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Brazil and China in Mozambican Agriculture: Emerging Insights from View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE the Field provided by IDS OpenDocs

Sérgio Chichava, Jimena Duran, Lídia Cabral, Alex Shankland, Lila Buckley, Tang Lixia and Zhang Yue

Abstract , a country undergoing rapid transformations driven by the recent discovery of mineral resources, is one of the top destinations for Chinese and Brazilian cooperation and investment in Africa. This article provides an account of the policies, narratives, operational modalities and underlying motivations of Brazilian and Chinese development cooperation in Mozambique. It is particularly interested in understanding how the engagements are perceived and talked about, what drives them and what formal and informal relations are emerging at the level of particular exchanges. The article draws on three cases (1) ProSavana, Brazil’s current flagship programme in Mozambique, which aims to transform the country’s savanna, spreading along the Nacala corridor, drawing on Brazil’s own experience in the Cerrado; (2) the Chinese Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC); and (3) a private Chinese rice investment project in the Xai-Xai irrigation scheme, which builds on a technical cooperation initiative. Commonalities and differences between the Brazilian and Chinese approaches are discussed.

1 Introduction Rosário (2012) emphasises instead the political Since Mozambique’s independence in 1975, motivations underlying agricultural governance, official policy discourse has unremittingly arguing that private interests and electoral represented agriculture as the backbone of the objectives have been key drivers of policy economy. The sector is the main source of decisions that have failed to produce livelihoods for about 80 per cent of the active developmental outcomes for the majority of the population and its contribution to Gross rural population. Despite some success stories, Domestic Product (GDP) (23 per cent in 2010) mostly in cash crop sectors (such as sugar, cashew remains significant (MINAG 2010a: 4), despite nuts, tobacco and horticulture), the dominant the rapid expansion of the mining and energy smallholder sector remains poor, vulnerable and sectors. Yet the country’s enormous agricultural dependent on subsidised inputs from the state. potential remains largely untapped. Of its 36 million hectares of arable land, distributed After the end of the civil war in 1992, across ten different agro-ecological zones, only Mozambique quickly become flooded with 10 per cent are farmed and only 50,000 hectares development assistance and eventually emerged, are currently irrigated, 60 per cent of which are towards the end of the 1990s, as one of Africa’s in sugar cane plantations (MINAG 2010a: 4). largest most aid-dependent countries. Agriculture has traditionally been one of the The devastating effects of civil war, the poor largest aid-receiving sectors and the sector was infrastructural base, low productivity levels, for several years supported by a pool-fund vulnerability to extreme weather events, limited mechanism aimed to build the institutional investment and weak institutional capacity are capacity of the agricultural ministry and improve amongst the factors frequently offered as aid coordination in a highly donor-populated explanations for disappointing performance. sector. Recently, donor coordination initiatives

IDS Bulletin Volume 44 Number 4 July 2013 © 2013 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © 2013 Institute of Development Studies Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

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have become somewhat discredited, due to Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) of a failure to show tangible results on the ground, a -based coordinator post to oversee all less positive attitude towards foreign aid by the agriculture-related projects in the country, a current government leadership, and the pilot initiative for Brazilian cooperation more emergence of alternative development generally. Mozambique also hosts the largest cooperation partners, such as China and Brazil. number of researchers from the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) in The first two parts of the article describe the Africa and the corporation has also appointed a emerging engagements between Mozambique general coordinator based in the country to and Brazil and China in the agriculture sector. oversee Embrapa-led projects. Embrapa is hosted Next the article analyses policy discourses, by the Mozambican Institute for Agrarian imaginaries of agriculture and development and Research (IIAM), an institution under the the interests of actors and networks playing out Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) and Brazil’s in such encounters. The article draws on main Mozambican counterpart for agriculture- empirical material collected through participant related projects. observation and key informant interviews undertaken between 2011 and 2012.1 A number of patterns are noticeable. First is the diversity of institutions involved. Unsurprisingly, 2 Brazil in Mozambique Embrapa is the dominant Brazilian cooperating Mozambique occupies a prominent position in institution, with several of its research units Africa–Brazil relations, which stems from a involved in project implementation. Others have combination of historical affinities, common recently joined the agricultural cooperation language, diplomatic bonds and, increasingly, domain, including government agencies, such as business opportunities (Cabral et al., this IDS the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), Bulletin). It is the top beneficiary of Brazilian the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), and technical cooperation programmes in Africa the General Secretariat of the Presidency, as well (Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin). At the end of as Brazilian social movements, such as the 2011, Brazil’s technical cooperation portfolio in Popular Peasant Movement and the Peasant Mozambique comprised 21 active projects, with Women’s Movement, each with different nine new projects in the process of negotiation.2 objectives and visions. Agriculture, education and health are the main areas of focus, taking the number of active Second is the move from one-off training projects as the measurement criteria (ABC 2010). initiatives towards programmes with a longer timeframe and a more systemic approach to Apart from technical cooperation, Mozambique capacity building, the so-called ‘structural is also an increasingly important destination for cooperation’ programmes. The largest of this Brazilian private capital, particularly in mining type at the moment in agriculture is ProSavana, and construction. Vale, the second largest mining a programme that has been subject to much company in the world, has a coal mining attention and controversy. concession at Moatize, , and has recently been the focus of attention due to a Third is the transfer into Africa of Brazil’s own controversial population relocation away from agricultural policies, or elements of those policies. the mining site. Camargo Correa, Odebrecht ProSavana, More Food Africa and the Food and Andrade Gutierrez also have significant Acquisition programme are all examples of presences. Brazil’s National Economic and Social cooperation programmes aiming to reproduce Development Bank has been playing a central Brazil’s own policy experiments with agricultural role in expanding Brazilian businesses and development, for which claims of domestic success promoting Brazilian exports in Africa (CINDES have been made (Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin). 2011). Trade between Brazil and Mozambique has, as a result, been displaying an increasingly Fourth is the establishment of triangular upward trend.3 cooperation arrangements, whereby Brazil partners with traditional donors in providing The importance of Mozambique for Brazilian cooperation to Mozambique. The Japanese cooperation is shown by the creation by the Development Cooperation Agency (JICA) and

