Information Management and the Early English Atlantic Empire, 1603-1640

by Kelsey Flynn

B.A. in History, December 2008, University of Maryland- College Park M.A. in History, May 2011, The George Washington University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 15, 2016

Dissertation directed by

Linda Levy Peck Columbian Professor of History

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington

University certifies that Kelsey Flynn has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of February 17, 2016. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

Information Management and the Early English Atlantic Empire, 1603-1640

Kelsey Flynn

Dissertation Research Committee:

Linda Levy Peck, Columbian Professor of History, Dissertation Director

Marcy Norton, Associate Professor of History, Committee Member

David J. Silverman, Professor of History, Committee Member

iii

To my family

Acknowledgments

This dissertation owes a debt of gratitude to the generosity of many people. I would first like to thank my dissertation director, Linda Levy Peck. It is a great privilege to work with the very best. With her encouragement, commitment, and insight, I have grown tremendously as a scholar. I thank Professor Peck for taking me on as a student and for encouraging me to follow my curiosities across Europe and the Atlantic.

I would also like to thank the rest of my superb committee. Marcy Norton, my dedicated second reader, always encouraged me to think deeply and creatively. This project is worlds better because of her guidance. David Silverman read the entire draft and his comments proved invaluable to my revisions. Denver Brunsman lent his support to this project even before arriving to GW and continued to offer encouragement and perspective throughout the process. Finally, I am especially grateful to Sabrina Baron, whose English

Civil War class ten years ago first piqued my interest in seventeenth-century England.

At GW, I was privileged to learn from many excellent professors, especially

Andrew Zimmerman, Suzanne Miller, and Nemata Blyden. My friends and colleagues also provided tremendous support over the years, including: Holly Polish, Scott Thompson,

Christopher Hickman, Jon Keljik, Tamar Rabinowitz, Natalie Deibel, Patrick Funiciello,

Justin Pope, Nick Alexandrov, Seth Lashier, Kate Densford, and Katie White. I am especially grateful to Jack Garrett, my friend and ally from start to finish.

This research would not have been possible without the support of many excellent institutions and generous grants. Like many D.C. area early modernists, I owe a special thanks to the Folger Shakespeare Library, whose resources and programs were critical to my training and research. The Folger also provided me with much needed funding during

v my writing years, for which I am exceedingly grateful. This fellowship also gave me another home, at Shakespeare Quarterly, where my colleagues, Jessica Roberts Frazier,

Gail Kern Paster, Jennifer Leinhart Wood, and Anna Levine gave me much needed encouragement and support. Fellowships and grants from the Huntington Library, the

Cosmos Club Foundation, the Loughran Foundation, and the Lois. G. Schwoerer

Scholarship allowed me to visit the many archives this project required. I would also like to thank the Institute for Historical Research at the University of London for providing me with a visa so that I could spend a research year in the United Kingdom.

I would like to thank my parents, Michael and Susan, and siblings, Erin and

Michael, whose patience, support, and love made this all so much more manageable. They treated every opportunity, across the country and the Atlantic, as an adventure, and their visits were a welcome distraction from my work. Finally, I would like to thank my husband,

Joseph Batista, who never doubted me. Writing a dissertation requires a special type of companion and it was with his support, encouragement, and patience that I was able to write this dissertation.

Abstract of Dissertation

Information Management and the Early English Atlantic Empire, 1603-1640

This dissertation examines how information management lay at the heart of the

English state’s efforts to construct an empire in the Atlantic from 1603 to 1640. In the first decades of the seventeenth century, English subjects settled colonies as far-flung as

Virginia (1607) and Guiana (1609), experimenting with colonization along the Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean. During these years the state also developed large networks of informants and spies, built a centralized archive, engaged in censorship and propaganda, and instituted bodies of centralized oversight, to protect and promote England’s nascent empire. By examining these previously unexplored aspects of the state’s colonial engagements, this study challenges the dominant narrative of the early English Atlantic empire—characterized as a late seventeenth-century project of the fiscal-military state— and reveals the myriad strategies of information management the government employed to further its early seventeenth-century imperial project.

Previous scholarship has rendered the early Stuart project as a prehistory of empire, or if generous, an accidental one. By closely examining the Crown and Privy Council’s attention to the early decades of Atlantic colonization, this dissertation challenges notions of political “salutary neglect” and makes significant revisions to histories of English state formation and empire building. Both historians of England and colonial North America have tended to couple the processes of modern state formation and empire building with the development of centralized administrative authority and naval expansion in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. However, this narrow and traditional interpretation of empire limits our understanding of the early English empire’s

vii composition, and, more broadly, the sophisticated strategies the state used to navigate the complex Atlantic context.

By employing information management as a category of analysis, I identify spaces of power harnessed by the English state in the absence of strong military power and centralized authority. Intelligence networks, print culture, and archive-building, for example, when taken together under a shared analytical framework, are revealed as collaborative and complementary efforts. Moreover, by examining these practices as tools for empire building, this dissertation expands our criteria for the range of actors who contributed to this project. I demonstrate how spies, archivists, printers, Amerindian emissaries, and many others, worked under the direction of Crown and Council to further

England’s fledgling empire. Hardly accidental or neglected, I argue, English empire building was a collaborative and creative project, imagined and promoted by the early

Stuart kings and their governments, and based in no small part on information management.

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Table of Contents

Dedication ...... ………………iv

Acknowledgments ...... v

Abstract of Dissertation ...... vii

List of Figures .……………………………………………………………………..……..x

Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………………..xi

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….….1

Setting the Stage………………………………………………… …..……………….....30

Chapter 1: Designing an Embassy for Espionage: English Intelligence in Spain and the Negotiation of Atlantic Diplomacy...………………………………...... 44

Chapter 2: The Printing Press and the Pulpit: Imperial Propaganda for England's National Project, 16071623……………………………………………………...... 92

Chapter 3: From Antiquaries to Archivists: Sir Thomas Wilson and the State Paper Office……………………………………...…………………………………...... 145

Chapter 4: Making a Royal Colony: The Virginia Commission, 1623- 1625……...…..188

Chapter 5: "Dangerous" Subjects and "Domestic Enemies:" Colonial Defense during the Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Powhatan Wars…………………...………...... 236

Chapter 6: Accounting for Empire: Customs, Lading, and the Great Migration…...…..278

Conclusion…………………………..……………………………………………….…313

Bibliography……………………………..………………………………………….….323

List of Figures

1. Title Page. Treasuror, councell and company for Virginia. A proclamation for the erection of guest houses, 17 May, 1620. London: Felix Kingston, 1620…...129

2. Title Page. Council for Virginia. A declaration of the state of the colonie. London: Thomas Snodham and Felix Kingston, 1620…………………………..…130

3. Broadside. G. Newman to the minister and church-wardens of [Bethersden] London: T. Snodham 1616………………………….………………………….….136

4. Arthur Agarde’s Compendium (1610). In F.S. Thomas, A History of the State Paper Office: A View of the Documents Therein Deposited. London: J. Petheran, 1849…………………………….………..…………………..160

5. Printed bill of lading. 1636. TNA HCA 15/1…….………………………………....307

6. Printed bill of lading. 1636. TNA HCA 15/1………….………………………..…..309

Abbreviations

Add. Additional BodL Bodleian Library, Oxford CSP Calendar of State Papers ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography OED Oxford English Dictionary TNA The National Archives (UK) BL British Library VHS Virginia Historical Society PC Privy Council NRO Northamptonshire Record Office HCA High Court of Admiralty STC Short Title Catalogue

Introduction

On the eve of the English Civil War, England’s once-struggling empire had taken off in the Atlantic. From Barbados to Canada, English settlements dotted the North

American coastline and the Caribbean islands. In England, the Crown and Privy Council managed at least a dozen colonial ventures. On the ground, over 50,000 English subjects populated the colonies and worked to establish trade in various commodities.1 By supporting diverse Atlantic enterprises, in under forty years, the early Stuart monarchs had planted seeds of empire which, with careful fostering, produced a healthy imperial harvest.

When James I ascended the throne in 1603 he quickly made peace with Spain one of his first priorities. The peace settlement was largely successful; both states renewed trade and condemned piracy. However, one critical aim that England failed to achieve was access to trade in the West Indies. With West Indian privateering no longer a viable avenue to these resources, James needed to find an alternative strategy to compete in American trades.2 Therefore, during the 1604-1625 Anglo-Spanish peace, James approved several colonial patents in places without Spanish settlements. This policy endeavored to pursue imperial expansion while maintaining peace with Spain.

The patents James approved varied in their approaches for settlement and trade.

Colonial projectors principally envisaged Virginia (1607) for mineral resources and crop

1 Alison Games, Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 4. 2 Unsanctioned and illegal privateering and trade in the West Indies did not end with the Treaty of London. English West Indian trade persisted during Anglo-Spanish Peace, particularly in the tobacco smuggling trade in Trinidad and Guiana. Spanish authorities were perplexed by this trade but had inadequate resources to stop it. See Kenneth Andrews, “The English in the Caribbean 1560-1620,” in The Westward Enterprise: English activities in Ireland, the Atlantic and America, 1480-1650, ed. Kenneth Andrews et al. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978), 122-123; and Joyce Lorimer, “The English contraband tobacco trade in Trinidad and Guiana, 1590-1617,” in The Westward Enterprise, 124-50.

1 cultivation, Bermuda (1615) for agriculture, Guiana (1616; 1620) for exploration,

Newfoundland (1610) for fishing, and St. Christopher (1624) for tobacco cultivation.3 All of these colonies struggled in their infancies, thereby requiring assistance from the Crown to bolster defense, trade, and immigration. James routinely intervened in the affairs of the

Virginia Company of London in order to stimulate immigration and trade. He also endeavored to curb corruption, most notably by dissolving the Virginia Company in 1624.

When James died in 1625, each colony, with the exception of the dwindling Guiana settlements, had survived its growing pains.

In order to defend England’s Atlantic colonies during these formative years, James used his resources for information management as tools for empire building. Beginning in

1605, English diplomats transformed their embassy in Madrid into a hub of intelligence networks that spanned Europe and the Atlantic. James employed ambassadors, consuls, and informants to gather intelligence on Spain’s colonies, West Indies fleets, and King

Philip III’s plans to attack England’s fledgling colonies. James and his Privy Council also engaged in colonial promotion by printing colonial propaganda and by ordering all Church of England ministers to deliver sermons in praise of England’s colonial ventures.

Moreover, in order to gather the evidentiary basis for negotiating disputes with European powers over Atlantic territories and seas, James dramatically improved archival and record-keeping practices.

James’s son and successor, Charles I, devoted additional resources to imperial expansion, making colonial affairs the frequent business of his Privy Council. During his reign, Charles approved English settlements in the Caribbean islands of Barbados (1627),

3 As we will see in chapter two, colonial projectors included a range of additional motivations for their settlements, including propagating the Church of England.

Nevis (1628), Providence (1629), Antigua (1632), Montserrat (1632), St. Lucia (1637),

Tortuga (1638), Tobago (1639), as well as the North American colonies of Massachusetts

Bay (1628) and Maryland (1632). Charles also authorized further attempts to settle Guiana

(1626) and Canada (1629; 1631).

When Charles ascended the throne England was again at war with Spain (1625-

1630). No longer tied to the peacetime imperial settlement, war offered Charles opportunity to pursue a more aggressive project in the West Indies. Charles issued letters of marque and enthusiastically supported plans for an English West India Company.4 To defend his island colonies and aid further colonization attempts, Charles shipped ordnance and munitions to the Caribbean. When these measures proved insufficient for colonial defense,

Charles turned to information management to energize his limited resources of imperial control. For example, in Virginia, during the Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Powhatan Wars,

Charles and his Privy Council tightened channels of information to protect the colony from foreign and domestic attacks.

In the 1630s, Charles dedicated additional government resources to improving colonial administration. He ordered all subjects migrating to the colonies to provide documentation certifying that they had taken the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy and all merchants to provide accurate bills of lading to customs authorities on both sides of the

Atlantic. In order to ensure compliance, Charles established the Committee for Foreign

Plantations to attend diligently to oversee these requirements. This body, permanently established in 1634, met weekly to review all documentation pertaining to colonial

4 John Appleby, “An Association for the West Indies? English plans for a West India Company, 1621-29,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 15 (1987): 222.

3 migration and trade. By the time of the English Civil War, the management of England’s empire was nearly, if not already, an institutionalized matter of state.

This narrative of the early English Atlantic empire contrasts sharply with most of its histories. Many histories of empire begin after 1688, and nearly all after 1640. The early

Stuart project is rendered a prehistory of empire or, if generous, an “accidental” one. This dissertation rejects this narrative by drawing attention to information management as a creative tool employed by Crown and Council to harness imperial control. In doing so, it brings the early Stuart imperial project into view. Formerly disparate and unconnected innovations, including intelligence networks, propaganda, and archive building, when taken together under a shared analytical framework, are revealed as collaborative and complementary projects. These innovations demonstrate systematic efforts by the state to shape England’s empire. By employing information management as a category of analysis,

I identify spaces of power harnessed by the English state in the absence of strong military power and centralized authority. Moreover, by examining these practices as tools for empire building, this dissertation expands our criteria for the range of actors who contributed to this enterprise. I demonstrate how spies, archivists, printers, Amerindian emissaries, and many others, worked under the direction of Crown and Council to bolster

England’s fledgling empire. By creating new strategies, infrastructure, and institutions to manage colonial activities, the early Stuart kings laid significant groundwork for modern state building.

Historiography

By examining information management, this dissertation challenges ongoing and interconnected debates concerning two fundamental questions: can the relationship between the state and the colonies be considered an imperial project, and, what are the origins of the modern English state? Historians of England and colonial North America have tended to couple the processes of modern state formation and empire building with the development of centralized administrative authority and military augmentation. Plainly put, without a strong navy and the Board of Trade, the cornerstones of the First British

Empire, an English empire could not have existed. This narrow and traditional distinction of what constitutes empire limits our understanding of the early English empire’s composition and, more broadly, the sophisticated strategies the state used to compete in

Europe’s imperial contest. I argue that the state’s efforts to collect, organize, and control information about English Atlantic activities reveals that the Crown actively pursued an imperial project from the first decades of English colonization.

