1111u lil n11w1 Yeshivat Har Etzion - Israel Koschitzky VBM Parsha Digest, Year Ill, Parashat 5781 Selected and Adapted by Rabbi Dov Karoll Quote from the Rosh Yeshiva The unit on the gifts to the kohanim, which follows the episode of Korach, comes as a response to both groups [incense-offerers and Datan & Aviram]. On the one hand, this unit emphasizes the sanctity of the priesthood and its unique status in the Sanctuary... [see 18:7]. This answers the claim of the 250 incense-offerers, who sought to deny the special status of the kohanim. On the other hand, the principle of the priestly gifts is directed towards Datan and Aviram, establishing that one must honor God with the first of his produce, guarding himself against immersion in self-centered, hedonistic materialism and lust.. -Harav Mosheh Lichtenstein Parashat Korach Dispute that is Not for the Sake of Heaven By Harav Yehuda Amital zt"I Based on: https://etzion.org.il/en/tanakh/torah/ sefer-bamidbar/parashat-korach/dispute-not-sake-heaven LACK OF LOGIC Sometimes, as we approach Parashat Korach, we become so involved in lofty ideas and concepts that there is a danger of forgetting what Korach actually did, and the main lesson to be learned from the parasha. All kinds of explanations and reasons are offered for this episode, for the fact that this group rebelled against God, while the bottom line remains that there is no real explanation that can answer the question of why Korach acted as he did. This is the main message of the paras ha : that a person who gets involved in conflict and argument acts illogically. We look at great people who squabble with each other, and wonder: What got into that respectable, elderly man, who used to be so wise, to lead him into such foolishness? We forget that there is really no logic in a squabble. In contrast to Korach's illogical behavior, Moshe and Aharon act with composure and equanimity. The Gemara, commenting on their demeanor, tells us (Chullin 89a): The world exists only for the sake of Moshe and Aharon. There is it written, "What are we? (literally: we are ma)," while elsewhere it is written, "He hangs the world on nothingness (belima)." Rabbi llaa said: The world exists only for the sake of one who holds himself back at a time of argument, as it is written: "He hangs the world on belima (figuratively, on restraint)." The world exists not by the merit of the pious, saintly ascetics of the world, but rather by the merit of someone who holds his mouth at a time of argument! It is specifically in this that a person's greatness is expressed. We must remember that any person who gets into an argument has a "Kamtza" - a core of companions. He also has a "bar Kamtza" - people who dislike him . We should not think that if we enter into a dispute, we will be immune to the deterioration and illogic that always follows. We must elevate ourselves to the level upon which the world rests - the level of Moshe and Aharon, who held themselves back at a time of argument.

ALL ARE HOLY? Having established that Korach's rebellion lacked logic, we may examine his claim : "For all the congregation, all of them, are holy." Korach cannot understand why there must be a tribe of that is chosen from amongst the nation, while in truth the entire nation is holy. He canot fathom the necessity of a higher stratum standing above the nation, when the entire nation has merited prophecy. A similar claim is voiced by the nations of the world: why it is necessary that there be a Chosen Nation? Why can all the nations not exist on the same level? They continue to ask: if you Jews are indeed chosen, why are you in exile? If you are truly the Chosen Nation, why are you not prominent and celebrated, but rather persecuted? When Moshe answers Korach and his company, he is also answering the nations of the world: "In the morning God will show.... " Morning, as we know, symbolizes the redemption, while night is the darkness of exile. Moshe knows that there is no answer to these questions in the world as it is today. We have to pray for the 'morning,' for the redemption. Only then will the truth of Am Yisrael become clear. Therefore the chapters of Tehillim that begin with the words, "Of the chief musician; a psalm for the sons of Korach" speak of the future redemption, where all will understand the function of Am Yisrael amongst the nations. (This sicha was delivered on Shabbat Parashat Korach 5733 [1973]. Adapted by Rami Yanai, Translated by Kaeren Fish.) Parashat Korach Korach: Ideologue or Provocateur By Rav Alex Israel

