Department of Political Science G C UNIVERSITY LAHORE

Home , Madrassas in Pakistan, Syed Muhammad Saleem

A A THESIS TITLED

Role of Madrassa Education in Societal Harmony: A Case Study of the Punjab

Ahmad Raza Khan

66-GCU-PHD-PS-08

Department of Political Science G C UNIVERSITY LAHORE

Abstract

In recent years, Madrassa education has caught the attention of international community; wondering and trying to discover the real motives behind such education system. More importantly, the concern is regarding the character building and development of a peculiar mindset; which the students acquire after graduating from such Madrassas. In Pakistan, the above mentioned concern is equally highlighted as there is a suspicion that Madrassa graduates become extremists or even terrorists. This particular research explores the Madrassa system in the province of the Punjab; looking into a variety of Madrassas and their syllabi. It also explores the ideology and thinking patterns of the Madrassa students; keeping in mind their likely inclination towards the society. The main investigation revolves around the theme that whether these Madrassa graduates contribute positively towards the society or they become agents of destruction. After going into a considerable detail of the literature; as well as over viewing such primary sources as government documents and programmes of the Madrassas; visiting several Madrassas, in various parts of the Punjab, conducting interviews, with the administrators and teachers of Madrassas and collecting responses, from the Madrassa students, through an elaborate questionnaire, the following points have been drawn as conclusion; (i) Madrassa students do not necessarily incline towards militancy. (ii) It was also discovered that there is a deficiency in the training methodology as well as lack of professional guidance; to explore and exploit the real potentials of the students. The recommendations include revision of the Madrassa syllabi, introduction of new disciplines in the curriculum, investment in teacher training, provision of more capable and competent teachers; to bring the Madrassa students at power with the graduates of general/secular education system of the province. Enrichment, of their existing potentials and capabilities, can enable them contribute more significantly and productively; towards the wellbeing and welfare of the society.

Chapter: 1

Introduction

The Muslim civilization ensured its intellectual development, through a comprehensive education system, known as Madrassa education system. The Madrassas of the Middle East, the Central Asia and Northern Africa imparted almost all branches of then known knowledge; from 11th to 19th Century. The Islamic civilizational improvements owe their development to the educational system that not only ensured the imparting of modern sciences of that time but also enabled its graduates to excel in the fields of their choice. This system was known as the “Madrassa System”. Most of the Muslim scientists and scholars were the graduates of these Madrassas. The idea was to prepare capable and productive citizens; who could perform duties, in the society, more efficiently and effectively. This educational system was rearranged by Nizam Al Mulk Al Tusi (1018-1092 AD). He introduced and implemented the present format of Madrassa System- combination of schooling with boarding facilities. In the Muslim countries, during those days, the Madrassa system was the only effective source of imparting knowledge- both in religion and formal education. The golden age of the Muslim Civilization also witnessed the hay days of Madrassa education system. The syllabus of these Madrassas included both religious education and pure and social sciences. These institutions were open for all and sundry to join and enlighten their minds under the supervision and guidance of the most cherished experts in their fields. People traveled from far off areas to benefit the knowledge of the learned in these Madrassas. The rich used to organize and support these Madrassas considering it a religious duty. However, patronizing Madrassas was considered as a matter of prestige in the society as well. The downfall of the Muslim Civilization, at the hands of the Mongols, also caused an irreparable damage to the Madrassa system as the libraries were burned down and the teachers and students were murdered. The Muslim occupancy of Indian sub-continent brought a vital change in the Madrassa system. The social fabric of this area demanded more concentration on imparting basic principles and practices, of the religion, as the overwhelming majority of the society was non-Muslim and the converts were carrying less Islamic imprints in their minds. The need of the hour was to inform and train these converts about the performance of regular religious

25 duties and rituals. The centuries old native orientations of the locals, regarding matters of social and individual life, forced the organizers of Indian Madrassas to lay more emphasis on religion and try to refine thoughts and practices of the converts according to the injunctions of Islam. Every social practice needed redirection and redesigning; to transform the lives of the Indian Muslims according to the principles of Islam. The Twentieth Century had been full of significant events, taking place in almost all parts of the world. The First World War and downfall of Ottoman Empire, in 1924, gave birth to a series of events, at international level, which ultimately resulted in the demise of the British Empire, dawn of US leadership, in international affairs, and establishment of dozens of independent states; born out of British colonies and those of other European empires. The world affairs took a new turn when (former) Soviet Union emerged as a superpower, in the middle of the Twentieth Century, and started challenging US supremacy in the world affairs. This tug of war, between the two superpowers, sandwiched several other countries; particularly the ones that held significant geographic or strategic positions or assets. Most of the Muslim areas also got independence during this phase. Most of them joined the Western Capitalist bloc; either due to their historical tendencies, towards the former colonial masters, or the infidel nature of Communism. Consequently, the allied Muslim countries provided full support to the Western powers to defeat communist infidels. The West in turn, utilized the political support and natural wealth of the Muslim countries and enjoyed unavoidable influence there. Independence of Pakistan, in 1947, provided a new social setup; where the population was overwhelmingly Muslim and the perceived threats to their religion, culture and civilization were not there anymore. It was an ideal situation, for the Ulema, to revisit their protectionist stance and make Madrassa education system compatible to the new social setup. The Muslims, in Pakistan, could benefit from this and develop a socio-political system; according to the basic principles of Islam. Unfortunately, the sectarian differences became explicit when the political system of the newly born country was to be devised. Consequently, sectarian identifications, and demarcations, gained prominence and the spirit of “Muslim brotherhood”

26 acquired a back seat. Some Ulema even used Madrassas for their political objectives and opposed or supported sitting governments; in order to receive material gains and benefits. The experts in religion presented themselves as champions of politics; some were even successful in securing positions in the governments. The Western anti-Communism campaign had its effects on Pakistan since 1950s, when Pakistan had joined the Western Capitalist Bloc. Several significant changes took place in the last decades of the Cold War. The Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, involved Pakistan directly in anti-Communism campaign of the West. During this period, Pakistan served as a base camp for Afghan resistance groups and fought a proxy war on behalf of the West in Afghanistan to push the Communists out of this country. Religious sentiments, of the Afghans particularly and of the Muslims of other areas generally, were used to declare anti-Communism campaign, in Afghanistan, as “Jihad”. Anti- Afghan government elements were declared, and treated as, “the Holly Warriors”. Their training and supplies were ensured, and supervised by the then Pakistan government; under the patronage of the US government and the CIA. These warriors were trained in camps labeled as Madrassas. They were abandoned, after they had served their purpose. They became rudderless mercenaries and indulged in a civil war, in Afghanistan, after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The same fighters, mostly graduates of US funded training schools cum Madrassas, had little knowledge of modern state craft, science, technology and international relations. They took the reigns of the country which the US had abandoned so callously. These new rulers were called “Taliban” (Students of Madrassas). These people were trained and experienced only in fighting against Soviet invaders and had no experience, neither theoretical nor practical, of managing affairs of state at both domestic and international levels. The effects of this upheaval, in Afghanistan, soon reached neighboring Pakistan; particularly in the areas bordering Afghanistan. The events of 9-11, gave a twist to the world affairs. These events provided an opportunity to the Western leaders and decision makers to criticize extremist Muslim groups openly. Osama Bin Laden was blamed for planning and executing the events of 9-11 and other similar acts of aggressive

27 behavior. All such activities were labeled as “Terrorist activities”. Pakistan became the center of activities once again. This time, however, it was “between the devil and the deep see”. The US pressure, on one side, and Afghan influences and effects, on the other, sandwiched the people of Pakistan. In the long run, Muslim faith, its several concepts and many religious practices of the Muslims became under heavy criticism by the pro-west writers and scholars. The concept of “Jihad”, which was the primary force behind the downfall of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, was criticized the most. Madrassas, which were re-arranged in some parts of Pakistan to befit the requirements of the US policy of containment of Communism, were criticized for their religious nature. The efforts to follow the basic principles of Islam were declared „Fundamentalism‟ and therefore their preaching was declared harmful to the Western social set up. The Madrassa institution, in general, was blamed for preaching fundamentalism and extremism. As far as international community is concerned, the Western perception of the Pakistani Madrassas is not very positive as well. They consider these institutions as agents of promoting fundamentalism (in a negative sense) and extremism amongst the Muslims. This perception deserves a revision. The patterns of social orientations and performances of the Madrassa graduates need to be evaluated afresh to determine their standing as able and effective citizens of a modern Islamic society. Their perception of the society needs to be evaluated and also that of the society about them. The need of the hour is to find out ways through which the educational differentiation is analyzed in our society. As education plays a vital role in promoting homogeneity in any society, the impact of the Madrassa education needs to be evaluated to enable it to perform an effective role in the society. The question: whether the Madrassa system can produce capable and productive members of the modern society needs to be answered. This study is designed to find out facts about Madrassa education in Pakistan generally and in Punjab particularly. The Western perception about Madrassas needs to be analyzed to determine whether Muslim rulers were rightly pressurized to reform Madrassa education or it was a biased and misguided activity with tunnel vision. The legitimacy of blaming Madrassas of

Pakistan needs to be evaluated as well to determine whether the US was right in blaming Madrassas or it has used Madrassas as a „scapegoat‟ to conquer Afghanistan and make their presence permanent in the region. It is not possible to determine the positive or negative role of any organization or institution without looking deep into the formation and working of that institution. One should praise or criticize the structure, functions and working of any organization after acquiring full information about it. The best information about the Madrassa education can be acquired only from the people who are directly linked with it. They can provide information about the conditions and working of the Madrassas. Their views about the existing social setup and lifestyles, of ordinary people, are of great importance for determining their perception about the society. Only then, one can, and should, declare whether Madrassa graduates are a threat to the modern society and civilization or not; as already blamed by several Western writers.

1.1: Objectives of the Research This research has been initiated to achieve the following objectives.

1. Evaluating the role of the Ulema as role model for their students.

2. Identifying the level of politicization of the Madrassas, by politico- religious leaders, and its effects on Madrassa students. 3. Significance rendered to general education in the Madrassas.

4. Role of Madrassas as character building institutions.

5. Developing understanding of concepts like Extremism, Militancy and Terrorism and the role of the Madrassas in promoting/harboring them.

6. Identifying whether Madrassa system needs reforms and in which dimension and magnitude?

7. Evaluating the potentials of Madrassa graduates; to play a productive role in promotion of harmony in the society.

8. Discovering the capabilities of Madrassa graduates; to become productive citizens of the modern society.

This research includes collection of opinions from the administrators of Madrassas, teachers and students; to find out their opinions about the working of Madrassas and the atmosphere prevailing there. After collecting the data, efforts will be made to derive a conclusion; about the real status of Madrassas in our society. On the basis of these deductions, effectiveness of Madrassa education will be assessed as well. Only then, the Western perception, about Madrassa education system in Pakistan, can be evaluated to determine whether it is a valid opinion or is a biased or misunderstood theory. This research is neither trying to legitimize or criticize the US foreign policy nor is looking into the reasons that have helped her establish her unilateralism in the world. It has been designed to gauge the validity of the blame upon Madrassas; that they promote fundamentalism and favor extremism which consequently breed Terrorism.

1.2: Research Questions This research is an endeavor to find answers to the following questions. 1. Role of Madrassas in socialization of their graduates, in the Punjab particularly and in Pakistan generally.

2. What is the perception of Madrassa graduates; regarding society and its structures?

3. Can Madrassa graduates live in the same society, as it is prevailing? 4. Are they capable of living as productive citizens? 5. To what extent they can play a productive role in society? 6. Are they trained to become useful citizens of a modern society? 7. Do they have any knowledge, and skill, about the present technologically advanced world? 8. What do they feel about social evils; whether they are the products of society or of behaviour of people living in? 9. What kind of suggestions they have; to reform problems in the society?

10. Does Madrassa education improve any character traits in its graduates? 11. Are they willing to assimilate with the society, and other communities, or not?

1.3: Hypothesis A hypothesis has been developed; to identify, investigate and interpret the variables and concepts, related to this research. Usually, the theories of research do not recommend hypothesis, in the presence of research questions, but this research includes the hypothesis to streamline the objectives of the research. This hypothesis will not be tested through statistical methods; as the focus of this research is on evaluating the authenticity of the allegations; labeled against the Madrassa education system and its graduates. The hypothesis of this research is,

“If the Madrassas groom their graduates prudently then prospects of their assimilation in society become more obvious”.

1.4: Chapterization This study is divided into the following chapters to facilitate the collection of data and explanation of the facts.

1.4.1: Chapter 1: Introduction In this chapter, subject matter of the thesis will be presented briefly; to enable the readers understand the arguments which will be made during the discussion.

1.4.2: Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will shed light upon the literature related to the Madrassa system; particularly discussing the working of Madrassas and the capabilities of Madrassa graduates.

The second part will discuss the conceptual framework of the research; determining the boundaries of the research and enlisting the variables to be studied and differentiating the study able actors, related to the Madrassa system, from the non- study able ones.

1.4.3: Chapter 3: Structure and Working of Madrassas in the Punjab and Pakistan The structure and history of working of Madrassas, in Pakistan generally and in the Punjab particularly, will be discusses in this chapter. The effort will be to inform the readers about the working of Madrassa system in the society. All the Madrassa boards are headquartered in the Punjab and, as a matter of fact, there is no structural differentiation, in the Madrassa set up, on provincial basis.

1.4.4: Chapter 4: Politicization of the Madrassas This chapter will shed light upon different dimensions of use, or misuse, of Madrassas by the Ulema and the Government for political objectives during different phases of history. The main emphasis however will be on the Madrassa working in the Punjab. One must not ignore the fact that the Madrassas in the Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) were, at to some extent still are under heavy influence of Governmental perversion during 1980s. The mushroom growth of Madrassas, during 1980s, was primarily in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) yet it had far reaching impact on the societal set up in the Punjab; particularly in the shape of „Weaponing of Sectarianism‟.

1.4.5: Chapter 5: The Veracity of Madrassa Education System in the Punjab This chapter will discuss the details of the survey, conducted for this research. Questionnaire will be developed to collect information, from Madrassa students, about the true state of affairs, in the Madrassas, and themselves; to gauge the validity of claims, and blames, made about these students.

The information about the Madrassas, visited during the survey, their administration and facts about their students, explored through the questionnaire and observed during the personal visits, will be discussed.

1.4.6: Chapter 6: Potentials and Perspectives of Madrassa Students in the Punjab This chapter will comprise of the perceptions, of Madrassa graduates, about the society and its systems and structures. The parts of the questionnaire, which deal with social, political and economic harmony, will be discussed in this chapter. Efforts will be made to assess; whether the Madrassa system is an effective mobilizing agent in the Punjab or not? The main emphasis will be on providing authentic information about the mystified Madrassa system and its graduates.

1.4.7: Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations This chapter will access the entire debate made in the write up and will try to find answers to the research questions. Efforts will be made to make some recommendations, to the stakeholders, for the sake of improved interactions between the Madrassa graduates and the society.

1.5: Research Methodology As the nature of this research is primary, therefore empirical methods will be used for data collection. Interviews will be conducted from the heads of Madrassas, and the heads of Madrassa Boards, and questionnaire will be developed to collect responses from the Madrassa students. Secondary sources will be used to collect information about the structure and working of Madrassas in the historical context. Books, research reports and articles will be accessed to verify the validity of different claims and allegations regarding the Madrassa system in Pakistan. A study of the statements and activities of different religio-political leaders will also help in determining the level of politicizing of the Madrassas by these leaders. The statements of foreign leaders and those of Pakistani leaders, and decision makers, will be useful in determining the validity of the objections made by

33 these leaders regarding the Madrassa system in Pakistan generally and in the Punjab particularly.

Chapter: 2 Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

Islam is generally believed, by the Muslims, as a religion of peace; preaching cooperation and peaceful relations with humanity. It provides guidelines regarding all fields of life and it is been left to the contemporary scholars to elaborate and explain the injunctions of Islam; in order to meet the demands of modern times while remaining inside the fundamental principles of Islam. Islam does not necessitate elimination of non-Muslims, or even their views and rituals, as a criterion to become a true Muslim. If we glance at the history, the rulers have been using the name of Islam to justify their worldly ambitions, at times resorting to certain kinds of brutalities. The Muslims are living in different parts of the world. Most of these areas were under colonial rule, till middle of the Twentieth Century and became independent after the Second World War. Most of them joined Western capitalist group during the Cold War period. One of the major reasons for this overwhelming support, by the Muslim countries, was godless nature of communist bloc. West, on the other hand, mostly comprised of the people who believed in one God and followed revealed book(s). During the last decades of the Cold War, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (1979-1989). During this period, Pakistan served as a base camp for Afghan resistance groups and fought a proxy war on behalf of the West in Afghanistan to push the communists out of the country. The U.S. established many training camps in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan (bordering Afghanistan).These camps trained Afghan Mujahideen to fight the Russian Communists. The Mujahideen were made to believe that they could achieve martyrdom (Shahadat) for this ―Holy cause‖, by driving ―godless‖ infidels out of Muslim Afghanistan. During this period, many Muslim and non-Muslim writers tried to legitimize the ―Holy war‖ as according to the Islamic interpretations. The events of 9-11 changed the world course and its outlook to a greater degree. As declared by the then U.S. President George W. Bush, ―Either you are with us or against us‖1. Commitment for world peace and harmony was replaced by pitiless vengeance and any desire for neutrality was

1 President George W. Bush, Addresses the Nation, The Washington Post Sep. 20, 2011, at, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_ 092001.html, 29-May-2012.

36 not to be accepted, rather, it was subject to reprisal. Islam came under close scrutiny and the acts of a few Muslim terrorists were declared as the result of the orthodox teachings of Islam. The concept of Jihad came under discussion, by both the Western world and the ideologues of militant thinking within Islam. Along with it, Madrassas also came under severe criticism. Their existence and working generally, and their graduates particularly, came under discussion and several studies were initiated, supported and funded by various international institutes, organizations and agencies, to explain the working of the Madrassas in Pakistan, with an emphasis on their syllabus and training of their graduates. This study is related to Madrassa education system in Pakistan. The objectives of the study include explanation of the syllabi along with an analysis of Madrassa graduates, keeping in view their capabilities and potentials of becoming beneficial citizens of Pakistan. In order to understand the working of these Madrassas, their syllabi and the potentials of their graduates, it is pertinent to analyze and evaluate the available material related to Madrassa education system in Pakistan. This chapter is divided into two major parts. The first will comprise of review of literature and the second will explain the conceptual framework of this thesis. The review of literature is further divided into four categories. The First will discuss the literature explaining the mechanism and working of the Madrassas. The Second will consist of those researches that present the state of affairs, as it exists, in the Madrassas of Pakistan. The Third category will comprise of that literature, of scholars, who defend the Madrassa system and provide answers to the critiques of the Madrassas and their manner of providing education. The Fourth category will shed light on those researches that blame Madrassas for promoting extremism and even harboring terrorism.

2.1: Review of Literature Several writers, belonging to the Madrassa administration community, or other segments of society, explained the structure and working of Madrassas, well before the international community started to focus its attention towards the Madrassa system. Some of them wrote books to explain

37 the whole phenomena, suggesting measures to reform the system; while others were more descriptive in their approach and did not go beyond providing basic information about the Madrassa system. 2.1.1: Literature discussing Structure and Working of Madrassas Some Pakistani writers like Muhammad Amin2, Ibn-ul-Hassan Abbasi3, Muslim Sajjad & Saleem Mansoor Khalid4 are among those who have tried to explain and improve the structure and working of Madrassas; existing in various parts of Pakistan. Their focus has been on the establishment, need of Madrassas in society and the type of education; being imparted in the Madrassas. These books reflect a common theme that Madrassas were established to spread Islamic education for the betterment of Muslim community. These books provide us with a history of Madrassas, in the Muslim world in general and India and Pakistan in particular. The major issues like impact of Madrassa education on society and adjustment and acceptance of their graduates, by the community, have not been taken into consideration. These are simple explanatory books and do not cover the significant issues which are being confronted by the Muslims; particularly after Samuel P. Huntington‘s work, ―Clash of Civilizations‖5 started an intellectual discourse; which later turned into a theory. He portrayed that the next war would be between Christian and Muslim civilizations6. These books have not discussed violence and aggression, based on ideological differentiations, and have also ignored the role of Madrassa education in promoting or projecting them. Dealing with the issues of syllabus, Molana Syed Salman Hussaini Nadvi has written a book, ―Hamara Nisab-e-Taleem Kaisa Ho‖. It discusses the syllabi taught in Dar-Ul-Uloom Deoband and Nidva Tul Ulema7. It is limited

2 Muhammad Amin, Hamara Deeni Nizam-e-Tallem (Lahore; Markaz Tahkek Islami; 2004) 1-314 3 Ibn-ul-Hassan Abbasi, Deeni Madaris; Past, Present, Future (Karachi; Maktaba Umer Farooq; 2005.) 1-178 4 Muslim Sajjad & Saleem Mansoor Khalid, Deeni Madaris Ka Nizim-e-Taleem (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1993.) 1-270 5 Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs 72:3 summer 1993. 22-49 6 Ibid 22-49 7 Syed Salman Hussain Nadvi, Hamara Nisab-e-Taleem Kaisa Ho (Karachi: Majlis Nashriat Islam; 2004.)1-264

38 to the syllabi and criticism on it and presents a brief history of the evolution of Madrassa education system in different parts of Islamic world. It does not take into account the possibilities of promotion of violence and aggression inculcated by the Madrassa education. The main emphasis of this book is on the improvement of existing syllabi; to make the followers of Islam stanch Muslims both in theory and practice. It does not discuss the impact of religious education on society and nor does it prove or negate any links of Madrassa education with terrorism8. Another scholar, Molana Mufti Muhammad Zayed has compiled a book‘‘Tohfatul Ulema‖9. It comprises of different sayings of Molana Ashraf Ali Thanvi. It deals with the establishment and management of Madrassas. The emphasis is mainly on general rules of conduct for administrators, teachers and students of Madrassas. It does not cover the aspect of social integration of Madrassa graduates with their society. It also does not discuss the relationship of Madrassas with extremism and terrorism10. Professor of religious studies, Saleem Mansoor Khalid, of Lahore, has compiled a book,‖Deeni Madaris‖11. This book covers many aspects related to Madrassa education system. It also includes speeches of some scholars who have given their points of view regarding Madrassa education and its problems. It appears to be a compilation of various ideas and lacks in depth analysis and any logically deducted conclusion12. Writers like Munir Ahmed Khalili, Ahmad Shalbi, and Mazhar Moeen have discussed the type of education imparted in Madrassas and the Muslim teachers. The main focus of these books is on criticizing the manner in which Islamic education is provided to the young students. He has discussed in his book Makalat-e-Taleem the importance of teacher as a role model for students13. Munir Ahmad Khalili also shed light on importance of education

8 Ibid 9 Mufti Muhammad Zayed ,Tohfa –tal Ulema (Lahore: Maktaha –tul-Ilm) II 10 Ibid 11 Saleem Mansoor Khalid, Deeni Madaris Main Taleem (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies; 2001.) 1-472 12 Ibid 13 Munir Ahmad Khalili, Makalat-e-Taleem (Rawalpindi: Hassan Al-Bana Academy; 2004.) 1-232

39 and believes that quality education does not confine itself to providing suitable jobs, for its graduates. Rather, quality education, in the author‘s view, is to make them aware of national and community needs14. One article, in this book, is about the effects of 9/11 on Islamic education but it does not touch the debate whether 9/11 and subsequent events were the product of Madrassa education or Islamic teachings. He has simply explained the adverse effects of the event of 9/11 on the general and Islamic education, in the Muslim countries15. His contentions are limited and also portray an output of a concerned mind but do not serve as a guideline, to prove or counter what is propagated by the West. In his another book, ―Taleem aur Tahzeeb-o- Sakafat Kay Rishtay,‖16 he has explained the importance of education as a reformer of human character. He has emphasized on the importance of local language in education.17 He has also emphasized on the importance of training as well along with teaching18. He declares that a teacher is a respectable person and is thus taken as a model in the society.19 Ahmad Shalbi, a famous scholar on Islamic education and history, in his book, ―Tarikh-e-Taleem-o-Tarbiat-e-Islamia‖ has discussed issues related to Muslim education system20. It is a balanced research which discusses Islamic education system and its output; the Madrassa graduates. The emphasis is mainly on the role of a teacher and a student in an Islamic education system. The formation of Madrassas is also discussed briefly in this book21. He has discussed the Madrasa education system in the broader context and is not confined to Pakistan; rather he takes the examples of various societies. This work provides a comprehensive understanding, of religious education, in a comparative perspective and is useful when it comes to comparison between the Madrassa education system, and syllabi, in Pakistan with those of other Muslim countries of the world.

14 Ibid 132-137 15 Ibid 174-185 16 Munir Ahmad Khalili, Taleem aur Tahzeeb-o-Sakafat Kay Rishtay (Lahore): Idara Matbooat –e- Sulemani; 2002.) 176 17 Ibid 105-136 18 Ibid 41-70 19 Ibid 137-156 20 Ahmad Shalbi, Tarikh-e-Taleem-o-Tarbiat-e-Islamia (Lahore:Idara Sakafat-e- Islamia;1999.)1-134 21 Ibid 105

Professor Mazhar Moeen, of the Oriental College, University of the Punjab Lahore, in his book, ―Pakistan Main Arabi Zaban‖22 has emphasized on the importance of Arabic language. He is of the opinion that Islamic principles cannot be understood, thoroughly, without proper understanding of Arabic language23. He recommends compulsory teaching of Arabic language in Pakistan and in other non-Arabic Muslim countries; to enable the young generations understand Islamic teachings in a profound manner24. Syed Riasat Ali Nadvi has written a book, ―Islamic Nizam-e-Taleem‖25. His main emphasis is on duties and responsibilities of Madrassa teachers and students. He has discussed, in detail, the formation of education system in Islam and working of Madrassas. He has also mentioned important guidelines for teachers and administrators of Madrassas. He declares that character building is the primary objective of Islamic education system26. He has suggested some reforms in the existing Madrassa education system and curriculum but has not discussed social problems faced by the Muslims and has not entered in the present concept of Madrassas related to terrorism. Syed Mohammad Saleem in his book, ―Hind-o-Pakistan main Musalmano Ka Nizam-e-Taleem-o-Tarbiat‖27 has explains in detail the evolution of Islamic education system in the world and in Indo-Pak subcontinent. The writer has proved that Muslim education system has produced many scholars of repute in various fields of life28. He has also written about the qualities of Islamic education system where character building holds top priority as against Western education system, introduced in Indo-Pak , that aims at preparing people for jobs only29.The writer has also discussed the evolution of Madrassas in Indo-Pakistan and the attitude of British imperialists against local education systems30. The curricula of some of Madrassas have been finely compared with those of British educational

22 Mazhar Moeen, Pakistan Main Arabi Zaban (Lahore:Markaz Al Sheikh Zayad Al Islami;2003.)1-240 23 Ibid 171-189 24 Ibid 192 25 Syed Riasat Ali Nadvi, Islami Nizam-e-Taleem (Azamgarh: Moaraf Press; 1938.) 1-156 26 Ibid 22-24 27 Syed Muhammad Saleem, Hind-o-Pakistan Main Musalmano ka Nizam-e-Taleem-o- Tarbiat (Lahore: Islamic Publications; 1980.) 1-312 28 Ibid 16-26 29 Ibid 27-68 30 Ibid 181-234

41 institutions in India as well. The local universities of different kinds, which tried to impart either only one format of education or tried to combine both British system of education and Muslim system of education, have also been discussed by the writer31. This book covers academic aspects of Muslim system of education in Indo-Pak sub-continent before and during the British rule in India but does not discuss whether Madrassas promoted or preached hatred towards non-Muslim and specially the Westerners either in history or in present day Pakistan. Syed Manazir Ahsan Gilani has written a two volumed book, ―Pak-o- Hind main Musalmano ka Nizam-e-Taleem –o-Tarbiat‖32. He has explained, in detail, the education system in ancient India33. He has provided details about different scholars who took pains in getting education form scholars of their times34. He has also discussed different interactions of some of Muslim scholars with local non-Muslim people. In short, he has provided a brief history of the evolution of Muslim education set up in Indo-Pak but has not mentioned anywhere that the Muslims ever preached extremism against non- Muslims. This book is very old therefore it does not cover the aspect whether Madrassas promote terrorism or not. These writers have presented their ideas in a concrete and concentrated manner. Their main emphasis was on presenting the Madrassa education system and highlighting its strengths and weaknesses. They have considered Madrassa system as an independent entity and have shown less concern about its place and significance in the Pakistani society and hence have omitted the role of Madrassa education in the demanding social setup and have also not discussed the allegations made against the Madrassa system. Consequently, the potentials of Madrassa graduates have remained out of discussion as well. Although, these writings are of significance, but nevertheless, fulfill the needs of this research.

31 Ibid 270-304 32 Syed Manager Ahsan Gilani, Pak-o-Hind main Muslmano ka Nizam-e- Taleem-o- Tarbiat (Lahore: Maktaba Rehmania; book written in 1942, date of Publication not given.) 1-774 (2 volumes) 33 Ibid 1:15-37 34 Ibid 2:31-46

2.1.2: Research Reports on Madrassa System and Their Present State of Affairs Most of these reports were initiated after the events of 9/11 took place and the world was told, by the US Government, that Madrassas were responsible for promoting and breeding hatred and the surge of terrorism was actually a trickledown effect of Madrassa teachings. In that scenario, several international organizations and agencies, including even The World Bank, initiated and financed various researches to find out facts about the state of affairs in the Madrassas of Pakistan. Most of these researches were either focused on specific issues or were trying to authenticate the claims made by earlier writers and researchers. Some of them were even presented as fact- finding reports in front of various legislatures of the world; including that of the US. A few research based books have also been included in this category- to present a detailed view of the Madrassa system; as presented by the Western researchers or by the ones based and working in the West. The scientific research techniques adopted during these researches have made them more authentic and reliable, for the World Powers, than perception based individual works. These reports have primarily focused on the following three themes, I: The establishment, enrolment and education system of Madrassas, II: Whether they are open to change or not and III: Their suspected links with terrorism.

International Crisis Group report, ―Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military‖, has presented a clear difference between ―Jihad‖ and Terrorism. According to this report, some local and foreign forces used a handful of Madrassas, almost all of them belonging to one sect only, to train their supporters for politico-military objectives35. The same report has also established that the Madrassas serve as schools for the poor and therefore must not be eliminated especially when government is incapable of providing educational facilities to all its masses. This report though initially presented wrong figures about Madrassa enrolment, due to a calculation mistake, yet

35 For details see Chapter 5, ―Politicization of Madrassas‖.

43 this error was removed later on. This report has also presented some recommendations, to the government of Pakistan, in which registration problems and curriculum reforms have been addressed mainly36. The World Bank financed a research to find out facts about Madrassa education in Pakistan. This research concentrated on the phenomenon of Madrassa enrollment in Pakistan37. The report was prepared by scholars from different Universities and data was analyzed by the World Bank staff coordinating on this project. The survey was conducted in selected villages of three districts of the Punjab (Pakistan); Faisalabad, Attock and Rahim Yar Khan. According to this report, the enrolment trend is almost similar in three geographically different districts38. The data collected has been compared with 1998 census data and PIHS rounds of 1991, 1998and 200139. The entire data rejects the hypothesis that only poor and religious families send their children to Madrassas, The report concludes that almost 75% families, with one child in a Madrassa, send their second child to ordinary schools40.The report says that 10 Pashtoon districts have comparatively higher Madrassa enrollment average i.e. 3%. While overall average of Madrassa enrollment in Pakistan is merely 1%41. The only point of increase in Madrassa enrollment was during soviet invasion of Afghanistan when a Holy War was started against Soviet oppression42. The next report is based on research conducted by Uzma Azhar43. This report provides information about formation of Madrassas and their curricula. The writer has stated that politicians have often misused Madrassas for the

36 International crisis group, Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military (29 July2002) at, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/southasia/pakistan/Pakistan%20Madrasas %20Extremism%20And%20The%20Military.pdf, 29-May-2012. 37 Tahir Andrli, Aism Ajaz Khawaja, Religious School Enrolment in Pakistan look at the data (The World Bank:December 2005.) 38 Ibid 39 PIHS ; Pakistan Integrated household Survey conducted by State department Govt. of Pakistan in Ibid 40 Ibid 41 Ibid 42 Ibid 43 Uzma Azhar, Islamic Education A Brief History of Madrassas with comments on curricula and current pedagogical practices (March 2003), at, http://schools.nashua.edu/myclass/fenlonm/block1/Lists/DueDates/Attachments/10/madra ssah-history.pdf , 29-May-2012.

44 projection of their political agendas44. The number of Madrassas increased immensely due to the funds provided by Pakistan government and CIA, especially in Pashto speaking areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan; to produce Mujahedeen to fight Soviets in Afghanistan in 1980s45. As a spillover effect of these Madrassas and their Mujahedeen, many sectarian Madrassas grew strong in Pakistan to Implement and strengthen their version of Islam46. The writer has concluded that Madrassas do not pose any immediate threat to the security of the world. The Madrassa education, that has become complicated due to the self-centered interventions of many local and foreign actors, can be reformed only if Muslim leaders and scholars find solution to existing problems and enable Madrassas to prepare their students for playing more effective role in modern world47.

The USIP sponsored a report; which was prepared by Christine Fair48. This report provides background information about syllabi and levels of class work in Madrassas. The writer has negated the link of Madrassas with terrorism or militancy. She has sited many other writers and research reports that also provide the same information that most of the terrorists of the world were highly educated people and were not Madrassa graduates49. The writer, while preparing this report, collected views from people in the Government of Pakistan and outside the government; regarding Madrassas in Pakistan. According to her, Madrassa people, usually, do not believe in government policies, regarding Madrassa reform, because these policies are initiated due to external pressures by the US and the UK governments50. The Madrassa want to get registered to get some sort of legitimacy in the society but it is the government that has been creating hurdles in Madrassa registration51. The writer has concluded that people are looking for cheaper education and

44 Ibid p17 45 Hussein Haqqani in Ibid 18-19 46 Ibid 19 47 Ibid 20-21 48 C. Christine Fair, ―Islamic Education in Pakistan‖ United States Institute of Peace: 21 March, 2006. 49 Ibid 50 Ibid 51 Ibid

Ulema are unable to fulfill the demands of modern times but there is no evidence found that Madrassas are producing terrorists52.

The next report is written by Marc Sageman53. The writer has tried to prove that most of the terrorists who carried out notorious terrorist activities in recent years were neither poor nor mentally sick. His research, conducted on popular terrorists, reveals that most of the terrorists belonged to middle class and were highly education people. Most of them were living in their non-birth areas and were enjoying more facilities than their countryman in their native areas54. The writer has concluded that close affiliations persuade people, belonging to different extremist groups, to turn into fanatical terrorists55.

Muhammad Qasim Zaman has written a book, ―The Ulema in Contemporary Islam: custodians of change‖56. This book does not directly discuss Madrassas. It only explicates that Ulema play an important role in changing trends of the population and giving directions to the large segment of population57. The book, in an implied way, does bring forth that Islam is radicalized by Ulema and, it is also embedded in the under currents, that Ulema use students for religious activism58.

2.1.3: In Defense of Madrassas

The Fourth category houses the analysis of such books and reports as were written by local, foreign and foreign settled or stationed Pakistani writers who tried to defend the Madrassa system. Some of the writers, included in this category, have tried to clarify the allegations made against Islam.

Swati Pandey and Peter Bergen have asserted that Madrassas are not linked with terrorism directly or indirectly59. Their contention is that terrorism has been an activity of different people for specific gains. The greatest

52 Ibid 53 Marc Sageman , The Normality of Global Jihadi Terrorism‘ The Journal of International Security Affairs No.8, Spring 2005 54 Ibid 55 Ibid 56 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulema in contemporary Islam : Custodians of change (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 2002.) 57 Ibid 58 Ibid 59 Peter Beraen and Swati Pandey, The Madrassa Scapegoat The Washington Quarterly: Spring 2006 , 117-125

46 terrorist actions of recent times have been carried out by highly educated people from modern universities of their areas or of Western countries. None of them had ever been to any Madrassa as a regular student60. The writers have concluded that Madrassas do not pose any threat to Western Countries. All the terrorists that carried out major terrorist activities were trained from Western Universities or Western styled Universities of their countries61.

According to William Dalrymple, ―By and large, however, madrasa students simply do not have the technical expertise or conceptual imagination necessary to carry out the sort of attacks we have seen al-Qaida pull off in the past few years‖62.

Evens Alexander has also conducted a research about this phenomenon63. He is of the opinion that most of the writers like Samina Ahmad and Andrew Strochlen have mistakenly blamed all Madrassas in Pakistan for preaching terrorist activities. As a matter of fact, only a few Madrassas were established in Pakistan to work as de-facto training camps for Mujahideen fighting against Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1980s64. Madrassas, in fact, provide education in the remote areas and to the poorest people. They are, sometimes, the only opportunity to literacy for people living a remote area where government has failed to provide educational facilities to masses65.

The reports of Jihad Watch and IPS are also based on ground realities. The report by Jihad Watch66has brought forth serious analysis through examples of various Madrassas in Pakistan. It enumerates that Madrassas are established as educational institutions but, in Pakistan, some special types of Madrassas were established, under the auspices of the US government; the CIA. These Madrassas trained Afghan immigrants and

60 Ibid 118-122 61 Ibid 121 62 William Dalrymple, “A Largely Bourgeois Endeavor: Al Qaida-Style Terrorists are not the Type Who Seek out Madrasas” The Guardian, Wednesday, July 20, 2005. 63 Evans Alexander, Understanding Madrassas at , http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060101facomment85102/alexanderevans/understandingm adrasahs.html 25 May 2012 64 Ibid 65 Ibid 66 ―Pakistan‟s Universities of Jihad” Jihad Watch (www: //Jihad watch.org) 25 May 2012.

47 transformed them into Mujahideen; to fight against the Soviets on the behest of the US. These were not for serious educational purpose. These specific training centers were labeled as Madrassas to buy easy support and cash religious sentiments of people. Such may not equated with the traditional Madrassas. The traditional Madrassas, on the contrary, work for promotion of education and not terrorism67.

Institute of Policy Studies Islamabad (IPS) presented several reports after going deep into the working of Madrassas68. These reports have been prepared on the basis of workshops, discussion groups and field researches. They deal with updating and modernizing the syllabi taught in the Madrassas; some definite reforms are needed to be done and the government efforts to impose these reforms in Madrassas are usually carried out with irrational strategies69. The reports do not touch Madrassas linkage with terrorism. One of the reports does explain that Madrassas are not used for training terrorist groups.

According to Corinne and Rebecca Winthrop, hue and cry about Madrassas is unnecessary. Only a few Deobandi Madrassas were, and still are, linked with Taliban and ―Terrorists‖70. They also clarified a myth about Madrassa enrolment, ―The truth is that a tiny fraction of Pakistani kids attend these schools. The large majority go to government schools (about 65 percent), and an increasing portion of kids (about 30 percent) attend private schools‖71.

2.1.4: Literature Criticizing and Blaming the Madrassas Apart from the books and research articles, there are number of research reports on Pakistani Madrassa system, dealing with its various aspects. Pakistani Madrassas came under focus of international community and they were perceived as training grounds for the potential terrorists. These reports were sponsored by various organizations, mostly based in the West.

67 Ibid , 68 Institute of Policy Studies, Deeni Madaris: Current Situation &. Future Strategy 69 Ibid 70 Corinne Graff and Rebecca Winthrop, Busting Pakistan's madrassa myth, at, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/01/busting_pakistans_madrassa_myth,15- Oct-2012 71 Ibid

While accessing the role of General Zia Ul Haq, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre (ESISC) 2010 report, At the Border of Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Grand Game against Terrorism, declares, ―[Zia] created dozens of Madrassas (religious schools) which educated multitudes of militant Islamists. By these actions, he encouraged a culture of Jihad which is still continuing today in Pakistan‖72. Some of them are research based while most of these articles present a general view and are usually based upon personal opinions and observations of the writers. It will not be of much use to review all of them separately. The major writers who have been criticizing Madrassas for preaching extremism or terrorism are listed below along with their works.

Table: 2.1: Writers who have criticized the Religious Education System and Madrassas S No Name of Writer Article Title Publisher 1 Christopher M. The Islamic Traditions of CRS Report for Blanchard Wahabism and Salafiyya Congress 2 Alfred B Prados Saudi Arabia: Terrorist CRS Report for Financing Issues Congress 3 Qandeel Weapons of mass Forsvarets Siddique instruction? A preliminary forskningsinstitutt/ exploration of the link Norwegian Defence between madrassas in Research Pakistan and militancy Establishment (FFI) 20 July 2009 4 Paul M. P. Bell Pakistan‘s Madrassas: Naval Postgraduate Weapons of Mass School Monterey, Instruction California

72 European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre (ESISC) 2010 report, At the Border of Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Grand Game against Terrorism, at, http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/analyses/at-the-border-of-pakistan-and- afghanistan-the-grand-game-against terrorism/14.%20AT%20THE%20BORDER%20OF%20PAKISTAN%20AND%20AFGHA NISTAN.pdf, 15-Oct-2012.

5 Ali Riaz Global Jihad Sectarianism Institute of Defense and the Madrassahs in and Strategic Studies Pakistan Singapore 6 John Gowland The History of Islamic The Socialist, Aug/Sep Fundamentalism and its 2003 Issue No 3 future 7 Marc Sageman Joining The Global Jihad Understanding Terror Networks (Book) 8 Hussain Islam‘s Medieval Outposts Foreign Policy Journal Haqqani 9 Jonathan Petre Abuse Widespread in www.telegraph.co.uk/n Islamic Schools ews/main 10 Vijay Dutt Sexual, physical abuse at www.indiamonitor.com/ (Report) Madrassas news 11 Hussain Madrassas: Knowledge or The Daily Star, Haqqani the Shade of Swords 21April,2004

12 Brent Hurd Many Pakistani VOA News.com 20 (Report) Madrassas teach World July, 2005 view of Intolerance 13 Luke Harding in Madrassas mix football The Guardian 16 Lahore with support for Jihad July,2005

Apart from these, there are scores of writings and articles, criticizing the Madrassas. These are just a glimpse of the material; related to this issue. The mentioned reports were mostly sponsored by various organizations in the West. Most of these writers have tried to establish that teaching and preaching of religion leads to the promotion of fundamentalism, extremism and ultimately terrorism73. Apart from these books and research articles, there are number of research reports on Pakistan Madrassa system; dealing with its various aspects. Pakistan Madrassas came under focus of international

73 Several writers and people are usually confused by the inter-exchanged usage of these terms. In order to remove such ambiguities, a chapter has been added in this research; Chapter No 3 ―Putting the House in Order‖.

50 community and they were perceived as training grounds for the potential terrorists. These writers have evaluated the Madrassas on the basis of limited view and the conducts of some of the Madrassa teachers, and even administrators, have been used to blame the entire Madrassa system. These writers have blamed the Madrassa education system for promoting extremism and terrorism. Husain Haqqani in his book, ―Madrassa to Mosque‖ and in his article, ―Islam‘s Medieval Outposts‖74 has stated that Madrassas have not been playing a productive role and Zia ul Haq gave support to Madrassas to provide ―Jihadis‖ who later on spread in the world. Whether a system is right or wrong, in some cases, is altogether different from how it is practiced75. Obviously the products of Madrassas; their graduates, are, and should be, the concern of the society but labeling everybody on the basis of limited observation, deductive method, is not always appreciable. The material analyzed and evaluated in these four categories is of great significance but does not discuss, in detail, the potentials and capabilities of Madrassa graduates. As a matter of fact, most of the researches, conducted so far, have either concentrated on Madrassa syllabi- to either evaluate its authenticity or analyze its richness- or have focused on the Madrassa administration, administrators, teachers, funding or even links of Madrassas with politics. Most of them failed to bring into consideration the Madrassa graduates; their potentials as productive citizens and their capabilities as law abiding citizens.

There are several aspects of Madrassa education system which have not been explained properly, in the literature. Most of the writers have either emphasized on the aspect they were interested in or was significant, according to their perception. Most of the dimensions, of Madrassa education system, still need to be explored and explained. There is a dire need to investigate the Madrassa system in detail and, particularly, evaluate its

74 Husain Haqqani, Islam‘s Medieval Outposts at, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1136 , 25 May 2012 75 How a gun is used does not make this invention right or wrong.

51 graduates to understand their state of mind, authentically explain the basis of their perceptions and confidentially predict the effects of their activities on society. This research has been designed to fulfill these needs. The literature has raised several questions, about Madrassa system generally and their graduates particularly. These questions need to be answered; so as to clarify the position of suspicious status of Madrassas in our society. The objections, allegations and suspicions labeled against Madrassas, and their graduates, are the catalyst behind this research and are the research questions, for this endeavor. The quest for answers, to these questions, is carried out through a conceptual framework explained in the following.

2.2: Conceptual Framework

In order to evaluate the role of Madrassa education in promoting harmony in society, it is necessary to conduct a research in which the Madrassa students are included. They are the best source to know that what the society is going to receive from the Madrassas. The productivity and efficiency of any educational institution can best be evaluated by gauging the capabilities of its products; the graduates. The objective of an educational institution or system is not merely housing the young for couple of years, till they physically gain strength, but to groom them mentally, as well as psychologically, to enable them to control their emotions and feelings and persuade them to put their efficiencies to productive use, both for themselves and their community. The definition of productivity may vary from person to person, and society to society, but every society has some predetermined list of acts and intentions that are considered beneficial for the whole community. Such ought to be promoted and inculcated through education system. Madrassa education is promoting, and also inculcating, several intentions, perceptions and preferences for actions among its graduates. These teachings need to be studied, from the perspective of the students- as they have received and acknowledged them- to declare the contributions of Madrassa system in promoting or shattering harmony in society.

Madrassa education system remained out of the focus of intellectual discussions, for decades, for several reasons. Primarily unwillingness of the

Madrassa administrators, to appreciate any reforms or initiate any changes, has been the primary reason for their intellectual detachment from society. Their only interaction had been, and still is, as places of religious education- whether elementary, reciting the Holy Quran, or higher, specialization in religious knowledge and in performance of religious rituals.

The world is changing rapidly now; events taking place in one part of the world, particularly in the central or centralized parts76, affect the rest of the world; one way or the other. Pakistan is situated in the centralized part of the world. Its geo-strategic location has brought more problems than blessings, from international community. From U2 to Afghan Jihad Pakistan remained the battlefield of proxy wars between the world powers. Madrassa education, unfortunately, was used as a tool during some of these campaigns. The butterfly impact of this meddling in Madrassa system is haunting us more seriously than ever. The US, with the help of her aide, transmogrified the Madrassa education system, fortunately in some parts of the country only, to breed mercenaries for Afghan Jihad.

Pakistani authorities were, and to greater extent still are, suffering from a concussion and thus unable to foresee the results of their love affair with the US. This has turned out to be nothing but a labor of love for the nation. The US designs, in this region, have forced Pakistan to a permanent kyphosis; in intellectual, physical and emotional realms. Apart from that, we had to levirate with Afghan Mujahideen and other warriors as well.

Education system serves as vena cava in a society. A society cannot develop and sustain without improving and maintaining a productive and progressive education system- that aims at developing a productive and comprehensive character in the youth, and thus, enabling them to steer the nation through ever changing demand driven socio-political set-up of the world.

76 Central parts are Europe, Northern America, North Eastern and far Eastern Asia which are politico-economic core of the world and centralized are those areas which have acquired significance, in world affairs, due to their politico-economic or geo-strategic significance. South Asia generally and Pakistan particularly has become centralized for past several decades. For details, see Joshua Goldstein, International Relations Chapter 1.

The objective of every research is to highlight some important issues so as to answer some significant questions. The problems in the society instigate and motivate a researcher to dig out facts, related to that specific problem, and suggest solutions, if possible. Today, the most important question faced by Pakistani nation, second in importance only to securing existence, is developing a social setup that can provide solutions to, most if not all, the problems and issues prevailing in the society. This quest is virtually impossible to answer without reforming the prevailing education system(s). Pakistan unfortunately has more than one mainstream education systems. All of them, more or less, are based on divergent priorities and are eventually assembling products that have no connections or similarities with each other. That is why Dr. Tariq Rahman righty called them, ―Denizens of Alien Worlds‖77. This research is not designed to analyze, evaluate or authenticate the legitimacy or authenticity of any sect- or even cult based on interpretational variations of the religious edicts. To the researcher, all the Muslims are alike; as long as they tolerate and respect various groups that, may or may not, express or assert their separate identity on the basis of any distinction or differentiation. The primary objective of this research is to calculate and, if possible, influence the present and future interactions between the Madrassa graduates and various segments of society. This research is no avant-garde, rather an attempt to present the true picture of state of affairs in the Madrassas and is an attempt to record, analyze and present, in a profound manner, the thoughts and perceptions of Madrassa graduates- the future stake holders of the society. The Conceptual Framework of this research includes the study of the following dimensions of Madrassa education system. 2.2.1: Aims and objectives of Madrassas

Basic aims and objectives of establishing Madrassas are analyzed under this heading. The dimensions of objectives can be acquired through interviews and discussions with the organizers, teachers and students.

77 Tariq Rehman, Denizens of Alien Worlds; A study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004.)

Broachers, manifesto and objective statements also help in noting down aims and objectives of establishing Madrassas. Aims and Objectives are divided into two sub-categories, for discussion facilitation.

2.2.1.1: Explicit

These are clearly presented and projected through speeches, pamphlets and booklets to highlight the efficiency and proficiency of Madrassas and their administrators. The productivity and necessity of a Madrassa is projected by highlighting past achievements and future plans of the Madrassa. One can easily evaluate the positive aspects of explicit objects out of such material. Still some sectarian differences are also highlighted to show sectarian affiliations and to attract sect based donors and supporters. These objectives shall be evaluated in this research, through the said sources, and be analyzed in the light of interviews and discussions, conducted during the research, from Madrassa administrators, teachers and students. The open ended questions in the Questionnaire will be of great help as well.

2.2.1.2: Implied

They are neither easy to locate nor easy to determine. Some Madrassas appear to be working for the promotion of religious education but are actually propagating their own, sectarian or extremist ideas. As a matter of fact, all Madrassas have sectarian affiliations and identification. Even the ones who claim not to be sect based have their fixed boundaries and a - not to be violated ―lineage‖78.

2.2.2: Identity of Madrassas

The Madrassas are identified on the basis of their structures, functions and roles.

78 Ahl Hadis claim to be not followers of any of the conventional Four Imams of Sunnis, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik, Imam Shafi and Imam Ahmad Bin Hamble. While Jamat Islami people claim to be non-sectarian but are not allowed to deviate from the interpretations given by Molana Maududi.

2.2.2.1: Structures of Madrassas

Structures are organizational edifice of Madrassas. The structures are usually formal or informal. Formal structures include different official positions that are created to run the affairs of an organization. Along with that, they have informal way of creating committees, groups and sometimes cells to work for the organization. It is interesting that most of the structures, in the Madrassas, do not go along with the public sector or private sector organizations- even the nomenclature is new and not easily understandable for most of the people. The formal structures are usually tacit and go by the strict lines of discipline.

2.2.2.2: Functions of Madrassas

Functions represent the actual spelled out activities of the Madrassas which are given in their organizational documents. They emphasize on religious practices and rituals, fund raising, publications and propaganda etc. Salary structures of staff are generally not given in detail. Some of the Madrassas consorted by ―Auqaf‖ do have salary structures but they are too less to make them capable of leading financially better life. Generally the Madrassas have a statement of revenue collection and expenditures. Minute details are usually not highlighted and masses are requested to donate generously for the promotion of religion- without actually knowing that how much was spent on students and how much was consumed by the administration on their official ‗facilities‘79.

2.2.2.3: Role of Madrassas in Society

Role is determined on the basis of the education Madrassas impart; behavioral Patterns that are infused; identification of their educated people; the literature they produce. Role is a variable which is difficult to operationalize. It sometimes leads to ambiguity and negative impact which was not even intended by the Madrassas. The difficulty lies in evaluating and calculating the perceptions and interactions of Madrassa students and teachers. As society, usually, labels its members on the basis of their

79 Interview of Mr. Shafiq Ahmad, Honorary Finance Manager Rabta Tul Madaris, on, 2-Jan- 2012. He said, ―Molvis should not travel by aerolanes‖.

56 appearance and the perceptions developed through some generalized instances and shared opinions. The Madrassa graduates, eventually becoming religious scholars cum guides cum experts have earned various labels for themselves in the society. An accepted label is ―Mullah‖ -a misnomer and anti-propaganda term. The society considers that Madrassa students are meant to come for, ―Quran Khani‖ and other religious rituals like death and marriage. Their only utility lies in leading prayers and ―Duaa‖. This is not what Madrassas are meant for but behavioral patterns have earned them some offensive labels like ―Halwa Khor, Bisyar khor‖ and sweet stuff eaters80.

Every Madrassas has its own identity. It is either on the basis of sect they belong to or the leader of the sect they follow. Personality cult plays a dominant role in determining identity of a Madrassa. Some Madrassas are known due their affiliation or linkage with popular Madrassas which existed in the past.

Sometimes identity of a Madrassas is also on the basis of the activities they perform. That can be academic, religious or even aggressive. In short identity of Madrassas is, usually, determined on the basis of the following.

1. Sect

2. Personality of Administrator or founder

3. Activities

4. Attitude: Accommodating or Non-accommodating or even Aggressive

Human beings have to interact with each other for better fulfillment of natural needs. This interaction gave birth to the formation of society. People living in the same society have divergent backgrounds and varying needs and priorities. Such variations promote and strengthen feeling of oneness and a sense of similarity among masses. Groups are formed in society on the basis of similarities and commonalities; both tangible and intangible. Various people, and even groups, have various basis and criterion for sameness and

80 Ahmad Sari, Suraj Jahan Se Nikalta Hai (Quetta: 2003.) 10-15

57 consequently have diverse, and sometimes unique, basis of their grouping. Their needs and priorities also differ from ―others‖. This diversity in identity gives birth to feelings of separate identity and identification. Compulsory interactions and varying interests, between various groups, create and strengthen patterns of behavior in every society. These behaviors, in most of the cases, govern the actions and activities of the members of a specific group; with those of the others. 2.2.3: Objectives of the Research This research has been initiated to achieve the following objectives.

9. Evaluating the role of the Ulema as role model for their students.

10. Identifying the level of politicization of the Madrassas, by politico- religious leaders, and its effects on Madrassa students. 11. Significance rendered to general education in the Madrassas.

12. Role of Madrassas as character building institutions.

13. Developing understanding of concepts like Extremism, Militancy and Terrorism and the role of the Madrassas in promoting/harboring them.

14. Identifying whether Madrassa system needs reforms and in which dimension and magnitude?

15. Evaluating the potentials of Madrassa graduates; to play a productive role in promotion of harmony in the society.

16. Discovering the capabilities of Madrassa graduates; to become productive citizens of the modern society.

This research is designed to evaluate and analyze the social interactions of Madrassa graduates with other communities. Therefore considering the Madrassa graduates a separate community- as they are already entertained as a separate entity by several segments of society- this research is aimed at studying and evaluating the interactions of this community with rest of the society. This identification is based on ideological differentiations. Territorial, tribal and ethnic differences do not hold any strength at all; among the followers of same religious group. The primary

58 focus of this research is on ―Societal Harmony‖. Therefore, the actions and perceptions, of Madrassa teachers generally and graduates particularly, will be evaluated to determine that to what extent they are capable of assimilating with the prevailing socio-politico-economic systems and set up in the Punjab, as well as in Pakistan. Their judgments regarding the prevailing systems and their perceptions and predictions to reform, improve or even replace the existing systems will be analyzed to determine their ownership and affiliation to the prevailing structures in Pakistani society.

The thesis title highlights two basic themes; Firstly, ―Societal Harmony‖ which is used in the context of synchronization of various groups in a lifestyle where they can live side by side- believing in the notion of ―peaceful coexistence‖. Secondly, ―Role of Madrassa Education‖, to what extent Madrassa education prepares its graduates to live, side by side with others, in the same society. One would agree with the fact that Pakistan society is overwhelmed with people who have not received religious education as a code of life; to be followed strictly. Therefore this majority is definitely different from religious graduates; who receive religious education as a compulsory code of life. In this scenario, the behavior of a minority needs to be studied to evaluate, and predict where needed, their interactions and perceptions towards the majority. It is an undeniable fact that it is the minority that has to live with the majority; and not the vice versa. Several questions arise in mind regarding Madrassa education system and its graduates. In order to understand the status and behavior of Madrassa students, some of these questions have been accepted as research questions.

2.2.4: Research Questions This research is an endeavor to find answers to the following questions.

1. Role of Madrassas in socialization of their graduates, in the Punjab particularly and in Pakistan generally.

2. What is the perception of Madrassa graduates; regarding society and its structures?

The perceptions of general people and the objections and allegations, labeled against the Madrassas and their graduates, are the catalytic agents behind this research. In order to seek answers to the research questions, and gauge the validity of objections and allegations, leveled against the Madrassa education system and its graduates, there is a need to seek answers; regarding the several dimensions of Madrassa education system.

In order to study the behaviours and interactional patterns of Madrassa teachers generally and students particularly, it is necessary to initiate a scientific research, based on a social theory that helps explain interactions in the society. Sociologists have presented several theories; to understand and discuss human interactions in the society. Some of them deal with distribution, and sharing, of power while others discuss rise, and reasons, of conflicts and, methods of, conflict management. Madrassa graduates are already treated as a separate entity in the society81. This research is primarily a study of

81 They are considered as ―Instructed Muslims‖; surrounded by a few ―Practicing Muslims‖ and a huge majority of ―Performing Muslims‖ and ―Tagged Muslims‖. Differentiations based on personal observations and discussions with various Madrassa heads and teachers.

60 interactions among several groups/communities; Madrassa graduates with the rest, living side by side in the same community. This division is neither on the basis of ethnic identification nor on cultural differentiation. Rather it is based on ideological prioritization. The graduates of Madrassas prefer the lifestyle they are taught and a large portion of the society, in Pakistan generally and in the Punjab particularly, intends to live according to the culture driven social setup and norms; already prevailing in the society. In some cases, the strength of ideology and practice of culture become in conflict with each other for social dominance. The magnitude of preference, given to the structures and practices, has divided people into various groups. Some are rigid, in implementing their ideas, while others are either flexible enough to allow difference of opinion to coexist or are willing to even accept influences from others, for the sake of collective welfare and prosperity. Both primary and secondary sources have been used, in this research, and qualitative and quantitative tools have been utilized to collect data; as nature of this research demands deployment of the both82. 2.2.5: Research Methods and Tools In order to acquire firsthand information from the Madrassa graduates, survey method was used to record their behaviour and perceptions. Interviews were also conducted with the heads of Madrassas, and Madrassa Boards, to evaluate their perceptions and preferences regarding the prevailing social setup. Interviews usually focused on identifying the explicit and latent objectives and activities of Madrassas while the questionnaire primarily aimed at recording perceptions of Madrassa students towards the existing social setup and structures and their potentials to reform its ills. Rather than asking direct questions regarding societal harmony, so as to avoid cosmetic answers, indirect questions were asked and the responses were used to evaluate the perceptions and potentials of respondents. The basic themes, to be understood and examined through this questionnaire, are;

82 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods and Approaches (Washington: Sage Publications 2013.) 239-242

1. Those who blame society for all the faults, have least ownership and sense of responsibility. Those who want to improve themselves/ character have the highest sense of responsibility and are less likely to disturb others. They have the moral courage to admit their mistakes and willingness to reform themselves. 2. Those who want to reform the society have the highest level of ownership and can be considered as productive citizens; one can serve the society to what extent depends upon opportunity and skills- both gifted and developed. 3. Those who allow it to remain in the same poor condition, have less ownership for the social system but still are no threat to it. 4. Those who want to replace it, irrespective of whatever they offer as a substitute and how much excellent it may be, they will create disturbance in the society and will bring problems for others (during transitional phase). Having a good strategy is one thing and implementing a strategy wisely is another.

This research is designed to study the potentials and capabilities of students; to assimilate in the prevailing socio-politico-economic system in Pakistan. Sectarian differences and justifying who is right and who is misled, to what extent, is neither primary nor secondary question of this research. Despite the fact that sectarian differences do play an important role in character building and behaviour formation in Madrassa students, still they do interact with each other in social, political and economic affairs. Sectarian differences can, and are for several practical reasons, put aside by declaring them one‘s personal matters;

―Lakum Denokum Waliyadeen‖ (Al Quran 109:6)

Chapter: 3 Putting the House in Order: Conceptualizing Fundamentalism, Jihad and Terrorism

It was mentioned, in the previous chapter, that there is a general impression that Madrassa students tend to develop more extremist views and are not prone to change according to modern requirements of the society. It is, also, projected that this is so because there seems to be some lack of understanding among the teachers and organizers of Madrassas regarding some basic concepts of Islamic laws and principles. Actually, a large segment of society is not clear on several concepts, and is confused due to self- interpretations and biased explanations by several writers and government officials. There is a need to clarify such confusions; so as to promote ―Intellectual homogeneity‖ in the society.

The world of academics has been, constantly, under transformation- owing to the contributions of various writers sharing their thoughts and experiences with others. The academia, at one point in time, has never been unanimous on the same interpretations of any event or activity. Both the performers and the defendants have been trying to justify their stance. This intellectual discourse has clarified minds but, at the same time, has confused them as well. This chapter is an attempt to explain some of the most commonly used concepts which are being used extensively by voguish scholars and scrollers83.

In this chapter, we will deal with these concepts; so that clarity can be achieved. The conceptual clarity, acquired through this discussion, will serve as parameters; while evaluating the Madrassa syllabi as well as the attitudes of the teachers and students. The main concepts, that need to be discussed and clarified, are ―Fundamentalism‖, ―Jihad‖ and ―Terrorism‖. Today, despite globalization and generalization of several concepts, there is still an appreciable amount of diversity in public expectations, acceptability and conduct, in various parts of the world, due to the differences in historical and cultural experiences and practices.

83 Label given is by the ‗researcher‘ to the writers who do not produce anything new. Rather, they keep on writing the same things, time and again, only to increase the volume of their works. Thereby, increasing the amount of ‗scrolls‘ only.

Before going into the details as how the three concepts; Fundamentalism, Jihad and Terrorism are linked together, it will be pertinent to explain them in detail first.

3.1: Fundamentalism The term fundamentalism has become a misnomer. It was used for the first time for Muslims in Algerian Civil War when Islamic forces won the first round of general elections in 1991. The West was persuading the ruling elite to hold general elections. The army cancelled the results and appointed a dummy president, Muhammad Boudiaf. The Islamist forces resisted against the move and a bloody civil war started between the Islamist forces and the army backed government84. It was the time when the Islamist forces were labeled as fundamentalists. Since then the concept of fundamentalism became in common use in the political literature. Earlier this concept was used to refer to ―Orthodox Christian‖ perspectives. As a matter of fact, writers in Politics barely used this concept in regular writings. The focus remained primarily on discussing social interactions and reasons for violent behaviour- which obviously vary from period to period and society to society. The events of 9/11 gave a new turn to the thoughts and actions of scholars/writers and governments respectively. Since then, the only connotation, attached to the concept of fundamentalism, is ―Islamic Extremism‘‖; with no place for tolerance and adaptability. Despite the reticent attitude of the US government, most of the writers and scrollers used the concept of fundamentalism to denote to extremist behaviour of some of the Islamic groups. Christian fundamentalism went out of discussion. ―In the post 9/11 climate, little if any attention was being paid to the inroads Christian fundamentalism was making in local and international politics. The focus had become riveted on ‗Islamic fundamentalism‘ as the only form of extreme religious behaviour. Even though, for instance, Christian

84 Richard T. Antoun, Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic and Jewish Movements (Boston: Rowman and Little Field Publishers, 2001.) 92-94

fundamentalist, Jerry Falwell had stated publically that America got what it deserved‖85. Incidentally, the scholars did not put more emphasis to the fact that fundamentalism, originally, is not restricted to religious realms only. It also refers to ideological basis of social and cultural movements86. Fundamentalism is actually glorification of past traditions and practices which are considered essential for a successful life. The traditions may be old but the methods to sustain and revive them can be new. In most of the cases, the efforts of fundamentalists are to reinterpret the past. Such movements usually profess self-separation and segregation; form the society, so as to protect their cherished traditions from alteration. Its basis extends from national pride to lingual or cultural differentiation or even xenophobia. In this scenario, the groups that are striving to protect or implement certain principles can be labeled as ―fundamentalists‖87. The problem with explaining fundamentalism is that, in most of the cases, the definitions, maintained and applied, do not encompass all the aspects of this concept. The explanations, communicated by various writers, are actually their perceptions. Carol Schick and John Jaffe are of the view, in one of their article, ―How can we use the term so that it has analytical meaning and is not just a label used by self-proclaimed non- fundamentalists‖88? It is pertinent to discuss a few definitions of fundamentalism before initiating a discussion on the cosmic applicability of this concept. According to Encyclopedia Britannica, ―Fundamentalist and Evangelical churches comprise a mixed group of theologically conservative communions that stress the full, and often verbal, inspiration of the Bible and its complete authority over faith and practice‖89. It explains that the encyclopedia considers fundamentalism as adherence to basic rules as explained by religion.