Empire Building

Despite English Atlantic colonization efforts from 1607 to 1640, this period has been described as “proto” or “pre” imperial, governed through policies of what Edmund

Burke termed “wise and salutary neglect.”5 The work of early Stuart empire building has been credited to projectors, adventurers, colonists, and investors. In this interpretation, the

Crown is described as both uninterested in and disengaged from empire building.6

5 Edmund Burke, The Works of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke: With a Biographical and Critical Introduction, and Portrait After Sir Joshua Reynolds, vol. 2 (London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1842), 186. 6 Robert Bliss, Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Revolution in the Seventeenth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 17; Kenneth Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-

In histories of colonial North America, the early Stuart imperial project is subsumed within narratives of American exceptionalism. In histories of Virginia, for example, colonists are described as laboring independent of crown assistance in order to survive the desperate conditions in the early decades of the settlement. The independent spirit of men like John Smith represented the frontier adventurer. Assemblies and courts in Virginia represented self-governance, thereby enabling the creation of laws independent from

English common law.7 Similarly, in histories of New England, the desire for freedom from

Stuart tyranny propelled desperate colonists to transform a difficult land into one of opportunity. In this interpretation the state, desirous only to rid the metropole of problematic “puritans,” ceded its authority to the colonists.8 Thus, both narratives celebrate the independent spirit of “exceptional” colonists, who, within their communities, developed sets of American values that demanded nationhood in the American Revolution.

In The Pilgrims and Pocahontas, Ann Abrams untangles the origin stories that are embedded in histories of colonial North America. Abrams argues that in the decades following the American Revolution, “the ‘invented traditions’ of Virginia and

Massachusetts filled the cultural and historical void created by separation from the English

1630 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 13-16; L.H. Roper, English Empire in America: 1603-1658 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2009), 131-2; Michael Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England: 1550-1700 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 410-11. 7 Roper, English Empire in America, introduction; A.U. Abrams, The Pilgrims and Pocahontas: Rival Myths of American Origin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); R.J. Rives, “The Jamestown Celebration of 1857,’” VMHB 66.3 (1958): 259-71; J.M. Lindgren, “Whatever is Un- Virginian is Wrong: The APVA’s sense of the Old Dominion” Virginia Calvacade 38 (1989): 35- 68. 8 Alden Vaughan suggests that “students of our ‘national character’—however imprecise that term may be—generally agree that deeply embedded in the assumptions and aspirations of modern America lies a hefty legacy of Puritan New England,” in The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620-1730, ed. Alden T. Vaughan (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1972), xi.

6 motherland. Independence meant abandoning the British royal heritage and state- controlled religion. The loss necessitated not only writing a unique U.S. history but also required manufacturing complementary social, moral and ritual customs to reinforce this history. When the Revolution suddenly severed colonists’ ties with the Old World, the new one had to be restructured with regional lore at its foundation.” In the postcolonial period,

Americans with disparate experiences and identities searched for “historical anchors;” these regional and national narratives were attempts to construct a unifying past.9 L. H.

Roper argues that these broad interpretations survived through the early twentieth century as “self-consciously Whiggish” attempts to “place early American history within a wider context of the progress of Anglo-American liberty.”10

In the 1960s, new social historians writing histories from the “bottom-up,” challenged these narratives of liberty and progress by turning attention to oppression. By examining the histories of subaltern subjects including women, slaves of African descent, and Amerindians, these historians deepened our understanding of the lived experiences in colonial North America. Since the 1980s, historians working in the field of Atlantic history have placed the English colonies back within the connective framework of Europe and

Africa. Interpreting the Atlantic Ocean as a connective space where the trafficking of people and commodities was accompanied by the dissemination of ideas, these histories provide a deeper understanding of the close Anglo-American ties by identifying various religious, occupational, and kinship networks. For example, in Coming Over, David Cressy captures the intimate ties between English subjects in England and the colonies evidenced

9 Abrams, The Pilgrims and Pocahontas, 5. 10 Roper, English in America, 2.

7 by a heavy two-way flow of letters and people.11 More recently, Atlantic history has also brought attention to the multinational character of the Atlantic littoral, where the Caribbean served as an “entangled” space for Europeans, Africans, and indigenous peoples as they moved throughout the Atlantic world.12 Atlantic history has also challenged and revised narratives tethered to the notion of the nation-state. For example, Carla Pestana’s The

English Atlantic in the Age of Revolution, demonstrates how the dramatic upheaval of the

English Civil War reshaped the English Atlantic.13 England’s domestic politics not only influenced the character and government of the colonies, but the needs of the colonies also informed English state building.

Atlantic historians have also drawn attention to the wider global connections of

Atlantic agents and projects. In Web of Empire, Alison Games traces the global careers of early English colonists and projectors and, in doing so, exposes John Smith as much more a cosmopolitan than a frontiersman. Games examines the networked knowledge that

English men (and occasionally women) brought from global travel to colonial spaces. She demonstrates how these agents drew from their careers as merchants and consuls to inform their colonial experiences. By mapping colonial agents across a global geography, Web of

Empire broadens the world of early modern subjects and reveals a dynamic global context that shaped Atlantic imperial projects and rivalries.14

11 David Cressy, Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 12 Eliga Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery,” The American Historical Review 12.3 (2007):764-786. 13 Carla Pestana, The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640-1661 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004). 14 Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

This dissertation too is interested in the ways knowledge gathered (from diplomats, travelers, archivists, etc.) served England’s fledgling imperial project. Yet, by diffusing empire to so many fine threads, Games disengages early English Atlantic empire building from its principal patron: the state. Atlantic history has in many respects, posed a challenge to the primacy of the nation-state as a basis of historical inquiry, revealing the limitations of imperial authority and the blurring of national boundaries on the ground. While this work offers a much-needed corrective, in doing so, we lose sight of the state completely. I argue that moving away from the trappings of the modern state does not require historians to dismiss or ignore the role of the state. Instead, we should consider the early modern state on its own terms and examine the type of empire such a state might produce. In doing so, we can see how the Crown engaged in, exerted influence over, and managed distant territories.

State Formation

Historians of England have also rendered this period as a prehistory of the British

Empire by coupling the imperial project with the development of a centralized modern state, characterized by an emerging administrative bureaucracy in the late seventeenth century. Overseas expansion is generally subsumed within a broader narrative of the growth of long distance trade, stimulated by a northern-European proto-capitalist attitude and investment in joint-stock companies. The colonies established became, in this assessment, the basis of an “accidental empire.” In this interpretation, the Crown, i.e. the state, cannot lay claim to its foundation, as it possessed no imperial ideology. Furthermore, historians have described the act of approving colonial patents—which granted limited

9 authority to proprietors, companies, and the on-site officials they appointed— as a relinquishment of Crown sovereignty.15

This interpretation can in part be explained by periodization. These years of sustained colonization efforts are bookended by the more popular histories of Elizabethan privateering and the dramatic rupture of the English Civil War. Interpretations of the

English Civil War have been offered for every major historiographical “turn”—from the

Whiggish view of an inevitable progressive struggle between Crown and Parliament, to a

Marxist school that interpreted the civil war as a bourgeois revolution, to a revisionist emphasis on long-term causes and short-term triggers, and to a more recent three-kingdoms approach that considers the peripheral pressures on the metropole.16 Each of these diverse approaches tend to offer hypercritical accounts of the personalities and policies of James I and Charles I—underscoring the monarch’s ineptitude that contributed to the tensions between the Crown and Parliament. Furthermore, the broad narrative of seventeenth- century state building describes a “weak state” prior to the rupture of the English Civil War and the emergence of a “strong state” shortly after. However, if we compare the considerable growth of the empire and its administrative apparatus on the eve of the Civil

War with the post-Cromwellian apparatus, the contrast is hardly stark.

15 Kenneth Andrews, Trade Plunder and Settlement, introduction and chapter 14; Robert Bliss, Revolution and Empire, especially chap. 2; Michael Braddick, “The English Government, War Trade and Settlement, 1625-1668,” in Nicholas Canny, Origins of Empire, and Braddick, State Formation, chap. 9; John Elliott, “Atlantic History: A Circumnavigation” in Armitage and Braddick, British Atlantic World, 264-5. 16 Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529-1642 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); J.S. Morrill, The Revolt of the Provinces: Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil War, 1630-1650 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976); Conrad Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War: the Ford Lectures delivered in the University of Oxford, 1987-1988 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, The English Civil War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

This interpretation is also deeply entangled in progressive analyses of seventeenth- century English state formation. As imperial historians have argued, the perceived inability of the state to manage an empire again rests in interpreting the early Stuart kings as relying on a “weak-state” model. In this model, most state officials operated with poorly defined jurisdictions, found power through patronage and often corruption, and required the use of part-time state agents with limited supervision.17 In this interpretation, articulated most recently by Michael Braddick, the state did not develop the tools to exercise imperial control until the development of the fiscal-military state in the second half of the seventeenth century, when the Cromwellian regime transformed the scale of government revenues necessary for military augmentation.18 Only then, with a navy large enough to conduct military exercises such as the failed “Western Design” and a sizable purse able to support permanent administrative bodies such as the 1696 Board of Trade, was the state capable of managing an empire.

This interpretation is uniquely British, perhaps in its Whiggishness. Historians of

Spain, Portugal, and France have yet to require modern state building as a precondition of empire.19 In the case of Spain, Henry Kamen has even argued that while Spain had a decentralized and fragmented government, its empire was perhaps more “modern” than

17 For a critique of the “weak-state” model and its implied relationship to state and empire building, see Ken Macmillan, Atlantic Imperial Constitution: Center and Periphery in the English Atlantic World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 13. 18 Michael Braddick, in State Formation, revises John Brewer’s argument that the fiscal-military state was not established until the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Brewer, Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English state, 1688-1783 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1989). 19 James Pritchard argues that France’s empire was disconnected and tenuous, In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670–1730 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

11 any state in Europe.20 Moreover, Dutch historians have not hesitated to call their global enterprise an empire, despite its mostly commercial nature. In fact, by comparing the work of the “upstart empires” of the early seventeenth century (England, the Dutch Republic, and France), we can see remarkable similarities in the diversity of strategies these states employed to compete with Iberian hegemony.21

Furthermore, this interpretation fails to consider the connection between the “weak state” model and the empire it produced. Simply put, an early modern state, as opposed to an early modern state, might produce a very different type of empire.22 In early seventeenth-century England, the state was governed at the center by the Crown and Privy

Council. As previously described, many state officials also engaged in private enterprise, occupying multiple posts and undertaking public and private professions simultaneously.

In histories of state formation, this practice is often identified as a weakness. Yet there were also advantages to this culture of dual professions. Many government agents began careers in continental foreign posts where they established far reaching networks of contacts.

James’s administrators contracted merchants and antiquarians in order to draw on the greatest expertise and finest talents available to craft policy.23 Overseas merchants also

20 Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power, 1492-1763 (New York: Harper Collins, 2003). 21 The concept of “upstart empires” draws from the dissertation in progress by Melissa Morris, entitled, Cultivating Colonies: Tobacco and the Upstart Colonies, 1580-1640 (Columbia University), as discussed at the Global Early Modern Caribbean Seminar, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA, July 2014. 22 This distinction is my own. By early modern, I emphasize the flexible features of the pre- modern state, whereas the early modern state indicates modern state building innovations, particularly centralized administration. 23 Linda Levy Peck, Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I (London: Unwin & Allen, 1982), 100.

12 often doubled as intelligencers. These diverse careers resulted in vast information networks with Crown and Council at their nexus.

Moreover, many colonial projectors and subscribers were also high-ranking state agents. This distinct blurring of private and public boundaries suggests that empire building was a collaborative effort between state and citizen-state agents. L.H. Roper suggests that the early Stuart reigns might be styled an “Age of Projectors and Projects,” in which many statesmen and citizens presented projects for improving government revenue.24 While cleverly put, this description overlooks many of the ways the early Stuart kings themselves engaged in these ventures and how the Crown’s imperial policies changed over time.

By examining practices of information management as tools for empire building, this dissertation expands our criteria for the range of actors who contributed to the Stuart imperial project. In addition to Games’s cosmopolitans, whose diverse careers enabled them to bring a range of talents to colonial spaces without the motivation and direction of a state-driven imperial project, there were also a multitude of imperial agents and collaborators who performed the work of empire building on behalf of the Crown.25 Spies, archivists, printers, bishops, church-wardens, surveyors, port agents, colonists, and

Amerindian go-betweens all worked under the direction of Crown and Council to further

England’s imperial project. This healthy mix of state-agents, bureaucrats, informants, and government contractors, employed by the early Stuart kings and their governments, shaped

England’s Atlantic empire.

All of these actors were critical to empire building in an age of more expansive foreign policy. For most of his reign, James I’s foreign policy served dual goals that were

24 Roper, English in America, 31. 25 Games, Web of Empire.

13 often in tension: to maintain peace within Europe’s borders while pursuing trade and territories in the Atlantic and beyond. James’s imperial aspirations in the Atlantic brought him frequently into conflict with newly allied Spain, whose proscriptions over this space prohibited English encroachment. The Jacobean government’s interests were shared by the governments of France and the Dutch Republic, who also vied for access and influence in the Americas. Thus, Atlantic imperial contests consistently complicated and informed continental diplomacy and, in so doing, altered the scope and practices of international relations. Conflicts and competition emanating from the Atlantic periphery required more complex information systems to expediently gather accurate reports in order to inform this wider context of European diplomacy. Settling disputes in far-flung territories also required collaboration between leading statesmen, jurists, and archivists in England with colonial subjects and collaborators on the ground.26 As Europe’s Atlantic imperial contest became by the mid-1610s deeply entangled in European diplomacy, the need to expand information resources proved critical.

Elizabeth Mancke argues that in the early modern period, as imperial issues were discussed at a foreign policy level, empire and state building were mutually constructed.

In Mancke’s words, “the restructuring of international relations in response to overseas expansion…reinforced state formation because it reinforced one of the most centralized parts of government, foreign affairs. Thus empire building was not just a problem of how

26 Elizabeth Mancke “Empire and State,” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. Michael Braddick et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 195; Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 3-7; Amy Turner Bushnell and Jack. P. Green, “Peripheries, Centers, and the Construction of Early Modern American Empires: An Introduction,” in Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1-25; Paul Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

14 to govern a larger, more dispersed, and more diverse composite polity…the problem was also one of negotiating a shifting and ambiguous international order.”27 As we will see, to compete in Europe’s Atlantic contest, the Crown drew on and expanded the state’s resources, many of which concerned information management, in order to accommodate more complex geopolitics.