Based on: https://etzion.org.il/en/tanakh/torah/sefer-bamidbar/parashat-korach/korach-ideologue-or-provocateur Our parasha describes yet another dark episode in the series of wilderness uprisings, this time with a new type of rebellion. Unlike the episode of the spies or the story of the "lusting" for meat, this rebellion is not directed against God. Instead, this popular uprising targets and , and thus is not so much a revolt against God as a mutiny. The rebellion is led by Korach, Moses' cousin, with a well-orchestrated campaign against Moses and Aaron, amassing quite a following. But it isn't all simply personal. Like any mass movement, there are spiritual arguments and ideological claims to his propaganda. We will examine the agenda that Korach raises against Moses and Aaron. What does he say that gains such wide appeal? Is there genuine reason for complaint? Is Korach a well-meaning ideologue or a political opportunist? We shall attempt to answer some of these questions by using midrash, taking the Midrashic tradition as a sophisticated commentary, highlighting important themes and variant strains in the Torah text.

MIDRASH 1. ALL THE PEOPLE ARE HOLY "And Korach took" (16:1 ): What parasha precedes this episode? ... Tzitzit (fringes) (15:34). Korach jumped up and turned to Moses: "You say, 'Put on the fringe a thread of blue (tekhelet) wool:(ibid.) What about a garment that is itself a blue color, would it not be exempt from the blue thread (on the Tzitzit)?" Moses replied, "It is obligatory to have the blue thread:' Said Korach, "A garment which is all blue is not exempt and 4 meager threads do the trick!?" "A room full of Sifrei Torah, would it need a Mezuza ?" Moses answered in the affirmative. Korach replied, "The Torah contains 275 sections and they are not enough to fulfill the house's obligation to have a Mezuza, but these 2 sections (written in the Mezuza scroll) will fulfill the obligation for the entire house! Moses, you must be fabricating this!" (Mid rash Tanchuma) At first glance, it seems that Korach's challenge lies in the detailed technicalities of a Torah discussion. The argument here revolves around the logic of the Torah's regulations. A 4-cornered garment must be adorned with ritual fringes, Tzitzit, which contain a thread dyed blue by the tekhelet dye. Korach asks about a 4-cornered garment which is entirely tekhelet in color. He laughs at the law which obligates affixing an additional blue thread to such a garment. If the objective is to have blue thread, why is this necessary with an entirely blue garment? Likewise, if a room contains a stock ofTorah scrolls, why does it need the miniscule Mezuza scroll on the door? Are the contents of the room not enough? So at first glance, the argument is a challenge to Torah law and its authority. But look closer; both these halakhic examples are identical. Both cases concern logical inconsistencies in which the ritual act is considered superfluous due to the presence of a larger representative element. What do these stories tell us about Korach's rebellion? Was the rebellion based on Torah discussions? Or is this Mid rash hiding a deeper reading of the text: They massed against Moses and Aaron and said to them, "You have gone too far, for ALL THE COMMUNITY IS HOLY, all of them and the Lord is in their midst. WHY DO YOU RAISE YOURSELVES above the Lord's congregation?" (16:3) "For all the community is holy... Why do you raise yourselves?"This not a Torah argument. It is a strident call for equality and democratization. Korach attempts to undermine Moses' position on democratic grounds. If the people are holy, they don't need leaders or intermediaries. He uses the metaphor of the Tallit and the Mezuza, symbolic laws, designed to lead to a higher purpose. The law ofTzitzit is to act as a "reminder" of God's presence within our lives. "The tekhelet color is like the sea which is like the sky which reminds us of God's Holy presence:'

2 (Ras hi, 15:34). The tekhelet blue is meant to direct the heart and mind heavenwards. Likewise, we place the Mezuza so that "these words will be on your heart" (Shema, Deut 6:2). These laws are not themselves important, says Korach; they are just to lead a person to God. Logic suggests that a tekhelet garment, blue in color, is stronger than the blue Tzitzit thread. Likewise, why is a Mezuza superior to a Torah scroll? A Torah scroll is essential to fulfill the dictates of the law. But Korach asks, why is it necessary to limit the symbolic act to a single thread, to a small piece of parchment? Why not extend it to the entire garment, the whole house? And by the same logic, why not crown the entire nation with Torah, with leadership? If they are all holy, then why is Moses or Aaron in a privileged position? Why not give prophecy or the high priesthood to the average man? All the people are holy (the entire Tallit is blue) so why do we need leaders (a special thread)? Why are you - Moses - standing aloof in the leadership role? Do you not respect the holiness of the nation? Do you view yourselves as "holier" in some way?

