPUIFS TJUF JUFNQMPZTBCPVU XPSLFST weapons components t 4UPSJOHBOEEJTQPTJOHPGFOSJDIFEVSBOJVN Y-12 Today Today Y-12 is one of four production facilities in the Y-12 has completed work on life extension programs U.S. nuclear weapons complex; it focuses on uranium GPSUXPXFBQPOTUIF8JOUFSDPOUJOFOUBMCBMMJTUJD processing and storage and development of related NJTTJMFXBSIFBEBOEUIF#BOE#TUSBUFHJD technologies. Its missions are to maintain the safety, OVDMFBSCPNCTɨF#-&1JODMVEFESFGVSCJTINFOU security, and e#ectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons PGJUT$4"*UJTOPXXPSLJOHPOBO-&1PGUIF8 stockpile; reduce the global threat of nuclear prolif- submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, which eration and terrorism; and provide highly enriched is scheduled to be completed in 2022. uranium for use in U.S. naval reactors. Y-12 also supplies the Navy with HEU from dis- Y-12 produces all U.S. nuclear weapons secondar- mantled weapons to make fuel for use in the nuclear ies, canned subassemblies (CSAs), and radiation cases. reactors that power all U.S. submarines and aircraft Y-12 National Security Complex, 2011 Photo: NNSA NewsR M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 79 carriers. An agreement with the Department of Defense Budget requires Y-12 to provide HEU through 2050. :T':CVEHFUJTNJMMJPO CJMMJPO In addition to weapons work, Y-12’s mission includes QFSDFOU PGUIJTJTGPSXFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFT118JUIJO preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. UIBUDBUFHPSZ UIFMBSHFTUBQQSPQSJBUJPOXBTNJM- Its main tasks in this area include securing and remov- MJPOGPS3FBEJOFTTJO5FDIOJDBM#BTFBOE'BDJMJUJFT UIBU ing uranium and nuclear materials from vulnerable is, operation and maintenance of NNSA facilities). sites globally, developing technologies to detect ura- "OPUIFS NJMMJPO XFOU UP EJSFDUFE TUPDLQJMF nium as part of treaty veri"cation and border control, work, QBSUPGUIF4UPDLQJMF4UFXBSETIJQ1SPHSBNUIBU and disposing of excess HEU from dismantled weap- TVQQPSUT-&1TBOEXFBQPOTTVSWFJMMBODFBOENBJO ons by converting it to low-enriched uranium (LEU) tenance activities. After weapons activities, the for civil use. next-largest budget category at Y-12 is defense nuclear *OUIF6OJUFE4UBUFTEFDMBSFENFUSJDUPOT OPOQSPMJGFSBUJPO GVOEFEBUNJMMJPOGPS': of HEU to be excess to military needs. Much of this Information about funding for Y-12 was not in- has already been down-blended; the rest is to be con- DMVEFEJOUIF':-BCPSBUPSZ5BCMFTQVUPVUCZ verted by 2015. About 10 percent of excess HEU is the NNSA. However, the overall NNSA budget request down-blended at Y-12 for use as fuel in research reac- JODMVEFT SPVHIMZ CJMMJPO JO GVOEJOH GPS: tors or to produce medical isotopes. Y-12 is the primary VOEFSUIF//4"1SPEVDUJPO0ïDF XJUIOFBSMZBMMPG provider of LEU for research reactors worldwide. UIJT QFSDFOU GPSXFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFT8JUIJOUIF Remaining excess HEU is shipped to the Savannah XFBQPOTBDUJWJUJFTDBUFHPSZ BCPVUNJMMJPOJTGPS River Site or a commercial facility in Lynchburg, VA, UIF6SBOJVN1SPDFTTJOH'BDJMJUZ to be down-blended for use as fuel in nuclear power reactors. 11 Numbers for FY 2013 are based on the Continuing Resolution annualized for the full year. 80 UNION OF CONC ERNED SC IENTIS T S About the Authors Lisbeth Gronlund, senior scientist and co-director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists Dr. Gronlund holds a doctorate in physics from Cornell University. Her research focuses on technical issues related to U.S. nuclear weapons policy, ballistic missile defense, and nuclear arms control. Gronlund is a fellow of the American Physical Society (APS) and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. She received the 2001 Joseph A. Burton Forum Award of the APS “for creative and sustained leadership in building an international arms-control-physics community and for her excellence in arms control physics.” Before joining the Union of Concerned Scientists, Gronlund was a Social Science Research Council–MacArthur Foundation fellow in international peace and security at the University of Maryland, and a postdoctoral fellow at the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Eryn MacDonald, analyst, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists Ms. MacDonald holds a master’s degree in government from Cornell University. Her research areas include the U.S. nuclear complex, arms control and nonproliferation, and East Asian security. Before coming to UCS, she coordinated internships for the International Science and Technology Initiative at MIT. Stephen Young, senior analyst, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists Mr. Young holds a master’s degree in international affairs from Columbia University. His areas of expertise include arms control, nuclear weapons policy, ballistic missile defense, and nuclear threat reduction programs. In addition to his research, he meets frequently on these issues with administration officials, members of Congress, and journalists. Before joining UCS, Young was deputy director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a national alliance of 17 nuclear arms control organizations. He previously served as a senior analyst at the British American Security Information Council, legislative and field director for 20/20 Vision, and senior information specialist at ACCESS, a