85 Carol Schick, JoAnn Jaffe, Ailsa M. Watkinson, Ed, Contesting Fundamentalisms (Canada: Fernwood Publishing, 2004.) 1 86 Ibid 2 87 Ibid 2-3 88 Ibid 2 89 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (USA: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc, 1978.) 7: 777

According to Oxford Dictionary, fundamentalism means, ―Strict adherence to the basic principles of any subject or discipline‖90. It presents fundamentalism as a practice of following the basic rules strictly. Fundamentalism is defined in The American Heritage Dictionary as, ―A usually religions movement or point of view characterized by a return to fundamental principles, by rigid adherence to those principles and often by intolerance of other views and opposition to secularism‖91. In recent times, the argument has turned into a debate between religionism and secularism. The principles in secularism are subject to removal and reform while the rules of a religion are permanent and irreplaceable, not at least by the followers. According to Oxford Dictionary of the US Military, fundamentalism is; ―A form of Protestant Christianity that upholds belief in the strict and literal interpretation of the Bible, including its narratives, doctrines, prophecies, and moral laws‖92. This definition has clearly explained fundamentalism as adherence to religion and complete following of its edicts, in both letter and spirit. According to Mariam Webster Dictionary, fundamentalism is; ―A movement or attitude stressing strict and literal adherence to a set of basic principles‖93. Here again, the emphasis is on strict following of predetermined rules, by the followers. According to Professor Christoph Stuckelberger, professor of ethics, University of Basel, Geneva, fundamentalism is; ―A religious or political movement or attitude with a strict adherence to a set of basic principles,

90 Oxford Dictionaries, at, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fundamentalism, 19-Oct- 2012. 91 American Heritage Dictionary, at, http://www.answers.com/topic/fundamentalism, 19- Oct-2012. 92 Oxford Dictionary of the US Military, at, http://www.answers.com/topic/fundamentalism 19-Oct-2012. 93 Mariam Webster Dictionary, at, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/fundamentalism, 19-Oct- 2012.

67 based on a literal, not adapted interpretation, especially as a return to former principles‖94. These definitions have explained fundamentalism as a compulsory practice and following of predetermined rules and regulations; usually of a religion and occasionally of a social structuring mechanism. This adherence is compulsory for the followers only. These rules are to be followed by those, only, who agree to adhere to a specific religion or social group. None of them has mentioned anything regarding forced implementation on others or compelling others to abide by any basic rules unwillingly. Thus one may conclude that willingness to follow comes first and then comes the strict adherence to the basic rules. In reality, fundamentalism is a way of life which emphasizes on following the basic principles of a religion or a philosophy; in order to achieve a desired result. Usually whenever religion spreads, it accepts the cultural values of the people living in new areas. In this process, sometimes, texture of religion undergoes some changes. The followers, at a given time, start thinking about the new cultural contents; which by that time have become part of the religion. Eventually, they start emphasizing on the basic principles; which were originally believed in and practiced by the early followers. So, they start revisiting and reinterpreting the edicts and practices of religion to prepare a proper code of conduct, befitting their perceptions and expectations; by weeding out, or neutralizing, the new inductions. This divides the followers, of the same religion, into different groups; on the basis of their belief and support for various interpretations, of basic principles, and preference to various practices and their performance. This is the situation when appearance becomes more important and the spirit, of any religious performance, acquires a backseat. This differentiation, in religion, is known as sectarianism. Consequently, the society gets divided into various groups; based on sectarian differentiations. Many a times, these groups resort to conflicts and try to purify the ideas by force. Same was the case with the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims. Conflicts among Jews, state church controversy in Europe and un-numbered conflicts among Muslims were events promoted

94 Heidi Hadsell, Christoph Stuckelberger,(Ed), Overcoming Fundamentalism: Ethical Responses from Five Continents (Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009.) 11

68 by sectarianism. The grouping is based on variations in the interpretations of the edicts. All the groups, in this situation, emphasize on the authenticity of their version of religion and float apparent symbols to differentiate their adherents and supporters from rest of the lot95. That is why; we have one Holy Quran one Holy Prophet (PBUH) but five ‗Fiqah‘, due to four Imams of Sunnis and one Shia. Actually, these are based on interpretational variations. All the groups that emphasize on the importance of basic principles are not violent and aggressive. They may be fundamentalist but not necessarily extremist always. Thus fundamentalism should not be equated with extremism and violence. The concept of fundamentalism is attached to the activities of the Muslims only, yet in all the religions, the main stream religionists were divided into groups. One group asserted that religion should be followed in its original form and no interpretations should be allowed. This group was known as fundamentalists96. As a matter of fact, fundamentalism as a concept was first used by Protestants, in the US, in1920s when they projected that basics of Christianity should be evolved97. It was not an extremist movement to compel people forcibly. Rather, it was a reactionary social reformist campaign, emphasizing upon the basic principles of Christianity, which were eroding due to rapid social change process. ―The term fundamentalism derives from the US Protestant evangelical movement that began in the late 1800s…. Taking its name in 1920 from ‗The Fundamentalists: A Testimony of Truth (1910-1915)‘, a twelve volume set of essays that reasserted the five-point fundamental creed of evangelical Christianity in the face of growing liberal theology‖98.

95 That is why; various groups of the Muslims emphasize more on appearance than character building. Colour, shape and size of turban, shape and size of mustaches and length of trousers are imposed as identification symbols to differentiate the followers, of a specific group (my followers), from rest of the lot; simple followers of God and Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). 96 The Religious Book, at, http://www.answers.com/topic/fundamentalism, 19-Oct-2012. 97 Ibid 98 Carol Schick, Ed,Contesting Fundamentalisms 7

All fundamentalist groups need not to be extremist or violent. Though, some of their followers derive basis to justify their forceful actions, yet most of them intend to attract others on the basis of their character and principles- along with the rewards offered, in the life hereafter, in case of a religious campaign99. This concept from American perspective could not become popular. There have been reformist groups in both Judaism and Christianity; emphasizing on the purification of religious injunctions from periodic infusions. The irony is that terms like orthodox, conservative, followers of old testaments were used for old Jews and Christians. Fundamentalism was not commonly used in their rivalries, conflicts and intellectual pursuits. Daniel Pipes, who is known as an opponent of the Islamic principles, has given his own view on the subject. ―Every fundamentalist association does not indulge in political activity, some remain out of politics because of their unequivocal rejection of the current situation in the Islamic world‖100. Incidentally, most of the religious reformist movements start as non- political campaigns and are initiated, mostly, by non-political persons. Soon they start affecting the political realm, as they automatically challenge the inequalities supported by the regime. This breeds the political implications, and imprints, of that movement. Thus, the movement is either supported or opposed by the political elites. Actually, most of the modern scholars, and scrollers, have misunderstood fundamentalism as extremism. Therefore, either intermix the both or take them as synonyms. They may be closer to each other, as far as influencing is concerned, but definitely do not have synonymousness between them. Whenever these scholars, who are unable to differentiate, conceptually, between the two, are trying to explain the compulsory following of certain rules, ―Fundamentalism‖, they take it as a compulsory implementation on all masses, ―Extremism‖; irrespective of any difference between the followers and non-followers. As far as sociological rules are concerned, the ones that

99 Ibid 5-14 100 Daniel Pipes, In the Path of God: Islamic and Political Power, (New York: Basic Books, 1983) 138, in, Sohail Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt and Iran (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1995.) 387.

70 deal with the establishment of a specific social order, the non-followers are compelled to follow the prevailing social order but it does not mean forcing them to complete following, based on surrender101. This surrender is for only those who agree to follow in the first place. In modern political literature, fundamentalism is connected with terrorism. Some writers are of the opinion that fundamentalism is a basic tool of freedom fighters Jihadis and terrorists to achieve their specific objectives102. Fundamentalism simply means adherence to basic principles of a specific code of conduct. All those, who emphasize on strict following of already set principles, can be technically called ‗fundamentalists‘. The principles of nationhood and rules of an organization expect the members/ workers to follow the set regulations and standard operating procedure (SOP). They all emphasize upon the significance of rules. The entire judicial and police system tries to convince, and even compel where needed, to follow certain rules, already set by the society and approved by the governmental mechanisms. Technically, all of them can be called fundamentalists; if the conventional wisdom, that all those who want to implement principles in true letter and spirit- in their literal not adapted interpretation- are fundamentalists, is accepted to interpret fundamentalism. If one goes in blind following of the conventional wisdom, that all fundamentalists are extremists, than all the law making and enforcing agencies, including much revered legislature, should be declared as ‗exponents of fundamentalism and extremism‘. Civilizations have developed only because of refinements in their regulatory principles and equal, but impartial, implementation of such principles. Fundamentalism thus should be considered as an approach that intends to glorify the significance of certain principles, and even practices, that may differentiate its followers from others. Pluralistic societies always cherish diversity of identity and thoughts. This ―healthy diversity‖ can be helpful in admiring fundamentalist tendencies- as long as they do not resort to forceful application. In terms of social norms and practices, the acceptability of any action is subject to public approval. If the adherents of basic principles, the

101 See Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We: America‟s Great Debate (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd.) 59-80 102 See Chapter 2, ―Literature Review and Conceptual Framework‖ for details.

71 fundamentalists, are appreciated by people, their actions will be adored by the masses and will eventually become common practice. If not, their hypothesis will be rejected and they will be compelled to redirect their perceptions and actions. The only golden principle, that needs to be upheld and strengthened, is tolerance- something education is supposed to inculcate. The other concept which is playing a predominant role in modern political literature, media and propaganda against Islam is ―Jihad‖. Most of the Western and American writers equate Jihad with unlawful torture and terrorism. It is not only an exaggeration but a totally misperceived and misconceived definition of Jihad. Most of the scrollers, ‗writhing‘ about this concept, lack in depth knowledge of this concept. In order to distinguish Jihad from terrorism, the concept of Jihad needs to be understood first.

3.2: Jihad Jihad is derived from the Arabic word ―Juhda‖ which literally means an, ―Effort‖ to do something. It carries an important position in the present day political literature. Religiously the concept is a part of faith and an important field of Islamic way of life. It is discussed seven times in the Holy Quran and is explained in the ‗Sayings and Doings‘ of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) approximately 300 times. It has been explained by jurists, scholars and Ulema in un-numbered ways. Until the last decade of the Twentieth Century, it was used in the positive context. The debate is divided in two parts to facilitate the discussion.

3.2.1: Revealed Knowledge This category includes the injunctions, communicated in the Holy Quran and practiced or directed by the Holy Prophet (PBUH). In order to avoid any unnecessary argument, the Hadis from the compilations of ‗Sheikhaan103‘ will be referred to only. Islam has specifically mentioned situations and events when any aggressive action, or even war, can be initiated.

103 The writers of the two most authentic books of Hadis, Muhammad Ibn Ismail al-Bokhari (196-256 AH/ 810-870 AD), compiler of Sahi Bokhari and Abu Hussain Muslim Nishapuri, compiler of Sahi Muslim (206-261 AH/ 821-875 AD), are known as ‗Sheikhaan‘.

The Holy Quran directs the Muslims to, ―Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you, but begin no hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth not aggressors‖104. As a matter of fact, Jihad is a broader term. According to the teachings of Islam, Jihad is, or can be, launched in the following spheres105. 1. Trying to control one‘s instinctive and physical desires. 2. Making efforts to control someone‘s enmity, jealousy, revenge and hatred against believers or even non-believers. 3. Struggle against all those actions of the government which undermine Islam and the Islamic belief system. 4. Efforts against those individuals, who damage lives of the Muslims, their property and undermine Islam and its belief system. Al these dimensions of Jihad are broad based and aim at motivating the Muslims, collectively, to work for the preservation of Islam only; not to force others to embrace it. Most of them do not allow use of weapons. Self- control and persuasion are also efforts; literal meanings of Jihad. If any issue arises, in order to fight against non-believers who try to damage Islamic belief system, there are certain limits fixed by Islam which are not to be crossed. In the Holy Quran the struggle for the existence of human life revolves around two aspects; (1) Struggle against those who damage and undermine Islamic belief. Even in this perspective, an important condition has been emphasized; first they must be warned and advised to stop their activities. If they do not stop their activities, only then Jihad becomes an option.106 (2) Muslims have to strive against non-believers if they try to kill Muslims, threaten their lives and damage their property. In this scenario, the same condition of offering peaceful settlement is to be offered first. In both these dimensions, if non-believers pay ―Jazia‖ (a tax) to the rulers of an Islamic state, their rights to live (exist and excel) and security are ensured by the government. If they do not pay taxes but undermine the belief

104 The Holy Quran Al Bakara 2, Ayat 190 105 Qari Rashid Thanvi, Mumtahin, Jamia Islamia, Kamran Block Allam Iqbal Town Lahore, in discussion with the researcher on 15-Oct- 2012. Several other Madrassa teachers and administrators also shared similar views. 106 The Holy Quran Al Anfal 8, Ayat 38-39

73 system and destabilize the state, then war against them becomes a duty of the Muslims only to ensure law and order in the society107. Islam emphasizes that only wrong doers whether; individuals, groups or regimes, which resort to anti-Islam activities, are to be controlled and stopped by persuasion or by force but the community they belong to is not to be targeted. As explained in the Holy Quran, a war can only be waged against a group only, ―If they violate their pledges, after once signing the treaties, and try to harm your religion, fight with them hoping that they may refrain from their actions‖108. In this Ayat, the Muslims were directed to fight with those non-Muslims who had violated the ―Treaty of Hudabiya‖109. The Muslims are bound to abide by the conditions of agreements signed with the non-Muslims. They cannot simply write off agreements on the basis of any hostile action carried out by the non-Muslims. The conditions laid down in the agreement are to be followed strictly by the Muslims. The commitments, made with the government of non-believers or with the individuals, are to be honored. Ignoring such commitments is not appreciated by Islam. ―Those infidels who have an agreement with you, and they have not violated that agreement nor have helped your enemies, observe your agreement till its expiry date. No doubt Allah loves the pious‖110. Immediately, after this, the Holy Quran talks about those infidels who do not keep their treaties, and violate them frequently. Allah directs the Muslims to hunt such betraying infidels till they stop embrace Islam111. Incidentally, this very verse is quoted, more than any other one, by those extremists who intend to wage a campaign against all the non-believers. The irony of the fate is, that majority of the Muslims is ignorant of Arabic language and is also unaware of the reference to the context of the injunctions of the Holy Quran. Consequently, when somebody trims any verse of the Holy Quran and quotes only, ―Kill all the infidels, wherever you may find them‖, many Muslims fall under the impression that Islam orders indiscriminate killing

107 The Holy Quran Al Tauba 9, Ayat 12-13 and 29 108 The Holy Quran Al Tauba 9, Ayat 12 109 An agreement signed between the Islamic government of Medina and the rulers of Makkah in 6th Hijrah. 110 The Holy Quran Al Tauba 9, Ayat 4. 111 The Holy Quran Al Tauba 9, Ayat 5.

74 of all infidels. One may satisfy one‘s thoughts by assuming, ―Ignorance is bliss‖ but if ignorance turns someone into an apparatus of an evildoer, then ignorance is a curse. The Holy Quran talks about various topics, in different dimensions and scenarios. It is not wise to declare any Quranic injunction, as basis to legitimize any hostile action, without understanding the situation and scenario, with particular reference to the contents, when that specific order was given. The concept of Jihad is discussed in 164 verses of the Holy Quran, omitting those that discuss heavenly rewards for martyrs of Jihad112. These Ayat can be divided into the following categories, on account of their time, contents and emphasis.

Table 3.1: Categories of Quranic Ayat on Jihad S No Category No of Ayat Percentage 1 To Avenge Bloodshed 06 2.96% 2 To Protect someone or Self Protection 02 0.98% 3 To Stop Bloodshed (Fasad) 08 3.95% 4 Specific Situation/ Periodic arrangement 95 46.79% 5 Certain Rules which must be followed 05 2.47% 6 Motivation only/ Stick to Allah‘s Path 87 42.85% Total 203* 100% * The total number of Ayat has increased because some Ayat discuss more than one topic and thus fall in more than one category.

This enlisting shows that a great number of Ayat, 46.79% are related to a specific situation. The principles explained in them may not always be applicable to all situations. Second major category, that has the handsome number of Ayat 42.85% in it, is motivational. Allah orders His followers to wage an effort so that their bondage with Him may strengthen. No details about specific situation or directions are given. Beyond these two, the most emphasized category, 3.95%, is waging a war to stop bloodshed (Fasad). Bloodshed, without any reason, Fasad, has been denounced many a times in

112 164 Jihad Verses in the Koran, Compiled by Yoel Natan at, http://answering-islam.org/Quran/Themes/jihad_passages.html, 11-Nov-2012.

75 the Holy Quran. Along with that, the sacredness of the treaties has also been emphasized upon113. The sayings of the Holy Prophet (SAW) clearly indicate the restrictions that must be followed during a military campaign, even against the infidels. ―During some of the Ghazawat of the Prophet a woman was found killed. Allah's Apostle disapproved the killing of women and children‖114. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) never emphasized on waging war promptly. He ordered his followers not to wish for a fight with the non-Muslims except when it was unavoidable. The Muslims were told to remain patient if and when they were to face an enemy. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) (during a holy battle), waited till the sun had declined and then he got up among the people and said, ―O people! Do not wish to face the enemy (in a battle) and ask Allah to save you (from calamities) but if you should face the enemy, then be patient and let it be known to you that Paradise is under the shades of swords‖115. Jihad, in Islam, is an effort that can be initiated only by a Muslim government, after due consideration and consultation. It shall be declared as a decree by the state against any group of people or country that causes direct and serious danger or harm to Islam or its followers116. Jihad is not every war fought by every Muslim against non-Muslims. It is one of the most sacred duties. An action can be justified as jihad only when it fulfills certain requirements laid down by Islam. Every campaign must first fulfill the legitimacy test, and then the rules of engagement, as laid down by Islam, must be followed and lastly must have authorization by the Muslim ruler of that territory before claiming to be a ‗Jihad‘. The use of the word jihad is very simple but justifying any action to be really a ‗Jihad‘ is as difficult as proving to be practical Muslin after embracing Islam. If the use of force

113 The Holy Quran Al Tauba 9, Ayat 6-11 114 Sahi Bokhari narrated by Abdullah, Vol 4,Book52,Number 257,at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/052.sbt.html, 11-Nov- 2012. 115 Ibid, 116 Qari Rashid Ahmad Thanvi, Muntazim Jamia Darul Uloom Islamia, Kamran Block Allama Iqbal Town Lahore, in discussion with the researcher, on15-Nov-2012.

76 crosses the laid down boundaries then it no longer remains a religiously justifiable activity and thus can be considered as an act of militancy or terrorism. Declaring that such actions are preached by Islam goes against the meanings and the spirit of Islam. Islam does not allow brutality and savagery, in any case. Even lawfully carried out revenge is also a guided activity and certain acts of brutality like ―Musla117‖ have been prohibited. The Holy Quran clearly directs the Muslims to respect and follow all the agreements signed with the non-Muslims; as long as they do not violate them. Jihad is a combination of certain activities that include both spiritual and physical efforts to ensure self-control and peace and tranquility, in the society, respectively. It does not mean waging an endless or rudderless war against all those who do not believe in Islam. Protectionist mode in Islam is allowed only when the existence of the community or faith is in danger; self-survival. Incidentally, all social setups not only allow but encourage self-preservation and self-protection. All the religions allow and legitimize actions taken in self-defense. 3.2.2: Reasoned Knowledge Here, the concept of Jihad is discussed in the light of definitions and explanations given by various scholars. Different modern scholars and writers have been trying to explain, this context, in limited or broader contexts; depending on their understanding and perception. According to the Oxford Dictionary; ―Jihad (in Arabic) means struggle, contest… one for the propagation of Islam‖118. It is also, in the same dictionary as, ―A religious war of Muslims against unbelievers in Islam, inculcated as a duty by the Koran and traditions‖119. According to Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, ―The Muslim believers' exerting their abilities, talents, and power in struggling in the path of God using their resources of life,

117 It was a traditional Arab practice of cutting the nose, ears and lips of a dead enemy to show hatred and vengeance. 118 The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition (Vol viii) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.) 238 119 Ibid 238

property, speech, and all available instruments to make the Word of God prevail in this world‖120. According to the Encyclopedia of Religion, Jihad means, ―It is the verbal noun of the Arabic verb ‗Jahada‘ meaning ‗to endeavor, to strive, to struggle‘…. An effort towards a commendable aim. In religious contexts it can mean the struggle against one‘s evil inclinations of efforts towards the moral uplift of society or towards the spread of Islam‖121. According to the Encyclopedia AMERICANA, ―Jihad is an Arabic word meaning ‗struggle‘. As a religious duty theoretically laid upon all followers of Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)‖122. According to ‗Zionism and Israel - Encyclopedic Dictionary‘, jihad means, ―Struggle, usually applied to an Islamic war. Also an inner struggle to find true faith and overcome temptation, which is considered ‗the greater Jihad‘. In political utterances however, ‗Jihad‘ almost always refers to the lesser Jihad - war against an infidel enemy‖123. The applicability of Jihad is also mentioned in the same encyclopedia, ―Jihad is not a war to force the faith on others, as many people think of it. It should never be interpreted as a way of compulsion of the belief on others, since there is an explicit verse in the Qur'an that says: ‗There is no compulsion in religion‟ Al-Qur'an: Al-Baqarah (2:256)‖124. While clarifying the oblivious of Jihad, the same encyclopedia, amazingly, states, ―Jihad is not a defensive war only, but a war against any unjust regime. If such a regime exists, a war is to be waged against the

120 Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, Jihad, at, http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/000248.html, 19-Oct-2012. 121 Mircea Eliade, Ed, Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company1987.) 8: 88-91 122 The Encyclopedia AMERICANA: International Edition (USA: Grolier Incorporated 1987.) 16: 91-92 123 Zionism and Israel-Encyclopedic Dictionary at, http://www.zionism- israel.com/dic/Jihad.htm , 11-Oct-2012. 124 Ibid

leaders, but not against the people of that country. People should be freed from the unjust regimes and influences so that they can freely choose to believe in Allah‖125. Famous scholar on Islam, John L. Esposito, in his book, Islam the Straight Path, has explained jihad as, ―Striving hard in God‘s cause‖126. G. H. Jansen in his book, Militant Islam, is of the opinion that Islam preaches militancy and Jihad is considered as one of the means to achieve objectives of militants127. Professor Derek Brown explained in the Guardian, ―The essential meaning of jihad is the spiritual, psychological and physical effort exerted by Muslims to be closer to God and thus achieve a just and harmonious society‖128. In Religious Education: Glossary of Terms, Jihad is defined as, ―Personal individual struggle against evil in the way of Allah. It can also be collective defence of the Muslim community‖129. A group of scholars has tried to define different terms that we use regularly. According to them, ―In Islam, jihad is the struggle for the faith. It can manifest on the outer, as holy war, or on the inner, as the spiritual process‖130. All these definitions have explained Jihad in the context of the historical usage of the term. Unfortunately, the true meanings of the concept, as explained by Islam, were not always applied on this term. In most of the cases, politically motivated actions and activities were labeled as Jihad to win authenticity, legitimacy and support. Some people have tried to explain Jihad in a more comprehensive manner; so as to make it more specific yet elaborate. University of Southern California, Muslim Students Association (US C., M.S.A.) has tried to define jihad in the following words,

125 Ibid 126 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (USA: Oxford University Press,1998) 93 127 G.H. Jansen , Militant Islam (London: Pan Books , 1979.) 188-204 128 Derek Brown ,Attack and aftermath: A glossary of terms at, http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,559312,00.html, 19-Oct-2012. 129 Religious Education: Glossary of Terms, at, http://www.mmiweb.org.uk/publications/re/glossary.pdf, 24-Oct-2012. 130 What We Mean by The Words We use, at, http://www.zoofence.com/define04.html , 24- Oct-2012.

―It is an Arabic word the root of which is Jahada, which means to strive for a better way of life…. Jihad should not be confused with Holy War; the latter does not exist in Islam nor will Islam allow its followers to be involved in a Holy War. The latter refers to the Holy War of the Crusaders. Jihad is not a defensive war only, but a war against any unjust regime. If such a regime exists, a war is to be waged against the leaders, but not against the people of that country. People should be freed from the unjust regimes and influences so that they can freely choose to believe in Allah‖131. The concept of Jihad was so insignificant that ‗Encyclopaedia Britannica‘ did not even mention this concept in its edition published in 1978132. Same is the case with, ‗The Encyclopedia of Islam‘. Jihad, as a concept, is not even touched briefly, in its edition Published in 1978, due to its insignificance at international level at that time133. This concept acquired significance after Iranian Revolution in 1979 and reached the apex of its elucidation when a new breed of mercenary warriors was needed to fight a proxy war against the former USSR, on behalf of the US it was the time when every tom harry and dickens was writing against the former USSR and was trying to present the US, and its allies, as the only civilized community on the planet. Professor Bernard Lewis, expert in Oriental studies and Muslim history, has explained his views about Jihad as, ―The overwhelming majority of classical theologians, jurists and traditionalists (specialists in the hadith) understood the obligation of jihad in a military sense‖134.

Most of these definitions talk about Jihad as a struggle for the preservation of Islam and an effort to protect the rights of the Muslims. The

131 USC MSA at, http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/reference/glossary/term.JIHAD.html, 24-Oct- 2012. 132 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 7: 777 133 E. Van Donzel, B. Lewis and Ch. Pellat, Ed, The Encyclopedia of Islam (Netherlands: E J. Brill; 1978.) 134 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.) 72

80 writers and scholars have tried to explain this concept as a compulsory pillar of Islam; unfortunately without emphasizing on the situations and conditions when Jihad can be waged. The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, edited by John L. Esposito, has rightly mentioned Jihad as, ―To Strive‖ or ―To Exert‖135. Furthermore, the same dictionary talks about restrictions that must be followed and declares it the sole discretion of the government to launch a Jihad136. The problem arises when some extremist groups misinterpret and misuse this concept only to legitimize their campaign against their political rivals. ―To justify their struggle against their coreligionists, extremists branded them unbelievers for their neglect in adhering to and enforcing a particular interpretation of Islam‖137. Jihad, as a concept attracted massive global attention, in the modern times, when it was misused by the US, in 1980s, to develop religious fervor against the Soviet Campaign in Afghanistan. It was the time when Jihad was labeled as ―Holy War‖. Jihad was given negative meanings in 1990s when some radical Islamic groups declared the West and the US as the enemy of the Muslims and carried out terrorist activities labeling them as a Jihad. Since the events of 9/11, Jihad is used as a point of criticism against the Muslim faith. In some pieces of literature, it has been declared as a tool of carrying out terrorist activities. Before that, this concept did not receive that much attention as much it does now. The problem occurs when war is waged in anger or revenge and the boundaries laid down by Islam are not kept in view. Islam condemns excess of any kind. Islam is of the opinion that war can only be declared if all amicable means for the settlement of the conflict fail and use of force is the last option left. It is to be done on rational grounds and certain rules are to be followed strictly. Historically speaking, the term Jihad was used by the West, in the Twentieth Century, to motivate the Muslims against the Communism. Soon after the Second World War, the US started propagating against the

135 John L. Esposito, Ed, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2006.) 159 136 Ibid 160 137 Esposito, Ed, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam 59

Communism and persuaded the Muslims, of the world generally and those of the neighboring countries of former Soviet Union particularly, to fight against the Communism, as their religious duty, due to its atheist nature138. When Soviets went to Afghanistan to protect a pro-Communist regime, the US decided to counter Soviet influence in the region. The US used Islamic forces to resist the Soviets in Afghanistan. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were used excessively to prepare and train Muslims to fight against the Communists. The American and Western Media and their intelligence agencies played a vital role in organizing Islamic forces to launch ‗Jihad‘ against Soviet forces in Afghanistan139. When the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Communism was no longer a threat to the global supremacy of the Capitalism, the US and its allies left the war torn Afghan in lurch and did not heed to the hue and cry of the poor Afghan people suffering in refugee camps all over the region. The warriors, who were arraigned and trained by the US but were no longer maintained by it, concluded that the US was misusing the sentiments and resources of the Muslim countries and had also used them in its war against Communism. These Islamic forces turned against the US, due to her hegemonic tendencies, and started a campaign against her to stop the exploitation of the Muslims. They started activities against the US and her allies declaring them enemies of the Muslims. Since then, every Muslim individual, or country, that criticizes US or her allies and tries to resist their influence, is labeled a ‗terrorist‘ and its activities are termed as ‗terrorism‘. In order to better understand terrorism, as a concept not as a practice or action, it is necessary to discuss and shed light upon various aspects of this concept in detail.

138 Feroz Khan Noon former Prime Minister of Pakistan, quoted in, Adlia Ki Azadi, Sawere Sawere, by Nazir Naji, Daily Jang Lahore 29 May 2007. 139 Ahmad Rashid, Taliban, Islam Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: IB Tauris, 2000) 175-176

3.3: Terrorism The aggressive behavior of the rules and insurgents was known in the history as barbarianism, cruelty, torture, Violence and inhumanness. Terror or terrorism was seldom used in the political literature. It was first used when Charles XIV ruled France with power and authority. His rule was known as ―Reign of Terror‖140. Since then, most of the writers did not use this expression to show their hatred against any brutal activity. The terms like uncivilized and brutal activities were usually used to denounce the savagery played by any individual or state. ―Terrorism‖ became under extensive use when in the early 1990s some extremist Muslim groups criticized the presence of the US forces in the Persian Gulf and declared her activities harmful for the Muslim countries of the region. These groups were declared extremist, and mistakenly, fundamentalist. Their activities were labeled as a threat to the ―Western Civilized World‖. Later on, the events of 9/11 boosted up the anti-extremism sentiments, among the people in the Western countries. The US, in response to these events, declared a war against everybody who disagreed with her in almost all spheres of domestic life and international affairs141. Since then, this concept is extensively used by scholars, and excessively used by scrollers. The main focus is on the Muslims who take up weapons against the governments in their areas or start a campaign against the super powers of the world. Terrorism as a concept is enormously used but is still looking for its universally acceptable definition. Many institutions, agencies and individuals have tried to define this concept. The ‗Convention of League of Nations‘ tried to define terrorism as, ―All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public‖142.

140 D.M. Schlegheck, International Terrorism (Lexington Mass: Lexington Books,1988.) 8 141 President Bush‟s Address to joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, 142 Definitions of Terrorism at, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html ,11- Nov-2012.

The UN Resolution 51/210, of, 17 December 1996, explained terrorism as a, ―Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them‖143. The United Nations Security Council, however, did pass a resolution, ―Resolution 1373 (2001)‖ to condemn and control terrorist activities, on 28 September 2001, but no specific definition of terrorism was produced144. The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution named, ―The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy‖ on 8 September 2006145. The resolution emphasized on controlling terrorism. Again, no definition of terrorism was given146. Such pledges weaken the efficiency of the organization and increase the chances of misuse, by the enforcement agencies. The commitments of the members also become shaky. Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) adopted resolutions to explain terrorism. According to it, "Terrorism means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the

143 UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism at, http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/761/65/PDF/N9776165.pdf?OpenEleme nt, 11, Nov, 2012. 144 Press Release SC/7158, Security Council 4385th Meeting at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm,11-Nov-2012. 145 United Nations General Assembly Adopts Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy at, http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.html#resolution, 11-Nov-2012. 146 Ibid

stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States‖147. It declared any act, or threat, of violence, as terrorism; that aimed at terrorizing the masses. Terrorism is defined in various perspectives, by different writers. Most of them, incidentally, expressed their perspectives and perceptions; while labeling brutal and, politically motivated cruelties, as ―Terrorist Activities‖. It is pertinent to mention a few definitions of terrorism, before initiating the debate regarding universality of any definition. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia defines terrorism as, ―Systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective‖148. Oxford Dictionary of the US Military defines terrorism as, ―The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear. Terrorism is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological‖149. This definition points out certain components of terrorism. Firstly, it should be a calculated and estimated use of violence. It means that terrorism must be a limited or use of violence. Secondly, the main objective should be inculcating fear rather than causing maximum damage. Finally, the objective is to compel others to do something. It means that a terrorist activity is a means only and not the end itself. This definition appears comprehensive but the question arises, that what we will call an activity in which harm is inflicted upon masses or society only to destroy them. The results, of such activities, are secondary in such cases. While, Oxford Dictionary of Politics explains terrorism as a, ―Term with no agreed definition among governments or academic analysts, but almost invariably used in a pejorative sense, most frequently to describe life-

147 OIC Convention to Combat Terrorism 1999, at, http://www.oicun.org/7/38/, 11-Nov-2012. 148 Britannica Concise Encyclopedia at, http://www.answers.com/topic/terrorism, 11-Nov- 2012. 149 Oxford Dictionary of US Military at, http://www.answers.com/topic/terrorism#ixzz1dOXzy82L, 11-Nov-2012.

85 threatening actions perpetrated by politically motivated self-appointed sub- state groups‖150. While Webster's University Dictionary defines terrorism as, ―Systematic use of violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve an end‖151. Thus terrorism turns out to be a systematic violent activity with predetermined objectives. The Oxford English Dictionary defines terrorism as, ―(a) Policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; (b) the employment of methods of intimidation; (c) the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized‖152. The American Heritage Dictionary explains terrorism as, ―The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a person or an organized group against people or property with the intention of intimidating or coercing societies or governments, often for ideological or political reasons‖153. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI, declares terrorism as, ―The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives‖154. US Department of Defense defines terrorism as, ―The unlawful use of -- or threatened use of -- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives‖155. The British Terrorism Act 2000 explains terrorism as, ―Violent offences against persons and physical damage to property‖156.

150 Oxford Political Dictionary 11-Nov-2012. 151 Understanding Terrorism, World Conflict Quarterly at, http://www.globalterrorism101.com/UTDefinition.html, 11-Nov-2012. 152 Ibid 153 Ibid 154 Ibid 155 Ibid 156 Ibid

According to Article 22 Chapter 38 0f the US Code, ―Terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents‖157. Wilkinson discussed this Phenomenon in a different context. He said, ―Terrorism is a special mode of violence which may be briefly defined as coercive intimidation. It involves the treat of murder, injury, or destruction to terrorize a given target into conceding to the terrorists will‖158. Walter Laqueur, professor, historian and expert writer on terrorism, has tried to explain it in simple words, ―Acts of violence and repression as carried out by the government against its own people‖159. Martha Crenshaw, professor of global issues at the Wesleyan University Connecticut160, considers terrorism a tool of influencing political will. According to her, ―Terrorism is the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence to coerce changes in political behavior. It involves symbolic acts of violence, intended to communicate, political message watching audience‖161. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Pearce Professor of International Relations at University of South Carolina Columbia162 declares, ―Terrorism is premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience‖163. These definitions explain terrorist activities carried out under various circumstances. None of them explains the complexities of terrorism comprehensively. The following main points can, however, be extracted from these definitions, so as to develop a list of pre-requisites, elements, strategies

157 US Code Collection, Title 22 Chapters 38, 2656f. Annual country reports on terrorism at http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode22/usc_sec_22_00002656---f000-.html, 11-Nov-2012. 158 John Richard Thackrah, Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987.) 27 159 Walter Laqueur, The Age of the Terror (London: Weidenfield and Nilcoln; 1997.) 27 160 Martha Crenshaw at, http://www.wesleyan.edu/wesmaps/course9900/faculty/crenshaw564.htm, 11-Nov-2012. 161 Martha Crenshaw, quoted in, Charles W. Kegley (Ed), International Terrorism Characteristics, Causes and Control (Hampshire: Macmillan Company; 1990.) 53 162 Charles W. Kegley, Jr. Vice Chairman at, http://www.cceia.org/about/trustees/officers/charles_w_kegley_jr.html , 11-Nov-2012. 163 Kegley, Ed, International Terrorism Characteristics, Causes and Control, 53

87 and objectives of terrorist acts. The presence of the following can help differentiate between acts of violence and terrorist activities.

Table 3.2: Components of Terrorism S No Components Activities 1 Pre-requisites Sequential, cyclic and systematic activities by a group. 2 Elements Fear of random victimization ―it could have been me‖. 3 Strategies Indiscriminate and massive killing of innocent, noncombatant masses. 4 Audience The majority that does not agree with them. 5 Objectives Political power/disorder or restructuring of behaviour or systems.

Keeping in view all these components of terrorism, the following explanation may be accepted as operational definition, ―The philosophy that deals with acts performed by an individual, group or institutions with the help of instruments which would kill, injure or create panic to achieve already specified objectives‖164.

3.4: Politics of Terrorism Generally, in the Western societies, religion has a little or indirect role to play, in practical politics. Although the universities, colleges and other institutions had established the departments of religion or comparative religions but intra- and inter-religious controversies were not the focal point, of discussions, till Soviet Union emerged as a super power, in 1949, and America stepped into the arena to contain the spread of Communism. The Americans used all methods to contain the spread of communism. In this pursuit, religion was exploited in different countries. The religion factor further gained prominence, in international politics, with the collapse of former Soviet Union. A famous professor of Harvard University, Samuel P. Huntington,

164 Prof. Javeed Ahmed Sheikh, former Vice Principal GC (U) Lahore, in discussion with the researcher on 16-Aug-2006.

88 presented a unique idea of, ―Clash of Civilizations‖165; emphasizing on the significance of religious differentiations, in international politics, over geographic factors. Afghanistan is said to be the breeding place of terrorists. It is important to look into the history of Afghanistan, before, during and after the Soviet invasion, to find out the realities about ‗the harboring of terrorism‘. One must find out how this area turned into a resting place for people like Osama Bin Laden and who Taliban really were. The US was interested in defeating the Communism during the Cold War. It started a campaign of propagating the Communism as an evil and a menace to the mankind166. It planned to indulge the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to speed up her downfall167. In the pursuit of her objectives, the US did not care for the loss of human lives and for the devastation a country had to suffer. The United States devised a strategy to de-stabilize Soviet Union and to establish her own hegemony in the world. The CIA obtained support of ISI of Pakistan to use religion in their war against the Communism. Various Madrassas and organizations were used to recruit, train and deploy youth against former Soviet Union, engaged in Afghanistan. Several training centers, disguised as Madrassas, were established in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The ISI gave financial support to various politico/religious leaders in Pakistan to use their Madrassas for the international campaign against Communism168. The US had planned to indulge Soviet Union in Afghanistan to avenge its humiliation in Vietnam. The US started supporting Afghan anti-government groups, long before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan169. After the Soviet invasion, the US started a global campaign of denouncing the Soviet Union

165 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs , (Vol.72,No.3, Summer 1993.) 22-49 166 H.W. Brands, The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.) 1-243 167 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration‟s Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994.) 23-82 168 For details, see Chapter 5, ―Politicization of Madrassas‖. 169 Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski (President Jimmy Carter‘s National Security Advisor), The CIA‟s Intervention in Afghanistan at, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html, 11-Nov-2012.

89 and requested/compelled all its allied Muslim rulers to support the Afghan resistance. The whole scheme was planned and supervised by the CIA. Different participants were directed to play their assigned roles only. The US played the role of the maestro; supervised the whole set up and ensured that everything went as planned. It financed, guided, trained and, even, supervised Mujahideen in using sophisticated weapons170. The Mujahideen were trained in urban sabotage and were brainwashed to care for their task only. The notorious suicide belts were used to carry bombs at hard to reach places in mountains. The biggest target, which could never be achieved despite all efforts and detailed information, was the destruction of ‗Termez Bridge‘; a major road link between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union171. After the Soviet withdrawal, the US left the Mujahideen unattended. It was a time when the warlords became strong and an endless struggle for power started. Every leader tried to increase his territory. The warlords established their own regimes with independent tax collection systems. All of them were former Mujahideen. There was no central command and control system. The central government of President Rabbani was limited to the capital Kabul only. During this period of chaos and anarchy, there were two more groups of former Mujahideen who were apparently silent; the foreign Mujahideen and the local young refugees who had also returned to their regular life after the Soviet withdrawal; considering that Jihad had ended. After many years of chaos and conflict, a group of former Mujahideen, with less ethnic identifications and a bonding factor of studying in same Madrassas, united together in Kandahar against social and moral set up promoted by the corrupt warlords. Mullah Umer became their leader and they started expanding their control in the surrounding areas172. These people called themselves ‗Taliban‘ which means ‗students‘. They received support from the public who were fed up with the mutual conflicts and selfish ends of the warlords. Pakistan also supported these ‗Taliban‘ while betraying its former allies Gulbadin Hikmatyer and others. Pakistan favored Taliban in

170 Steve Coll, CIA‘s Covert Afghan War, Washington Post 9 July 1992 at, http://www.globalissues.org/article/258/anatomy-of-a-victory-cias-covert-afghan-war, and also at, http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/anatomy2.htm, 11-Nov-2012. 171 General Yousaf, quoted in , Ibid 172 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, (London: I B Tauris, 2000.) 17-30

90 capturing weapons and territory. The idea was to establish a safe route to Central Asian Republics173. Pakistan first accepted the link with Taliban by declaring them as, ―our boys‖ but later on denied any link with them174. After the Taliban control over Kandahar, they spread like epidemic in the entire Afghanistan. Many people who were annoyed with their leaders joined Taliban force. The Taliban were considered as saviors of people and strict followers of Islamic principles,‖Sharia‖. They imposed a strict form of Sharia; the one they had learned in Deobandi Madrassas, mostly organized by Jamiat Ulema Islam JUI, Darul Uloom Haqania (Akora Khatak) and analogous. The Taliban opened trade routes to Central Asia and ensured safety of the travelers against a safe passage tax175. The US did not oppose the spread of Taliban in Afghanistan. It actually welcomed this development176. The US was pursuing its interests in the area once again. Afghanistan was to witness another phase of political activities, motivated by foreign actors, with personal interests. The Taliban were supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia directly and by the US secretly, as earlier, to provide peace and stability which was needed to construct a trans- national oil pipeline from Central Asian republics to Pakistan seashore. John J. Maresca, Vice President, International Relations UNOCAL Corporation, testified before ―House Committee in International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in1998‖ and highlighted the significance and utility of Caspian Sea reserves, ―Proven natural gas reserves within Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan equal more than 236 trillion cubic feet. The region's total oil reserves may reach more than 60 billion barrels of oil -- enough to service Europe's oil

173 Ibid 27-28 174 Ibid 29 175 Ibid 28 176 State Department Spokesperson Glyn Davies said that he saw, ―nothing objectionable‖ in the Taliban‘s plans to impose strict Islamic Law, quoted in, Phil Gasper, Afghanistan, the CIA, Bin Laden and the Taliban, International Socialist Review, November-December 2001 at, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_CIA_Taliban.html , 11-Nov- 2012.

needs for 11 years. Some estimates are as high as 200 billion barrels‖177. While referring to the problem of transporting these resources to the market, he said, ―The solution seems simple: build a ‗new‘ Silk Road. Implementing this solution, however, is far from simple. The risks are high, but so are the rewards‖178. This indicates the financial interests, of the Western powers, in the region. They were least concerned with the welfare of people, nor even bothered about the politico-social stability, or even cultural setup of the host area. Their only concern was; ‗earning more profits‘. The people and the society were never a priority of these ‗businessmen‘. In continuation of the same, when the tragic events of 9-11 took place, the then US President George W. Bush declared it a war, ―They had declared war on US and I made up my mind at that moment that we were going to war‖179. He said at another place, ―Our nation faces a threat to our freedoms… we are the target of enemies who boast they want to kill—kill all Americans, kill all Jews and kill all Christians. We have seen that type of hate before‖180. Immediately after that, most of the president‘s aides issued statements against Osama Bin Laden, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US President expressed that all those countries who have been contributing and helping terrorists will be dealt with. Likewise the media (whether electronic or print) opened up against Islamic fundamentalism, Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. They also blamed Madrassa education for preaching fundamentalism, Jihad and terrorism. Almost everybody started giving his opinions to reform Madrassa education system.

177 Testimony by John J. Maresca, Vice President International Relations UNOCAL Corporation, to House Committee in International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, on 12 February 1998 at, http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/linkscopy/Maresca2usG.html , 11-Nov-2012. 178 Ibid 179 Bob Woodward , Bush at War , (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.) 15 180 President Bush‘s address to Nation, World Congress Center , November 8, 2001

―Extremism and fundamentalism have become buzzwords in the global war on terror, and are continually attached to madrasas. Have they become mere scapegoats or do they offer a solution to the problem? Moreover, are the weaknesses of madrasas due to their internal conflicts or only the natural limitations found in any educational system? These are questions that must be looked into before a politically motivated rhetoric of madrasa reform is enunciated as the only possible solution of the madrasa ‗problem‘‖181. After the events of 9/11, the US changed her policies overnight and started criticizing Taliban government. Afghanistan was declared a breeding place for terrorists. The US declared Osama Bin Laden responsible for planning attacks on the US and ordered the Taliban to hand him over to the US. The Taliban government refused to cooperate, without realizing the consequences, and, consequently, provided an opportunity to the US to enter into Afghanistan directly. The US entered Afghanistan and ousted Taliban, out of power, within no time. The Muslim rulers, along with others, were realized in advance that they had no option but to cooperate with the US. The then US President, George W. Bush, declared anti US countries as ‗axis of evil‘, ―North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. …States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world‖.182 He did not stop at that. Rather, he, egotistically, divided the entire world community into two groups,

181 Mohammad Waqas Sajjad, Madrasas in Pakistan: thinking beyond terrorism-based reforms, at, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299648777_44752615.pdf , 27-Sep- 2012. 182 The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002, at, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, 11-Nov-2012.

―We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with US or you are with the terrorists‖183. It was nothing but the US egomania. The then US administration thought of nothing less than a full scale war, to satiate the lust for power and to ensure their ―command over the entire world‖. He further stated about his future plans, even more egregiously, ―We are at the beginning of our efforts in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is only the beginning of our efforts in the world. No group or nation should mistake America‘s intentions: Wherever terrorist group exist of global reach, the United States and our friends and allies will seek it out and we will destroy it‖184. All this was done without any sound evidence. Despite hue and cry by several scholars and writers, the US administration, successfully, convinced the public opinion in their favour and diverted all efforts to ‗war on terror‘. The onus of terrorist attacks on the US was shifted to Osama Bin Laden, ―We have already indicted Osama Bin Laden. He is under indictment for terrorist activity. Our war is against terrorism. Those who would conduct terrorist acts against the United States, those who sponsor them, those who harbor them, those who challenge freedom wherever it may exist‖185. President Bush was not alone in perpetrating war. General Colin Powell said in a statement, ―We have to make it clear to Pakistan and Afghanistan, this is show time‖186. President Bush reflected his egocentric approach, in State of the Union Address, ―The American flag flies again over our embassy in Kabul. Terrorists who once occupied Afghanistan now occupy cells at Guantanamo Bay‖187. He legitimized his invasion of Afghanistan by stating,

183 President Bush‘s Address to joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, at, http://cnn.com/2001/us/09/20/gen.bush.transcript, 11-Nov-2012. 184 Ibid 185 Remarks by the President on September 24,2001 at, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.html, 11-Nov-2012. 186 Bob Woodward, Bush at War 32 187 The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 at, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html, 11-Nov-2012.

―What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning. Most of the 19 men who hijacked planes on September the 11th were trained in Afghanistan's camps, and so were tens of thousands of others. Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning‖188. While declaring the objectives of the global war against terror, President Bush said, ―Our first priority must always be the security of our nation…. My budget supports three great goals for America: We will win this war; we'll protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy‖189. All this was done with an objective to ensure strict US control over socio-political activities of various countries of the world. There are many writers and researchers who are of the opinion that the US establishment is under heavy influence of Israel190. Many provide ample evidence of US financial and technical support to Israel; in its brutalities against the Palestinians191. Incidentally, these acts are not called, ‗Terrorist Activities‘. Apart from that almost all US plans have resulted in creating more mess and problems, rather than solving them. The most important reason for these failures, second in importance only to reliance on analysts having tunnel vision, is incapacity to accept, and consequently, correct the mistakes. As said by J.F. Kennedy, ―An error does not become a mistake unless you refuse to correct it‖192. The Bush administration, like most of the predecessors, did not care for the long-term consequences, of their policies and acts, and waged a massive full scale war in Afghanistan. The warring factions of the Afghans again had a

188 Ibid 189 Ibid 190 John J. Mearsheimer, Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby at, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0040.pdf, 11-Nov-2012. 191 US Israel Genocide, at, http://www.thewe.cc/contents/more/archive/atrocities.htm , 11- Nov-2012. 192 US President John F. Kennedy, Secret Society Speech at, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xhZk8ronces&feature=player_embedded , 11-Nov- 2012.

95 common enemy, whose foreign policy, in the Middle East, was already under question and criticism, and was held responsible for promoting anti- Americanism in the Muslims of the world generally and in those of the Middle East particularly. The sentiment of Jihad, that was once projected by the US against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, became alive and all the valorous combined together to fight the invading armies. This, ironically, helped the so called terrorists strengthen their moorings with other anti-US elements. Ayman Al-Zawahiri said that Afghan war served as an, ―Incubator‖ and the young warriors got, ―practical experiences in combat, politics and organization‖193. The US was careless about the spillover effects of its policies and was more concerned with its personal priorities. She persuaded her satellite regimes, in different Muslim countries, to adopt coercive measures against those groups which were criticizing the US policies and activities in, and around, Muslim countries. The Muslim rulers carried out ruthless actions against the hardliners and made them staunch supporters of their cause instead of changing their mentality. The concept of terrorism needs in-depth study before imposing any perception, as definition. As far as differentiation between freedom fighters and terrorists is concerned, one should look for (a) the support by the population, (b) strategy of indiscriminate or directed activities and, most importantly, (c) nature of demands; whether for a larger group of people or for the members only. These indicators may not be perfect but still may be of a great use, while differentiating freedom fighters from terrorists. This chapter is an attempt to clarify the confusions, if any, regarding the three most commonly used concepts; fundamentalism, Jihad and terrorism. As for fundamentalism, all fundamentalists are not extremists. Usually when some writers make an attempt to explain fundamentalism, they actually explain extremism. All extremists have some fundamental tendencies to protect and project. Therefore, one may conclude that ―all extremists are fundamentalists‖; in one form or the other. Nevertheless, all fundamentalists

193 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under The Prophet‘s Banner[in Arabic] (serialized by Asharq al-Awsat, 3 December 2001) quoted in, Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.) 85

96 do not intend to impose their perceptions and principles on others; particularly through use of force like the extremists. Consequently, one must not assume that, ―all fundamentalists are extremists‖. Before discussing any of these concepts, one must understand the basic difference between fundamentalism and extremism; strict following of basic principles, by one‘s own self, and forced implementation of basic principles on others. Democracy not only appreciates diversity, in the society, but also protects it and respects the opinions of the minority opposition. A clash arises when the minority makes an attempt to assert its will through intimidation. Jihad has been misunderstood and misquoted many a times. Mostly, the stronger interpret and project it for political objectives. Several people have criticized it, even as a concept and as a pillar of Muslim belief; without realizing the fact that most of the problems faced by the world, due to this concept, are the spillover effect of the misinterpretations of this concept. Incidentally, a few have objected the incendiary literature and activities by the US, during 1980s. The accomplices of the US policy in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation, through the ―Jihadis‖, were cherished and rewarded once. Many in Pakistan, at that time, supported the US policy. In particular, General Zia‘s regime went out of its way to support the US policy postures. Eventually, the ―Frankenstein‖ turned against the masters and was, consequently, declared persona non grata for the entire globe. The previous interpretations, of concepts like Jihad, lost their meanings and utility and so did the same patronized Jihadis. Their activities were declared deviltry and pledges were made to rout them out of the entire world. The main reason being that the Afghan Jihadis, uncontrolled and unmonitored, shifted towards extremism and terrorism; targeting the Western interests in and outside the region. In order to clarify the misconceptions of Jihad, the Islamic organizations, with the help of renowned scholars, should present the real meaning of Jihad; which is much more comprehensive than just taking up arms. In other words, Jihad, for many scholars, means reforming the society and performing social welfare activities. Some religious groups tend to use the name of concepts like Jihad to religiously legitimize their agendas and actions; which might be different from the pure religious connotation of these concepts. Ignorance of the masses,

97 from Arabic language, provides opportunities to misinterpret religious principles and pillars. As far as terrorism is concerned, the UN has repeatedly pledged, through its resolutions, to counter terrorism but is still unable to produce its universally acceptable definition. The difference of opinion in differentiating freedom movement from terrorism is a big hurdle in this regard. Still, one should have reached the simple conclusion, ―All acts that injure unarmed civilians are unacceptable‖. Freedom movements should also be gauged on the same criterion. Still, absence of a comprehensive definition is a great hurdle in the success against terrorism. The academicians can help overcome this confusion; by determining the boundaries and levels of various violent acts. Everybody must not be at liberty to give his perception about such an intricate concept like terrorism and preconceptional labeling of certain events, or ideas, like terrorism, must be shunned. It would also provide a guideline for the state to enact appropriate laws and to enforce them with the backing of the large segment of the society. Terrorism has become a menace, in recent times, where the individual groups have justified their actions under one pretext or the other. The state has to locate the ―real reasons‖ of the disillusionment of a particular group; especially emphasizing on the deprivation, may it be because of poverty, lack of facilities, impression of aloofness or purely ideological. Pakistan is seen, by the international community, as a classic example where certain non-state actors and groups are indulged in perversion, betrayal and extortion. The US efforts to manage extremism, in Afghanistan, have an overspill effect on the tribal areas of Pakistan; which has further complicated the above mentioned concepts and their meanings. Most of the complexities can be resolved through developing a consensus among masses, regarding commonly accepted norms, practices, actions and national objectives. It becomes difficult for a nation to develop without acquiring internal homogeneity and coherence.

Chapter: 4 Structure and Working of Madrassa Education System in the Punjab and Pakistan

This chapter is divided in two parts; the first will, briefly, discuss the history of Madrassa Education in the Punjab in particular; taking in view the overall Pakistani environment. The second part will shed light on the structure and working of Madrassa education system in detail. All prophets- from Adam to Muhammad (PBUH) - were sent for guidance. Religions- both revealed and manmade- emphasize on making their adherents good citizens of society. These followers teach subsequent generations and the process continues to keep the teachings of religion(s) alive and under practice. Greek Sophists are considered as the first recognized teachers in the Western world. They were engaged and well paid to equip the young generations with the skills of oratory and to enlighten their vision through discussions based on Mythology, geography, astronomy and values of society. Scholars like Socrates presented a fresh perspective of prevailing socio-political norms, values and practices. Among his disciples, Plato rose to glory and advocated a new politico-social order that could replace the existing democracy that had killed his teacher. Plato is considered to be the first one to establish an educational institution named ―Academy‖ to teach these values. This practiced was continued by Aristotle, student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the great. He established his own institution, ―Lyceum‖. He put all his efforts in developing a practicable sense of politics in his student. He is often called the father of Political Science194. The contributions of the Greeks, in the development of the fields like logic, pure and social sciences are appreciated by all and sundry. Arabia was almost in dark ages at the advent of Islam. Islam changed the lifestyle of the Arabs and motivated them to seek knowledge. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) not only provided revealed knowledge to his followers but also encouraged the learning of worldly knowledge. His followers, and their successors later on, continued imparting religion to the converts as well as the young ones-enabling them to perform religious practices more accurately and helping them become productive citizens of their times. As a matter of fact,

194 M. Judd Harmon, Political Thought; From Plato to the Present (New York: Mc Graw Hill Book Company,1964.) 11-74

100 the renaissance in the West owes its intellectual roots to the Muslim civilizations in the Central Asia, the Middle East and the Northern Africa. The Muslims ensured the preservation, and communication of knowledge, through education system initially established in the mosques and then developed into a full education system; labeled as ―Madrassa‖: a place of learning195. As far as the present format of Madrassas is concerned, the credit goes to Nizam al Mulk al Tusi 1018 – 14 October 1092 AD196, 408-485 AH197. He was a counselor (Wazir) to a Saljuke king. The Saljuks had risen to power after defeating the Ghaznavides in different battles stretching from 1028-1039 AD. The Abbasid Caliph was ousted from Baghdad by the Ismaili Shia Dynasty ―The Fatimids‖. The Saljuks ousted the Fatimids out of Baghdad after being authorized by the Abbasid Caliph. The Fatimids had initiated a network for spreading their interpretations in the Middle East and the Central Asia. The Saljuks, having the services of Nizam al Mulk al Tusi at their disposal, showed devotion to the spread of Sunni Interpretations to counter the Shia influence and to enable the Muslims to perform religious duties more accurately and confidently198. He established a magnificent Madrassa ―Al Nizamiyyah‖ in Baghdad199 and organized many such Madrassas in different parts of Saljuk Dynasty rule. He was the one who organized all three basic arrangements; reading classes, mosque, for prayer, and residential facilities under one administrative control. He fixed salaries for the teachers and approved stipends for brilliant and needy students200. He also started the practice of donating property to the Madrassas to cater their financial needs on permanent basis201. The Muslim rulers, in all parts of the world, eventually followed Al Nizamiyyah and organized their educational systems according to the set up

195 Madrassa is derived from Arabic word ―Dars‖, meaning ―A place of delivering lectures‖. 196 Nizam al Mulk al Tusi, http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ei2/nizam.htm , 2, Feb, 2012. 197 Syed Suleiman Hussaini Nadvi, Hamara Nisab e Taleem Kaisa Ho (Karachi:Majlis Nashriat e Islam, 2004.) 85 198 Ahmad Shalbi, Tarekh Taleem o Tarbiat Islamia (Lahore: Idara Sakafat Islamia, 1999.) 104-105 199 Ibid 83-86 200 Riasat Ali Nadvi , Islami Nizam e Taleem 45 201 Shalbi, Tarekh Taleem o Tarbiat Islamia 104

101 initiated by Nizam al Mulk al Tusi. The Madrassa system in Pakistan is still, to greater extent, based on the same format.

4.1: Background of Madrassa Education in Indo-Pakistan Sub- Continent

“Respect for learning had always been the redeeming feature of the East”202 The history of Madrassa education is discussed briefly here; during the British rule and after independence203.

4.1.1: Madrassa Education at the advent of the British Rule in Indo- Pakistan Sub-Continent The initial British interaction with Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent was for the sole purpose of trade; executed through ―The East India Company‖. The Company was founded as ―The Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies‖204. It had been granted a ―Royal Charter‖ for twenty years, on 31st December 1600 AD, to be revised by the British Legislature. The Company was given trade rights by the then Mughal emperor Jahangir in 1608 AD205. The influence of the company grew gradually and it succeeded in establishing its control over several parts of India206.The Company, when established its control over Indo-Pakistan, introduced several politico-social steps that affected the denizens of this area. Among them was ―Resumption Act No 19 of 1793 AD‖. According to this Act, the government property, allotted prior to 1793 AD, could not be retained by the allottee unless he had a documented proof of the allotment207. Many Madrassas suffered due to this Act. They had no documented proof and subsequently were deprived of their

202 G. W. Leitner, History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2002.) i 203 For detailed history of evolution of Madrassa education system, in the Muslim countries, see Ahmad Raza Khan, Madrassa Education in the Punjab Pakistan (Unpublished MPhil Thesis) Department of Political Science G.C. University Lahore, 2007. 204 The East India Company at, http://www.theeastindiacompany.com/ , 13 March, 2012. 205 Muhammad Abdullah Malik, Tarekh e Pak o Hind (Lahore: Qureshi Brothers, 1987.) 801 206 Ibid 800-802 207 Salem, Hind o Pakistan Main Musalmanoo Ka Nizam Taleem o Tarbiat 211-215

102 possessions. It promoted a sense of hatred for the new masters and the new system. Thomas Babington Macaulay, October 1800 to December 1859 AD, was appointed as the first Law Member of the Governor-General's Council through the Government of India Act 1833. He came to India as Law member of Supreme Council of India in 1834 AD208. He was given the task of writing a report on the educational condition of India. He thus presented his ―notorious‖ report on 2nd Feb 1835 AD. He criticized the local culture as well as education systems and declared them incapable of fulfilling the needs of modern industrialized world. He emphasized on the importance of English Language as a median of instruction and as a portal to knowledge for the locals209.

4.1.2: Madrassa Education in the British India, 1859-1947 India was put under the direct control of the British Crown in 1859 AD. As a consequence, to this development, new rulers introduced many reforms, to suit their requirements of colonization. The indigenous education system was already serving the needs of the people but a parallel system was initiated to provide modern Westernized education. Within a couple of decades, the number of Government schools grew in hundreds and that of local schools, of all kinds, started reducing rapidly. The Muslims were generally not in favour of learning in Government Schools, and most importantly, English Language. There were hardly a few who not only supported the modern learning but, in spite of stiff opposition of the British learning system, took measures to facilitate new learning patterns, structure and subjects. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was the one who worked wholeheartedly for the promotion of modern knowledge among Muslims. Along with him, there were a couple of other people who took some initiatives to persuade the Muslims, of the Sub- Continent, to acquire modern education. Molana Azizuddin Dehlvi gave a ―fatwa‖ in favour of learning English language210. There was another group of

208 Syed Shabbir Bokhari , Macaulay Aur Baresghir Ka Nizam Taleem (Lahore: Ayena Adab, 1986.) 17-18 209 Ibid 25-48 For original text of his report, see ibid 61-76 210 Syed Shabbir Bokhari , Macaulay Aur Baresghir Ka Nizam Taleem (Lahore: Ayena Adab, 1986.) 90

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Muslims which was not in favour of modern system(s). They emphasized on traditional religious education and institutions like Darul Uloom Deoband, as centers of purely religious education, were established in 1864 AD211. Nadwa Tul Ulema Lucknow, a moderate institution between Darul Uloom Deoband and Aligarh University, was established in 1898212. The British did not ban religious education system(s); learning in Sanskrit, for the Hindus, and in Arabic, for the Muslims, were allowed. Consequently, the society was divided into two groups; one supporting British education system, in Government schools, and the other concentrating solely on religious education, to ensure the religious knowledge, practices and rituals.

4.1.3: Madrassa Education in the pre-Partition Punjab The Muslims first established their rule in the Punjab under Mahmood of Ghazna through his first Muslim Governor, Malik Ayaz in 1021 AD213. It remained under the Muslim rule till late 18th century when Sikhs divided it into several small states which were eventually combined by Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1799 AD214. This Sikh rule ended by the annexation of the Punjab by the British in 1849 AD. The British Government took direct control of Indo- Pakistan Sub-continent 1858- and declared it India eventually215. Mr. Arnold, the first Director Public Instructions Punjab, reported in 1856 that the locals had their indigenous education systems concentrating primarily on religious education216. Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims had their educational institutions and the Madrassas were managed through donations and trust properties217. The British established new schools and, in some cases, funded already existing schools to spread modern education; in British India including the Punjab. There were several local level small schools, ―Koran Schools‖ or ―Quran Schools‖, to impart the reading of the Holy Quran.

211 Khalid Yar Khan , Tarekh Taleem (Lahore: Urdu Markaz , 1960.) 383-384 212 Syed Noor Allah , Tarekh Taleem Hind 1800-1965 AD (Karachi: South Asian Publishers,1973.) 403 213 Muhammad Abdullah Malik, Tarekh e Pak o Hind 71-72 214 Ibid 790 215 Ibid 830 216 Salem, Hind o Pakistan Main Musalmanoo Ka Nizam Taleem o Tarbiat 187 217 Ibid 187-188

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Historical accounts show that teachers, in the rural areas, were considered as facilitators and guide- and serving them was considered as a matter of pride- and almost all the well-established villages had some sort of education system; even if it was a Quran School ―Maktab‖218. The British started patronizing some of the schools, to promote modern secular education, and also, as a parallel development, established Government schools for the same purpose.