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Figure 1 ProSavana in Mozambique

Montepuez

Lichinga

Lilongwe Mandimba Cuamba Nacala Meconta Ribaue Monapo Mecanhelas Nampula Gurue Mumupula Alto Molocue

Source Bias (2012).

the United States Agency for International an example of ‘Brazil’s neo-colonialism in Africa’ Development (USAID) are thus far Brazil’s main (Rafael 2011) and of how Mozambique is set to trilateral cooperation partners for agricultural become ‘Brazil’s new agricultural frontier’ (Folha projects. The UN’s World Food Programme de São Paulo 2011). ProSavana is expected to (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization cover 14 million hectares of land along the (FAO) are also expected to be working with Nacala corridor, an area spreading across three Brazil in the multi-country Food Acquisition provinces of northern Mozambique (Niassa, programme. In addition to creating a platform Nampula and Zambézia), to reshape the region’s for synergies in technical expertise, trilateral economic landscape and transform it into a cooperation also allows Brazilian technical highly productive region addressing food security cooperation to be complemented by financial issues (Figure 1). cooperation provided by traditional donors. ProSavana is inspired by the development The final observed trend is the gradual experience of the Brazilian tropical savanna permeation of private interests and capital into (known as Cerrado), accomplished through, inter development cooperation initiatives in the alia, Prodecer, a 30-year cooperation programme agricultural sector. As noted above, More Food between Japan and Brazil. This programme is Africa is an example of this. The creation of the credited with transforming the Cerrado into one Nacala Fund (see below), which seeks to mobilise of the most productive regions in the country, Brazilian and Japanese capital into the region that and for turning Brazil into a leading global ProSavana is targeting, is another manifestation. producer of soybeans (Hosono and Hongo 2012). ProSavana itself is targeting a region whose ProSavana is being implemented through a principal strategic economic importance is as an triangular partnership between Japan, Brazil and export corridor for the output of Brazilian mining Mozambique. As a trilateral programme, it is operations in landlocked Tete Province. justified as a ‘win-win-win’ cooperation initiative (JICA and Oriental Consultants 2011). 2.1 The case of ProSavana ProSavana is perhaps the most ambitious and ProSavana envisages supporting both commercial high-profile initiative in the recent history of and smallholder agriculture production systems, Brazil’s development cooperation in Africa. The of large and small scale, largely through research programme has been described by the media as and extension, drawing on Brazil and Japan’s