As this dissertation will show, the Stuart kings built a more centralized state and an increasingly supervised empire over time. Early Stuart empire building was engineered by two very different monarchs. James’s project was very early modern in its orientation: it was creative, flexible, and inexpensive. For most of his reign, James deployed and expanded his resources to support Atlantic endeavors, principally through diplomacy, intelligence programs, printed propaganda, and the reach of the Church of England. James also created new institutions to manage the international disputes brought about by

European Atlantic imperial rivalries. He appointed Sir Thomas Wilson to dramatically restructure and improve the State Paper office, in order to negotiate England’s claims to

Atlantic trade and territories. Furthermore, at the end of his reign, to address corruption and mismanagement in Virginia, James took a more direct approach to imperial management. He dissolved the Virginia Company in 1624 and made Virginia a royal colony.

Following the death of his father in 1625, Charles I dedicated far more government resources to empire building. His approach was early modern. He instructed his Privy

Council and Attorney-General to collect Atlantic intelligence, navigational and geographic reports, and ordered his leading jurists to establish consistency in colonial design. He

27 Mancke, “Empire and State,” 195.

15 created a permanent administration to attend to the needs of colonial government and subjects—the Committee on Foreign Plantations—which regularly monitored colonial migration and trade until the English Civil War. During Charles’s reign, information management facilitated imperial oversight, evidenced by the numerous passes for migration and trade examined by the Privy Council Committee for Foreign Plantations.

Charles also turned to information management when he lacked the resources to physically defend the colonies, particularly during simultaneous wars with Spain and the Powhatans.

Ideology and Empire

Historians have also cited the early Stuart empire’s alleged lack of imperial ideology to separate it from the First British Empire. This explanation is unsatisfactory, and frankly, not supported by the evidence. English monarchs and colonial projectors consistently articulated ideological claims to England’s Atlantic colonies. In Europe, the idea of empire can be traced to the Roman “imperium” which granted authority to Roman magistrates to act on behalf of Rome and its citizens in war and peace. Its meaning became abstracted as Rome grew; it came ultimately to signify authority. In the latter days of the

Western Roman Empire, imperium connoted two further dimensions: imperium as sovereignty and as rule over multiple dominions.28 In early modern Europe, monarchs articulated both expressions of imperium. In England, imperium indicated the power of a sovereign monarch above any higher earthly authority. In 1533, Henry VIII, in the Act in

Restraint of Appeals famously declared “that this realm of England is an empire…governed by one supreme head and king, having the dignity and royal estate of

28 David Armitage, “Introduction,” Theories of Empire, ed. Armitage (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) xv-xvii.

16 the imperial Crown…unto whom a body politic…ought to bear, next to God, a natural and humble obedience.”29 James I used the language of empire in his attempt to ensure a peaceful union between England and Scotland, declaring to Parliament in 1604, “The

English should not treat Scotland like a naked province…I hope you mean not I should set

Garrisons over them, as the Spaniards do over Sicily and Naples, or govern them by

Commission.” Avoid this, James argued, and the union would “advance the greatness of your Empire seated here in England.”30 James also deployed the term “empire” to refer directly to his English Atlantic colonies. In the 1625 proclamation issued after making

Virginia a royal colony, James declared “that the territories of Virginia, the Somers Islands, and New England shall form part of his empire and the government of Virginia immediately depend upon himself.”31

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a range of authors articulated

England’s imperial ideology towards overseas possessions. In The Limits of the British

Empire (1578), John Dee claimed the Crown’s rights to the Northern Seas and American territories based on discovery. Dee proposed a cautious imperial program, led by a “Petty

Navy…toward New Foreign Discoveries making: for Gods glory, the Wealth-Public and the Honorable Renown of this Islandish Empire.”32 Richard Hakluyt’s Diverse Voyages, which chronicled English overseas activities also made a case for England’s rights of

29 Geoffrey Elton, The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 353. 30 James I, “A Speech…delivered…on Monday the xix day of March 1604, being the First Day of the First Parliament,” in C.H. McIlwain (ed), The Political Works of James I (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965), 14. On the relationship between union and empire, see John Robertson, “Empire and Union: Two Concepts of the Early Modern European Political Order,” in Theories of Empire, ed. Armitage, 1-10. 31 James I, Proclamation for settling the plantation of Virginia, May 13, 1625. STC. 8774. 32 Andrews, Trade Plunder and Settlement, 10.

17 discovery, shaped by the belief that English ventures were divinely ordained.33 Elizabeth’s explorers and privateers, notably Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, and John Hawkins, envisioned a much more aggressive sea-faring empire. In Raleigh’s words: “This was

Themistocles opinion long since, and it is true, that he that commands the sea, commands the trade, and he that is Lord of the Trade of the world is lord of the wealth of the world.”34

Elizabeth’s sea captains crafted their imperial visions to appeal to their royal patron in a time of anti-Spanish sentiment. Peace with Spain in 1604 required a modified imperial ideology that softened aggression towards Spain and further emphasized England’s rights to American territories. Rights of discovery and possession in areas without permanent

Spanish presence became particularly important. Travel and promotional literature about

Virginia and Guiana was careful to articulate these rights. In his popular work, Purchas his

Pilgrimage, Samuel Purchas deftly wove stories of English discovery into a divinely ordained project of empire. Moreover, the promotional literature printed by both the

Virginia Company and the Crown’s Council for Virginia, emphasized the colony’s religious and moral imperative. Raleigh and Purchas also identified England’s empire as designed to increase trade.35 In the early seventeenth-century, Robert Johnson’s Nova

Britannia (1609), a promotional text for the Virginia and Bermuda colonies, and so popular that it was read by Philip III, emphasized commercial greatness as a key to building a

33 Peter Mancall, Hakluyt’s Promise: An Elizabethan’s Obsession for an English America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); on Hakluyt’s religious convictions see David Harris Sacks “Richard Hakluyt and the Making of the Atlantic World,” in The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550-1624, ed. Peter Mancall (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007): 410-453; see also David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chapters 3 and 4. 34 Quoted in Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement, 9. 35 John Holmes, “The Guiana Projects: Imperial and Colonial Ideologies in Ralegh and Purchas,” Literature & History 14.2 (2005): 1-13.

18 successful empire.36 Johnson reminded his readers of England’s royal fleets, merchant ships, and “excellent” navigators, who, with the support of the nation, would make “this little Northerne corner of the world…in short time the richest Store-house and Staple for

Marchandize in all Europe.”37

James had both practical experience and legal guidance to inform his imperial governance. As King of Scotland, James VI ruled over his own empire, consisting of the

Scottish mainland and the northern islands. As King of England, James had legal precedent that suited his imperial ambitions. His Attorney General, Sir Edward Coke’s argument in

Calvin’s Case (1608) established the relationship between the Crown’s central authority and dependent or colonial territories.38 While the case pertained to the rights of Scottish subjects to inherit land in Scotland, its ruling also set broad guidelines for “colonial” subjects with regards to law making, allegiance, and central oversight. When extended to the Atlantic colonies, Calvin’s Case established a foundation in which the king delegated power to make laws to charter holders so long as these laws were commensurable with those of England. Ken Macmillan argues that these charters formed “the constitutional relationship between center and periphery.” The preambles of all charters “clearly assert

36 Andrew Fitzmaurice “The Commercial Ideology of Colonization in Jacobean England: Robert Johnson, Giovanni Botero, and the Pursuit of Greatness,” William & Mary Quarterly 64:4 (2007): 791-820. 37 Robert Johnson, Nova Britannia Offring most excellent fruites by planting in Virginia. Exciting all such as be well affected to further the same (London, 1609), D4r. STC 14700. 38 Allen D. Boyer, Sir Edward Coke in the Elizabethan Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 109; Kunal M. Parker, Making Foreigners: Immigration and Citizenship Law in America, 1600–2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 26-27; David Chan Smith, Sir Edward Coke and the Reformation of the Laws: Religion, Politics and Jurisprudence, 1578-1616 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 253; D. Alan Orr, Treason and the State: Law, Politics and Ideology in the English Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 151; Alan I. Macinnes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 63.

19 the Crown’s continued imperial and sovereign authority.” 39 The Crown held the power to revoke charters, thereby holding ultimate authority over companies and local assemblies.

James and Charles also consistently framed English colonial ventures as part of a national project. As chapter two will demonstrate, the Crown’s published propaganda for the Virginia, Bermuda, and Newfoundland colonies described their benefits to the

England’s nation, church, and position within Europe. Promotional pamphlets aimed at soliciting immigrants and capital investment appealed to civic responsibility and national pride. James also used the Church of England to disseminate his Protestant imperial vision.

In the midst of James’s imperial project, it would seem that the English ideology of empire was already Protestant, maritime, and purposed for trade.

Empire of Information

Information management, defined in this project as the methods the state used to collect, organize, and deploy information, has recently emerged as a central concern for historians of early modern Europe. Confronted with an information overload catalyzed by the internet and expanded digital capacities, it is unsurprising that historians like Ann Blair would wonder how early modern individuals experienced an earlier information overload generated by innovations in print and communication.40 During the last five years, events and innovations such as WikiLeaks, the government’s seizure of the telephone records of reporters for the Associated Press, and the surveillance programs revealed by Edward

39 Macmillan, Atlantic Imperial Constitution, 24. 40 Ann Blair, Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).

Snowden to the public, ignited debates about the boundaries between state power and individual rights to privacy. States appear to be harnessing more comprehensive and efficient information systems as powerful tools for controlling and furthering their formal and informal empires. Thus, by observing how information management is deployed as a weapon in the twenty-first century context that is largely post-imperial, we are better equipped to recognize projects of information management in an earlier imperial context.

The study of information management as a particular method of investigation is particularly useful for identifying spaces of power harnessed by states in the absence of strong military power and centralized authority.41 The structure of the early seventeenth- century state, as Blair demonstrates, made information management the work of overlapping networks and groups of knowledgeable communities.42 As previously addressed, in a system in which statesmen doubled as colonial investors and foreign intelligencers, a well-connected core of elites could perform the work that would later be conducted by bureaucrats in multiple state agencies. Part of the training of young elites, groomed to become statesmen and foreign diplomats, included instructions in thorough note-taking on matters of intelligence.43 King James and his secretaries drew from these networks and adapted them to accommodate a wider geopolitical context and assist empire-

41 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), introduction; Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). 42 Blair, Too Much to Know. 43 Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, Profitable instructions describing what speciall obseruations are to be taken by trauellers in all nations, states and countries; pleasant and profitable (London, 1633). STC. 6789.

21 building. Thus, the early Stuart “weak-state” model blurred the boundaries of private and public work, enabling more complex networks of information sharing.44

C.A. Bayly argues that societies with well-organized and adaptive information systems are able to make limited resources work harder.45 Using the study of information management as a lens for viewing state building reveals and connects modes of soft power.

For example, a well-ordered archive can function as an important resource for both controlling knowledge and for crafting policy. In The Information Master, Jacob Soll clearly shows how, in France, libraries were hubs of state information networks and how feudal archives were strategically manipulated for diplomacy. Soll argues that these practices aided French state building. By accumulating a “massive bank of information,” supported by a professional bureaucracy, the Crown strengthened its power over the nobility and parlements.46

This innovation is one in which the early Stuart kings were interested. King James augmented the State Paper Office to better equip his government to negotiate domestic and foreign policy. Thomas Wilson, Keeper of the State Papers, used his position to wrest official documents from private hands. Charles closed the impressive, popular, and quasi- public library of Sir Robert Cotton because he believed it posed a threat to the Crown’s authority over privileged information. These initiatives also facilitated state building.

While the Crown initially turned to information management as a tool for empire building in order to avoid depleting its financial and naval resources, once colonies proved viable,

44 See Bayly, Empire and Information and Soll, Information Master. 45 On the other hand, inadequate information systems can work against empire, for the French case see Kenneth Banks, Chasing Empire Across the Seas: Communication and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002). 46 Soll, Information Master, 73.

22 the Crown met the needs of a growing empire with sustained central oversight. The Crown created a Privy Council committee, the Committee for Foreign Plantations, to closely oversee to the rapid growth in colonial immigration and trade.

The Parameters of this Dissertation

A study with such a wide scope requires an explanation of its parameters. Using information management as a method of investigation, I have followed my sources to various European and Atlantic locations. This method results in clusters of studies around particular places, which without explanation, can obscure the wider project of English empire building. Moreover, I have chosen to include a range of case studies that examine different practices of information management. Therefore, each chapter presents a different aspect of state-driven information management in the period while simultaneously seeking to show change over time.

As the chapters will demonstrate, many of the Crown’s resources for imperial information management served to protect and promote Virginia. As chapter two foregrounds, while Virginia was neither the first nor the only important English Atlantic colony, the resources the Crown dedicated to it were unmatched. James would likely have preferred to situate his empire in the West Indies, but this choice would directly violate

Anglo-Spanish peace.47 Thus, situated far from Spanish settlements, Virginia was a strategic location for England’s imperial project.

47 As I have argued elsewhere, Guiana captured the English imagination far more than Virginia, but this enthusiasm didn’t translate into success. See “Designing an English Empire: Guiana and the Amazon Company, 1590-1640” (Association of Caribbean Historians Conference, Willemstad, Curaçao, 2012).

Apart from Virginia, this dissertation provides limited analyses of England’s other early seventeenth-century colonies. Bermuda, Virginia’s smaller affiliated colony, with lesser political and financial stakes, draws attention in a few chapters. The West Indies feature largely as a site of English imperial aspirations, Anglo-Spanish diplomatic conflict, and as a hub of information networks. But since England’s Caribbean colonies, founded in the late 1620s, did not establish tobacco economies until the late 1630s, they were not yet a central concern for the Crown. Guiana, the site for many hopeful explorers and colonists, will be discussed briefly. Finally, New England receives exclusive attention in chapter six, when the rapid growth in immigration to this area in the 1630s became a central concern for the Crown.