WHO IS HOLY? So the argument is a moral, democratic one. The Midrash's halakhic reading supports this line of argument. This helps us understand another central detail of the story: the test which is used to prove the authentic leadership group. The test of the firepans (see 16:5-7) is formulated in terms of determining "who is holy," and who "shall be the holy one:' Moses offers the Korach clan to act as High Priest for a day. They will perform the very holy incense ritual, one which carries a death penalty if abused. Moses' challenge to the rebels is a direct response to their own argument. But Moses focuses here upon the issue of "Holiness:' If the people are indeed "holy" as Korach claims, and thus befitting of leadership, then the incense should work for them. ls everyone a holy person befitting of the priesthood or is the holy person he whom God chooses? The "showdown" takes place "before God:' It is only God who can decide who has the authentic aura of "holiness:' Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz deepens the connection between Tzitzit and Korach, noting that the parasha aboutTzizit also raises the issue of "Holiness'; concluding with the phrase, "And you will be holy to the Lord:' Prof. Leibowitz explains that the holiness ofTzitzit is a task, to make oneself holy. Korach's group, on the other hand, asserts that the community is holy, assuming that holiness is "bestowed upon one" passively. While the former is a demand placed upon a person, the latter frees one from responsibility (Notes on the Weekly Parasha, pp. 96-97). So, this argument relates to democratization and holiness: is holiness an innate virtue in the Jewish nation or is it something to work towards, to achieve? If it is the former, then there is no need to accept Moses and Aaron over Korach as national leader. But if the latter is correct - that holiness is a product of years of self-refinement - then Korach's argument looks quite weak.

MIDRASH 2 - INTEGRITY OF A LEADER What did Korach do? He gathered the entire congregation and began to tell stories (Mid rash Tehillim): There was once a widow in my neighborhood who had 2 little girls, orphans. She owned a modest field (from which they made their living). She began to plough the field; Moses told her"Do not plough with an ox and a donkey together" (Deut. 22:10). She began to sow the field, He said "Do not sow the field with mixtures of seeds" (Lev. 19:19). She began to harvest the crop; he said, "leave the gleanings, and the edge of your field for the poor:' She gathered the harvest; he said, "Give the tithes to the Priest and the Levite:' She gave it all to him. She sold her field and bought 2 sheep in order to clothe her children from their fleece and to gain profit from their offspring and milk. They gave birth; Aaron came and demanded the firstborns .... First of the fleece, he said. God gave it to me .... she stood there crying with her 2 daughters. That is what they did to this desperate woman. This is what they do and they pin it all on the word of God. Korach is quite a storyteller, knowing how to appeal to the crowd's soft side. As a good politician, he uses images of poverty stricken single-parent families to arouse public anger. Let us examine his argument, contained within this text. This Midrash suggests another tactic in Korach's propaganda armory. Korach accuses Moses and Aaron of using and abusing the Torah to their own personal gain. They interfere in the lives of the normal person, making demands which they claim are based in the This Midrash suggests another tactic in Korach's propaganda armory. Korach accuses Moses and Aaron of using and abusing the Torah and thus in God's law. But is it a coincidence that many of these benefits go into their own pockets? (And don't forget that Moses brought the law to the people ... .) He has ample "evidence" at his disposal, and he combines this with a perfect sob-story. Is this Midrash rooted in the text? Where are these themes manifest in the Torah narrative? There is 1 point in the story where Moses seems to get personally offended, a very unusual trait for Moses. Moses calls Dathan and Aviram - Korach 's colleagues - to a meeting in an attempt to resolve the dispute (16 :12-15): Moses sent for Dathan and Aviram .. . but they said, "We will not come! Is it not enough that you brought us from a land flowing with milk and honey to have us die in the wilderness that you would also lord over us?" ... Moses was greatly saddened and he said to

3 God, "Pay no attention to their prayers. I have not taken the donkey of any one of them nor have I wronged any of them." This text is strange. Moses' response seems inconsistent with the accusations which have been leveled against him . Dathan and Aviram accuse Moses of failing in his mission of taking the Israelites to the promised land. Moses is offended, upset, and turns to God. But his prayer relates to a different theme. Moses asks that the prayers of these men be ignored. He then asks God to affirm that he has shown perfect integrity as leader. These accusations are not in the text, but our Midrash ably puts these words into Korach's eloquent mouth. Moses is bothered far more by the challenge to his personal honesty than the critiques of his leadership. The Midrash uncovers these hidden accusations which hurt Moses the most. Korach has portrayed Moses as a scheming trickster! He has even undermined the divine authority of the Torah in the process. These words and ideas can cause the most devastating damage in the long term . Maybe this is why public miracles are used to defeat the rebellion. A response from God is the only way these accusations can be proven false.