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experiences and technologies. The programme have visited Mozambique in recent years. In has three main components (Embrapa 2012): 2010, Senator Kátia Abreu led a visit in her (1) ProSavana-Projecto de Investigação capacity as president of the CNA.4 According to (ProSavana-PI), launched in 2011 and focusing on one view, Brazilian farmers are keen to come to reinforcing IIAM’s research and institutional Mozambique because of the low cost of land as capacities; (2) ProSavana-Projecto de Extensão compared to Brazil, the incentives offered by the (ProSavana-PE) to be launched during 2013 and Brazilian government within ProSavana, the emphasising training and extension, and opportunities offered by the Nacala Fund and including pilot productive projects for small and Mozambique’s location with its easy access to commercial growers; and (3) ProSavana-Plano Asian markets.5 The head of AMPA has also Director (ProSavana-PD), launched in 2012 and referred to the lack of stringent environmental aimed at producing an integrated agro-industrial regulations in Mozambique as an incentive to master plan for the area, looking not only at invest (Folha de São Paulo 2011). Whether or not agricultural production and productivity, but also a wave of exclusively Brazilian land deals is at broader regional development issues, such as imminent, Brazilian managers are already a infrastructure and markets. feature of Zimbabwean- and Mozambican-owned commercial farms in the Nacala corridor region, This latter component is laying the groundwork and Brazilian investors have begun to form joint for Brazilian and Japanese private investment in ventures with Mozambican and Portuguese agri- agriculture in the region, although ProSavana business concerns like Agromoz, which recently itself does not include any such investments. The began soybean, cotton and maize operations in subcontracting of Getúlio Vargas Projects the Gurué district of Zambézia.6 (GV-Projetos), the consultancy arm of a well- known Brazilian business school, Getúlio Vargas The Nacala Fund, a private fund aiming to Foundation, to oversee implementation of mobilise capital in Brazil and Japan to support ProSavana-PD constitutes a new practice in agri-business projects along the Nacala corridor, Brazilian cooperation. is expected to attract around US$2 billion to support large-scale production systems through Since the launch of ProSavana, promotional the creation of associations led by Brazilian activities have taken place in Brazil, Japan and farmers, who will work with Mozambican Mozambique. For example, the event farmers to transfer expertise and strengthen ‘Agribusiness in Mozambique: International capacity, as well as integrating smallholders into Cooperation Brazil–Japan and the Investment value chains.7 The Fund was launched in 2012 at Opportunities’, that took place in Brazil in 2011, high-profile events in Brasília and Maputo which attracted some high-profile participants from the had significant Brazilian and Mozambican Mozambican and Brazilian governments, as well government participation, despite its ostensibly as some influential representatives from Brazil’s private sector identity. It has already received agri-business (such as the President of the expressions of interest from major Brazilian and Agriculture and Livestock Confederation of Brazil Japanese conglomerates, such as Votorantim and (CNA), Senator Katia Abreu and the President of Sumitomo, and is currently being promoted the Higher Council of Agribusiness from the São through a series of roadshows with the aim of Paulo State Federation of Industries). Brazilian being fully subscribed by the time the ProSavana and Japanese entrepreneurs were also present, Master Plan is due in July 2013.8 including Mitsubishi Co. (Loureiro 2012). Another event on ‘Investment Opportunities in The Fund for ProSavana’s Development Mozambican Agri-business’ was held at the Initiative was set up in September 2012 in Federation of Agriculture and Livestock of Mato Nampula, as a bilateral initiative between Grosso in Cuiabá, organised by the Mato Grosso Mozambique and Japan, to support different Association of Cotton Producers (AMPA), ABC pilot models for the integration of smallholders and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs into selected value chains. Like the Nacala Fund, (AMPA 2011). this is a parallel initiative that is not formally part of ProSavana. An initial budget of More than 100 farmers, especially from the US$750,000 (Chichava et al. 2013) and a first Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, are reported to credit package of MZN11.5 million (New

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Figure 2 China–Mozambique trade, 1995–2008

300

250

200

150 US$ million

100

50

0 1997 1995 1996 1999 1998 2001 2007 2005 2003 2004 2006 2002 2008 2000

China’s imports from Mozambique China’s exports from Mozambique

Source Centre for Chinese Studies (2009), using data from the World Trade Atlas.

Mozambican Metical) (US$390,000) have of private investment and the modernisation of already been approved to fund the activities of agriculture, both because it is seen as several companies operating in the Nacala representing the fulfilment of the modernisation corridor (Chichava et al. 2013). Loans to these discourse prevalent in Mozambican debate, and companies will be offered at an interest rate of because of the opportunities for individual as well up to 10 per cent and they have to commit to as collective economic benefit. One Mozambican integrate smallholders through contract farming journalist has argued that ProSavana serves the and not as waged labourers. Besides the loan, private interests of members of the ruling party these companies will benefit from technical (Mabunda 2012). ProSavana’s combination of assistance from MINAG, JICA and GAPI-SI, a technology transfer and private capital is Mozambican financial institution supporting contrasted with traditional aid projects where business development (Chichava et al. 2013). private capital mobilisation is often not sufficiently taken into account. 2.2 Local expectations and perceptions ProSavana has been both praised and strongly Civil society has, on the other hand, voiced criticised in Mozambique. Its perceived concerns about potential negative impacts, in importance for Mozambican government actors is terms of social inclusion as well as environmental shown by the fact that it has attracted several sustainability. The Mozambican National senior MINAG officials – the programme’s Peasants’ Union (UNAC) has recently accused director is the former director of IIAM, and the ProSavana of being top-down and failing to former director of MINAG’s International involve farmers and civil society in a meaningful Cooperation Department has been hired as an way (UNAC 2012). It has also warned about the adviser. Mozambican political and business elites danger of creating a wave of landlessness in the look forward to replicating the Cerrado experience, country, impoverishing rural communities by as well as emulating Embrapa’s role as a world- making them dependent on large-scale leading agricultural research corporation. They investments, and damaging the environment and are also enthusiastic about the prospective inflow compromising sustainability. There has also been