Readers will also notice the absence of Ireland. This omission is for the most part a matter of scope—rather than evidence. Kings James and Charles devoted considerable attention to establishing plantations in Ireland. These projects, and their relationship to

England’s American colonies, have been (and continue to be) the focus of rigorous historical scholarship.48

This dissertation also includes a limited and often homogenous group of historical actors. To put it plainly, apart from chapter five, this dissertation is almost exclusively about middling and elite white men. Individual women rarely appear. But their absence should not be taken to suggest that women did not contribute to empire building. Women participated in intelligence networks and information sharing at court. Women also

48 See Nicholas P. Canny, Kingdom and Colony: Ireland in the Atlantic World, 1560-1800 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Audrey J. Horning, Ireland in the Virginian Sea: Colonialism in the British Atlantic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Keith Pluymers, “Colonizing lands and landscapes in the English Atlantic, c. 1580-1640,” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2015).

24 contributed to manuscript news networks and they most certainly read the propaganda the

Crown produced.49 Furthermore, women were investors in colonial enterprises and charitable contributors to Virginia and Newfoundland.50 On the ground in the colonies,

Algonquian women were important information go-betweens. Indeed, perhaps the most important emissary, Matoaka, the daughter of chief Powhatan, popularly known as

Pocahantas, helped to broker Anglo-Powhatan peace in Virginia. Therefore, while women only occasionally appear in the records, and in this study, they were central to the networks, culture, and empire that the English state sought to build.

Because this dissertation examines empire building from the point-of-view of the state, the contributions of Amerindians, Africans, and other subaltern subjects are only partially examined. The single sustained exception are the Powhatan go-betweens discussed in chapter five. This chapter also contains the only person of African origin or descent, John Philip. Philip’s experience is only recorded through his testimony against the

English subject, Simon Tuchin. This testimony is also mediated by court practices. While during these early decades of colonization, before the large-scale importation of African slaves, persons of African descent constituted only a small percentage of Virginia’s population, Africans most likely contributed to the information networks this project considers. Africans on ships and in the Caribbean likely were unnamed participants in the information exchanges recounted in English correspondence and reports. In the future,

49 James Daybell, “Gender, Politics and Diplomacy: Women, News and Intelligence Networks in Elizabethan England,” in Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture, ed. Robyn Adams and Rosanna Cox (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 101-119. 50 At least 83 women invested in joint-stock companies between 1575 and 1630 and many others were likely unnamed joint investors with their husbands. Richard L. Greaves, Society and Religion in Elizabethan England (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), 313; Theodore K. Rabb, Enterprise & Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the Expansion of England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967).

25 through a more rigorous examination of these sources, and by consulting new ones, I hope to consider these areas more fully.

Chapters

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part examines King James’s projects of information management: Atlantic intelligence networks, colonial propaganda, and archive building. These chapters demonstrate how James expanded his existing institutions and networks to promote and defend England’s fledgling colonies. Chapter one examines intelligence practices developed at the English embassy in Madrid from 1605 to

1625, which increased England’s ability to negotiate Anglo-Spanish Atlantic affairs. After the 1604 Treaty of London, the embassy served as the hub of Atlantic intelligence networks from which agents intercepted state correspondence and decoded Spanish ciphers in order to track Spain’s West Indian fleet. These far-reaching networks helped English ambassadors protect the fledgling colonies in Virginia and Bermuda from purported

Spanish attacks and negotiate grievances over Sir Walter Raleigh’s disastrous expedition to Guiana (1617-1618).

Chapter two explores the ways the Crown and Privy Council engaged in censorship and propaganda to support England’s Atlantic colonies from 1607 to 1624. During these years the Crown published promotional texts, ranging from broadsides to sermons, to stimulate investment in, and immigration to, England’s fledgling colonies. The Crown also employed its most powerful organ for information dissemination, the Church of England, to shape the narrative about England’s fledgling colonies. Through these materials, King

James and the Virginia Company hoped to convince English subjects that participation in

26 the Virginia enterprise was a national, moral, and Christian undertaking. This chapter demonstrates the integral role the Crown played in shaping the messaging around

England’s neophyte colonies in order to control how England’s imperial project was communicated to the public.

Chapter three examines the Crown’s efforts to grow and organize England’s state archives. This chapter follows the career of the first Keeper of the State Papers, Sir Thomas

Wilson, who wrested state papers from the hands of statesmen and antiquaries in order to keep privileged information within the confines of the state. Wilson then used his archive to craft important arguments of precedent, such as the Law of the Sea (1614). This was important work; as European powers navigated a wider geopolitical context, competing for trade and territories in an Atlantic and indeed global setting, diplomacy and international relations relied more consistently on establishing legal precedent. Possessing the material evidence from which to draw precedent put states at a competitive advantage. By creating organized and efficient archives, Wilson better equipped the Crown to negotiate global geopolitics.

At the very end of his reign, James I aggressively engaged in colonial affairs. In

1623, in the wake of the Virginia massacre and amid factional disputes within the

Company, James authorized a commission to investigate the Company’s management and conditions in the colony. This commission interrogated the Company’s written record and conducted an on-site investigation in Virginia. During this investigation, Crown and

Council also endeavored to control information about the commission by controlling speech and print and by printing reports updating subjects on its progress. This investigation was part of the Crown’s broader efforts to reform its government and increase

27 central authority while signaling its willingness to intervene in colonial affairs and exercise imperial authority directly.

The final two chapters turn to Charles I’s project of imperial information management, to which he devoted significant resources for central oversight. The fifth chapter examines information management in crisis in Virginia during the Second Anglo-

Powhatan War (1622-1632) and the Anglo-Spanish War (1625-1630). War with Spain allowed Charles to pursue a comprehensive imperial agenda, particularly in the West

Indies, but it also made English colonies the targets of military action. Fears of an external

Spanish attack compounded anxiety about internal Powhatan attacks in Virginia. Lacking naval strength both in Europe and the Atlantic, the Caroline government relied on its information systems to police the empire and protect the colonies from domestic and foreign threats. To protect privileged intelligence, Charles closed channels of information between ordinary colonists and their Powhatan neighbors and authorized only qualified emissaries and go-betweens to cultivate intelligence agents. Charles and his Privy Council also prevented information about England’s colonies from falling into Spanish hands by barring outsiders from visiting the colony and interrogating suspicious subjects who came into Virginia’s harbors. By gathering and protecting intelligence about England’s colonies,

Charles hoped to further his imperial project and strengthen England’s position in Europe’s

Atlantic contest.

The final chapter examines the Committee for Foreign Plantations, the Privy

Council’s body for colonial oversight, which managed many aspects of colonial affairs in the 1630s. Responding to the unprecedented growth in immigration and trade in the late

1620s and 1630s, the Committee enforced tighter restrictions on immigration, especially

28 to New England, and customs collection. The Committee frequently stayed ships, closely examined passenger lists and certificates confirming each colonial traveler had taken the

Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance, inspected cargo at the Customs House, and punished interlopers. All of this work required a wealth of paper and parchment which traversed the

Atlantic and serves as evidence of a growing bureaucracy reliant on effective practices of information management. By examining the work of the Committee for Foreign

Plantations, I argue that regular imperial oversight, generally attributed to the Board of

Trade at the end of the seventeenth century, was already instituted before the English Civil

War. By 1640, England’s American colonies were governed by Crown and Council in

London, and supported by their agents in Europe and around the Atlantic. Hardly

“accidental” or “neglected,” English empire building was a collaborative and creative project, imagined and promoted by the early Stuart kings and their governments, and based in no small part on information management.

Setting the Stage

England was late to Europe’s contest for the Americas. Henry VII famously refused to patronize Christopher Columbus, and the voyages he later commissioned, such as John

Cabot’s 1497 expedition to North America, yielded little to compete with Spain’s burgeoning imperial wealth. His successor, Henry VIII, was concerned mostly with domestic and European matters, and devoted few resources to further England’s position in the Americas. Henry VIII authorized a few Atlantic expeditions, including those of

Sebastian Cabot, but many fleets were lost before even reaching the Americas. By the end of his reign, apart from his interests in Ireland, Henry’s only Atlantic claim was to

Newfoundland. Henry’s next two successors, Edward VI and Mary I, did not build on his

Atlantic endeavors.1

But information gathering, management, and manipulation were present at the outset of more serious efforts. Elizabeth I commissioned far more expeditions for discovery than her predecessors. She patronized a group of explorers to improve England’s prospects for colonizing the Americas. A generation of explorers— Sir Francis Drake, Sir John

Hawkins, Sir Martin Frobisher, and Sir Walter Raleigh—laid claim to American lands in

England’s name. They mapped the coasts they sailed and lands they explored, keeping journals and submitting reports detailing Amerindian inhabitants, natural resources, and prospective commodities.

1 Queen Mary continued the Tudor conquest of Ireland by sending English colonists to settle in the Irish Midlands. In the Atlantic however, Mary did very little. Her marriage with Philip II of Spain handcuffed her ability to promote American ventures. Philip would not allow England to trade in the Americas and Mary could not license privateering expeditions against her husband’s nation.

These late sixteenth-century English voyages served three purposes: to locate mineral resources, identify spaces suitable for English investment and colonization, and assert English sovereignty by precedent of first discovery. As exploratory ventures commissioned by the Crown, the success of all these goals hinged on gathering accurate information. Elizabeth instructed English explorers to gather and record this information to serve the Crown’s Atlantic and foreign policy interests.

Mapping Geography

The first task for the Crown’s explorers was to draw detailed and reliable maps. As

James C. Scott has shown, maps and surveys were how states first dealt with lands and their peoples.2 Maps of the Americas served dual purposes: to aid future discoveries and colonial ventures, and to assert England’s sovereignty over spaces explored. These two goals often worked in tandem. By reproducing central features of landscape previously unexplored by Europeans, the Crown provided evidence of discovery. To publicize these discoveries—and claim sovereignty through discovery—the Crown authorized the publication of American maps.

Mapping territories for the first time was a difficult endeavor. England’s most promising maps were drawn by a small circle of committed mapmakers and explorers.

Michael Lok, Frobisher’s principal backer, published a detailed map of New England

(1582), drawn from Frobisher’s exploration. Frobisher also brought with him to America

2 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Scott noted that maps and surveys, “did not successfully represent the actual activity of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to; they represented only that slice of it that interested the official observer. They were, moreover, not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when allied with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade,” 3.

31 the painter John White, who drew detailed maps of the places they explored. White, who is best known for his drawings of Algonquians, also accompanied Raleigh to Virginia in

1585, where he collaborated with the prodigious mapmaker and explorer, Thomas Hariot.

Hariot was one of England’s leading astronomers, mathematicians, and navigation experts.

He gathered and recorded all sorts of information in Virginia. He published much of this information in A Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia (1590), in which he described and inventoried each of the commodities he encountered.3

As critical sources for imperial design, these maps also contained valuable information that the Crown needed to protect. To guard this information, many published maps were purposely vague or misleading. The Crown was careful to authorize only those works published by their preferred printers who could guarantee that privileged information was not printed.4 The Crown closely guarded accurate maps, many of which remained in manuscript form.

To enhance her knowledge of the Americas, Queen Elizabeth ordered her explorers to carefully record their movements. In preparation for Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s 1583 expedition to America, Edward Hoby instructed Gilbert to “note the particular place where every such thing shall be found…all the islands, their bigness, commodities, and havens, and the elevations of every isle,” and record these details “both in your maps and journals.”5

Elizabeth protected the maps and journals of her America-bound explorers—information that belonged to the state, not to explorers. When Drake returned from his circumnavigation

3 Thomas Hariot, A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia (London, 1590). STC. 12786. 4 Ken Macmillan, “Sovereignty ‘More Plainly Described’: Early English Maps of North America, 1580–1625,” Journal of British Studies 42.4 (2003): 413-447. 5 Edward Hoby, Instructions to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 1582, BL, Add. MS 38823, fol. 1. These instructions were to be turned in to the court, see Macmillan, Sovereignty and Possession, 157.

32 of the globe (1577-1580), Elizabeth’s Principal Secretary, William Cecil, Baron Burghley, ordered him to hand over his journal, which included maps. Elizabeth also denied Drake access to his journal when he printed his account of the voyage. The same protocol applied to Gilbert’s 1582-1583 voyage to Newfoundland and Raleigh’s 1596 exploration of

Guiana.6

The Elizabethan government’s insistence on secrecy is also evident when we compare published maps alongside manuscript maps prepared by the queen’s mapmakers.

John Dee’s manuscript maps (c. 1580-1582), which included the most current map-making technologies and details drawn from Drake’s recent expeditions, are much more detailed than those published during the same years. Elizabeth also prohibited Drake from publishing his “Of Famous and Rich Discoveries” in 1578 because of the geographic details it contained.7

James Rosier’s A True Relation (1605) addressed this very tension. Printed by the former junior partner of the Queen’s Printer, George Bishop, Rosier recounted Captain

George Waymouth’s exploration of Virginia.8 Rosier explained that his delay in publication served to protect state interests: “After these purposed designes were concluded, I was animated to publish this briefe Relation, and not before; because some forrein Nation (being fully assured of the fruitfulnesse of the countrie) have hoped hereby to gaine some knowledge of the place.”9 Rosier clarified that he withheld precise

6 Macmillan, Sovereignty and Possession, 158. 7 Macmillan, Sovereignty and Possession, 157. 8 “Bishop, George (d. 1668),” Maryann S. Feola in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37195 (accessed January 17, 2016). 9 James Rosier, A true relation of the most prosperous voyage made this present yeere 1605 (London: Eliot’s Court Press; George Bishop, 1605). STC 21322.

33 navigational information in order to satisfy the Crown’s desire for secrecy. Moreover,

Rosier omitted information gathered from and about Algonquian people in order to provide an advantage for “those that shal goe in the next Voyage.”10 As Rosier described, for

England’s empire to succeed, protecting information was paramount.

Considering the fierce European contest for American trade and resources, protecting the information English explorers labored to gather and record was a sage state policy. During the period of Elizabethan exploration, keeping navigational maps secret helped to prevent other states from acquiring the tools to settle in those territories. Once

England established overseas colonies, keeping this information confidential served to protect the fledgling settlements from foreign attacks. As chapter one will show, in the early seventeenth century, Spanish diplomats endeavored to obtain much information about Virginia and Bermuda. Therefore it was important that James closely protect his maps and surveys from Spain and other European Atlantic competitors.