Table 4.1: Increase in government schools and decrease in local schools (1856-1878) S No Year Local Pupils Government Pupils Government Schools Schools Expenditure 1 1856 5024 30196 456 6064 1, 28, 864 2 1870 4133 50551 1087 43080 10, 18, 640 3 1878 4662 53027 1210 54065 13, 69, 146 Source: G.W. Leitner, History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab

The table shows slight reduction in local schools, from 1856 to 1870 but an increase in the number of their pupils. The number of government schools increased significantly, almost 300%, and the number of students, in these schools, also increased immensely; almost 900% increase. It shows that a huge number of students got attracted towards the new education system and their parents were convinced about educating their young ones; particularly in the modern British school system. The British introduced their education system and practically shifted the priorities of education; for the people of the Punjab. According to Dr. G. W. Leitner, ―Education was first degraded by us from an object of mental and moral culture to a means for purely worldly ambition…. Instead of identifying them with our interests, everything in their literature

218 Leitner, History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab i-v

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which appeared ridiculous to our hasty examination was held up to tacit scorn‖219. There are several instances where the Madrassas were established by learned, throughout the Punjab. The prime Task, of these institutions, was to spread religious education primarily; along with the discussion and explanation of subjects categorized into social and pure sciences. The syllabus also included the teaching of such of such Western philosophers like Plato, Aristotle; along with subjects like mathematics and astronomy220. Lahore, being the largest city of the province, had, and still has, the greatest number of Madrassas. Several learned people established Madrassas here to impart basic principles of Islam to the new converts and young Muslims. Sheikh Tahir Lahori (Died 1040 AH 1630 AD) was a successor ―Khalifa‖ of Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, ―Hazrat Mujadad Alf Sani‖221. He established a Madrassa in, then, outskirts of Lahore, Mozang. People established their residences around his Madrassa known as ‗Miani‖ because in Punjabi ―Miana‖ means Maulvi. This Madrassa had a rich library as well. The entire area, along with the Madrassa was looted and burnt down by the Sikh looters when they captured Lahore222. This area, later on, became a graveyard and still exists in the middle of the city. Sheikh Muhammad Mir known as Mian Mir (Born in 957 AH and died on 7 Rabi ul Awal 1045 AH) shifted to Lahore in 985 AH and started a Madrassa to educate the Muslims of this area223. Sheikh Muhammad Ismail known as ―Mian Kalan‖ or ―Mian Wadda‖ (995 AH- 1085 AH) started his sermons in a mosque outside ―Mohalla Talepura‖ in Lahore. He established his Madrassa there. His pupils, studying the Holy Quran, mostly consisted of the blind and handicapped224. All the Madrassas in the Punjab were working parallel to the growing government schools. Though the social set up was much disturbed by the new economic set up and service structure, enforced by the British, yet there were many

219 Ibid ii 220 Ibid 73 221 Syed Muhammad Mian, Ulema Hind Ka Shandar Mazi,(Karachi: Maktaba Rashidia, 1991.) 1:286-290 222 Kanhaya Lal , Tarekh Lahore in , ibid 289 223 Ibid 369-373 224 Ibid 389-394

106 people who sought their salvation in acquiring religious education alone. Even today, there are many who, for some reasons, send their children to Madrassas rather than schools, imparting somewhat secular education- making people eligible for government and private sector jobs. After independence, a large number of immigrants comprised of religious graduates. They utilized their experiences and established new Madrassas in various parts of the Punjab, as well as Pakistan. Despite the fact that the society was no longer non-Muslim dominated, as was the case in united India, the Madrassas did not revise their syllabus and continued to concentrate on old syllabus which as designed to perform two basic functions; firstly to protect religious teachings in a non-Muslim dominated society and to train the converts- the art of performing religious practices ―Ibadat‖ properly.

4.1.4: Madrassa Education in the Punjab, Pakistan After the creation of Pakistan, the initial governments were insensitive to education sector, along with many other important sectors of national life. Madrassa education system remained over shadowed by the government and the private school system inspired by the British educational system of the colonial period. Most of the Madrassas did not have any permanent source of income. Charity by public and donations by a few rich people were major sources of income. Madrassas welcomed financial aid from almost every source without questioning the legitimacy of the income of the donor. The standard of education was sometimes compromised to increase the number of students225. The Madrassas established their Boards, all five headquartered in the Punjab, to register themselves according to the relevant sects. The process of registration was initiated when the governments wanted to introduce some reforms to streamline this system of education and wanted to have a reliable data regarding the number of Madrassas and their working patterns. This step highlighted the bifurcations between various sects and divided the society on sectarian grounds.

225 Information revealed during interviews and discussions with heads of various Madrassas.

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4.2: Structure and Working of Madrassas in the Punjab and Pakistan

There is a general expression about Madrassas that they are misfits in the modern society and their graduates are unable to play a productive role in the modern society. This conventional wisdom, both at domestic and international levels, about the Madrassas of Pakistan, requires a revision. People usually express their opinions, about Madrassas, based on their information collected from unquotable sources like hearsay. In most of the cases, public at large is unable to differentiate between various categories and levels of Madrassas. What they mostly know is that Madrassas are based on ―Sectarian Differences‖ and produce extremists who are geared to forcibly convert, whoever comes across, to their own frame of mind. Had it been the case, the millions of Madrassa graduates, since independence, would have transformed a major chunk of the population as their staunch supporters. But this is not the case. Therefore, there is a dire need to discuss the structure and working of the Madrassas in detail- in order to educate ourselves about the truth and apropos state of affairs relating to Madrassas in Pakistan. Madrassa system in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent redirected its pace after the establishment of the British Rule in India in 1859 AD. It was dedicated solely to religious education, in order to protect the religion from the onslaught of Westernization. After independence in 1947, the education system remained primarily westernized. The government run schools, as well as the private schools continued the British educational system of the colonial period. The government did not initiate any effort, of any significance, to improve the inherited education system. The bureaucratic approach of resisting change, maintaining status quo and ‗strictly‘ following the already set rules, did not enable the newly born country to groom its new generations; enabling them to face new challenges and perform new duties assigned to them due to changed political and social setup. The old educational setup, incidentally, was not geared for character building or preservation of indigenous values or

108 customs. Rather, it was developed to produce workers for the colonial machinery. The Madrassas, too, did not show any intention to reform their system and were not interested in rearranging the existing set up. They continued the same curriculum and syllabi, which were adopted to counter the then prevailing socio-cultural problems. They ought to have revised the religious education system that could reassign the new duties of social harmony and personality enhancement to the graduates- enabling them to perform social duties more efficiently and productively. Rather, their emphasis remained on producing exclusive experts in religious education. They were good in their brand of religion but remained deficient in other socio-economic performances226. Soon after independence, the differences between the two main schools of thought, in Sunni Islam, Ahl Sunnat and Deobandi, which had minor interpretational variations not even differences, became vast due to clashes in political interests. These differences, however, grew with the passage of time and gave way to many shades of opinions; thus, resulting in the formation of Jamiat Ulema Pakistan, out of Jamiat Ulema Islam of Molana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani in 1948227. These political differences found sociological basecamps in the shape of sect based Madrassa Boards. Consequently, a never ending race started between the major Madrassa Boards to increase and showoff their socio-political influence the country and enhance the number of affiliated Madrassas, to acquire ever shifting first position based on maximum number of affiliated Madrassas. This race of becoming biggest Madrassa Board and thus asserting its influence on the governments, provincial and central, still continues in the country. To better understand the conditions and circumstances prevailing in the Madrassas of Pakistan in general and of the Punjab in particular, it is appropriate to discuss the structure and working of Madrassas in some detail- also highlighting various governmental attempts to reform this system.

226 For detailed discussion see, Ahmad Raza Khan, Madrassa Education in Punjab (Unpublished M Phil Thesis) Department of Political Science, G.C. University Lahore, 2007. 227 For details see Chapter 5, ―Politicization of Madrassas‖.

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4.2.1: Structure of Madrassas Islam emphasizes on the principle of brotherhood, among fellow Muslims, but despite all the teachings of the Holy Quran and, efforts by, the Holy Prophet (PBUH), the Ulema, and subsequently their Madrassas, are still divided on interpretational differences. These interpretational variations are so deep rooted, due to certain reasons, that the identification of a Muslim as a ―follower‖ of Allah and the Holy Prophet (PBUH) has become problematic. The Muslims are, generally, identified into two groups; Shia and Sunni sects. Sunnis have further subdivisions as; Ahl Sunnat Wal Jamat, Deobandi and Ahl Hadis (Salafi) sub-groups. Even Jamat-e-Islami, a group proclaiming to be non-sectarian but , at the same time, appreciating and, staunchly, following the explanations and interpretations given by Maulana Maududi, also appears to be much closer of Deobandi orientations and explanations228. Consequently, the Madrassas are also divided on the same sectarian lines and so are their registering and degree awarding boards. There are different figures, given by various writers, regarding the number of Madrassas in Pakistan, during different periods of history. Before discussing them, it is appropriate to mention, province wise population and estimation till 2010229. It would help understand the growth patterns in the Madrassas and their linkage with growth in the population.

228 Opinion based on observation of their literature and their support and resistance to certain religious practices; which are used as criterion, by people, to determine the ideological moorings of Sunni Muslims. Apart from that, some of their Madrassas were established and are still run by pro Deobandi ideas teachers. The main board of Darul Uloom Fauz Ul Quran, Shinka, Hazro district Attock, read ―Founded by Molana Muhammad Ayub, graduate of Darul Uloom Deoband‖. Visit to the Madrassa on 4-April- 2012. 229 Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, Population Census Organization, Letter No, 8(2)/2011-PCO(C), dated, 10th October, 2011, Appendix (F)

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Table 4.2: 1951-1998 Census Population and Estimated Population as on 5th March 2010 (Pakistan and Punjab only) Year Population Increase in Population Increase in In Punjab in Pakistan Population in Punjab Population out of Pakistan 1951 33,740,167 - 20,540,762 - 60% 1961 42,880,378 27% 25,463,974 24% 59.38% 1972 65,309,340 52% 37,607,432 47.68% 57.58% 1981 84,253,644 29% 47,292,441 25.75% 56% 1998 132,352,279 57% 73,621,290 55.67% 55.62% 2000 138,007,615 10% 76,716,981 4.2% 55.58% 2010 166,284,297 20.48% 92,195,434 20.17% 55.44% Source: Letter No, 8(2)/2011-PCO(C) Appendix (F) (Table Compiled by Researcher)

Table 4.2 shows that the population increase has been almost consistent, with minor variations only. As far as the share of the Punjab is concerned, amazingly, the ratio is on a slight decrease, but still keeping the Punjab on the top, in population, in foreseeable future. The following discussion will be made on the basis of these figures and percentages. The effort will be to analyze the growth of Madrassas, particularly in proportion with the ever increasing population, in Pakistan generally and in the Punjab particularly. Professor Hafiz Nazar Ahmad, in his book, “Pakistan Main Deeni Madaris Ka Mukhtasir Jaiza”, has given a count of Madrassas in Pakistan from 1947 to1979.

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Table 4.3: Number of big Registered Madrassas in Pakistan from 1947 to 1979 S No Year Number of Increase Increase in Percentage Madrassas 1 1947 137 - - 2 1950 244 107 78% 3 1960 671 430 176% 4 1972 893 222 33% 5 1979 1000 107 12% Source: Hafiz Nazar Ahmad ,Pakistan Main Deeni Madaris Ka Mukhtasir Jaiza, in, Saleem Mansoor Khalid ,(ed), Deeni Madaris Ka Nizam Taleem (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies,1987.) 26 (Percentages added by the researcher)

Table 4.3 shows that the highest increase ratio, 176%, was during 1950s. It was the time when the population was growing rapidly, Table 4.1, and several immigrant Ulema were also establishing their Madrassas230. The ratio was also high, 78%, in the first 3 years of independence, 1947-1950, for the only reason that all the Ulema who migrated from India established their Madrassas in various parts of the country. Likewise, 1960s also witnessed somewhat high growth rate, 33%, because the fresh graduates of Madrassas spread all over the country to disseminate religious education, and to perform several religious duties. Muhammad Qasim Zaman has compiled a, district wise, table of growth in the number of Madrassas; in the Punjab, 1975-94

230 Migration from India, to Pakistan, was allowed, to Muslims, till mid-1950s.

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Table 4.4: Division Wise Number of Madrassas in the Punjab (1975-1994) S No Division 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 1 Bahawalpur 278 417 598 795 883 2 D. G. Khan 153 217 297 363 411 3 Multan 45 102 179 212 325 4 Lahore 75 120 170 219 323 5 Rawalpindi 58 85 119 157 169 6 Sargodha 75 98 130 148 149 7 Gujranwala 52 66 96 131 140 8 Faisalabad - - - - 112 Total 736 1105 1589 2025 2512 Sources: Zindagi (Lahore: 17 February 1995), 39; The News (Islamabad: 7 March 1995)231

Though these figures have discuss a period a period of almost two decades, and they are two decades old as well, yet they shed light on the most excessively discussed period; the1980s. The number of Madrassas almost doubled in almost all divisions of the Punjab from 1980 to 1990. Incidentally, the population also increased at an alarming 55.67% rate. Dr. Saleem Hamid Ali has developed a table, in his book, indicating the increase in the number of Madrassas in various parts of the country, during different phases of history.

231 Zindagi (Lahore: 17 February 1995), 39; The News (Islamabad: 7 March 1995), 11, in, Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi`i and Sunni Identities Modern Asian Studies 32, 3 (1998) 689-716, at, http://www.zmo.de/dietrich/Sectarianism.pdf , 18- Oct-2012.

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Table 4.5: Number of Madrassas in Pakistan (1947-2000) S No Province/Region 1947 1960 1980 1988 2000 1 Punjab 121 195 1012 1320 3153 2 NWFP 59 87 426 678 1281 3 Sindh 21 87 380 291 905 4 Baluchistan 28 70 135 347 692 5 A J Kashmir 4 8 29 76 151 6 Islamabad - 1 27 47 96 7 Northern Areas 12 16 47 102 185 8 F A T A - - - - 300 Total 245 464 2056 2861 6761 Source: Saleem H. Ali, Islam and Education: Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan‟s Madrassahs (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009.) 27

Table 4.5 clearly states the fact that the perpetual growth in the number of Madrassas, during first thirty years, was due to increase in population, and decrease in governmental efforts to provide educational facilities to the growing number of people, as the growth rate was relatively higher in urban/settled areas of the country. The data shows that the number of Madrassas increased rapidly after 1980 in Baluchistan, Azad Kashmir, Islamabad and Northern Areas. They continued increasing even after 1988; defying the conventional wisdom. The ratio of increase in numbers is relatively higher in urban areas (Islamabad and Punjab). The problem with the data, regarding Madrassas, is so confusing that one can easily get astray due to substantial difference in the figures given by various writers and researchers. The Madrassa system is organized under a set format. There are five boards of Madrassas that represent their interpretational variations (sects) and register the likeminded Madrassas if and when they fulfill certain requirements, structural improvements and hiring of qualified staff, just to ensure the maintenance of a certain standard of education.

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Table 4.6: List of Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan S No Estd. Name of the Board Orientation Head Office 1 1955 Wafaq Al Madaris Ahl Hadis, Jamia Salafia Al Salafia Wahabi Faisalabad 2 1959 Wafaq Al Madaris Shia, Fiqa Jamia Al Muntazar Al Shia Jafria Model Town Lahore 3 1959 Wafaq Al Madaris Deobandi Khair-Ul Madaris & Al Arabia Garden Town Multan 4 1960 Tanzeem-Ul- Barelvi: Ahl- House No 8 Ravi Road Madaris Ahl e-Sunnat- (Near Minar-e-Pakistan) Sunnah Wal Jamat Lahore 5 1983 Rabta Tul Madaris Jamat Islami Mansoora Lahore Al Islamia Source: Information collected by the Researcher from the offices of Madrassa Boards and some of their publications.

Most of these boards were initiated after governmental efforts to regularize the Madrassas after 1959 Education Committee Report. The Government of Pakistan awarded recognition to the Degrees of the Madrassa if it was awarded by a Board after conducting exams on a set format. The degrees of Madrassa Boards were given recognition through an ―Equivalence‖ letter by University Grants Commission (UGC), now HEC, issued on 17- November- 1982. The post graduate degrees of Madrassas were declared equal to M.A. Arabic/Islamic Studies232. The idea was to make them eligible to acquire jobs in teaching fields or to further pursue their studies in Arabic/Islamic Studies233. Higher Education Commission (HEC) has issued a new directive on 12 May 2004, according to which, ―Shahadat Aalmia‖ can be considered equal to M.A. Arabic/ Islamic Studies only if the student has

232 For details see Appendix (E) 233 Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996.) p 320,

115 passed all four exams, Aama, Khasa, Aalia and Aalmia, with two years period in between, and from a recognized board of Madrassas234. According to some writers this equivalence plan put traditional graduates at par with the formal graduates and enhanced job opportunities for Madrassa graduates. That is one of the reasons for booming growth in Madrassa Graduates in late 1980s and later in 1990s235. There are five Madrassa Boards in Pakistan. All have been given degree awarding status by HEC. They are; 1. Rabta-tul-Madaris Al Islamia (Jamat Islami) (Mansoora Multan Road Lahore) 2. Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Ahl Sunnat (Barelvi: Ahl-e-Sunnat-wa-al-Jamat) (8 Ravi Road, Lahore) 3. Wafaq Al Madaris Al- Arabia (Deobandi) (Khairul Madaris & Garden town Multan) 4. Wafaq Al Madaris Al-Salafia (Ahl Hadis, Wahabi) (Jamia Salafia Faisalabad) 5. Wafaq Al Madaris Shia (Shia, Jafria) (Jamia Al Muntazar Model Town Lahore)

Apart from these boards, five Madrassas, four in the Punjab, are also authorized by HEC to award Degrees, independently. Table 4.7: Independent Degree Awarding Madrassas S No Name of Madrassa Orientation City/Place 1 Dar-Ul-Uloom Muhammadia Ahl-e-Sunnat Bhera District Ghausia Sargodha 2 Jamia Islamia Minhaj-Ul-Quran Ahl-e-Sunnat 366 M Model town Lahore 3 Jamia Ashrafia Deobandi Ferozepur Road Lahore 4 Jamia Taleemat Islamia Ahl Hadis Sargodha Road Faisalabad

234 HEC letter no (8-16HEC/A&A/2004) issued on 12 May 2004. Appendix (E) 235 Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan 295

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The Madrassas have long adopted the syllabus ―Dars Nizami‖, devised by Mullah Nizamuddin Sehalvi Farangi Mehli (Lucknow); died 1748 AD. Before 1857, there were more than one syllabi. Shah Waliullah (1703-1762 AD) devised a syllabus for his Madrassa, ―Rahimiyya‖, where great emphasis was laid upon imparting philosophy, medicine, Algebra, Mathematics and Metaphysics along with Hadis, Fiqh, Arabic language and grammar236. The idea was to produce enlightened and capable citizens. This syllabus was continued for a while but was later replaced by ‗Dars Nizami‘ to counter sociocultural influences in post 1857 period.

Table 4.8: Levels of Dars Nizami S No Course/Degree Duration Equivalence 1 Mutwasita 3 years Middle 2 Aama 2 years Matriculation 3 Khasa 2 years Intermediate 4 Aalia 2 years Baccalaureate 5 Almia 2 years Post Graduate M.A.

There is a need to differentiate between the ‗Maktab‘ and the Madrassa. Maktab is a place where only the recitation of the Holy Quran is taught. It can be visual or verbal, (Nazra or Hifz respectively) and Madrassa is a place where Islamic jurisprudence (Dars Nizami) is taught along with Arabic Language. The students are eligible to take admission in Dars Nizami classes only after passing the primary level examination from ordinary schools; fifth grade237. The syllabus of Madrassas is almost the same; The Holy Quran, with the capability to translate it and understand the spirit of the injunctions, revealed in it, and Hadis, sayings and actions of Holy Prophet (PBUH). Rest is just commentary; explanatory material. All Sunni Boards have almost 90%

236 Syed Suleiman Hussaini Nadvi, Hamara Nisab e Taleem Kaisa Ho (Karachi: Majlis Nashriat Islam, 2004.) 92 237 Information provided by Madrassa Boards and pamphlets and monographs distributed by the boards of Madrassas.

117 same syllabus. The only difference lies with some Shia Madrassas (as explained in the following paragraphs). Broadly speaking, one may differentiate the Madrassas into three major levels.

Table 4.9: Levels of Madrassas S No Level Courses/Degrees taught 1 Elementary Mutwasita to Aama 2 Secondary Aama to Khasa 3 Higher Aalia to Almia and ―Daura Hadis‖ Takhasus

Elementary level Madrassas serve as nurseries to prepare students for higher level learning institutions. These are relatively higher in number as they do not have to fulfill too many compulsions of Boards for registration. Secondary level Madrassas are the ones greatest in number as the number of students is relatively higher at this level and again the compulsions of the Madrassa Boards are not very hard to fulfill, as compared to those imposed on a Madrassa before getting registered as High level institution. Higher level Madrassas have better building structures and relatively improved boarding facilities. They offer higher level degrees but also have middle level classes. Elementary level classes are usually arranged either in separate campuses or in separate blocks. The following table shows the number of Madrassas (including Maktab), teachers and students in Pakistan.

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Table 4.10: Approximate Number of Registered Madrassas and Students (including Maktabs) in Pakistan S No Name of the Madrassa Affiliated Teach Students *Projected Board Madrassas ers Students 1 Rabta-tul-Madaris Al 883 2708 49534 1,10,000 Islamia 2 Tanzeem Ul Madaris 7000 26380 593718 13,00,000 Ahl Sunnat 3 Wafaq Al Madaris Al- 14054 55000 700000 15,00,000 Arabia** 4 Wafaq Al Madaris Al- 338 1475 38713 85,000 Salafia 5 Wafaq Al Madaris Shia 310 1800 16000 33,000 6 Jamat Al Daawaa*** 33 - 1200 2700 7 Jamia Muhammadia 250 1000 23000 23000 Bhera**** 8 Jamia Islamia Minhaj- 11 200 2700 2700 Ul-Quran**** 9 Jamia Ashrafia 20 - 3000 3000 10 Jamia Taleemat Islamia 1 20 150 150 Total 17822 88583 14,26,815 30,56,850 Source: Information collected from various Madrassa Boards and their publications till Dec 2013. * There is no authentic data about exact number of students in Madrassas, nor can be any. As the Madrassa Boards can only provide the number of students appearing in their final exams, in any given year238.

238 The students appear in the final exam of the Madrassa Board in the second year of every degree. They have to pass the final exam of the first year, of their degree, within the Madrassa. Thus they remain out of any student calculation and will remain uncalculated unless Madrassa Boards collect information from all their affiliated Madrassas or someone visits all the Madrassas of Pakistan and collects data of students. The total number of these, in-house student is more than the ones appearing in the final Madrassa Board exam because Mutwasita is of three years and the students remain in-house students for two consecutive years and still some do not appear in the final exam because they do not feel prepared fully or are not allowed to take the final exam due to their less preparedness. Therefore, a projected number of students is presented to give a more accurate count.

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** Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia did not provide any information or support, directly or indirectly. Their data was collected from their website or some other sources; with the help and efforts of some personal friends in Deobandi Madrassas. ***Jamat Al Daawaa is not recognized as a board by the government of Pakistan. Its head office is at ―Jamia Al Daawaa Al Islamia‖, registered with Wafaq Salafia, at Muridke (near Lahore). Its syllabus varies from that of other Madrassa Boards. ****All four Independent Degree Awarding Madrassas have several affiliated Madrassas, and Maktabs, with them.

All Madrassa Boards have almost same format of class room lecturing and examinations. The only variations lie in Shia Madrassas where teacher‘s certification is given importance for promotion into the next level of learning. As far as Shia Board, Wafaq Al Madaris Shia is concerned; they have the same two year degree program like other Boards. The students intending to get HEC recognized degrees have to follow the relevant Madrassa Board rules which are same for every Board The students who want to appear in Madrassa board exams; have to follow the rules set by the HEC for all Madrassa boards. The Madrassas are moving on a constant pace and in the designed direction. These directions do need some refinement. The problem is that whatever Madrassas require, the government is unable to provide and whatever the government demands, the Madrassas are unable to comply with. The debate regarding Madrassa reforms is due to a delusion associated to it, by both the government and Madrassa administration. The government and other funding and funded agencies are unable to clarify their intentions to Madrassa establishment. The Madrassa people apprehend such reforms as an attempt to alienate the existing format and structure of Madrassas. They take these attempts as efforts for ‗replacement‘. While the government must communicate effectively that the efforts are for improvement. 4.2.2: Working of Madrassas The Madrassa system, in Pakistan generally and in the Punjab particularly, was continued by various religious scholars on the same format

120 as was adopted after 1857, with an idea to protect Islamic teaching from European cultural invasion- as envisaged by then Ulema of united India. Independence of Pakistan however gave birth to a new social setup. Pakistan comprised of Muslim majority areas where people had religious understanding, to some extent, and their faith structure was definitely not under threat of extinction or of mass influencing by the non-Muslim or even Hindu socio cultural dominance. Though there were many Hindu practices which had got lateral entry into those of the Muslims yet they could best be sifted out quite easily by inculcating the Islamic practices and beliefs. The Madrassas could work as a sieve and the siftings could be strained out of Pakistani society. Unfortunately, the Madrassa organizers did not acquire the role of a mass character building institution. They continued imparting religious education, with great emphasis on interpretational differentiation. The political opportunities and, subsequently, the activities of some religious leaders had more negative impacts on the spirit of Madrassa system than the positive ones. Under these circumstances, the Madrassas, despite almost same syllabus, have acquired various responsibilities in the society. There are some members of clergy who are not much interested in political activities unless it was a matter of great religious significance- for them at least. They step into political arena only when the matter is too serious to ignore and their faith is either challenged or threatened. Situations like ―Khatm-e-Nabuwat‖ (Ahmadi Conflict) or ―Blasphemy‖ compel them to step forward and utilize all the resources in hand to get things done. They deploy all the power and potentials and follow ―All out‖ strategy239. Such were considered, and eventually labeled as, ―Do or Die‖ situations. Apart from these non-political Ulema, there is a handsome number of Ulema who consider participation in political activities as an opportunity to implement Islamic laws in the country. They might have influenced the decision makers and could have convinced the people of Pakistan, to support

239 The UK, during Falkland War1982, sent all Sea harriers, to attack the invading Argentinian forces, unlike military SOP; saving some assets for strategic and structural requirements. For details see, I counted them all out and I counted them all in, at, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1340166/I-counted-I-counted-BBC-reporter-Brian- Hanrahan-dies-aged-61.html, 25-Apr-2012.

121 them in implementation of Islamic edicts- as they thought they should be- had they been united amongst themselves and unanimous in their plan of action. They, on the contrary, remain divided and indifferent from each other. Their greatest emphasis always was, still is and perhaps always will be unfortunately, on the projection and implementation of interpretational variations; sectarian differences. That is why they could not apply pressure, convincingly, on the decision makers and were unable to convince people, to win their support, for them in elections due to the absence of unanimously acceptable set of religious practices. Incidentally, the two major sects in Pakistan; Ahl Sunnat and Deobandi do not have clear bifurcation among the political and non-political Ulema. Both have their Madrassas affiliated with their relevant boards. It is not easy to differentiate them on structural basis. The only yardstick is the personal activities of those Ulema. Still this research has tried to identify certain indicators to facilitate the readers and researchers in their quest to differentiate various Ulema on the basis of their regular political activities. On the basis of these activities, one may differentiate political Ulema from non- Political Ulema. The following table highlights the activity patterns of such Ulema as may be labeled as ―Political Ulema‖ or ―non-Political Ulema‖.

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Table: 4.11: Activities Based Classification of Political and non-Political Ulema S No Activities Political Ulema Non-Political Ulema 1 Past Leaders Political Leaders Religious academicians Owned and scholars 2 Achievements Constitutional & Academics and social Cherished Legal Reform 3 Call to people Political rallies Learning and serving humanity 4 Alliances Political groups Academics and social reform groups 5 Opinion on Political Regularly Hardly ever issues 6 Supporting or Essentially Reluctantly opposing Govt. 7 Protests and For Political Faith related issues only demonstrations objectives 8 Affiliation with Permanent Hardly ever Political Parties 9 Contesting Elections Regularly Never permanently * * The only event when several non-Political Ulema participated in practical politics was PNA movement during 1977 Elections.

Most of the Ulema, incidentally, do not accept this bifurcation among them. Hussain Ahmad Madni, in a meeting held at the Madrassa of Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, opted for active participation in politics during Khilafat Movement; unlike Maulana Thanvi who was not in favour of such activities and wanted to concentrate on imparting religious education and character building240. This was a turning point in Deobandi Ulema. Even today, Thanvi Ulema do not favour participation in political activities, directly or even indirectly. They declare political affiliation, and voting, a personal matter of all the persons related to their Madrassas. The administration has nothing to do

240 Qari Rashid Ahmad Thanvi, Mumtahin, Jamia Lahore Islamia, Allama Iqbal Town Lahore, in discussion with the researcher, on 17-Dec-2011.

123 with such activities. Rather, political propagation and motivation are prohibited within Madrassa premises241. The political Ulema were, and still are; either associated with Madrassas or even have established some for their own. Apart from these historical enactments of objective oriented Madrassas, another type of so called Madrassa emerged and spread rapidly during 1980s when global anti- communism campaign got an objective; ―defeat Soviet Union in Afghanistan". It will be unjust to ignore this functional differentiation among Madrassas. Similarity of name must not confuse the researchers anymore. Unfortunately the researchers in the past did not, or could not; differentiate between the various categories of Madrassas on the functional basis. They either bracketed all the Madrassas, structurally or apparently same, into one category and applied their conclusions, regarding CIA/ISI Madrassas, on the rest of the lot and rang alarm bells on immense increase in the number of Madrassas; without realizing the fact that most of them were state sponsored activity- unlike the traditional Madrassas which are public enterprises242.

241 Qari Rashid Ahmad Thanvi, Ibid 242 Most of the researches making a hue and cry about mushroom growth of Madrassas, particularly in NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and FATA, could not realize the fact that these were merely training centers established by CIA/ISI to train and transform Afghan Refugees into Mujahedeen to fuel Afghan war in 1980s. For details see, Dr. Fazal Raheem Marwat, Politics of Aid: From Mohajir to Mujahid (Peshawar: Islamic Research Institute, University of Peshawar, 2005.)

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Jamal Malik has given a count of Madrassas from 1960 to 1983/84243.

Table: 4.12: Number of Madrassas in Pakistan and in the Punjab till 1983/84 (According to Jamal Malik) S Orientatio 1960 1960 1971 1971 1979 1979 1983/84 1983/84 No n Pakis Punja Pakis Punja Paki Punja Pakista Punjab tan b tan b stan b n 1 Deobandi 233 - 292 173 354 198 1097 353 60% 56% 32% 2 Barelvi 98 - 123 93 267 197 557 466 76% 74% 84% 3 Ahl-e- 55 - 47 42 126 122 76 43 Hadis 90% 97% 57% 4 Shia 18 - 15 13 41 38 116 54 87% 93% 47% 5 Jamat-e- 13 6 41 14 57 20 107 37 Islami 46% 34% 35% 35% 6 No Data 55 - 390 244 900 437 - - 63% 48% Total 472 6 908 579 174 1012* 1953 953 64% 5* 58% 49% Source: Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996.) p198 (Tables 34 (A & B) combined) (Jamal Malik has given details of data on the basis; whether registered or not, along with the sources for each figure. This research includes maximum digit from each column. The percentage is added by the researcher and increased to the nearest round figure.) * Data as per Halepota Report of 1979. Jamal Malik has also used the same data.

The pattern of increase in the number of Madrassas is quite evident in this table. Though it is till 1984 still the figures are authentic and so is the research by Jamal Malik. Let us discuss the development patterns in different Boards of Madrassas, one by one, in Pakistan generally and in the Punjab particularly. The effort is to find out reasons for specific pattern and influences of these patterns on the society. The percentages mentioned here are out of total Madrassas linked with a specific Board instead of total number of Madrassas present in the province.

243 Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan 198

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4.2.2.1: Madrassas in the Punjab It is necessary to discuss the growth patterns of Madrassas, affiliated with various Madrassa Boards, in order to understand their preferences and activities and to stratify them on strong grounds. 4.2.2.1.1: Deobandi Madrassas There is not so significant increase in the number of Madrassas in Pakistan. From 233 in 1960, they increased to 292 in 1971(only 59 in ten years). The number rose to 354 in Pakistan till 1979(only 62 in ten years). While, the number of Madrassas jumped to 1097 till 1984 (745 in just five years). The precipitous increase in Deobandi Madrassas strengthens the argument that the boom was not to cater the expanding population but was intended and funded by non-Madrassa elements. Incidentally, this increase was not in densely populated areas. Rather the pattern was, amazingly, in reverse in the Punjab. In 1971, 60% Deobandi Madrassas were located in the Punjab but till 1979, the ratio dropped to 56% and in 1984 there were merely 32% Deobandi Madrassas in the Punjab. It shows that the number of Deobandi Madrassas was increasing rapidly but not in densely populated province; the Punjab. 4.2.2.1.2: Barelvi Madrassas In 1960, there were 233 Barelvi Madrassas in Pakistan. Figures for the Punjab are not available; therefore the growth patterns can be analyzed from 1971 onwards. In 1971 there were One Hundred and Twenty Three Barelvi Madrassas in Pakistan. Out of which, Ninety Three (76%) were in the Punjab. In 1979, this number increased to Two Hundred and Sixty Seven in Pakistan. Out of which, One Hundred and Ninety Seven (74% of their total) were in the Punjab. Later on, in 1984, the number of Barelvi Madrassas increased to Five Hundred and Fifty Seven in Pakistan, out of which, Four Hundred and Sixty Six (84%) were in the Punjab. It clearly indicates that Deobandi Madrassas were increasing in the areas which were experiencing population explosion. 4.2.2.1.3: Jamat-e-Islami This religious Political party has always been active in Politics since its establishment in 1941(discussed in detail at the end of this chapter). It has its own Madrassa Board, established in 1983 (the days of decadence of

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Madrassa repute). It had Thirteen Madrassas, in Pakistan, in 1960. Six of them (46%) were in the Punjab. This number rose to Forty One, in Pakistan and Fourteen (34%) in the Punjab, till 1971. While in 1979, they had Fifty Seven Madrassas in Pakistan and only Twenty (35%) of them were in the Punjab. By 1984, the number rose to One Hundred and Seven in Pakistan; with Thirty Seven (35%) of them in the Punjab. This tendency shows that the Jamat was keeping pace with the increasing population but the other factor is highlighted in the following paragraphs, where the growth of Jamat-e-Islami related Madrassas, in NWFP and Baluchistan, is discussed. Shia Madrassas and Ahl Hadis Madrassas have almost same growth patterns and were increasing in numbers in all provinces of Pakistan on almost same ratio. 4.2.2.2: N.W.F.P. (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) The important thing to discuss is the growth pattern of Deobandi and Jamat-e-Islami Madrassas, along with comparative analysis of Barelvi Madrassas, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. This might enable the readers to understand the causes behind this unnatural growth in ‗educational institutions‘ that can be best productive in the areas where population is increasing rapidly; providing nursery for them. Deobandi Madrassas increased, both in numbers and percentage, in NWFP. In 1971 there were Sixty Two Deobandi Madrassas in NWFP (out of, their, total 292 in Pakistan). The number increased to Sixty Nine in 1979 (out of, their, total 354 in Pakistan) and multiplied to one hundred and eight (out of their total 1097 in Pakistan) till 1984244. Jamat-e-Islami had only two Madrassas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, (then NWFP); out of their thirteen total Madrassas in Pakistan, in 1960. The number rose to Forty One in Pakistan with only Five in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, till 1971. In 1979, however, Twenty One, out of total Fifty Seven in Pakistan, were in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This number doubled and Jamat had One Hundred and Seven Madrassas in Pakistan while Forty One in NWFP till 1984245. The point to note is that it had only Thirty Seven Madrassas in the Punjab in 1984. This

244 Ibid Tables 34 (A) and 34 (D) 198-199 245 Ibid Tables 34 (A) and 34 (D) 198-199

127 growth ratio points out the role of Jamat-e-Islami in areas that were crawling with Afghan Refugees. 4.2.2.3: The Baluchistan Increase in specific Madrassas is also interesting to note in Baluchistan. Despite the fact that Baluchistan is the most scarcely populated area in the country, Deobandi Madrassas were mushrooming at more than double ratio than that of Barelvi Madrassas there. There were only 15 Deobandi Madrassas, as against 14 Barelvi Madrassas, in Baluchistan in 1971. The number of Deobandi Madrassas rose to 20, as compared to 12 Barelvi ones, till 1979; (only 5 in almost a decade). But, it jumped to 163, as against only 23 Barelvi Madrassas, till 1984; 800% increase in merely 5 years246. Jamat-e-Islami, despite their handsome strength in urban areas and densely populated areas of the Punjab, also worked as an ―avant-garde247‖ in NWFP and Baluchistan. It had only 13 Madrassas in Pakistan and only 2 in Baluchistan, while there was only 1 Barelvi Madrassa there in 1960. The number rose to 5 in Baluchistan, while having total 41 in Pakistan, with only 14 of Barelvi Madrassas in Baluchistan, in 1971. Till 1979, there were only 6 Madrassas in Baluchistan, with 12 Barelvi ones. But, during the period of decadence of Madrassa culture, the number of Jamat-e-Islami Madrassas doubled to 13in Baluchistan, with 23 Barelvi Madrassas, till 1984248. Now a consolidated look at the data shows that Barelvi and Jamat-e- Islami Madrassas doubled during 1979-84 period but, Deobandi Madrassas witnessed 800% increase in its Madrassas; in an area which never witnessed heavy population growth rate ever. One may say; there were more Deobandi Madrassas, teachers and administrators, and less Baluchs to study in them. Obviously these places were established to ‗entertain‘ Afghan Refugees249. This growth was not due to population increase but only to induct Afghan Refugees. These figures do not include unregistered Madrassas as no Madrassa Board had any record about such institutions. Ironically, the

246 Ibid Tables 34 (A) and 34 (E) 198-199 247 An artist with new ideas. Title given to it by Jamal Malik in, Ibid 197 248 Ibid Tables 34 (A) and 34 (E) 198-199 249 Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat has discussed, in detail how Afghan Refugees were transformed into Mujahideen through such places, in his book, Fazal-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Parvez Khan Toru, From Muhajir to Mujahid: Politics of War through Aid

128 government, at that time, was also not serious about their enrollment or stratification. As far as financial matters of Madrassas are concerned, various patterns are found in different periods of history. In 1960s Ayub Khan, on the recommendations of the ―Commission on National Education: January-August 1959‖250, initiated reformatory steps in formal and religious education. The Madrassa organizers got together and took some reformative steps by themselves. Among establishment of regulatory mechanisms and syllabi improvements, some finance related initiatives were also taken. Earlier Madrassas relied mostly on rural support, but in 1960s, urban merchant class was given access to Madrassa management and thus collection of funds became easy and the Madrassas could expand in rapidly expanding cities251. During 1980s, apart from ‗sponsored Madrassas‘ the growth rate is at pace with the population growth. Among many other reasons for this increase in number of Madrassas, government‘s inability to entertain the requirements of people, in education sector and other walks of life, is also played an important role. ―This was a time of State withdrawal from all services and a corresponding phenomenal growth is seen in private institutions and NGOs as well‖252. Apart from personal deductions, research reports like, "Philanthropy in Pakistan: A Report of the Initiative on Indigenous Philanthropy", also highlight the public tendency of donations and charity, considering it a social as well as a religious duty, in Pakistan253. According to Mufti Naeem of Jamia Binoria Karachi, ―We do not want to divulge our sources as many individuals who fund us do not want their charitable ventures to be made public‖254. The personality and social status of Ulema also plays a vital role in enhancing, or even reducing, the collections. The Ulema, in most of the

250 Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Report of the Commission on National Education: January-August 1959 Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1961. 251 Mumtaz Ahmad, Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh at, http://www.globalwebpost.com/farooqm/study_res/bangladesh/mumtaz_madrassah.pdf, 4-Oct-2012 252 Khalid Rahman and R. Bukhari, quoted in, Sajjad, Madrasas in Pakistan: thinking beyond terrorism-based reforms 253 Philanthropy in Pakistan: A Report of the Initiative on Indigenous Philanthropy", Aga Khan Development Network, August 2000, sec. 4, p. 44, quoted in, ibid 254 Mufti Naeem of Jamia Binoria Karachi, quoted in, Zofeen Ebrahim, Religious Schools - Boon or Bane? at, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41714, 4-Oct-2012.

129 cases, are easily accessible and their lifestyles are also open to everybody for analysis. The mosque plays a vital role in several social activities. Apart from that, the religiosity of people also motivates them to contribute in the promotion and imparting of religion. That is why; chances of corruption and embezzlements are minimum in Madrassa expenditures255. Such high social status and respect enables Ulema to manage the affairs of Madrassas, both financial and social, effectively. The respect for them and religiosity of people play an important role in arranging funds for Madrassas. Thus the Madrassas, working in Pakistan generally and it the Punjab particularly, need to be classified, on the basis of their activities and preferences, and should be discussed separately, from each other.

4.3: Reforming the Madrassa system There have been several attempts to reform and refine Madrassas system. Some were effective to some extent but most of them remained incapable to even win a support among the Ulema. Unfortunately, most of the initial education policies, in Pakistan, did not give much significance to the discussion about Madrassa education system. Their emphasis was, mostly, on reforming general education system and institutions. Incidentally, all the policies, from 1947 to date, intended to develop an indigenous education system with main emphasis on character building, promoting nationhood, strengthening oriental values and, above all, producing graduates that can coup with the demands of modern times. All this was envisaged to be done with in the ―Islamic‖ perspective256. The academicians, in Pakistan, are also not much informed about the true state of affairs in Madrassas. Their impetuous has been on general education institutions. ―Generally scholars and educational professionals have a very weak understanding of even the basic dimensions of the madrassah‖257.

255 Sajjad, Madrasas in Pakistan: thinking beyond terrorism-based reforms 256 Anjum Rahmani, Pakistan Main Taleem: Aik Tahqeqi Jaiza ( Lahore: Pakistan Writers Cooperative Society, 2006.) 143-210 257 Christopher Candland, Pakistan‘s recent experience in reforming Islamic Education, at, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FinalPDF.pdf , 18-Oct-2012.

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The government schemes, and strategies, are discussed here; with reference to their emphasis on Madrassa education system.

4.3.1: Commission on National Education 1959 The first ever serious study, regarding education system in Pakistan, was organized by Ayub Khan; after more than a decade of the creation of Pakistan. He, soon after assuming power, established ―The Commission on National Education‖ on 30-December-1958. The Commission presented its report in August 1959258. The report highlighted the significance of certain categories of education; medical, legal, commercial, gender and higher education etc. This report also emphasized upon the importance of compulsory religious education for all259. Madrassa education did not receive much attention; only two pages, with 10 recommendations. Still the Madrassas were pointed out for giving over emphasis to religious education. ―The time given to the teaching of Islam and its allied subjects is about 75% of the total in the institution, with the result that the knowledge of the other subjects even at the highest stages of Madrasa education, which require 15 and 17 years, does not go beyond the matriculation standards‖260. Consequently, the commission recommended certain changes to reform/improve the Madrassa syllabus and enhance its productivity in the modern world. ―At the elementary stage, education must be broad based and the curriculum of Maktabs, Madrasas and Dar-Ul-Ulums should make due provisions for subjects the study of which will give their students some training for the vocational or professional courses they may later choose to follow‖261. Such recommendations were taken as remarks highlighting the incapacity to produce productive citizens. The Ulema got offended and the efforts for improvement by some Ulema, based of self-realization of the need

258 Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Report of the Commission on National Education Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1961. 259 Ibid 211-215 260 Ibid 285 261 Ibid 287

131 for improvement, suffered a heavy blow. The commission did not rely on highlighting the areas of special attention but went a step further to suggest measures, along with the motives behind them. ―As these institutions have themselves become conscious of the need for change, they should not find it difficult to adapt their curriculum to the requirements of our complex society and present Islam in a way acceptable to the rational mind‖262. The body that had no representatives from Madrassa system, or even clergy, was recommending future course to a system that had survived despite strong criticism and practical efforts to dismantle it and replace it with British style education system, during the British rule in Indo-Pak sub- continent263. The commission report of 1959 developed a sense of ―us‖ vs. ―them‖ among the Ulema. They started considering general educational institutions as a potential rivals, again. The defense for existing Madrassa curriculum became strong than ever and very few improvements could take place practically. Ayub Khan, despite all his interest in promoting education, could not free himself from governance related issues and was entrapped in the labyrinth of politics. The Madrassas adopted a mix attitude against his policies. Those Ulema who were participating in practical politics, took every decision with the perspective of ‗allies of government or opposition parties‘. The rest kept concentrating on their primary function; imparting religious education on the same old pattern. 4.3.2: Proposals for a New Educational Policy July 1969. The then President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, constituted a committee to prepare proposals, for new education Policy, in 1969. As it was headed by Air Marshal Noor Khan, therefore, its report is also known as, ―Noor Khan Committee Report 1969‖. It provided a detailed structure for new education policy but did not give much significance to Madrassa education system. The discussion, about Madrassas, could not

262 Ibid 287 263 The efforts were made in 1915-16 to introduce subjects of general education in Madrassas. Those which opted it were known as ―Reformed Scheme Madrassas‖ and those which did not, ―Old Scheme Madrassas‖, in East Pakistan. Ibid 285

132 secure more than one page, in the entire report264. It made the following recommendations265; 1. A Madrassa Education Board should be established, in the West Pakistan, similar to the one already working in the East Pakistan. 2. The Madrassa Certificates should be given equivalence to general education stream certificates. 3. Mathematics and science subjects should be taught in the Madrassas, along with religious syllabi. These brief suggestions could not be incorporated due to political turmoil and change of government in the country. 4.3.3: The Education Policy 1972-1980 This policy did not mention anything about Madrassa education system in the country266. The entire emphasis was on regulating and structuring general education institutions; particularly in post nationalization period. 4.3.4: National Education Policy 1978 The then President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia Ul Haq, in an educational conference in October 1977, suggested to review the state of education, in the country, and suggest recommendations to reform it. The new education policy was, consequently, prepared and presented in 1978. It mainly focused on general education and no specific suggestions were made regarding Madrassa education system. The existence, and working, of Madrassas was appreciated and pledge was made to constitute a separate committee, to regulate and reform the Madrassa education system267. 4.3.5: Qaumi Committee Barai Deeni Madaris Pakistan (National Committee for Religious Madrassas Pakistan) 1979 The first ever committee, exclusively for Madrassa reform, was established by General Zia Ul Haq; ―Qaumi Committee Barai Deeni Madaris Pakistan‖ (National Committee for Religious Madrassas Pakistan),

264 Government of Pakistan, Proposals for a New Educational Policy: July 1969 (Islamabad: Ministry of Education and Scientific Research, 1969.) 13-14 265 Ibid 3 266 Government of Pakistan, The Education Policy 1972-1980 (Islamabad: Ministry of Education, 1972.) 1-45 267 Government of Pakistan, National Education Policy; Salient Features (Islamabad: Ministry of Education, 1978.) 11

133 established in 1979268. The report of this committee is known as ‗Halepota Report‘; named after its president, Mr. Abdul Wahid Halepota. It was organized to look into the affairs of Madrassas and recommend suggestions to improve their efficiency. The committee comprised of 15 Ulema, all administering Madrassas, 8 educationists, 5 Vice chancellors or principles and three directors of research institutes including the president of the committee, and 4 professors, performing administrative duties related to education related offices and institutions269. After briefly highlighting the history of Madrassa education in Indo-Pakistan, in both pre and under British rule, the report presents the present condition of Madrassas. The main emphasis is on recommendations for improvement in the curriculum at all levels. Though the committee was overwhelmed with Ulema yet, its recommendations were not accepted, and eventually implemented, by the Madrassas in totality. It did bring some positive changes in the prevailing Madrassa education system. The Madrassa Boards became more efficient and their degrees were given equal status to M.A. Islamic Studies and M.A. Arabic language. Before going into the recommendations, it is pertinent to note that there were already a few notable Madrassas which already had amended their curriculum and had given considerable weightage to general education. Out of total 10 augmented Madrassas, 7 were in the Punjab and remaining three were in Sind. It shows that the Madrassas were already aware of their modified role in urban areas of the country, and particularly in more populated areas. The district wise details show that more populated areas usually had more high level Madrassas, as compared to less populated areas or remote rural regions270. This report made several recommendations regarding, buildings, furniture, hostels, financial matters and, most importantly, the syllabus. The effort was to make them progressive and dynamic educational institutions, without compromising or endangering their primary function; imparting religious education. The members of this committee, keeping in mind the

268 Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minority Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Notification No 3/6/Secy/78. Islamabad, 17th January, 1979. 269 Government of Pakistan, Report Qaumi Cometi Barai Deeni Madaris Pakistan, (Islamabad: Ministry of Religious Affairs, 1979.) 270 Ibid 194-197

134 respect for teachers and peaceful environment in Madrassas, intended to increase emphasis on religious education, in general education institutions, both in schools and colleges271. Perhaps they intended to make their students fervent ―knowledge seekers‖ rather than readers272. This committee made several recommendations, regarding various field of Madrassa activities. The primary objective was to introduce certain reforms, as were considered necessary to make this education system more effective and productive. Its recommendations were appreciated by the Ulema as most of its members were Ulema, and administrators, of various Madrassas; representing all sects. These recommendations were presented in detail and deserve detailed discussion here as well. 4.3.5.1: Proposed Madrassa Syllabus: The committee recommended teaching of the following subjects; along with religious subjects already taught in Madrassas273.

271 Ibid 50 272 In Arabic and Persian, and also in Urdu, students are called, ―Talib-e-Ilm‖ (The one who seeks knowledge). While in English language ‗Student‘ is used (learner; learning knowledge in an educational institution.) Incidentally, it does not reflect his willingness to acquire knowledge. 273 Government of Pakistan, Report of Qaumi Cometi Barai Deeni Madaris Pakistan 65-66

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Table 4.13: Proposed Madrassa Syllabus by the Committee 1979 (Halepota Report)274 S No Level Class Equivalence Duration General Subjects 1 Element Ibatdaia Primary 5 Years Urdu, Mathematics, ary Social Studies and General Science. 2 Second Mutwasita Matriculation 5 Years General Mathematics, ary General Science, Pakistan Studies and English Language. 3 Gradua Alia BA 4 Years Any two subjects out of tion Economics, Political Science and English Literature. 4 Higher Takhasus, MA 2 Years Islamic Studies, Almia syllabus in Madrassas and general Universities should be the same.

It was also suggested that Dars Nizami should be given 66% time and regular school subjects 33% time. Duration of Ibtadaia (Primary) Mutwasita should be of 5 years and Alia was extended to 10 years from 8 years. The idea was to bring Madrassas and general education institution at power in syllabus, duration, system of examinations and equivalent degrees so as to provide more job opportunities for Madrassa graduates. It was also suggested that Islamic Studies syllabus, in general colleges and universities, should also be made similar to that of Madrassas, at the same levels275. The work was so extensively done that the details for all levels, including yearly study plans,

274 Ibid 65-66 275 Ibid 66

136 were also mentioned for all levels and courses276. The details of proposed syllabus were given in ―Appendix 5‖ of this report277. 4.3.5.2: System of Madrassas This committee proposed a ―Qaumi Idara Barai Deeni Madaris‖ (National Centre for Religious Madrassas). It was designed to perform the following functions278, a) Conduct final examinations of all three levels; Mutwasita, Alia and Takhasus. b) Announce the results. c) Distribute the Degrees. d) Publish and revise the syllabus.

This proposed Centre, revisable every 3 years, comprised of 18 members selected on the following format.

Table: 4.14: Composition of Proposed National Centre for Religious Madrassas S No Office Criterion Strength 1 President Intellectual 1 2 Secretary Admin 1 3 Members Deobandi 3 4 Members Barelvi 3 5 Members Ahl Hadis 3 6 Members Shia 3 7 Sec. Education Ex officio 1 8 Sec. Ministry of Religious Affairs Ex officio 1 9 Member UGC Ex officio 1 10 Chairman Inter Board Committee Ex officio 1 Source: Government of Pakistan, Report of „Qaumi Cometi Barai Deeni Madaris Pakistan‟ 91

276 Ibid 67-85 277 Ibid 147-155 278 Ibid 90-90

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Most of the members of existing committee were recommended, including the sitting president Mr. Halepota, as members of the proposed Centre279. 4.3.5.3: Welfare of Madrassas This Committee suggested measures to improve the existing infrastructural conditions, educational facilities and working environment of Madrassas. The priority was to facilitate the demands of Madrassas and equip them with facilities like libraries and other facilities necessary for developing a conducive learning environment; while bringing Madrassa standards and systems at power with general education system through regulations and streamlining of procedures280. The then government of General Zia ul Haq, took some steps to implement the recommendations of this Committee. Among other things, the most important development was the acceptance of ―Shahadat Almia‘ Takhasus‖ as equal to M.A. Arabic/Islamic Studies by University Grants Commission (UGC) now (Higher Education Commission HEC) in 1982.

4.3.6: Pakistan Madrassa Board Ordinance Aug-2001, and Deeni Madaris Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002 General Pervez Musharraf promulgated ―The Pakistan Madrassa Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance (PMEBO)‖ in 2001. Later, the second Ordinance, ―Dini Madaris (Regulation and Control) Ordinance‖ was promulgated in June 2002. The associates of General Pervez Musharraf started talking about his intentions long before the promulgation of the Ordinances of 2001 and 2002. ―The Government plans to integrate religious Madaris with mainstream education system, and introduce changes in their courses and teaching methodology. This is to be done with a view to enabling these institutions to play their due role of

279 Ibid 91-93 280 Ibid 97-109

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producing not only religious scholars but also leaders in all fields of learning and human endeavor‖281. Some writers, usually renowned for their facts based deductions, sometimes support a biased view. The authenticity of their deductions becomes questionable due to their frailly basis, not for mere fragility of argument. Christopher Candland writes, ―According to some authoritative estimates, the Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaris Deenia may represent as many as 15,000 madaris. However, most of the members of the association are principals and teachers at relatively small madaris‖282. The facts however do not support his claim regarding the Madrassa heads. ―Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaris Deenia‖ is headed by Molana Saleem Ullah Khan. He is President of the Ittehad and is also President of ‗Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia; the board with the biggest number of registered Madrassas. Professor Mufti Muneeb-ur-Rahman, President Tanzeem ul Madaris Ahl Sunnat, is Nazim Ala of the Ittehad. Qari Muhammad Hanif Jalandhri, Nazim Ala Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, is special associate to the Ittehad. Every informed person, about the Madrassas in Pakistan, is aware of the position and prestige, enjoyed by these heads. Only an ill-informed person will consider them less effective persons. As for the rest of the members of the Ittehad, all are either heads or Nazims, or even focal persons, of the Madrassa boards283. It appears that most of the writers, and analysts, give their opinions obliviously.

281 Dr, Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, address, on 3-Aug- 2000, quoted in, Quarterly IPS NEWS(July-September 2000) Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, p 3 in Fakhr-ul-Islam, Reforms in Religious Madaris of Pakistan at, http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/4_2/03_fakhr_islam.pdf, 21-Dec- 2012. 282 Christopher Candland, Pakistan‟s Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education 158, at, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FinalPDF.pdf, 21-Dec-2012. 283 Appendix (D), notification of the proceedings of the Ittehad meeting.

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4.3.7: The Monologues Apart from the governmental or collective efforts, several Madrassa administrators have initiated steps to introduce new disciplines, in their Madrassas; despite several restrictions and compulsions. Some administrators facilitate, their students, in regular education by arranging separate teachers or regular classes for general education. Most of the Madrassas, under Organized and Prudent administrations, ensure certain degrees of general education for their students. A brief introduction of some of the Madrassas, visited, will be of great help to update conventional wisdom. 4.3.7.1: Al Madina Islamic University It has regular classes, for general education. It has its own school and college where the students can study up to post graduate level. They emphasize on their students to study up to graduation. Daily timetable includes classes of general subjects, along with Dars Nizami classes284. 4.3.7.2: Jamia Al Rahim (Al Raheem University) It is situated in the suburbs of Faisalabad and affiliated with Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia285. Though it does not have high level classes, as is a relatively new establishment, yet is projected through a massive publicity campaign. He who ever visits the new settlements, in the North East of Faisalabad, cannot miss the publicity boards, pasted and placed on almost all electricity polls and walls. This Madrassa offers adequate qualification in computer and ensures affluent English language communication skills286. The students of Mutwasita (eighth grade) were conversing quite confidently, in English language287. The Hafiz Quran students are inducted at Mutwasita level, only. They are taught English language, in the first year of studies, Arabic in the second year and computer in the third and final year. The students are later sent to Jamia Darul Quran, Faisalabad; parent Madrassa of Jamia Al Raheem.

284 Molana Shaban, Principal, Al Madina Islamic University (Tanzeem Ul Madaris) Gujranwala, in discussion with the researcher, on 25-February-2012. 285 Jamia Al Raheem, Millat Town, University Block, Millat Road Faisalabad. For details please visit the official website of the Madrassa, www.alraheem.org, or email at, [email protected], 286 Visit to Jamia Al-Raheem, on 1-May-2012. 287 The teachers, of the Madrassa, were so confident of their students‘ communication skills that they had put an open challenge, to every visitor; he who could defeat their students in English communication, would be gifted a free Umra ticket.

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This scheme is, perhaps, designed to produce religious graduates who are capable of utilizing computer and are affluent in English communication; something Madrassa graduates are usually deficient in. It might also help in catalyzing ―Tableghi Jamat‖ activities in English speaking world. 4.3.7.3: Markaz Al Mauta Al Kharia It has a regular government recognized school; ―Alfalah Secondary School‖ affiliated with the secondary school board. The uniqueness of this school is that Madrassa students attend regular classes with ordinary students of general education, in the school. The Madrassa timetable is designed to provide opportunity, to the Madrassa students, to take regular classes in the school288. It not only has a well-equipped computer lab but also has a well maintained library which is consulted by the researchers and scholars of M Phil and PhD levels289. 4.3.7.4: Imam Bukhari International Islamic University It is affiliated with Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia but has taken several new initiatives290. It has three levels and structures for education; a high school, ―Imam Ibn Temiah High School‖, which is affiliated with the Gujranwala Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education; ―Al Harmain College of Arts, Commerce and Computer Sciences‖, affiliated with the Punjab University Lahore; the University itself, offering religious education. The college also offers a blend of religious education, along with the regular education291. 4.3.7.5: Jamia Lahore Al Islamia It is also affiliated with Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia. It has established ―Lahore Institute of Social Sciences‖ and has initiated BA/BSc., BBA, B. Com, BS, M. Com, M.A, MBA, and M Phil, in several subjects292. It has a vast library and offers combination of religious education with regular education.

288 Muhammad Nazir Madni, Principal, Markaz Al Mauta Al Kharia (Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia) Dera Ghazi Khan, in discussion with the researcher, on 14-February-2012. 289 Visit to the computer lab and library on 14-February-2012. 290 Visit to Imam Bukhari International University, on 26-February-2012. 291 Prospectus, Imam Bukhari International Islamic University, Motra, Daska, District Sialkot. 292 Jamia Lahore Al Islamia, 91 Babar Block New Garden Town and 99 J Block Model Town Lahore. Information circulated in ―Monthly Mohadis‖, an Urdu publication of the Jamia. It has affiliation, and equivalence agreements, with Imam Muhammad Bin Saud University Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

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4.3.7.6: Markaz Al Daawa Al Islamia Markaz Taiba It offers a unique blend of religious cum general education and physical training. It is operated by Hafiz Saeed, with the intellectual contributions and efforts of Hafiz Abdul Salam Bin Muhammad Bhutvi. Though affiliated with Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia, yet it has its own examination mechanism and structure. It has more than three hundred associated Madrassas and Maktabs. The students have to appear in the final papers of the Board but this Madrassa, and its affiliated Madrassas, has introduced several books in Urdu for character building and preaching religious principles; religious interpretations of its own sect, Salafi, obviously. The unique features, of this Madrassa, include compulsory physical exercises, for the students and teachers, and systematic organization of religious education and general education. The internal papers are marked by the external examiners, after putting fictitious roll numbers on them. The arrangements of hostels and kitchen are also appreciable and special attention is given to character building of the students. The administration is keen to ensure an effective control over ―sexual harassment‖ of students, particularly in the hostels. The teachers are allotted rooms, and houses for their families, within the campus293. It has the potentials to become an independent degree awarding Madrassa. Among the independent degree awarding Madrassas, Minhaj Ul Quran, of Dr. Tahir Ul Qadri, is a good example of ideal mixing of religious and regular information. Their students must pass graduation examination, fourteen years of education, to pass ―Shahadat Almia‖ degree. Jamia Ghausia Muhammadia Bhera also offers a blend of both religious and regular education. Their graduates must also pass graduation examination; form Sargodha University, before graduating ―Shahadat Almia‖. These Madrassas have only been discussed to present a picture of the new trends in Madrassa education. Apart from these, a few, examples there are hundreds of religious education schools; offering a mixture of religious

293 Hafiz Abdul Salam Bin Muhammad Bhutvi, Mohtamim, Markaz Al Daawa Al Islamia Markaz Taiba (Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia), Muridke, District Sheikhupura, and Muhammad Shahid Kasuri, Nazim Imtahanat, in discussion with the researcher, and personal observation by the researcher during personal visit, on 10-June-2012.

142 and regular education. Their working and influences are of great significance but are out of the conceptual framework of this research. Despite all the reformist efforts, the Madrassa system has not changed much. Apart from many other reasons, the mistrust between the government agencies and the will of Madrassas to remain ‗ untamed‘ have a major role to play in ensuring the failure of most the recommendations. The problem appears to be due to the conflict between modernity, dominantly Westernization, and traditionalism. To some philosophers religions, and traditionalism, come under the threat of extinction due to forceful generalization of modernity. ―Marx, Hegel and Weber are among those who see religion diminishing as modernization occurs‖294. If this argument be true then there is an understandable reason for traditionalism of Madrassas. They have, perhaps, acquired the responsibility of defending traditionalism; against the onslaught of Westernization. ―Madrasas might well be the sole institutions that have rejected this thesis to such an extent. Hence, when Watt (1961) contends that Western dominance has developed two strands of intellectual thought in Muslim countries– the religious and the secular – it is clearly madrasas that are the primary upholders of the former. But, does traditionalism essentially mean rejection of development, and contemporarily, does madrasa education lead to terrorism? While posing Islamist neo-fundamentalism as a real problem of this century, Roy (2004) in his study of globalized Islam answers in the negative on both counts‖295. Today, one of many objections, leveled against Madrassas, is that they teach books written several centuries ago296. To many, these books lack the capability of producing characters that modern society needs and appreciates. Incidentally, this allegation does not hold ground as secular institutions still

294 Nikki R. Keddie, Secularism & Its Discontents. Daedalus, 132 (3) pp. 14-30. Quoted in, Mohammad Waqas Sajjad, Madrasas in Pakistan: Thinking beyond terrorism-based reforms http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299648777_44752615.pdf , 4-Oct-2012. 295 Mohammad Waqas Sajjad, Madrasas in Pakistan: thinking beyond terrorism-based reforms at, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299648777_44752615.pdf , 4-Oct- 2012. 296 Christine Fair has given details of the Madrassa Syllabus with writer and year of his death, C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious education in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2009.) 107-114

143 declare, pre-Islamic, Plato and Aristotle, along with several medieval philosophers and scholars, necessary for comprehensive understanding of Political philosophy. Along with that, sociology and other social sciences, and even natural sciences, cannot ignore the significance of the writings of the scholars, researches and scientists of medieval period. Technically speaking, Madrassas prepare graduates in Arabic language. Emphasis on religiosity is due to the reference books, ambiance in the institutions and background of the teachers. It may sound weird but Dars Nizami Syllabus is first and last an Arabic language course. The books, taught and referred to, are ancient religious explanations and interpretations. They are referred to due to their linguistic value. Sectarian differences are a trickledown effect of these writings. The books, referred to, were mostly written by the scholars who explained various injunctions and practices, of Holy Prophet (PBUH), according to their best of knowledge and to entertain the needs of the then prevailing societies. That is why, Madrassa students, who later on become teachers, prefer and appreciate the interpretations given by the likeminded. The same are, unfortunately, the responsible for strengthening sectarianism among the teachers and students. Eventually Madrassas, just like regular educational institutions, have to impart some ancient books about the rules of Arabic language. As far as ancient philosophy books are concerned, they were included in the syllabus only to give a brief understanding of this intricate subject. According to Mumtaz Ahmad, ―It consists of about twenty subjects broadly divided into two categories: al-ulum an-naqliya (the transmitted sciences), and al-ulum al-aqliya (the rational sciences). The subject areas include grammar, rhetoric, prosody, logic, philosophy, Arabic literature, dialectical theology, life of the Prophet, medicine, mathematics, polemics, Islamic law, jurisprudence, Hadith, and Tafsir (exegesis of the Quran). It is important to note that out of

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the twenty subjects, only eight can be considered as solely religious‖297. He has concluded, on the basis of his field research, that Madrassa teachers and students are much satisfied with the prevailing system in Madrassas but they do realize the importance of modern branches of knowledge and are in favour of introducing some courses of basic sciences298. ―In response to our survey questions on madrasa curriculum, an overwhelming majority of respondents (91.5% teachers and 77.1% students) agreed with the statement that the present system of madrasa education in Pakistan is adequate and does not need any changes. At the same time, however, a significant majority of teachers (57.1%) and students (65%) were of the opinion that madrasas should also include science courses in their curriculum‖299. Studies show that Madrassa syllabus in not altogether outdated and incapable of producing good citizens who can earn a respectable livelihood. ―Thus the social significance of the madrassa education lies not only in the fact that it imparts religious education to a large number of students, but that it also ensures access to employment. It has been observed that while there has been considerable unemployment among the youth educated at secular schools and colleges, the graduates of madrassas have rarely faced such problems and usually find jobs commensurate with their training‖300. Mumtaz Ahmad has presented a comparative analysis between two surveys, conducted in1976 and 2000, whereby, the trend in Madrassa enrolment had changed immensely. Earlier most of the students came from

297 Mumtaz Ahmad, Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh, at, http://www.globalwebpost.com/farooqm/study_res/bangladesh/mumtaz_madrassah.pdf, 4-Oct-2012. 298 Mumtaz Ahmad, Madrasa Reforms and Perspectives: Islamic Tertiary Education in Pakistan at http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/PR09_IslamEd.pdf , 4-Oct-2012. 299 Ibid 300 Mumtaz Ahmad, Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh

145 landless and peasant families but the ratio decreased from 80% to 55% in 2000301. Lower level private employees have developed a tendency of sending their children to Madrassas. Their ratio has increased up to 35% in 2000, from mere 5% in1976302. Another misconception that needs to be clarified is the ‗conventional wisdom‘ that only Imams of Mosque send their children to Madrassas, so as to appoint them in their mosque after them. According to the same survey, there were only 3% students whose father was an Imam303. Attraction in any educational set up is linked with the perception and prioritization of parents and their children. Divergence is the sole characteristic of human beings. All humans neither always admire the same nor will ever unite on denial. Vastness in the boundaries of ―Variance threshold‖ represents the richness of society. Human desires can be controlled only by ‗contentment‘. Level of contentment will vary from person to person and from situation to situation. That is why, no two people will always desire for the same thing. As far as Madrassa graduates are concerned, they have a different spectrum from that of government school and private school graduates304. All those who appreciate simplicity in life and consider minimum supply of basic needs sufficient for their life, will approve that happiness can be acquired even without abundance of wealth. Therefore, Madrassa graduates, after giving first priority to ―Edicts of Islam‖ consider most of the accessories of life as less important. Consequently, they are able to spend a more satisfied life, even without most of the ―regular‖ facilities of life. One may agree with their contentment or not but, according to principles of sociology, they have a right to live their life according to their choice; obviously without threating that of others. ―If a student wants to make a livelihood working in a spiritually rewarding if low-paying job, he should be admired, not condemned‖305.