MIDRASHIC APPROACH No. 3 - A FAMILY ARGUMENT Why did Korach create a dispute? His uncle, Elitzafan the son of Uzziel was appointed as chieftain over the family [of Kehat] (Num . 3:30) .... Korach said, "My father is one of 4 boys, 'And the sons of Kehat: Am ram, Yitzhar, Chevron and Uzziel' (Ex. 6:18). the firstborn, has his son Aaron as the priest and Moses as the national leader. Who should take the role of chieftain? Obviously the second son, and I am Yitzhar's son! I should have become chieftain, and now Moses has appointed the son of Uzziel - the youngest - over me! I am going to oppose Moses and overturn the appointment. (Tanchuma) Here, the Midrash does not attempt to cloak Korach 's rebellion in an ideological stance. This is simple family rivalry, one family member resenting his cousin's advance. Korach is jealous and his self-centered ambition fuels the rebellion.

TIMING It is interesting to think about what series of events precipitated this rebellion. What caused the feeling in the camp to be such that the leadership of Moses and Aaron were questioned? NACHMANIDES suggests that the rebellion happened after the decree that Israel wander in the desert for 40 years. At this point, the national morale plunged to an all-time low. The people were bitter and despondent. This was not the first hiccup in the journey to the promised land, and the emotional climate provided fertile ground for cultivating feelings of discontent amongst the people. Korach took advantage of these emotions and developed the themes of Moses' leadership failure, embellishing it and making it into a full-scale mutiny. But the IBN EZRA sees the issue differently. He speaks of the elevation of the (see Num . ch. 3, 4, 8) as the main cause of the rebellion. The people saw Moses giving special rights and privileges to his own tribe. Now the served in the Temple and were eligible to receive tithes from the rest of the nation. Who set up this hierarchy, making the Levites more prestigious? Moses. Now this argument is problematic, since Korach himself is a Levite, but the lbn Ezra explains that this was Korach's genius. He was able to unite multiple groups with different agendas under a single banner: "All the people are Holy!" The lbn Ezra explains that the appointment of the Levites to High Service and the subsequent "reshuffle" opened a Pandora's box of complaints. The firstborn Israelites (Korach was a firstborn) were upset that they had been "demoted" from the Temple service. Reuvenites (Reuven is the firstborn tribe of Jacob) like Dathan and Aviram were wondering why the Levites had been chosen and their tribe passed over. The Levites were offended that only Aaron's sons were granted the Priesthood whereas they were mere assistants. Korach took all the malcontents and united them in a call for democratic appointment. Look at these readings of the timing of this rebellion. Each seems to reflect one of the strands raised in our Midrashim.

SUMMARY We have seen several explanations for this rebellion. Was it fueled by ideological egalitarianism or personal jealousy? Was it a genuine lack of confidence in Moses, concern about his integrity, or were the Israelites looking for a scapegoat after the decree to wander for 40 years? And then, there is a second question; who stirs up the trouble? Is it Dathan and Aviram, the 250 chieftains, or Korach himself? It seems that each group has a clashing agenda, yet they work in harmony. The diverse arguments associated with Korach suggest that his mutiny, rather than a unified movement, might have been a coalition of several factions with different agendas. Korach, Levite and relative of Moses, is joined by "Dathan and Aviram ... and 250 chieftains of the Israelite community" (16:1-2). It seems that most of these people are significantly