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much speculation in the media about the US$20 million was used to import agricultural interests ProSavana is serving (Loureiro 2012; equipment from China. The overall aim was to Rafael 2011). help improve local farmers’ production, with the intention of providing production for the 3 China in Mozambique factories. In 2012, Mozambique signed another China’s relationship with Mozambique reaches long-term credit line of US$60 million to develop back several decades. During Mozambique’s the Chokwe Agro-Processing Complex. The struggle for independence in the 1960s, China project aims to develop several activities, provided political, economic and military support including a processing, packaging and for the Liberation Front of Mozambique, Frelimo conservation unit; a cattle breeding and (Centre for Chinese Studies 2009). In 1975, processing farm; rice processing factories; when Mozambique gained independence, China rehabilitating the irrigation system and established formal diplomatic relations with the establishing an irrigation maintenance unit and country. Since then, China and Mozambique agricultural service centres (MINAG 2012). In have conducted frequent high-level exchanges addition, since 2011, Mozambican authorities and maintained a friendly cooperative have been negotiating two loans of US$25 million relationship. Agricultural development and US$12 million with China Exim Bank in partnerships take place in the context of wider order to rehabilitate the Chipembe and Nguri economic, trade and investment relations, dams in (GdM 2011). although there is no evidence of a widespread Chinese ‘land grab’ as suggested by some These loans and commercial investments are (Brautigam and Ekman 2012). Figure 2 shows complemented by a series of development that the volume of trade between China and cooperation and investment projects. The next Mozambique experienced significant and rapid two sections highlight two cases. growth over the past decade. 3.1 The China Agriculture Technology Demonstration Since 2007, China has been among the top ten Centre investors in Mozambique. In 2010, Chinese At the Beijing Summit of FOCAC in November investments in industry accounted for 71 per 2006, President Hu Jintao announced the cent of total investments, with investments in establishment of ten Agricultural Technology construction, services, agriculture and agro- Demonstration Centres (ATDCs) across Africa, as industry representing 21 per cent, 6 per cent and part of eight steps for the consolidation of 2 per cent respectively. Investments by Chinese China–Africa partnerships (FOCAC 2006). The entrepreneurs in southern Mozambique (Maputo objective of the centres is to perform agricultural Province and Maputo City) accounted for more demonstrations, rural extension and technical than 85 per cent of the total.9 training to boost the productivity of the beneficiary countries and to contribute to food Under the framework of the Forum on China– security. There are also diplomatic motivations, Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China announced accompanied by the idea that aid should generate the exemption of debts of RMB294 million mutual benefit. For China, economic gains include (Renminbi) (US$48) as of the end of 2005.10 promoting Chinese agricultural technology in the African market, easing in Chinese investors and Mozambique also borrowed from the China Exim expanding trade opportunities. Bank with the aim of rehabilitating and developing important agricultural infrastructure The ATDC in Mozambique is located in Boane in regions considered critical to boosting the district, southwest of Maputo, occupying agriculture sector.11 This included a 52 hectares of IIAM’s Umbeluzi agrarian station. US$50 million concessional loan, the first The total production area is 35 hectares of corn, US$30 million tranche of which was placed under rice and vegetables. The centre cost around the management of the Office of the Zambezi US$6 million and its operation costs the Chinese Development Plan (GPZ) and was used to build government annually about US$180,000.12 It is three agro-processing factories (cotton, rice and managed by the Hubei Lianfeng Agricultural maize) in Manica, Zambezia and Tete Provinces Development Corporation, which was running respectively (MINAG 2010b). The remaining the Hubei-Gaza friendship farm (Triangle of

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Central China 2012). Hubei agricultural 2008). The company named to carry out the companies are encouraged through the ‘Going project was Moçambique Lianfeng Out’ policy (Li et al. 2012), a central driving force Desenvolvimento de Agricultura Co., Limitada of Chinese integration into the global economy (also referred to as Hubei Lianfeng Mozambique for the past decade. Meanwhile, on the Co. Lda. or HLMO Co.Lda.). It is a subsidiary of Mozambican side, coordination has been Lianfeng Overseas Agricultural Development Co compromised due to misunderstandings and Ltd, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, the same power conflicts between MINAG and the company running the ATDC. Ministry of Sciences and Technology (MCT) (Duran and Chichava 2012). Parallel to these activities, a group of Chinese scientists from the Chinese Academy of 3.2 The case of the Xai-Xai irrigation scheme Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) visited Xai-Xai in The Regadio do Baixo Limpopo (RBL), more 2008–09 to perform rice yield tests with the commonly known as the Xai-Xai irrigation support of the Gates Foundation, under the scheme, is located in and covers framework of the ‘Green Super Rice Program’. an area of 12,000 hectares. It is one of the largest Thirty varieties of Chinese hybrid rice and one irrigation schemes in the region (Ganho 2012). It Mozambican variety, called ‘Limpopo rice’, were was created in 1951, during the colonial period, successfully tested (CAAS 2009). and after being used for some time after Mozambican independence it was left abandoned HLMO Co.Lda. never managed to fully develop for many years. The rehabilitation of the the 300 hectares granted by the Mozambican Massingir dam in 2003 brought important government during the five years of activity infrastructure improvements and institutional (Direcção Provincial de Agricultura de Gaza and agricultural development. The arrival of 2010).13 According to an evaluation of the project Chinese and other investors in Xai-Xai is seen by carried out by the provincial government of Gaza, Mozambican authorities as a new hope in the the company was also unable to fulfil other efforts to boost Mozambican agriculture. aspects of the bilateral agreement (Direcção Provincial de Agricultura de Gaza 2010). For Initial contact between Chinese and example, the arrangement had been for HLMO Mozambican actors started in 2005 through Co.Lda. to help local farmers improve their meetings between the governments of Gaza and productivity from original levels of 1–3 tonnes to Hubei Provinces, and site visits throughout Gaza 7–10 tonnes per hectare through the transfer of (Direcção Provincial Agricultura de Gaza 2008). Chinese technology (Direcção Provincial de A bilateral agreement specified that a Chinese Agricultura de Gaza 2010). However, upon enterprise from Hubei would establish a rice implementation, payments were required for production project in the Ponela block of the training services provided, something that had not irrigation scheme, and would transfer Chinese been mentioned in the original agreement. The rice production technology to local farmers. It majority of local farmers were unable to pay for also envisaged developing horticultural such services. According to employees of HLMO production in Moamba district, Co.Lda., technology transfer has failed because (Direcção Provincial de Agricultura de Gaza Mozambican farmers lack commitment to 2008). The text of the agreement did not specify agriculture. As one of the respondents explained, what was to be done with the rice produced, what ‘We are here to help farmers, but the farmers are technology would be transferred, and how local not interested in agriculture’.14 This issue remains beneficiaries would be identified. a main source of local disappointment with Chinese engagement in the region. According to CPI (Centro do Promoção de Investimentos [Investment Promotion Centre]) In 2012, because of the above difficulties, data, the project, with a budget of US$1.2 million, Wanbao Grain and Oil Investment Limited was to be implemented in an area of 300 hectares. (WAADL) took over the project. WAADL brings However, the agreement between the provincial along greater financial muscle and has been governments of Gaza and Hubei foresaw that the granted an area of 20,000 hectares to produce area covered could reach up to 10,000 hectares rice and establish agro-processing facilities. A (Direcção Provincial de Agricultura de Gaza Mozambican source estimates that the