301 Ibid 302 Ibid 303 Ibid 304 For details see Tariq Rahman, Denizens of Alien Worlds. 305 Muhammadullah Khalili Qasmi, Madrasa Education: its Strengths and Weaknesses, quoted in, Mohammad Waqas Sajjad, Madrasas in Pakistan: thinking beyond terrorism- based reforms at, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299648777_44752615.pdf , 4- Oct-2012.

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As for enhancing the capabilities of Madrassa graduates, many high level Madrassas offer modern education, technical awareness facilities and even parallel degree pursuits306. The government initiated reforms usually lack public trust. This level of mistrust increases in case of Madrassas. Incidentally, most of the government initiatives have divided the Ulema. Those who are convinced by the proposals are bracketed as pro-government Ulema and the rest, irrespective of their non- interest, are labeled as anti-government Ulema. In such atmosphere of mistrust, even the best recommendations will have the worst results. ―The first of these reforms in 1962 followed a strategy of controlling financial sources and changing the curriculum. This was an effort to control the meaning of Islam and undermining the clergy‗s authority and the juncture from where…a clear rift between secularism and traditionalism began to emerge‖307. The government officers and representatives, in most of the cases, try to dispense their own perception as the only viable option. Apart from that, the governments mostly try deal with the Madrassas, considering them as equal and same entities. This attitude is not accepted by those setups that are self- sufficient and have deep social footings. ―One-size-fits-all reforms are bound to fail‖308. The government reforms should not concentrate on emphasizing the significance of general subjects and their introduction in Madrassas should not be projected as panacea to all the ills. The basic spirit of Madrassa Education must be given first priority. ―If a madrasa graduate who is trained in Islamic sciences has to be an effective community leader in his position as a teacher or an imam of a mosque, there is only so much that extensive training in mathematics for instance can help him with. However, equip him with knowledge and practical training on say, safety

306 Various research reports referred to in, ibid 307 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities Modern Asian Studies, 1998, 32 (3) pp. 689-716, at, http://www.jstor.org/pss/313163 , 11-Oct-2012 308 Muhammad Waqas Sajjad, Madrasas in Pakistan: thinking beyond terrorism-based reforms at, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299648777_44752615.pdf , 11-Oct- 2012

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issues, religious tolerance, health, domestic violence and that could actually be an endeavour worth a thousand reforms given his proximity to the community. This is where it is essential to understand the reason for Islamic education in the first place‖309. Fakhr-ul-Islam has rightly concluded, ―In short, a durable solution should come from the Madaris themselves and Government should facilitate it‖310. The problem with the government sponsored reforms is that they lack in-depth understanding of the Madrassa system, at least in most of the cases. The only serious effort was ―Halepota Report‖ of 1979. That committee comprised of sufficient number of Madrassa related Ulema and even the government representatives were also scholars in Islamic learning and experts in teaching. The recommendations though had a clear tilt towards pampering of Madrassas but at least, for the first and the last time, the Madrassas agreed to regulate their system, under semi-governmental control and were ready to bring their syllabus at power with the general education system of the country. Had those proposals been implemented sincerely, we might not have been, still, arguing the difference in syllabus and capabilities of Madrassa graduates. Along with that, the proposed similarity of syllabus, in both the Madrassas and general education institutions, would have given us graduates with sufficient religious education from general education institutions and graduates with sufficient general education from the Madrassas. At least, no one could misguide the graduates of general schools and colleges, by misinterpreting the edicts of Allah; as all school children would have been aware of Arabic language.

309 Ibid 310 Fakhr-ul-Islam, Reforms in Religious Madaris of Pakistan at, http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/4_2/03_fakhr_islam.pdf , 21- Dec-2012.

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4.4: Categorization of Madrassas In Pakistan, every opportunist and selfish person managed to deceive and misguide people; due to the practical absence of regulatory mechanisms, in socio-political structures. Every buccaneer, whenever possible, swindled people of their belongings- both spiritual and physical. Such embezzlements were either supported or, at least ignored, by the governments: an act of criminal negligence. The governments, shamefully, patronized many of such activities rather than criminalizing them. ―Many of the problems and allegations regarding madrasas are based on politics rather than any facets inherent in the madrasa system. Others, such as sectarianism, are ubiquitous dogmas all over the country‖311. Consequently, various instrumental institutions were established by these rackets during different phases of Pakistan‘s history. It will be totally deceptive to combine all the institutions under one heading, just for discussion comfort. The seriousness of the subject and the variety in the structural- functional differentiation demands separate discussions about these institutions that have disguised as Madrassas but actually are serving the interests of the founders. According to Mohammad Waqas Sajjad, ―The blanket term madrasa is often used without knowledge of intricacies within the elaborate system – a literary crime that both Eastern and Western academics commit. They are highly heterogeneous institutions, with major differences even within formal denominations. By professing to counter extremism through generic reforms, policy makers place an innocuous one- room institution for five students studying the Quran in the evenings, a reputed university with thousands of students being taught sciences and religion, as well as a strident radicalized institution preaching violence on the same platform – an etymological dilemma that needs to be clarified at the outset‖312.

311 Sajjad , Madrasas in Pakistan: thinking beyond terrorism-based reforms 312 Mohammad Waqas Sajjad , Madrasas in Pakistan: thinking beyond terrorism-based reforms at,

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Christopher Candland, professor of Political Science, Wellesley College, has rightly pointed out the significance of Madrassas. ―Most have done a remarkable job of caring for and educating a large population whose basic needs have been entirely neglected by the state‖313. Apart from this fact, many writers have discussed some institutions under different labels- only to point out the functional differences. This research has stratified the Madrassas in three major categories. Each is rich enough to be further divided in to sub categories but that would have been too complicated and distractive. Therefore, three major categories are explained here. These categories are developed with an intention to facilitate the discussion and remove misconceptions regarding all Madrassas. People generally are not aware of the various roles and functions performed by Madrassas, and institutions labeled as Madrassas. This categorization will help them differentiate among the various institutions and centers, all claiming to be Madrassas. This arrangement also intends to bring those Madrassas out of murk that are working for the promotion of religion and spread of education.

http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299648777_44752615.pdf , 27-Sep-2012. 313 Christopher Candland, Pakistan‟s recent experience in reforming Islamic Education at, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FinalPDF.pdf , 18-Oct-2012.

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Table: 4.15: Functional Categorization of Madrassas314. S Category Objectives Products Results No 1 Edifying Disseminate Religious Performance of Religious Graduates Religious duties Knowledge for and scholars facilitated and Character building character building. 2 Instrumental Spreading specific Supporters Street Power for objectives; for political political objectives or Political Ideas, and sectarian staunch supporters for radical ideas etc. activities promoting a specific dogmatic identity. 3 Hoax Warriors for proxy Warriors Sectarian Extremism actions. (Jihadis) and Terrorism

4.4.1: Edifying Madrassas These Madrassas were established to disseminate knowledge; primarily religious knowledge but other branches of reasoned knowledge were, and still are taught, briefly as well. Most of them were established by learned graduates of major and well established Madrassas. Most of them were immigrants, after independence, and were experienced in running Madrassas in their native areas or were trained by their teachers to disseminate knowledge to others. The main objectives were to educate the young Muslims in religious education- though with unavoidable sectarian touch-, enable them practice Islam more confidently and practically implement its principles in daily life. All of them aim at educating youth for the future responsibilities in practical life and to produce the clerics- the torch bearers of religious teachings in future. As far as sectarian differences are concerned, that is a spillover effect of referring to additional books for explanation and commentary, written by the forefathers within the same group.

314 This research will primarily concentrate on ―Edifying Madrassas‖ but the socio-Political implications of the other two categories cannot be ignored altogether.

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These Madrassas were primarily established to disseminate religious knowledge. They operate in both rural and urban areas. Researches have proved that the government has not been able to organize and operate educational institutions for people of Pakistan in both rural and urban areas. Apart from government schools, even private schools are not available insufficient number to bear out the needs of people. Consequently the Madrassas have come to the rescue. They not only provide free education but also offer an irrefutable benefit in the life hereafter.

Table 4.16: Fund Raising Methods and Collections by Edifying Madrassas315. S No Mode Means Urban Areas Rural Areas 1 Cash Donations Heavy Average Level Collections Collections 2 Cash Charity Heavy Heavy Collections Collections 3 Cash *Fee Average Level Almost nil Collections 4 Kind Agricultural Average Level Heavy Collections Product Collections 5 Kind Property Average Level Heavy Collections Collections 6 Misc. Sacrificial Average Level Heavy Collections skins Collections * Madrassa Boards Charge Registration and Examination Fee from students which is paid either by students or by their Madrassas.

The students, in urban areas are mostly high-school dropouts or those who could not afford regular schools. Still a handsome number of students come from religiously orientated families who want to educate their children in religious education along with regular school education. This trend is stronger in followers of Deobandi and Salafi schools of interpretations316. Students, at

315 Information collected through interviews, observation and various pamphlets. 316 Interviews conducted with the heads of Madrassas and discussions with the students.

152 higher levels, sometimes follow the reputation of a certain Madrassa to master a specific field or domain. Some prefer improving ―Qirat‖, while others will go for developing ‗Oratory‘ and some of them will choose a specific Madrassa for its specialization in ―Hadis‖. Students even shift Madrassas during different degrees to benefit from the specialization of various Madrassas to refine their academic pursuit. Teachers known for their special skills and potentials are also hired, occasionally on better incentives- both material and intellectual, to facilitate students. Greater number of students is mostly considered as an indicator of the success of the Madrassa. The Madrassas in the urban areas are usually established in the well- populated areas, so as to attract the students, and are later shifted, or even extended, to peripheral areas of major cities- to accommodate the ever increasing number of students. Most of the Madrassas, mentioned the table above, have more than one campus. Some even have branches in nearby cities as well. Apart from this, many new and relatively small Madrassas are budding up in mostly backward areas of big and average size cities. These are usually unregistered in the beginning but are found struggling for getting themselves registered with the Board of the same school of thought317. The delay in the registration is attributed towards the other party by both these registration seeking Madrassas and the Boards. The Madrassa Boards are of the view that there are certain pre-requisites for registration that these Madrassas do not fulfill. While the organizers and administers of such Madrassas blame the Board officials for practicing delaying tactics and also complain about high registration fee. As far as the necessity of registration is concerned, it is not due to any governmental compulsion; rather it brings legitimacy for the newly established Madrassa and develops public trust in this new establishment. This enhancement of trust surely increases contributions and donations. Most of the religious scholars around are directly, or indirectly, affiliated with such Madrassas. This list also includes the modern religious scholars like Dr. Tahir Ul Qadri. He has contributed a lot in spreading religious, as well as formal education among the youth. He launched a movement to; (a) educated

317 Interviews conducted with the heads of Madrassas and visits to various Madrassas.

153 youth in religious knowledge; (b) help the Muslims to become responsible citizens; (c) improve the conditions of Muslim Ummah. His Madrassa, in Lahore, developed into a big Madrassa and has now become a university, Minhaj University- offering combinations in religious and regular education. HEC has notified this Madrassa as an independent degree awarding Madrassa318. He formed a political party; ―Pakistan Awami Tehrik‖ (PAT) in May 1989 to address the problems of people. He contested the elections of 1990 but could not win any seat. Subsequently, he re organized his party and focused upon the youth. His sermons got political coloring and the students of his Madrassa got attracted towards politics. He secured one seat, his own, in 2002 elections but, after a couple of years, resigned and abandoned all political activities for almost a decade till his sudden return in politics, a little before general elections in the country. He unsuccessfully attempted to delay the general elections through several tactics, including a long-march to Islamabad. Eventually he left the country politics on its own and the general elections took place on 11 May, 2013. He is presently concentrating on religious education and social reform programs. His brainchild Tehrik Minhaj- ul-Quran is an international organization, working in several countries. The International Biographical Centre (IBC) of Cambridge, England has declared Dr Tahir Ul Qadri as, ―The International Man of the year 1998-99‖ for promoting peace in the society319. There are several other examples where the religious scholars have devoted their lives for the promotion of religious education. Their Madrassas, despite severe financial crises, do not usually deviate from their primary objective of imparting Religious Education. They can righty be considered as ―a political‖ institutions. The only episodic political influence used by these Madrassas is during severe reactionary protests against; a) Blasphemy320

318 HEC letter No (8-16HEC/A&A/2004) issued on 12 May 2004. Appendix (E). 319 List of awards of Dr. Tahir ul Qadri, http://qadri.minhaj.org/en/content/view/21/38/ ,4 June 2012 320 The demonstrations by various Ulema, irrespective of their affiliations and sectarian differences, against Cary catchers in Danish newspapers in Feb 2006. Late Dr. Sarfraz Naeemi remained behind bars, for more than one year, only for giving a protest call in violation of section 144; banning public assembly.

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b) Khatm-e-Nabuwat321. The teachers of these Madrassas are usually the graduates of the same Madrassa- the trend that is similar in almost all well-established regular institutions of the world; from Harvard to GCU Lahore. Despite all the good intentions, the fact remains that all the Madrassas identify, differentiate and register themselves with the relevant Madrassa Board; established on sectorial basis. Their graduates, eventually, specialize and excel within the boundaries of the same sect. Honestly speaking, the interpretational differences among different clerics, in history, are merely explanations of various injunctions and solutions to prevailing problems- according to their own understanding. Anyone of them hardly declared the followers of other set of interpretations as infidel. It is the followers, who seek and project their legitimacy through proving and promoting their strong moorings with a specific combination of interpretations and their exponents, so as to acquire a great number of supporters and followers. 4.4.2: Instrumental Madrassas The ever increasing population requires sound planning and perseverance in organizing educational institutions and providing jobs for fresh graduates. Failing to these, the government cannot and should not expect smooth functioning of society and harmonious intermixture of various groups prevailing, one way or the other, in the society. Such deficiencies make way for lateral entry of opportunists and self-centered people to establish their setups and befool common people easily. Venal social setup provides patronage to their designs. Most of the Madrassas, included in this category, may not be that much selfish or deceptive but definitely are not, in totality, in line with the true spirit of imparting knowledge; a social service Edifying Madrassas are established for. Researchers like Jamal Malik have discussed them under the heading, ―Integrationist‖322. This category includes the Madrassas initiated by leaders of religious political parties or adherents of specific dogmatic interpretations, who

321 Whenever the finality of the Prophethood of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) is challenged, all and sundry from all Madrassas, irrespective of sectarian differences, come to streets for massive agitations like those of 1954 and 1974. 322 Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan 197

155 consider the spread of their preferred ‗options‘ as sole objective of their lives. Religious Political parties establish Madrassas to prepare their staunch political supporters. Political affiliation and support always remains an integral part of the hidden curriculum of these establishments. Political parties like Jamat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema Islam, Jamiat Ulema Pakistan and some small political parties organized Madrassas to train and produce their political workers, apart from producing religiously educated citizens. These parties frequently use their students for pressure tactics. Such institutions are affiliated with the Board sharing same sectarian ideas or sometimes have established their own board to maintain their distinct identification323. The leaders of religious political parties always maintain a religious appearance; as it helps them win public support and financial assistance. They establish institutions to fulfill their political objectives. According to recent surveys, Madrassas affiliated with Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia and Rabta Tul Madaris have stronger affiliations with, and influences of, political parties, ―The survey shows that Deobandi and JI madrassas are more inclined towards politics as 82 percent of Deobandi and 100 percent of JI madrassas have political affiliations‖324. Such institutions exploit public sentiments and win social and, much needed, financial support due to their religious educational institution like appearance. Apart from this, most of the religious political parties in Pakistan have more than once served as the associates of the government in various domestic and international levels. The leaders of such religio-political parties are usually poikilothermic. They pop up to offer their services to government whenever there is a job for them and become latent actors in the society when the winds are not so favorable. This attitude has put many religious scholars and intellectuals to shame. According to many, Islam does not restrict political activities. As a matter of fact, there are several Islamic injunctions, like

323 Rabta Tul Madaris is the sole ownership of Jamat Islami. It accepts affiliation by only those Madrassas which accept and adhere to the religious teachings and political ideas, respectively, given by Maulana Maududi. 324 Muhammad Amir Rana, Mapping the Madrasa Mindset: Political Attitudes of Pakistani Madaris A PIPS Research Journal, Jan-Mar 2009, at, http://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja &ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsanpips.com%2Fdownload.php%3Ff%3D05.pd f&ei=_NQEU4T5KMnNsgb3tIB4&usg=AFQjCNHVlN3K9u4olz6yhDhr11OpTQebIw&bvm= bv.61535280,d.Yms , 4-June-2012.

156 jurisprudence and inheritance, which can be implemented under any political system; which does not, forcefully, restrict ideological affiliations from interfering into governmental spheres325. Still Islam does not compel its followers to forcefully implement their political dominance in their vicinity. Religious political parties, despite all their claims, have not been able to attract much public support. In almost all general elections, they have not been able to bag more than a minimal of 2-5% votes. The only exception was in 1977 general elections when PNA secured a handsome number of seats. That was actually an anti-Bhutto sentiment transformed into PNA. In 2002 general elections, MMA (an alliance of nine religious political parties) secured some eats in NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). That was a reaction to American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The results were almost the same after 2008 and 2013 general elections. Religious leaders, and their political parties, were able to bag personal seats only; which were not more than ten percent, combined, of total contested seats326. The leaders of religious political parties, usually, justify their political activities and intermixture of political participation with that of religious duties, educational services, by quoting the Holy Quran; ―Among you, there should be a group of people, who should call towards the betterment, promote good acts and denounce bad acts; only they shall be successful‖327. They consider, political participation, as a religious duty and, incidentally, want others to support them as if it were their religious duty as well.

4.4.3: Hoax Madrassas This category includes the Madrassas that were established, exclusively, for producing foot soldiers for armed campaigns. The end of Cold War was staged in Afghanistan. The factors behind this choice require a separate research but are out of the framework of this

325 Discussions with various heads of Madrassas and teachers. 326 For details, see the official website of ―The Election Commission of Pakistan‖ 327 The Holy Quran 3: 104

157 research, despite their utmost significance. Soviet Union entered Afghanistan and the US came to help Afghan resistance. Rest is history. CIA and ISI established training centers in Afghan refugee camps to produce warriors to feed the Afghan War. These training camps were established on the format of traditional Madrassas, and were consecrated, so as to convince the religiously motivated Afghans more easily. Curriculum included brainwashing and physical training to training to use weapons. The US wanted surrogates to complete the job for her. These training sites were, and still are unfortunately, labeled as Madrassas by most of the scholars and writers. This research has discussed them under the heading; ―Hoax Madrassas‖. The US helped ISI of Pakistan, through CIA, to build and operate hundreds of school cum training camps- labeled as Madrassas- in Afghan refugee camps. Later on, foreign volunteers were also welcomed and trained in these facilities. According to rough estimates, 1500 Madrassas were established near the Afghan border. The US government and the CIA persuaded Saudi Arabia to provide the finances328. Local and foreign experts were hired to establish, construct, run and spread these centers; hoax Madrassas. Several underground bunkers and training facilities were also constructed. Some of them were even used by Osama Bin Laden, during his early days when he was an accomplice to the US. He established his own network under US umbrella, ―Maktab al-Khidamat‖ (MAK)329. ―That Pan-Islamic effort, whose fighters were funded, armed and trained by the C.I.A., eventually brought some twenty-five thousand Islamic militants, from more than fifty countries, to combat the soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The United States, intentionally or not, had launched Pan-Islam‘s first Jihad, or holy war, in eight centuries‖330. This was not all, all efforts were put together to develop love for war among the Afghan refugees. Special books were prepared by scholars in the

328 Ahmad Rashid, Taliban Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I B Tauris, 2000.) 130-132 329 Ibid 130-132 330 Mary Anne Weaver, The Real Bin Laden, The New Yorker, Jan24, 2000 at, http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=2000-01-24#folio=032, 21-Sep-2012.

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US universities to motivate the Afghans. Millions of Dollars were spent to make this project successful. ―Published in the dominant Afghan languages of Dari and Pashtu, the textbooks were developed in the early 1980s under an AID grant to the University of Nebraska-Omaha and its Center for Afghanistan Studies. The agency spent $51 million on the university‘s education programs in Afghanistan from 1984 to 1994‖331. The purpose of these Madrassas was to, ―Create a generation of militant Islamic freedom fighters...who would rise up and run the godless Soviet communist forces out of Afghanistan‖332. Many institutions, particularly in this category, are not registered with any board. They may be following the syllabus of a Madrassa board but are not enlisted anywhere. Most of these institutions went underground after strict government policies but still some of them are operating with changed names. The far flung areas of the Punjab are suspected for having such institutions, unfortunately still labeled- and misunderstood- as Madrassas. Such may be highlighted if and when they are pointed out during the field survey. The Madrassa graduates usually concentrate and excel in their relevant set of interpretations, sect, because of ―Greenhouse effect‖, in the Madrassas. He who has been nurtured with sectarian differences, and ―can‖ refer to or quote only the works of his sect; is most likely to develop a prejudice against the followers of other sets of interpretations. The bigwigs of most of the Madrassas, and sects, also appreciate back tapping, one way or the other.

The Muslim Civilization originated from the Middle East and spread in its surrounding areas, within a couple of decades. After establishing the political control, over the adjoining areas, the Muslims started a tireless campaign to translate and transfer the then most modern scientific and

331 Joe Stephens and David B. Ottaway, From U.S., the ABC‟s of Jihad at, http://ratical.org/ratville/CAH/USjihadABCs.pdf , 21-Sep-2012. 332 Martin Schram, The United States and Madrassas , The Globalist 21 September 2003 at http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=3453 ,21-Sep-2012

159 sociological knowledge in to Arabic. The Muslim Caliph dynasties, from Abbasids to Ottomans, patronized learning and established institutions, Madrassas, which served as a role model for rest of the then civilized world. People like Nizan ul Mulk Tusi introduced a new concept in Madrassa system and allotted property to various Madrassas for their financial independence. This intellectual elevation, eventually, helped the Muslims supersede the civilizations that had been ruling the realms of knowledge for centuries. The renaissance in the Europe, during 14th to 17th century also owes its foundations to the Muslim learning centers. As discussed in preceding pages, the Madrassa education system, in pre-British Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent, served the society and fulfilled its academic and administrative needs; by educating those who had an access to these institutions. The British came to this land as merchants and gradually started to rule as colonial masters. They introduced new socio-politico- economic systems and in order to manage these, systems and structures, they needed staff-workers who could read and write the foreign language, English, and could carry-out and implement the directions of the new masters without further ado. Therefore, a new education system was enforced and the traditional educational systems, based on religiosity and emphasizing on morality and character building, were forced to hibernate. The skills in language became the criterion for judging capability and intellectuality. This new social setup received criticism, from a large segment of society, but there were several people who were of the opinion that the new socio-politico-economic order should not be boycotted; rather it could be benefitted from. People like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan put all efforts to keep the Muslims at pace with the changing social setup and needs. He, and his followers, believed in cooperating with the British and educating the Muslims in their language so that the Muslim community, which had been left behind in social status and financial stability, could be compensated. The other major community, the Hindus, had not only embraced modernity, to greater extent, but had institutionalized, her efforts, to become a productive and progressive member of the new setup. On the other hand, there was a handsome number of people who shunned away from the British; their way of life and language. This large segment of society continued to send their children, particularly

160 boys, to Madrassas; where they could not learn English language and modern sciences. Their studies were primarily focused on religion and Arabic language; to facilitate learning and understanding religious debates. The Madrassas went into preservationist mode and saw their survival in emphasizing more on Arabic language and religious books and their explanations. The hallmark syllabi taught by Shah Wali Ullah became a thing of the past and subjects of social and pure sciences were reduced from the curricula. The basis for this was preservation of religious knowledge and Arabic language, as a means to read and understand Islam. Darul Uloom Deoband was the first one to adopt these conservative syllabi. Rest of the Madrassas followed one after the other and in less than no time; almost all the Madrassas adopted ―Dars Nizami‘ syllabi. This strategy did help in saving the Arabic language and knowledge about the religious books but definitely incapacitated the Madrassa graduates from performing any vital and productive role in the modernizing society. The creation of Pakistan did away with the British threat of, institutionalized, cultural dominance and subjugation of religious beliefs; as perceived by the Muslim clergy. Never the less, the Madrassas continued to perform in their old preservationist style. The new country had, and still houses, an overwhelming majority of the Muslims. There was no threat of extinction; either to the Muslims or to their culture. This new social setup was an ideal situation for the Madrassas to come out of their previous protectionist mode and develop a new system that could prepare graduates who could perform efficiently and productively in the overwhelmingly Muslim society. They did not go for any revision in their system, structure, syllabi or curricula. They continued the old patterns; considering them the best even in the changed socio-political circumstances. The only change introduced, eventually, was use of Madrassa students for political objectives. Today the Madrassas have five Boards; most of them are based on sectarian identification. Rabta Tul Madaris, of Jamat Islami, is the only exception who claims to be non-sectarian. All the Madrassa Boards are headquartered in the Punjab; three in Lahore, one in Multan and one in Faisalabad. The Government of Pakistan recognized the Madrassa Board issued Degree of ―Shahadat Almia‖, sixteen years of education, equal to M.A.

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Arabic and Islamic Studies in 1982. Along with the five Madrassa Boards, four Madrassas were also authorized to award recognized Degrees independently. All of them are situated in the Punjab. HEC, in 2004, clarified the situation and explaining that ―Shahadat Almia‖ degree, issued by a Madrassa Board, would be recognized and accepted only when the student had passed all the examinations, from Alia to Almia, with two years difference between the two, from the Madrassa Board. As far as the syllabus of the Madrassas is concerned, all the Madrassa Boards are following ―Dars Nizami‖ syllabus; developed by Mullah Nizam ud Din Sihalvi Farangi Mehli (Died 1748). This syllabus emphasizes on Arabic language and its grammar. Technically speaking, Dars Nizami is an Arabic language course. The books included in it, for practice and information, are religious explanations and commentaries, written by Muslim scholars. Most of them are centuries old and still hold significance in literature and religious explanations. Some Madrassas, like Jamat Al Daawa, have reduced some Arabic books and have introduced some commentaries, written in Urdu. Sectarian differences become strong because only those reference books and explanations of religion are allowed which are written by the writers and scholars supporting and defending the same sect. In Pakistan, the task of implementing Islam became difficult because almost all sects either tried to implement their sets of beliefs or wanted to ensure special protections and recognition for their particular religious beliefs and practices. The governments, rather than finding an amicable solution to the problem, tried to harvest their political objectives. Some regional developments like Soviet entry into Afghanistan also affected the sectarian harmony negatively; by weaponing the sectarianism. Government agencies established recruitment and training centers, labeled as Madrassas, to convince religious minded Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This step served the immediate purpose but had its long term negative effects for the country. Some Madrassas in the Punjab also played the recruitment role but most of these activities remained outside the province. Several Madrassas have initiated reforms in their curriculum and have started understanding the need of reforms in their syllabi as well; some are doing it due to government pressure while others have realized the needs of

162 the society. Still, they cannot amend, or replace, the core syllabi books and contents, as they have to follow the syllabi finalized and implemented by their relevant Madrassa Boards; their students have to appear in the final examinations of the relevant Madrassa Board. However, they, on their own, have started facilitating their students in general school education. Some Madrassas are even affiliated with ―Secondary Schools Boards‖ as regular science schools. The Madrassas have been categorized into three categories; to enable the readers understand the differences between various Madrassas. Edifying Madrassas concentrate on imparting knowledge only; so as to enhance the mental capabilities of students. Instrumental Madrassas primarily aim at serving the political interests of their mother organizations; while providing religious education. Hoax Madrassas, which deserve to be called ‗centers‘ rather than a Madrassa, were established to serve the special interests, definitely not academic, of the government and some other groups. This categorization of Madrassas is purely for educational purposes and does not bear any bias against any group, cult, community or sect. These ‗centers‘ which were established to cater ‗other‘ needs- and achieve objectives other than imparting education- do need extensive study but fall out of the conceptual framework of this research. This research, during field survey and analysis, will primarily focus on Edifying Madrassas; despite the fact that Instrumental and Hoax Madrassas are also playing an effective role in the society. However, some groups falling into instrumental category are also included as they have recognized Madrassa boards.

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Chapter: 5 Politicization of Madrassas

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Politics has deep imprints on most of the social activities in modern times. The social activities and performances also have a reverse impact on politics and political decision making. From friendships to associations, from support for a plan to disagreement in petty local affairs, all are affected by political affiliations. Still, this disagreement is said to be the beauty and strength of democracy. In this highly politicized environment, religious scholars and leaders could not remain as an exception, unfortunately. The governments in Pakistan have, many a times, used religious forces for their personal interests and benefits. Religious forces realized their power during 1953 agitation and so did the government. Since then, the governments have used these forces, or the ones which could remold and utilize the public sentiments on the name of religion. The subjectivism of the rulers has always succeeded in finding supporters among so called religionists; as long as the government is not a pinchpenny. This chapter will shed light upon different dimensions of use, or misuse, of Madrassas by the Ulema and the Government for political objectives during different phases of history. The main emphasis, however, will be on the Madrassas working in the Punjab. One must not ignore the fact that the Madrassas in the Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) were, and to some extent still are, under heavy influence of Governmental perversion since 1980s. The mushroom growth of Madrassas, during 1980s, was primarily in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP) but it had far reaching effects on the societal set up in the Punjab; particularly in the shape of ―Weaponing of Sectarianism‖. Some Madrassas in the Punjab had similar tendencies but with a difference from the ones in tribal parts of NWFP and border areas of Baluchistan. A number of Madrassas in the Punjab started to cultivate rigid sectarian differences and became a hotbed of recruitment for some terrorist groups; which were extended as far as the tribal areas of Pakistan. Eventually, a strong linkage could be witnessed between some of these Madrassas with those of extremist groups in FATA and other tribal areas. A brief insight into the working of some of the major religious political parties will be of great help in understanding the real state of affairs in their Madrassas. As most of the Western writers either rely on their meetings with

165 one or two major leaders of such parties or depend mostly on reports, funded by international donor agencies, aiming at collecting data on specific variables and then interpreting it. This research, on the contrary, relies on detailed discussions and field visits more than one hundred Madrassas throughout the province.

5.1: Jamat-e-Islami It was established by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi in 1941333. It is a finely organized party with structured hierarchical administrative set up. Ironically, it is the only major political party that is democratically centralized- unlike other mainstream political parties of Pakistan- despite all their proclamations of love for democracy. Jamat-e-Islami actively participates in politics and intends to get their jobs done through political influence. According to Jamal Malik, ―The representatives of Jama‗at-e-Islami, in contrast, rely on occupying political positions in order to exert any influence‖334. To avoid any confusion or influence, it has its own board of Madrassas: ―Rabta-Tul-Madaris Al Islamia‖. It is headquartered at Mansoora, Lahore- within the premises of the head office of the Jamat Islami. Despite all the claims of religious services and sectarian neutrality, the board affiliates only those Madrassas that follow the teachings and interpretations of the founder. No other version is acceptable. Apparently they claim to be non-sectarian but practically they have become a new sub-sect; falling somewhere closer to Deobandi set of interpretations. Maulana Maududi did not enjoy good relations with the Quaid. He was not much convinced about his ‗Muslim hood‘ and subsequently did not consider him an appreciable figure for the Muslims to follow. He refused to work, for the creation of Pakistan, shoulder to shoulder with the Quaid335.

333 Jamat-e-Islami, http://jamaat.org/beta/site/index , 16-May-2012. 334 Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996.) 201 335 Interview with Mr. Ahmad Yar Khan on 11-Sep-2011. He had met Mr. Bashir Akhger, at Sadiqabad District Rahim Yar Khan, in 1975-76. Mr. Bashir Akhgar was member of the eight member delegation that had met Maulana Maududi, in a farm owned by a Hindu, near Ambala Railway Station. The delegation tried to convince Maulana to support All India Muslim League, in its quest for Pakistan. Maulana openly said that he was not sure

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According to some sources, he was never in favour of Pakistan336. However, after its creation accepted it and participated in practical politics. He also refused to accept the 1948 India Pakistan War in Kashmir as ‗Jihad‘337. At later stages, his party sought its progression in supporting Kashmir uprising and eventually became a vanguard of ‗Kashmir Jihad‘. Soon after independence, Jamat-e-Islami got involved in the educational institutions by patronizing the establishment of ―Islami Jamiat Talaba Pakistan‖ in December 1947338. Later it started influencing the students of Madrassas by establishing ―Jamiat Talaba Arabia‖ on13 January 1975 AD339. The objectives were, rather still are, to orientate the young Muslims with the political demands of the modern times and to train them for a productive part in the political activities of the country340. Now one must not get confused by this list. It should be kept in mind that all the office bearers and workers must spiritually and physically follow the interpretations of Maulana Maududi and his disciples. The inbred mechanism of the organization and later on its limited activities in specific Madrassa board affiliated Madrassas are to ensure the strong moorings of the students with the policies of the main party; Jamat-e-Islami. This student organization, just like its mother set up, has a well- structured hierarchical set up341. The entire effort is to ensure the rise, to power, of only those who are authorized by the heads of the mother party. Along with many other co-curricular activities, Jamiat Talaba Arabia has been organizing campaigns to convince ‗Imams‘ of, various mosques, to motivate people for Jihad through their sermons. It has also been collecting funds for the Jihad and has been distributing it among the ‗Mujahedeen‘ in Indian held

about the Quaid being a Muslim in the first place. Following him in a political campaign was a farfetched cry. 336 The Two Faces of Maududi, http://www.spittoon.org/archives/6885 , 20-Sep-2012. 337 M. Hamidullah, The Muslim Conduct of State (3rd Ed, Lahore, 1953, 191), in, Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.)137 338 Islami Jamiat Talaba, http://jamiat.org.pk/new/index.php?func=page_cms&cms_id=75 , 16-May-2012. 339 Pamphlet, Jamiat Tulaba Arabia an introduction ( Lahore: Maktaba Al Misbah, 1A Zaildar Park.) 42 340 Ibid 43 341 Ibid 58-60 (the hierarchy starts from ―Hami‖ then comes ―Karkun‖ then ―Rafique‖ then ―candidate For Rukan‖ and in the end ―Rukan‖.)

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Kashmir and Afghanistan342. It also had, for quite some time; an independent department ―Amur Jihad‖ (Matters of Jihad) to organize conferences- highlighting the significance of Jihad- and even arranged physical training for potential aspirants of Jihad343. Some workers of Jamat-e-Islami admit, not so openly of course, that they had participated in Afghan Jihad during the days of its official glorification, under the banner of the US and funding by CIA344. Some of them even admitted having knowledge about certain activities, carried out by Jamat, in Indian held Kashmir345. Data shows that Jamat-e- Islami concentrated more in former NWFP and Baluchistan, particularly areas near Afghan border, than in the Punjab. ―Out of 107 affiliated DM in 1983/84 only 37 were located in Punjab, while 41 pertained to NWFP and to the Tribal Areas where most of the schools were situated close to Afghan border‖346. It highlights their practical attachment with the ―governmental Jihad strategy‖. Despite all its well organized structuring, well financed set up and repeated support for most of the Military regimes, it is still unable to win the hearts of people. Many people still consider it a subsidiary organization of the Military and avoid extending any political support. Still one cannot ignore the fact that the party has chains of English medium schools, with a mixture of religious education to attract moderate parents. The products of such institutions, along with those of others, are helped settling in governmental jobs and other influential positions in the society. They might be aiming at achieving a handsome number of staunch supporters, occupying important positions, and then initiating reform, from within, at a massive level in the society.

342 Ibid 66-67 343 Ibid 75 344 Open Secret; everybody knows how the USA pampered these warriors and CIA financed and trained them. 345 Literature spread by Jamat in the society and information provided by people who do not want their names to be disclosed. As a matter of fact, one can still see places, inside Mansoora office of Jamat, named after martyrs of Kashmir Jihad with details. 346 Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996.) 196

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5.2: Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) The British introduced their socio-political set up in India after establishing their rule. Their efforts were resented and were substituted by some local clerics. The Muslim clergy strengthened its parallel educational system to ensure the survival of Islamic, or even indigenous, social set up from the onslaught of European culture. Darul Uloom Deoband was established for the same purpose347. The Ulema, following other schools of interpretations were also doing the same, one way or the other. The weaknesses of Ottoman Empire and its subsequent defeat, at the hands of allies in the First World War, forced the Muslims of Sub-continent, particularly the Ulema, to participate in practical politics. The movement launched to protect the Holy places and the Caliphate was labeled as ‗Khilafat Movement‘. The religious sentiments were exploited and the Muslims here were forced to commit political suicides348. ‗Jamiat Ulema Hind‘ (JUH), the very first religious political party, was founded in 1919. Initially it cooperated with the Muslim League but later on developed differences and opted nationalist point of view thus opposed the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Ultimately, pro Muslim League Ulema established ‗Jamiat Ulema Islam‘ (JUI), in 1945, to counter anti-Pakistan propaganda of JUH during the crucial elections349. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was elected its first President in his absence350. Jamiat Ulema Hind, however, continued opposing the demand and even condemned the creation of Pakistan351. Jamiat Ulema Islam later on broke into many groups, all becoming independent political parties eventually, on sectarian lines. Almost all these religious political parties established their own Madrassas for imparting religious education, preparing their political supporters and promoting their brand of religion.

347 Manazir Ahsan Gilani, Sawaniah Qasmi (Deoband: 1373 AH.) 2:319-320 348 Abandoning modern studies, surrendering surnames, properties and, above all, migration movement; all were political suicides by the Muslims of sub-continent. 349 M Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976.) 36 350 Anwar al-Hassan in M Rafique Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958 36 351 Muhammad Mian, Ulema-e-Hind Ka Shandar Mazi (Karachi: Maktaba Rasidia,1991.) 6:114-502

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JUI has been in active politics since day one; from Objectives Resolution 1949 to Tehreek Khatm-e-Nubuwwat 1954352 and 1974353. JUI remained active in almost all political activities, during different phases of history; from Combined Opposition Party (COP), Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) and Muthida Majlis Amal (MMA). Incidentally, JUI always remained in the front row of volunteers for serving the sitting governments particularly the military dictators. JUI supported General Zia-ul-Haq in US proxy war in Afghanistan, against Soviet Union. It also ‗helped‘ General Pervaiz Musharraf legitimize all his actions, including his election as the President- even in uniform- through 17th Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan. The leader of one of its strongest faction; JUI (F) Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman remained ‗Leader of Opposition‘ during 2002-2007 Parliamentary period and worked as ―Friendly Opposition‖354. JUI is more influential in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP) and Baluchistan. That is why this party remained over efficient during Afghan Jihad in providing Mujahedeen and training to them in and through their Madrassas355. Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman personally established contacts with the government agencies and rendered all the support- the agencies could pay for356. Many other leaders also admitted openly about their activities which in no way could be declared as educational. Samiul Haq said, ―Even before the Pakistani government had an Afghan policy, we were sending our mujahids to fight alongside the Afghan

352 Government of the Punjab, Punjab Enquiry Report (Government of the Punjab: 1954.) 353 First anti Ahmadi movement and protest resulted into imposition of first martial law in Lahore in 1954. Later, Khatm Nabuwat Movement, became strong in 1974, and Ahmadis were eventually declared Non-Muslim through 2nd Constitutional Amendment in1974. 354 Title given to MMA by Mir Zafar Ullah Jamali, P.M. Pakistan from 2002-2004. The title however was given by him after the end of his Premiership. 355 Darul Uloom Haqania (Akora Khatak Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) where Mullah Umer is said to have been studying is controlled by this party directly. 356 Ray Robinson, Has the Global Islamic Jihad Movement Fractured? At, http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/03/has_the_global_islamic_jihad_m.html ,27, May 2012.

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mujahidin. We did not need the ISI; the ISI and the CIA needed us‖357.

5.3: Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP) It was established during a meeting of Sunni Ulema at ―Madrasah-i- Islamiah Arabia Anwar al-Uloom‖ Multan on 28 March 1948358. Maulana Abu‘l Hasnat Qadiri became first president. The list of primary objectives included359; i. Making Pakistan a ―true Islamic state‖. ii. Promoting Islamic ideas and ideals among the Muslims of Pakistan. iii. Uniting the Ulema of Ahl Sunnat. It was among the first ones to support Kashmir Jihad financially and morally in 1948360. Most of its followers are ―Ahl Sunnat Wal Jamat‖ ―Barelvi‖. Population wise the followers of this set of interpretations are in overwhelming majority in the Punjab and also are in majority in other parts of Pakistan. The following characteristics are common among these people. i. Respect for shrines. ii. Less participation in the activities of religious political parties. iii. Least participation in agitations and street power shows by religious political parties. iv. Regular TV and Cinema viewing but also observing fasts and offering prayers. v. Moving with the fashion trends and clothes in vogue, within certain limits; not crossing the cultural and religious limits, in most of the cases. vi. Organizing, or even attending, ‗Mahfil-e-Naat and Qawwali- for sentimental satisfaction and to strengthen moorings with the religion.

357 Samiul Haq, the head of the JUI (S), interviewed and quoted in, ICG Report, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military 20 March 2003, at, http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/icg/pakistanmullahsandmilitary.pdf , 4-Oct-2012. 358 Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam‟iyyat Ulama-i-Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993.) 2. Also see Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.) 31-32 359 Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam‟iyyat Ulama-i-Pakistan 3-4 360 Ibid 5-6

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vii. Most of them attend the company of Pirs or successors ―Gadinasheen‖; of famous shrines. Barelvis intend to follow the teachings of saints and scholars, particularly the local ones. This tendency is though criticized by some groups, particularly Ahl Hadis, Salafi group, but still such teachings are revered and cherished due to cultural similarities. The critics however label such teachings as ‗indigenized Islam‘. That is why, the Barelvi are last ones, as a group, to agitate against any social change361. JUP is relatively stronger in the Punjab. Their meetings usually take place in big Madrassas362. These political activities do have a strong impact on the students of such Madrassas. JUP could not remain active continuously in the national politics, as compared to its rival JUI. The first incident when it successfully brought people on streets was a religious issue that had a great sentimental value for masses. Sir Zafarullah Khan, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, delivered a speech in Karachi on 18 May 1952. Some parts of this speech were declared unacceptable for the Muslims and the Muslim political parties demanded his removal and declaration of Ahmadis as non- Muslims363. Agitations and riots started in the country, particularly in Lahore. This resulted in the imposition of First Martial Law in Lahore in 1953. The agitation was controlled, with an iron hand, by military. ―Tracers work both ways‖. This episode made religious political parties aware of their strength as well as the government. At later stages, JUP established its students‘ wing, to ensure continuous supply of supporters. Anjuman Talaba Islam (ATI) was established in 1968 for the same purposes364. It was launched in both Madrassas and regular schools and colleges to make the youth aware of their Islamic duties, regarding the protection and spread of Islam and protest against un-Islamic practices. Evidences show that JUP, and its associate groups, do not declare any cultural influence as ‗cultural invasion‘ not at least that rapidly as the JUI and Jamat-e-Islami do. The only event that motivates them and brings them to streets is ‗blasphemy‘. They consider love and

361 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan 33-34 362 Mujeeb Ahmad, Jam‟iyyat Ulama-i-Pakistan 11-33 363 Ibid 12 364 Ibid 220

172 respect for the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as a symbol of their faith365. Avoid such incidents and you do not need to worry about the threat of agitation from a huge chunk of Muslim population of the country. There are no explicit evidences, or proofs, of JUP‘s involvement, in providing Jihadis for the Afghan war, or helping con man during Afghan War in the 1980s. If any member of this organization, or any disciple of its Madrassas, volunteered for the ‗Afghan Jihad‘, it must have been his personal decision. The support for Kashmir cause was also verbal and moral; a few traces of practical support also fall into personal choice category.

5.4: Minhaj-Ul-Quran and Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) Dr. Tahir Ul Qadri is a reputed scholar. He has initiated several research and education activities and has established educational institutions to provide religious education, under modern formats, in the country, as well as in some foreign countries. His Madrassa, Minhaj-ul-Quran, has become a university now and HEC has notified this Madrassa as an independent degree awarding Madrassa366. Dr. Tahir ul Qadri formed a political party; Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) in May 1989367. He contested the elections of 1990 but could not win any seat. Subsequently, he reorganized his party and focused upon the youth. His sermons got political coloring and the students of his Madrassa started participating in the meetings of the party368. Minhaj-Ul-Quran is an international movement with branches in several countries369. In Pakistan, it has some influence in Punjab. PAT offices are not linked up with Madrassas but the students do participate in party meetings and rallies. Tehrik Minhaj-ul-Quran is open for donations and fund raising but is not involved in Jihadi activities or violence370. The International Biographical

365 Most of the acts of punishing those who were responsible for blasphemy were carried out by Barelvis. The protests in March 2006, against blasphemous cartoons, were organized by the Barelvi Ulema; most of whom were not political leaders. 366 HEC letter No (8-16HEC/A&A/2004) issued on 12 May 2004. Appendix (E) 367 Tahir ul Qadri, http://qadri.minhaj.org/en/content/view/21/38/ 4-June-2012. 368 Personal observation and news read in different newspapers. 369 Tahir ul Qadri, http://qadri.minhaj.org/en/content/view/21/38/ 4-June-2012. 370 Interviews of various heads of Madrassas.

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Centre (IBC) of Cambridge, England has declared Dr Tahir Ul Qadri as, ―The International Man of the year 1998-99‖ for promoting peace in the society371. Dr. Tahir ul Qadri became member of National Assembly in 2002 General Elections, from Lahore City, but resigned from his seat after a couple of years and went into political hibernation, abandoning practical politics. His Awami Tehrik also went out of the scene as he settled in Canada and even acquired Canadian citizenship. Suddenly, he had a flashback of political activities and came back to Pakistan, just before 2013 General Elections, like a bolt from the blue. His standpoint was that accountability was more important than holding General Elections. His episodic entry into Pakistan politics ended inaudibly when the General Elections took place, according to schedule, and it was once again proven that people raver religious leaders, in religious matters, but do not support them in politics.

5.5: Splinter Groups Several Shia and Sunni groups emerged during 1990s, due to ―Weaponing of sectarianism‖372. Tehrik Nifaz Fiqa Jafria (TNFJ), a sectarian Shia group was organized as a reaction to the violent activities of Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). It differed from other Shia groups in its approach towards political and social outlook. It was based in limited ―Imam Bargahs‖. Though it had an aggressive nature yet it neither sent its members to any camp for training nor motivated them to fight in Afghanistan. If there were any instances, they were merely individual actors who got training, somehow, and joined Iranian backed Shia fighters in Afghanistan373. Other groups like ―Jaish Muhammad‖ and ―Sipah Muhammad‖ had some Madrassas in Pakistan where they taught their interpretations of Islam. Much of this teaching was based on intolerance and extremism. Most of the sectarian incidents that took place in Pakistan in the last twenty years could be traced to these groups. The Government of Pakistan banned all these

371 List of awards of Dr. Tahir ul Qadri, http://qadri.minhaj.org/en/content/view/21/38/ ,4 June 2012. 372 The abundance of weapons and their frequent use against each other, by sectarian groups. 373 Interviews and discussions with the heads of different Madrassas.

174 religious extremist groups in 2002374. Sipah Sahaba was the only group that had a, relatively, strong influence and standing in Deobandi Madrassas, under its influence. Its leaders used to challenge the writ of the state and even tried to implement their own brand of Islam; which had no room or relaxation for disagreement or difference of opinion375.

5.6: Charlie Wilson’s War ―How America ‗manages‘ Eurasia is critical. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the world‘s three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia would almost automatically entail Africa‘s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania geopolitically peripheral to the world‘s central continent. About 75 per cent of the world‘s people live in Eurasia, and most of the world‘s physical wealth is there as well, both in its enterprises and underneath its soil. Eurasia accounts for about three-fourths of the world‘s known energy resources‖376. The US was putting all efforts to restrict the influence of former Soviet Union, since the start of the Cold War. Though it had to face a humiliation in the Vietnam War yet it was determined to make USSR pay. The USSR made a historical mistake by entering into Afghanistan-the graveyard of empires. It provided the US an opportunity to settle score with the USSR. Pakistan, due to its geo-strategic importance, had to play the role of a host for both American analysts and strategists and Afghan warriors. The religion was used as a legitimizer to induce religious minded Afghans. Historical Deobandi influences in Afghanistan and personal tilt of people like General Zia ul haq, towards Deobandi interpretations, paved the way for some politically

374 BBC, Religious Extremist Groups Banned in Pakistan, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1758534.stm , 18 July 2012. 375 Tarekhi Dastavaiz, at, http://www.kr-hcy.com/Historicald/x/index.shtml , 18-July-2012. 376 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chess Board (New York: Basic Books, 1997.) 31, available at, http://endthelie.com/books-and-reading-material/zbigniew-brzezinski-the- grandchessboard/#axzz2lk4ypfkT , 29-May-2012

175 motivated Deobandi leaders and Madrassa administrators to render their services in that holy campaign. International political environment affects the regional, as well as, local scenario. The ideological differences, that divided the world countries into two major blocs; Capitalist and Communist, shed their imprints on south Asia as well. Most of the Muslim countries are capitalist by economic set up and pro West by design. Communist ideas did attract some Muslim rulers but still they were unable to justify the Godlessness of the Soviet Union. Two significant events took place in the neighbourhood of Pakistan in1979. Iranian Islamic Revolution in early 1979 and Soviet entry into Afghanistan in Dec 1979 put indelible effects on geo-strategic importance of Pakistan. Both the events persuaded the scholars and researchers, all over the world, to look for the reasons and effects of these two mega events. The former proved to be self- sufficient, in many aspects, but the later invited external support and assistance, as it fit in the global US designs of countering Communism at global level. Pakistan could not escape the role as a facilitator to the US but, instead, it became a party in the Afghan war. The elite in Pakistan were always pro US, so it was easy to assign them a task as they were always willing to work on any assignment. As far as people were concerned, the US had been declaring resistance to communism as a religious duty of the Muslims of Pakistan since long377. The rulers and decision makers of financially mismanaged countries like Pakistan cannot think of living without foreign aid. The foreign aid, invariably, comes without any strings attached to it. According to Feroz Khan Noon, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, ―Pakistan‘s relations with the U.S.A. are governed partly by the aid which this country had been giving to Pakistan…. This aid, however generous it has been and still is, involves the U.S.A. directly with the planning and administration of the receiving country. It is unrealistic to assume that any substantial aid from any country can be given without any ‗strings‘ attached to it‖.378

377 Feroz Khan Noon Former Prime Minister of Pakistan in, Nazir Naji , Savere Savere, Daily Jang 29 May 2007. 378 Feroz Khan Noon, From Memory (Islamabad: The National Book Foundation, 1993.) 292

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The US interests and influence continued affecting the decision making in Pakistan. Eventually, it increased in Afghanistan when US Ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped and killed in Kabul in February 1979. The US ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped and killed in Kabul on 14 February 1979. President Jimmy Carter signed a directive on 3 July 1979 through which he authorized secret aid and assistance to anti-Soviet elements in Afghanistan. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter‘s National Security Advisor, wrote a note to the President, telling him, ―In my opinion, this aid was going to induce a Soviet military invasion‖379. When Russia invaded Afghanistan, Brzezinski again wrote to President Carter, ―We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam‖380. It was all due to lack of trust between the USA and USSR. The Americans never trusted the Soviets. Brzezinski expressed his version, ―Détente of the kind that existed in the mid-Seventies was really undermined by the Soviets, who thought that they could have détente and a fundamental shift in the balance of power at the same time381. The US started providing financial and military assistance to resistance groups fighting against Soviet Union and pro-Soviet Union Afghan government382. Religious sentiments were used and this war was labeled as ―Islam‘s war against Infidels‖. The warriors, participating in this war, were declared ―Mujahideen‖ and were assured victory because, ―God was with them‖383. All this was done with only one objective: avenge the Soviet Union. For this, all methods and schemes, irrespective of their long-term consequences, were initiated and operationalized. Several local activists were hired to glorify Afghan war as Jihad. Some religious political parties also benefitted from this

379 Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, (President Jimmy Carter‘s National Security Advisor), The CIA‘s Intervention in Afghanistan, at, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html ,18-Sep-2012 380 Ibid 381 Zbigniew Brzezinski, quoted in, Robert D. Billard, Jr., Operation Cyclone: How the United States Defeated the Soviet Union (Undergraduate Research Journal at UCCS Volume 3.2, October 2010) at, http://ojs.uccs.edu/index.php/urj/article/viewDownloadInterstitial/103/91, 23-Sep-2012. 382 Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, (President Jimmy Carter‘s National Security Advisor), The CIA‘s Intervention in Afghanistan , at, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html ,23- Sep- 2012 383 Zbigniew Brzezinski, to Mujahedeen, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYvO3qAlyTg , 21-Sep-2012.

177 situation and minted millions of Dollars- many through propagation of Jihad in their Madrassas, and others, while some through providing foot soldiers for this campaign. Some writers even blame such people for supporting ―Taliban‖ and Al-Qaeda even after 1998384. Today‘s terrorists were heroes yesterday. People like Osama Bin Laden were prancing around in Pakistan, with government support and US patronage, only because he was working for the US and was a key operative in her global designs. Almost all the terrorist, who are playing havoc with Pakistan society, are actually the freedom fighters, Mujahideen, of 1980s385. A brief account of the training and equipment supply to these warriors, by the US, can help understand the gravity of the situation and the monsters we are to deal with. Most of the writers started writing about CIA links with Afghan Mujahideen, now labeled as Terrorists, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, but there were a few who started highlighting these ‗affairs‘ and tried to bring into light the horrible results of ignoring a professionally trained groups of warriors. CIA provided modern and sophisticated ammunition to Mujahideen and also practically trained them how to use it, effectively, against Soviet Army in Afghanistan. According to Steve Coll, the CIA supplied Mujahideen, ―Delayed timing devices for tons of C-4 plastic explosives for urban sabotage and sophisticated guerrilla attacks, long-range sniper rifles, a targeting device for mortars that was linked to a U.S. Navy satellite, wire-guided anti-tank missiles, and other equipment‖386. CIA specialists also guided and supervised ISI personnel in planning operations for Afghan Mujahideen.

384 Ray Robison, Has the Global Islamic Jihad Movement fractured? American Thinker, July 28, 2011, at, http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/03/has_the_global_islamic_jihad_m.html , 23-Sep- 2012. 385 Hillary Clinton-US Created Al Qaeda Trained, Armed, and Funded them Too, at, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIw29u7m7WA , 23-Sep-2012. 386 Steve Coll, CIA‟s Covert Afghan War (Washington Post 9 July 1992.) at, http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/TerrorInUSA/Anatomy.asp, 23-Sep- 2012

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―At any one time during the Afghan fighting season, as many as 11 ISI teams trained and supplied by the CIA, accompanied the Mujahideen across the border to supervise attacks. The teams attacked airports, railroads, fuel depots, electricity pylons, bridges and roads‖387. CIA equipped Mujahideen with modern weapons and special skills, through training, when William Casey, then CIA Chief, got a new strategy approved; suggesting increased weaponing of Mujahideen and special training for specific operations. ―Casey connected with these allies as they developed a new plan for Afghan Jihad. Known as National Security Decision Directive 166, with an annex, classified Top Secret/ Code word, the blueprint they produced before the legal basis for a massive escalation of the CIA‘s role in Afghanistan, starting in 1985. The new policy document provided a retroactive rationale for the huge increase in covert funds forced into the Afghanistan program in late 1984 by Charlie Wilson. It also looked forward to a new era of direct infusion of advanced US military technology into Afghanistan, intensifies training of Islamist guerrillas in explosive and sabotage techniques, and targeted attacks on Soviet military officers designed to demoralize the Soviet high command. Among other consequences these changes pushed CIA, along with its clients in the Afghan resistance and in Pakistani intelligence, closer to the grey fields of assassination and terrorism‖388. CIA trained Mujahideen in modern warfare and taught them how to use sophisticated equipment, ―CIA operations officers helped Pakistani trainers establish schools for the Mujahideen in secure communications, guerrilla warfare, urban sabotage and heavy weapons…Pakistani officers traveled to the United States for training on the Stinger

387 General Yousaf, The Bear Trap, quoted in Ibid 388 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 ( New York: Penguin Press, 2004.) 123-124

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in June 1986 and then set up a secret Mujahideen Stinger training facility in Rawalpindi, complete with an electronic simulator made in the United States. The simulator allowed Mujahideen trainees to aim and fire at a large screen without actually shooting off expensive missiles. The screen marked the missile's track and calculated whether the trainee would have hit his airborne target‖389. Millions of Dollars were distributed through local operatives. ISI was a liaison in the whole affair. Religious political parties were funded heavily to establish and run Hoax Madrassas; where the recruits could be trained and brainwashed for Afghan War390. Finances were provided to different heads of religious political parties and of Madrassas to improve the infrastructure of their establishments. It was an easy way of convincing poor parents to send their children to such Madrassas where facilities were abundant and the students had good boarding facilities. Some of these leaders utilized these funds for their personal needs and pleasures. They purchased costly vehicles to travel and constructed big houses for themselves. Some of them used this opportunity to promote their personal dogmas. They tried to impose their own interpretation of Islamic principles upon others. As a result of these unchecked activities, many extremist religious groups emerged in the society. Some of them established their own institutions where training was given; how to convince opponents through force. The students in these institutions enjoyed full access to weapons. They claim to be public welfare organizations but actually they have their hidden motives and are still preparing groups of semi trained people in the art of using weapons. The students are allowed to keep loaded arms in their hostels. Sometimes accidents occur and result into the loss of precious lives391.

389 General Yousaf, The Bear Trap, quoted in, Steve Coll, CIA‟s Covert Afghan War (Washington Post 9 July 1992.) 390 Amjad Hussain, Born in CIA at, http://www.zoklet.net/totse/en/politics/central_intelligence_agency/162381.html, 21-Sep- 2012. 391 A student got killed by his own gun in his hostel room,Death of Saad Haris, Saut Al Jamia Magazine (Jamia Al Daawaa Al Islamia Muridke, July 2006.) 6-7

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Islam has emphasized greatly on acquiring education. The curriculum, taught by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) included subjects and training related to reasoned knowledge, along with revealed knowledge. The idea was to produce capable and competent citizens; rather than dwarfed followers. The experience in Pakistan, regarding leader follower relationship, has not been very healthy; for the promotion of followers‘ characters. Mostly, the leaders, both religious and political, expect their followers to render support only; questioning is usually not allowed and criticism, even the healthy and honest one, is seldom tolerated. In Pakistan, most of the religious political parties, like most of the other mainstream political parties, expect their supporters to strengthen the cause of the party; without bringing into question the authenticity and productivity of their policies. Such attitude, and interaction, does not promote political consciousness; among the supporters. Consequently, the leaders are at liberty to adopt any strategy, and float any idea, declaring it ―the only solution‖ to the prevailing issues. Such leaders have been frequently using their street power for personal gains; either through supporting a specific governmental scheme or organizing protests, to pressurize the sitting governments. The role played by some religious political parties of Pakistan, during Afghan campaign in 1980s, is a clear manifestation of the domineering role of religious political leaders. Politics is not a forbidden tree in Islam. All the Muslims are directed, by Allah Almighty Himself, in the Holy Quran, and by His Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), to live in society and develop the society according to the Islamic principles. The important thing is to maintain a balance between various duties and responsibilities, assigned to the Muslims; both in the realm of religion and social life. Those who are able to maintain balance are the cherished ones. Religious political leaders, despite all their efforts, are usually unable to maintain impartiality and neutrality; while discussing social issues and events with their students. Their political ideas do receive appreciation from their fellow teachers and students, in their Madrassas. Consequently, a class of political supporters emerges, and strengthens, automatically; without much effort. The trickledown effects of political activities, carried out in Madrassas, produce foot-soldiers for religious political parties.

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Education is, first and last, an effort to improve character and develop capabilities in the youth; to enable them perform social duties more efficiently and productively. An education system that does not enable people acquire better social skills; character traits, should not be considered as an educational system in the first place. Any arrangement to misuse such a sacred system cannot be anything except betrayal to the cause of humanity. Political motives of local and foreign leaders have put a shame to the Madrassa education system. Despite all religious and international justifications, educational institutions should not be used for political objectives. Their students must be the last resort for political activists, only in the matters of self-survival and for limited time only. The students were used by the Muslim League as well, during Pakistan Movement, but their physical and intellectual abilities were used only; to motivate the Muslims of sub- Continent in favour of Pakistan. As soon as the objective was achieved, the Quaid himself directed students to abandon political activities and concentrate back on their studies. The Ulema, who used their Madrassas for political objectives, were, inherently, unable to understand the implications and complications of politicizing their Madrassas. The education system, they had been living in and preserving, had deprived them of foresight and had incapacitated them to anticipate the results in the long run. Being unaware of the ―Butterfly effect‖ of their activities, they thought of the immediate benefits and were unable to comprehend the effects that were associated with their policies, in the long run. The products, they had helped produce, are now causing serious problems for the country. A small activity has become a great menace now.

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Chapter: 6 The Veracity of Madrassa Education System in the Punjab

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The primary objectives of this study are to evaluate and calculate the potentials and capabilities of Madrassa students; to become productive members of the existing socio-political set up of Pakistan. To what extent the threat perceptions, as propagated by some agencies and institutions, are right? Is there a need to take special, long term or short term, steps to change, amend or alter the life patterns and perceptions of the Madrassa graduates? In order to evaluate that to what extent Madrassa graduates are responsible for, or are involved in, criminal activities, a comprehensive research on the background of accused/ criminals both captured and not captured is needed. It might fall into the domain of Forensic Sciences but is outside the conceptual framework of this research. The search for truth has always been the virtues of wise and intelligent men. Researches and fact finding investigations have long been initiated to study and, if possible, influence human thoughts and actions. The objectives of scientific research include collection of authentic data and presentation of valid and dependable results. In order to make a research focused on a specific issue, or particular dimensions of an issue, variables are identified and research is designed to study causal relationship between various activities and their results. This research is also designed to study the effects of certain variables, which cause variance in output; along with an intention to reform the output. This research is primarily based on responses collected from Madrassa students. The effort is to collect their opinions regarding the prevailing socio- politico-economic set up, in Pakistan; so as to evaluate their potentials and prospects of living harmoniously, along with other communities and groups, in the society. This research will address regular school, college and university education as ―general education‖; because it includes several subjects in it. While, Madrassa education concentrates on religious education alone therefore, it will be called as ―specific education‖. The specializations in various fields of knowledge, law, medicine, business etc., including religious education at post-masters levels will, be mentioned as ―specialization education‖.

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6.1: The Survey The Punjab was taken as a case study as conducting survey in the entire country was not possible; keeping in mind the travelling ordeals and poor law and order conditions in some parts of the country. Apart from that, no special governmental facilities or support are provided to the researchers in Pakistan. The survey was, therefore, conducted in the Punjab Province of Pakistan; as it was not possible to conduct such a mammoth research by the researcher alone. Within the Punjab, visiting all thirty seven districts of the Punjab was neither appreciable nor possible. Therefore, applying the stratified sampling techniques, nine divisional headquarters- stretching from Eastern border with India, Lahore, to Western edge of the province, Dera Ghazi Khan, Northern corner of the province, Rawalpindi to South Eastern corner, Bahawalpur- were visited. These divisional headquarters also represent demographic characteristics of the province; necessary to make findings, of a survey, generalizable. According to 1998 Census, the cities, on the basis of population, were divided into three categories. The updated list below explains the details.