4 motivated by self-interest. Maybe for this reason the Mishna states: "Every controversy ... which is not pursued in a heavenly cause will not be perpetuated .... What is that controversy that is not pursued in a heavenly cause? This is the argument of Korach and his clan:' (Avot 5:17) This argument is not directed towards heaven. It looks towards earth. It is not really about ideals at all. The ideals are just a foil for the real ambition, the personal vendetta, the desire for fame and power. Korach's group had no unified agenda other than toppling Moses. It is for this reason that their issues "will not be perpetuated:' A moral or ideological truth lasts forever, an ideological discussion will endure and provoke thought and spiritual growth. But a self-centered argument driven by misplaced personal ambition at the expense of others will always be consumed by its own fire - just like Korach. Shabbat Shalom Avodat Hashem - Foundations of Divine Service

Shiur #23: Loving God (XIII): Loving Israel and Loving God (Part 1) By Harav Baruch Gigi Based on: https://etzion.org.il/en/philosophy/issues-jewish-thought/practical-issues-philosophy/loving-god-xiii-loving-israel-and Loving One's Fellow: Not Quite as Oneself When we began to discuss the mitzva of loving God, we mentioned the mitzva of loving one's fellow: "Love your fellow as yourself" (Vayikra 19:18). In the context of this verse, we addressed the difficulty in demanding that a person truly love every member of the people of Israel ("your fellow") as himself. We cited Ramban's explanation, in his commentary on the Torah, according to which the formulation of the verse is somewhat hyperbolic. Ram ban thus tempered the actual demand of the Torah (Vayikra 19:17), explaining that the Torah's demand is that one wish very kindness upon his fellow, just as he wishes upon himself, but not that it means the same degree. Ramban inferred this explanation from the formulation of the verse: It does not say ve-ahavta et re'akha kamokha, but ve-ahavta le-re'akha kamokha, meaning that one must desire that his fellow experience complete goodness, without stinting. Now that we have examined and analyzed the principles of loving God, it seems that we can provide a deeper, more fundamental perspective on the mitzva of loving one's fellow.

Love Your Fellow - Literally We have addressed the fact that loving God is both necessary and expected of us, since it is not a demand that one love something outside of oneself, but that one love something that is truly close to one's heart. A person's soul is a part of God above that resides in one's heart; as a direct result, every person's soul facilitates his intimate connection with God. In order to achieve this awareness and understanding, a person must internalize the proper relationship between his body and his soul. The body aspires to connect the person to the earth, from which it was made, while the soul aspires to lift the person upward to its source, to God. When there is a deep awareness of this point, a person can connect intimately to his supreme Source, to the Creator of the world. This notion is particularly apparent from the words of the wise man in Kohelet. On the one hand, he shows that there is no hope for mankind to rise up and draw close to God; there is no difference between man and beast, as both share the same fate - emerging from the dust and returning to the dust (see 3:19-20). At this stage, even a person's "spirit" is "the same spirit" as that of a beast. However, the wise man then distinguishes between 2 types of spirit: "Who knows if a man's spirit rises upward and if a beast's breath sinks down into the earth?" (3 :21). The first spirit is that of the beast, the animalistic spirit. The second spirit, in contrast, is the divine spirit - the divine soul that resides within a person. The divine spirit rises up and never sinks down into the earth. As the wise man said, "And the dust returns to the ground as it was, and the spirit returns to God who bestowed it" (12 :7). If a person can cause the divine spirit within him to overpower his body, then it can truly be claimed that "the thing is very close to you" (Devarim 30:14). If we adopt this point of view of the mitzva of the love of God, we can develop the concept of the love of Israel as well - that one can indeed truly love every member of the people of Israel as himself. Thus R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the Ba'al Ha-Tanya, explains that the attainment of "Love your fellow as yourself" can be brought about through unity of souls, meaning by a recognition that all Jews draw their souls jointly from God Himself and are thus "called real brothers" (Tanya, Likkutei Amarim 32). The Ba'al Ha-Tanya adds the demand that one cause his soul to overcome his body. The body is separate - "He who isolates himself pursues his desires" (Mishlei 18:1) - while the soul is one, hewn from a supreme Source.