The early Stuart Crown expected all colonial participants to contribute to this information project. James and Charles gathered information to help colonists, colonial companies, and colonial authorities to settle successful plantations. They closely guarded navigational, cartographic, and structural intelligence from England’s European competitors. As chapter two will demonstrate, the Crown worked hard to keep reports damaging to these enterprises from the public. Information favorable to the colonies needed to be shaped into convincing propaganda to encourage investment and participation.

Managing information was critical to empire building from the first moments of colonization.

10 Rosier, A true relation, A2V.

When English colonists first settled Atlantic colonies, they endeavored to obtain a thorough account of the land. King James gave instructions to leaders of the voyage to

Virginia in 1607: “You shall do well to send a perfect relation by Captaine Newport of all that is done, what height you are seated, how far into the land, what commodities you find, what soil, woods and their several kinds, and so of all other things else to advertise particularly.”11 James directly attended to protecting this information. In Virginia, James ordered colonial authorities to “suffer no man to return but by pasport from the President and Counsel, nor to write any letter of anything that may discourage others.”12

During the colony’s first years, settlers surveyed and mapped Virginia’s land.13 In

1607, Robert Tyndall drafted a detailed plan of the James River and drew charts of the

James and York Rivers. According to William Strachey, Captain Argall mapped the coasts on sailing expeditions up the North American coast, “observ[ing] all along the coast, and drawing the plotts thereof, as he steered homewardes, unto our bay.”14 Early seventeenth- century explorers, including John White, Bartholomew Gosnold, George Weymouth, and

Henry Hudson also drew detailed maps and surveys of the North American coast. The

Virginia colonist, Captain William Powell, drafted detailed maps of Virginia.

11 John Smith, Capt. John Smith: Works, 1608-1631, ed. Edward Arbor (Westminster: Archibald Constable and Co., 1895), xxxvii. 12 James I, Instructions for the Colony on Landing, 1607, in Edward Duffield Neill, History of the Virginia Company of London: With letters to and from the first colony never before printed (New York: B. Franklin, 1968), 13. 13 We can place the mapping of American spaces within James’s broader project of land management in England and Ireland. James simultaneously undertook a massive project of land management in 1608, in the Forest of Dean, and in Ireland. Keith Pluymers suggests that James’s disappointment with Ireland refocused his attention to Virginia in 1610, see Pluymers, “Mapping Rebellion: Evaluating Plantation Land in Late Tudor Ireland, 1584-1603” (paper presented at North American Conference on British Studies, Little Rock, Arkansas, 14 November, 2015). 14 Don Alfonso de Velasco to Philip III, 22 March 1611, in Alexander Brown, The Genesis of the United States (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1890), 457.

Despite measures to protect colonial intelligence, Spanish ambassadors successfully obtained some reports from English colonies. In 1608, the Spanish ambassador, Don Pedro de Zuñiga, sent Philip a report about Virginia which contained drawings that described the rivers, harbors, and sailing path from England. But this report was grossly inaccurate, which suggests it may have been deliberately given to him so that he would avoid seeking additional maps.15 The next Spanish ambassador, Don Alfonso de

Velasco, found better success. In 1611, Velasco obtained an accurate detailed map of

Virginia, which he claimed was drawn by a surveyor James sent to the colony.”16

King James and the Virginia Company also commissioned surveys of Virginia and

Bermuda in the years following settlement. In 1616, the Somers Isles Company sent

Richard Norwood, an expert in navigation, mathematics, and cartography to Bermuda to conduct a thorough survey of the land. When James dissolved the Virginia Company in

1624, he dispatched Norwood to Virginia to take a thorough survey of the condition of the colony in order to aid James’s Royal Commission’s plan to improve it. To ensure that

Norwood was familiar with the most current technologies, James sent him by way of the

Dutch Republic to observe the latest agricultural innovations.17

English explorers and early colonists drew many of their maps and reports from

Amerindian sources. While the English had explored much of the North American coastal lands, geographic details for inland territories, which included settlements with Algonquin names, demonstrates the reliance on indigenous informants. It is difficult to attribute this information directly to such informants, since only on a few occasions did mapmakers and

15 Zuñiga to Philip, 10 September 1608, in Brown, Genesis, 183-184. 16 Velasco to Philip, 22 March 1611, in Brown, Genesis, 457. 17 Council for Virginia to Sir Dudley Carleton, 29 March 1623, TNA, SP 84/9/123.

36 explorers clearly identify their sources. One example is Captain John Smith’s 1612 map

“Virginia.” On this map, Smith drew crosses on places “discovered” by the English, whereas the rest of the details derived “by information of the Savages, and are set downe, according to their instructions.”18 Another 1611 map, the one copied by the Spanish ambassador Velasco, also noted Amerindian contributions. As the key described, this map was drawn in four colors, whereby, “[a]ll the blue is done by the relations of the Indians.”19

Elizabeth and James also collected information from Amerindian captives taken to

England. In 1576 and 1577, Frobisher brought Inuit captives to London.20 In 1584, Raleigh brought two men, Manteo of Croatan and Wanchese of Roanoke, to London from his

Carolina expedition. At Durham House, Raleigh and Hariot taught Manteo and Wachese

English, while simultaneously gathering information about their homeland.21 Tisquantam, the Patuxet man who famously assisted the Plymouth colonists, made six Atlantic crossings. He was initially captured by Captain George Weymouth in 1605. In England,

Sir Ferdinando Gorges taught him English. In 1614, John Smith brought Tisquantam as an interpreter on his expedition.22 In 1609, the Sea Venture, the ship returning from England

18 G. Malcolm Lewis, “‘Native North Americans’ Cosmological Ideas and Geographical Awareness: Their Representation and Influence on Early European Exploration and Geographical Knowledge,” North American Exploration: A New World Disclosed, ed. John Logan Allen (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 117 19 Lewis, “‘Native North Americans,” 118. 20 Alden Vaughan, Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1550-1776 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-10. Vaughan notes that while these captives were the first Amerindians thoroughly documented in London, at least four others preceded them. 21 Vaughan, Transatlantic Encounters, 21-22. 22 Smith’s lieutenant, Thomas Hunt abducted Tisquanto and tried to sell him and other captives in Spain. Franciscan friars rescued him and eventually made it to London and after participating in another North American expedition. Tisquanto finally made it home in 1619, see Charles Mann, 1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus (New York: Random House, 2005), 61- 66.

37 to Virginia that wrecked on the coast of Bermuda, carried two Powhatan men: Namontack and Machumps, both of whom were returning from their second trip to England.23

Mapping Spaces: Amerindian Inhabitants

Explorers and surveyors also collected information about indigenous people and their cultures. They gathered some of this information directly from Amerindian sources and drew other reports from observation and speculation. John White wrote detailed accounts of Algonquian behaviors and customs. He drew portraits of Algonquian men and women, which Theodor de Bry used for his engravings that accompanied the illustrated edition of Hariot’s Briefe and True Report.24 Hariot learned Algonquin languages and served as a go-between for the English. Indeed, the lengthiest section in Hariot’s account was his description of Algonquian people, in which he detailed “their natures and maners.”25

Hariot described Algonquian clothes, weapons, and the organization of their towns and homes.26 He recorded the structure of their government, counted the towns belonging to each werowance, and the number of “fighting men.”27 Hariot paid attention to cultural difference, particularly distinctions in language. He recorded the manner of war and the nature of their religion, noting, “[t]hey beleeue that there are many Gods which they call

Mantóac, but of different sortes and degrees; one onely chiefe and great God, which hath

23 Vaughan, Transatlantic Encounters, 50. 24 Hariot, A briefe and true report (Frankfort, 1590). STC 12786. 25 Ibid., 24-30. 26 Ibid., 25. 27 “A chief of the Indians of Virginia and Maryland in early colonial days.” OED Online, "werowance, n," accessed June 25, 2016, http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/227860.

38 bene from all eternitie.” Hariot’s primary goal was to describe and record. But like most

English reports, Hariot’s account contained Eurocentric civilizing discourse. When noting how English “knowledges and craftes…exceede theirs in perfection,” Hariot remarked, “if meanes of good gouernment bee vsed, that they may in short time be brought to ciuilitie, and the imbracing of true religion.”28

John Smith’s, A Description of New England also contained dense ethnographic information. Smith recorded the sovereignty and jurisdiction of each territory he explored.

Unlike Hariot, Smith tended to universalize differences in culture. Describing “the

Countries of Aucocisco, Accominticus, Passataquack, Aggawom, & Naemkeck,” Smith noted “all these, I could perceiue, differ little in language, fashion, or gouernment.”29

Collecting Knowledge: Botanical and Trade Surveys

Collecting information about potential commodities was also central to the Stuart imperial project. Early exploratory ventures not only identified spaces suitable for English colonization, but also prospective merchantable commodities and materials for colonists’ sustenance. These reports were sent first to the Crown, Councilors, and Company members. Virginia authorities also sent these reports to the Crown’s supervisory body, the

Council for Virginia.

Hariot gathered and catalogued specimens as he explored Virginia. The first sections of his text described “marchantable commodities,” including silk grass, worm silk, flax and hemp, sassafras, cedar, wine, oil, furs, iron, and dyes.30 Hariot identified

28 Hariot, A briefe and true report, 25. 29 Smith, A description of New England (London, 1616), 9. STC. 22788. 30 Hariot, A briefe and true report, 7.

39 commodities according to England’s needs and uses and he also noted American products and their value and use by Algonguians. For example, in his discussion of dyes, Hariot tied local expertise to English manufacturing: “There is Shoemake well knowen, and vsed in

England for blacke; the seede of an hearbe called Wasewówr: little small rootes called

Cháppacor; and the barke of the tree called by the inhabitaunts

Tangomóckonomindge…their goodnesse for our English clothes remayne yet to be proued.

The inhabitants vse them onely for the dying of hayre;and colouring of their faces, and

Mantles made of Deare skinnes.”31 Hariot also included a second list of commodities, “fed vpon by the naturall inhabitants,” that would provide sustenance for the colonists.32 This list included roots, fruits, acorns, and beasts.

John Smith also identified a range of merchantable commodities:“From Pennobscot to Sagadahock is all Mountainous and Iles of huge Rocks, but ouergrowen with all sorts of excellent good woodes for building houses, boats, barks or shippes; with an incredible abundance of most sorts of fish, much fowle, and sundry sorts of good fruites for mans vse.”33 He listed the many herbs, fruits, and vegetables found in the mountains. He also identified opportunities to learn from indigenous practices. Noting the presence of “a kinde or two of flax,” Smith remarked, “wherewith they make nets, lines and ropes both small and great, verie strong for their quantities.” Smith also listed dozens of trees, birds, fish, and game animals.”34

Other Englishmen undertook brief trips to the colonies to gather botanical specimens. John Tradescant, botanist, and gardener to prominent men, including Robert

31 Ibid., 11. 32 Ibid., 13. 33 Smith, Description of New England, 8-9. 34 Smith, Description of New England, 29.

Cecil Earl of Salisbury; George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham; and later King Charles I took great interest in collecting colonial specimens. In 1625, Tradescant wrote to Sir

Edward Nicholas, secretary of the Admiralty, informing him that Buckingham had authorized him to “deal with all merchants from all places, but especially from Virginia,

Bermudas, Newfoundland, Guinea, Binney, the Amazon, East Indies, & c., for all manner of rare beasts, fowls and birds, shells and stones.”35 John Tradescant the younger, who succeeded his father as the king’s head gardener, made three expeditions to North

America.36 In 1637, Charles sent Tradescant to Virginia “to gather all rarities of flowers, plants, and shells.”37 These botanical and trade surveys helped direct agricultural projects on the ground. As we will see in chapter two, they were also a central feature of colonial promotional literature.

The Uses of American information

These were the types of information that informed England’s colonial policy.

During the first sixteen years of colonization, the Virginia Company and King James’s

Council for Virginia directed English colonial ventures in Virginia and Bermuda. The

Council assumed a supervisory role, tending to become involved in colonial government only in times of crisis. The Council harnessed these reports as propaganda to counteract when news of hardship in the colonies reached England.

35 Note of things desired from Guinea, for which letters are to be written to the merchants of the Guinea Company and the Gold Coast, July, 1625, TNA SP 14/4/155. 36 Barbara Sebek and Stephen Deng, Global Traffic: Discourses and Practices of Trade in English Literature and Culture from 1550-1700 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 147. 37 Report of the National Museum, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), 69n.

But as Virginia colonists struggled to stabilize the colony, James and his Privy

Council became increasingly concerned about the Company’s ability to successfully manage it. As will be discussed in detail, after the 1622 Massacre, the Company’s failings became even more apparent. In 1623, James authorized an investigation into the Virginia

Company. The committee of investigation had two aims: to determine whether the

Company was fit to manage the colony, and to provide recommendations for how to improve conditions on the ground. The committee seized the Company’s written records, gathering the aforementioned maps and reports on which to base their recommendations.

On directions from the Privy Council, the committee also ordered their on-site investigators to take surveys and a census of the colony.

Charles I also gathered surveys and reports from the colonies in order to inform his imperial project. During war with Spain (1625 to 1630), Charles used this information to streamline colonial design. He instructed Secretary of State, Sir Edward Conway and

George, Baron Carew to draw together maps, relations, and papers from Virginia to restructure the colony’s government.38 Attorney General Sir Robert Health drafted arguments for increased English presence in the West Indies in order to counter Spain and the Dutch Republic.39 Heath also reviewed all the information that had been collected to approve patents for diverse colonial projects. In the West Indies, Charles granted his father’s one-time favorite, James Hay, Earl of Carlisle a patent for over twenty islands including St. Christopher, Barbados, and Antigua. He also approved the patent of the

Providence Island Company, the Guiana Company, the Massachusetts Bay Company

38 Secretary Sir Edward Conway to Sir Thos. Smythe, 29 April 1625, TNA CO 1/3/39. 39 Memoranda by Attorney General Sir Robert Heath, April 1625, TNA, CO 1/3/37.