security information clearinghouse. He also was a fellow in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights. Hon. Philip E. Coyle III, senior science fellow, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Mr. Coyle is an expert on U.S. and worldwide military research, weapons development and testing, operational military matters, and national security policy and defense spending. In 2010 and 2011 he served as associate director for national security and international affairs in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. In this position he supported the universities and laboratories that comprise the R&D capabilities of the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and other agencies. From 2001 to 2010, Coyle served as a senior advisor to the president of the World Security Institute and its Center for Defense Information. In 2005 and 2006, Coyle served on the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC), appointed by President George W. Bush. From 1994 to 2001, he was assistant secretary of defense, and director of operational test and evaluation for the Department of Defense. From 1979 to 1981, Coyle served as principal deputy assistant secretary for defense programs in the Department of Energy. In this capacity he had oversight responsibility for the department’s nuclear weapons research, development, production, and testing programs, as well as its programs in arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear safeguards and security. From 1959 to 1979, and again from 1981 to 1993, Coyle held positions at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) working on a variety of nuclear weapons programs and other high-technology programs. He also served as deputy associate director of the Laser Program at LLNL. M AKING SMART S E CURITY C HOIC E S 81 Steve Fetter, professor, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland Dr. Fetter has been a professor at the School of Public Policy since 1988, serving as dean from 2005 to 2009. He is currently associate provost for academic affairs. He received a doctorate in energy and resources from the University of California– Berkeley. His research and policy interests include nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, nuclear energy and releases of radiation, and climate change and low-carbon energy supply. From 2009 to 2012, Fetter served as assistant director at large in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Previously, he was special assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, and served in the State Department as an American Institute of Physics fellow and a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow. He has been a visiting fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs, MIT’s Plasma Fusion Center, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Fetter has also served on the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control, the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee, the Director of National Intelligence’s Intelligence Science Board, and the board of directors of the Arms Control Association. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow of the American Physical Society. Photo: Ken Lund/Flickr An entrance to what was formerly known as the Nevada Test Site, where the United States conducted hundreds of full-scale nuclear weapons tests, first aboveground and then underground. It is still used to conduct tests with nuclear material, but on a limited scale with smaller amounts of such material. Making Smart Security Choices The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex The mission of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex—the laboratories and facilities that research, design, produce, maintain, and dismantle such weapons—is to ensure that the arsenal is reliable, safe from accidents, secure from unauthorized use, and no larger than needed to maintain national security. To fulfill those goals, the complex needs to have the resources and facilities to extend the life of nuclear warheads, assess their reliability and safety, understand the impact of aging and modifications to them, and retain employees with essential scientific and technical expertise. The complex also requires the capacity to dismantle retired weapons in a timely fashion, and to develop methods for verifying further reductions in nuclear weapons. The complex must also minimize the security risks entailed in storing, transporting, and disposing of weapons-usable materials. Finally, the complex must meet all these challenges with limited resources. Doing so will require making smart choices based on strict attention to priorities. The administration and Congress will make important decisions on the nuclear weapons complex over the next few years. To inform those decisions, this report examines the essential missions of the complex, considers its key challenges, and suggests critical near-term and long-term steps. This report is available online (in PDF format) at www.ucsusa.org/smartnuclearchoices. The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous, independent science to work to solve our planet’s most pressing problems. Joining with citizens across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative, practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future. 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