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investment now reaches US$200 million,15 Brazilian professionals working on ProSavana in although a Chinese source talks of US$95 million Mozambique argue that the value added of (Danqing and Yongsheng 2012). Hubei authorities Brazilian cooperation is the provision of first-hand consider this to be one of the province’s most expertise and technical cooperation without important overseas investments in agriculture, a intermediaries. The close relations between shining example of the ‘successful “going out” of Embrapa and Mozambican institutions are Hubei agriculture’ and winning ‘honour for the portrayed as guaranteeing a more horizontal country’ (Hubei Daily 2012). relationship and better government ownership. The representative of Embrapa in Maputo Even though the activities are still at an early explains: stage, some concerns are beginning to be voiced in the local press, including fears of displacement of Embrapa never works alone. Our partners are farmers and concerns about water management. always the local research institutions – in the As with the Brazilian interventions, debates over case of Mozambique, IIAM. Because Brazil’s who wins, and who loses are emerging. interests are the local government’s interests, our close working relationships – both 4 Dimensions of the development encounter government-to-government and local experts- What then are the emerging features of the to-Brazilian experts – are a guarantee of that.18 Brazil–Mozambique and China–Mozambique encounters, as framed by the selected The emphasis on the technical character of development cooperation efforts? This section cooperation in official discourse, however, considers narratives of development cooperation, underplays the importance of commercial and imaginaries of agricultural development and political motivations. Despite adhering to the technological modernisation and the underlying South–South principle of mutual advantage or motivations of actors involved in these encounters. shared gains, Brazil presents its cooperation activities as free of commercial interest and, at 4.1 The Brazil–Mozambique encounter the highest political level, Brazil’s presence in Brazil’s official discourse favours concepts of Mozambique and Africa more broadly is framed, ‘international cooperation for development’, especially by Lula, primarily in terms of ‘technical cooperation’ or ‘development partner’ solidarity and moral debt linked to the slave over conventional terms like ‘official development trade history (Instituto Lula 2012). assistance’, ‘technical assistance’ or ‘donor’ (Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin; Costa Vaz and Above all, Brazil’s own experience strengthens the Inoue 2007). It stresses that Brazilian projects in country’s legitimacy as a cooperation partner in Africa are demand-driven – though this is not developing commercial and family agriculture in always the case, especially in the case of triangular Africa and Mozambique. In the words of a senior projects like ProSavana. Brazil also claims that its diplomat at the Brazilian Embassy in Maputo, limited experience as a provider of international ‘Brazilian cooperation is legitimate because we are cooperation is an advantage in the sense that ‘we bearers of a successful development experience’.19 are all learning together’.16 For example, the Brazil is often presented as a successful model for Embrapa representative in Maputo states: the development of agri-business or commercial agriculture as well as family agriculture. For Embrapa and Brazilian cooperation are going example, the development of the Cerrado has been through a learning and maturing process in referred to as ‘a miracle’ (The Economist 2012) or Africa. We are defining what Brazilian ‘one of the great achievements of agricultural cooperation for the development of agriculture science in the twentieth century’ (statement by Dr is. Firstly, we thought of Embrapa Africa, but Norman Borlaug, Nobel Peace Prize winner, when we arrived to [sic.] the continent, the quoted in Hosono and Hongo 2012: vii). demand from the African countries was huge – in 2009, I visited 11 African countries – and for Brazil’s own versions of the Cerrado narrative not this reason we decided to think bigger and to only emphasise the role of agricultural science create Embrapa International. Our interests and the enabling policy environment promoted are what are best for our African partners and by a strong state with a long-term development for Mozambique.17 vision, but also a particular social imaginary of