(1628) and expanded English presence in Canada (1629). Sir John Coke also proposed a state-run English West Indian Company.40

Following the Anglo-Spanish War, Charles devoted additional resources to imperial oversight. This management also involved collecting information, but the information gathered primarily concerned those subjects who travelled to, and traded in,

England’s Atlantic colonies. As chapter six will demonstrate, the Committee for Foreign

Plantations, Charles’s appointed body to oversee colonial affairs, reviewed the many certificates, licenses to travel, and ship registers required for colonial travel and trade.

This narrative is not an exhaustive summary of the types of information collected by English men and women in and about the Americas. Some of this information was collected for private interests—to further scientific and natural curiosities or to adorn homes and gardens with colonial curiosities. Like Tradescant’s collections, which served the Crown’s interests as well as a cabinet of curios, interest in the Americas could simultaneously serve state and private interests.

This dissertation will not address all the information English people collected.

Instead, it will consider the ways in which managing information informed English empire building. The Crown and Privy Council put some information gathered to use while simultaneously concealing and manipulating other information. The ways they used this information depended on its utility to the imperial project. As we will see, the early Stuart kings and their governments commissioned and co-opted information from and about

America to inform English empire building.

40 Propositions [in the handwriting of Sir John Coke] for incorporating a company for defense and protection of the West Indies, 14 April 1625, TNA, SP 16/1/59.

Chapter One

Designing an Embassy for Espionage: Anglo-Spanish Relations and the Negotiation of Atlantic Diplomacy

“Those that I employ; send me word that they every day grow more doubt that there will be something attempted against the Plantation in Virginia....But howsoever it will be required that those of Virginia live in continual expectation of being assailed; for first or last, the Spaniards will certainly attempt them, for thereof they make already public profession.”1 “For [spying] is a tender and dainty business which must not be slubbered2 or foiled with haste.” 3

When James I ascended the throne in 1603, he made peace with Spain one of his first matters of state. The war with Spain had grown costly; peace was a pragmatic solution to an overstretched budget. The Treaty of London (1604), which settled the peace, was largely successful. Both countries renewed trade and condemned piracy. Philip III renounced his intention to restore Catholicism to England and James agreed to end English intervention in the Dutch Revolt. The one aim that England failed to achieve to this point was formal access to trade in the West Indies. This failure complicated Anglo-Spanish politics. Peace with Spain was central to James’s foreign policy. However, if James were to abstain from Europe’s competition in the Americas, England could risk losing out on the great potential of trade, resources, and land that this hemisphere offered.

1 Sir John Digby to James I, 5 March 1613, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 293. 2 Hastily put together; hurriedly gone through; done or performed carelessly, etc. OED Online, “slubbered,” accessed September 13, 2015, http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/182199. 3 Digby to James, 3 August 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 19.

Thus, the renewal of diplomatic relations, with an embassy in Madrid, and resident consuls4 in Iberian port cities, was critical to gathering intelligence about Spain’s empire and the wider Atlantic. The intelligence networks established directly after the peace— even before England’s resident ambassador arrived—demonstrate the priority of this intelligence gathering. Consulates in port cities offered English agents a strategic position to better observe Spain’s West Indian trade and gather more reliable Atlantic intelligence and news. Consuls and merchants (who were in some places one and the same) wrote reports at least weekly to James and his secretary of state, Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, which contained detailed bills of lading for Spanish treasure fleets and reports from sailors.

Once the resident embassy was established, English diplomats used consuls’ position and their resources to develop complex networks of informants and spies to better compete with Spain in the Americas.

This chapter examines the intelligence practices instituted by diplomats at the

English embassy in Madrid in order to better equip England to compete with Spain in the

Americas and protect English Atlantic colonies. I argue that the English embassy in Madrid served as a lens through which to view Spain’s West Indian trade and as a hub of Atlantic intelligence networks. English diplomats cultivated intelligence agents who intercepted correspondence, decoded Spanish ciphers, monitored naval preparations, and tracked the movements of the West Indies fleet. This information helped English statesmen to better

4 “Hence, by gradual development: An agent appointed and commissioned by a sovereign state to reside in a foreign town or port, to protect the interests of its traders and other subjects there, and to assist in all matters pertaining to the commercial relations between the two countries. So consul-general, vice-consul. (The ordinary current sense.)” OED Online, "consul, n." 8, accessed December 13, 2015, http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/39939.

46 understand the mechanisms of the Spanish Empire and defend England’s fledgling colonies.

Diplomatic intelligence programs were not a seventeenth-century innovation.

Constructing capable networks of informants and spies was a long-established aspect of foreign diplomacy. Well-placed intelligence agents at foreign courts helped states gain a competitive edge. But individual statesmen often hired spies to serve their own interests, not exclusively the interests of the state.5 This point is where King James’s intelligence programs diverged from those that came before. Salisbury, James’s Secretary of State, responsible for foreign affairs, initiated some of the intelligence activities in Spain. After

Salisbury’s death in 1612, James directed intelligence himself.

The reach of these networks was also unprecedented. In order to warn the Crown and colonists of impending attacks on the Virginia and Bermuda colonies, English diplomats employed intelligence agents throughout the Atlantic and intensified espionage activities at the Spanish court. Ambassadors designed this program to meet the challenges posed by an environment of rumor and misinformation in Spain. They worked hard to gain and corroborate accurate reports to navigate this milieu.

Residency in Spain, Europe’s nexus of American trade and empire, provided

English diplomats a tremendous opportunity to gather Atlantic intelligence. As agents of a new imperial rivalry, these diplomats often encountered increased scrutiny and antagonism. Therefore, in order to defend England’s Atlantic interests and improve

5 John Michael Archer, Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 5; Foreign Intelligence and Information in Elizabethan England: Two English Treatises on the State of France, 1580-1584, Camden Fifth Series Vol. 25, ed. David Potter (London: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6.

England’s position in Europe’s Atlantic contest, English diplomats in Spain cautiously and covertly developed far-reaching networks of informants and spies. These Atlantic networks enabled James to protect English settlements in Virginia and Bermuda from Spanish attacks. Therefore, by using the position and resources of English diplomats in Spain to conduct effective Atlantic intelligence, James expanded his available resources to defend and further England’s nascent imperial project.

The intelligence yielded by this program also proved critical during Anglo-Spanish conflicts over Guiana. Sir Walter Raleigh’s second attempt to explore Guiana in 1618 drew sharp objections from King Philip and his ministers. In his defense of this expedition,

James articulated a clear imperial policy that endeavored to maintain peace without compromising empire building. To defend Spain’s proscriptions over the Americas, James forced Philip and his ambassadors to engage in a wider debate over sovereignty and possession of American territories. Moreover, by attempting to restrain English power in

America, and establish an international order in the Atlantic “beyond the line” of discrete boundaries for European relations, Spain recognized English overseas authority by negotiating Atlantic disputes through routine foreign policy procedures.6 This period of

Anglo-Spanish peace, punctuated by tensions over Atlantic competition, helped to shape the early English Atlantic empire. Peace with Spain allowed English ambassadors in

6 Mancke, “Empire and State,” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800,” ed. Armitage and Braddick, 196; As will be discussed, Charles Carter argued that beginning with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559), all states negotiating peace with Spain demanded the right to trade with the Indies, and when refused, left the matter out of the treaty. As a result, since the treaties did not cover foreign access to the Indies, there was “‘no peace beyond the line.’” Carter suggests that while this did not “affect a raider’s status regarding piracy… it did remove an important motive for government’s restraint of one’s own subjects.” Carter, “Diplomatic intervention in English law enforcement: Sarmiento and James I,” in Tudor Rule and Revolution; Essays for G.R. Elton from his American friends, ed. DeLloyd Guth et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 264-265.

Madrid to develop effective intelligence practices to manage Atlantic information and protect the fledgling colonies. With these resources, James and his Privy Council were better prepared to defend England’s nascent Atlantic empire.

Background

Tensions between England and Spain were high during the final decades of the sixteenth century. The undeclared Anglo-Spanish war (1585-1604) saw conflict in Europe and in the Americas. Both states traded victories and defeats. In Europe, England won early victories in Cádiz (1587) and over the Spanish Armada (1588), while Spain defeated a retaliatory English Armada (1589) and two later English armadas (1596 and 1597) both which were frustrated by bad weather and poor planning. In the Atlantic, Spain defeated the attempted Caribbean raids of Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins (1595) and that of Sir Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex and Sir Walter Raleigh (1597).7 In this context of war, the proliferation of mutually antagonistic literature created a climate that heightened antipathy and widened the cultural gap between England and Spain. However, despite these antagonisms, by the end of the sixteenth century, fatigue and frustration with the protracted and costly war encouraged both sides to consider a peace.

The peace signed by Spain and France at Vervins in 1598 made Anglo-Spanish peace even more likely. By making peace with both powers, Philip III hoped to give Spain more power over its enemies and allow time to replenish his military resources diminished

7 See David B. Quinn and A.N. Ryan, chapter 5, “Plunder and Exploration in Time of War, 1585- 1604,” in England’s Sea Empire, 1550-1642, ed. Quinn and Ryan (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), 133-153.

49 in the Dutch conflict.8 Thus, for both sides, pursuing peace was mostly a fiscal strategy. In the summer of 1598 William Camden recorded that the matter was “acutely debated in

England.”9 Elizabeth’s Privy Councilors, apart from Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, largely favored a peace.10 The matter also became a topic of public opinion. Individuals circulated their positions in manuscript and printed tracts appeared in the Netherlands.11

Heeding the advice of her Councilors, Elizabeth considered the matter from many angles.

She assigned the antiquary, Sir Robert Cotton, to prepare arguments both in favor of and against peace.12 At a conference in Boulogne in 1600, English and Spanish delegates conducted preliminary meetings for a settlement. While many terms were agreed on, discussions broke down largely because Spain rejected the possibility of English trade in the West Indies. After the peace talks failed, King Philip, hoping to force the queen back into negotiations, sent forces to Ireland to assist the rebellion of Hugh O’Neill, Earl of

Tyrone, against the English. While Elizabeth’s army successfully defeated Irish and

Spanish forces, the protracted and costly battles continued until her death.13 The conflict in

Ireland further convinced Privy Councilors, and the future King James, that securing peace with Spain was necessary.

Thus, shortly after his ascension, James made peace with Spain his first matter of state. He was not, as historians have suggested, forging a reputation as Rex Pacificus or

8 Paul Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), viii. 9 William Camden, Annales, 155; “Accurate interim discpeatur in Anglia, an in reipub. & Reginae rem esset, pacem cum Hispano pacisci,” as quoted in Alexandra Gadja, “Debating War and Peace in late Elizabethan England,” The Historical Journal 52. 4 (2009): 863. 10 Gadja, “Debating War and Peace,” 852. 11 Ibid., 868-9. 12 Andrew Thrush, “The Parliamentary Opposition to Peace with Spain in 1604: A Speech of Sir Edward Hoby,” Parliamentary History 23:3 (2004): 302. 13 Susan Doran, Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge, 2000), 62.

50 signaling Spanish sympathies, but instead responding to a popular and pragmatic call for an end to the war.14 Philip was also amenable to peace with England because it would provide a safeguard in the Indies, a counterbalance to French power, and help to resolve the war with Holland quickly.15 English and Spanish delegates met at Somerset House in the summer of 1604 to address their terms. Both states hoped to end the embargo on trade.

Spanish representatives desired to end English piracy in the Indies and secure better treatment for Catholics in England. English representatives lobbied once again for access to the West Indian trade.16

England was not the first European power to seek permission to trade in the West

Indies. Beginning with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (1559), all powers negotiating with

Spain routinely requested trade in the West Indies and, when denied, simply left the matter out of the treaty. Charles Carter argued that since the treaties did not address West Indian access, they were only limited to Europe and European waters, inferring that “there was

‘no peace beyond the line.’”17 In many ways, Carter’s assessment is correct; privateering and illegal trade persisted when states were at peace with Spain. But this might have more to do with Spain’s limited ability to police the area than an agreement to a “beyond the line” policy. Letters of marque (official licenses for privateering) were rarely issued

14 R.M. Smuts, “The making of Rex Pacificus : James VI and I and the problem of peace in an age of religious war,” in Royal subjects: Essays on the Writings of James VI and I, ed. Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002): 364-5; Pauline Croft “Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain,” in The accession of James I: Historical and Cultural Consequences, ed. Glenn Burgess et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 140-1. Croft argues that the 1604 peace can be interpreted as the final act of Elizabethan diplomacy instead of the first chapter of Jacobean diplomacy. She attributes the peace mostly to Salisbury. 15 Charles Carter, The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 12. 16 Linda Levy Peck, Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), 105. 17 Carter, “Diplomatic intervention in English law enforcement,” 265.

51 publicly during times of peace and aggressive West Indian campaigns typically occurred when states were at war with Spain. Moreover, England, like other European powers, generally pursued different West Indian policies when at war or peace with Spain. As this chapter will demonstrate, during peace time, rather than test Spanish patience in the West

Indies, James actively pursued an imperial policy of settlement and trade in places without a permanent Spanish presence.

Thus, in order to satisfy both continental and imperial aims, James crafted a new policy that endeavored to maintain peace with Spain while pursuing Atlantic resources.

Elizabeth’s policy of privateering and plunder in the West Indies only suited a wartime context.18 This context required James to find a different space, without an active Spanish presence, for colonization.19 While King Philip maintained Spain’s right to most of the

Americas derived from the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), James based his conception of imperial sovereignty on active possession. Located distant from Spain’s settlements, and previously surveyed by English explorers, Virginia would become the choice location.

Despite disagreement over the West Indies, English and Spanish representatives agreed to peace at Somerset House on August 19, 1604. While Spain refused to make concessions over the West Indies, both sides achieved some desirable ends in the Treaty of

London. Spain renounced its intention to restore Catholicism to England and opened up

Spanish ports to English merchants. England denounced piracy in the West Indies and ceased military and financial intervention in the Dutch Revolt. The signing of the peace was a momentous affair. Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton organized a ceremonious

18 Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 138.

52 welcome for the Constable of Castile who came to London to sign the treaty.20 Charles

Howard, Earl of Nottingham, led a group of more than 600 courtiers, friends, and liveried escorts to witness Philip sign the peace in 1605 in Valladolid.21

Once in Madrid, English diplomats established a new resident embassy.