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Table 6.1: Divisional Headquarters and Districts of the Punjab S No City Population (1998) Size 1 Attock 1,274,935 Small 2 Bahawalnagar 2,061,447 Medium 3 Bahawalpur 2,433,091 Medium 4 Bhakkar 1,051,456 Small 5 Chakwal 1,083,725 Small 6 Chiniot* - Small 7 Dera Ghazi Khan 1,643,118 Small 8 Faisalabad 5,429,547 Big 9 Gujranwala 3,400,940 Big 10 Gujrat 2,048,008 Medium 11 Hafizabad 832,980 Small 12 Jhang 2,834,545 Medium 13 Jhelum 936,957 Small 14 Kasur 2,375,875 Medium 15 Khanewal 2,068,490 Medium 16 Khushab 905,711 Small 17 Lahore 6,318,745 Big 18 Layyah 1,120,951 Small 19 Lodhran 1,171,800 Small 20 Mandi Bahauddin 1,160,552 Small 21 Mianwali 1,056,620 Small 22 Multan 3,116,851 Big 23 Muzaffargarh 2,635,903 Medium 24 Narowal 1,265,097 Small 25 Nankana Sahib* - Small 26 Okara 2,232,992 Medium 27 Pakpattan 1,286,680 Small 28 Rahim Yar Khan 3,141,053 Medium 29 Rajanpur 1,103,618 Small 30 Rawalpindi 3,363,911 Big

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31 Sahiwal 1,843,194 Small 32 Sargodha 2,665,979 Medium 33 Sheikhupura 3,321,029 Big 34 Sialkot 2,723,481 Medium 35 Toba Tek Singh 1,621,593 Small 36 Vehari 2,090,416 Medium Total 73,621,290 *Districts were recently created and no data is available yet. Districts highlighted in Green are Divisional Headquarters. Legends: Size determined according to the following formula More than 3 Million Populations Big More than 2 Million Population Medium Less than 2 Million Population Small Source: 1998 Census data (updated by researcher) available at, http://neims.com.pk/downloads/Population%20Census%20Data-PCO.pdf, 24-Oct, 2011.

Out of nine divisional headquarters, five are Big cities, two are Medium and remaining two are Small cities. So, cities of all three sizes were included in the survey. The heads, of Madrassa Boards were consulted while preparing the questionnaire. As the researcher is stationed in Lahore therefore, Pilot survey was conducted in Lahore. Twenty Five copies of questionnaire were distributed in Madrasas affiliated with all five Madrassa Boards. On the basis of their feedback some improvements were made and then survey was initiated. The survey was conducted from November 2011to August 2012. Initially, the questionnaire was distributed in Lahore, as it has the greatest number of Madrassas- per city- and maximum number of Madrassas ware also visited here- as being the biggest city of the Province. Other parts of the Province were visited subsequently. The survey suffered hiccups as one of the Madrassa Boards, Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, was not ready to cooperate in such an academic research. Observation of the behavioral patterns of the administration, of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, reveals that they volunteer to cooperate, efficiently, in such activities as have some

187 tangible benefits or rewards attached with it392. The research, outside Lahore, could not be started till February 2012 because Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia was not providing any reference letter. After several attempts, Qari Hanif Jalandhri, Nazim Ala Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, could be contacted personally. He, instead of facilitating this research, refused openly, from providing any reference letter or any information about the Madrassas registered with the board393. The Southern parts of the Province were visited first, due to winter season, and the Northern parts were visited after March 2012. The Central parts, of the Punjab, Gujranwala and Faisalabad were visited many a times, as they were on the way to Rawalpindi and Sargodha. The only exception Sargodha, as it is neither included in the Northern Punjab nor falls in the Southern Punjab- though is intentionally included in ―Saraikistan‖ to extend the territory and population of it- was also visited in and after March 2012. In order to collect questionnaire from some less efficient Madrassa administrators, the researcher had to pay several visits to some cities. The list of visits to several cities is given below. Table 6.2: Number of Visits to Various Cities. S No Name of City Size Visits Reasons 1 Bahawalpur Medium 2 Repeated visits to some Madrassas, their delaying tactics and slow response. 2 Dera Ghazi Khan Small 2 To collect responses from one Madrassa 3 Faisalabad Big 7 Repeated visits to some Madrassas, their delaying tactics and slow response. 4 Gujranwala Big 3 To collect responses from Two Madrassas 5 Lahore Big * Repeated visits to Madrassas for collecting responses.

392 For details see Ahmad Raza Khan, Madrassa Education in the Punjab Pakistan (Unpublished M Phil Thesis, Department of Political science, G. C. University Lahore. Chapter 4) 58-59 393 Meeting with Qari hanif Jalandhri, Nazim Ala Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, in his Lahore Madrassa Jamia AlKhair, Johar Town on 11-Feb-2012.

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6 Multan Big 3 To meet Qari Hanif Jalandhri and collect responses from some Madrassas. 7 Rawalpindi Big 3 To convince some Madrassa heads and collect responses. 8 Sahiwal Small 2 To collect responses from some Madrassas 9 Sargodha Medium 3 Repeated visits to one Rabta Tul Madaris Madrassa, delaying tactics by its administration and slow response. * As the researcher is stationed in Lahore therefore number of visits could not be calculated as some Madrassa were visited even more than five times. Sometimes questionnaire was redistributed in some Madrassas.

Permission letters were requested from al Madrassa Boards. Heads of Four Madrassa Boards were kind enough to cooperate fully. They provided lists of addresses and reference letter to the heads of affiliated Madrassas, requesting them to cooperate in this academic research394. The experiences of M Phil research, in the same field were of great help in the researcher. The reference letter given by late Dr. Sarfraz Naeemi, back in 2006, was of great help as the same contents were copied by all Madrassa heads. The only exception was Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia. Its administration refused to provide any information or even extend any cooperation. 6.1.1: The Obstinate Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia is, proclaimed to be, the biggest Madrassa Board in Pakistan395. Despite their limited following, they claim to have the highest number of students in Madrassas. This claim is being repeated, persistently, for last couple of decades. One needs a comprehensive research to determine the authenticity of such claim as, in case of being true half of the Muslims in Pakistan should be Deobandi by now; on account of number of

394 See Appendix (A) for details. 395 The Board does not provide exact information, not at least to academic researchers, and their website shows mixed counting of both Madrassas and Maktabs. Perhaps a thorough investigation into the matter may reveal the facts but this definitely falls out of the conceptual framework of this research.

189 students appearing in the final exams every year. As this issue is out of the design of this research, it will not include verification of such claims. The only objective is to evaluate the perceptions and potentials of Madrassa graduates and not the validity of claims made by Madrassa Board(s). The administration of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia was contacted to get addresses of affiliated Madrassas and a reference letter; to ensure smooth conduct of this research. The Nazim Ala, Qari Hanif Jalandhri was contacted, in Multan, through his office phone no on 19-Dec-2011. His phone attendant, Mr. Aslam told that Qari sb was busy and could not be contacted. After six calls, on various days and times, Qari hanif Jalandhri was available on phone on 28-Dec-2011. When the researcher informed him about the research and its scope, he said, ―Send me the details of what you need in written form and also the copies of reference letters given by other boards‖396. The required information was sent immediately. Then started a long spell of phone calls by the researcher and delaying tactics, using excuses like Qari sb was busy or not available, started. During these calls, it was observed that the phone operators were not allowed to communicate exact information about the availability of Qari sb. They even hesitated mentioning the number of days after which one may call to contact Qari sb. They always said, ―Qari sb is not available. Contact after so many days‖397. On 18-Jan-2012, it was communicated by Mr. Aslam that the letter would be posted today or tomorrow and would reach the researcher in two or three days. On 19-Jan-2012, the letter, dated 17-Jan-2012, was received, by the researcher, through which the researcher was directed to contact Madrassas personally and collect required information; if they wanted to communicate398. The information about affiliated Madrassa and their addresses were neither mentioned in the letter nor was the list provided ever.

396 Qari Hanif Jalandhri, Nazim Ala Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, in telephonic conversation, with the researcher, on 28-Dec- 2011 at 6:10 PM. 397 The researcher sometimes asked about calling after three or four days or a week but the staff never said ok to any time limit. Their only emphasis was on not telling any number of days. On 7- Jan- 2012, one of the phone attendants, in the absence of Mr. Aslam told the researcher, on the condition of anonymity, that Qari sb had strictly forbidden everybody from telling his schedule to anyone and no one could dare give even a guess when he would be available. He said, ―Qari sahib nay sakhti say mana kiya hai kisi ko bhi unke mutaliq batanay kay liye. Sirf itna kahnay ki ijazat hai kah abhi dastiab nahi hain, baad main pata karlain‖. 398 Appendix (A)

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The letter was signed by Saifullah Abrar, assistant to Nazim Ala Qari Hanif Jalandhri. He, Saifullah Abrar said that it was what was ordered by Qari sb. The researcher then traced the contact number of Molana Saleemullah Khan, President Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia. He is Mohtamim Jamia Farooqia Karachi. He has a fulltime assistant, Molana Abdul Razaq, to look after the affairs on his behalf. According to him, ―He is not available to everybody trying to contact him and the matters of Wafaq were to be handled by Qari Hanif Jalandhri‖399. He further added, ―President [Wafaq] has said that Wafaq will neither give any information about its affiliated Madrassas nor will give any reference letter. You may collect information personally or through your contacts‖400. The researcher, as being a persistent person, contacted the office of Qari Hanif Jalandhri once again to request a personal meeting with him and try to explain the seriousness of the matter and convince him on authenticity of the research. He, as usual, was not accessible. His telephone operator, Mr. Hanif, despite knowing that the researcher was calling from Lahore and was anxious to meet Qari sb, did not inform that Qari sb was in Lahore401. He was still saying that Qari sb was out of Multan and there were no chances of his return within a couple of days. This ruse came to an end on 11-Feb-2012 when, to the good luck of the researcher, Qari Rashid Thanvi of Jamia Islamia Kareem Block Allama Iqbal Town Lahore told the researcher that Qari Hanif Jalandhri was in Lahore and was staying at Jamia Al Khair in Johar Town. The researcher rushed to the place and was able to meet Qari Hanif Jalandhi in his commodious office in Jamia Al Khair. The meeting continued for almost half an hour. The researcher, in a long but fruitless effort, tried to convince Qari sb but he was neither willing to cooperate nor ready to accommodate. His domineering attitude made him look like ―Aristo Amer‖402. He refused from giving any information about affiliated Madrassas, lists and addresses, and

399 Telephonic conversation with Molana Abdul Razaq, assistant to Molana Saleem Ullah Khan President Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, on 28-Jan-2012 at 1 PM. (Urdu conversation translated by the researcher) 400 Ibid telephonic conversation with Molana Abdul Razaq, on 28-Jan-2012. 401 Telephonic conversation with Mr. Hanif, telephone operator of Qari Hanif Jalandhri, on 11-Feb-2012 at 9:30 AM. 402 Aristocratic Americans who think that everybody else is wrong and only they have the right knowledge.

191 reference letter. On the request that if that was the policy of the Wafaq, it should be communicated in written form, so that it may be included in the appendix of the thesis. He openly said, ―I will neither give any letter nor will give written refusal‖403. It was last nail in the coffin and there was no further hope for any cooperation from the Wafaq administration. The abstruse behaviour of Qari Hanif Jalandhri provided inconceivable answer when he was requested, by the researcher, to provide addresses of affiliated Madrassas, ―Go to any city, ask for the most famous Madrassa from anybody, it will be our Madrassa‖404. In this dismal situation, Qari Rashid Thanvi, of Jamia Lahore Islamia, came to the rescue and extended full support. He provided references and addresses of some Madrassas of Lahore and in the surrounding cities. He also told about the official website of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia and informed about the special method of searching information on it. The survey had to be initiated, outside Lahore; and so it was. Though locating a Madrassa affiliated with Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia was not an easy task, in some areas, but convincing their administration was even harder job. Eventually, by the grace of Almighty Allah, the responses were collected according to the designed sample size.

6.2: The Madrassa Boards and their Affiliated Madrassas All the Madrassa Boards do not have equal number of affiliated Madrassas. Therefore, it is pertinent to mention each one of them separately. The Madrassa Boards have been listed alphabetically. It has been mentioned earlier that only Alia and Almia students, graduation and post-graduation respectively, had to be included in the survey, because of their maturity of thoughts and vast educational background. Therefore, only those Madrassa were included in the lists, and subsequently in the survey where higher level classes were available. Some Madrassa Boards had lists according to the levels of Madrassas; therefore they provided relevant lists only. While some

403 Qari Hanif Jalandhri, Nazim Ala Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, in discussion with the researcher at Jamia Al Khair, Johar Town Lahore, on 11-Feb-2012. He said, ―Na main likh kar doon ga, na hi letter doon ga‖ (conversation took place in Urdu, translated by the researcher) 404 Ibid meeting with Qari Hanif Jalandhri on 11-Feb-2012.

192 had only one consolidated list, they provide it and the researcher had to locate higher level Madrassas, on the basis of several factors. The Madrassas, Edifying Madrassas only, were divided into four types; on the basis of certain structural and performance related characteristics explained in the following table.

Table 6.3: Types of Edifying Madrassas S Type of Characteristics No Madrassa 1 Traditional 1. No fixed or scheduled starting time of classes. 2. No timetable developed or implemented. 3. No regular class tests and no progress record maintained. 4. No separate class rooms, usually all classes sitting in the Mosque hall or courtyard. 5. No separate periods for various topics and books. 6. No fix timing of ending of session/ discussion. 7. Discussion of concepts more important than covering syllabi/ books. 8. Personality dominated decision making. 9. Students have to get up well before Fajr Prayer. 10. Classes starting at Tahajud or soon after Fajr Prayer. 11. Breakfast at about10 AM. 12. Rest from 11 AM to 1 PM (approximately). 13. No school classes or guidance. 14. Revision after Zohar Prayer till Maghrib Prayer. 15. Dinner after Maghrib Prayer. 16. Gone to bed soon after Isha Prayer. 17. Students in hostel rooms according to classes, not age. 18. Clothing and other needs usually students‘ personal arrangements. 19. No regular setup by Madrassa to look-after student needs. 20. Strong student teacher relationship. 2 Enriched 1. Trends of colonial British/ Government schools adopted. 2. Personality dominated decision making 3. Enrolment procedure followed and record kept. 4. Timetable developed and followed, to greater extent. 5. Students have to get up at Fajr. 6. Get ready and take breakfast till almost 8 AM. 7. Daily session starts with the ringing of bell or an assembly. 8. Attendance taken and record maintained. 9. Regular class tests and record maintenance.

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10. School/ guidance for general education. 11. Classes usually start at 8 am, or so, and end at noon. 12. School classes or guidance after Zohar Prayer. 13. Lunch, of some sort, or break. 14. Revisions from Maghrib to Isha and even after words. 15. Dinner after Maghrib. 16. Mess menu not very regular. 17. Going to bed at almost 10 pm or so. 18. Strong student teacher interaction and relatively strong relationship. 3 Progressive 1. Organized on the lines of colonial British/ Government schools system. 2. Administrative bodies established, comprising of members from within and outside the Madrassa. 3. Admission tests to ensure the admission of good students. 4. Enrolment forms filled and record properly kept. 5. Timetable developed and followed strictly. 6. Academic calendar developed and followed strictly. 7. Teachers scrutinized and their performance evaluated through informal methods. 8. Student needs taken into consideration before any program. 9. Periods for various topics and books. 10. Students have to get up for Fajr Prayer. 11. Get ready and take breakfast till 8 AM. 12. Daily session starts with the ringing of bell and a compulsory assembly. 13. Attendance taken and record maintained. 14. Regular class tests and record maintenance. 15. Compulsory School classes of general education. 16. Classes usually start at 8 am, or so, and end at noon. 17. School classes after Zohar prayer. 18. Lunch, of some sort, and break after Zohar Prayer. 19. Revisions from Maghrib to Isha and even after-words. 20. Dinner after Maghrib Prayer. 21. Mess menu prepared and followed. 22. Common room and daily newspapers provided. 23. Going to bed at almost 10 PM or so. 24. Hostel incharges ensure cleaning, maintenance and cater other needs of students. 25. Mixing and interactions of students under strict control of hostel incharges. 26. Strict control in hostels to prevent sexual harassment. 27. Discussions and lectures on social/ contemporary issues arranged and appreciated. 28. Multiple student teacher interaction and a commitment to develop a good character and productive citizens.

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4 Apposite 1. Modern educational facilities and equipment used. 2. Teacher recruitment procedures to induct capable and committed teachers. 3. Strict admission policies and tests and enrolment records properly maintained. 4. Attendance record maintained and struck off lists displayed to ensure compulsory attendance. 5. A nominal fee charged from affording students. 6. Charities collected and maintained by separate department. 7. Governing and administrative bodies established, comprising of members from within and outside the Madrassa. 8. Budgeting and appropriations approved by administrative body. 9. Uniform and other codes of conduct implemented. 10. A vision of preparing productive, participative and enlightened members of society. 11. Hostels maintained under strict administrative control to ensure quality residential and mess facilities. 12. Common rooms and daily newspapers provided. 13. Character building ensured through various steps and strategies. 14. Compulsory Graduation for all students. 15. Regular school classes at noon, after Zohar. 16. Sports after Asar Prayer. 17. Revisions and dinner after Maghrib Prayer. 18. Students go to bed at 10 PM or so. 19. Equal or handsome number of day scholars. 20. Student needs and satisfaction also taken into consideration before devising a strategy or program. 21. Multiple student teacher interaction and a commitment to a comprehensive character building in student teacher relationship.

A Madrassa is known by the administration that runs it. People develop affiliations or biases towards any mosque or Madrassa usually because of the administrations, which manage them. One must also keep in mind that Madrassas are not like branches of their relevant Madrassa Board. They are affiliated with them only because of degrees and sectarian similarities. Most of the big and influential Madrassas do not follow the directions, by their Madrassa Boards, strictly. Their only interaction is regarding registration and final exams of their students. Remaining administrative and financial matters are neither the domain, nor responsibility, the Madrassa Boards. Incidentally, some Madrassa administrators do not give much weightage to the rules of

195 their respective Madrassa Board. They openly claim, and declare, ―We are not bound to obey Madrassa Board in every matter. We run our Madrassa therefore, we are at liberty to take decisions. Madrassa Boards cannot dictate us what to do‖405. There is a latent tussle between various Madrassas, even representing same sect and having affiliation with the same Madrassa Board. The reasons are sometimes easily understandable and sometimes hard to point out. Usually, this tussle is not direct and people talk about it in their close circles only. Occasionally someone speaks loudly of one‘s achievements and considers such an indicator of superiority over other Madrassas. Madrassa administrators, and their administration, usually remain active in pointing out the indicators through which they can project their Madrassa as a big and influential one. Enrolling maximum number of students, number of students appearing in the final papers of the relevant Madrassa Board and collection of funds, particularly collection of sacrificial animals‘ skins on Eid Ul Azha, are projected as symbols of bigger size and higher influence, of the Madrassa, in the society406. On the basis of certain characteristics and practices, the Madrassa administrations, of the visited Madrassas, are divided into following types. The objective is, definitely, neither humiliating nor ridiculing anybody. The only effort is to evaluate and determine the role of administration in developing the character and personality of Madrassa graduates. Teacher has a strong influence on his students. He serves as a role model for his students. He can, and does, influence the character of his students even more effectively than their parents407. Madrassa students, in several cases, become more like disciples of their teachers than mere students. As the primary focus of this research is on perceptions and potentials of Madrassa graduates, therefore, it is necessary to locate, highlight and determine those factors that play an important role in the personality grooming of these students. Teachers, as well as Madrassa administration, play a significant role in personality grooming of students- particularly when most of

405 Hafiz Hassan Madni, Principal Jamia Lahore Islamia, in discussion with the researcher, on intercom, on 29-Feb-2012. (Conversation was held in Urdu, translated by the researcher) 406 Expression deducted after discussions with heads of various Madrassas. This practice is more entrenched in relatively smaller cities and rural areas. 407 Interview of Molana Abdul Malik, President Rabta Tul Madaris Al Islamia Pakistan, on 4- Dec-2013.

196 the students are staying in Madrassa hostels. In this situation, the perceptions and actions of Madrassa teachers and administration hold great significance. Therefore, in order to stratify the Madrassa graduates, it is necessary to differentiate vigilant and efficient Madrassa administration from the not so efficient one. The following attributions have been made, to Madrassa administrations, on the basis of their characteristics mentioned against their attributes.

Table 6.4: Types of Administration in Edifying Madrassas S No Administration Characteristics of Madrassa 1 Improvident 1. Bookmark teachers408. 2. Considering only those things important that apparently or directly offer any benefit for them or their Madrassa. 3. Believing that everything else is useless. 4. Communicating religious information only. 5. Preparing Imam of Mosque only. 2 Impulsive 1. Concerned with teaching only. 2. Claim to be efficient but not very efficient. 3. Hurried performances and usually less productive. 4. Distributing religious knowledge only. 5. Aiming at producing Imam of Mosque only 3 Efficient 1. Well-read and able to teach effectively. 2. Capable of understanding the needs of time. 3. Willing to prepare productive students. 4. Disseminating religious knowledge to prepare capable and productive citizens. 5. Promote and facilitate general education and some skills to their students. 4 Organized 1. Well prepared and ready to discuss, and solve, challenges of life. 2. Capable of devising strategies to meet the needs of time. 3. Concentrating on character building as well. 4. Disseminating religious knowledge to prepare capable and productive citizens. 5. Ensuring general education to higher levels and basic skills like computer etc.

408 Title given by the researcher to the teachers who concentrate on fixed parts of books/syllabus. They do not dare see beyond the limited pages/topics. A bookmark is also placed in a book to ensure opening the same page and avoiding wasting time on other pages.

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5 Prudent 1. Well prepared and ready to perform in society. 2. Capable of foreseeing social ills and devising strategies to meet the needs of time. 3. Able to prepare a group of students that can perform productively and efficiently in the society. 4. Disseminating religious knowledge to prepare capable and productive citizens. 5. Ensuring compulsory general education, up to higher levels, and basic skills like computer etc. 6. More emphasis on character building and self- reform than imposing opinions on others. All the Madrassas and their administration, visited, were stratified on these criteria. Types of Madrassas are based on their structure, and system, while their administration was stratified on the basis of their behaviour, interaction and approach towards life. It is likely to happen that a traditional Madrassa may have improvident or impulsive administration but it cannot have organized or prudent administration. Likewise, a Madrassa can be declared progressive or apposite only when it has organized or prudent administration; as both can neither work nor stay in a traditional Madrassa. The Madrassas that cooperated in this research are entertained as equal participants, despite the fact that some of them did not return that many number of questionnaire copies as many they were provided and some even requested more copies, as they had ‗misplaced‘ some of them. As for those Madrassas which did not cooperate, one way or the other, they need to be identified separately, from each other, on the basis of their response and behaviour. They have been categorized as following. A. The Madrassas which refused, clearly and openly, to cooperate. B. The Madrassas which received the copies of questionnaire promised quick response but did not return the filled questionnaire. C. The Madrassas that claimed that the Questionnaire copies were either lost, and could not be retrieved, or were already sent back to the researcher by mail. D. The Madrassas that, claimed that they, did not have high level classes.

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Some Madrassas fall in more than one category because they changed their stance and mode of cooperation after some time. Therefore, the first label represents their first response and the second one their final position. The Madrassas are affiliated with their relevant Boards; therefore need to be discussed in their relevant clusters.

6.2.1: Rabta Tul Madaris Al Islamia Pakistan It is the smallest Madrassa Board with only eleven higher level Madrassas in the Punjab. Out of which, seven were male and four female Madrassas. As it is a small Madrassa Board and has only eleven high level Madrassas, therefore all of them had to be visited, irrespective of where they were located. Most of the Madrassa administrators were cooperative. Seven of them cooperated and extended support. Two of them did not put whole hearted effort in distributing and collecting questionnaire and two did not extend any support at all. The non-cooperating Madrassas fell in the same (B) category as both of them continued saying that they were ―working on it‖ but proved to be non-productive in the end409. Molana Abdul Malik, President Rabta Tul Madaris, showed special concern and held an inquiry from the Madrassas which had not cooperated410. Table 6.5: List of Rabta Tul Madaris High Level Madrassas in the Punjab S City High Level Visited Coope Popul Respo Perce No Madrassas rated ation nses ntage 1 Attock 2 2 1 8 3 38% 2 Bahawalpur 1 1 1 10 6 60% 3 Gujranwala 2 2 2 37 19 51% 4 Lahore 2 2 2 90 54 60% 5 Jhang 1 1 1 25 17 68% 6 Multan 1 1 1 20 3 15% 7 T. T. Singh 1 1 1 2 1 50% 8 Sargodha 1 1 0 - - - TOTAL 11 11 9 192 103 54%

409 See Appendix (B) for details. 410 Molana Abdul Malik, President, Rabta Tul Madaris, in discussion with the researcher, on 4 Dec, 2013.

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6.2.2: Tanzeem Ul Madaris Ahl Sunnat Tanzeem Ul Madaris Ahl Sunnat Pakistan is one of the biggest Madrassa Boards in Pakistan. It has a vast network of Madrassas and Maktabs in the Punjab, as being the most densely populated province of the country. They represent the overwhelming majority of the Muslims of Pakistan; Barelvi. There was a time when ―Ahl Sunnat Wal Jamat‖ title was mostly used by Barelvi Ulema, and people also understood it in the same context. Now, the situation has changed, Deobandi Ulema, initially a few and now a handsome number of them, use the same title411. Some Barelvi Ulema are skeptical of this trend and consider such practices as an attempt to mislead the majority population412. Tanzeem Ul Madaris has over 9000 affiliated Madrassas and Maktabs in Pakistan. It has 296 high level, ―Fauqani‖ Madrassas in the Punjab. Out of these, 154 Madrassas are located in the nine Divisional Headquarters, of the Punjab province; sample area. As it has been mentioned in the start, of this chapter, that sample size included only nine Divisional headquarters, therefore, only these cities were visited. In these cities, Madrassas in the core and periphery, if available, were visited. At the micro level, where more than one Madrassas were available in the same vicinity, random sampling technique was followed and easily accessible Madrassas were visited.

411 Qari M. Abubakar Siddique, of Jamia Hanafia, Madni Mohallah Jhelum, visiting card reads, ―Servant of Ahl Sunnat Wal jamat‖. 412 Madam Nabira Andleeb Naeemi, Nazim Alla Jamia Siarajia Naeemia, Mughalpura Lahore, on 10-Jan-2012. She said, ―They want to join the Swad-e-Azam [majority]‖. Urdu conversation, translated by the researcher.

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Table 6.6: List of Tanzeem Ul Madaris Ahl sunnat High Level Madrassas in the Punjab S City High Level Visited Coope Popul Resp Perce No Madrassas rated ation onses ntage 1 Bahawalpur 04 2 2 70 14 20% 2 D. G. Khan 02 2 1 5 3 60% 3 Faisalabad 28 3 2 50 42 84% 4 Gujranwala 34 5 5 94 70 74% 5 Lahore 43 12 11 633 425 67% 6 Multan 08 4 2 45 41 91% 7 Rawalpindi 26 5 3 130 80 62% 8 Sahiwal 03 3 3 55 29 53% 9 Sargodha 06 4 3 88 73 83% TOTAL 154 40 32 1170 777 66%

Incidentally, most of them are located in four most densely populated cities of the Punjab; 43 in Lahore, 34 in Gujranwala, 28 in Faisalabad and 26 in Rawalpindi- total131 leaving 156 in remaining cities. 40 Madrassas were visited and 32 cooperated fully while 8 did not cooperate for some reason413.

6.2.3: Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia is the biggest Madrassa Board with over 19000 affiliated Madrassas and Maktabs in Pakistan. As explained earlier, the Wafaq administration refused openly from providing any information about Madrassa addresses and reference letter was not provided as well. In this situation, it was difficult to locate Madrassas affiliated with Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, unlike the claim of Qari Hanif Jalandhi that Wafaq Madrassas were so much popular and, thus, were easy to locate. Even if some Madrassas were located, the biggest problem was convincing most of the boastful administrators. Some of them were apparently cooperative but did not cooperate, even after several contacts and visits and went untraceable, with mobile phones switched off, even after making promises of meeting and

413 See Appendix (B) for details

201 cooperation414. Some administrators were very cooperative and provided support, information and even guidance. The support given by Qari Rashid Thanvi of Jamia Darul Uloom Islamia was of great significance. He informed about the method of locating Madrassa addresses through Wafaq website. Though it was a time consuming activity yet helped in finding the Madrassas a lot. Qari Muhammad Umar Ibrahim of Jamia Qasmia, at Rahman Pura, also turned out to be a learned person. Though his colleagues did not share his intellectual stature yet he proved to be a vigilant and vibrant member of his community415. The response from Wafaq Al Arabia Madrassas was very poor. The researcher had to use his personal contacts, in some cases, to convince the administration and even then some of the Madrassas provided photocopies of filled questionnaire, after hiding the name of their Madrassa. In a few cases, the students of some Madrassas were contacted, after refusal by their Madrassa administration. They agreed to cooperate, after persuasion and motivation, but were so scared that they refused to fill the questionnaire with their own hands, and did not even provide personal information completely; they were afraid of being pointed out by their Madrassa administration. This was the only Madrassa Board where it became difficult to collect responses from at least one Madrassa in each city. The list of non- cooperating Madrassas is the longest in this Board as well416.

414 Three visits to Rawalpindi, to Jamia Islamia, Kashmir Road, met Dr. Abdul Rahman, Mohtamim, on 2-April-2012 and his brother, Qari Anas, on 20-May-2012. Contacted the Madrassa administration 26 times but information was not provided nor even a simple ―NO‖. 415 Meeting with Qari Muhammad Umar Ibrahim, Finance Secretary of Jamia Qasmia, Rahman Pura Lahore on 17-May-2012. He had done ―Aima Course‖ from International Islamic University Islamabad and was doing ―Diploma in English Language‖ from National University of Modern Languages (NUML). 416 See Appendix (B) for details.

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Table 6.7: List of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia High Level Madrassas in the Punjab S City High Level Visited Coope Popu Respon Perce No Madrassas* rated lation ses ntage 1 Bahawalpur - 6 1 10 6 60% 2 D. G. Khan - 5 1 10 4** 40% 3 Faisalabad - 5 1 40 8 20% 4 Gujranwala - 5 1 25 9 36% 5 Lahore - 4 2 61 34 56% 6 Multan - 4 1 10 5** 50% 7 Rawalpindi - 3 1 70 9** 13% 8 Sahiwal - 3 1 15 10 67% 9 Sargodha - 5 1 11 6 55% TOTAL - 40 10 252 91 36% * Wafaq did not provide any information at all therefore, figures are not available. ** Questionnaire collected through personal efforts.

6.2.4: Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia It is also a small Madrassa Board with 672 affiliated Madrassa and Maktabs, throughout the country. It is headquartered in Faisalabad and is headed by a wise and prudent person, Muhammad Yasin Zafar, Nazam e Alla. He was among the first ones to respond to the researcher and not only provided relevant information but also contacted some Madrassa heads and satisfied their queries regarding this research. According to the list provided by the Board, there were twenty high level Madrassas in the Punjab. Wafaq Al Salafia provided addresses of only male Madrassas. On inquiry it was told that female Madrassas neither had any willingness nor any setup to extend such support and provide such information417. As it had a limited number of Madrassas therefore all the high level Madrassas of this board had to be visited, irrespective of where they were situated. All twenty Madrassas were visited. Jamia Muhammadia Ahl Hadis at Khanpur Katora, District Rahim Yar Khan, also has its female wing

417 Visit to Wafaq Al Madaris Salafia head office, Jamia Salafia, Faisalabad, on 14-March- 2012.

203 under almost same name. The administration was kind enough to get questionnaire filled from their female students as well. That is why; the number of female respondents is very low in this Madrassa Board. Most of the Madrassa administrators were cooperative and accommodating except the heads of big Madrassas in Lahore. All three Madrassas in Lahore refused to cooperate, despite repeated recommendations and guarantees by Molana Muhammad Yasin Zafar, Nazim e Alla. The Madrassa ‗owned‘ by the renowned religious scholars- ―Jamia Lahore Islamia‖ of Hafiz Abdul Rahman Madni and his son Dr. Hafiz Hassan Madni and ―Jamia Ahl Hadis‖, Dalgaran Chowk Nishtar Road, of Hafiz Abdul Ghaffar Ropri were, unexpectedly, non-cooperative. People at Jamia Ahl Hadis were unable to locate the copies of questionnaire. The pretentious attitude of Hafiz Hassan Madni was completely not understandable. His subordinates ensured on phone that most of the questionnaire were filled and could be collected but later on it was told that they were lost and Dr. Hafiz Hassan Madni must be contacted before supplying the new copies418. When he was contacted, by the researcher, he said that he had some reservations about some questions and, according to him, ―The questions do not appear to be collecting information for an academic research‖419. He further said, vehemently, ―Madrassas are not subordinate to the Wafaq. They are managed by themselves and are [thus] not bound to follow all the directions given by the Wafaq‖420. His subordinate staff could not say anything else except that they had told Madni sb to return the filled questionnaire but he desired not to. Jamia Ahl Hadis Markaz Al Badr, at Bahawalpur, also used delaying tactics and eventually replied that the copies of the questionnaire were lost and could not be retrieved. Jamia Asria at Jhelum, despite being a modernizing Madrassa also had the same response421.

418 Visit to Jamia Lahore Islamia, 91 Babar Block New Garden Town Lahore on 29-Feb- 2012. 419 Hafiz Hassan Madni, Principal Jamia Lahore Islamia, in discussion with the researcher, on intercom, on 29-Feb-2012. (Conversation was held in Urdu, translated by the researcher) 420 Hafiz Hassan Madni, Principal Jamia Lahore Islamia, in discussion with the researcher, on intercom, on 29-Feb-2012. (Conversation was held in Urdu, translated by the researcher) 421 See Appendix B (IV) for details.

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Table 6.8: List of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia High Level Madrassas in the Punjab S City High Level Visited Coope Popul Respo Perce No Madrassas rated ation nses ntage 1 Bahawalpur 1 1 0 - - - 2 D. G. Khan 1 1 1 10 8 80% 3 Faisalabad 4 4 4 97 51 53% 4 Gujranwala 2 2 1 11 3 27% 5 Jhelum 1 1 0 - - - 6 Kasur 1 1 1 31 25 81% 7 Lahore 3 3 0 - - - 8 Multan 1 1 1 17 10 59% 9 Okara 2 2 2 28 18 64% 10 Rahim Yar 2 2 2 50 24 48% Khan 11 Sargodha 1 1 1 20 6 30% 12 Sheikhupura 1 1 1 30 27 90% 13 Sialkot 1 1 1 50 24 48% TOTAL 21 21 15 344 196 57%

6.2.5: Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia It is a small Madrassa Board. According to the data provided by the Board, it has only 364 affiliated Madrassas and Maktabs. Out of which, 196 are in the Punjab. The lists provided had no distinction between Maktab and Madrassa- what to speak of high level and Low level Madrassa differentiation. The researcher, therefore, had to point out high level Madrassas on the basis of high level students sent by the Madrassas, in the final papers of the Board. It had only 72 high level Madrassas in the Punjab. Out of which, 34 were in nine divisional headquarters and 38 in other cities. Therefore, stratified sampling technique could not be applied on this Board as well. The high level Madrassas in all the cities of the Punjab had to be visited to collect a handsome number of respondents, as most of the high level Madrassas had very small number of students. The following figures emerged after survey.

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Table 6.9: List of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia High Level Madrassas in the Punjab S No City High Level Visited Coop Pop Respon Percent Madrassas erated ulati ses age on 1 Attock 2 2 1 4 3 75% 2 Bahawalpur 1 1 - - - - 3 Bhakkar 8 4 3 47 35 74% 4 Chakwal 4 3 2 25 20 80% 5 Chiniot 3 3 1 17 17 100% 6 D. G. Khan 3 3 2 11 10 91% 7 Faisalabad 4 3 3 55 36 65% 8 Gujrat 1 1 1 8 6 75% 9 Khushab 2 2 1 30 10 33% 10 Lahore 9 4 4 210 34 17% 11 Lyyah 4 1 1 5 4 80% 12 M. B. Din 3 3 3 23 16 70% 13 Mianwali 2 2 2 - - - 14 Multan 4 2 1 11 11 100% 15 Muzaffargar 4 1 1 5 5 100% h 16 Rahim Yar 2 2 1 5 4 80% Khan 17 Rawalpindi 4 2 1 6 6 100% 18 Sahiwal 2 2 1 3 3 100% 19 Sargodha 7 2 2 40 24 60% 20 Sialkot 2 1 - - - - 21 Vehari 1 1 1 4 4 100% TOTAL 72 45 31 509 248 49%

Though the sample was nine divisional headquarters, of the Punjab, but practically almost entire Punjab had to be visited, due to small Madrassa Boards. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia was the only board which had a handsome

206 number of high level Madrassas but the strength, of higher level students, was not sufficient to include a handsome number of respondents from this Board. Most of the Madrassa administrators cooperated and supported the perception of the researcher that small Madrassas, particularly in the small cities, cooperate more enthusiastically than big Madrassas in big cities.

6.2.6: Autonomous Degree Awarding Institutions Higher Education Commission (HEC) has authorized five Madrassa Boards to award degrees and, along with them, five autonomous institutions are also authorized to award religious degrees. Four of them are situated in the Punjab while the fifth one, Darul Uloom Korangi, is in Karachi. Thus, the four autonomous degree awarding institutions were also visited, to include the opinion of their students as well.

Table 6.10: List of Autonomous Degree Awarding Madrassas in the Punjab S City Name of Orientati Popul Respo Perce No Madrassas on ation nses ntage 1 Faisalabad Jamia Talemat Salafi 20 11 55% Islamia 2 Lahore Jamia Ashrafia Deobandi 100 21 21% 3 Lahore Minhaj Ul Quran Barelvi 60 48 80% 4 Sargodha Jamia Muhammadia Barelvi 300 151 50% Ghausia (Bhera) TOTAL 480 231 48%

The survey was quite informative in the sense that it provided an opportunity to visit almost all cities of the Punjab- particularly due to Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia. However there were several hiccups in collecting filled questionnaire as some of the Madrassa administrators were not in habit of keeping their word and returning the questionnaire as promised. Still many

207 were persuaded and motivated and were ultimately able to return some of the copies of the questionnaire422.

6.3: Consolidated Information from the Survey The consolidated data, about high level Madrassas, visited, and the responses collected, is given in the following table.

Table 6.11: Consolidated List of High Level Madrassas visited in the Punjab S Madrassa Board High level Visit Perce Popul Respo Perce No Madrassas ed ntage ation nses ntage 1 Rabta Tul Madaris 11 11 100% 172 103 60% 2 Tanzeem Ul 154 40 26% 1170 777 66% Madaris 3 Wafaq Ul Madaris -* 40 - 252 91 36% Al Arabia 4 Wafaq Ul Madaris 21 21 100% 343 196 57% Al Salafia 5 Wafaq Ul Madaris 72 45 62% 509 248 49% Al Shia 6 Autonomous 4 4 100% 480 231 48% Degree Awarding Madrassas TOTAL 262 120 46% 2926 1646 56% * No data was provided by Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia.

The responses, collected through the questionnaire, were entered in the SPSS software and results were drawn. As the primary objective, of this research, was to evaluate the authenticity of the claims, and blames, made regarding the Madrassa education system and its graduates, therefore, the percentages, of the responses, were developed, and analyzed; to determine the authenticity of the statements, made about the potentials, capabilities and

422 See Appendix (B) for details.

208 status of Madrassa graduates. The respondents were asked indirect questions; to avoid cosmetic answers. The rationale, behind this research, was to determine the validity of perceived and projected threats, from the Madrassa system and its graduates, and their, portrayed, incapacity; to become productive citizens of the present modern society of the Punjab and Pakistan. The Madrassas were classified into three sizes on the basis of their size, number of students, facilities for their students and their staff and their popularity in the surroundings. Some big Madrassas had small number of high level students while some shall Madrassas had, relatively, handsome number of high level students.

Table 6.12: Size of Madrassas Visited S No Size of Madrassas Responses Percentage 1 Big 1314 79.8 2 Medium 219 13.3 3 Small 113 6.9 Total 1646 100

Most of the respondents came from big Madrassas, almost 80%. This question was asked to find out whether the students have any preference of Madrassas for admission, and have the courage to compete for admission, or they look for small Madrassas where one or two teachers teach almost entire syllabi.

209

Figure 6.1:

There is an overwhelming majority of male respondents in this research, not because that their number is too high, but because of the reason that Wafaq Al Arabia female madrassas refused to cooperate and Wafaq Al Salafia also did not provide details of their female Madrassas.

Table 6.13: List of Gender of the Respondents S No Gender of Respondents Responses Percentage 1 Male 1229 74.7 2 Female 417 25.3 Total 1646 100

Almost 74% respondents, in this research, were male while remaining 25% were female. Great difference in the gender ratio was because of the fact that some Madrassa Boards did not approve conducting this research in their female Madrassas and gender ratio varied from one Madrassa Board to the other.

210

Figure 6.2:

211

The details of gender vise participation of respondents, according to Madrassa Board, are given below for information.

Table 6.14: Consolidated List of Madrassa Board vise Gender of the Respondents S Madrassa Boards Respon Male % Female % No dents 1 Rabta-Tul-Madaris 103 33 32.0% 70 68% 2 Tanzeem-Ul Madaris 777 554 71.3% 223 28.7% 3 Wafaq Al Madaris Al 91 91 100% 0 0% Arabia 4 Wafaq Al Madaris Al 196 187 95.4% 9 4.6% Salafia 5 Wafaq Al Madaris Al 248 133 53.6% 115 46.4% Shia 6 Independent Minhaj Ul 48 48 100% 0 0% Quran Lahore 7 Independent Jamia 151 151 100% 0 0% Muhammadia Ghausia Bhera 8 Independent Jamia 21 21 100% 0 0% Ashrafia Lahore 9 Independent Jamia 11 11 100% 0 0% Talemat Islamia Faisalabad Total 1646 1229 74.7% 417 25.3%

It is quite possible that a big Madrassa may be situated in a small city and a small Madrassa may be working in a big city.

Table 6.15: List of the Size of Madrassa City S No City Size Responses Percentage 1 Big 1036 62.9 2 Medium 434 26.4 3 Small 176 10.7 Total 1646 100

212

Most of the respondents, almost 63%, came from Madrassas situated in the big cities, as expected. While, more than 26% were studying in medium level Madrassas and almost 11% were studying in small Madrassas.

Figure 6.3:

The area where a Madrassa is situated was also studied to see whether high level Madrassas are located in the populated areas or are established in far off areas, where they may not be easily accessible.

Table 6.16: List of Madrassa Situated in the Area S No Area Number of Madrassas Percentage 1 Inside City 727 44.2 2 Suburbs 481 29.2 3 Nearby Town 80 4.9 4 Distant Town 358 21.7 Total 1646 100

213

A handsome number of respondents, 44%, came from the Madrassas situated inside city, easily accessible to students and masses and day scholars could also attend them easily. 29% respondents belonged to the Madrassas situated in the suburbs of cities and 21% from the ones in distant towns-the reason for this was Jamia Muhammadia Bhera423.

Figure 6.4:

The next part of this chapter discusses the personal information about the respondents; collected through the Questionnaire.

423 See Table 6.10 for details.

214

6.4: Personal Information about the Respondents: Collected Through the Questionnaire The questionnaire developed, for this research, comprised of both closed and open ended questions. The idea was to give maximum opportunities, to students, to give their own free opinion; instead of limited closed question options for variety of opinions. Closed questions are easy to analyze but they do not accommodate variety of options; which is a beauty of a social research and also helps in acquiring more clear and authentic information. Though difficult to tabulate and evaluate, a huge number of open ended questions has been added in this questionnaire. The efforts were made, while preparing the questionnaire, to avoid ―cosmetic answers‖. The respondents usually do not give exact answers when they are directly asked about their opinion. The respondents were not asked directly about societal harmony so that they may not give fabricated or misguiding answers; to show their commitment to society. The questions were asked about their perceptions and actions, about any situation, in society, and the potentials of students were evaluated out of their responses424. For the facility of discussion, the questionnaire was divided into four parts; first was about the ―Personal Information‖ of the respondents. Second part collected information related to ―Social Harmony‖. Third part collected opinions about ―Political Harmony‖. Last part housed information related to ―Economic Harmony‖. They were developed to house, in detail, the perceptions of the respondents, regarding various domains of social life. This chapter, however, discusses personal information only; as parts related to the various aspects of harmony have been explained in the next chapter.

6.4.1: Personal Information It was developed to de-mythicize the Madrassa system; whatever said, about Madrassa system, is right or not. Most of the myths about Madrassa system are about the background of its students and the conditions in which

424 Questions about computer were deliberately avoided to see the mental approach of the students and the teachers who first saw the questionnaire and then distributed it. The only person who pointed out that there was no question about the significance, role and impact of computer, particularly internet, in the questionnaire, was Dr. Raghib Hussain Naeemi, of Jamia Naeemia, Lahore. He was told about the reasons; which he agreed to.

215 they join a Madrassa. These could be best evaluated, and thus declared plausible or busted, through basic and personal information. This part mostly comprised of closed questions. Most of the question, regarding the personality and family of the respondents were added to evaluate various myths about Madrassa students. For example, it is usually said that the school dropouts are sent to Madrassas. If that be the case, the students must be of higher age in smaller classes. To verify that myth, the age of the respondents was asked, without telling them the reason for the question. The responses will help in determining whether the students joined Madrassa soon after they were able to study or they spent some years, five or six perhaps, in school and when were unable to grasp knowledge there, were sent to a Madrassa; as if the study here was much easier as compared to that of general schools. 6.4.1.1: Question No 1: The name and address of the Madrassa. It was to make the questionnaire, filled by the students of a Madrassa, easy to differentiate from those filled by those of other Madrassas. It gave the detailed information about the exact number of Madrassas visited from each Madrassa Board425. It also provided information about total number of respondents from each Madrassa Board.

425 See Table 6.11 for details.

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Table 6.17: Total Number of Respondents from each Madrassa Board S No Madrassa Boards Respondents Percentage 1 Rabta-Tul-Madaris 103 6.3 2 Tanzeem-Ul Madaris 777 47.2 3 Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia 91 5.5 4 Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia 196 11.9 5 Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia 248 15.1 6 Independent Minhaj Ul Quran 48 2.9 Lahore 7 Independent Jamia Muhammadia 151 9.2 Ghausia Bhera 8 Independent Jamia Ashrafia Lahore 21 1.3 9 Independent Jamia Talemat Islamia 11 .7 Faisalabad Total 1646 100

Tanzeem Ul Madaris turned out to be the biggest Madrassa Board, with 47% respondents, as they cooperated completely; unlike Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia which did not cooperate, at all, and most of its affiliated Madrassas, visited, also refused to cooperate and provide any information426. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia became second, with 15% of total respondents; despite the fact that 45 Madrassas, of this board, were visited; in the length and width of the Punjab province.

426 They are always skeptic of everything that does not fit their understanding.

217

Figure 6.5:

The Madrassas were divided into various types, on the basis of certain criteria, discussed in the start of this chapter427. The data shows the details of the Madrassas visited during the survey. It was of great significance because the responses of the students needed to be cross tabulated with their Madrassa type, and type of administration, to test the hypothesis of the research. Table 6.18: Respondents from various Types of Madrassas Visited S No Types of Madrassas Responses Percentage 1 Traditional 185 11.2 2 Enriched 742 45.1 3 Progressive 603 36.6 4 Apposite 116 7.0 Total 1646 100

427 See Table 6.3 for details.

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The data shows that most of the respondents, in Madrassas visited, 45%, were from enriched Madrassas. These Madrassas have adopted some tangible traits of modern educational set up but have been unable to admire and adopt the intangible aspects like developing a comprehensive character and imparting modern knowledge, to necessary extent; enabling them to meet the challenges of modern times. Still, hope is not lost, 36% respondents were from progressive Madrassas which try to equip their students with sufficient knowledge and skill, enabling them to coup with the demands of modern day living. Only 7% came from Apposite Madrassas as the number of such efficient Madrassas is very low due to scarcity of Organized and Prudent administrators.

Figure 6.6:

The administration of the Madrassas, visited, was also divided into various types, five in total, on the basis of their capabilities and efforts for the society428.

428 See Table 6.4 for details.

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Table 6.19: Respondents from various Types of Madrassa Administration S No Type of Administration Responses Percentage 1 Improvident 67 4.1 2 Impulsive 480 29.2 3 Efficient 609 37.0 4 Organized 252 15.3 5 Prudent 238 14.5 Total 1646 100

The data shows that 37% respondents came from the Madrassas run by ―Efficient‖ administration. 29% from ―Impulsive‖, 15% from ―Organized‖ and 14.5% from the Madrassas run by ―Prudent‖ administration. This bifurcation seems less relevant but the cross tabulation of specific student responses, with the type of Madrassa administration, will help in estimating the reasons that influence and shape student behaviour.

220

Figure 6.7:

6.4.1.2: Question No 2: Age of the respondent It was asked to evaluate whether the respondents joined Madrassa education directly or wasted some years in schools and joined Madrassa education after being dropped out of schools- as blamed by some writers. It was included to test the myth that most of the Madrassa students are actually school dropouts. If this be the case, the age of the respondents should be higher than their class level study years. The question was not asked directly about their past educational endeavors. Therefore, it was never asked, from the respondents, that whether they had failed in the school and had then joined a Madrassa. If it had been asked, they would have never admitted it and would have given cosmetic answers. To avoid such flaws in data collection, and to make data more authentic, the age of the respondents was asked and then their past educational endeavors were calculated. A Madrassa student has to pass primary level, an elementary level of five years study, to get admission in a Madrassa. It means that he/she has to

221 be roughly ten years old, with an exception of one or maximum two years- in special cases only. The expected age, at a certain class level is explained in the following table.

Table 6.20: Average Expected Age of Madrassa Students on Completing a Degree Average Age Mutwasita Aama Khasa Alia Almia on Admission (3 years) (2 Years) (2 Years) (2 Years) (2 Years) 10-12 Years 13-15 15-17 17-19 19-21 21-23 Years Years Years Years Years

Madrassa graduates are usually labeled as school dropouts; who joined a Madrassa after failing for a couple of years, in a general school. If that be the case, these students must be above the expected age bracket, as mentioned in Table 6.20.

Table 6.21: List of Age groups of the Respondents S No Age Group Respondents Percentage 1 15-20 Years 551 33.5 2 20-25 Years 886 53.8 3 25-30 Years 159 9.7 4 More than 30 Years 21 1.3 5 Not Given 29 1.8 Total 1646 100

The data, collected through this research, revealed that most of the respondents 54% fell between age group 20-25 years. Remaining were even younger, 33.5% were of the age between 15-20 years. Only a minute number 1.3% were more than 30 years old. It shows that Madrassa students join this system soon after passing primary level (class 5). The claims that Madrassa students are failures in schools, and join a Madrassa after making several unsuccessful attempts in regular school, does not hold any ground.

222

Figure 6.8:

6.4.1.3: Question No 3: Native City of the Respondent It was added to assess the travelling patterns in Madrassa students. The more the people travel, in the country, the more ownership they develop for various parts, they travel to. This question provided information about two dimensions; size of the native city of the respondents and its distance from Madrassa city. Cities of Pakistan were stratified into, big, medium and small, on the basis of population (1998 Census)429.

429 See Appendix (C) for details.

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Table 6.22: List of Size of Native City of Respondents S No Size of City Respondents Percentage 1 Big 508 30.9 2 Medium 622 37.8 3 Small 400 24.3 4 Not Given 116 7.0 Total 1646 100

The data revealed that about 38% respondents were from medium sized cities. Almost 31% came from big cities and 24% belonged to small cities. It shows that most of the respondents, almost 62% belonged to big or medium cities, thus rejecting the conventional wisdom that Madrassa students come from the backward areas, where there are no educational facilities and no business opportunities- for their parents.

Figure 6.9:

224

The second objective of asking the name of native city was to calculate distance of the native city from the city where the Madrassa was situated. The idea was to locate travelling patterns of the students and the distance they had to cover for acquiring religious education.

Table 6.23: Distance of Native City from Madrassa City S No Distance of Native City Responses Percentage 1 Same City 528 32.1 2 Nearby Big City 74 4.5 3 Nearby Medium City 185 11.2 4 Nearby Small City 171 10.4 5 Distant Big City 61 3.7 6 Distant Medium City 165 10.0 7 Distant Small City 117 7.1 8 Other Province Big City 89 5.4 9 Other Province Medium City 104 6.3 10 Other Province Small City 35 2.1 11 Not Given 117 7.1 Total 1646 100

The data showed a mix response; 32% respondents belonged to the same city while 11% had come from a nearby medium city and a little over 10% had come from nearby small cities. 10% had come from distant medium cities and 7% from distant small cities. A mere 4% belonged to distant big cities; quite understandably they must have gone to the Madrassas in their own city. This trend showed that Madrassas students travel far off areas only when they usually do not have high level institutions in their area and, most importantly, remain within their city, wherever possible, to remain in close contact with their families. It refutes the claim that Madrassa students are forced away from their families and their families cannot contact them or can know about their condition. As a matter of fact, it was observed, during the survey, that all Madrassas relieve their students on Thursday afternoon, so that they may go to their homes as Friday is observed as weekly holiday in

225 almost all Madrassas. Therefore, they remain in constant touch with their parents and any misuse of authority, by the Madrassa administration, can easily be reported to the families.

Figure 6.10:

6.4.1.4: Question No 4: Profession of the Parents of the Respondents It was needed to determine whether the blame that only Madrassa teachers send their children to Madrassas is right or wrong. Some researchers have concluded that majority of Madrassa students belongs to peasantry. It also helped verify whether the claim, that mostly peasants send their children more for religious education than working class, was right or not.

226

Table 6.24: Profession of the Parents of Respondents S No Parents’ Profession Responses Percentage 1 Business 431 26.2 2 Agrarian 574 34.9 3 Private Job 206 12.5 4 Govt. Job 212 12.9 5 Madrassa Teacher 157 9.5 6 Not Given 66 4.0 Total 1646 100

The data partly supported the claim as almost 35% respondents told that their parents were agrarian, by profession. 26% claimed to be belonging to families running their personal businesses. While, the families of almost 13% were government servant and those of almost 12% were doing private job. Incidentally, only 9.5% came from Madrassa teachers‘ families. The blame, that only Madrassa teachers send their children for higher studies, was whitewashed by the data.

227

Figure 6.11:

6.4.1.5: Question No 5: Total Brothers and Sisters of the Respondents To have an idea of average family size in the country and also evaluate the claim that big and poor families send their children to Madrassas due to financial constraints. This question had to be evaluated along with the next one which was about the number of siblings studying, or have already studied, in a Madrassa. Studying in a Madrassa meant attending ―Dars Nizami‖ classes not learning the Holy Quran in a Maktab. Table 6.25: Total Number of Brothers and Sisters of the Respondents S No Total Brothers and Sisters Responses Percentage 1 1-2 63 3.8 2 3-4 359 21.8 3 5-6 574 34.9 4 7-9 480 29.2 5 10 or More 104 6.3 6 Not Given 66 4.0 Total 1646 100

228

The data disclosed that almost 35% respondents had 5-6 siblings430. More than 29% had 7-9 siblings and almost 22% had 3-4 siblings. Only 6% belonged to large families where there were ten or more than ten siblings. It shows that Madrassa students come from all family sizes; claiming that they belonged to larger families, which could not afford expenditures on them, does not hold much ground.

Figure 6.12:

6.4.1.6: Question No 6: Number of siblings studying, or have studied, in a Madrassa It was to clarify the claim that children from same families come to Madrassas and all the siblings study in a Madrassa. Some researchers had also concluded that families that had sent one child to a Madrassa had sent other children to general schools as well.

430 According to Pakistan Census 1998, average household size is 6-7 at, http://www.census.gov.pk/index.php, 11-Dec-2011.

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Table 6.26: Siblings Madrassa Students S No Siblings Madrassa Students Responses percentage 1 None 891 54.1 2 1-2 530 32.2 3 3-4 133 8.1 4 5-6 40 2.4 5 7-9 15 .9 6 More than Nine 2 .1 7 Not Given 35 2.1 Total 1646 100

The data exposed the fact that all the claims about Madrassa education were not based on facts. 54% respondents reveled that they had no sibling studying in any Madrassa, nor had any studied earlier. The allegation that only the poor send their children, and mostly all of them, was not correct. As a matter of fact, writers quote single instances, which are actually exceptional cases. The majority, of Madrassa students, comes from the families which have sent only one or two children, to a Madrassa; remaining children either remain at home or study in general schools. Some students even mentioned, in the questionnaire, that remaining brothers and sisters were studying in regular schools. As far as expenditures on regular education are concerned, the government schools have been providing free books, to their students431. Keeping in mind the fact that most of the Madrassa students, contacted in this research, were from big and medium cities of the country, and most of them belonged to the same city (Table 7.23), which in most of the cases was a divisional headquarter, the claim that parents send their children to Madrassas due to poverty alone does not hold ground. It may be one of the several, minor, reasons but several respondents had clearly mentioned, in the questionnaire, that they were receiving religious education as a religious duty and their parents wanted them to become expert in religion; for several socio- religious reasons.

431 A foreign funded scheme was launched to persuade the poor to send their children to regular schools.

230

Figure 6.13:

6.4.1.7: Question No 7: Class level of the Respondents It was to confirm that only the students of higher levels were responding. This study was designed to include students of higher classes. The idea was to collect information from mature students who would have spent sufficient time in Madrassas to have a better understanding of the system and would be able to give an authentic view. Apart from that, higher level students are usually serious in their studies and do not have afterthoughts of abandoning Madrassa education and starting a business of their own; as was seen in lower level students.

231

Table 6.27: Class level of the Respondents S No Level of Class Responses percentage 1 Alia (BA) 680 41.3 2 Almia (MA) 868 52.7 3 Higher 60 3.6 4 Others 38 2.3 Total 1646 100

Almost 53% respondents were students of Almia (MA). 41% were studying in Alia (BA) and a small portion of the respondents, 3.6%, were students of specialization (Takhasus)432. Some students, intentionally or unintentionally, did not mention their class level. They were entertained as others; 2%. The high number of respondents, from Almia classes, made the responses more authentic as the students of the highest class were responding to the questions.

432 It is neither a class system nor a government recognized degree (unfortunately). Those who aspire to become ―Mufti‖ (the one who can issue a religious decree, ―Fatwa‖) study from senior teachers, after passing Almia exam, and they issue them personal certificates qualifying them to issue a ―Fatwa‖.

232

Figure 6.14:

6.4.1.8: Question No 8: Respondents’ Period of stay in Madrassa It was included to calculate the pattern of movement in Madrassa students. The students who complete their studies from the same Madrassa are more likely to have strong imprints of a specific group of teachers and will be staunch supporters of a particular set of ideas; projected and promoted by their teachers. Table 6.28: Respondents’ Period of Stay in this Madrassa S No Period in this Madrassa Responses percentage 1 1-2 Years 262 15.9 2 3-4 Years 317 19.3 3 5-6 Years 452 27.5 4 7-8 Years 327 19.9 5 9-10 Years 149 9.1 6 More than 10 Years 59 3.6 7 Not Given 80 4.9 Total 1646 100

233

The data brought forth a mixed trend. 27% were studying, in that particular Madrassa, for five to six years while almost 20% were in that Madrassa for the last seven to eight years. 19% had a short stay of only three to four years and almost 16% were the new comers to the institution with only one to two years stay.

Figure 6.15:

Further investigations into the data brought to light the fact that period of stay, in a particular Madrassa, varies from one Madrassas Board to the other.

234

Table 6.29: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Board and Period of Stay in this Madrassa S Madrassa 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 More Not No Board Years Years Years Years Years than Given 10 Years 1 Rabta-Tul- 14.6 51.5 10.7 14.6 2.9% 1.0% 4.9% Madaris % % % % 2 Tanzeem-UI 22.8 16.6 27.8 20.8 6.2% 3.0% 2.8% Madaris % % % % 3 Wafaq Al 8.8% 6.6% 16.5 27.5 8.8% 27.5 4.4% Madaris Al % % % Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 6.1% 25.5 46.4 16.3 2.0% .5% 3.1% Madaris Al % % % Salafia 5 Wafaq Al 11.7 21.4 39.1 13.3 6.9% 2.4% 5.2% Madaris Al % % % % Shia 6 Minhaj Ul .0% 16.7 35.4 43.8 .0% 2.1% 2.1% Quran % % % 7 Jamia 6.6% 4.6% 1.3% 22.5 44.4 1.3% 19.2 Muhammadia % % % Ghausia 8 Jamia 47.6 28.6 4.8% 9.5% 9.5% .0% .0% Ashrafia % % 9 Jamia Talemat 9.1% 45.5 18.2 27.3 .0% .0% .0% Islamia % % % Total 15.9 19.3 27.5 19.9 9.1% 3.6% 4.9% % % % %

Cross tabulation revealed that in Rabta Tul Madaris, more than 51% respondents were staying, in the same Madrassa, for the last three to four years; the reason being that Rabta Tul Madaris has limited number of high level Madrassas and therefore students join them after acquiring initial

235 information from other Madrassas. Same is true for Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia where 46% respondents have been studying in the same Madrassa for the last five to six years. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia also has somewhat same situation as 39% respondents had been studying in the same Madrassa for the last five to six years and 21% for the last three to four years. It is quite understandable that both parents and students prefer educational institutions of good repute at higher levels. Therefore, one can assume that, students staying for five to six years mean that, they joined the particular Madrassa for higher studies only. It also meant that they analyzed the performance of various Madrassas, where possible, to select a better one and obviously were not dumped in any Madrassa, by their parents, for the sake of staying in a Madrassa only. However, the respondents from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia gave different figures. Their 27% respondents had been in that Madrassa for the last seven to eight years and the same 27% for more than ten years; despite the fact that this Madrassa Board has the biggest number of Madrassas and thus the students have several options for admission in higher classes.

Figure 6.16:

236

In order to confirm whether the students were staying for such longer periods, in the same Madrassa, due to the quality of education or for any other reason, cross tabulation analysis was done on the basis of type of Madrassa and type of Madrassa administration with period of stay in the Madrassa.

237

Table 6.30: Cross Tabulation of Type of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia Madrassas with Period in Madrassa S Madrassa 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 More Not Perce No Type Years Years Years Years Years than Given ntage 10 Years 1 Traditional 7.4% 7.4% 7.4% 33.3 .0% 37.0 7.4% 100% % % 2 Enriched 14.6 9.8% 31.7 19.5 .0% 19.5 4.9% 100% % % % % 3 Progressive .0% .0% .0% 34.8 34.8 30.4 .0% 100% % % % 4 Apposite* ------Total 8.8% 6.6% 16.5 27.5 8.8% 27.5 4.4% 100% % % % * There was no Apposite Madrassa in Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia that had cooperated.

It was astonishing to note that 37% of Traditional Madrassa respondents, in Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia Madrassas, had been studying in the same Madrassa for more than ten years and more than 33% had been for the last seven to eight years. It supported the perception that some Madrassa teachers do not appreciate variety of perceptions and grooming for their students. Incidentally, people who remain studying in the same educational institution, throughout their academic carrier, develop strong affiliation not with their teachers but also with their ideas and are less likely to deviate from the ―indoctrinations‖ infused by their teacher(s). The tilt of respondents, towards longer stays in the same Madrassa, is also visible in Enriched Madrassas, almost 32% for five to six years, and in Progressive Madrassas, 35% each for seven to eight years and nine to ten years. Remaining 30% have been in the same Madrassa for more than ten years. Cross tabularization of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia Madrassas, on the basis of type of Madrassa administration, with period of stay in the particular Madrassa also turned out to be of great significance.

238

Table 6.31: Cross Tabulation of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia Administration of Madrassa with Period in this Madrassa S Madrassa 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 More Not Percen No Type Ye Yea Year Yea Year than Give tage ars rs s rs s 10 n Years 1 Improvident 3.0 .0% 12.1 24.2 .0% 51.5% 9.1% 100% % % % 2 Impulsive 25. 16.7 37.5 20.8 .0% .0% .0% 100% 0% % % % 3 Efficient 9.1 18.2 18.2 36.4 .0% 9.1% 9.1% 100% % % % % 4 Organized .0% .0% .0% 34.8 34.8 30.4% .0% 100% % % 5 Prudent* ------Total 8.8 6.6 16.5 27.5 8.8% 27.5% 4.4% 100% % % % % * No Prudent Administration could be found, cooperating, in Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia.

51% of the respondents, from Madrassas under Improvident administration, had been studying in the same Madrassa for more than ten years. Respondents from the Madrassas, run by Organized Administration, also had a similar trend. All 100% respondents from such Madrassas had been studying in the same Madrassa for more than seven years.

6.4.1.9: Question No 9: Respondents’ Place of Residing Students living in hostels receive training more effectively and are prone to removal of family traditions than day scholars433. Results in this question revealed one of the major reasons for strong character building and grooming. It is known that hostel life affects personality more than mere class room discussions. It provides, rather compels, to practice the norms and traditions (rules) which are only taught in the class room.