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the ‘conquest of the wilderness’. An FGV can expand their production and markets, to representative referred to this during a discussion sell to China and India. In the end, everything of the objectives and procedures of the Nacala is done with a commercial perspective.23 Fund: ‘Agriculture is a high-risk economic activity. A way to minimise risks is to bring in people who From a different perspective, ProSavana and the have the knowledge and experience – and these enthusiasm around replicating the Cerrado people are Brazilians. Brazil is recognised experience have been fiercely criticised by worldwide as a global food producer, and the organised civil society inside and outside Brazilians know how to do it. In Brazil, for the Mozambique. UNAC, in contact with Brazilian Cerrado we used to say: “Cerrado, neither given nor social movements through Vía Campesina, has inherited”’.20 It was worse than the Wild West’.21 publicly voiced its concerns (UNAC 2012). Japanese social movements and NGOs are also Seen from the Mozambican side, there are two mobilising around ProSavana.24 Such critical clashing perceptions of Brazilian cooperation. voices are supported by arguments emphasising Government officials, mostly from institutions the social and environmental damages of large- like MINAG, the Centre for the Promotion of scale ‘agri-business’ associated with the Cerrado Agriculture (CEPAGRI) or IIAM, portray the model (Classen 2013; Weinhold et al. 2011). Brazilian experience as a successful one. They hope that access to Brazilian technology will help Different actors in the Brazil–Mozambique boost agriculture production and productivity partnership also have different motivations. and perhaps replicate the Cerrado miracle. While IIAM is eager to strengthen connections According to an official from MINAG: with Embrapa and perhaps attempt to emulate its institutional model, UNAC, while asserting its Brazil has a valuable experience in position in Mozambique’s still amorphous civil agriculture. The Brazilians succeed in the society, looks with fascination at Brazil’s dynamic tropicalisation of soybean, for example. So, rural social movements and the country’s history Mozambique is going to acquire Brazilian of vigorous political contestation. know-how. Thanks to Brazilian technology, our farmers are going to be stronger and we are 4.2 The China–Mozambique encounter going to establish agriculture value chains.22 Mozambican politicians and elites have been receptive to China’s renewed interest in the Mozambican government officials also praise the country. In agriculture there is great enthusiasm ‘win–win’ dimension of Brazilian cooperation and about cooperation with China. President Guebuza are less inclined to downplay the political and has stated how China has successful development commercial agendas. The same official experience, especially in promoting agriculture emphasised that: and rural development, and emphasised that Mozambique can learn from China to be self- ProSavana is a highly ambitious programme sufficient in grains (Revista Macau 2011). As an and the important political and economic official from MINAG explained: mutual interests are a guarantee for its success. For example, today the FAO director is The relation between China and Mozambique a Brazilian, José Graziano da Silva. For his has multiple faces. There is the commercial election, Brazil negotiated with Guebuza the feature on one side and the technology support of Mozambique for his candidacy. transfer feature on the other. For example, Brazil pressured Portuguese-speaking African the ATDC in Boane is a project focused on countries to support Graziano by committing to technology transfer and is a donation from the a South–South cooperation policy. With Brazil, Chinese government. On the other hand, the main objective is technical assistance. For projects like the processing factories in example, with ProSavana we are going to Zambézia or the rice production project in benefit from the Brazilian technical assistance Xai-Xai have a more commercial perspective.25 and institutional strengthening of IIAM; our farmers will be stronger; and Japan will However, perceptions of China’s actual support the project financially. Brazilian engagements in agricultural development in farmers will be able to come here, where they Mozambique are divided. Mozambican

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government officials and elites look at Chinese In the field, perceptions between Mozambican investments and technical assistance with and Chinese actors are more complex. The enthusiasm. China is seen as holding the answer to Chinese managers of the Xai-Xai rice project perceived technological gaps in Mozambique’s and of the ATDC expressed the need to agriculture. At the ATDC inauguration in 2011, transform the Mozambican way of thinking; President Guebuza stated: ‘The aim is not just [to] according to interviews with Chinese workers at increase productivity because it can be done in the ATDC, they had been unable to achieve different ways. Productivity is not always increased successful cooperation because Mozambicans did by the expansion of the production area. We need not believe it was possible to produce more by to keep in mind the other component of increasing working more. Secondly, a Chinese manager at production through the rise of productivity in Wanbao criticised the fact that the majority of small areas.’ Besides the technology, Chinese work Mozambicans working in agriculture were capacity and discipline are highly praised: involved in a range of off-farm activities and so were not dedicated to agriculture. Mozambican Mozambican farmers don’t live in the bureaucrats from RBL echoed these sentiments, machamba (farm). The Chinese do, they are arguing that Mozambican farmers ‘are not always there, working. In a Mozambican committed to the agriculture tasks’ and that they machambas, for three men there are three beds. therefore ‘showed limited interest to learn from The Chinese only have two beds for three men the Chinese’ (Chichava forthcoming). because there has to be someone working.26 5 Contrasting discourses, diverging perceptions However, the opinion of lower-rank officials is In their official discourses, both China and Brazil more cautious and marked by stereotypes and frame their engagement in Mozambican misunderstandings. These are exacerbated by agriculture through narratives of historically language barriers and cultural differences derived solidarity. However, the bases of this arising in cooperation with Chinese actors on the solidarity are different: while Brazilian policy ground; these in turn affect the functioning, the actors express a sense of moral debt to Africa, relations and the transfer of technology and China portrays itself as a longstanding partner knowledge. Firstly, language barriers hinder against the colonial powers of the world. communication among local technicians from IIAM, the day labourers and the beneficiaries of Another commonality in official discourse is the the courses given at the centre. Likewise, there is emphasis on a shared experience of having been mistrust among Mozambican technical staff at aid-recipient countries until recently. This gives the centre regarding Chinese knowledge and both Brazil and China the moral authority to work conditions: ‘The Chinese don’t speak contrast their own claimed ‘demand-driven’ Portuguese or English. We don’t talk to them. approaches with traditional donors’ top-down and And they say they are agricultural experts but conditionality-heavy models. Particularly in they don’t follow the regulations for the China’s case, however, resisting the idea of chemicals they use. I think there is something conditionality does not mean that aid does not wrong in that centre.’27 One farmer explained, require reciprocity: the explicit emphasis on ‘I learned some things but at the end everything ‘win–win’ provides a legitimating framework for goes to the garbage because we don’t have the the expectation of commercial or diplomatic means to implement what we learned.’28 advantage in return for development cooperation.