Unfortunately for most of the English ambassadorial staff, Spain was at first a strange and uncomfortable place. Decades of Anglo-Spanish conflict accompanied by religious and cultural differences created a generation of English people unaccustomed to Spaniards.

Furthermore, the popularity of anti-Spanish and “black legend” literature in England and anti-English print culture in Spain fostered mutual distrust. During the first years of the embassy, these cultural divisions clouded the experiences of the resident ambassador, Sir

Charles Cornwallis, and his secretary, Francis Cottington.22 Cottington loathed his living conditions, lamenting “how poorly myself must live here.” He later commented on the assignment of Sir John Digby as ambassador, expressing his sorrow that Digby should be exiled to “this wretched and unhappy country”23

The cultural isolation that diplomats and their servants felt was also accompanied by religious discrimination. As Protestants, many English residents and travelers to Spain were frequently harassed and imprisoned by the Inquisition. English diplomats spent much of their time lobbying for the release of these prisoners. This tension was a common and

20 Peck, Northampton, 110. 21 Joseph Cresswell, English Polemics at the Spanish Court: Joseph Creswell’s Letter to the Ambassador from England, the English and Spanish texts of 1606, ed. Albert J. Loomie (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), 3; “Howard, Charles, second Baron Howard of Effingham and first earl of Nottingham (1536–1624),” James McDermott in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13885 (accessed January 14, 2016). 22 Martin Havran, Caroline Courtier: The Life of Lord Cottington (London: Macmillan, 1973), 12. 23 Ibid., 34.

53 perplexing problem; even English embassy servants were imprisoned for religious reasons during their years of residence.24 Thus, Spain was at first a challenging place to conduct effective diplomacy.

Building the Framework for Intelligence

Resident embassies were a late medieval and early modern innovation.25 Italian states first began to set up embassies in the fifteenth century and England was not long to follow. By the 1520s, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey began the practice of sending networks of resident ambassadors to capitals on the continent.26 But the religious wars of the mid-to- late sixteenth century damaged many diplomatic institutions. After 1568, the only resident

English ambassador was at the French court.27 In the late sixteenth century, this situation improved. Elizabeth sent ambassadors to European capitals who were supervised by her

Principal Secretary, William Cecil, Baron Burghley.

Through ambassadors, Burghley undertook various intelligence projects. Between

1579 and 1584, he led a project to survey the entire French political class and the structure of power in the provinces.28 As part of this project, he sent his son, Robert Cecil, the future

Earl of Salisbury, to Paris in 1584 to collect intelligence to inform his report.29 But this project was, according to David Potter, “not so much about spying as information gathering

24 Ibid., 14. 25 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), 17-44. 26 Ibid., 161. 27 Ibid., 205. 28 Foreign Intelligence and Information, Potter, 1. 29 Ibid. Potter notes that Burleigh’s project resembled the detailed reports taken by Venetian ambassadors, known as Relazioni. Relazioni contained descriptions of the current political, military, economic, and social conditions of the assigned country.

54 and analysis.”30 Burleigh indeed sent spies to Europe’s capitals, but they were not ambassadors. John Michael Archer argues that far from being professionalized, “the field of intelligence was instead a particularly obscure sector of the greater field of patronage.”31

As this chapter will demonstrate, both claims do not adequately describe English intelligence in Spain during King James’s reign. While one of Cornwallis’s initial tasks was to provide reports about the Spanish court and the structure of power, his responsibilities shortly thereafter involved more covert practices of espionage. James ordered Cornwallis and his successors to employ spies to intercept confidential information. Salisbury was an integral intelligence director during the early years of

James’s reign. But after Salisbury’s death in 1612, James directly managed intelligence coming from Spain.

For Sir Charles Cornwallis, who had risen quickly under the patronage of Salisbury, his appointment as resident ambassador to Spain was a tremendous opportunity to demonstrate his capabilities as a statesmen. While eager to perform well in his duties,

Cornwallis was unhappy in Madrid. He fell ill on his journey to Spain and experienced frequent health problems throughout his short tenure. To make matters worse, Cornwallis was harassed by the Inquisition and had financial troubles. From 1607 he asked James to relieve him of his post. But despite these difficulties Cornwallis worked hard to construct an effective embassy. He wrote treatises for James and Salisbury on the state of the kingdom, the structure of the court, the wealth of the nobility, and other matters of valuable

30 Archer, Sovereignty and Intelligence, 5. 31 Ibid.

55 intelligence. He also labored to protect English merchants in Spain from agents of the

Inquisition.32

One of Cornwallis’s most urgent matters was establishing a successful intelligence network inside Spain. To achieve this goal, Cornwallis and his secretary Cottington, needed to gather information from a wide pool of intelligence sources, so that reports from each source could be corroborated or contradicted by reports from other sources. These agents generally fell into five groups: allies at court, foreign ambassadors, consuls, merchants, and sailors or dock workers.

Allies at court were valuable sources for current information. They offered insight into the proceedings of various councils and the direction of Spanish policy. But after decades of war, finding allies was challenging. Cornwallis found a cold welcome and general skepticism. He did, however, find an important ally in Philip’s favorite, Don

Francisco Gómez de Sandoval, Duke of Lerma. Lerma proved to be a valuable confidant for Cornwallis and his successors.33

While Cornwallis did not have an established group of confidants to draw on when he came to the Spanish court, English ambassadors at other European courts, particularly those in Brussels (the capital of the Spanish Netherlands), Paris, and the Hague, often did.

These ambassadors had access to intelligence from Spain. Maintaining frequent correspondence with other European diplomats was an important part of diplomatic work

32 “Cornwallis, Sir Charles (c.1555–1629),” Chris R. Kyle in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6337 (accessed January 14, 2016).See also Complaints made in Spain, with answers, July 1607, TNA SP 94/19 f. 99; How to overthrow Spanish power, 1607, TNA, SP 94/16 f. 192; Spanish power and how it may be broken, c. 1608, SP 94/15 f. 214- 219. 33 Discourse between Lerma and Cornwallis, 1 October 1605, TNA, SP 94/13, f. 60-71.

56 and was especially critical to intelligence gathering. James instructed each ambassador to form relationships with men and women at court, particularly those close to the king, in order to gain intelligence pertaining to all aspects of English foreign policy. Ambassadors then shared this information with other diplomats throughout Europe. Through these exchanges, often another ambassador’s networks could fill critical intelligence gaps.

Cornwallis sent frequent letters to his counterparts in Brussels and Paris, detailing the movements of the West Indies fleet and Philip’s growing discontent with England’s

Virginia colony. Cornwallis’s secretary, Cottington, also corresponded frequently with other English ambassadors and their secretaries.34 These ambassadors and their secretaries sent Cornwallis and Cottington reports relevant to England’s interests in Spain and recounted conversations with the Spanish representatives at their respective courts.

In the first years of the embassy, when information was most difficult to acquire,

English consuls served as much-needed intelligencers. James sent consuls to Spanish port towns with instructions to cultivate informants and observe trade. As agents on the ground, they observed trade and reported naval preparations, news, and gossip. Immediately after peace was signed, Salisbury sent Thomas Wilson, his personal secretary (and future Keeper of the State Papers), to Bayonne, an important French shipping hub near the Spanish border. Salisbury instructed Wilson to develop relationships with English, Spanish, and other European merchants. Wilson left Spain shortly after Cottington arrived there but continued to receive weekly letters from consuls and merchants in Spain and Portugal about

Atlantic intelligence for many years.35 In Lisbon, Hugh Lee was the principal informant

34 Charles Cornwallis to Thomas Edmondes, 22 February 1607, BL, Stowe MSS 169 f. 299; Francis Cottington to William Trumbull, 22 February 1607, BL Stowe MSS 169 f. 301. 35 Wilson received regular letters from Hugh Lee, Richard Cocks, and B. Bourdet.

57 from 1605 to 1620 and the appointed consul from 1609.36 Lee wrote at least weekly to the resident ambassador in Madrid and the Secretary of State in England. By the early 1610s,

James and Salisbury established a more permanent system of resident consuls in which each consul cultivated his own networks of informants.

During these early years English and Scottish merchants also proved especially critical to intelligence gathering. Despite the ban on trade, many merchants had stayed in

Spain during the war and by 1604 were deeply entrenched in their communities. Working with English consuls resident in each major port city, these agents successfully gathered

Atlantic intelligence.37 In Lisbon, Matthew Bruning and Thomas Honyman provided frequent reports. In Seville, John Jude and Neville Davis served as chief informants.

Spanish authorities occasionally caught on to these merchants’ intelligence activities. In

1608, the English merchant and intelligence agent Richard Cocks was arrested in San

Sebastian for suspicious activities.38 In 1610, Spanish authorities arrested Neville Davis in

Seville on charges of espionage and banished him from the city. According to Cornwallis,

Davis had drawn attention to himself by behaving “only in the nature and fashion of a spy, and his much looking into the negotiations and most private and secret businesses of the contratacion house and the course of the kings Indies.”39 Davis’s arrest suggests that

Spanish authorities closely watched English consuls and merchants.

36 TNA SP 94/16; see also John Stoye, English Travellers Abroad: 1604-1667 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 247. 37 As the State Papers Foreign for Spain in 1605 demonstrate, Cornwallis and Salisbury received frequent reports from the aforementioned consuls and English merchants residing in Spanish ports directly after England and Spain negotiation peace. See TNA SP 94/12. 38 Cocks would later have a career as a merchant in Japan and with the East India Company. 39 Cornwallis to Lords of the Council, 1610, TNA 94/16 f. 69.

English ambassadors and consuls also employed additional intelligence agents in port cities to watch the West Indies trade and observe naval preparations. While they are difficult to identify, this group included sailors, dock workers, and customs agents. In one of his first letters from Madrid, Cornwallis reported to Salisbury about the silver influx from the West Indian trade and his efforts to learn the destination of a newly built fleet.40

Informants in Seville, Cadiz, Lisbon, Malaga, San Sebastian, and Bayonne appear in the records. They counted the goods and materials that the Spanish treasure fleet brought home and, if possible, bribed agents who could provide accurate bills of lading for each arrival.

On the ground in Havana, English agents watched as the treasure fleets were stocked with minerals and commodities and sent their reports to their agents in England. Once the fleet arrived in Spain, informants in Spanish ports detailed ships’ cargo as it was unloaded.

In addition to these five groups of agents, Cornwallis’s dispatches suggest, albeit vaguely, that he successfully acquired a few spies within the Spanish government shortly after his arrival. For instance, in October 1605, he mentioned as his source for intelligence at court “one whom I employ in those Discoveries.” This agent was most likely one of the secretaries or messengers who assisted the Council of State. As Paul Allen notes, one of the responsibilities of Council secretaries was to sort through incoming correspondence in order to set the agenda for Council meetings.41 While these meetings were held in secret, secretaries recorded the Councilors’ recommendations and wrote them up as advice papers called consultas. Hiring these well-placed spies became an important aspect of the intelligence program of Cornwallis’s successors.

40 Charles Cornwallis to Salisbury, 4 September 1605, TNA, SP 94/12 f. 7-8. 41 Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 5.

With these agents in place, Cornwallis and Cottington were better able to collect intelligence. Thus, by cultivating relationships with people at court, ambassadors well- established in other European courts, consuls, merchants, and others, Cornwallis and

Cottington became proficient in the culture of Spanish politics and the management of

Spain’s Empire. After these networks were firmly in place, English diplomats began to conduct more covert intelligence.

Sir John Digby, the Intelligence Master

In 1610, James appointed Sir John Digby as resident ambassador in Spain. He arrived in Madrid in June 1611.42 Like Cornwallis, Digby had quickly risen in James’s favor, serving previously as a gentlemen of the Privy Chamber and as one of the king’s carvers.43 He was an ambitious agent, eager to demonstrate his abilities to his king. Digby quickly expanded and improved the intelligence networks established by Cornwallis and

Cottington. Within a few years he built an impressive network of informants and spies. In addition to the consuls and merchants, Digby enlisted men to watch the movement of goods into and out of the Casa de la Contratación (House of Trade) and secretly search customs records. These agents drew up accurate bills of lading detailing the treasure of the West

Indies fleet. Digby also employed agents at court who intercepted and quickly deciphered

Spanish letters. Moreover, like Cornwallis, Digby had a friendship with the Duke of Lerma.

Digby thus collaborated with statesmen, merchants, colonists, and travelers. He understood

42 “Digby, John, first earl of Bristol (1580–1653),” David L. Smith in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/7628 (accessed January 14, 2016). 43 Smith, “Digby,” ODNB.

60 that determining the accuracy of the information each individual provided required corroboration from an abundance of sources in Europe and the Atlantic.

Digby was particularly adept at enlisting Spanish agents at court. In Madrid he bribed agents to intercept, decipher, and copy official Spanish correspondence and dispatches, often to the bewilderment of Spanish ministers. Digby’s ability to access this information became particularly apparent in his efforts to acquire intelligence regarding

Spain’s plans to attack the Virginia colony.

Digby acquired his espionage acumen through hard work. When he arrived in

Madrid in 1611, he was overwhelmed with the intelligence he was required to gather given his limited budget. But knowing that his success hinged on this activity, Digby immediately brought the matter to James’s attention, complaining that “it is not possible, for an

Ambassador to be sent to a Courte poorly provided of means of Intelligence and correspondency then I am to this [court].” He warned James that until he found a “surer way” of acquiring sound intelligence, “I shall be very distrustful to write unto your Majesty any thing is certain.” He reminded James that the conditions in Spain were different from other European courts. He had “neither here the assistance of any allied to your Majesty, nor a faction of our religion. ... [nor] directions to receive assistance of any other man at this Courte or Kingdome, in your Majesty’s service.” Without further assistance, James would find intelligence “from hence colder and poorer than from other parts.”44

As Digby emphasized, had he been appointed to a well established embassy, he would have found a network of confidants and intelligence agents already in place. In

Madrid however, despite the intelligence infrastructure and networks Cornwallis

44 Digby to James, June 1611, TNA, SP 94/18, f. 111-112.

61 developed, Digby found his embassy poorly equipped to gather adequate intelligence. It is unclear whether Digby received additional resources; his purse for intelligence, only £125 quarterly, remained meager throughout his posting. But Digby proved to be an exceptional intelligence agent. Even with his small intelligence allowance, Digby managed to hire well- placed spies to intercept and copy important Spanish dispatches relating to Anglo-Spanish affairs and acquired the ciphers to decode letters.