433 For details, how hostel life helps breaking link with family traditions, watch the movie, Schooling the World: Whiteman‟s Last Burdon.

239

Table 6.32: Respondents Residing at S No Residing at Responses percentage 1 Hostel 1248 75.8 2 House 398 24.2 Total 1646 100

Almost 76% respondents were staying in the hostel of their Madrassa. Most of the Madrassa administrators, interviewed, also emphasized on keeping students in hostel; to supervise and ensure practical implementation of the edicts of Islam. Despite all the good intentions of the administrators, sectarian grooming also strengthens as a trickledown effect of hostel life.

Figure 6.17:

240

6.4.1.10: Question No 10: Reason for taking admission in this particular Madrassa Some Madrassas are famous for specialization in a specific field or branch of religious teaching. Therefore, students come from far off areas to study and specialize in that particular field. Some Madrassas are known for their discipline and good educational environment. Students coming for such reasons are looking for good education, while those who joined that particular Madrassa only because it was closer to their house, or any relative was already there, are usually looking for a degree only.

Table 6.33: Reason for Admission in this Particular Madrassa S No Reason for Admission Responses Percentage 1 Qirat and Hadis Knowledge 706 42.9 2 Good School 27 1.6 3 Neighbourhood 38 2.3 4 Good Educational 741 45.0 Environment 5 Relative already here 11 .7 6 More Than One Reasons 87 5.3 7 Serving Islam 26 1.6 8 Others 10 .6 Total 1646 100

45% of the respondents said that they had joined that particular Madrassa due to its good educational environment. Educational environment includes methods of teaching and competent staff. Almost 43% replied that they were there to specialize in either Qirat or in Hadis knowledge. There are several Madrassas which are known for any specialization. Therefore, students interested in that specific area, prefer the specific Madrassa famous for that specialization. Those who did not answer were included in ―Others‖ category.

241

Figure 6.18:

6.4.1.11: Question No 11: Profession planned by the Respondents after Graduating from the Madrassa A series of such questions has been presented, in the questionnaire, to assess the true intentions of a respondent regarding his future plans about profession. Table 6.34: Profession Planned after Graduation 1 S No Profession planned Responses Percentage 1 Job 112 6.8 2 Business 94 5.7 3 Teaching 1259 76.5 4 Teaching+ any other 94 5.7 5 Whatever Possible 21 1.3 6 Serving Religion 53 3.2 7 Others 13 .8 Total 1646 100

242

More than 76% respondents preferred teaching as a profession after graduation. Almost 7% were determined to get a job while almost 6% had a desire to continue teaching along with any other profession- usually a business of their own434. All those who did not give any answer were included in ―Others‖.

Figure 6.19:

6.4.1.12: Question No 12: Any voluntary services given in the Madrassa. It was to evaluate whether Madrassas are working as educational institutions only or they tend to use their students as ―free labour‖. Serving others is an appreciable activity but it should be voluntary, not compulsory, and definitely not at the expense of academic carrier.

434 Some female respondents also opted business as profession. On inquiry, they replied that their mothers, and other female family members, were already running small business, inside their houses.

243

Table 6.35: Voluntary Services Performed by Respondents in Madrassa S No Voluntary Services Respondents percentage 1 Office Managing 86 5.2 2 Maintenance 181 11.0 3 Teaching 111 6.7 4 Others 90 5.5 5 None 1178 71.6 Total 1646 100

The data clarified that a vast majority of almost 72% did not perform any voluntary services in their Madrassa. 11% were, however, involved in maintenance work, which included organizing some functions and looking after the affairs of Madrassa; if and when requested. Only a minor number, 5% had permanent responsibilities like Imam of Mosque or reciting ―Azan‖ (the call for the prayer). Almost 7% were teaching their junior classes. It should help clarify the misperception that Madrassa administrations use their students as free labour and these students are not serious learners.

244

Figure 6.20:

6.4.1.13: Question No 13: General education acquired by the Respondent This question was included to answer a significant blame on Madrassa students that they have closed minds and have no access beyond four walls of Madrassa.

Table 6.36: General Education Acquired by the Respondents S No General Education Respondents percentage 1 Matric 734 44.6 2 Intermediate 373 22.7 3 Graduation 292 17.7 4 Masters 128 7.8 5 Less or Diploma 118 7.2 6 Not Given 1 .1 Total 1646 100

245

The data was a blow to such scrollers who start blaming and labeling others without authentic information. Almost 45% respondents had passes Matriculation examination. Almost 23% had passed Intermediate examination; nearly 18% were, amazingly, Graduates from an HEC recognized university and almost 8% had, astonishingly, done Masters from an HEC recognized university. Merely 7% were under-matriculates. Only .1% did not give details of his/her qualification. A careful analysis of the data shows that almost 93% had passed Matriculation examination435. If we still consider them unaware of modern knowledge and incapable of participating in the affairs of society, then, our education system and, most importantly, syllabus of Matric level needs extensive overhauling. Matriculation is considered as a basic and comprehensive level that provides information and guidance about several subjects. It has compulsory Urdu and English language and literature subjects along with Mathematics, Pakistan Studies and Islamic Studies, as compulsory subjects. There are some elective subjects as well; all designed and implemented by bureaucracy. Separation for specialization starts after Matriculation; Pre-Engineering and Pre-Medical including combinations in Arts, Commerce and computer science. The students do not have to study all the subjects after Matriculation. The ones aspiring for medical subjects will not have to study mathematics for rest of their life and same is true for engineering students as they will not have to study biology ever again. If they can survive in this modern society after studying several subjects till Matric level and specializing in their relevant subject alone, why and how Madrassa students can be declared misfits for this society after passing the same Matriculation examination? As far as their grooming and prioritization are concerned, they may need some readjustments, or revisions, but they can and should not be declared misfits. Now, after knowing that almost all of them pass matriculation examination, in order to influence their perceptions and to make them responsible and sensible citizens- and all those who matriculate, we need to revise the syllabus and curriculum of matric examinations.

435 The common perception that only those, who cannot prosper in school education, join Madrassas is not based on facts. As a matter of fact, such students, as are unable to study in schools, in some cases, join Maktabs; where they learn reciting the Holy Quran only. Deduction made after discussions with several heads of Madrassas.

246

Figure 6.21:

The same question had another option, Technical education or Diploma. It was added to see whether Madrassa students are given any technical education, for skill development, or not.

Table 6.37: Technical Education or Diploma Acquired by the Respondents S No Technical Education or Diploma Respondents Percentage 1 Government Diploma 143 8.7 2 Computer 241 14.6 3 Electrical/ Home Appliances 26 1.6 4 Professional/ Skilled Worker 20 1.2 5 Household Skills 24 1.5 6 More than One 26 1.6 7 Nil 1166 70.8 Total 1646 100.0

247

The data showed that almost 71% respondents were not given any technical education. Only 14% received Computer education and almost 9% had acquired a Government Diploma of some technical education.

Figure 6.22:

Apparently it looked as the Madrassa students were concentrating on their education only but cross tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Technical Education provided strong evidences which supported the ―Hypothesis‖ of this research and also provided answers to certain research questions.

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Table 6.38: Cross Tabulation of Administration of Madrassa with Technical Education S Madrassa Govt. Comp Electri Profess House More Nil Perce No Type Diplo uter cal/ ional/ hold than ntage ma Home Skilled Skills One Applia Worker nces 1 Improvident 3.0% 1.5% 3.0% 1.5% .0% .0% 91% 100 % 2 Impulsive 2.9% 9.6% 2.3% 1.7% 1.3% .2% 82.1 100 % % 3 Efficient 11.5 9.7% .8% 1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 74.9 100 % % % 4 Organized 5.6% 19.0 .8% 1.2% 1.6% 3.6% 68.3 100 % % % 5 Prudent 18.1 36.6 2.5% .8% 3.4% 3.8% 34.9 100 % % % % Total 8.7% 14.6 1.6% 1.2% 1.5% 1.6% 70.8 100 % % %

It became evident, through the data, that 91% respondents from Madrassas under Improvident Administration did not receive any technical education at all. Only 3% of them had acquired any Government Diploma and another 35 had received training to repair electrical/home appliances. Respondents in Impulsive Administration Madrassas were not very lucky either. 82% of them did not receive any technical education and only 9% had an access to computer education. Efficient Administrations provided facilities to acquire Government Diploma, in technical education, to 11% of the respondents and almost 10% had an access to computer learning. While almost 75% still had no technical education. Organized Administrations ensured computer education to 19% of the respondents, in their Madrassas, and 68% were deprived of any technical education. The Madrassa administration efforts, to develop the skills of their, were visible in in the responses from the Madrassas run by Prudent Administrations. More than 36% students were receiving, or had already received, computer literacy training. 18% had already acquired Government Diploma in technical

249 education and only almost 35% were unable to receive technical education of any sort. It strongly supports the ―Hypothesis‖ of the research that tunnel vision of the Ulema was depriving Madrassa students of opportunities to excel. One may argue that if the students were aspiring for specialization in religious education, why they needed any other skill in the first place? The answer is quite simple. Some religious scholars and Madrassa administrators still believe that Madrassas were, and still are, established to produce Imam of Mosque and religious guides436. As a matter of fact, all Madrassa graduates are neither supposed to, nor intend to, work as Imam of Mosque- not because they do not like that profession but simply because they did not acquire religious education to make it a profession. They opted it for character building and as a religious duty. That is why, most of them desired to adopt teaching, of both religion and general education (Table 7.34), rather than becoming an Imam of Mosque or starting their own Madrassa; serving religion alone. The only idea was to help others understand religion and, eventually, reform their characters. Therefore, it seemed appropriate to equip students with skills to provide honest, dedicated and trustworthy workers in the society- who could earn their livelihood through skill and impart others without ―Commercializing‖ religious education.

436 Molana Habib Ullah Ludhianvi Mohtamim Jamia Milia Islamia, of Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, in discussion with the researcher, on 14 April, 2012. He was of the opinion that Madrassas were established to keep the Mosques working and nothing else. The same was the only duty for them even today.

250

Figure 6.23:

6.4.1.14: Question No 14: Profession Envisaged by the Parents of the Respondents It too was repeated periodically to determine the difference of opinion between parents and their children, regarding profession. If it was same, it meant that the students were sent in the Madrassa after determining his or her future activities. If they were different or uncertain then it could mean that children were there without any planning and may not be committed and determined towards their studies437.

437 The students who opt Pre-medical by themselves are more committed students than those whose parents directed them to opt these subjects. Observation based on personal experience after discussions with students, in Intermediate classes and Graduation classes, for almost 10 years

251

Table 6.39: Profession Envisaged by the Parents of Respondents S No Profession Envisaged by Parents Respondents Percentage 1 Job 149 9.1 2 Business 97 5.9 3 Teaching 1244 75.6 4 Teaching and any other 74 4.5 5 Whatever Possible 28 1.7 6 Serving Religion 28 1.7 7 Others 26 1.6 Total 1646 100

It was quite clear, by the data, that almost 76% respondents confirmed that their parents also wanted them to become teachers rather than Imam of Mosque as; propagated by ―Conventional Wisdom‖. More than 9% wanted their children to join any job and almost 6% desired business for their children. Almost 5% replied that their parents wanted them to continue teaching along with a profession- usually a business of their own. Only 2% were not sure what their parents wanted them to do. That is why they simply said ―serving religion‖; the method and mechanism were not clear in their minds.

252

Figure 6.24:

6.4.1.15: Question No 15: Reason for Preferring Madrassa Education It was added to gauge whether the students considered religious education necessary for character building or were inspired by somebody or could not afford school education. Those who opt religious education, considering it necessary for character building, consume and digest knowledge with a view to reform themselves. Those who are inspired by someone usually do not apply their knowledge and logic on anything. They simply want to follow, and become like, the one they cherish or revere.

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Table 6.40: Reason for Preferring Madrassa Education S No Preference for Madrassa Respondents Percentage Education 1 Religious Education is Necessary 1415 86.0 for Character Building 2 Inspired by Somebody 103 6.3 3 No School Available 14 .9 4 Costly School 18 1.1 5 Enforce Islam/ Replace Existing 6 .4 System 6 Religious Duty 36 2.2 7 Serving/ Promoting Religion 31 1.9 8 Comprehensive/ Combination of 9 .5 Both Domains of Knowledge 9 Personal Interest/ Liking 14 .9 Total 1646 100

The data revealed that 86% respondents had joined Madrassa education considering it necessary for character building, while, 6% were inspired by somebody. Only 2% had joined Madrassa education either because of non-availability of school or costly education system there. Out of the remaining, 2% had joined it considering it a religious duty. This provides an answer to the propaganda that most of the students join Madrassas due to the inability of their parents to educate them in schools. It has already been clarified (Question No 6, Table 6.26) that siblings of Madrassa students are usually studying in schools; acquiring general education.

254

Figure 6.25:

6.4.1.16: Question No 16: Other Sects Taught in Your Madrassa It was added to value the teachings of Madrassas that how much they prepare their students for a dialogue with other sects. The Madrassa that teach in detail about other sects, want their students to be fully aware of sectarian differences, before entering into practical life.

Table 6.41: Other Sects Taught in Your Madrassa S No Preference for Madrassa Respondents Percentage Education 1 Only Own Sect Taught 238 14.5 2 Necessary Difference Only 754 45.8 3 Detailed teaching of other Sects 593 36.0 4 Non-Sectarian 40 2.4 5 Others 7 .4 6 Not Given 14 .9 Total 1646 100

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Almost 46% respondents were of the opinion that their Madrassa was telling them necessary differences between sectarian interpretations. It meant that they were trying to clarify their students‘ minds only and had no intention of producing sectarian discoursers. 36% respondents claimed that their Madrassas were teaching about other sects in detail. When the reason was asked from several Madrassa heads and teachers, they claimed that they wanted their students to be well protected and may not fall a pray to the misguiding of someone from another sect438. This is one of the main points of this research that several Madrassa administrators, and teachers, wish to see their students as bulwark against other sects. This trend is further strengthened by recommending reference books written by the elders and scholars- sometimes scrollers- belonging to the same sect439. This practice eventually makes sectarian identification, and practices, superior over the rest of the responsibilities. No single effort can counter the negative effects of such activities alone-―rest cure‖ will definitely not heal sectarian differentiations.

438 Interviews and discussions with heads and teachers of several Madrassas; usually Improvident and Impulsive but others were no exception as well. 439 See Chapter 4, ―Structure and Working of Madrassas‖ for details.

256

Figure 6.26:

6.4.1.17: Question No 17: Your sect Better than that of others It turned out to be a controversial question but was asked to estimate the sectarian rigidity among Madrassa students. Those who claimed that their sect was closer to the Holy Quran and Sunnah were less fanatic than those who opted righteousness- latently meaning that others were not right.

257

Table 6.42: Your Sect Better than that of others S No Your Sect better than Others Respondents Percentage 1 Peaceful/ Respectful 174 10.6 2 Harmony/ Balanced 186 11.3 3 Love for The Holy Prophet 124 7.5 (SAW) 4 Closer to Quran and Hadis 614 37.3 5 Righteousness 196 11.9 6 More Authentic/ Strong 65 3.9 Arguments 7 Non-Sectarian 53 3.2 8 Not Clear 234 14.2 Total 1646 100

The responses indicated towards the trend that a handsome number, of students, was clear in their minds while a good number just gave fillers as answers. 37% said that their sect was closer to the injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah while 11% declared their sect as a balanced approach which aimed at establishing peaceful relations with other communities; either based on sect or religion or any other differentiation. 10% of the respondents shared the same sentiments with respect for all scholars and saints. Almost 12% however, declared that they were on the right path- and others were consequently not.

258

Figure 6.27:

6.4.1.18: Question No 18: Enforcement of Rules in your Madrassa It was included to see whether the myth that Madrassas adopt brutal methods, to metalize their students, is based on facts or not.

Table 6.43: Rules Enforced in Your Madrassa S No Enforcement of Rules Respondents Percentage in Your Madrassa 1 Strictly 712 43.3 2 Reasonably 848 51.5 3 Taught Only 82 5.0 4 No Rules Applied 4 .2 Total 1646 100

More than 51% respondents replied that their Madrassas implemented rules to the reasonable extent. While, 43% admitted that rules were

259 implemented strictly. Some Madrassa teachers were in favour of strict implementation of rules, wherever needed, as the primary task of educational institutions had always been character building, therefore strict implementation of rules, for character building and grooming, was inevitable. The results showed that most of the Madrassas were not very strict in forcing rules on their students- as proclaimed by several humanists that Madrassa administrations comprise of savages and treat their students brutally. There are some cases reported in media, and highlighted by some activists, but they are exceptional instances and most of them are taking place in Maktabs, where sometimes some ―Molvis‖ overreact, but they are neither qualified people nor teachers of a Madrassa. Most of the sensible Madrassa administrators also supported the view that punishment was neither permanent nor perfect strategy to convince the students. Rather, persuasion, motivation and incentives were more useful and productive steps; to convince the students for hard work440.

440 Dr. Raghib Naeemi, of Jamia Naeemia, Lahore, in discussion with the researcher, on 28- Dec-2011. Molana Sheikh Muhammad Shafi Najafi, of Jamia Al Murtaza, 96-B, Model Colony, Lahore (Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia), in discussion with the researcher, on 2-Jan- 2012. Miss Nabera Andleb Naeemi, Mohtamim, Jamia Sirajia Naeemia, Mughalpura Lahore (Tanzeem Ul Madaris), in discussion with the researcher, on 10-Jan-2012. Molana Akram Kashmiri, Registrar, Jamia Ashrafia, in discussion with the researcher, on 12-Jan- 2012.

260

Figure 6.28:

6.4.1.19: Question No 19: Religious Education Necessary for Character Building It was a sequel to questions No 10 and 15 that whether the students were receiving religious education for character building, and thus were willing to revise and improve their thoughts and actions, or had just ended up in a Madrassa, without any planning. The response was again in support of the argument developed earlier (in Question No 10 and 15) that Madrassa students were quite clear in their minds regarding priorities of their life and were aware of the effects of their decisions on their lives.

261

Table 6.44: Religious Education Necessary for Character Building S No Religious Education Necessary Respondents Percentage for Character Building 1 Yes 1313 79.8 2 To Greater Extent 284 17.3 3 To Some Extent 29 1.8 4 Not Necessary 10 .6 5 Not Sure 5 .3 6 Others 5 .3 Total 1646 100

Almost 80% agreed that religious education was necessary for character building, while 17% believed that it was necessary to a greater extent. All those who did not give any answer were entered into others. Careful analysis of the social patterns in Pakistan reveal the fact that majority of society members is deprived of humane characteristics like honesty, truthfulness, love and care for others and also lacks a sense of responsibility towards the society and its members. Most of them attend schools and acquire degrees in general education. According to Dr. G. W. Leitner Madrassas, ―Give hope and comfort and resignation to millions of human beings, whom the irritation, false views of life and discontent taught by our system would render unhappy and drive into dissatisfaction‖441.

441 G.W. Leitner, History of Indigenous Education in the Punjab (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2002.) 67 (First Published in 1882)

262

Figure 6.29:

6.4.1.20: Question No 20: Proposing Practical Steps for Reforms This question had five sub parts; each requesting a solution to prevailing problems, including the last one which called for any other special suggestion by the respondent. These were all open ended questions, though difficult to tabulate yet necessary to acquire detailed information; as they were to be cross matched with responses in other parts of the questionnaire.

6.4.1.20.1: Question No 2o (i): Steps to Reform Character The idea was to gauge the understanding level and potentials of Madrassa students; regarding prevailing sociocultural trends- and characters of people developing as a consequence of this social setup.

263

Table 6.45: Steps to Reform Character S No Steps to Reform Character Respondents Percentage 1 Religious Education/ Training 253 15.4 2 Governance/ Public Service 11 .7 3 Implementing Religion 200 12.2 4 Character/ Self-Reform 669 40.6 5 Social System Reform 56 3.4 6 Following Religion 301 18.3 7 Do Not Know 156 9.5 Total 1646 100

More than 40% respondents emphasized on character building efforts. It was a clear indication towards the harsh reality of society that good character needs to be developed- it does not emerge on its own. It has to be evolved- through education obviously. 18% declared following religious edicts as a method for character building and 15% declared religious education necessary for character building. Only 12% favoured coercive measures like implementing religion. They were of the perception that forceful implementation of religion would automatically bring changes in the character. Such steps might bring some changes in the character but such changes might prove to be temporary or might breed resistance as they would not be accepted willingly. Most of the writers are convinced that Islam spread on the basis of willingness, rather than through sword. Had it been imposed through sword, writers argue, population in and around Delhi would have been 100% Muslim at the time of partition of Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent in 1947.

264

Figure 6.30:

6.4.1.20.2: Question No 20 (ii): Steps to Reform Society It was added to inquire their perception and collect opinions, from the respondents, regarding social system and ways to reform it. The nature and practicability of suggestions would help determine the potentials of the respondents; Madrassa students.

265

Table 6.46: Steps to Reform Society S No Steps to Reform Society Respondents Percentage 1 Religious Education 192 11.7 2 Governance/ Social Reform 338 20.5 3 Implementing Religion 236 14.3 4 Collective Good/ Public Welfare 283 17.2 5 Self-Reform/ Character Building 266 16.2 6 Following Religion 141 8.6 7 Honest/ Deserving Rulers 12 .7 8 Do Not Know 178 10.8 Total 1646 100

More than 20% respondents emphasized the need of improving social setup or initiating governance related reforms while 17% declared public welfare and collective good related activities necessary for improving social setup. Combined together, 37% respondents were in favour of initiating reform and welfare programs in the society. That is not all, 16% considered character building or self-reform as necessary steps for reforming society. Almost 20%, collectively, declared religious education, and following religion as necessary steps. Only 14% were in favour of implementing religion; to reform society. Religions generally, and Islam particularly, emphasize on character building and moral values. The need is to identify methods of implementing it without any bias; the variety in interpretations makes the job even more difficult.

266

Figure 6.31:

6.4.1.20.3: Question No 20 (iii): Steps to Reform Politics It was added to examine the capabilities, of the respondents, to suggest appropriate steps, for reforming the existing political system. It also helped in gauging their ownership for the existing political system; as against their willingness to replace it.

267

Table 6.47: Steps to Reform Politics S No Steps to Reform Politics Respondents Percentage 1 Religious Education 85 5.2 2 Governance/ Public Service 162 9.8 3 Following/ Implementing 404 24.5 Religion 4 Character Building/ Reform 175 10.6 5 System Reform 216 13.1 6 More than One 8 .5 7 Loyal/ Deserving Rulers 310 18.8 8 System Replacement 62 3.8 9 Do Not Know 224 13.6 Total 1646 100

The results were scattered but interesting. More than 24% considered following or implementing rules of Islam as a best step towards reforming morally corrupt and structurally lame politics of the country. Almost 19% wanted to see honest and deserving rulers- who could put country‘s politics back to nation building track- while more than 10% rightly emphasized on the importance of character building. 13% wanted to reform political system and almost 4% intended to replace the existing system. All those who favoured loyal rulers, character building, religious education and following religion, 59% in total, did present practical steps while those who emphasized on governance/public service and system reform, almost 23%, were actually presenting their desires only, instead of suggesting any practical steps. The ones who need to be worried were those, 3.8%, who intended to replace the existing system; declaring it irreparable.

268

Figure 6.32:

6.4.1.20.4: Question No 20 (iv): Steps to Reforming the System of Government in Pakistan It was asked to provide an opportunity, to the respondents, to suggest practical steps for reforming the governmental system. It also helped in accessing the expectations, of the respondents, from the government.

269

Table 6.48: Steps to Reform the System of Government in Pakistan S No Steps to Reform Government Respondents Percentage 1 Religious Education 68 4.1 2 Character Building 112 6.8 3 Implementing Religion 459 27.9 4 Structure Reform 199 12.1 5 Governance/ Public Service 231 14.0 6 System Replacement 103 6.3 7 Honest Rulers 251 15.2 8 Role of Ulema in Politics 21 1.3 9 Do Not Know 202 12.3 Total 1646 100

The responses, in this question were also mixed. Almost 28% considered implementing religion as an effective solution. While, 15% wanted honest rulers and 14% wanted to improve governance related performances including public service. 12% were in favour of reforming the structure and almost 7% considered character building a remedy to the ills of governmental system and structures. 12% simply admitted their incapacity; by not answering the question and thus ending up in do not know category, while, 6% were in favour of system replacement. All those who suggested religious education, character building, structural reforms and reforms in governance system, to improve public service, almost 60% combined, presented some practical steps; at least to start with. While those who opted implementing religion or honest rulers, 43% combined, did not have any solid recommendation that could be appreciated and, subsequently, forwarded. A little more than 6% however considered system replacement as the only solution to the problem. Some of the Ulema also had the similar opinions. They too emphasized on the significance of honesty, loyalty and accountability for improving government efficiency and credibility442.

442 Molana Sheikh Muhammad Shafi Najafi, of Jamia Al Murtaza, 96-B, Model Colony, Lahore (Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia), in discussion with the researcher, on 2-Jan-2012. He said, ―The rulers should work, for Pakistan, as loyal Pakistanis; after coming into power.

270

Figure 6.33:

6.4.1.20.5: Question No 20 (v): Any other suggestions It was added to provide an opportunity, to the respondents, to express their feelings about the society and prevailing socio-politico-economic systems.

They should not involve in corruption‖. The conversation took place in Urdu, translated by the researcher.

271

Table 6.49: Any other Suggestions S No Any Suggestions Respondents Percentage 1 Promoting Religious Education 89 5.4 2 Character Building 131 8.0 3 Implementing Religion 234 14.2 4 System Reform 65 3.9 5 Governance/ Public Service 85 5.2 Improvement 6 Loyalty to Country/ Society 23 1.4 7 System Replacement 145 8.8 8 Honest Rulers 36 2.2 9 Role of Ulema in Politics 10 .6 Do Not Know 828 50.3 Total 1646 100

It was the least answered question. More than 50% respondents did not give any suggestion. It was an open ended question and the respondents were at liberty to give any suggestion, regarding social and political issues. 14% wanted to communicate the significance of implementing religion to solve the issues discusses earlier. 8% emphasized on character building, while almost 9% enchanted the same slogan of replacing existing system. It shows that most of the respondents were giving opinions by themselves. It appears as if teachers do not initiate any discussion on issues like social reforms and improvement. It seems that the only answer they have, for all the queries of students, is ―implementing religion‖. Keeping the validity of this argument aside, one has to point out, or devise, methods and mechanisms to implement Islam in the modern society. The dimensions of public needs and services have changed in last 1400 years. Therefore ―Motzalite‖ interpretations of religion are no longer applicable now. You have to travel by train, ship and aeroplane and will have to offer prayers in moving vehicles- which was not the case centuries ago- therefore, new interpretations and explanations need to be developed. What we need is a consensus, on these interpretations and explanations, rather than denial or intimidating them.

272

Figure 6.34:

6.4.1.21: Question No 21: Social Issues Discussed with Teachers It was used to gauge the preparedness of Madrassa students regarding social setup and social issues.

Table 6.50: Social Problems Discussed with Teachers S No Social Problems Discussed Respondents Percentage 1 Often 810 49.2 2 Occasionally 705 42.8 3 Hardly Ever 111 6.7 4 Not Needed 13 .8 5 Others 7 .4 Total 1646 100

According to the responses, 92% claimed that their teachers discussed social issues, other than syllabus. It was a healthy sign as it would inculcate a sense of responsibility, towards the society, among students and their ideas would be more refined and polished. The responses in the previous question were not very encouraging but it did not mean that the respondents were not

273 aware of social issues. It only highlighted that teachers were not continuing discussions in the right direction- it is the teachers who need to be advised and not the students to be blamed or declared castoff.

Figure 6.35:

6.4.1.22: Question No 22: Any Skill Taught by the Madrassa Just to see whether the Madrassa students are equipped with any additional skills or are restricted to subject books only-as claimed/blamed by some writers.

Table 6.51: Any Skill Taught by the Madrassa S No Any skill Taught Respondents Percentage 1 Computer 261 15.9 2 Home Appliances 24 1.5 Maintenance 3 Professional Skill 97 5.9 4 Household Skills 150 9.1 5 More than One 142 8.6 6 No Skill 972 59.1 Total 1646 100

274

Data showed that 59% respondents claimed that they were not taught any skill and almost 16% had acquired computer awareness to some extent. Household skill was a response given by female respondents only. Almost 9% claimed to have acquired more than one of the following skills.

Figure 6.36:

This apparently simple table needed in depth analysis. Therefore, cross tabulation of Madrassa administration was run with skill acquiring. The results were astonishing and eye-opening.

275

Table 6.52: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Any Skill Taught S Madrassa Compu Home Profes Househ More No Total No Administr ter Appliances sional old than Skill ation Maintenanc Skill Skills One e 1 Improvide 32.8% .0% .0% .0% .0% 67.2 100 nt % % 2 Impulsive 11.7% 3.5% 5.4% 2.5% .2% 76.7 100 % % 3 Efficient 16.6% .3% 3.4% 8.9% 4.8% 66.0 100 % % 4 Organized 17.9% .0% 7.5% 13.1% 21.8% 39.7 100 % % 5 Prudent 15.5% 2.1% 13.0% 21.4% 23.9% 23.9 100 % % Total 15.9% 1.5% 5.9% 9.1% 8.6% 59.1 100 % %

Almost 33% respondents, from Improvident Administration Madrassas, amazingly claimed to have acquired computer skills, up to some undefined level, while 67% had not been introduced to any skill. Amazingly, no respondent claimed to have acquired any other skill. As far as Madrassas under Impulsive Administration were concerned, almost 77% respondents were deprived of any skill development activity and almost 12% had acquired computer related skills. As for Efficient Administration run Madrassas, 66% were deprived of any skill, more than 16% had acquired computer awareness, almost 9%, all female obviously, had acquired household skills and almost 5% had acquired more than one skill. A consolidated view shows that 34% had acquired some sort of skill. As predicted in the ―Hypothesis‖ of the research, Organized and Prudent Administrations were putting effort in making their students skillful. Almost 18% respondents, from Organized Administration Madrassas, were computer literate, nearly 22% had acquired more than one skill, 13%, female obviously, had household skills training and more than 7% had professional skills of some sort. Merely 39% had not acquired any skill and amazingly none of the respondents claimed to have learnt home appliances maintenance. It

276 means that more than 60% had acquired some sort of skill and were definitely not going to be a burden on society; as feared and propagated by some writers. The prudence of Prudent Administration was once again proven in this question. Only24% of their respondents could not be introduced to any skill. Remaining 76% had acquired different skills; almost 24% with more than one skill. Specialists need not to concentrate on nonprofessional activities but those who do not acquire knowledge for earning sake only, do sharpen their mental and physical capabilities in nonprofessional realms of learning. It has been centuries old practice in Madrassas that medicine and some other branches of knowledge were taught side by side with religion; to make religious scholars self-surviving and not depending on religious services or activities. Likewise religion was used to be taught to scientists and chemists; to enrich their morality and sense of responsibility443.

Figure 6.37:

443 See Chapter 4, ―Structure and Working of Madrassas‖ for details.

277

6.4.1.23: Question No 23: Madrassa Sending in Processions and Meetings It helped in understanding the nonacademic training of the Madrassa students. The results confirmed that Madrassas did send their students to processions and meetings.

Table 6.53: Madrassa Sending in Processions and Meetings S No Processions and Meetings Respondents Percentage 1 Never 250 15.2 2 1-2 Times 227 13.8 3 Sometimes 602 36.6 4 Often 558 33.9 5 Not Given 9 .5 Total 1646 100

More than 36% said that they were sent sometimes and almost 34% admitted to have been sent, to several meetings and processions, very often. All the meetings and processions cannot be bad as religious festivals and festivities also demand student attendance. Several religious meetings are also attended by students. The need is to point out, and differentiate, good educational meetings and processions from the harmful ones444.

444 All the respondents from Jamia Darul Uloom Islamia, Allama Iqbal Town Lahore, had written on the questionnaire that, Madrassa allows going in ―Mehfil Qirat‖ (Recitation of the Holy Quran) only.

278

Figure 6.38:

6.4.1.24: Question No 24: Kind of Processions and Meetings Attended Through this question, the interests of Madrassa administration and grooming patterns of their students were to be studied. Some Madrassas use their students as street power for political objectives while some others use them for developing their influence in the society445.

445 See Chapter 4, ―Structure and Working of Madrassa Education‖ for details. For political use of Madrassa students, see Chapter 5, ―Politicization of Madrassas‖.

279

Table 6.54: Kinds of Processions and Meetings Attended S No Kind of Processions and Respondents Percentage Meetings 1 Religious 991 60.2 2 Political 72 4.4 3 Protest 150 9.1 4 Religious and Protest 127 7.7 5 All Three 140 8.5 6 None 166 10.1 Total 1646 100 More than 60% respondents replied that they were sent, by the Madrassa, to attend, and participate, in religious meetings and processions. 10% clarified that they were never sent to any meeting or procession by the Madrassa. Remaining options received nominal responses. The notable response came from 9% students who claimed to have been sent to political meetings and processions, by their Madrassas.

280

Figure 6.39:

6.4.1.25: Question No 25: Define Fundamentalism It was a direct and open ended question. It was asked to estimate two things; firstly, the information of students regarding present day political issues and secondly, to calculate their intellectual capability regarding a commonly used, rather misused, concept. As it was an open ended question therefore various options were developed after analyzing almost fifty responses and were revised after first two hundred entries446.

446 Deducing accurate options, in open ended questions, is always a herculean task but such efforts are worth doing because the respondents can give their best ideas and can speak their heart out.

281

Table 6.55: Respondents Defining Fundamentalism S No Fundamentalism Respondents Percentage 1 Adherence to your Religion 330 20.0 2 Adherence to Basic Rules 150 9.1 3 Considering Others Wrong 145 8.8 4 Self-Proclaimed Rules/ Blind 215 13.1 Following 5 Following Regulatory Set Up in 48 2.9 Society 6 Selfishness/ Self-Aggrandizement 106 6.4 7 Prohibited by Islam/ Anti Islam 29 1.8 8 Do Not Know 623 37.8 Total 1646 100

Almost 38% respondents did not answer it, 20% pointed out rightly that it meant adherence to one‘s religion. A little over 13% considered fundamentalism as blind following of ideas or of self-proclaimed rules. They, as a matter of fact, shunned fundamentalism- considering it as selfishness and stubbornness. A little over 9% declared fundamentalism as compulsory following of basic rules of a code of conduct and almost 9% thought that fundamentalism was a mentality according to which one starts considering others wrong and falls a pray to selfish ness. A careful analysis shows that 32% respondents understood fundamentalism in the right context447. While, 30% were unable to grasp the true spirit of the concept and were, eventually, unable to explain it in the appreciable manner or in the acceptable context.

447 Fundamentalism means following predetermined basic rules. See Chapter 3 ―Putting the House in Order‖ for details.

282

Figure 6.40:

6.4.1.26: Question No 26: Respect for Teacher This apparently simple question was designed to gauge teacher student relationship in Madrassas and to assess the level of respect for teachers; that students have in their minds. As long as the students do not respect their teachers, they will not be willing to learn- wholeheartedly- from them. It was a closed question and had three options; along with the fourth, any other.

Table 6.56: Respect for Teachers S No Respect for Teachers Respondents Percentage 1 More Than Parents 539 32.7 2 Equal to Parents 418 25.4 3 Second to Parents 669 40.6 4 Others 20 1.2 Total 1646 100

283

The results confirmed the perception that students had a great deal of respect for their teachers. More than 40% replied that they had a great deal of respect for their teachers; second only to their respect for their parents. Almost 33%, astonishingly, respected their teachers even more than their parents. A little over 24% declared that they respected their teachers equal to their parents448. Only 1% had different answers or did not give any answer at all.

Figure 6.41:

6.4.1.27: Question No 27: Suggestions for Reforms in Madrassa System This question also helped in estimating student‘s capabilities to improve Madrassa system. It also helped in knowing the nature of reforms needed in the Madrassa system. It was an open ended question to facilitate the vastness in the perceptions of the respondents and variety in responses.

448 It explains the concept that teacher is one‘s spiritual father and influences one‘s personality more than one‘s parents.

284

Table 6.57: Suggestions for Reforms in Madrassa System S No Reforms in Madrassa System Respondents Percentage 1 Not Needed at All 78 4.7 2 Improve Syllabi 82 5.0 3 Admin Reforms 356 21.6 4 Introduce New Disciplines 449 27.3 5 Stop Personalization of 54 3.3 Madrassas 6 Motivation/ Character Training 166 10.1 7 Govt. Role/ Support Needed 132 8.0 8 No Suggestion 329 20.0 Total 1646 100

A little more than 27% emphasized on the need of introducing new disciplines. Some of them had even mentioned, in the questionnaire, that modern sciences, English language and other subjects of commerce etc. should be introduced and some over emphasized subjects like ―Mantaq‖ (logic) and philosophy should be shrunk449. Almost 22% wanted to initiate administrative reforms like teacher training programs, teaching plan and wanted better administrative arrangements particularly from Madrassa heads. 10% wanted to see more emphasis on motivation for studies and practical following of the principles taught; some even pointed out lack of practical character training by their teachers. One of the most common complaints, by both the students and Madrassa administrators or office bearers, was laziness and coning late in classes. Laziness and less importance for commitment- keeping ones word- were also observed, and experienced, during the survey450. Dr. Muhammad Raghib Hussain Naeemi, while explaining reasons

449 Some heads of Madrassa Boards were also in the favour of readjusting the syllabus but were unable to initiate reforms due to lack of willingness and determination in some members of Madrassa Boards and heads of Madrassas. Molana Abdul Malik, President Rabta Tul Madaris, in an interview with the researcher on 4 December 2013, expressed his opinion that ―Mantaq‖ (logic) and Philosophy should be limited and modern subjects like Political science, Economics and International Relations should be taught at higher levels. He also emphasized on the importance of teaching Urdu and English languages. 450 Several Madrassa administrators were found complaining about the lazy attitude of some of their teachers; particularly when the administrator was relatively younger than the teachers. Such teachers were of the opinion that they were covering the required amount

285 for laziness and lack of punctuality among teachers, did admit that several teachers lacked a sense of ownership and responsibility and considered covering of required syllabus more important than giving full designated time to the class. According to him, it was due to, ―Lack of ownership‖ and was responsible for such attitude of some of the teachers; ―Teachers come late in class, then quickly cover the syllabus and feel irritated when asked the reason for their late coming in the class‖451. Molana Abdul Malik, of Rabta Tul Madaris, interpreted the reasons, for such careless behaviour, as, ―Lack of interest‖. According to him, such teachers were teaching, ―For job sake only‖452. Some Madrassa administrators were of the opinion that any reform, in the Madrassa system, could be successful if it was introduced gradually and with the support of the Madrassa Boards453. A handsome number of respondents, 20% did not give any suggestion at all and 8% wanted to see increased government support, or role in some cases, for the sake of Madrassa system reformation. A minimal 3%, of the respondents, pointed out that some Madrassa administrators were treating Madrassas as their personal property; it should be checked and stopped. Almost 5%, however, were completely satisfied with the prevailing Madrassa system and opined that no change or reform was needed.

of syllabus and timing was of not much importance in that regard. As for laziness, it was a common trait in almost all Madrassas. 451 Interview with Dr. Muhammad Raghib Hussain Naeemi, Mohtamim Jamia Naeemia, Garhi Shahu Lahore, on 28 Dec 2011. 452 Molana Abdul Malik, President Rabta Tul Madaris, interview conducted on 4 December 2013, at his residence in Mansoora, Lahore. 453 Interview with Dr. Muhammad Raghib Hussain Naeemi, Mohtamim Jamia Naeemia, Garhi Shahu Lahore, on 28 Dec 2011

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Figure 6.42:

Apparently simple answers in this question were actually of great significance as they were an important yardstick to gauge the potentials of Madrassa graduates regarding their own education system; their capability to understand flaws in a prevailing system and their willingness to improve their own system. Cross tabulation of Madrassa administration with reforms in Madrassa system revealed new dimensions of understanding level of the respondents.

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Table 6.58: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Reforms in Madrassa System S Reforms Improvi Impulsi Efficient Organiz Prudent Total No dent ve ed 1 Not Needed at 35.8% 4.4% 2.0% 5.6% 2.9% 4.7% All 2 Improve 6.0% 5.8% 3.3% 7.9% 4.2% 5.0% Syllabi 3 Admin 10.4% 24.2% 17.2% 29.4% 22.7% 21.6 Reforms % 4 Introduce New 22.4% 17.7% 36.1% 14.7% 38.7% 27.3 Disciplines % 5 Stop 1.5% 1.0% 5.3% 3.6% 2.9% 3.3% Personalization of Madrassas 6 Motivation/ 3.0% 12.9% 4.8% 17.5% 12.2% 10.1 Character % Training 7 Govt. Role/ 1.5% 6.9% 12.5% 2.0% 7.1% 8.0% Support Needed 8 No Suggestion 19.4% 27.1% 18.9% 19.4% 9.2% 20.0 %

Majority of the respondents, almost 36%, from Madrassas under Improvident administration, was not in favour of any reforms or improvements; a clear indication of teacher influence on students and evidence that why and how Madrassa system does not favour, or support, reforms. More than 19%, from the same setups, did not give any suggestion at all; again proving that Improvident Administrations do not let their students develop ―out of the box approach‖. They tend to teach them whatever they had read and are nothing but typical ―Bookmark teachers‖. Same gloomy picture was seen in Impulsive Administration run Madrassas. More than 27% respondents did not give any opinion at all and a little over 24% desired to have some administrative

288 reforms. Madrassas, under Efficient Administrations, did produce some encouraging results as 36% respondents favoured introduction of new disciplines and a little over 17% wanted to introduce administrative reforms in their Madrassas. Almost 19% were still unable to think of any reform in Madrassa system. Respondents from Organized Administration Madrassas provided a variety of responses; showing their ability to have diversity in opinion and proving their capability to think ―out of the box‖. More than 29% favoured administrative reforms, more than 17% wanted more emphasis on motivation and character building and almost 18% wanted introduction of new disciplines. Still a large number, more than 19% did not give any suggestion at all. The students, under Prudent Administrators, were relatively more focused on reforms- as expected- and were clustered in more practical options. Almost 39% supported introduction of new disciplined, almost 23% wanted to initiated administrative reforms and a little over 12% wanted more motivational steps and more emphasis on character building. Only 9% of them did not give any opinion.

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Figure 6.43:

As far as the improvement in the syllabi is concerned, suggestions given in ―Halipota Report 1979‖ were appreciated by several Madrassa administrators. They were of the opinion that the syllabi, in Madrassas, government schools and private schools, should be similar, if not same, up to Matriculation level; to ensure character building and grooming on the same lines. Several Madrassa administrators emphasized the need of introducing new disciplines, along with the prevailing subjects. Some even suggested trimming of the existing books; to facilitate new subjects. Several Madrassa administrators, mostly Organized and Prudent, have already introduced new disciplines, along with the existing syllabi; as they could not replace the existing books because the Madrassa Boards took final examinations, from these books, and only they had the authority to remove or replace them454.

454 Most of the Madrassa administrators, presented this view. According to Dr. Raghib Hussain Naeemi, Jamia Naeemia, Lahore (Tanzeem Ul Madaris) had started persuading and facilitating its ―Almia‖ students to pass Matriculation examination in 1975. Molana Muhammad Shafi Najafi, Mohtamim, Jamia Al Murtaza, (Wafaq Al Madaris Shia) Model

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Some even complain about the rigid behaviour of the Madrassa Boards, regarding any change or improvement in the syllabi. Some Madrassa administrators even blame Madrassa Boards for promoting sectarian differences455. It, once again, strengthened the theme of the research that Madrassa teachers, and administration, were greatly responsible, for inculcating rigid tendencies in their students, and were not grooming their students properly and were unable to produce sensible and productive citizens. Information collected in this part of the Questionnaire was of great significance in evaluating the potentials and capabilities of Madrassa students-regarding all fields of societal life- and would be used to gauge the validity and weightage of the responses given in the subsequent parts. As respondents had given information, in the first pat, without realizing that it would be cross checked and cross matched with the responses in the subsequent parts, therefore it would be easy to authenticate the responses- and point out factors that play an effective role in perception building and character development of the Madrassa students. The responses, in this part of the questionnaire, helped clarify misunderstandings and misperceptions; particularly about the Madrassa students. The notions that only the poor send their children to the Madrassas,

Colony Lahore, in discussion with the researcher, on 2-January-2012, stated, ―Sciences and other branches of [reasoned] knowledge should also be taught along with Arabic grammer‖. Conversation took place in Urdu, and was translated by the researcher. However, there were some administrators who were not convinced and emphasized on continuing the same syllabus. Molana Akram Kashmiri, Registrar, Jamia Ashrafia, in discussion with the researcher, on 12-Jan-2012. He was of the opinion, ―There is nothing wrong with the existing syllabi and curriculum of Madrassas, rather it is the government schools and private schools that need revisions in their systems, structures and priorities‖. He further added, ―Why any research about government and private schools, colleges and universities is not conducted? Why Madrassas are under observation‖? The conversation took place in Urdu, translated by the researcher. Similar ideas were shared by Molana Habib Ullah Ludhianvi Mohtamim Jamia Milia Islamia, Faisalabad (Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia), on 14-April-2012. While some young scholars and administrators had a different view. People like Qari Muhammad Umar Ibrahim, Finance Secretary of Jamia Qasmia, Rahman Pura Lahore (Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia), in discussion with the researcher on 17-May-2012, asserted the need of improving the syllabi and curriculum of the Madrassas. He himself had passed ―Aima Course‖ from International Islamic University Islamabad and had also passed ―Diploma in English Language‖ from National University of Modern Languages (NUML). Qari Rashid Ahmad Thanvi, of Jamia Islamia, Lahore (Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia) said, in one of his meetings with the researcher, ―Reforms in Madrassa system are not possible because of the hard liners in the Wafaq‖. Conversation took place in Urdu, translated by the researcher. 455 Muhammad Ibrahim, Nazim Ala, Jamia Rizvia Mazhar Ul Uloom, Tanzeem Ul Madaris Multan, in discussion with the researcher, on 12-February-2012.

291 only to save expenditures on education, do not hold strong grounds as most of the respondents had majority of their siblings either studying in general schools or living with their parents; definitely not enrolled in a Madrassa. Several respondents pointed out the fact that their siblings were studying in government schools or colleges and they were here only for the sake of religious knowledge; which, according to them, was necessary for character building. Most of them had pre-declared objectives of becoming a teacher; imparting religious education rather than becoming extremists in the society, as projected by some writers. The conventional wisdom that only the clergy sends its children to Madrassas was also negated as most of the respondents belonged to agrarian families or their parents were professionals. Only a small number of respondents disclosed that their parents were religious teachers or performers; Imam of a mosque. The commitment and decisiveness of the respondents, to become a teacher, clarifies the misperception that Madrassa students are not sure or certain about their future. The constitutionally protected freedom of profession and association allows them to acquire any kind of education and adopt any legal profession; one may consider beneficial for one‘s self. As far as the suggestions are concerned, most of the respondents gave appreciable opinions and practical suggestions; reflecting their understanding of the prevailing social system and its problems. Some of them even suggested reforms in the Madrassa system and curriculum; which were also emphasized upon by several Madrassa teachers and administrators and were already preponderated upon in, wisely devised, governmental Madrassa reform strategies. Thus, there is a dire need to revisit the perceptions about Madrassa education; particularly regarding the potentials of Madrassa graduates.

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Chapter: 7 Potentials and Perspectives of Madrassa Students in the Punjab

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This chapter houses, and subsequently, analyzes the perceptions and perspectives, of the respondents; related to social, political and economic systems and structures in the society. The emphasis will be on evaluating their perceptions about the existing systems their and potentials to become productive members of the prevailing socio-politico-economic systems. Their suggestions to improve, the existing systems, will also be analyzed and, through this, their ownership towards the society, and its institutions, will be measured, wherever possible. In order to avoid over-statistization, the opinions, of the respondents, have been evaluated on the simple criterion; to what extent the respondents intend to reform or replace the existing systems. Those who are determined to replace the existing systems, only because they are not legitimate, according to their perception, are a threat to the society. While, those who are suggesting reforms, to improve the efficiency of the institutions, are definitely not a threat to the society. The level of appreciation, of their suggestions, adds to their capabilities and would, thus, enhance their credibility; as productive citizens. The questionnaire had four parts. The first, about personal information, has already been discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter will include discussions about the remaining three parts.

7.1: Social Harmony This part comprised of questions regarding interactions in social matters. From daily interactions to social norms and institutions and from moral values to their decay several questions are included. Character building responsibilities and rules of peaceful living, in a society, are also themes of the questions in this part. The perceptions of respondents regarding non- compulsory relations, with other communities, and intangible aspects of their character are to be analyzed through these questions. It was developed to analyzing the social inclusions of Madrassa graduates; their potentials to promote social harmony in the society.

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7.1.1: Question No 1: Level of Interaction with other Sects. Through this question, the effort was to evaluate the intentions of Madrassa graduates; whether they consider people, belonging to other sects, trustworthy and intent to develop interactions with them or not456.

Table 7.1: Interaction with other Sects S No Interaction with other Sects Respondents Percentage 1 No Difference Needed 454 27.6 2 Limited Interaction 684 41.6 3 A Little Care needed 214 13.0 4 Avoid 210 12.8 5 No Relation at all 69 4.2 6 Not Given 15 .9 Total 1646 100

Almost 42% respondents were in favour of developing interaction with other sects but with a little care in mind. Most of them pointed out that such interactions should not be at the expense of one‘s belief. According to some respondents, best solution, to avoid any differences and conflicts, was to follow the policy of, ―Do not disturb the sect of others and do not leave your sect‖457. Almost 28% did not put any restrictions on such interaction at all. Some of the respondents, 13%, were in favour of developing and maintaining interactions with people, practicing interpretations of other sets, but just wanted to be careful and conscious. Their only concern was preservation of their own sets of beliefs; as long as they were not endangered by any interaction. The critical responses were the ones which wanted to avoid such interactions or did not want to have any at all. Almost 13% were in favour of avoiding any interaction with people following the interpretations of other sects while only 4% did not want to have any kind of interaction at all. As it was mentioned earlier, the respondents understood this interaction in the context

456 Students took this interaction in the context of establishing long lasting friendly relations- rather than mere hello or hi. 457 Translated by the researcher, ―Dosron ka maslak chairo nahin. Apna maslak choro nahin‖.

295 of strong friendly relationship. Therefore, their responses should not be interpreted as their judgment towards establishing, or not establishing, nominal interactions of daily routine. Rather, they opined about long-term friendly interactions and relations458.

Figure 7.1:

Cross tabulation of responses, in this question, was of great significance in pointing out the reasons for such responses.

458 One must also keep in mind that in Pakistani society people usually do not intermarry with other tribes or communities. Likewise, those who follow strict sectarian bifurcations also marry their children within the followers of same sect; though exceptions are always there. As far as less practicing Muslims are concerned, social mobilization, modernity and, most importantly, coeducation are playing an important role in increasing inter-clan and inter-community relationships/marriages.

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Table 7.2: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Interaction with Other Sects S Madrassa No Limited A Little Avo No Not Total No Administrat Difference Interacti Care id Relati Given ion Needed on needed on 1 Improvident 47.8% 26.9% 3.0% 9.0 13.4 .0% 100 % % % 2 Impulsive 17.9% 36.5% 12.1% 25. 8.1% .4% 100 0% % 3 Efficient 23.8% 41.7% 21.0% 11. 2.0% .0% 100 5% % 4 Organized 23.8% 41.7% 21.0% 11. 2.0% .0% 100 5% % 5 Prudent 29.4% 47.9% 14.3% 5.9 1.3% 1.3% 100 % % Total 27.6% 41.6% 13.0% 12. 4.2% .9% 100 8% %

The results showed that only the students from the Madrassas under Improvident Administration and Impulsive Administration were not in favour of developing any interaction at all; 13% and 8% respectively. Highest ration of the respondents, who wanted to avoid such interaction, 25%, also came from the Madrassas under Impulsive Administration. Variety in responses, as earlier, again came from Prudent Administration run Madrassas. Though a huge number, almost 48%, favoured limited interaction, yet they wanted to control, not restrict their interactions459.

459 The reason for this reservation was understood after discussions with teachers in Prudent Administration run Madrassas. Several teachers are hired because of their specialization in the subject, instead of their mental capabilities in administrative affairs and broadness in vision. Therefore, the students do receive influences form such teachers as favour sectarian isolation or extreme caution; for preservation sake only.

297

Figure 7.2:

7.1.2: Question No 2: Rate Television as an Invention This question was asked for two reasons; firstly to know the perception of respondents regarding scientific inventions like TV and secondly, to know whether they were aware of the great influencing power of TV or not. The perception of respondents was further evaluated, in detail, in the following questions.

Table 7.3: Rate TV as an Invention S No TV as an Invention Respondents Percentage 1 Very Positive 97 5.9 2 Positive to Some Extent 960 58.3 3 Very Negative 176 10.7 4 Negative to Some Extent 165 10.0 5 Depends on Usage 238 14.5 6 Others 10 .6 Total 1646 100

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More than 58% declared it a positive invention, to some extent, while more than 14%, rightly, pointed out that it depended on the usage of TV. More than 10% declared it very negative and 10% considered it a little negative. Almost 6%, only, declared it a very positive invention. A careful analysis shows that almost 79% considered TV as a good invention or the one that could be used as for good purposes- as it depended on usage- and almost 21% were either apprehensive or against this invention.

Figure 7.3:

Cross tabulation, of Madrassa Administration with TV as an Invention, revealed that almost 39% respondents, from the Madrassas run by Improvident Administration, thought that productivity of TV depended on its usage. Almost 36% considered it positive to some extent while, almost 21% declared it to be a very negative invention.

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Table 7.4: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Rate TV as an Invention S Madrassa Very Positive Very Negative Depends Othe Tot No Administrati Positiv to Some Negativ to Some on rs al on e Extent e Extent Usage 1 Improvident 1.5% 35.8% 20.9% 3.0% 38.8% .0% 100 % 2 Impulsive 4.0% 60.6% 12.9% 8.1% 14.0% .4% 100 % 3 Efficient 4.9% 61.9% 10.8% 12.0% 9.0% 1.3 100 % % 4 Organized 10.7% 53.2% 10.7% 13.5% 11.9% .0% 100 % 5 Prudent 8.4% 56.3% 2.9% 7.1% 25.2% .0% 100 % Total 5.9% 58.3% 10.7% 10.0% 14.5% .6% 100 %

More than 60% respondents, from Impulsive Administration Madrassas, considered it positive to some extent and 14% attached its productivity with its usage. The students of Efficient Administration Madrassas also gave almost the same responses. Almost 61% declared it positive to some extent and 14% emphasized on the significance of its usage. The respondents from Organized Administration run Madrassas gave peculiar responses. Despite the fact that more than 53% respondents declared it positive to some extent and more than 13% considered it negative to some extent, almost 11% considered it very positive and the same percentage of respondents declared it very negative. Almost 12% considered its usage as more important. Prudent Administration Madrassas once again took the lead, in grooming and guiding the conscience of their students. More than 56% of them considered it positive to some extent, 25% gave more weightage to the usage, for declaring something positive or negative. Almost 3% declared it very negative and 7% considered it negative to some extent.

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Figure 7.4:

A consolidated view of the responses would help understand whether the respondents, as a whole, were in favour of TV or not.

Table 7.5: Madrassa Administration based Consolidated view of Rating TV as an Invention S Madrassa Approving Disappro Depends on Findings No Administration TV ving TV Usage 1 Improvident 37.3% 23.9% 38.8% Apprehensive 2 Impulsive 64.6% 21% 14.0% Approving TV Use 3 Efficient 66.8% 22.8% 9.0% Approving TV Use 4 Organized 63.9% 24.2% 11.9% Approving TV Use 5 Prudent 64.8% 10% 25.2% Approving TV Use Total 64.2% 20.7% 14.5% Approving TV Use

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A consolidated data of responses about TV, as an invention, turned out to be highly approving and favoring TV. The only apprehensiveness, they had shown, was about the right use of TV. They were not satisfied with the use of this invention. The responses in the next question explained it in detail. It is commonly withheld that some sects disapprove TV, or even photograph, considering it an anti-Islamic practice and a forbidden activity460. This stance is best analyzed in the upcoming question but, before evaluating responses in the next question, it is pertinent to analyze responses, in this question, through cross tabulation; on the basis of Madrassa Board. The idea was not disdain any particular sect, or set of beliefs, but to test the validity of the perceptions; prevailing among the masses.

460 Most of the Deobandis and Ahl Hadis are against photographing living organisms, particularly humans. Though this research does not address various sects as different groups yet, their strong influences, that affect the prevailing norms and structures, need to be studied.

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Table 7.6: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Board with Rate TV as an Invention S Madrassa Very Positive Very Negative Depends Othe Total No Administra Positi to Some Negati to Some on rs tion ve Extent ve Extent Usage 1 Rabta Tul 2.9% 68.9% 2.9% 5.8% 18.4% 1% 100 Madaris % 2 Tanzeem 4.1% 64.5% 9.5% 9.1% 12.6% .1% 100 Ul Madaris % 3 Wafaq Al .0% 30.8% 34.1% 8.8% 26.4% .0% 100 Madaris Al % Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 1.5% 43.9% 22.4% 18.4% 13.3% .5% 100 Madaris Al % Salafia 5 Wafaq Al 14.5 60.5% 3.6% 8.1% 13.3% .0% 100 Madaris Al % % Shia 6 Minhaj Ul 27.1 22.9% .0% 4.2% 45.8% .0% 100 Quran % % 7 Jamia 6.0% 66.2% 4.6% 12.6% 7.9% 2.6 100 Muhamma % % dia Ghausia 8 Jamia .0% 42.9% 28.6% 9.5% 4.8% 14. 100 Ashrafia 3% % 9 Jamia 9.1% 36.4% 18.2% 9.1% 27.3% .0% 100 Talemat % Islamia Total 5.9% 58.3% 10.7% 10.0% 14.5% .6% 100 %

Almost 69% respondents from Rabta Tul Madaris Madrassas consider TV as a positive and useful invention, to some extent, and more than 18% are of the opinion that usage of this invention will determine its productivity or destructivity. A minor portion, almost 3% declared it a negative invention. Respondents from Tanzeem Ul Madaris had almost the similar opinion. More than 64% considered it positive to some extent while more than 12% intended

303 to rate it on the basis of its usage. More than 9% however, declared it negative- perhaps because there was a huge number of Madrassas run by Improvident and Impulsive administrations. Respondents from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia Madrassas supported the conventional wisdom, and prevailing belief, that they were not in favour of taking photographs. Greatest proportion of their respondents, 34% declared it a very negative invention, almost 31% considered it positive to some extent and more than 26% wanted to rate it on the basis of its usage. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia had the highest ratio of respondents who declared TV a very negative invention. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia had the second highest ratio, 22%, of the respondents who declared that TV was a very negative invention. Jamia Ashrafia was no exception as almost 29% of their respondents were against TV. More than 14% of their respondents went into ―Others‖ category because some did not answer the question- perhaps they were not comfortable with the question- and some openly wrote that watching TV was prohibited by Islam. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia turned out to be a great supporter of TV. None of their respondents said that TV was a very positive invention. More than 60% considered it positive to some extent and more than 14% declared it very positive invention. Respondents from Minhaj Ul Quran put their weight in the usage of TV to determine its productivity, almost 46%. None of their respondents said that TV was a very negative invention. An overwhelming majority of respondents from Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia, Bhera, 62%, considered it positive to some extent. Respondents from Jamia Talemat Islamia, Faisalabad, had a mix response. More than 36% considered it positive to some extent, a little over 27% intended to determine its productivity on the basis of its usage and more than 18% declared it a very negative invention461.

461 The reasons for this variation, in responses, can be traced in the fact that it is managed by Efficient Administration.

304

Figure 7.5:

The consolidated view of Madrassa Board based rating of TV as an invention is presented here to clarify confusions and explain the prevailing perceptional stance of respondents, from various Madrassa Boards.

305

Table 7.7: Madrassa Board based Consolidated View of Rating TV as an Invention S Madrassa Approving Disappro Depends on Findings No Administration TV ving TV Usage 1 Rabta Tul Madaris 71.8% 8.7% 18.4% Strongly Approving TV Use 2 Tanzeem Ul 68.6% 18.6% 12.6% Approving TV Madaris Use 3 Wafaq Al Madaris 30.8% 42.9% 26.4% Strongly Al Arabia Against TV Use 4 Wafaq Al Madaris 45.4% 31.7% 13.3% Against TV Al Salafia Use 5 Wafaq Al Madaris 75% 11.7% 13.3% Strongly Al Shia Approving TV Use 6 Minhaj Ul Quran 50% 4.2% 45.8% Apprehensively Approving TV Use 7 Jamia 72.2% 17.2% 7.9% Strongly Muhammadia Approving TV Ghausia Use 8 Jamia Ashrafia 42.9% 52.4% 4.8% Against TV Use 9 Jamia Talemat 45.5% 27.3% 27.3% Against TV Islamia Use (Mean) 64.2% 20.7% 14.5% Approving TV Use

Most of the Madrassa Boards were in favour of using TV, though they showed some serious concerns regarding the misuse of TV. Still they were found aware of the significance, and power, of this important scientific invention. As far as its usage is concerned, it depends on the government and its policy, if there is any, regarding affecting or influencing the norms of society and the process of social change462.

462 Media, particularly electronic media TV, has a major role, and influence, in the process of social change. It has become stronger than ever, particularly, after the introduction of private news and entertainment channels in Pakistan.

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7.1.3: Question No 3: kinds of Programs watched on TV This helped understand the exposure of respondents to various programs, shown on TV.

Table 7.8: TV Programmes Watched by Respondents S No TV Programmes Watched Respondents Percentage 1 News Only 263 16.0 2 Sports Only 72 4.4 3 Religious Only 297 18.0 4 Entertainment 162 9.8 5 More Than One 490 29.8 6 Not Specific/ Very Less 145 8.8 Do not Watch at All 217 13.2 Total 1646 100

The response was a mixed one. Almost 30% said that they watched more than one type of TV programmes; almost all of them opted religious programmes and news and only a few selected more than two. 16% preferred watching news only and 18% watched religious programmes only. Almost 10% watched entertainment programmes and almost 9% did not watch any particular one. A little more than 13% did not watch TV at all. A consolidated figure shows that 78% respondents watch different TV programmes, almost 9% were not very specific, about the programmes watched, and only 13% did not watch it at all.

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Figure 7.6:

Cross tabulation, of the responses, on the basis of Madrassa Administration revealed interesting figures. Table 7.9: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with TV Programmes Watched S Madrassa News Sport Religi Ente More Not Do not Tot No Administra Only s ous rtain Than Specifi Watch al tion Only Only ment One c/ Very at All Less 1 Improvident 14.9 3.0 7.5% 3.0 29.9 16.4% 25.4% 100 % % % % % 2 Impulsive 21.0 3.1 22.5% 3.5 29.4 6.3% 14.2% 100 % % % % % 3 Efficient 14.3 5.9 16.9% 11.7 30.5 7.4% 13.3% 100 % % % % % 4 Organized 15.9 6.7 21.0% 11.1 22.6 10.3% 12.3% 100 % % % % % 5 Prudent 10.5 .8% 11.8% 18.5 36.1 13.9% 8.4% 100 % % % % Total 16.0 4.4 18.0% 9.8 29.8 8.8% 13.2% 100 % % % % %

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Almost 30% respondents, from Improvident Administration Madrassas, watched more than one type of TV programmes463. More than 25% did not watch TV at all. More than 29% respondents, from Impulsive Administration Madrassas, also watched more than one type of TV programmes, more than 22% preferred to watch religious programmes only and 21% watched news only. More than 30% respondents, from Efficient Administration Madrassas, watched more than one type of programmes and almost 17% watched religious programmes only. Respondents, from Organized Administration run Madrassas, had mixed responses. More than 26% watched more than one type of programmes, 21% watched religious programmes only and almost 16% watched news only. Respondents from Prudent Administration Madrassas also had a variety of responses. A little more than 36% watched more than one type of programmes, more than 18%- highest percentage of all types- watched entertainment programmes and almost 14% did not have any specific type of programmes watched. It proved that Prudent Administrations were preparing their students while keeping them within the prevailing social set up and were not over burdening them, to keep them aloof from the normal social practices like watching TV. The time spared for TV might not be too lavish but they were definitely utilizing social and scientific structures and inventions, respectively, for seeking awareness and enhancing knowledge.

463 Most of the respondents, who watched more than one type of TV programmes, had opted both news and religious. Only a handful had opted three types of programmes.

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Figure 7.7:

As discussed in the previous question, cross tabulation, of responses, on the basis of Madrassa Board was also run to find out any special trends; within various Madrassa Boards.