Yet local officials praise highly the work capacity While both Brazil and China see development and discipline of Chinese people: cooperation both as a foreign policy instrument and as a means to create economic opportunities, One of the great advantages of the Chinese is there are differences in emphasis. In Brazil’s their work culture. In Mozambique, the boss case, the discourse of ‘solidarity diplomacy’ stays home and calls the workers to tell them highlights the fact that the country seeks what to do in the machambas; the Chinese boss diplomatic advantage from its cooperation is different. He is working next to the farmers engagements, but the picture is much less clear and workers… So, the Chinese model is made with regard to commercial advantage. While to increase productivity.29 there is a strong emphasis on the purely

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technical nature of agricultural development learn. This somewhat contradicts the discourse cooperation among some Brazilian actors, others of ‘mutual learning’ that is common among place an equally strong emphasis on its potential advocates of South–South cooperation. Brazil’s to open up investment opportunities. China, by agricultural development cooperation contrast, has a more consistent discourse: the practitioners are happy to acknowledge what commercial aspects of development cooperation they have learned in the past from richer are emphasised as integral to what a wide range countries (especially the USA and Japan), but of Chinese actors see as a more effective, few if any of them recognise that they may have economically sustainable approach to something to learn from Mozambican farmers or agricultural development cooperation. agricultural researchers.

Both countries frame the agricultural Mozambican policy elites share with both Brazil development models they seek to share with and China an emphasis on technologically driven Mozambique as based on their own successful modernisation as the key to the future of development experience. Both sets of experience agricultural development in the country. In include a strong emphasis on the guiding role of addition, they see China and Brazil as important the state and the complementary importance of sources of capital as well as technology – private investment. But the nature of the something they perceive as lacking in the agricultural transformations to which these cooperation models offered by established factors contributed is very different. Brazil’s Northern donors. Mozambican government highest-profile agricultural development success officials idealise both Chinese and Brazilian story is the transformation of the Cerrado – a agricultural experience, with an emphasis on land-extensive, labour-substituting, technology- technology inputs for productivity increases. and capital-intensive shift towards export- However, these idealising narratives are oriented agriculture. For China, the key contested by Mozambican NGO and media achievement was the country’s conquest of food discourses which sound a much more cautious security in a context of labour abundance but and critical note on the potential for local extreme land scarcity, via the leap in productivity farmers to benefit from Chinese and Brazilian achieved in cultivation of the country’s main involvement. staple crop, rice. Mozambican frontline bureaucrats and farmers The narratives deployed in both countries to share some of the idealising discourses of their explain these successes are also very different. superiors, but they are also more inclined to China emphasises the hard-working virtues of its emphasise differences between Brazilian and farmers, and their skill in making productive use Chinese approaches. Perhaps due to the fact that of the scarce natural resources of the country’s their presence is currently linked exclusively to densely populated countryside. Brazil, by technical cooperation, a field in which they face contrast, has a national narrative of pioneering significant administrative and budgetary gaúchos taming the wild and empty interior of the constraints, the Brazilians are perceived as country’s Centre-West. Both sets of narratives having less money than either the Chinese or a translate across into social imaginaries of traditional donor like Japan. The Brazilians have Mozambican agriculture; Chinese development attracted some criticism for delays in following cooperation practitioners attribute through on their promises, while the Chinese Mozambique’s low agricultural productivity to have a reputation for acting quickly, unhampered wasteful use of resources, while Brazilians are by bureaucratic delays and procurement rules. more inclined to emphasise the need for The Chinese are also perceived as more enterprising spirit and sustained investment to commercially driven, not least because their overcome the constraints imposed by ‘sustainability model’ includes charging for geographical remoteness, natural hazards and agricultural extension services that have poor infrastructure. traditionally been provided free in Mozambique, whether by the state or by international NGOs. The self-affirming nature of these narratives means that both Chinese and Brazilians tend to The perceived Chinese tendency to establish believe that they have much to teach and little to enclaves, which are often difficult for even