5 From this perspective, we can state confidently that "We all have one father.. . one God created us" (Malakhi 2:10). We all cling as one to the Root, the Foundation, and the Source. This kind of love, whose Source and Foundation lie in the recognition of the unity of all the souls of Israel, is the complete, pure love. When a person causes his soul to overcome his body, even his soul becomes liberated from the body's shackles, bursting forth not only with the love of its Creator, but also with the love of Israel, of which it is an inseparable part. This is a natural, fundamental love that cannot be stopped or hindered. The great difficulty in achieving this sublime state is rooted in the great struggle that is constantly being waged within a person. Every person struggles to cause his soul to overcome his body, to prioritize the spiritual aspirations of pursuing divine service, of living a life of Torah and mitzvot, and of allowing these values to feature prominently in one's life. When a person reaches this level of control over his body, and is able to see the true, eternal reality of his spiritual world, then his soul is one, together with the souls of the community of Israel. The souls of the community of Israel are all one unit, a notion that is expressed by several mitzvot. We can demonstrate this by examining one positive mitzva and one transgression: the mitzva of arevut (mutual responsibility, see Sanhedrin 27b), and the prohibition of taking vengeance and bearing grudges (Vaykira 19:18).

All Jews Are Responsible for One Another Chazal identified the principle of mutual responsibility between Jews with regard to fulfilling mitzvot at 2 junctures: at the giving of the Torah and before the people of Israel entered the land of Israel. We read in Mekhilta De-Rabbi Yishmael (Ba-Chodesh 5) that when the Jewish people stood at Mt. Sinai, they accepted God's kingship, and also "pledged themselves for another." However, the midrash notes that at that time, they only accepted communal responsibility for overt acts and not concealed ones. In Massekhet Sanhedrin (43b), Chazal viewed the value of arevut as connected to the moment when the people of Israel entered the land, to the act of crossing the Jordan, in light of the covenant that was forged with God at the plains of Moav. The Talmud cites two different derivations based on the verse: "Concealed acts concern the Lord our God; but with overt acts, it is for us and our children forever" (Devarim 29:28). But the common denominator between the 2 Tannaitic positions cited there is that the act of crossing the Jordan and entering the land of Israel was significant in terms of the value of arevut and maintaining a sense of mutual obligation. On both positions, at that time, the Jewish people accepted greater mutual responsibility for another. What is the relationship between these 2 junctures - the covenant at Sinai and the covenant at the plains of Moav - with respect to mutual obligation and responsibility? We can offer 2 possible suggestions: 1. The covenant at Sinai was cancelled after the sin of the Golden Calf, so they needed to forge a new covenant at the plains of Moav. 2.The covenant at Sinai was a vow that stemmed from the nation's desire and willingness, through understanding and responsibility. The covenant at the plains of Moav added the element that gave this vow binding force for all future generations. In either case, the principle of arevut took on a binding, halakhic nature, obligating every member of the people of Israel to demonstrate concern for his fellow Jew's spiritual endeavors and to aid him in fulfilling mitzvot. This is implied in a passage from the end of the third chapter of Massekhet Rosh Ha-shana: "Ahava the son of R. Zeira learned: Any blessing that one has already recited on behalf of oneself, he can recite again on behalf of others" (29a). As Rashi explains there: "Since all Jews are responsible for one another with respect to mitzvot." There is also a parallel obligation to prevent others from violating prohibitions whenever one sees a member of the people of Israel who is about to violate any prohibition. The test case for the limits of arevut is when there is a conflict between one's personal obligation to be totally free of spiritual iniquity and one's responsibility toward the other. In other words, how should one deal with a situation in which one must act against one's religion in order to prevent another person from sinning or in order to allow another person to fulfill a mitzva? Of course, we are not referring to a case in which a person must violate a severe transgression, but merely a minor sin - for the sake of a much greater gain for his fellow. The question, as formulated by Chazal, is: "Is then a person told, 'Sin, in order that your fellow may thereby gain?"' (Shabbat 4a). Since the Talmud does not provide a unified position on the matter, the Rishonim sought to reconcile the passages. In this framework, we will suffice with one of Ritva's responsa. Ritva writes (Shabbat 4a) : "There he acted on his own accord, whereas here, we stated that we do not tell him that he may do so." Ritva distinguishes between 2 types of people who find themselves in a situation