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Table 7.10: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Board with TV Programmes Watched S Madrassa News Sport Religi Entert More Not Do not Tot No Administr Only s ous ainme Than Specifi Watch al ation Only Only nt One c/ Very at All Less 1 Rabta Tul 20.4% 2.9% 4.9% 16.5% 27.1% 7.8% 20.4% 100 Madaris % 2 Tanzeem Ul 14.3% 3.1% 22% 10.8% 33.5% 5.8% 10.5% 100 Madaris % 3 Wafaq Al 25.3% 7.7% 12.1% 2.2% 18.7% 7.6% 26.4% 100 Madaris Al % Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 13.8% 6.2% 11.2% 2.0% 36.2% 2.0% 28.6% 100 Madaris Al % Salafia 5 Wafaq Al 16.1% 3.6% 21.4% 11.7% 20.6% 19.4% 7.2% 100 Madaris Al % Shia 6 Minhaj Ul 10.3% .0% 2.1% 16.7% 33.3% 35.4% 2.1% 100 Quran % 7 Jamia 22.5% 9.9% 19.9% 11.9% 25.8% 9.3% .7% 100 Muhamma % dia Ghausia 8 Jamia 9.5% .0% 14.3 .0% 9.5% 4.8% 61.9% 100 Ashrafia % % 9 Jamia .0% 18.2 9.1% .0% 54.5 9.1% 9.1% 100 Talemat % % % Islamia Total 16.0% 4.4% 18.0 9.8% 29.8 8.8% 13.2% 100 % % %

A little more than 27% respondents, from Rabta Tul Madaris, watched more than one type of TV programmes while more than 20% watched news only and the same number did not watch TV at all. More than 35% respondents from Tanzeem Ul Madaris watched more than one type of programmes and 22% preferred religious programmes only. Situation in

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Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia was altogether different. More than 26% of their respondents did not watch TV at all, 25% preferred watching news only and almost 19% had more than one type of programmes to watch. Respondents from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia were limited in their options. A little over 36% watched more than one type of TV programmes while, more than 28% did not watch TV at all. Most of the respondents from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia, 21% preferred religious programmes, more than 20% watched more than one type of programmes and 19% did not watch TV programmes of any specific type. Respondents from Minhaj Ul Quran were clustered in two responses mainly. More than 35% did not watch any specific programme and 33% watched a variety of TV programmes. Respondents from Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia, Bhera, were more focused in their responses. Almost 26% watched TV programmes of more than one type, more than 22% watched news and almost 20% preferred religious programmes only. Jamia Ashrafia turned out to be the only Madrassa whose majority of students, almost 62%, did not watch TV at all. Incidentally, none of their students watched sports; same was the case with entertainment programmes. Most of the Jamia Talemat Islamia students, almost 55% watched more than one type of programmes and 18% did watch sports. The alarming situation was their 0% audience ship of news. They did not seem to have any interest in entertainment programmes as well.

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Figure 7.8:

If we develop a consolidated view of the responses, on the basis of Madrassa Board, to evaluate that the respondents from which Madrassa Board were in favour of watching TV programmes regularly, we will have to add viewers of news, sports programmes and those who watch more than one type of programmes in the category of, ―Favoring Regular TV Programmes‖. While, the respondents in the remaining columns, all those who either do not watch TV at all or do not have any specific type of programmes to mention and those who watch religious programmes only, will have to be included in, ―Against Regular TV Programmes‖ category as they did not seem much appreciative of the TV programmes normally watched by people in Pakistan generally and in the Punjab particularly464.

464 News, sports and entertainment programmes are usually watched by people. Though a handsome number of people watch religious programmes as well but that is for guidance sake only- usually without sectarian differentiation- and particularly during the Holy Month of Ramadan.

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Table 7.11: Madrassa Board based Consolidated View of TV Programmes Watched S Madrassa Favoring Against Findings No Administration Regular TV Regular TV Programm Programm es es 1 Rabta Tul Madaris 67% 33% Strongly Favoring Regular TV Programmes 2 Tanzeem Ul 61.7% 38.3% Favoring Regular TV Madaris Programmes 3 Wafaq Al Madaris 53.9% 46.1% Apprehensively Favoring Al Arabia Regular TV Programmes 4 Wafaq Al Madaris 58.2% 41.8% Apprehensively Favoring Al Salafia Regular TV Programmes 5 Wafaq Al Madaris 52% 48% Apprehensively Favoring Al Shia Regular TV Programmes 6 Minhaj Ul Quran 60.3% 28.7% Favoring Regular TV Programmes 7 Jamia 70.1% 29.9% Strongly Favoring Muhammadia Regular TV Programmes Ghausia 8 Jamia Ashrafia 19% 81% Against Regular TV Programmes 9 Jamia Talemat 72.7% 27.3% Strongly Favoring Islamia Regular TV Programmes (Mean) 57.21% 36.9% Apprehensively Favoring Regular TV Programmes

The findings turned out to be ―Apprehensively Favoring Regular TV Programmes‖; as most of the respondents were not very happy with the ―Commoditization of Women‖465.

7.1.4: Question No 4: Weekly Hours for Watching TV It is necessary to know about the time devoted for TV programs, to evaluate the significance of a powerful medium of communication like TV. Though most of the busy people, students and workers cannot spare mush time for TV but still they do spare an hour or so, in most of the cases, either to

465 An expression used to denote, and denounce, the excessive use of women for presentation and projection on TV.

314 keep themselves updated, with news, or to ward off their tensions, through the programmes of their interest.

Table 7.12: Weekly Hours for Watching TV S No Weekly Hours for Watching TV Respondents Percentage 1 2-5 Hours 574 34.9 2 5-10 Hours 166 10.1 3 10-20 Hours 46 2.8 4 More Than 20 14 .9 5 Whenever Possible 562 34.1 6 Do Not Watch TV at All 284 17.3 Total 1646 100

The results showed that almost 35% could spare between two to five hours weekly and 34% could not spare even that much. Only 10% could spare more time, five to ten hours weekly, and more than 17% did not watch TV at all.

315

Figure 7.9:

Cross tabulation had to be run, on the basis of Madrassa Administration and Madrassa Board to identify variations, in responses, and test the ―Hypothesis‖. All those who could not spare much time for TV were at least not against it or were not trying to resist one of the most important, and influential, source in the society.

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Table 7.13: Cross Tabulation of Type of Madrassa with Weekly Hours for Watching TV S Madrassa 2-5 5-10 10-20 More Whenever Do Not Total No Administrati Hours Hours Hours Than Possible Watch on 20 TV at All 1 Improvident 9.0% 4.5% .0% .0% 58.2% 28.4% 100 % 2 Impulsive 36.9 7.1% 2.7% 1.0% 36.0% 16.3% 100 % % 3 Efficient 33.3 13.1% 3.8% .8% 31.9% 17.1% 100 % % 4 Organized 40.9 6.0% 1.2% .8% 29.0% 22.2% 100 % % 5 Prudent 35.7 14.3% 2.9% .8% 34.9% 11.3% 100 % % Total 34.9 10.1% 2.8% .9% 34.1% 17.3% 100 % %

The results were almost similar to the responses in the previous question. Most of the students did not watch TV for extended hours weekly466. Highest percentage of respondents, almost 35% could spare two hours or more and a reasonable number of respondents, more than 10%, could spare five to ten hours weekly for TV. The highest percentage of respondents, 14%, who could spare five to ten hours, came from Prudent Administration run Madrassas. Almost 36%, of their respondents, could spare only two to five hours and almost 35% even less. The highest percentage of the respondents, who either could not spare at least two hours a week or did not watch TV at all, almost 87%, came from Improvident Administration run Madrassas. Variety in responses, as expected, came from Prudent Madrassas where almost 35% did not spare two hours a week for TV but almost 36%, at the same time did watch TV for at least two hours a week. It showed that their

466 keeping in mind the high level of their classes and engagement in dual degrees, one from Madrassa and the other from regular universities, five to ten hours a week is sufficient time to benefit, and receive influence from TV. Personal experience and observation, of the researcher as a teacher for almost a decade, the students who spend too much time on watching TV are, usually, unable to meet the requirements of their studies and, eventually, suffer in grades and even in results.

317 students did have the opportunity, and facility, to watch TV. There was no trend, or compulsion, of not watching TV regularly.

Figure 7.10:

Cross tabulation was also run, on the basis of Madrassa Board, to differentiate ―Receptive‖ boards from ―Reluctant‖ and ―Resistant‖ boards467.

467 Receptive were those Madrassa Boards which were benefitting from scientific inventions and were thus ready to receive new, but acceptable, ideas and instruments from the society. Reluctant were those who were accepting social compulsions, and structures, halfheartedly. Resistant were the ones who were putting all efforts in trying to retain their perceived, actually nostalgic, socio-political set up in the country- perhaps because of their nosophobia.

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Table 7.14: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Board with Weekly Hours for Watching TV S Madrassa 2-5 5-10 10-20 More Whenev Do Not Total No Board Hours Hours Hours Than er Watch 20 Possibl TV at All e 1 Rabta Tul 19.4% 6.8% 1.9% 2.9% 43.7% 25.2% 100 Madaris % 2 Tanzeem Ul 36.2% 10.4% 2.3% .8% 35.4% 14.9% 100 Madaris % 3 Wafaq Al 13.2% 1.1% .0% .0% 56.0% 29.7% 100 Madaris Al % Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 17.3% .0% 1.0% .5% 49.5% 31.6% 100 Madaris Al % Salafia 5 Wafaq Al 55.2% 10.1% 3.2% .8% 17.7% 12.9% 100 Madaris Al % Shia 6 Minhaj Ul 52.1% 18.8% 4.2% .0% 20.8% 4.2% 100 Quran % 7 Jamia 41.1% 28.5% 9.3% 1.3% 17.2% 2.6% 100 Muhammad % ia Ghausia 8 Jamia 9.5% .0% .0% .0% 28.6% 61.9% 100 Ashrafia % 9 Jamia 9.1% .0% .0% .0% 72.7% 18.2% 100 Talemat % Islamia Total 34.9% 10.1% 2.8% .9% 34.1% 17.3% 100 %

Rabta Tul Madaris had greatest number of respondents, almost44%, not watching TV regularly and 25% not watching TV at all. Tanzeem Ul Madaris had the highest percentage, of respondents, 36% spending two to five hours, weekly, on watching TV and almost same number, 35% not sparing time for TV regularly. Responses from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia Madrassas were clustered around the resistance for TV as 56% did not watch

319 it regularly and almost 30% did not watch it at all. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia was not exception to them. More than 49% of their respondents did not watch it regularly and more than 31% did not watch it at all. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia turned out to be the only Madrassa Board where majority of respondents, 52% watched TV regularly, even for more than two hours weekly. Respondents from Minhaj Ul Quran were also regular TV viewers; with 52% watching it for more than two hours, weekly, and almost 19% sparing five to ten hours weekly for TV. Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia, Bhera, also had a handsome number of TV spectators; 41% spending two to five hours weekly and almost29% sparing five to ten hours weekly. Respondents from Jamia Ashrafia, Lahore, were heavily clustered against the regular use of TV as almost 62% did not watch TV at all and more than 28% did not watch it regularly. Almost same was the response from Jamia Talemat Islamia, Faisalabad. Almost 73% did not watch TV regularly and 18% did not watch it at all.

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Figure 7.11:

A consolidated view of the respondents needed to be developed, on the basis of Madrassa Board, to differentiate those who were in favour of watching TV regularly from those who were not. All those who could spare two hours or more, weekly, were included in regular TV watching respondents and those who spent less than two hours, weekly, or did not watch it regularly, were combined with those who did not watch TV at all and were thus considered as the opponents of regular TV watching.

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Table 7.15: Madrassa Board based Consolidated View of Weekly Hours for Watching TV S Madrassa Favoring Against Findings No Administration Regular TV Regular TV Watching Watching 1 Rabta Tul Madaris 31% 69% Against Regular TV Watching 2 Tanzeem Ul 49.7% 50.3% Apprehensive about Madaris Regular TV Watching 3 Wafaq Al Madaris 14.3% 85.7% Strongly Against Al Arabia Regular TV Watching 4 Wafaq Al Madaris 18.8% 81.2% Strongly Against Al Salafia Regular TV Watching 5 Wafaq Al Madaris 69.3% 30.7% Favoring Regular TV Al Shia Watching 6 Minhaj Ul Quran 75% 25% Strongly Favoring Regular TV Watching 7 Jamia 80.2% 19.8% Strongly Favoring Muhammadia Regular TV Ghausia Watching 8 Jamia Ashrafia 9.5% 90.5% Strongly Against Regular TV Watching 9 Jamia Talemat 9.1% 90.9% Strongly Against Islamia Regular TV Watching (Mean) 39.65% 50.24% Apprehensive about Regular TV Watching

The results were clear about the perceptions of Madrassa Boards. Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia and Minhaj Ul Quran turned out to be the strongest supporters of watching TV on regular Basis- Receptive. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia, Jamia Ashrafia and Jamia Talemat Islamia turning out to be the strongest opponents of regularly

322 watching TV- Resistant. Tanzeem Ul Madaris appeared to be apprehensive, though not opponent- Reluctant468.

7.1.5: Question No 5: Recommend any Positive use of TV It was added to collect the opinions of respondents regarding improvement of TV programs- to make them productive and useful for character building and social reform rather than a tool for time consumption only. The recommendations, by the respondents, would help evaluate their potentials, for social reform, as well.

Table 7.16: Recommend any Positive Use of TV S No Recommend any Positive Use of TV Respondents Percentage 1 Religious Guidance 320 19.4 2 Reform: Character/ Society 74 4.5 3 Information/ Guidance about Society/ 501 30.4 World 4 Religious Guidance and Information 561 34.1 about the World 5 No Better Use Possible 73 4.4 6 Do Not Know 117 7.1 Total 1646 100

The results were quite encouraging as a little more than34% wanted to use TV for religious guidance and information about the world. More than 30% wanted to spread information about the world and guidance regarding social life. More than 19% wanted to use it for promotion of religion only, while, more than 4% wanted to utilize it for character building and reforming social norms and practices. 7% could not suggest anything and more than 4% were convinced that there could not be any positive use of TV. A consolidated figure shows that 69% respondents were in favour of using TV for social or character building and for sharing information and knowledge.

468 One must keep in mind that most of the respondents were apprehensive about most of the programmes telecasted on different TV channels. It must have a strong influence on regular TV watching when, particularly, the respondents were complaining about commoditization of women; their unnecessary usage in TV commercials.

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Figure 7.12:

The cross tabulation was run, on the basis of Madrassa Administration, to identify whether the Madrassa students were capable of suggesting any positive use of TV or not. It also helped us understand their mental approach regarding social reform and welfare.

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Table 7.17: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Recommend any Positive Use of TV S Positive Use of Improvid Impulsi Effici Organi Prudent % of No TV ent ve ent zed Total 1 Religious 17.9% 27.7% 13.6 25.0% 12.2% 19.4 Guidance % % 2 Reform: 1.5% 5.0% 3.8% 6.3% 4.2% 4.5% Character/ Society 3 Information/ 47.8% 25.2% 34.0 26.6% 31.1% 30.4 Guidance About % % Society/ World 4 Religious 17.9% 26.3% 37.1 31.7% 49.2% 34.1 Guidance and % % Information about the World 5 No Better Use 10.4% 4.6% 3.4% 8.3% .8% 4.4% Possible 6 Do Not Know 4.5% 11.3% 8.0% 2.0% 2.5% 7.1% Total 100% 100% 100 100% 100% 100% %

The results clearly rejected all the allegations of the critics of Madrassa education system. Most of the respondents, under every Madrassa Administration, emphasized on using TV for providing information and guidance about society and social life. Almost 48% respondents, from Improvident Administration run Madrassas, amazingly suggested using TV for providing information and guidance about social life and the world. More than 51% respondents, from Impulsive Administration Madrassas, were clustered around information and guidance about religion and society. 37% respondents, from Efficient Administration Madrassas, also supported spread of religious guidance and information about the society through TV, while, 34% also emphasized on educating people, through TV, regarding social life

325 and responsibilities. 58% respondents, combined, from Organized Administration, and more than 80% respondents from Prudent Administration run Madrassas favoured use of TV for providing information and guidance- both religious and social- for the sake of social welfare. It became clear that the Madrassa graduates had the potentials to suggest productive and effective reforms for character building in the Punjab society- which could eventually be extended to the entire country. Figure 7.13:

In order to authenticate the results, in this question, cross tabulation was run, on the basis of Madrassa Board, to evaluate whether all Madrassa Boards had the same trends or there was any variation among their responses.

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Table 7.18: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Board with Recommend any Positive Use of TV S Madrassa Religi Reform: Informati Religious No Do Tota No Administrat ous Charact on/ Guidance Better Not l ion Guida er/ Guidance and Use Know nce Society about Information Possi Society/ about the ble World World 1 Rabta Tul 5.8% 10.7% 24.3% 54.4% .0% 4.9% 100 Madaris % 2 Tanzeem Ul 23.7% 6.0% 26.6% 35.0% 2.7% 5.9% 100 Madaris % 3 Wafaq Al 14.3% 4.4% 39.6% 17.6% 17.6% 6.6% 100 Madaris Al % Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 21.9% 2.6% 20.4% 29.1% 14.3% 11.7 100 Madaris Al % % Salafia 5 Wafaq Al 26.6% 1.6% 47.6% 15.3% .0% 8.9% 100 Madaris Al % Shia 6 Minhaj Ul .0% .0% 6.3% 83.3% .0% 10.4 100 Quran % % 7 Jamia 4.6% 1.3% 42.4% 46.4% 1.3% 4.0% 100 Muhammadi % a Ghausia 8 Jamia .0% .0% 23.8% 33.3% 23.9% 19.0 100 Ashrafia % % 9 Jamia 9.1% 9% 27.3% 45.5% 9.1% .0% 100 Talemat % Islamia Total 19.4% 4.5% 30.4% 34.1% 4.4% 7.1% 100 %

The responses were also similar from all Madrassa Boards, with minor variations of course. Almost 79% respondents from Rabta Tul Madaris suggested using TV for guidance, both religious and social, and providing information about society and the world; they intended to use TV for social welfare and character building primarily. Same was the case with respondents from Tanzeem Ul Madaris, more than 62% wanted to promote guidance and information, through TV, and almost 28% wanted to impart religion, through it.

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Even Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia students, 57%, showed a great deal of knowledge by supporting the same informative and guiding role for TV. Though a great deal of their respondents, 17% was against TV. Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia had 49% and Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia had almost 63% suggested a productive use of TV. Respondents from Minhaj Ul Quran were quite focused on the objectivity of TV as 83% favoured its guiding and informative role. More than 88%, respondents from Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia Bhera, also favoured the guiding and informative role of TV. A little more than 57% respondents, from Jamia Ashrafia, did support guiding and informative use of TV but almost 24% were so confident about the negativity of TV that, according to them, no better use of TV was possible. No student from Jamia Ashrafia suggested that TV could be used for character building or even for promoting religion. This was contradictory to the claims of Molana Muhammad Akram Kashmiri, who claimed that a major reason, for prevailing misunderstandings about Madrassa system was; improper and relatively less presentation of their point of view in media469. One has to remain in contact with the media to communicate one‘s opinion properly and one has to understand a system closely to initiate a successful reform strategy. Majority of the respondents, from Jamia Ashrafia, did favour productive use of TV but a good number of respondents, almost 43% either did not give any opinion or was against TV. 72% respondents, from Jamia Talemat Islamia, Faisalabad, also suggested guiding and informative role of TV.

469 Molana Akram Kashmiri, Registrar Jamia Ashrafia, in discussion with the researcher on 12-Jan-2012.

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Figure 7.14:

A consolidated table was developed to identify those boards which were convinced that TV could be used for productive purposes from the ones who were not supporter of TV; an effective means of communication and a strong influencer of society and the process of social change. The respondents who had suggested character building, social set up reform, providing guidance and religious guidance and information about society were considered as supporters of ―Broader use of TV‖ and those who suggested promotion of religious teaching as the only use of TV were considered as supporters of ―Limited use of TV‖ and those who either did not suggest any use or were convinced that no better use of TV was possible, were considered as ―Opponents of TV‖. The results showed that most of the Madrassa Boards supported the use of TV and only two were apprehensive about the use of TV for productive reasons.

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Table 7.19: Madrassa Board Based Consolidated View of Recommend any Positive Use of TV S Madrassa Broader Limited Opponents Findings No Administration use of TV use of TV of TV 1 Rabta Tul 89.4% 4.9% 5.8% Strongly Madaris Favoring TV Use 2 Tanzeem Ul 67.6% 23.7% 8.6% Favoring TV Madaris Use 3 Wafaq Al 61.6% 14.3% 24.2% Favoring TV Madaris Al Use Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 52.1% 21.9% 26% Apprehensiv Madaris Al e about TV Salafia Use 5 Wafaq Al 64.5% 26.6% 8.9% Favoring TV Madaris Al Shia Use 6 Minhaj Ul 89.6% 0% 10.4% Strongly Quran Favoring TV Use 7 Jamia 90.1% 4.6% 5.3% Strongly Muhammadia Favoring TV Ghausia Use 8 Jamia Ashrafia 57.1% 0% 42.9% Apprehensiv e about TV Use 9 Jamia Talemat 81.8% 9.1% 9.1% Strongly Islamia Favoring TV Use Total 72.64% 11.67% 15.68% Strongly Favoring TV Use

A similar type of question was asked earlier as well; in which the respondents were requested to rate TV as an invention. As the results slightly differed, in both the questions, therefore, cross tabulation was run on the

330 basis of responses in the question, rating TV as an invention, with ―Recommend any Positive Use of TV‖. The idea was to locate the areas of differences and identify the patterns of variations.

Table 7.20: Cross Tabulation of Rate TV as an Invention with Recommend any Positive Use of TV S TV as an Religious Reform: Informati Religious No Do Not Tota N Invention Guidance Charact on/ Guidance Better Know l er / Guidance and Use o Society about Informatio Possi Society/ n about ble World the World 1 Very 10.3% 3.1% 39.2% 39.2% .0% 8.2% 100 Positive % 2 Positive 18.2% 5.4% 32.7% 37.2% .7% 5.7% 100 to Some % Extent 3 Very 19.9% 2.3% 17.6% 13.6% 27.3 19.3% 100 Negative % % 4 Negative 33.3% 1.8% 23.6% 27.3% 7.3% 6.7% 100 to Some % Extent 5 Depends 18.1% 5.0% 32.4% 39.9% 1.7% 2.9% 100 on Usage % 6 Others 20.0% .0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0 20.0% 100 % % Total 19.4% 4.5% 30.4% 34.1% 4.4% 7.1% 100 %

The results were quite predictable. Those who considered TV as a very positive invention, or considered it positive to some extent, more than 78% combined, were focused in their responses and suggested useful means of utilizing TV, for social welfare, character building- along with imparting religious guidance. None of them, quite expectedly, said that no positive use of TV was possible. Almost 70% respondents, who considered TV as a positive invention to some extent, suggested a reformist and informative role of TV. All the respondents, who considered TV as a very negative invention,

331 were clustered around the negativity options, here as well. More than 46% were either convinced that no better use of TV was possible or did not give any opinion at all and almost 20% of them did suggest promotion of religious guidance as the only positive use of TV, possible. Those, who considered it as a negative invention to some extent, were apprehensive due to the programmes telecasted on TV. That is why, more than 33% suggested promotion of religious guidance, more than 27% suggested telecasting of guidance material- of both religion and social awareness- and more than 26% suggested social training and guidance programmes; to be telecasted on TV. All the respondents, who weighed the credibility of any invention on the basis of its usage, more than 72%, were focused in their responses and suggested guidance and information, both religious and about social life, as the most important positive use of TV. The respondents, who were not focused in rating TV as an invention, were also shattered in this question. Amazingly, their percentage was 20% each in five responses, except character building.

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Figure 7.15:

These responses, and their cross tabulations, were used as a yardstick to measure the potentials of Madrassa graduates and to evaluate their perceptions about the prevailing social norms and practices in the society. The Punjab is the most densely populated province of the country and houses more than 55% population of the country. The rural areas are neither very scattered nor far off and cities are not very difficult to reach; as is the case in Baluchistan, parts of Sind and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. People living even in the remotest parts of the province have, relatively and comparatively, better travelling facilities and access to modern technology. Scientific inventions like TV, mobile phone and internet are easily available in almost all parts of the province. The case in other province is different as people do not like, and allow, TV in their families- some even do not allow their women to cast their vote in elections. People in the Punjab are relatively more adaptive and accommodating. TV holds a significant place in the rural and urban life of the

333 province. Responses in questions about TV were of great significance because, if someone does not watch TV, or even dislikes it, in the Punjab, it should be more alarming and problematic for the students of social change. The responses in such questions clarified that Madrassa students, irrespective of their Madrassa Board of type of Madrassa Administration- as labeled by the researcher, were active, and interactive, members of this society. They were not aloof from the social developments and changes in social trends, happening around them. The blames, as labeled by some scrollers, do not hold any ground. The Madrassa students also proved their potentials and credibility to reform and improve social structures and norms without causing any major interruptions. According to them, minor adjustments, here and there, could do the trick and no major overhauling was needed; as emphasized by the extremist groups like Taliban.

7.1.6: Question No 6: Steps for Moral Training of People It was added to estimate the capability of respondents to reform moral ills of society and their ownership of the society; how they intend to reform it. Morality, in this research, was taken, and explained, in the context of commonly accepted and appreciated character traits like honesty, truthfulness, care for others and decency in interactions with others. The philosophical debate regarding legitimizing certain actions and defending or denouncing specific acts was never the focus of this research. The students were briefed about the meanings of morality and couple of other concepts, used in some other questions, before they started recording their responses in the questionnaire.

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Table 7.21: Most Important Steps for Moral Training S No Most Important Steps for Moral Respondents Percentage Training 1 Education System Reform 154 9.4 2 Following Religion 57 3.5 3 Imparting Islam 553 33.6 4 Character Building/ Self-Reform 642 39.0 5 Governance/ Public Service 38 2.3 6 Social Reforms 42 2.6 7 System Replacement 33 2.0 8 Do Not Know 127 7.7 Total 1646 100

Most of the respondents, contrary to the allegations labeled against them, declared character building or self-reform and imparting Islam, 39% and 33% respectively, more important than anything; for character building. More than 9% wanted to reform the prevailing, general, education system and almost 8% did not have any answer, while rest of the options did not receive much support. Only 3% emphasized the need of following religion; which might have an intention of forcefully implementing religious interpretations- as believed accurate by them. Only 2% respondents voiced the need of replacing the existing social system- exceptions are also in the same ratio which are usually quoted by some writers to malign the entire Madrassa education system.

335

Figure 7.16:

Cross tabulation was run, on the basis of Madrassa Administration, to inquire any possible variations in the patterns of responses. The pattern, of responses, was not very unusual, in most of the cases. Still, there were some variations; worth mentioning.

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Table 7.22: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Most Important Step for Moral Training S Steps for Impro Impul Efficient Organized Prudent % of No Training vident sive Total 1 Education 1.5% 4.8% 13.6% 12.7% 6.3% 9.4% System Reform 2 Following 7.5% 3.8% 1.1% 7.5% 3.4% 3.5% Religion 3 Imparting 44.8% 38.3% 31.4% 26.2% 34.5% 33.6 Islam % 4 Character 31.3% 34.4% 41.1% 41.3% 42.9% 39% Building/ Self- Reform 5 Governance/ 3% 1.7% 2% .4% 6.3% 2.3% Public Service 6 Social 3% 2.3% 2.8% 4.4% .4% 2.6% Reforms 7 System 6% 3.8% 1% 1.6% .4% 2% Replacement 8 Do Not Know 3% 11% 7.1% 6% 5.9% 7.7% Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100 %

Almost 45% respondents, from Improvident Administration run Madrassas, declared imparting Islam as the most important step for moral training and more than 31% considered character building more important for moral training. More than 7% emphasized the need of following religion and 6% desired to replace the existing social system, as the prevailing system was irreparable according to them. More than 38%, from Impulsive Administration Madrassas, also considered imparting Islam as the most important step for moral training and more than 34% considered character

337 building more significant, and beneficial, than anything else. Though, almost 4% of them wanted to replace the existing social system; with a system of their choice obviously. Respondents, from Efficient Administration run Madrassas, had almost similar ideas but with slightly more emphasis on character building than imparting Islam; 41% and 31% respectively. Imparting Islam does not hold less significance in moral training as Islam has significantly emphasized on character building and relations with fellow human beings470. Emphasis on character building and, most importantly, willingness to reform one‘s self are considered more effective ways of moral training. Respondents, from Organized Administration run Madrassas, had more clarity in their thoughts. That is why they preferred practical steps like character building, with almost 43% support, over policies like imparting Islam. They were the ones who also emphasized the importance of reforming prevailing, general, education system. Respondents, from Prudent Administration run Madrassas, also gave first preference to character building and self-reform, almost 43%, and gave second preference to imparting Islam. They also emphasized the significance of efficient governance system and improvement in public service structure; to make people more loyal citizens and develop more respect and ownership for the society. They were least supportive to the idea of replacing the existing social system; they had a full confidence in the prevailing system and in their personal capabilities to reform it.

470 The saying of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) that only the one who does not harm other Muslims, with his hands and tongue, is a Muslim.

338

Figure 7.17:

As it was an open ended question, and the idea was to collect maximum number of opinion from the respondents, therefore, space for more than one answer was provided. The responses, given, were evaluated and stratified into various categories, on the basis of the main emphasis laid in the response. The second options were quite similar to the first ones, as various respondents had given preference to various steps for moral training.

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Table 7.23: Second Important Step for Moral Training S No Second Important Step for Moral Respondents Percentage Training 1 Religious Education/ Training 423 25.7 2 Change Social Norms 145 8.8 3 Following Islam/ Renaissance 170 10.3 4 Character Building/ Self-Reform 444 27.0 5 Governance/ Public Service 68 4.1 6 Mass Training 228 13.9 7 Do Not Know 168 10.2 Total 1646 100

Greatest support of respondents, 27%, came for character building and self-reforms. While, a handsome number of respondents, 25%, supported religious education and religious training to ensure moral training of the members of the society in the Punjab. Almost 14% were convinced that moral training schemes should be initiated at massive level. To them, individual efforts or training only a segment of society were not of great use. A little more than 10% saw following Islam and Islamic renaissance as the best ways of ensuring effective moral training in the society. 10% however did not have any strategy to suggest.

340

Figure 7.18:

Cross tabulation was run to evaluate the response patterns, in the responses, and gauge the depth of the respondents.

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Table 7.24: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Second Important Step for Moral Training S Steps for Improvi Impuls Efficient Organi Prude % of No Training dent ive zed nt Total 1 Religious 55.2% 20.4% 31% 21.4% 18.9 25.7 Education/ % % Training 2 Change Social 10.4% 8.3% 11.5% 5.6% 5.9% 8.8% Norms 3 Following Islam 10.4% 15% 10.5% 7.5% 3.4% 10.3 / Renaissance % 4 Character 1.5% 25.8% 18.9% 40.1% 43.3 27% Building/ Self- % Reform 5 Governance/ 7.5% 4% 3.8% 2.0% 6.7% 4.1% Public Service 6 Mass Training 11.9% 12.5% 14.8% 14.3% 14.3 13.9 % % 7 Do Not Know 3% 14.0% 9.5% 9.1% 7.6% 10.2 % Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100 100 % %

The results showed that majority of the respondents, from Impulsive Administration run Madrassas, 55%, considered religious education as the important step, necessary for moral training. While the respondents, from the Madrassas under Impulsive Administration, were divided in their opinion. Almost 26% considered character building and self-reform important while 20% declared religious education necessary for every reform. Respondents, from Efficient Administration Madrassas, were divided in their opinion as well. They rendered support to several steps but 31% recommended religious education; for moral training. The respondents, from Organized and Prudent Administrations run Madrassas, did give weightage to religious education and training but they gave more importance to character building and self-reform; 40% and 43% respectively. No one can deny the significance of religion in character building- most importantly the significance rendered by Islam to moral values

342 and training- but willingness to reform one‘s character is a pre-requisite to moral training and education without an emphasis on character building is merely ‗literacy‘471 and is thus not of much use for moral training.

Figure 7.19:

In order to develop a clear picture, the responses in this question, given as first and second important step, were combined together.

471 In technical terms, a literate is a person who can read whatever is written in front of him and can write whatever he has read; even without understanding the spirit of the text.

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Table 7.25: Consolidated View of Steps for Moral Training S Most Important Steps for First Step Second Mean No Moral Training Percentage Step Percentage 1 Education System Reform 9.4 - 4.7 2 Following/ Implementing 3.5 10.3 6.9 Religion 3 Imparting Islam 33.6 25.7 29.6 4 Character Building/ Self- 39.0 27.0 33 Reform 5 Governance/ Public Service 2.3 4.1 3.2 6 Social Reforms/ Training 2.6 13.9 8.2 7 System Replacement 2.0 8.8 5.4 8 Do Not Know 7.7 10.2 8.9 Total 100 100 100

The consolidated view also produced the similar results. Thus proving that the respondents had prioritized the steps according to their understanding but the measures were invariably the same; suggested as both the first most important step and second most important step for moral training in the society. More preference, 33%, was given to character building and self- reform, while, imparting Islam secured the support of almost 30% respondents. System replacement could not secure more than more 5% support.

7.1.7: Question No 7: Reasons for Moral Decay This would help understand their perceptions about social structures, gauge their ownership of society and their sense of responsibility. It was also an open ended question and, therefore, space for more than one answer was provided to collect maximum information from the respondents.

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Table 7.26: Most Important Reason for Moral Decay1 S No Reason for Moral Decay1 Respondents Percentage 1 Inefficient Education System 122 7.4 2 Social Setup not Right 106 6.4 3 Parents' Negligence 77 4.7 4 Technology and Westernization 122 7.4 5 Lack of Religious Training 579 35.2 6 Bad Character Traits/ Selfishness 451 27.4 7 Bad Governance 33 2.0 8 Do Not Know 156 9.5 Total 1646 100

The respondents were quite focused in their answers and an overwhelming majority, almost 63% combined, declared lack of religious training and bad character traits, selfishness, as the most important reasons for moral decay in the society. Religious education and training inculcate character traits and ensure good moral behaviour. More than 7% held education system responsible, for not promoting character traits, and the same percentage of respondents held technological gadgets and trend towards Westernization responsible for moral deterioration in the society472. More than 6% declared social set up responsible for all the moral ills, in the society.

472 The role of media, particularly satellite TV channels, internet and mobile phones have influenced the moral values, of the society, to the greater extent. Foreign TV channels and their programmes do have an effect on the minds of people.

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Figure 7.20:

The cross tabulation of Madrassa Administration was run to find out specific patterns in responses, given by students from Madrassas run by various types of Administrations.

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Table 7.27: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Most Important Reason for Moral Decay 1 S Steps for Improvi Impuls Efficie Organiz Prude % of No Training dent ive nt ed nt Total 1 Inefficient 7.5% 6.0% 7.1% 12.7% 5.5% 7.4% Education System 2 Social Setup not 9.0% 6.0% 3.3% 11.5% 9.2% 6.4% Right 3 Parents' 13.4% 5.6% 2.3% 7.9% 2.9% 4.7% Negligence 4 Technology and 6.0% 8.8% 7.6% 6.7% 5.5% 7.4% Westernization 5 Lack of Religious 47.8% 41.0% 35.8 26.2% 27.7% 35.2 Training % % 6 Bad Character 9.0% 16.9% 34.2 26.2% 37.8% 27.4% Traits/ Selfishness % 7 Bad Governance 3.0% 1.7% 2.3% .8% 2.9% 2.0% Do Not Know 4.5% 14.0% 7.6% 7.9% 8.4% 9.5% Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

The table shows that the percentage of support is varying, in lack of religious training and bad character traits/ selfishness. Responses in the rest of the options are mixed and do not show any specific trend in them. Most of the respondents, almost 48%, from Improvident Administration Madrassas, considered lack of religious training responsible for moral decay. The perception of the respondents, from Impulsive Administration run Madrassas, was not very different as 41% believed the same. The difference, however, started to emerge from the respondents, from Efficient Administration run Madrassas. Almost 36% supported lack of religious training while more than 34% held bad character traits and selfishness responsible; for moral decay. The respondents from Organized Administration run Madrassas, pointed out several reasons, for moral decay; from lack of religious training, 26%, to bad character traits, 26% again, and from inefficient education system, almost 13%, to faults in the social setup. Likewise, the respondents from Prudent Administration run Madrassas were more focused in their opinions. Almost 38% considered bad character traits

347 and selfishness responsible, for moral decay, while, almost 28% pointed out the lack of religious training, as one of the major reasons. No one can deny the significance of religious education and training, in promoting moral values in the society, but sometimes in special circumstances, when ―cognitive bias‖ overcomes ―cognitive dissonance‖473 religious training needs special emphasis on character building; it cannot, and should not, be expected as a trickledown effect of religion alone.

Figure 7.21:

As the respondents had given more than one answers, in this question, therefore second answers were calculated separately.

473 People justify their illegitimate actions, against others, on the basis of their perceptions about them and satisfy their inner psychological conflicts; denouncing self for wrong doing.

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Table 7.28: Most Important Reason for Moral Decay2 S No Reason for Moral Decay2 Respondents Percentage 1 Islam Not Practiced 553 33.6 2 Selfishness 175 10.6 3 Ignorance 106 6.4 4 Character not Developed 414 25.2 5 Bad Governance 71 4.3 6 Social Setup not Right 142 8.6 7 Do Not Know 185 11.2 Total 1646 100

The responses were quite clear and the respondents were focused on the significance of practicing Islam and incapacity of the society, including parents, in not developing character of people properly. Almost 34% respondents considered non-practicing of Islamic principles was the major reason while more than 35%, combined, declared that improperly developed characters and selfishness were responsible for moral decay in the society. Only 8% held social system responsible for its own moral degradation.

349

Figure 7.22:

7.1.8: Question No 8: Most Important Role in Character Building This was added to measure their level of understanding and find out more effective ways of character building. It was a closed question and the respondents had limited options. Still, some respondents chose more than one option.

Table 7.29: Most Important Role in Character Building S No Most Important Role in Respondents Percentage Character Building 1 Parents 572 34.8 2 Education 182 11.1 3 Environment 332 20.2 4 Teacher 247 15.0 5 More Than One 305 18.5 6 Others 8 .5 Total 1646 100

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The respondents were quite clear in their choices. Almost 35% declared the role of parents more important than that of anybody else. A little more than 20% gave importance to the environment and more than 18% selected more than one options474. 15% were convinced that teachers had a more effective role, in character building than anyone else. A careful analysis shows that almost 50% respondents were highlighting the significance of persons, in character building, while 31% were convinced that character building was a product of the systems and structures. Both are appreciable but the former have put responsibility on someone and it is more beneficial when we know that who is responsible for which duty and, consequently, can be held responsible, in case of negligence.

474 Most of the respondents, who selected more than one options, supported the significance of the role played by both parents and teachers. Some even supported more than two options.

351

Figure 7.23:

7.1.9: Question No 9: Most Important Requirement to Promote Cooperation in Society It is an important question and will be helpful in estimating the mental approach, of respondents, towards others. The way a group intends to interact and cooperate with others discloses its perception about other groups. Perceptions affect actions and need to be modified; in order to redirect actions.

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Table 7.30: Most Important Requirement for Cooperation S No Most Important Requirement for Respondents Percentage Cooperation 1 Good Character 412 25.0 2 Tolerance 317 19.3 3 Good Education and Training 320 19.4 4 Respect for Others 235 14.3 5 Dutifulness 119 7.2 6 More Than One 237 14.4 7 Others 6 0.4 Total 1646 100

All the options, in this closed question were closer to each other. They were added to increase the interest of the respondents, in the questionnaire, so that they may give honest answers, with dedication and commitment, in the upcoming questions. Apart from that, the responses helped in evaluating the significance of character building over efforts for developing good relations without any efforts for personality improvement first. 25% respondents declared that good character was necessary for ensuring cooperation, among various communities living in a society. More than 19% declared good education and training necessary for promoting cooperation while, 19% emphasized on the importance of tolerance. Less than 1% gave other suggestions, which means that almost all the respondents considered the already provided options sufficient enough to express their opinion.

353

Figure 7.24:

7.1.10: Question No 10: Most Effective Way to Bridge Differences This question directly informed about the methodologies, to be adopted by the respondents, for solving differences with other communities. The most problematic thing, in intragroup interactions, is the strategy of solving disputes. If differences and disputes are not solved amicably, minor disputes develop into major differences and breed mistrust, and clashes, among various groups.

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Table 7.31: Most Effective way to Bridge Differences S No Most Effective way to Bridge Respondents Percentage Differences 1 Sound Arguments 711 43.2 2 Avoid 422 25.6 3 Arbitration 124 7.5 4 Tolerance 244 14.8 5 Following Religion 16 1.0 6 More Than One 105 6.4 7 Mutual Cooperation and 24 1.5 Discussion Total 1646 100

More than 43% respondents favoured sound arguments and almost 26% supported the strategy of avoiding the clashes as the most effective ways of bridging differences. Almost 15% suggested tolerance as the best strategy to bridge differences.

355

Figure 7.25:

The results, in this question, apparently showed that most of the respondents were in favour of sound arguments, to bridge differences. Though sound arguments are an effective way to remove differences yet they promote a sense of competition and may start a never ending debate. The strategies which emphasize on avoiding differences and motivate, the members of various communities, to tolerate the difference of opinion are usually seen more productive and beneficial, in bridging differences. Cross tabulation was run on the basis of Madrassa Administration, to explore that whether the students of all Madrassas had the same perception or there was any major difference, on the basis of Madrassa Administration.

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Table 7.32: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Most Effective Way to Bridge Differences S Madrassa Sound Avoi Arbitr Toler Follo More Mutual Tot No Administrati Argum d ation ance wing Than Cooperat al on ents Relig One ion and ion Discussi on 1 Improvident 71.6% 6% 7.5% 7.5 .0% 6% 1.5% 100 % % 2 Impulsive 49% 22.1 6.7% 12.9 .2% 7.9% 1.3% 100 % % % 3 Efficient 36.9% 26.8 11% 17.4 1% 5.3% 1.6% 100 % % % 4 Organized 40.1% 34.9 4.0% 11.1 3.2% 6% .8% 100 % % % 5 Prudent 42.9% 25.6 4.2% 18.1 .4% 6.7% 2.1% 100 % % % Total 43.2% 25.6 7.5% 14.8 1.0% 6.4% 1.5% 100 % % %

The results once again supported the ―Hypothesis‖ that majority of the respondents, almost 72%, from Improvident Administration run Madrassas, considered sound arguments as the most effective way to bridge differences. As a matter of fact, arguments, no matter how sound they may be, are effective only when the opponents share a great deal of trust with the arguing group and are willing to accept their flaws. In case of trust deficit, the ―soundness‖ of arguments becomes invalid and in efficient. The percentage of supporters of sound arguments reduced, with the improvement in Madrassa Administration type, and support for ―Avoid‖ and ―Tolerance‖ increases gradually; indicating the sensibility of the teachers and maturity, of thought, in the respondents.

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Figure 7.26:

This was the last question in ―Social Harmony‖. Most of the questions, in this part of the questionnaire, were designed, and included, to collect opinions, from Madrassa students, regarding prevailing social setup, its structures and practices. Some questions appeared to be similar but they did serve the purpose of explaining the various dimensions of perceptions of the respondents. Some closed questions had apparently similar options but they also served their purpose and helped understand the level of understanding, of the respondents.

7.2: Political Harmony The third part of the questionnaire comprised of the questions assessing the perceptions and potentials, of the respondents, regarding existing political system and structures. No society can flourish without effective, efficient and reliable political system. Lack of trust, between various

358 communities, and hatred for each other- and in worst cases for the society or the country- are trickle down effects of bad governance and corruption. The political system of a country should ensure management of society and good regulation of resources. The better the governmental performance will be, the more the people will cooperate with their government and develop ownership for the country. This part of questionnaire was designed to analyze level of understanding, of the respondents, regarding prevailing political system, and their capability to suggest practical reforms in it. The primary objective of this part was to evaluate the political potentials of Madrassa graduates; in promoting political harmony. Those who intend to reform the existing system, with an objective to facilitate the entire society, are considered as the most loyal citizens of the state. While those who intend to harvest personal or communal benefits, out of certain changes and amendments, are considered as self-centered citizens. The ones, who are not satisfied with the prevailing political system and intend to replace it, even if they have the most ideal system as a substitute, are considered as the opponents of the prevailing political system. If the people of Pakistan, as a whole, decide to replace existing democratic political system, then it may be replaced with whatever the ―General will‖ decides. Bu, as long as they do not intend to do that, no one has the right to throw it away. As far as implementation of Islam is concerned, it can be implemented through any political system; based on accountability, transparency and public will and is working for public welfare.

7.2.1: Question No 1: Madrassa Teaches About Practical Politics Teaching of politics, as a subject, is not prohibited as it enables students to understand political system and its intricacies more comfortably and helps them become more vibrant and effective political workers in their practical life475. The responses clarified that most of the Madrassas do not teach about practical politics; a deficiency which puts the students in a disadvantage as they have to cast their votes, in the elections. It was observed, during the

475 ―Vigilance is the price of freedom‖ Rousseau

359 survey, that most of the Madrassa administrators, and teachers, were not in favour of discussing practical politics and politicians as it, according to them, diverted the attention of students from studies to other less important issues of society. They believed that the students, if groomed properly, could take decisions, regarding politics and political leaders, comfortably after completing their studies476.

Table 7.33: Madrassa Teaches about Practical Politics S No Madrassa Teaches Respondents Percentage about Practical Politics 1 Yes 312 19.0 2 No 964 58.6 3 To Some extent 359 21.8 4 Not Given 11 .7 Total 1646 100

More than 58% respondents said that their Madrassa did not teach about practical politics. While, almost 22% said that they were taught, about practical politics, to some extent and 19% said that their Madrassa did teach about practical politics.

476 Discussions with various Madrassa heads and teachers. Most of them said, ―They had entire life to take such decisions. Now was the time to concentrate on studies‖. Translated, from Urdu, by the researcher.

360

Figure 7.27:

7.2.2: Question No 2: Specific Political Party Projected by the Madrassa It was added to note whether Madrassas concentrate on imparting education or are preparing ―foot-soldiers‖ to enhance the street power of a specific political party.

Table 7.34: Specific Political Party Projected by Madrassa S No Specific Political Party Projected Respondents Percentage 1 Yes 248 15.1 2 No 1268 77.0 3 Madrassa Forbids from Politics 78 4.7 4 Implementing Islam 13 .8 5 Not Given 39 2.4 Total 1646 100

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The responses clearly indicated that most of the Madrassas were did not promote political affiliations or favorites.an overwhelming majority of 77% clearly stated that their Madrassa did not project any specific political party. To add to this neutrality, almost 5% respondents claimed that their Madrassa forbade them from participating in practical politics; for reasons discussed earlier. Only 15% said that their Madrassa did project a specific political party.

Figure 7.28:

As there are some Madrassas, and Madrassa Boards, which either have political parties of their own or have strong affiliations with any specific political party. Cross tabulation of Madrassa Board was run with ―projection of a specific political party‖; to find out whether they were using the Madrassa platform to cultivate their political ideas or were able to keep their political affiliations, and preferences, away from their professional responsibilities. The results were quite amazing and supported the ―Hypothesis‖, indirectly, that those Madrassa administrators and teachers, who had strong

362 political affiliations, were promoting and projecting a specific political party in the class477. Respondents from most of the Madrassa Boards had clear denial of projection of any specific political party except those which had strong political structures or role in practical politics.

Table 7.35: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Board with Specific Political Party Projected S Madrassa Yes No Madrassa Implement Not Total No Administrat Forbids from ing Islam Given ion Politics 1 Rabta Tul 32.0 40.8 1.0% .0% 26.2% 100% Madaris % % 2 Tanzeem Ul 12.5 82.6 4.1% .5% .3% 100% Madaris % % 3 Wafaq Al 18.7 74.7 5.5% .0% 1.1% 100% Madaris Al % % Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 4.1% 89.8 5.6% .0% .5% 100% Madaris Al % Salafia 5 Wafaq Al 10.1 83.9 6.0% .0% .0% 100% Madaris Al % % Shia 6 Minhaj Ul 41.7 50.0 2.1% 6.3% .0% 100% Quran % % 7 Jamia 31.1 53.0 6.6% 4.0% 5.3% 100% Muhammadi % % a Ghausia 8 Jamia 4.8% 90.5 4.8% .0% .0% 100% Ashrafia % 9 Jamia .0% 81.8 18.2% .0% .0% 100% Talemat % Islamia Total 15.1 77.0 4.7% .8% 2.4% 100% % %

477 Many students, from such institutions, said that their teachers portrayed a political party as the only party which was on the right path and thus declared it as the only hope for the country.

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Almost 41% respondents from Rabta Tul Madaris Madrassas said that their Madrassa was not promoting any specific political party but 32% said that it was. Amazingly 26% did not give any answer to this question- the highest percentage against this option478. The case with the respondents from Minhaj Ul Quran was not different as well. 50% of their respondents said no but almost 42% said yes479. Majority of the respondents, 53%, from Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia, Bhera, denied the projection of any specific political party, by their Madrassa, but 31% admitted such projections480. It showed that the Ulema, who had political affiliations and participate in practical politics, did influence the minds of their students and tried to produce their political supporters.

Figure 7.29:

478 The reason for this much promotion of a political party is quite understandable as Rabta Tul Madaris is a sub-agency of Jamat Islami Pakistan. 479 The reason for this must have been the political interests and activities of Dr. Tahir Ul Qadri and Pakistan Awami Tahrek (PAT). 480 Pir Muhammad Amin Ul Hasnat Shah, Mohtamim Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia, MNA on PML (N) seat and is Minister of State for Religious Affairs.

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7.2.3: Question No 3: Support other Sects in Politics It is of great significance to know whether Madrassas infuse sectarian differences, in religious interpretations and performances, only- which may be acceptable in certain conditions where such are observed as personal preferences and are, definitely, not imposed on others- or intend to keep their graduates at distance, from other communities, in all fields of life. This question is of great significance to estimate the potentials, of the respondents, for political harmony.

Table 7.36: Supporting Other Sects in Politics S No Supporting Other Sects in Respondents Percentage Politics 1 Support 115 7.0 2 Can Not Support 435 26.4 3 No Restriction from Madrassa 1039 63.1 4 Promotion of Religion 12 .7 5 Others 17 1.0 6 Not Given 28 1.7 Total 1646 100

Majority of the respondents, 63%, verified that there was no such restriction from their Madrassa. While, more than 26% said that their Madrassa did not allow them to support people, from other sects, in politics481. A positive sign appeared when 7% respondents clearly said that their Madrassa allowed them to support politicians from other sects. Remaining respondents were either not clear in their views or did not give significant answers.

481 Some teachers and students opined, during discussions, that people from other sects might implement their religious interpretations. This was not acceptable to them.

365

Figure 7.30:

Cross tabulation was run, on the basis of Madrassa Boards with supporting other sects in politics, to identify the Madrassa Boards which were to promote political harmony and, also, point out those which were likely to resist political harmony.

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Table 7.37: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Board with Supporting Other Sects in Politics S Madrassa Suppo Can Not No Promo Other Not Tot No Administra rt Support Restriction tion of s Given al tion from Religi Madrassa on 1 Rabta Tul 11.7% 1.9% 82.5% 1.0% .0% 2.9% 100 Madaris % 2 Tanzeem 3.1% 36.8% 58.0% 1.2% .1% .8% 100 Ul Madaris % 3 Wafaq Al 9.9% 28.6% 58.2% .0% .0% 3.3% 100 Madaris Al % Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 7.1% 27.6% 62.8% 1.0% .5% 1.0% 100 Madaris Al % Salafia 5 Wafaq Al 12.9 14.1% 70.6% .0% 2.0 .4% 100 Madaris Al % % % Shia 6 Minhaj Ul 22.9% 8.3% 60.4% .0% 8.3 .0% 100 Quran % % 7 Jamia 7.3% 14.6% 68.2% .0% 2.0 7.9% 100 Muhammad % % ia Ghausia 8 Jamia 4.8% 28.6% 47.6% .0% 14.3 4.8% 100 Ashrafia % % 9 Jamia 9.1% .0% 90.9% .0% .0% .0% 100 Talemat % Islamia Total 7.0% 26.4% 63.1% .7% 1.0 1.7% 100 % %

Respondents from Rabta Tul Madaris turned out to be very clear in their political decisions. Almost 86% said that there was no restriction from their Madrassa and almost 12% said that they were allowed to support people, from other sects, in politics482. Most of the respondents, from

482 One must keep in mind that Rabta Tul Madaris, and even Jamat Islami, claim to be non- sectarian and, apparently, do not try to impose their brand of Islam.

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Tanzeem Ul Madaris 58%, declared that their Madrassa did not put any restrictions but, astonishingly, almost 37% stated that they were not allowed to support, people from other sects, in politics. Almost same trend was seen in responses from Wafaq al Madaris Al Arabia; 58% were not restricted while almost 29% were not allowed483. Respondents, from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia, also had the similar trend; almost 63% were allowed and almost 28% were forbidden, to render political support to people from other sects. Respondents from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia were somewhat divided in their opinion. Almost 71% said that there was no such restriction from the Madrassa, while, 14% said that they were not allowed to support and almost 13% said that they were allowed to. Respondents from Minhaj Ul Quran, as being from a Prudent Administration run Madrassa, showed a great deal of responsibility and commitment to political cooperation. More than 60% of their respondents claimed that they were not restricted, by their Madrassa, from rendering any such support and almost 23% claimed that they were allowed to support anyone, in politics. Respondents from Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia, Bhera, also had a mixed trend in their responses. More than 68% said that their Madrassa did not put any restriction while, almost 15 % said that they were not allowed to support anyone, from other sect, politically484. The respondents from Jamia Ashrafia were quite clear in their political decisions. Almost 48% claimed to be free of any such restrictions from their Madrassa but almost 29%, at the same time, claimed to have been restricted from their Madrassa. The Efficient Administration of Jamia Talemat Islamia, Faisalabad, had trained its students in a profound manner. Almost 91% claimed to have no such restrictions by their Madrassa and 9% were allowed to support anyone in politics. It shows that the students were made aware of their political responsibilities, in a democratic society, but their mental capabilities were not dwarfed by any direction or compulsion to support any particular political

483 One of the main reasons, for this compartmentalization, was the fact that both the major sects had been resisting each other‘s political influence, through their political parties, and trying to influence the governments to implement their brand of religion. 484 Perhaps it was, again, due to the fear of implementation of the interpretations of the second biggest sect in Pakistan; Deobandi.

368 party. Rather, they were free to apply their mind and support any political party or person who appeared to be beneficial and productive. Though the results, in the previous tables, were in favour of political harmony yet a handsome number of respondents, from some Madrassas and Madrassa Boards, had indicated towards the restrictions imposed by some Madrassas, regarding supporting other sects in politics. In order to find out the details about the Madrassas which imposed such restrictions, cross tabulation was run, on the basis of Madrassa Administration, with supporting other sects in politics.

Figure 7.31:

The results clearly presented the picture where the imprints of teacher‘s personality could easily be seen affecting the perceptions of the students.

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Table 7.38: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Supporting Other Sects in Politics S Madrassa Sup Can No Promo Othe Not Tot No Administration port Not Restriction tion of rs Given al Supp from Religi ort Madrassa on 1 Improvident .0% 32.8 62.7% 1.5% .0% 3.0% 100 % % 2 Impulsive 6.9 38.5 52.5% .8% .2% 1.0% 100 % % % 3 Efficient 9.2 19.5 66.5% .3% 1.1 3.3% 100 % % % % 4 Organized 4.8 22.2 71.0% .0% 1.6 .4% 100 % % % % 5 Prudent 5.9 22.3 67.6% 2.1% 2.1 .0% 100 % % % % Total 7.0 26.4 63.1% .7% 1.0 1.7% 100 % % % %

Almost 62% respondents, from Improvident Administration run Madrassas, said that their Madrassa did not put any such restriction but almost 33% also admitted that they were not allowed to support other sects in politics. More than 52% respondents, from Impulsive Administration run Madrassas, claimed to be free of any such restriction but, at the same time, more than 38% admitted of being restricted from rendering political support to other sects. More than 66% respondents, from Efficient Administration run Madrassas, denied of having any such compulsions while, 19% admitted of being restricted by their Madrassa, from supporting other sects in politics. Organized and Prudent Administrations had prepared their students in a way that they were able to take decisions in more confidentially. Their respondents were quite clear in their decisions; 71% and more than 68%, respectively, declared that there was no such restriction from their Madrassa. Though 22%, from both, admitted such restrictions but one must keep in mind that some

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Organized and Prudent Administration run Madrassas had strong political affiliations485. As far as the high percentage by two major Madrassa Boards, in cannot support option, is concerned, the alarmingly high percentage of respondents- almost 33% and 38% respectively- against the same option, from Improvident Administration run Madrassas provides the answer. Actually, the entire Madrassa Board is not against supporting other sects in politics; rather, it is the Improvident and Impulsive Administrations that inculcate such ideas in the minds of their students. This trend is responsible for promoting a ―not so good‖ picture of Madrassa education system in the conventional wisdom486.

485 As mentioned earlier, Minhaj Ul Quran is organized by Prudent Administration but its founder and pattern in Chief Dr. Tahir Ul Qadri had been, and is now again, active in practical politics. 486 There is a saying in local Sindhis, living at the banks of the river Indus, ―If the shoulders of the river are well maintained, one needs not to protect ones house from floods‖. It was communicated by some Sindhi students, at GCU Lahore, and was translated by the researcher. It simply means that if a community performs its collective responsibilities efficiently, its members will not have to face individual problems; or ―solution to individual problems lies in collective efforts‖.

371

Figure 7.32:

7.2.4: Question No 4: Respondents’ Intentions to Participate in Practical Politics It was added to complete the sequence of questions and to keep the respondents satisfied that the query was about their personal choices and thus more direct and correct answers could be given without any worry or fear.

Table 7.39: Intentions to Participate in Practical Politics S No Intentions to Participate in Respondents Percentage Practical Politics 1 Yes 255 15.5 2 No 819 49.8 3 Not Sure Yet 543 33.0 4 Others 15 .9 5 Not Given 14 .9 Total 1646 100

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The responses indicate the preferences of the respondents. Almost 50% clearly stated that they were not interested in participating in practical politics; while, 33% were not sure yet. More than 15% said that they were interested in practical politics and had plans to participate in practical politics, after completing their studies.

Figure 7.33:

Initially, this question was added to maintain the confidence level of the respondents, in this questionnaire but the trends, in responses, necessitated the detailed explanation. Cross tabulation was run, on the basis of Madrassa Board, with intentions to participate in Practical Politics. The respondents who were not sure yet were likely to participate in practical politics; they must have had a strong urge to participate in practical politics, they were simply unable to take final decision.

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Table 7.40: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Board with Intentions to Participate in Practical Politics S Madrassa Yes No Not Sure Others Not Total No Administration Yet Given 1 Rabta Tul 19.4% 36.9% 43.7% .0% .0% 100% Madaris 2 Tanzeem Ul 16.0% 51.7% 31.8% .0% .5% 100% Madaris 3 Wafaq Al 20.9% 39.6% 37.4% .0% 2.2% 100% Madaris Al Arabia 4 Wafaq Al 11.2% 55.6% 32.1% .5% .5% 100% Madaris Al Salafia 5 Wafaq Al 8.5% 59.7% 28.6% 2.8% .4% 100% Madaris Al Shia 6 Minhaj Ul 29.2% 29.2% 33.3% 8.3% .0% 100% Quran 7 Jamia 20.5% 33.8% 40.4% 1.3% 4.0% 100% Muhammadia Ghausia 8 Jamia Ashrafia 14.3% 61.9% 19.0% 4.8% .0% 100% 9 Jamia Talemat 9.1% 72.7% 18.2% .0% .0% 100% Islamia Total 15.5% 49.8% 33.0% .9% .9% 100%

The results revealed that political affiliations of Madrassa administrators, and teachers, had strong imprints on the perceptions of their students. Almost 37% respondents, from Rabta Tul Madaris, had no intentions to participate in practical politics but, at the same time, almost 44% were not sure and more than 19% intended to participate, in practical politics. Almost 52% respondents, from Tanzeem Ul Madaris, had no intentions, almost 32% were not sure yet and 16% had intentions to participate in practical politics. Despite all the claims by Qari Hanif Jalandhri, of having purely rigorous academic activities in his Madrassas, the respondents, from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Arabia, showed a handsome trend towards political participation, in practical politics. Almost 40% were not interested but, at the same time, more than 37% were not sure and almost 21% were interested in

374 participating in practical politics487. Respondents from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Salafia were not much interested in, participating in, practical politics but had not abandoned the option as well. Almost 56% had no intentions, to participate in practical politics, but 32% were not sure yet and 11% were interested in it. The respondents from Wafaq Al Madaris Al Shia appeared to have least interest in practical politics as almost 60%, of their respondents, had no interest in practical politics and more than 28% were not sure yet. The respondents from Minhaj Ul Quran had the lowest ratio of not interested people, 29% only. More than 33% were not able to take a final decision and 29% had all the intentions to participate in practical politics488. More than 8%, of their respondents, had given several suggestions which fell into ―Others‖ category but they were also related to participating in practical politics- one way or the other. The respondents from Jamia Muhammadia Ghausia, Bhera, were also not sure in their decisions as 40% were not sure yet, almost 34% were not interested and more than 20% had decided to participate in practical politics. The respondents from Jamia Ashrafia had a mixed response. Almost 62% not having any intention, to participate in practical politics, 19% not sure yet and 14% had a desire to participate in practical politics. Almost 5%, of their respondents, give opinions which were included in ―Others‖ category but most of them had expressed their dissatisfaction over the existing political system and were apprehensive of its legitimacy as an ―Islamic system‖. The respondents, from Jamia Talemat Islamia, Faisalabad, were quite clear in their thoughts. Almost 73% not interested in practical politics and 18% not sure yet. Only 9% intended to participate in practical politics. The problem does not lie with the participation in practical politics. As a matter of fact, the youth, after completing studies, should participate in practical politics, to introduce new perspective to the existing perceptions and modes. The problem arises when a group- sect in this case- does not feel comfortable in cooperating with the other groups- sects in this case.

487 One must keep in mind the persistent effective political role and position of JUI, in national politics. 488 The influence of Dr. Tahir Ul Qadri, in their lives, must be kept in mind.

375

Figure 7.34:

7.2.5: Question No 5: Political principles Taught by Islam It was added to find out the knowledge of religion and capability to deduct the appropriate material out of it; knowing is one thing and understanding is the other. As it was an open ended question, therefore, space for more than one answer was provided and top two answers were entertained. The domains/categories of answers were developed, and revised, on the basis of the preferences given by the respondents. The respondents, in this question, gave answers which reflected their capabilities to understand and interpret their knowledge; contrary to the conventional wisdom that Madrassa graduates have no capability to analyze the curriculum they are taught.

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Table 7.41: Political Principles Taught by Islam 1 S No Political Principles Taught by Respondents Percentage Islam 1 1 Dutifulness/ Providing Rights 166 10.1 2 Self-Accountability 165 10.0 3 Implementing Islam 296 18.0 4 Justice and Equality 762 46.3 5 Loyalty/ Selfless Service 79 4.8 6 Governance/ Public Service 17 1.0 7 Do Not Know 161 9.8 Total 1646 100

More than 46% declared that the main focus of Islam, in political sphere, was on, promoting and ensuring, justice and equality. Though, 18% could not think of anything except implementing Islam yet, 10% still emphasized on the significance of dutifulness and providing rights. Another 10% declared self-accountability as the primary political principle; taught by Islam. Almost 10% were unable to contribute something, in this question. A careful analysis shows that more than 72%, combined, were of the opinion that Islam emphasized on establishment of a justice and equality based society, working for public welfare; where the rulers had to revise, and reform, their characters.

377

Figure 7.35:

As this question had more than one space for answer, therefore, first two references were given weightage. The respondents, in their second answer, gave a larger variety of answers and their support was also scattered, unlike their first option in the same question.

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Table 7.42: Political Principles Taught by Islam 2 S No Political Principles Taught by Respondents Percentage Islam 2 1 Providing Rights 360 21.9 2 Promoting Moral Values 100 6.1 3 Islamic Renaissance 110 6.7 4 More Than One 108 6.6 5 Governance/ Public Service 307 18.7 6 Social Setup Reform 98 6.0 7 Implementing Religion 346 21.0 8 Replacing Existing System 34 2.1 9 Do Not Know 183 11.1 Total 1646 100

Almost 22% declared ―providing rights‖ the political principle; taught by Islam. Whereas, 21% considered implementing religion as the basic principle and almost 19% declared governance and public service as the basic political principle of Islam. A consolidated analysis shows that more than 40%, combined, considered governance related performances, public service and providing rights, as the basic political principles of Islam. While, 21% had declared implementation of Islam, as a significant political principle by Islam and almost 19%, combined, considered character building related activities as the primary political teaching of Islam; they also include those who gave more than one opinion. Almost 7% wanted to see the revival of Islamic classical structures; the Caliphate. Only 2% clearly said that they wanted to replace existing political system. If both the categories, Islamic renaissance and replacing existing system, are combined, even then they hold almost 9% support.