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Mozambican government officials to access, is dietary habits with admiration for their supposed contrasted unfavourably with Brazilian qualities as hard workers who are prepared to agricultural cooperation workers’ perceived get their hands dirty. informality, flexibility and openness. Brazil’s commitment to strengthening existing 6 Conclusion institutions, rather than China’s preferred The differences in discourses justifying and option for developing new standalone ones, is framing interventions, and the range of also welcomed, particularly by IIAM’s staff who perceptions at local level, all influence the have acquired a powerful image of Embrapa as a development encounter. Yet at its core a model that their own institution should aspire to particular politics is being played out. In many emulate. In day-to-day engagements with people’s eyes, technical cooperation provides a Mozambican farmers and frontline bureaucrats, platform for external investment, and the language barriers are a major issue for Chinese exploitation of Mozambique’s agricultural agricultural cooperation. As a Portuguese- potential through a diversity of partnerships. speaking country, Brazil benefits from an initial Both Chinese and Brazilian development perception that Brazilian cooperation practices cooperation and investment initiatives in are better suited to Mozambican realities. agriculture chime with the interests of the political and business elite in Mozambique. An The perceptions of Mozambican actors directly alliance of elite interests is thus formed, involved in engagements with Chinese and sometimes with Western donors involved in Brazilian agricultural development cooperation trilateral arrangements. Undoubtedly, foreign are also shaped by a number of stereotypes that investment in the agricultural sector is needed in are current among the country’s population as a Mozambique, but questions of who gains, and whole. Brazil’s image is favourably influenced by who loses out are inevitably raised. A rush to the pervasiveness of cultural products, along with external investment, especially in the context of a general perception of openness and affability. large, area-based projects, such as ProSavana, However, very few Mozambican farmers have as has been questioned on multiple fronts. Will the yet come into direct contact with Brazilians, benefits of such investments spread to the vast particularly the ‘pioneer farmers’ who are lining majority of poor, rural smallholder farmers? Will up to export the Cerrado development model to the technology development centres, pilot Mozambique – a group perceived within Brazil projects and extension efforts focused on less as easy-going good companions than as hard- smallholders be appropriate and well targeted? nosed tamers of the ‘savage interior’. The Or will local political and business elites, in Chinese are already present in Mozambique in alliance with external investors, be the main much larger numbers, mostly working on beneficiaries? Only time will tell what the construction projects but increasingly engaged in distribution of outcomes will be, but Mozambique petty trading, natural resource exploitation and will certainly remain an important focus for the agriculture. Popular perceptions combine debate about future patterns of South–South bemusement and suspicion fuelled by language cooperation in Africa, with the political barriers and rumours of strange social and dimensions of such encounters at the centre.

Notes 5 Interview with ProSavana focal person at FGV 1 A longer version of this article is published as Projetos, 20 November 2012. a Future Agricultures Consortium working 6 See www.pinesso.com.br/noticias/agronegocio/ paper (Chichava et al. 2013). agromoz-grupo-agricola-interessado-na- 2 www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/CooperacaoSulSul/ cultura-de-milho-e-algodao-no-pais (accessed Mocambique (accessed 5 April 2013). 3 April 2013). 3 www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 7 Interview with ProSavana focal person at FGV newsarchive&sid=awyJqqwvrPhU (accessed Projetos, 20 November 2012. 3 April 2013). 8 Interview with FGV Projetos representative, 4 http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/noticia/2010- São Paulo, 19 October 2012. 11-19/com-apoio-do-brasil-cna-aposta-em- 9 Website of Economic and Commercial mocambique-como-grande-produdor-de- Counsellor’s Office of the Embassy of PRC in alimentos (accessed 3 April 2013). Mozambique http://mz.mofcom.gov.cn/

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aarticle/jmxw/201111/20111107855636.html 20 In the original Portuguese, ‘Cerrado – nem dado (accessed 3 April 2013). nem herdado’. 10 Website of the Embassy of PRC in Mozambique, 21 Interview with representative of FGV http://mz.chineseembassy.org/chn/zmgx/zmhz/ Projetos, 20 November 2012, Maputo. (accessed 3 April 2013). 22 Interview with the National Director of 11 These regions are Chokwe, in Gaza Province Agriculture Services from MINAG, 9 February (southern Mozambique), Zambezi Valley, 2012, Maputo. Zambezi Province (in the centre), and Nguri 23 Ibid. and Chipembe, in Cabo Delgado Province 24 UNAC members have travelled to Brazil to (northern Mozambique). meet the Brazilian NGOs and social 12 Ibid. movements and they were organising a 13 Interview with many ARPONE (Association of meeting in Japan in March 2013. the Ponela Irrigation System) farmers and 25 Interview with the National Director of RBL employees, May 2012, Xai-Xai. Agriculture Services in Maputo, 9 February 14 Interview with employee of HLMO in Xai-Xai, 2012. February 2012. 26 Ibid. 15 Interview with Senior Executive of CPI, 27 Interview with Technology Transfer Maputo, April 2012. Department of IIAM-Maputo, 17 February 16 Interview with Counselor Minister from the 2012. Brazilian Embassy in Mozambique, 28 Interview with local farmer from Xai-Xai and 6 December 2011, Maputo. member of the Association of the Ponela 17 Interview with Embrapa’s General Irrigation System (ARPONE), 18 October Coordinator, 17 July 2012, Maputo. 2012, Xai-Xai. 18 Ibid. 29 Interview with the National Director of 19 Interview with Counselor Minister from the Agriculture Services, 9 February 2012, Brazilian Embassy in Mozambique, Maputo. 6 December 2011, Maputo.

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