6 in which they must help their fellow Jew to avoid violating a severe prohibition, when doing so requires that one violate a minor prohibition. One kind of person consults his rabbi and asks for guidance regarding how to proceed, while another kind of person acts out of a deep sense of responsibility toward his fellow Jew, without feeling the need to seek guidance from a sage or a rabbi. According to Ritva, if a person consults his rabbi in such a case, the rabbi should instruct him not to violate the minor prohibition. But if he acts on his own accord, without asking, we inform him that he acted properly. At first glance, this is quite surprising. If it is proper to violate the minor prohibition in such a case, then why don't we instruct every person to act in this way? And if the person acted improperly in violating the minor prohibition, then we should try to prevent everyone from doing so! The simplest explanation of Ritva 's approach is that there are 2 levels within the mitzva of arevut. The most basic level that exists for every Jew is the obligation to ensure that every Jew fulfills mitzvot and avoids sins. This kind of arevut constitutes feeling a sense of personal responsibility, as a part of a larger whole, for the actions of others. This arevut is fundamentally parallel to the concept of an arev (guarantor) in halakhic civil law, referring to one who will guarantee - or take responsibility for - another person's loan. The higher level of arevut cannot be dictated by any judicial court. Rather, it is an obligation that is confined to a person's own consciousness. When a person recognizes that the nation of Israel is considered one body, it becomes clear to him that when one person sins, every other person must view this as his own personal sin. In light of this insight, the dilemma described above in Shabbat 4a cannot be viewed as an interpersonal conflict. In reality, we are all one person, the metaphysical personification of Israel. The closest analogy in terms of civil law to this idea is the a rev kablan, who, on one interpretation, is viewed as if he himself was the original borrower. This is the level of arevut that a person must accept on his own. Thus, the covenant at the plains of Moav caused all of Israel to become responsible for one another, while the covenant at Sinai represented voluntary arevut, stemming from Israel 's internal awareness that it was encamped in front of the mountain "as one person with one heart." The covenant at the plains of Moav bound the community of Israel to arevut as an obligation, but the covenant at Sinai provided the possibility of arevut that stems from a feeling of intrinsic belonging. The arevut of the covenant at Sinai is greater than the basic form of arevut, since it views everyone literally as 1 person. However, it depends on a penetrating understanding of the essence of the connection between all the various components of the community of Israel, which are like the limbs of 1 fundamental organism. If this recognition can truly penetrate into one's heart, then one can view every Jew as an inseparable part of oneself. The root of love, as we have seen, can be found fundamentally in a deep recognition of the root of unity.

The Prohibitions of Taking Vengeance and Bearing a Grudge In Parashat Kedoshim, in the first section of the verse that we have been discussing, we read: "You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your countrymen" (Vayikra 19:18). The prohibition of taking vengeance and the prohibition of bearing a grudge have been interpreted by the commentators in various ways. We will present 2 of these interpretations here. The Sefer Ha-Chinukh (241) explains that since everything that happens is ultimately brought about by God, he should not view one who harms him as the cause of that harm and seek vengeance. Rather, he should assume that his sins brought about the evil. He also explains that this helps remove contention and hate from people's hearts, leading to peace. The Chinukh emphasizes 2 points here. One, is to avoid taking vengeance in order to eliminate conflict and strife from the world. Also, it is not proper to take vengeance because all suffering that is caused is actually from God, and thus a person who causes suffering assumes the role of God's agent. R. Shlomo Ephraim Luntschitz, the author of Kli Yakar, writes that taking vengeance is generally a bad trait, because it is not worth responding to matters that have been done to you by a fellow Jew. He notes that when other nations act improperly against the Jews, vengeance is permitted, because this is called "divine vengeance," as these can be cases of seeking to turn Jews away from God. The main point advanced by Kli Yakar here is that it is proper to take vengeance for God's sake, but not for a person's sake. However, the Yerushalmi explains the prohibitions of taking vengeance and bearing a grudge in a different manner: It is written, "You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge against your countrymen." How is this to be done? If a man was cutting meat and the knife entered his hand, would the injured hand retaliate by cutting the other hand? (Nedarim 9:4) According to the Yerushalmi, the entire nation of Israel is considered one body, and all the people within that body serve as limbs. Thus, the prohibition of taking vengeance really needs no explanation, as long as we internalize the verse, "Love your fellow as yourself," and the idea that all of Israel is viewed as a singular organism. Translated by Daniel Landman To subscribe, or for comments, questions or sponsorship opportunities, please write us at: [email protected]

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