379

Figure 7.36:

7.2.6: Question No 6: Basic Reasons for Political Ills in Pakistan This question would help gauge the capabilities of the respondents; whether they are aware of the genuine political problems of Pakistan or not. One cannot reform or purify any system until and unless the basic reasons for the ills are not known and understood properly. Those who seek reformation equip themselves with initial necessary information and then acquire skills to weed out the unwanted. It would also help determine the level of political harmony, the respondents are likely to develop and produce. It was an open ended question and therefore, space for more than one answer was provided.

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Table 7.43: Basic Reasons for Political Ills in Pakistan 1 S No Reasons for Political Ills in Pakistan 1 Respondents Percentage 1 Selfishness/ Corruption 935 56.8 2 Political System Not Right 48 2.9 3 Lack of Tolerance/ Good Character 59 3.6 4 Islamic Principles not Followed 326 19.8 5 Bad Governance 108 6.6 6 Incapable System 38 2.3 7 Do Not Know 132 8.0 Total 1646 100

The respondents refuted the conventional wisdom, and arguments of the scrollers, by clearly declaring corruption and bad governance as basic reasons for political ills in Pakistan. Almost 57% declared it clearly and almost 7% declared bad governance as the basic reason. Almost 20% were of the opinion that it was all because of not following the Islamic principles. Almost 3% were convinced that the prevailing political system was not right and 2% considered it incapable one. Even if the respondents, who did not consider this political system right and those who declared it incapable, were combined together, as a threat to the existing political system- with all its inbred flaws- the total support was merely 5%. People, who do not have proper understanding about the working of any system, are, usually, unable to differentiate between the structural flaws and functional incapacities. Deficiency in proper implementation of a system does not mean that the system itself is incorrect or deficient. The respondents, in this research- the Madrassa graduates- proved their capabilities, regarding political system of Pakistan. They did not mix functional incapacities with structural flaws. The following questions would also help determine their potentials and capabilities to promote political harmony in the country.

381

Figure 7.37:

This open ended question accommodated more than one answers, to consume maximum knowledge from the respondents.

Table 7.44: Basic Reasons for Political Ills in Pakistan 2 S No Reasons for Political Ills in Respondents Percentage Pakistan 2 1 Political System not Appropriate 218 13.2 2 Social Setup not Right 20 1.2 3 Character not Developed/ Moral 217 13.2 Values Deteriorated 4 Westernization/ Incapable System 79 4.8 5 Islam not Practiced 364 22.1 6 Bad Governance 469 28.5 7 More Than One 122 7.4 8 Do Not Know 157 9.5 Total 1646 100

382

The second option, of the respondents, had support for a variety of options. More than 28% considered bad governance as the basic reason, for political ills in Pakistan, while, 22% declared that it was only because of not practicing Islam, in the politics. More than 13% considered that the prevailing political system was not appropriate and the support went to deterioration of moral values. Almost 5% were of the opinion that Westernization had produced this incapable political system.

Figure 7.38:

7.2.7: Question No 7: Steps Needed for Reforming Present Political System This was asked to find out whether the respondents own the present political system or just want to replace it. The suggestions given in the two parts of this open ended question will help recommend steps to reform prevailing political system and also will be of great help in determining the

383 level of competence; of the respondents. Some students provided a long list of suggestions. Shrinking them to two major categories would have been unjust to them. Therefore, they were entertained as ―More than One‖.

Table 7.45: Steps for Reforming Political System 1 S No Steps for Reforming Political Respondents Percentage System 1 1 Character Building 227 13.8 2 Social Reform 76 4.6 3 Islamic Training/ System 432 26.2 4 Governance/ Public Welfare 461 28.0 5 More Than One 109 6.6 6 System Replacement 127 7.7 7 Do Not Know 214 13.0 Total 1646 100

It was the question where the respondents could suggest practicing or implementing Islam as the effective steps for reforming the political system of Pakistan. 28% respondents stated that governance related reforms should be introduced and public welfare should be the top priorities of the government. A little more than 26% saw the solution, to all the ills in the political system of the Punjab and Pakistan, in providing Islamic training to people and in following the principles of Islam. Almost 8% were hopeless and wanted to replace the prevailing political system. Almost 14% emphasized on the importance of character building. 13%, unfortunately, were unable to contribute any suggestion.

384

Figure 7.39:

The respondents, in this question, gave support to a variety of answers. Therefore, it was necessary to run a cross tabulation, on the basis of Madrassas Administration, to identify patterns of support.

385

Table 7.46: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Steps for Reforming Political System 1 S Madrassa Charac Socia Islamic Govern More Syste Do Tot No Administra ter l Trainin ance/ Than m Not al tion Buildin Refor g/ Public One Replac Know g m Syste Welfar ement m e 1 Improvident 11.9% 4.5% 17.9% 23.9% .0% 14.9% 26.9 100 % % 2 Impulsive 8.3% 5.4% 31.3% 22.7% 6.3% 9.0% 17.1 100 % % 3 Efficient 15.6% 4.1% 27.9% 30.4% 4.3% 8.0% 9.7% 100 % 4 Organized 19.4% 6.0% 20.2% 21.4% 13.9% 6.7% 12.3 100 % % 5 Prudent 14.7% 2.9% 20.6% 40.8% 7.6% 3.4% 10.1 100 % % Total 13.8% 4.6% 26.2% 28.0% 6.6% 7.7% 13.0 100 % %

The results provided an interesting picture. Highest number of respondents, from Improvident Administration run Madrassas, almost 27%, did not have any suggestion to make; reflecting the mental level and approach of their teachers. Almost 24% suggested governance and public welfare related reforms, while, almost 18% suggested Islamic training and following Islamic system. A handsome number of respondents, almost 15%, declared the prevailing political system irreparable and suggested its replacement. The respondents, from Impulsive Administration run Madrassas, also had a similar approach to the political system of the Punjab, as well as to that of Pakistan. Their highest support, 31%, went to Islamic training and Islamic system. While, almost 23% suggested governance and public welfare related reforms. A little more than 17% could not think of anything, to contribute, and 9% wanted to replace the existing political system; declaring it unwanted. The respondents, from Efficient Administration run Madrassas, had a relatively different approach towards the prevailing political system. Their

386 highest support, more than 30% came for governance and public welfare related reforms. Almost 28% declared Islamic training and system as the important step, for reforming political system of the Punjab, as well as of the country. More than 15% were in favour of character building. The respondents, from Organized Administration run Madrassa, supported a variety of steps for the purpose. More than 21% suggested governance related reforms while more than 20% wanted to promote Islamic training. More than 19% emphasized on character building, for political system reform, and almost 14% gave several suggestions which could not be shrunk to two major categories. Whereas, the respondents, from Prudent Administration run Madrassas, were more concentrated in their opinions. Almost 41% suggested governance related reforms, more than 20% wanted to give Islamic training, for character building obviously, and almost 15% clearly stated that solution to political ills, in the country, lied in character building.

Figure 7.40:

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As this was an open ended question, therefore, the respondents gave more than one answer. The second important step, for reforming prevailing political system, was entertained in this table.

Table: 7.47: Steps for Reforming Political System 2 S No Steps for Reforming Political Respondents Percentage System 2 1 Character Traits/ Social Setup 116 7.0 Reform 2 Accountability/ Honest Rulers 489 29.7 3 Political System Reform/ Training 136 8.3 4 Following/ Implementing Islamic 404 24.5 Principles 5 Governance/ Public Service 161 9.8 6 System Replacement 98 6.0 7 Do Not Know 242 14.7 Total 1646 100

The responses, in this question, were similar to the ones in the previous table. Almost 30% respondents considered accountability and honest rulers as an important step, for political system reform, while more than 24% emphasized the need of following and implementing Islamic principles. Almost 15% were not fortunate enough to have any suggestion to contribute and only 6% were disappointed of the prevailing political system and wanted to replace it; rather than trying to improve its efficiency. Remaining respondents had scattered opinion; from governance related reforms to character building. The careful analysis shows that almost 55%, combined, suggested steps to reform prevailing political system, one way or the other, and wanted to improve the characters- of both the rulers and masses- to reform the political system of the country.

388

Figure 7.41:

7.2.5: Question No 8: Basic Duties of a Good Ruler It was added, again as an open ended question, to give the respondents more room and flexibility to express their opinions. Though responses in open ended questions are difficult to calculate and tabulate yet they are of great significance when the respondents‘ inner feelings and thoughts need to be extracted. It was added to find out the expectations of the respondents, from their rulers. These expectations will be of great help in identifying similarities in perceptions about a good government/ruler; in the minds of ordinary people of the Punjab, and also in those of the entire country. Similarities, in such expectations, enable people come closer to each other and work together for the projection and protection of a specific political system. Whereas, those who have different expectations, from rulers, tend to amend, or even replace, the existing structures; to bring in place the set up that can come up to their expectations and can best serve their interests.

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Table 7.48: Basic Duties of a Good Ruler 1 S No Basic Duties of a Good Ruler 1 Respondents Percentage 1 Loyal to Nation/ Selfless Service 337 20.5 2 Social Development 24 1.5 3 Governance/ Public Service 582 35.4 4 Following/ Implementing Islamic 375 22.8 Principles 5 More Than One 168 10.2 6 System Replacement 4 .2 7 Do Not Know 156 9.5 Total 1646 100

The results showed a mixed response. More than 35% declared improvement in the governance and public service as the basic duties of a good ruler. More than 20% wanted a loyal and selfless ruler. To them, personal traits, like loyalty and selflessness, were more important than anything; for a good ruler to become productive and beneficial for the society. Almost 23% did point out any duty; rather, they considered either following or implementing Islamic principles as the basic duties of a good ruler. There were more than 10% respondents who gave a longer list of the basic duties, of a good ruler. They were entertained as ―More than One‖; as no single option could encompass the list of duties mentioned by them.

390

Figure 7.42:

Like other open ended questions, the respondents mentioned more than one duty of a good ruler. The second options were entertained in this table.

Table 7.49: Basic Duties of a Good Ruler 2 S No Basic Duties of a Good Ruler 2 Respondents Percentage 1 Good Governance/ Public Welfare 469 28.5 2 Providing Rights/ Social Justice 552 33.5 3 Islamic System/ Renaissance 132 8.0 4 Honesty/ Selfless Services 203 12.3 5 System Replacement 2 .1 6 Islamic Qualities/ Good Character 117 7.1 7 Do Not Know 171 10.4 Total 1646 100

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The respondents were quite clear in their responses. More than 33%, rightly, considered providing rights and, ensuring, social justice as the basic duties of a good ruler. That is not all, more than 28% declared, ensuring, good governance and public welfare as the basic duties. Combined together, 62% suggested governance related improvements and reforms; right answer at the right place. More than 12% suggested honesty and selfless services but they are characteristics of a ruler not his duties; despite the fact that one cannot deny their significance in ensuring efficiency.

Figure 7.43:

Responses in this category were quite helpful in evaluating the perceptions of the respondents, Madrassa graduates, regarding the prevailing political system of the country. Their opinions were full of suggestions to improve the political system and make it more beneficial for the masses. The noteworthy thing is that majority, of the respondents, was not only aware of the political problems but also suggested practical and appreciable steps to reform the political system. They, as against conventional wisdom, did not suggest replacing the existing political system and institutions. Rather, they

392 suggested steps to make the political system more efficient and helpful for all the masses. It also shows ownership for this system and their potentials to become productive members of the prevailing political system. 7.3: Economic Harmony The fourth and last part of the questionnaire dealt with the issues pertaining to ―Economic Harmony‖. Most of the questions, in this part, were designed to collect information, from the respondents, about the existing economic system, faults in it and their reasons and suggestions to improve it. Most of the questions asked were directly helpful in gauging the perceptions and potentials of Madrassa graduates; regarding economic harmony.

7.3.1: Question No 1: Profession Recommended, for you, by Teachers It would help in understanding the level of confidence, in Madrassa teachers, about religious education and their willingness to recommend it as a profession to their students. Apart from this, it was also necessary to maintain the confidence of the respondents, in this research, that it was about their personality; so as to avoid cosmetic answers, which are usually given when the respondents know that their answers will be used as labels on them.

Table 7.50: Profession Recommended by Teachers S No Profession Recommended by Respondents Percentage Teachers 1 Private Job 17 1.0 2 Govt. Job 268 16.3 3 Business 233 14.2 4 Madrassa Teaching 751 45.6 5 Teaching + any Other 140 8.5 6 Teaching (in school/college) 51 3.1 7 Whatever Possible for Honest 160 9.7 Earning 8 Others 26 1.6 Total 1646 100

393

More than 45% students claimed that their teachers preferred and recommended Madrassa teaching for them. The reason was quite simple and obvious that there was a scarcity of highly educated people in Madrassas and most of the registered Madrassas were of lower levels. Therefore there was a need to have qualified teachers, in Madrassas, and to upgrade the existing Madrassas to higher levels. Dr. Raghib Naeemi, of Jamia Naeemia Lahore, revealed that the number of ―Almia‖ graduates was very low, as compared to lower level degree holders; usually ―Aama‖ and ―Khasa‖. There is an ever growing demand for new Madrassas due to rapid growth in population. That is why high level graduates are always needed to teach in the Madrassas489. More than 16%, of the respondents, were suggested government jobs and 14% were advised, by their teachers, to start their own business. Almost 10% were not given any special suggestions except ensuring an honest earning and more than 8% wanted to continue teaching, in a Madrassa, and wanted to adopt another profession as well.

489 Dr. Raghib Hussain Naeemi, Mohtamim Jamia Naeemia Gari Shahu, Lahore, in discussion with the researcher on, 28-Nov-2011. Several other Madrassa administrators and teachers also reiterated the same argument.

394

Figure 7.44:

7.3.2: Question No 2: Can Economic Needs be met after Acquiring Religious Education alone and how? Though, apparently, it looks like a simple question yet, it helped a lot in gauging the determination of Madrassa graduates towards their domain of knowledge and specialization. It also helped understand the level of knowledge, of the respondents, about economic situation, and issues, in the society and strategies, if any, to coup with financial constraints faced by people. It was as open ended question and had two parts; first for those who were convinced that the expenditures could be met, after acquiring religious education alone, and the other for those who were not convinced. The respondents were given separate space for both the options and, therefore, the responses were tabled in the separate tables.

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Table 7.51: Economic Needs met after Religious Education Alone S No Economic Needs met after Respondents Percentage Religious Education 1 Yes with Strong Faith 689 41.9 2 Yes with Simplicity/ Contentment 110 6.7 3 Not So Easily Possible 394 23.9 4 Extra Sources Needed 157 9.5 5 Teaching and Other Religious 49 3.0 Services 6 Do Not Know 247 15.0 Total 1646 100

The responses were simple; 42% said that they would be able to meet the financial expenditures with the help of strong faith. Rest of the respondents were more practical. Almost 24% admitted that it was not possible easily and more than 9% said that extra sources, of some sort, were needed ―to make both ends meet‖. A handsome number of the respondents, 15%, were unable to comment in this question. The responses show that either they were not worried about their financial needs or were not groomed to deal with this specific issue. Still the hope was not lost as, 43% combined, did show some concern, about financial issues.

396

Figure 7.45:

A handsome number of responses, in this question, was clustered in one option but remaining were quite scattered. Therefore, in order to get a clear picture, cross tabulation was run on the basis of Madrassa Administration with the claim that economic needs could be met after acquiring religious education alone.

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Table 7.52: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Economic Needs met after Religious Education Alone S Madrassa Yes Yes with Not So Extra Teaching Do Tot No Administrati with Simplicit Easily Sourc and Other Not al on Strong y/ Possibl es Religious Kno Faith Content e Neede Services w ment d 1 Improvident 40.3% 1.5% 16.4% 3.0% .0% 38.8 100 % % 2 Impulsive 54.0% 6.7% 18.5% 11.0% 1.3% 8.5 100 % % 3 Efficient 37.6% 7.1% 23.3% 6.4% 3.3% 22.3 100 % % 4 Organized 37.7% 8.7% 25.8% 11.1% 2.8% 13.9 100 % % 5 Prudent 33.2% 5.0% 36.6% 14.7% 6.7% 3.8 100 % % Total 41.9% 6.7% 23.9% 9.5% 3.0% 15.0 100 % %

The results were quite predictable. The respondents, from Improvident Administration run Madrassas, were unable to give any sound answer. More than 4% of them had satisfied the queries of their mind, regarding economic needs, by believing that strong faith would help them out in this regard and almost 39% were unable to comment on it. Only 16%, of them, admitted that it was not possible easily. The respondents, from Impulsive Administration run Madrassas, were also had almost similar perception, in this regard; 54% were convinced that it was possible with strong faith while, more than 18% admitted that it was not possible easily and 11% indicated the need of extra sources. The respondents, from Efficient Administration run Madrassas, were closer to those in the previous categories. More than 37% believed that strong faith would help them out, in this regard while, more than 23% admitted that it was not possible easily and 22% were unable to think of anything, to contribute. The respondents, from Organized Administration run Madrassas, also had confidence in the strength of their faith but majority of them was

398 convinced that it was a serious issue in life and, thus, could not be left unattended. Almost 38%, of their respondents, had belief in the strength of their faith and almost 26% admitted that it was not possible easily. Almost 14% could not think of anything to contribute while, 11% were in favour of availing extra sources and almost 9% recommended the strategy of simplicity and contentment. The respondents, from Prudent Administration run Madrassas, were more focused, in their responses, than others. More than 36% were convinced that it was not possible easily now. That is why, almost 15% were aware of the fact that other sources were needed, to meet the economic needs of life, in modern times. Almost 7%, highest in this option, highlighted the significance of exploring income opportunities through religious teaching and other religious services. It shows their understanding about the practical application, and utility, of their knowledge, in the society. Despite the fact that 33% respondents were confident that they would be able to fulfill their economic needs through strong faith, still, 63% combined, admitted the significance of economic needs in life and suggested various methods to fulfill them honorably.

399

Figure 7.46:

The second part of this question housed the responses of those who had the perception that financial expenses could not be met after acquiring religious education only. As all the respondents had to answer both the parts, therefore, all those who had supported the first part- financial expenses could be met after acquiring religious education alone- either did not give any answer, in this part, or gave an answer which supported their response in the previous part. Therefore, all of them were entertained as ―Not Applicable‖; as they had already given their opinion in favour of the first part.

400

Table 7.53: Economic Needs Not met after Religious Education Alone S No Economic Needs Not met Respondents Percentage after Religious Education 1 Other Sources Needed 266 16.2 2 Social System not Right 85 5.2 3 Not Possible Easily 344 20.9 4 Not Applicable 854 51.9 5 Do Not Know 97 5.9 Total 1646 100

Most of the respondents, almost 52%, fell in the ―Not Applicable‖ category; as they had already supported the first part of this question, one way or the other. Remaining respondents were clustered in two options only; almost 21% admitted that it was not possible easily and 16% declared that other sources were need. Only 5% blamed the social system and complained about the prevailing social norms, materialism, which persuaded people to earn, and spend, more money.

401

Figure 7.47:

Apparently, the responses did not show any intricacy but cross tabulation was run, on the basis of Madrassa Administration, with ―Economic needs not met after Religious Education Alone‖. Despite the fact that majority of the respondents, almost 52% in total, was clustered in ―Not Applicable‖ but the patterns of support, for other options, were interesting and worth discussing. Cross tabulation was run on the basis of Madrassa Administration with economic needs not met after religious education alone.

402

Table 7.54: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Economic Needs Not met after Religious Education Alone S Madrassa Other Social Not Not Do Tot No Administrati Sources System not Possible Applica Not al on Needed Right Easily ble Know 1 Improvident 11.9% 1.5% 14.9% 44.8% 26.9 100 % % 2 Impulsive 12.5% 4.0% 18.5% 60.4% 4.6% 100 % 3 Efficient 14.4% 6.4% 22.0% 51.4% 5.7% 100 % 4 Organized 17.1% 2.4% 26.2% 47.2% 7.1% 100 % 5 Prudent 28.2% 8.4% 18.9% 42.9% 1.7% 100 % Total 16.2% 5.2% 20.9% 51.9% 5.9% 100 %

Almost 27% respondents, from Improvident Administration run Madrassas, could not think of anything to contribute and almost 15% admitted that it was not possible easily, to meet the economic needs after acquiring religious education alone. Almost 12%, of them, were also convinced that other sources were needed, for the said purpose. More than 18% respondents, from Impulsive Administration run Madrassas, knew that it was not possible easily and more than 12% admitted the significance of availing other sources of income. 22% respondents, from Efficient Administration run Madrassas, knew that it was not possible easily and 14% were convinced of the significance of availing other sources of income. Little more than 26% respondents, from organized Administration run Madrassas, declared that it was not easy to meet economic needs, after acquiring religious education alone, and 17% signified the importance of other sources, in this regard. The respondents, from Prudent Administration run Madrassas, were exceptionally clear and well-focused in their ideas. More than 28% admitted the significance of other sources of income and almost

403

19% accepted that it was not an easy task. More than 8% highlighted the reason, entrenched materialism in the society; which had not left it an easy task anymore. Figure 7.48:

After evaluating the responses, in this question, one can easily evaluate the level of understanding of the Madrassa graduates; regarding the economic needs and their practical solutions.

7.3.3: Question No 3: Business Partnership with People from Other Sects This question was of utmost importance to calculate chances of promotion of harmonious relations among various communities.

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Table 7.55: Partnership with Other Sects S No Partnership With Other Sects Respondents Percentage 1 Ok 793 48.2 2 Not Ok 195 11.8 3 Better Avoid 580 35.2 4 Limited/ Careful Interaction 51 3.1 5 Others 27 1.6 Total 1646 100 The responses, in this question, were very encouraging as more than 48% said that it such partnership was acceptable to them. Though 35% neither approved it, totally, nor rejected it, altogether; they intended to avoid it, if possible. Almost 11% respondents were the real issue; who disapproved such partnership. It shows that almost half of the respondents had no problem at all in starting a business partnership with from other sects. Though these questions, about sectarian differentiation, were objected, by some respondents, in the opinion section, yet they were of great help in understanding the level of hatred, or that of accommodation and acceptance, for other sects.

405

Figure 7.49:

7.3.4: Question No 4: Business Partnership with non-Muslims This too helped assess potentials of harmony in economic interactions. Hatred pushes towards extremist steps and responses while lack of trust suggests precaution only.

Table 7.56: Partnership with Non-Muslims S No Partnership With Non- Respondents Percentage Muslims 1 Ok 384 23.3 2 Not Ok 432 26.2 3 Better Avoid 736 44.7 4 Limited/ Careful Interaction 70 4.3 5 Others/ Do Not know 24 1.5 Total 1646 100

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The results, in this question, were much different from the ones in the previous question. Almost 45% respondents showed the intention of trying to avoid such business partnership. More than 26% denied establishing such partnership and more than 23% declared it ok and did not see any problem such partnership. These results are clearly indicating the influence of the teachers who consider and declare non-Muslims as lesser level citizens490. Still the students have not denied such partnership. They have only showed apprehensions about it and have desired to avoid it, if possible.

490 One must also keep in mind the fact that most of the non-Muslims, in the Punjab, are Christian and most of the Christians, people regularly interact with, are sweepers. That is why, whenever the term Christian is used, the picture that comes to their mind is, unfortunately, of a sweeper. The second important factor, in this regard, is the role of Western non-Muslim countries; particularly the US. The policies and activities of the US, particularly in the last decade or so, have won her the label of an ―Anti-Muslim‖ country. The US support for the acts of blasphemy has added fuel to fire. This response was a clear expression of anti-Americanism as most of the respondents understood business partnership with the non-Muslims as partnership with the non-Muslim countries. Dr. Sarfraz Naeemi, late, had said, in discussion with the researcher in November 2005, ―The effects of the government policies are to be suffered by the masses‖. Translated by the researcher from Urdu, ―Mulkon ka boya awam ko katna parta hai‖. He meant that all the people, of other countries, are not bad but the policies of their rulers portray them as bad in other countries. This is what must have happened here.

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Figure 7.50:

7.3.5: Question No 5: Practical steps to Eliminate Interest System in Pakistan Interest is prohibited in Islam. Every religious scholar and student hates and intends to eliminate it for good. This question was asked to estimate the capabilities, of the respondents, regarding suggesting practical steps needed to eliminate interest from the society. Denouncing something is one thing and understanding practical steps, to curtail it, is another. As it was an open ended question therefore space for two answers was provided, to entertain more suggestions.

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Table 7.57: Practical Steps to Eliminate Interest 1 S No Practical Suggestions to Respondents Percentage Eliminate Interest 1 1 Self Help 115 7.0 2 Strong Faith 182 11.1 3 Islamic System 533 32.4 4 Economic Activity/ Facilities 72 4.4 5 Religious Education 116 7.0 6 Government Role/ Responsibility 267 16.2 7 Do Not Know 361 21.9 Total 1646 100

In the first column, the responses were scattered, showing the absence of student capability to suggest practical steps. Most of them were unable to suggest practical steps. They were of the opinion that establishment of Islamic system, 32%, and its strict following, 11%, would, automatically, eliminate it. Only 16% were able to point out that only government could eliminate it with a decree.

409

Figure 7.51:

The responses in the second column were not much different from the ones in the first column.

Table 7.58: Practical Steps to Eliminate Interest 2 S No Practical Steps to Eliminate Respondents Percentage Interest 2 1 Islamic System 605 36.8 2 Islamic Banking System 289 17.6 3 Good Governance 31 1.9 4 Economic Facilities 65 3.9 5 Motivation and Religious 216 13.1 Education 6 Do Not Know 440 26.7 Total 1646 100

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Majority of the respondents, almost 50% combined, still suggested implementation and following of Islam. There is no doubt that Islam prohibits interest but the respondents were requested to suggest practical steps; which most of them could not. A handsome number of more than 26% did not contribute any opinion at all.

Figure 7.52:

7.3.6: Question No 6: Contentment Personally Practiced Contentment is used in the context of satisfaction in the already achieved successes. Usually it is used as a synonymous of simplicity. It was asked to continue the sequence of the questions and confidence of the respondents in the research; that it was about their personality and responses could be given without any fear or worry. As a concomitant result, of this question, the determination and commitment, of the respondents, towards a simple life was also recorded.

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Table 7.59: Contentment Personally Practiced S No Contentment Personally Respondents Percentage Practiced 1 Very Much 216 13.1 2 Reasonably 1103 67.0 3 To Some Extent 247 15.0 4 Very Less 60 3.6 5 Others 20 1.2 Total 1646 100 Most of the respondents, 67%, gave an average answer that they practiced contentment to a reasonable extent. 15% said, to some extent, and 13% claimed to observe contentment to a greater extent.

Figure 7.53:

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7.3.7: Question No 7: Profession Planned after Graduation It was a sequel to the same questions, asked in part one of the questionnaire. The idea was to find out, through a relationship analysis that to what extent the respondents were giving original responses and not the cosmetic answers.

Table 7.60: Profession Planned by Respondents after Graduation S No Profession Planned Respondents Percentage 1 Madrassa Teaching 1021 62.0 2 Imam of Mosque 30 1.8 3 Private Job 16 1.0 4 Govt. Job 223 13.5 5 Business 118 7.2 6 Teaching + any Other 159 9.7 7 Whichever Possible 52 3.2 8 Others 27 1.6 Total 1646 100

The responses were similar to the ones given in the similar questions in the first part of the questionnaire and to the answers given in the first question of this part, where teachers were suggesting professions for their students. 62% respondents aphetically asserted that they had all plans to adopt Madrassa teaching as a profession. More than 13% intended to adopt a government job and almost 10% wanted to continue teaching along with any other profession. It clearly shows that parents, teachers and students all three are thinking on the same lines. An overwhelming majority of the respondents had, in all the questions, opined that they were interested in adopting teaching as profession. It showed their commitment to the religion and its promotion. The efforts, in this case should be to groom them and prepare them to perform their duties more productively; rather than blaming them for what they have not done and undermining them for what they may not be mainly responsible for.

413

Figure 7.54:

7.3.8: Question No 8: Islamic Banking System in Pakistan It was added to find out whether the respondents were aware of existing Islamic banking system in Pakistan. This would also help in gauging the level of legitimacy; Islamic banking system enjoys in the Madrassa graduates.

Table 7.61: Islamic Banking System in Pakistan S No Islamic Banking System in Respondents Percentage Pakistan 1 Absolutely Right 423 25.7 2 Right to Some Extent 789 47.9 3 Better Avoid it 150 9.1 4 Not Right 180 10.9 5 Others 21 1.3 6 Do Not Know for Sure 83 5.0 Total 1646 100

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The respondents gave clear opinions about the Islamic banking system. Almost 48% said that it was right to some extent while almost 26% said that it was right to some extent. Almost 11% had the perception that it was not right and 9% wanted to avoid it.

Figure 7.55:

A huge number of respondents, had declared Islamic banking system right to some extent but the cross tabulation, on the basis of Madrassa Administration, with Islamic banking system revealed a special pattern in the responses.

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Table 7.62: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Islamic Banking System in Pakistan S Madrassa Absolute Right to Better Not Othe Do Not Tot No Administrati ly Right Some Avoid Right rs Know al on Extent it for Sure 1 Improvident 10.4% 70.1% 7.5% 7.5% .0% 4.5% 100 % 2 Impulsive 26.3% 48.3% 9.4% 9.2% .6% 6.3% 100 % 3 Efficient 25.6% 42.5% 11.0% 12.8 1.8 6.2% 100 % % % 4 Organized 23.8% 49.2% 6.7% 14.3 2.4 3.6% 100 % % % 5 Prudent 31.1% 53.4% 6.7% 7.1% .4% 1.3% 100 % Total 25.7% 47.9% 9.1% 10.9 1.3 5.0% 100 % % %

The highest support, 70% for right to some extent, came from Improvident Administration run Madrassas and they were also the lowest, 10%, in declaring it absolutely right. The percentage of respondents, who considered Islamic banking system as absolutely right, was on an increase; with the improvement in Madrassa Administration improvement; 31% from Prudent Administration run Madrassas. Likewise, the lowest percentage of respondents who were not sure enough to contribute anything, 1%, also came from Prudent Administration run Madrassas. It shows that Madrassa administrations had a strong role in equipping their students with the information and knowledge about the prevailing systems and setups in the country.

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Figure 7.56:

7.3.9: Question No 9: Fix Profit by Regular Banks It was included, in the research, to collect the verdict, from the respondents; whether they considered it right or un-Islamic, as declared by many.

Table 7.63: Fix Profit by Ordinary Banks S No Fix Profit by Ordinary Banks Respondents Percentage 1 Legitimate 82 5.0 2 Illegitimate 434 26.4 3 Better Avoid it 242 14.7 4 Pure Interest 751 45.6 5 If Not Un-Islamic 39 2.4 6 Others 12 .7 7 Do Not Know 86 5.2 Total 1646 100

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The responses were clear and conclusive in this question. More than 45% declared it a pure interest and more than 26% considered it illegitimate. Almost 15% were more practical and suggested a softer way of avoiding it, if possible. 5%, astonishingly, declared it legitimate.

Figure 7.57:

7.3.10: Question No 10: Reasons for Economic Problems in Pakistan This open ended question required three responses. It was designed so to house variety of suggestions and appreciate the mental approach of the respondents. The responses helped understand the level of understanding, of the respondents, and their ownership for the prevailing economic system.

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Table 7.64: Reasons for Pakistan's Economic Problems 1 S No Reasons for Pakistan's Respondents Percentage Economic Problems 1 1 Dishonesty/ Corruption 849 51.6 2 Wastage of Resources 260 15.8 3 Lack of Accountability 52 3.2 4 Islam not Practiced 120 7.3 5 Bad Governance 113 6.9 6 System not Right 55 3.3 7 Do Not Know 197 12.0 Total 1646 100

The respondents vehemently declared that misconducts, of the rulers, were the most important reason for Pakistan‘s economic problems. More than 51% declared dishonesty and corruption and almost 16% considered wastage of resources as the primary reasons. That is not all, more than 7% pointed out issues, falling in bad governance, considering them responsible for economic problems of the country. More than 3% were wise enough to point out lack of accountability as a reason for the economic crises in the country. A consolidated figure shows that more than 77%, combined, held rulers, and their activities, responsible for economic problems of Pakistan. Only 7% were of the opinion that it was so because of not practicing Islam and 3% blamed the system. 12% were not fortunate enough to have any opinion, of their own, to contribute.

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Figure 7.58:

The responses, in the second table, were scattered and presented support for a variety of reasons, for the economic problems of Pakistan.

Table 7.65: Reasons for Pakistan's Economic Problems 2 S No Reasons for Pakistan's Respondents Percentage Economic Problems 2 1 Dishonesty/ Corruption 141 8.6 2 Wastage of Resources 337 20.5 3 Lack of Accountability 238 14.5 4 Islam Not Practiced 160 9.7 5 Bad Governance 321 19.5 6 Poverty/ Unemployment 202 12.3 7 Do Not Know 247 15.0 Total 1646 100

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More than 20% considered wastage of resources responsible for the economic problems while, more than 19% pointed out issues of bad governance, in this regard. More than 12% considered poverty and unemployment as reasons for the economic problems, rather than its results. 15% did not have anything to contribute and almost 10% declared that it was all because of not practicing Islam.

Figure 7.59:

The respondents were requested to give three opinions, in this question. The responses in the third table were, relatively, more coherent.

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Table 7.66: Reasons for Pakistan's Economic Problems 3 S No Reasons for Pakistan's Respondents Percentage Economic Problems 3 1 Dishonesty/ Corruption 76 4.6 2 Wastage of Resources 64 3.9 3 Lack of Accountability 195 11.8 4 Islam Not Practiced 231 14.0 5 Bad Governance 708 43.0 6 Masses Ignored by Rulers 62 3.8 7 Do Not Know 310 18.8 Total 1646 100

43% respondents pointed out bad governance related issues and considered them responsible for the economic problems of Pakistan. 14% believed that all such problems were because of not practicing Islam and almost 12% declared lack of accountability as the major reason for economic problems of the country. Almost 19% were unable to contribute anything.

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Figure 7.60:

The consolidated view of the responses, in all three tables, gave confirmations to the responses; while denying all the allegations of incapacity labeled against the Madrassa graduates. It showed that most of the respondents were aware of the fact that the rulers were either misusing their powers or were not held accountable, properly, for their misconducts. Not more than 10%, of the total respondents, were of the opinion that these problems were because of not practicing, or following, Islam. An average of almost 12% did not contribute anything. If both we combine both of them, presuming that those who did not contribute anything were not willing to pay attention to the prevailing economic system, even then they remain less than 25%. The conventional wisdom portrays that all the Madrassa graduates are against the existing economic system and are groomed to replace it through force, if needed. This perception needs to be revised. Now, it is time, for the society, to revise its perceptions.

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7.3.11: Question No 11: Solutions to Pakistan’s Economic Problems It too was an open ended question requiring three responses. Capability to apply is the crux of knowledge. The potentials of the respondents, and the level of their ownership for the society and its systems, can be best evaluated by analyzing the reforms, they suggest, for improving and cleansing a society of the menaces it faces and houses. It was, again, an open ended question and had three separate spaces for answers.

Table 7.67: Solutions to Pakistan's Economic Problems 1 S No Solution to Pakistan's Economic Respondents Percentage Problems 1 1 Accountability/ Honest Rulers 572 34.8 2 Right Use of Resources 227 13.8 3 Implementation of Islamic System 190 11.5 4 Education and Training 94 5.7 5 Governance 69 4.2 6 Poverty Alleviation/ Employment 196 11.9 7 System Replacement 48 2.9 8 Do Not Know 250 15.2 Total 1646 100

Though the responses were scattered, in their opinion apparently, yet the emphasis, on steps and strategies for solution to the economic problems of Pakistan, was clustered in favour of government efficiency improvement steps. Almost 35% wanted an effective accountability mechanism and wanted to have honest rulers. Almost 14% wanted to have right use of resources and almost 12% wanted to initiate poverty alleviation schemes and intended to provide jobs to the unemployed. More than 11% saw the economic salvation in implementation of Islamic system; which is also based on accountability and honesty of rulers. Almost 3%, only, wanted to replace the existing system; with the Islamic system according to their understanding obviously. More than 15% could not contribute anything. A consolidated view shows that more than 70%, combined, either suggested governance related reforms and wanted to

424 see honest and capable rulers or proposed practical steps, for public welfare and economic development of the country; thus challenging the authenticity of allegations, labeled against them, in both print and electronic media.

Figure 7.61:

Responses, in the second option, did not appear concentrated, apparently, but they were, somehow, focused on the domain of the steps; needed for economic revival of the country.

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Table 7.68: Solution to Pakistan's Economic Problems 2 S No Solution to Pakistan's Economic Respondents Percentage Problems 2 1 Accountability/ Honest Rulers 196 11.9 2 Right Use of Resources 439 26.7 3 Implementation of Islamic System 365 22.2 4 Character Building 116 7.0 5 Governance 195 11.8 6 System Reform 58 3.5 7 Do Not Know 277 16.8 Total 1646 100

The support for the second solution, as mentioned by the respondents, was apparently scattered but, actually more than 57% combined, supported governance related suggestions and steps to ensure honesty of the rulers. Almost 27% wanted to see a right use of resources while, almost 12% emphasized on the need of accountability and almost 12% suggested governance related reforms. More than 22% wanted to see implementation of Islam and almost 17% did not have anything to contribute.

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Figure 7.62:

The responses, in the third table, were also clustered in favour of the major domains of action; though they differed in the strategies.

Table 7.69: Solution to Pakistan's Economic Problems 3 S No Solution to Pakistan's Economic Respondents Percentage Problems 3 1 Enforcing Islam 122 7.4 2 Governance/ Justice and Equality 737 44.8 3 System Reform 184 11.2 4 Character Building 69 4.2 5 Honest Rulers 122 7.4 6 Do Not Know 412 25.0 Total 1646 100

The responses, in this table, almost 68% combined, were concentrated in favour of steps for improving governance, ensuring justice and equality through reforming the existing system. Almost 45% suggested governance

427 related reforms and wanted to have justice and equality in the society. More than 11% wanted to reform the existing system, one way or the other. More than 7% wanted to have honest rulers and 4% wanted to concentrate on character building of masses. An alarming 25% did not have anything to contribute. Perhaps, for the reason that, they had ran out of suggestions; after filling the first two places.

Figure 7.63:

At the end of the questionnaire, spaces were provided for suggestions and remarks, if any, regarding this questionnaire and this research separately. As they were not part of the research questions therefore were not included into the main body of the questionnaire. The responses in these spaces contained information of great significance and were, also, a source of motivation for the researcher.

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Table 7.70: Remarks about this Questionnaire S No Remarks about this Respondents Percentage Questionnaire 1 None 801 48.7 2 Good 434 26.4 3 Not so Good 26 1.6 4 Opinions must be 170 10.3 Implemented 5 Motivational 93 5.7 6 Informative 93 5.7 7 Add More Questions 29 1.8 Total 1646 100 A handsome number of the respondents, almost 49% did not give any opinion, while, more than 26% declared it a good structure. More than 10% emphasized the need of implementing the opinions; communicated through this questionnaire and more than 11% declared it motivational and informative.

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Figure 7.64:

The apparent apathy, in providing opinion about this questionnaire, was quite shocking, but the cross tabulation, on the basis of Madrassa Administration, not only explained the situation but also supported the hypothesis, once again.

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Table: 7.71: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Remarks About this Questionnaire S Type of None Goo Not Opinio Motiv Infor Add Tot No Administrati d so ns ation mativ More al Good must al e on Questi be Implem ons ented 1 Improvident 83.6 4.5 1.5% 9.0% 1.5% .0% .0% 100 % % % 2 Impulsive 47.7 23. 2.5% 12.5% 8.8% 4.2% 1.0% 100 % 3% % 3 Efficient 54.0 26. 1.1% 6.6% 3.1% 6.7% 1.5% 100 % 9% % 4 Organized 41.7 31. 1.2% 13.1% 4.0% 8.3% .8% 100 % 0% % 5 Prudent 34.5 32. 1.3% 13.0% 8.8% 4.6% 5.5% 100 % 4% % Total 48.7 26. 1.6% 10.3% 5.7% 5.7% 1.8% 100 % 4% %

The patterns of opinion, even in the last part of the questionnaire, once again provided answers to various research questions; most importantly the ones related to the potentials and capabilities of the Madrassa graduates. Along with that, the capability of some Madrassa teachers and administrators, to explore and exploit the potentials of Madrassa graduates, is also evident in this table.

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Figure 7.65:

Table 7.72: Remarks about this Research S No Remarks about this Respondents Percentage Research 1 None 951 57.8 2 Good 369 22.4 3 Not so Good 9 .5 4 Opinions must be 178 10.8 Implemented 5 Motivational 63 3.8 6 Informative 63 3.8 7 Add More Questions 13 .8 Total 1646 100

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Almost 58% did not give any opinion at all. More than 22% declared it a good and useful research. Almost 11% emphasized the need of implementing the opinions; acquired through this research.

Figure 7.66:

The cross tabulation of Madrassa Administration, with remarks about this research, revealed interesting patterns in the responses.

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Table: 7.73: Cross Tabulation of Madrassa Administration with Remarks About this Research S Type of None Goo Not Opinio Motiv Infor Add Tot No Administrati d so ns ation mativ More al Good must al e Questi on be ons Implem ented 1 Improvident 86.6 4.5 1.5% 4.5% 1.5% 1.5% .0% 100 % % % 2 Impulsive 55.2 19.4 1.0% 16.0% 5.2% 2.7% .4% 100 % % % 3 Efficient 63.5 20.9 .2% 6.1% 2.1% 5.6% 1.6% 100 % % % 4 Organized 54.4 30.2 .4% 11.9% 2.0% 1.2% .0% 100 % % % 5 Prudent 43.7 29.4 .4% 13.0% 8.0% 5.0% .4% 100 % % % Total 57.8 22.4 .5% 10.8% 3.8% 3.8% .8% 100 % % %

Similarly, the potentials and capabilities of Madrassa graduates can be put to right use; if properly identified and polished.

434

Figure 7.67:

The findings in this chapter are based on responses, collected through the questionnaire. They are merely presented in percentages, through statistical methods, and have been explained accordingly. Explanation and interpretation of percentages is useful where the objective is to dig out support and strength for a specific concept or phenomenon. This research, as mentioned in the beginning of the thesis, was not an attempt to validate or authenticate the sectarian differences or specific sets of interpretations. Rather, the primary objective of this was to gauge the validity of certain labels and allegations; labeled on the Madrassa education system and its graduates. Most of these labels portrayed both Madrassa system and its graduates as incapable and inefficient entities; consequently a burden on the society. Several writers and scholars have recommended massive structural and functional changes, in the Madrassa education system, while some have even suggested closure of the Madrassas. Improvement and refinement are virtues of intelligent minds but ―change should be for improvement sake and not for mere replacement sake‖. Consequently, there was a dire need to identify, and point out, the true state of affairs in the Madrassas of Pakistan and highlight the strengths and weaknesses of this system, generally, and of its graduates, particularly.

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Most of the respondents, in this research, had given their opinions with a perspective that this research was going to improve the efficiency and productivity of Madrassa education system. Some respondents had shown some concerns, about this research, while some were apprehensive about it. Some respondents had even considered it a governmental activity to collect personal information, about the students. Despite all opinions and apprehensions, most of the responses were appropriately provided. The open ended questions were answered in a detail, mostly, and the brief answers were also useful, in most of the cases. The respondents had opined, mostly, in favour of the existing socio- politico-economic systems and structures. However, a few of them were convinced that the prevailing structures were irreparable and deserved to be replaced. An overwhelming majority, of the respondents, gave suggestions to reform the existing systems. Though level of suggestions, practicability and applicability, depended, heavily, on the type of Madrassa Administration; that ran the Madrassa of the respondent. The respondents, from Prudent Administration run Madrassa, usually gave more appropriate and practical suggestions. Their opinions were also sound and based on facts. Their responses were clearly, and confidentially, presented and defended. The overwhelming number of open-ended questions helped a lot in determining the level of understanding and depth of arguments. Closed questions are, undoubtedly, easy to tabulate, as their responses are already codified or classified, but the dearth of understanding cannot be measured, easily, through them. This research has tried to produce a handsome volume of information, about the Madrassa education system and their graduates, to help the future researchers in their endeavors to seek truth.

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Chapter: 8 Conclusion and Recommendations

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This research primarily revolves around the issues of the Madrassa students and their adjustability in, and contributions towards, the society; once they graduate. In this aspect, twofold research strategy was adopted; first reviewing the literature of Madrassa education, keeping in view the types and syllabus of various Madrassas. Second, quantitative and qualitative methods of investigation were adopted; through which, 161 Madrassas were visited, in the Punjab; the questionnaire was distributed among the Alia and Almia (BA and MA levels) students and 1646 filled questionnaire were finally included in the research. Some were incomplete, to the extent that they did not reflect the opinions of the respondents satisfactorily, thus were excluded from the research. Apart from that, extensive interviews and discussions were conducted with the administrators of these Madrassas, asking them various questions; trying to locate their ideas and outlook towards the society and the ultimate objectives of the Madrassa graduates. The primary focus of this research was on evaluating the authenticity of objections and allegations; labeled against the Madrassa graduates particularly and the Madrassa system generally. As direct questions were avoided, there were fewer chances of cosmetic answers. This data and its interpretations, in collaboration with the qualitative findings, helped reach at certain conclusions; while keeping in view the research questions and hypothesis of this thesis. The investigation, in the history of Madrassa education, revealed that Pakistani society underwent significant changes, after independence of the country in 1947. The society became overwhelmingly Muslim majority society; unlike the previous social setup, in united India, where the society was overwhelmed by non-Muslims. This new socio-political setup demanded reorientation of several social structures. The Madrassas, unfortunately, could not appreciate these changes and little efforts were made to modify Madrassa syllabi; according to the new social realities and needs. Resultantly, the Madrassa graduates faced series of handicaps while competing with their counterparts; from general educational institutions. The only area of specialization and social participation, left for them, was religious performances and practices. Thereby, the Madrassa graduates were limited in

438 their job options and had a narrow perspective of whatever they had gained from Madrassa education. Presently, there are five Madrassa Boards, based on sectarian differentiations, in the country. They conduct regular examinations from Mutwasita to Almia levels. Their final degree of Shahadat Almia (16 years of education) is equivalent to M.A. Islamic studies and Arabic. Madrassas try to register themselves, with their relevant Madrassa Boards; to acquire legitimacy and respect in the society. However, there are several Madrassas which are not registered with any Madrassa Boards, for several reasons. The students, of registered Madrassas only, can appear in the Madrassa Board final examinations. Higher Education Commission (HEC), of Pakistan, has authorized four individual Madrassas to award degrees independently. They too have several affiliated Madrassa; whose students appear in the final examinations of these independent degrees awarding Madrassas. The governmental interactions, with the Madrassas, have neither been healthy nor have been welcomed warmly; by the Madrasas. Most of the reform efforts, in the Madrassa system, have been taken as dictations and interference in their affairs. The suspicions and objections, raised by the Madrassas, have neither been given significance nor tried to be clarified seriously. Bureaucratically enlisted and communicated reform proposals have always added fuel to the fire, in the prevalence of mistrust between the governments and the Madrassas. The misuse of Madrassas by the governments, for domestic and international political objectives has made this system more suspicious than ever. The Afghan Jihad imbroglio, during 1980s, practically divided the Madrassas into various groups; some participated in it, with full zeal and zest, most of them maintained neutrality and some even criticized the whole episode. This US sponsored and Pakistan government spearheaded campaign, against the former Soviet Union, had negative effects on the sanctity and moral superiority of Madrassas and its graduates. The events of 9-11, in 2001, brought the Madrassas of Pakistan under direct criticism, by the Western writers and scholars. Some writers from Pakistan, and the rest of the South Asian region, also criticized Madrassa education system. Most of them, however, presented limited views and usually quoted exceptional cases; to

439 malign this system. Some researches were also conducted, to dig out facts about Madrassa system. Most of them denied the authenticity of the objections and allegations; labeled against the Madrassas. Most of the researches, conducted after 9-11, aimed at exploring and explaining the state of affairs in the Madrassas. The potentials and credibility, of the Madrassa graduates, were seldom concentrated upon, by these researches. Most of the writers, while writing about Islamic principles and concepts, confuse the interpretations, of Islamic principles, with Islamic edicts; as communicated by Almighty Allah and His Messenger Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Significance of an important injunction of Islam does not mean that it is to be exercised or followed as understood and explained by any scholar of Islam. In several cases, Islamic principles were misinterpreted, by religious scholars, for personal or political objectives. All the practices of Muslims are not, always, based on the true spirit of Islamic principles. Sometimes, they are based on the understanding of a specific person or group. One needs to differentiate between the spirit and interpretation of Islamic principles. Belief in any Islamic principle is one thing and exercising it on the basis of interpretations and explanations is the other. Concepts like fundamentalism, Jihad and terrorism need clarification and weeding out of ambiguities. Fundamentalism simply means adhering to predetermined principles. Forceful implementation, of ones ideas and beliefs, on others is extremism, not fundamentalism. Extremists do have some fundamental principles, which they try to impose on others against their will, but all fundamentalists are definitely not extremists. The concept of Jihad also needs eradication of several confusions, misting it. It is an effort to reform one‘s self and refrain from the forbidden. The military application of Jihad is possible after severe analyses of the situation and can be waged by the Islamic governments only. Individual onslaughts cannot be justified as Jihad; as is the case in most of the cases. Terrorism has become a buzzword. There is no universally accepted definition of the concept but everyone is expressing one‘s views about it. Acts of torture or threats of torture, to the unarmed masses, are not acceptable, in any case. Simply, one may conclude, ―All activities that involve killing of innocent civilians, brutally, or damaging their properties, at massive levels‖; tantamount to acts of terrorism. International agencies, including the UN, have

440 actually enlisted events, which may be considered as acts of terrorism, while attempting to explain it. Terrorism is a socio-political issue, and is definitely carried out in a society; as terrifying an audience is one of the basic objectives of terrorism. Consequently, it should be dealt in the same manner; as a social activity, with severe political implications, arising due to political reasons. Reasons for such acts need in depth evaluation and explanation, while defining it; enlisting of various activities, to be declared as terrorist activities, is a compilation of its various kinds only. The most accurate and authentic information, about the capabilities and potentials of Madrassa graduates, can only be acquired through conducting a primary research; involving the Madrassa graduates themselves. Only they can best inform about their perceptions and preferences. Only then their credibility and position, in the present society can, and should be, determined. Incidentally, the Madrassa graduates have nullified the thesis, of most of the writers, that Madrassa graduates do not have access to general education; imparted in schools according to government designed syllabi and books. The research revealed that an overwhelming majority, of Madrassa graduates, has not only passed matriculation examination, from government boards, but are acquiring, or already have acquired, higher education, from government universities, even up to masters level. As a matter of fact, they have to make double efforts to study two different syllabi simultaneously. The analysis, of the Madrassa education system, has revealed that Madrassa education, particularly at higher levels, is actually subject specialization; in religion and Arabic language. They are expected to be specialists in religious knowledge. Therefore, it does not sound wise to force them learn subjects other than their area of specialization. As far as lower levels are concerned, they should be taught general education subjects like elementary mathematics, English language for communication and pure and social sciences. Elementary information, about several branches of knowledge, is appreciable and beneficial, for both the individual and the society, but is definitely detrimental if continued at specialization level (higher level).

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The findings of this research have revealed the fact that the Madrassa graduates have a different perception about life; its priorities and preferences. This is what makes them different from other graduates of colleges and universities. They consider modern education less important and give first priority to religious education; considering it the fundamental duty of every Muslim. The objections and allegations over the Madrassa graduates, declaring them incapable to live harmoniously in the society, due to their syllabi, do not hold strong grounds as most of them also acquire degrees from government educational institutions. Madrassa graduates are lucky to have studied in more than one system of education and have understood the significance of character traits like honesty and truthfulness; with a strong religious significance attached with them. This research also found out that most of the allegations, labeled against the Madrassa graduates, are not based on ground realities. The findings of this research strongly recommend that it is neither accurate nor authentic to declare all Madrassa graduates as a threat to the existing socio- politico-economic systems and structures of the country. They are neither ignorant nor indifferent form the issues faced by the country these days. Most of them have pointed out, the reasons for prevailing problems, accurately and confidently. They have also presented practical solutions; to solve the political, social and economic problems of the country. Most of them have rightly pointed out the need of honest, capable and conscientious rulers; with strong moral values and commitment to the public welfare. Accountability and character building have been equally emphasized upon; along with sincere efforts to improve the efficiency of the government. Though a minimal number of respondents opined in favour of replacing the existing systems, and structure, yet they were too less in number, to be considered seriously, and were form the Madrassas which were run by Improvident of Impulsive administrations. The respondents, from Organized and Prudent administrations run Madrassas, were not only focused in their opinions but also provided a variety of opinions; showing their vast understanding, of the issues, and proving their capabilities to suggest effective and appropriate remedies, to the prevailing problems of the society.

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Madrassas are no ordinary schools where a combination of several subjects is taught; to make students aware of the basics of several disciplines. Islamic Jurisprudence is the primary subject of the Madrassa syllabus. It cannot be taught without understanding the interpretations made by different scholars. Whenever a law needs to be interpreted, or explained in detail, the Ulema refer to the works of their sect‘s predecessors. This promotes sectarian affiliations and does not help towards inter-sect harmony. According to their teachers it is the only interpretation of the Islamic principles and others are either misled or display biased approaches. This is the bane of Madrassa education system. The perception of the Madrassa graduates needs to be changed. Their teachers must not declare everybody, who is not a Madrassa graduate, an ‗impure Muslim‘. The Madrassas are providing education to almost two million students in Pakistan. Some of them cannot afford school education or do not have schools in their areas. They are providing job facilities to thousands of people; as teachers and workers in the Madrasas. They are contributing religious experts, and servicemen, for daily and regular religious performances; from leading prayers in mosques to teaching the Holy Quran to children in their homes. These Madrassas house those destitute children whom the governments have failed to entertain. These destitute become religious workers and honest members of society; after acquiring education from the Madrassas. If they are deprived of this free boarding facility, which provides education and develops good character traits, they are most likely to fall victims to criminal activities. There is a need to improve Madrassa system its environment, particularly related to promotion of sectarian differentiations; still it is, and will remain, an integral part of Pakistani society. The research also revealed that the Madrassas, despite their beneficial services to the society, also promote sectarianism, to a reasonable extent, in the society. The teachers and the students of Madrassas do not accept this allegation but the observations indicate the opposite. No doubt, the syllabus of Madrassas has little to do with sectarianism but the problem arises when the teachers prescribe sectarian books to the students. The students are not allowed to consult books written by people belonging to other sects. This promotes sectarian biases among the students. When these students become

443 teachers, they continue the same practice; of supporting and defending their sect. The Ulema are, almost never prepared to review their perceptions. They always insist to enforce their version as an edict from the heavens. Even the seemingly minor rituals like the differences regarding the prayer timings, differences regarding placing hands in the prayer or even moving hands during the prayer; ―RafahYadain‖ are some of the examples where the Ulema project and support their patterns and compel their followers/admirers to embrace them as significant principle of Islam. As if strict following of these apparent practices is the real certificate of being a Muslim. Most of the ―Bones of contentions‖ in relation to these issues are actually the perceptions of the Ulema but are emphasized as edicts of God. Allocation of too much importance to appearance has divided the Ulema on minor issues and, consequently, they are seldom willing to agree with one another. This has led to the divisions in the Muslims. People are divided on sectarian basis and cherish their sectarian affiliations; even more than the basic principles and practices of faith itself. It is quite evident that there are a number of problems and confusions about religion in the people of the Punjab. Despite the fact that a large number of the population performs most of the religious rituals, a vast majority faces confusions and ambiguities regarding the true spirit and authentic interpretations of Islam. A deficiency to understand the Holy Quran remains a serious issue as people, as a whole, are ignorant of the Arabic Language. Consequently, as a short-cut to these hurdles, people rely on the Ulema; for the interpretation and even the implementation of the religion. In this manner, they accord these Ulema the status of the experts and in some cases, even the final authority. Incidentally, all the Ulema are not well equipped to give final verdict on intricate issues of the modern society. Most of them, unfortunately, provide simple solutions to the problems; corresponding to their lack of intellectual ability. There is a dire need to investigate, and clarify, such confusions but these are the boundaries of research which are just outside the scope of this research work. Islam puts emphasis on modifying personal character which should become a model for others to follow. If the graduates of Madrassas present

444 themselves as a role model then definitely others would follow them as role models; the same had been the practice, and reason for success, of the saints and preachers of Islam who spread Islam in Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent. Pakistan is primarily a Muslim majority society. People want to practice Islamic values but are confused due to many sects and controversies among different Ulema. Despite all sectarian differentiations, the research findings are that the Madrassas, as a whole, do not project biases and prejudices; in social, political and economic interactions. Students, from different shades of Madrasas, interact with each other almost daily, while operating in their daily activities, at social and economic levels. There have been several examples where religious political leaders have been cooperating, with each other, in politics; and have even contested elections from the same platform. If this spirit continues then there are more chances that harmony and tolerance will become the hallmarks of religious understanding. The need of the time is to concentrate on development of ―Edifying Madrassas‖, to produce capable and competent learned Muslims; just as the medieval Madrassas, which were teaching the then modern education in the true sense and were also producing religious scholars of great repute. We simply need another Nizam al Mulk al Tusi. Without further ado, one must understand the fact that the Madrassa graduates have the potentials and capabilities to not only live harmoniously, in the present society, but are also capable or suggesting, and even implementing, if required, practical remedial solutions to the prevailing problems in the country. Their potentials and capabilities, in most of the cases, are not explored and utilized properly; both by their administrations and the society itself. A vast majority of society considers them less productive and beneficial. They are taken as religious performers only; facilitating the performance of certain religious duties. This perception is based on the limited interaction of such people with the Madrassa graduates. This investigation revealed that if Madrassas are to be made more productive and efficient educational institutions, their placement has to be rationalized as part of the overall education system of the country. The findings also revealed that it is possible only if the public and their

445 representatives, as well as the Ulema, work together to make Madrassas, the great educational institutions which they were in their heydays. An impression is created, after this research, that it will not be possible to witness positive results soon. After evaluating the overall responses, received from the administrations of the Madrassas, and going into the details of the governmental measures, it can be concluded that efforts of herculean proportion are required to make the Madrassa system more productive than ever. After looking closely into the Madrassa system, it can be safely deducted that the Madrassa system has the potentials to produce capable and competent graduates if the Ulema update their approach towards life and come out of the biases against the modern education. The Madrassa education is having a firm impact on the minds and thinking of its graduates. It is still based on respect for the teachers and obedience to the principles taught. It is only the blinkered approach of their teachers that develops biases in the minds of the students. If this approach is redirected towards modern sciences, along with the religious teachings, and efforts are made to update the syllabus, the Madrassas can still produce capable, caring, obedient and law abiding knowledgeable citizens befitting a modern Muslim citizenry. This research extensively examined the Madrassa system through various methods; literature review as well as through questionnaires and interviews. Along with that, government documents and reform committees‘ reports were also looked into; in detail. This research concludes that Madrassa system and its relevance, to the modern day society, is a huge subject which can be examined from various dimensions; social, cultural, economic and political. As a requirement of PhD research work, we concentrated on only one aspect of the Madrassa education system; role of Madrassa education system in promoting harmony in the society.

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Recommendations On the basis of this research, the following steps and strategies are recommended, to the stake holders; to improve the performance of the Madrassas and develop a facts based understanding, about the Madrassas, in the society.

Recommendations for the Government 1. The governments, both central and provincial, first need to acquire a complete information regarding the objectives of education system, including Madrassa education system, then the deficiencies should be pointed out and redressed. 2. The Madrassa administrators are convinced that secular education system does not provide an opportunity for character building of the students, rather it is confined to more technical and job oriented. 3. Madrassas should be entertained as educational institutions. Therefore, Education Ministry should hold discussions with the Madrassa Boards; rather than Interior Ministry or Defense Ministry. 4. It is perceived that no reform can be successful, in Madrassa system, unless initiated, supported and implemented by the Madrassa Boards. 5. Reform schemes and strategies should be initiated after taking Madrassa Boards into confidence. Most of the reform schemes, initiated so far, were devoid of necessary practical steps and appeared to be a communiqué of a certain mindset. 6. The governments, from time to time, have been emphasizing on Madrassa reform but lacked clarity of thoughts and were devoid of steps, needed to be taken. Most of the reform policies were marred by bureaucratic intricacies and intrigues. 7. The 1979 Commission was a useful exercise and should, therefore, be followed as an example; while forming a committee to suggest reforms in the Madrassa system. 8. The reforms in the Madrassa system should be aimed at improving the capabilities and productivity of both the Madrassas and their graduates;

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rather than imposing unnecessary restrictions without any justifiable reason. 9. As an initial step, the governments should try, to persuade the Madrassas, to initiate and strengthen imparting those parts of non- religious education which are necessary to understand the working of modern societies. 10. The governments should facilitate Madrassas, in imparting general education, by facilitating and funding such arrangements; such as funding teacher salaries and helping in constructing class rooms in the Madrassas. 11. TEVTA has established some technical training facilities in a few Madrassas. This practice should be continued and extended to several other Madrassas. If government can neither ensure education of all children, nor it can persuade them to join government skill development centers, it should provide such facilities where the students are readily available and willing to benefit from such facilities. 12. In order to persuade the Madrassa Boards, ―Takhasus‖ level should be accepted as a degree and should be considered equal to M Phil/MS (18 years of education). It will motivate Madrassa Boards to organize regular classes and examinations. 13. Teaching of Arabic language should be made compulsory at school level; to protect the masses from misinterpretations by the selfish and bigoted religious interpreters. The present policy of imparting Arabic language at middle level classes (5-8 grade), is not taken seriously in letter and spirit.

Recommendations for Madrassa Boards

1. The Madrassa Boards must revise their syllabi; with an intention to improve the efficiencies of their graduates; after consulting administrators of various Madrassas. Character building and social training should be done through syllabi, rather than a spillover effect of the material studied.

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2. The experiments, of introducing modern sciences and subjects, should also be taken into consideration, before revising syllabi or curriculum. 3. The Madrassas must be stratified, on the basis of their infrastructure, facilities and strength of teachers. This stratification must be renewed, or revised, after every four to five years; to maintain updated and reliable information and maintain a certain standard of studies. The Madrassas that produce good results should be appreciated, and rewarded by the relevant Madrassa Boards. 4. ―Takhasus‖ classes should be started on regular basis in big Madrassas. 5. The qualification for a ―Mufti‖ should be fixed and the permission, to issue a ―Fatwa‖ (Religious Decree) should be granted by the Madrassa Boards only. 6. Research activities should be encouraged, at higher levels. Dissertation writing should be made a compulsory part of ―Shahadat-e- Almia‖ Degree. The emphasis of the research should be on promoting religious practices in the society; rather than highlighting interpretational variations and sectarian differences. 7. The Madrassa Boards should develop a pool of funds to help the good performing Madrassas and should also provide financial aid to the needy Madrassas; for infrastructure development and providing other facilities to the students.

Recommendations for the Madrassa Administrations 1. Separate class rooms should be designated higher level classes, depending on a particular subject; instead of mixing everybody together, under one roof, regardless of their specialty. 2. Proper hostel facilities should be provided, by the Madrassas, and special arrangements should be made to check sexual harassment, if any, particularly in ―Traditional Madrassas‖; where the systems and structures have not been improved much. 3. Attention should be paid towards introducing and facilitating general education; along with the religious one.

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4. Skills should be taught, to the graduates, to open more avenues for honorable earning. 5. Teacher training and improvement in teaching techniques should be given significance and regularity of teachers, in classes, must also be ensured by the Madrassa administrations. 6. Students of Madrassas should be provided access to such information media as newspapers, electronic media and internet facilities. 7. The libraries of the Madrassas should be well equipped and not confined to exclusive collection of religious books. 8. Students should not be allowed to take part in the rallies and demonstrations of the affiliated political parties, nor should they be seen as an instrument of a given ideology and politicking. 9. The Madrassa administration should focus on the autonomy of their institutions; devoid of any influence by religious personalities.

Recommendations for the Society, Scholars and Writers 1. The scholars and writers need to revisit their perceptions about Madrassa education system. Rather than vehemently defending it or vigorously denouncing it, one should collect firsthand information, regarding various aspects of Madrassa education system, and should then express one‘s opinion objectively. Communication of opinions/perceptions is a scholarly activity, conviction is a legal proceeding. Scholars and writers should avoid giving verdicts. 2. The society should be fully aware of the activities and objectives of the Madrassas, before giving donations, and later should also monitor the utilization of their funding. 3. Support should be given to those Madrassas only which are registered with a Madrassa Board and produce good results. 4. An Imam of mosque is a responsible, and respectable, person, only duly qualified graduates of reputed Madrassas should be appointed as Imam; by a committee of a relevant locality. 5. The Madrassas that offer good combination, of religious and general education, should be supported and parents should send their children exclusively to such Madrassas.

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