Philip’s ministers became concerned about Digby’s ability to gather privileged information. The reports he sent back to England were so detailed and accurate that the

Spanish ambassador encouraged Philip to look into Digby’s agents. After further investigation, the ambassador learned that Digby had been intercepting and transcribing his letters and dispatches. It is likely that Sir George Calvert, Salisbury’s client and a rising

Jacobean bureaucrat, who was also a Spanish pensioner, tipped off the Spanish ambassador, Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Conde de Gondomar, to Digby’s covert affairs.

Having grown increasingly suspicious of Digby’s ability to gather secret intelligence, Philip and his ministers attempted to tighten the security of their dispatches.

Anxious but undeterred, Digby quickly adapted so that the flow of his intelligence was nearly uninterrupted. Digby’s description of his response to Spanish counter-measures offers a rare window into how such intelligence gathering operated.

In August 1613, Digby described the process of stealing new ciphers:

For I already know where the first and second cyphers are, but in the custody of several men, for the first only deciphers counterfeit names [such] as Amadis de Gaule. I know likewise that there is a paper containing all the pensions established by the Constable of Castile and altered by Don Pedro de Zuñiga and so left and continued since. The prints of the most of the keys of the cabinets where the papers are kept are already exactly taken in wax.

The other I expect daily, but opportunity is to be attended. I have a discreet and fit person in readiness presently to dispatch away for the keys made in France, for they may not for good respects be made in Spain.

As Digby outlined, through the spies in his employ he had established a system whereby he could gain quick access to many dispatches and memoranda of state. He not only knew where the ciphers were located, but he also made copies of the keys to the rooms. Digby took pride in his ability to perform such feats, describing spying as a “tender and dainty business…which must not be slubbered or foiled with haste.” 45

Digby’s ability to intercept these dispatches continued to pose a problem for King

Philip. In September, 1613, Digby reported that “[t]here has been on the sudden a search of all of King of Spain’s papers and of those of [Secretary] Ciriza’s office.” Fortunately for

Digby, “all of them were found there and in good order.” However, Philip ordered his ministers to identify “the means that is to be used for the discovery of [Digby’s] correspondence in this Court.” Digby also suspected that Velasquez had “long appointed to set spies about me.” Strikingly, Digby’s intelligence kept him abreast of this investigation essentially in real time.46

Philip was convinced Digby had access to confidential information and hoped to identify his “means” of acquiring intelligence.47 If Digby’s suspicions were correct,

Velasquez hoped to hire spies to identify Digby’s own spies. But these efforts were most likely unsuccessful. As this letter evidences, Digby had obtained the very dispatch describing these efforts.

45 Digby to James, 3 August 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 19. 46 Digby to James, 13 September 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 73. 47 Ibid. On Spanish pensioners see Carter, Secret Diplomacy, 126 and “Gondomar: Ambassador to James I.” Historical Journal 7:2 (1964): 195-197.

By intercepting Spanish dispatches, Digby also identified intelligence leaks in

England. In the same month, Digby intercepted the instructions for Spain’s new resident ambassador in England. He found enclosed a list of Spanish pensioners at the English court, among them prominent statesmen such as Salisbury and Henry Howard, Earl of

Northampton. Digby immediately alerted James of his findings.48 While the king was unaware of this practice, the acceptance of Spanish pensions did not mean that these statesmen were necessarily engaged in espionage. Although closeted Catholics or Catholic sympathizers such as Calvert may have been eager to provide intelligence to a Catholic king, Charles Carter suggested that in the case of prominent ministers such as Salisbury, taking Spanish money “came to be treated as a prerequisite of the position of the chief minister. It did not buy friendship.”49 In practice, Salisbury (who died in 1612) was noticeably hostile to the interests of the pro-Spanish faction at court.50 Still, concerned about the interception of his letters in England, Digby wrote more frequently to James directly, urging him to also be careful. “I cannot too much nor too often recommend unto your Majesty the careful and secret carriage of these business” Digby emphasized, “for one of the suspicions they now have, both in England, and here, themselves and their pensioners, are all possible means and diligence to discover my advertisements, which hitherto by the[se] efforts, your Majesties may see they have in no kind been able to do.”51

Despite this intense suspicion and under scrutiny, his methods were never discovered.

48 Digby to James, 23 September 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 92. 49 Carter, Secret Diplomacy, 126. 50 Pauline Croft, King James (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 52. 51 Digby to James, 23 September 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 92.

But this scrutiny made Digby anxious and he became increasingly cautious with the security of his letters at the embassy.52 Digby complained that Spanish ministers were

“extraordinar[ily] watchful over me” and told James that a “confident friend adviseth me not only to be careful of my papers but also of my person.”53 From 1613 forward, Digby wrote nearly all of his official correspondence in cipher. When he shared correspondence he had intercepted, he inserted the text of these letters (in cipher) within the text of longer letters, and also provided misleading dates “in case they should play any foul play with my packet.”54 His efforts were successful. By identifying the Spanish pensioners and increasing his security in Madrid, Digby minimized the interception of his dispatches.

Politics of Misinformation: Evaluating the Threats to Virginia and Bermuda

The intelligence program established by Digby proved especially critical in the defense of England’s fledgling Atlantic colonies. Decades of war had hindered England’s ability to gather meaningful information about Spain’s Atlantic enterprises. English diplomats were eager to gain access to the largest stores of information about these activities. Indeed, learning about Spain’s empire, West Indies trade, and treasure fleets was one of the first areas of intelligence English diplomats sought to acquire. As previously described, the port cities of Seville, Lisbon, and Cadiz were peopled with sailors and merchants involved in the West Indian trade. English consuls, strategically placed in these cities, were positioned to best observe this trade and establish contacts on ships and in ports. English and Scottish merchants with ties to their communities could serve as

52 Digby to James, 13 September 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 75. 53 Digby to Rochester, 13 September 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 77. 54 Digby to James, 30 October 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 135.

65 effective informants to English ambassadors. With abundant opportunities, if English diplomats could harness and increase these networks, they would access a wealth of

Atlantic intelligence and a better knowledge of the Spanish empire.

The intelligence practices and networks established by Cornwallis, Cottington, and

Digby proved crucial to defending England’s young colonies in Virginia and Bermuda. As we will see, from 1607 to 1613, Spanish ministers frequently debated and planned to attack these English settlements. By relying on and improving their Atlantic intelligence networks, English diplomats gathered and corroborated numerous reports detailing these plans. These reports better equipped James to mediate Anglo-Spanish Atlantic disputes and defend his colonies from Spanish military threats.

In April 1606, James approved two patents for discovery and settlement on the eastern seaboard of North America. For at least twenty years, English navigators had explored this coast, which they called Virginia, and claimed England’s rights of discovery to the territory in printed narratives.55 James granted a charter to the Virginia Company of

Plymouth for northern territory, which only briefly settled the Popham Colony in 1607. He granted southern land from present-day North Carolina to New York state to the Virginia

Company (of London). The Company quickly garnered enthusiasm, attracting many of

London’s wealthy and titled men as subscribers.

In December 1606, under the charge of Captain Christopher Newport, the Company sent three ships carrying 105 passengers to Virginia. They landed in Virginia the following

May and established a settlement they called James Town. The colony was quickly plagued

55 Hariot, A briefe and true report; Hakluyt, Principal nauigations; John Brereton, A briefe and true relation of the discouerie of the north part of Virginia (London, 1602) STC. 3610; Rosier, A true relation.

66 by hardship. Only a week after arrival, Powhatan forces attacked a group of English invaders on an exploratory mission up river. They killed eleven of Newport’s men and wounded a young boy.56 Meanwhile in Jamestown, another Powhatan force attacked the settlement, but all of the colonists survived. Despite these assaults, Newport remained hopeful for success, carrying with him optimistic reports when he returned to London the following month. Admitting that he had failed to find either gold or silver mines, he praised

“the air, soil, and commodities of the country.”57

Despite Newport’s enthusiasm, colonists continued to find hardship in Virginia. In

August 1607, many colonists died from dysentery and other illnesses. In early 1608,

Newport returned with a new supply of colonists, but one accidentally set fire to the lodgings, leaving the colonists dependent on the Powhatans for most of their food.

Struggling to survive, the colony would not have been able to sustain a surprise attack from

Spanish forces. It was the job of English diplomats in Spain to ensure that both the king and the colonists were warned of any impending attacks.

This job first fell to Sir Charles Cornwallis. While Cornwallis had proved useful in gaining the structural intelligence necessary to begin identifying confidants and intelligence agents, he had little interest in cultivating Atlantic information networks, referring to the West Indian contest as “these years many distractions.”58 But by 1607, the

Virginia colony forced him to take Atlantic intelligence seriously. Virginia had become a contentious issue at the Spanish court in Madrid and was a frequent matter of discussion in

56 "Relation of the discovery of our river from James Fort into the Main; made by Captain Christopher Newport, and sincerely written and observed by a gentleman of the colony,” 7 May 1607, TNA CO 1/118. 57 Carleton to Chamberlain, 18 August 1607, TNA SP 14/28 f. 34. 58 Cornwallis to the Privy Council, 1608, TNA, SP 94/15 f. 200.

Philip’s Council of War. Cornwallis heard many rumors about preparations to attack the struggling colony. He gathered reports from many of his agents in order to discredit or confirm these rumors.59

To successfully defend Virginia, English intelligence capabilities needed to match the superior intelligence programs of Spain. Even before the first colonists set sail to

Virginia, the Spanish ambassador in London, Don Pedro de Zuñiga, worked hard to gather intelligence about Virginia. When the first group of colonists arrived to Virginia, King

Philip ordered Zuñiga to “report to me what the English are doing in the matter of

Virginia—and if the plan progresses which they contemplated, of sending men there and ships.” While he awaited reports from England, Philip brought the matter to his Council of

State, determined to take “into consideration…what steps had best be taken to prevent it.”60

Meanwhile, at the English court, Zuñiga lobbied James I against the colony. He argued that James’s choice to approve the venture was “contrary to good friendship and brotherly feeling it was… when that was a part of the Spanish Indies, and that [James] must look upon this boldness as very obnoxious.”61 James in turn argued that Spain could not lay claim to the territory, “but that it was a very distant country where Spaniards live.”

Moreover, James also claimed that Virginia was not covered in the treaty, noting that “it was not stipulated that his subjects should not go there, except to the Indies.” Drawing on

Spanish claims to discovery, James remarked “and that as Your Majesty's people had discovered new regions, so it seemed to him, that his own people might do likewise.”62

59 Cornwallis to Edmondes, 22 February 1607, BL, Stowe MS 169 f. 299. 60 Philip to Zuñiga, 8 March 1607, in Brown, Genesis, 91. 61 Zuñiga to Philip, 8 October 1607, in Brown, Genesis, 120. 62 Ibid.

Zuñiga dismissed King James’s arguments for Virginia. He warned James how important “that a remedy should be found for that matter in Virginia, because it was necessary to take measures about it before it assumed a worse condition.”63 Zuñiga continued to gather as much information as he could about plans for the colony and reports of conditions on the ground. In December 1607, Zuñiga urged Philip to “give orders that measures be taken in time; because now it will be very easy, and quite difficult afterwards, when they have taken root, and if they are punished in the beginning, the result will be, that no more will go there.”64

On Zuñiga’s recommendations, King Philip brought the matter of Virginia before his Council of War. In Madrid, Ambassador Cornwallis reported this meeting with alarm.

“What is resolved,” he wrote, “I cannot yet attain, but will with all means I can, endeavor to understand it.”65 Cornwallis asked his agents in port cities to remain observant and report to him any potential military preparations. In July 1608, Cornwallis reported to Salisbury that the Council of the Indies held a junta (legislative council) about the English colony.

Cornwallis promised to learn “[w]hat hath passed amongst them.”66 But when he didn’t find additional answers, Cornwallis turned to Spain’s military preparations to deduce whether an attack was forthcoming. The following February, Cornwallis reported to Sir

Thomas Edmondes, the English Ambassador to France, that “they are here for the reasons very busy in preparing and embargoing of ships. They publish their purpose to be for

63 Ibid, 122. 64 Zuñiga to Philip, 6 December 1607, in Brown, Genesis, 140. 65 Cornwallis to Edmondes, 3 July 1608, BL, Stowe Mss 170 f. 79. 66 Cornwallis to Salisbury, 3 July 1608, TNA, SP 94/15 f.77.

Algiers, But I rather think it to be for Virginia.”67 Fortunately for Cornwallis, these rumors proved to be false.

The following year, after Zuñiga sent Philip a report about the colony suggesting a more promising future in Virginia, discussions about the colony in the Council of War intensified. Zuñiga reported “the dangerous manner in which they hasten the fortifying of

Virginia.” Zuñiga noted that Thomas West, Baron De La Warr and Sir Thomas Gates had brought “a much larger force of men” than he had originally reported. Zuñiga worried that

“once they are fortified there this King here will declare himself the Master of that

Country.” He believed that if this occurred it would directly violate the terms of Anglo-

Spanish peace and prove a serious incursion into territory claimed by Spain.68

These reports brought Virginia to the center of Anglo-Spanish foreign policy. In

August 1609, Cornwallis confirmed that Spain’s Council of War and Council of State held

“diverse council” about Virginia.69 In November, Zuñiga reported to Philip that the timing was ripe for an attack. Gates’s fleet had just returned to England “laden with nothing but bad reports and letters of discouragement.”70 Zuñiga urged Philip to “command that an end be put to those things done in Virginia; because it is a matter of great importance.”71

Anxious about Philip’s Council meetings, James and Salisbury instructed Cornwallis to soften tensions over the colony, and, to the best of his ability, gather intelligence to

67 Cornwallis to Edmondes, 22 February 1608, BL, Stowe Mss 169 f. 299. 68 “and thereupon the peace which Y.M. now keeps with him, as I have said, might be broken” Zuñiga to Philip, 1 April 1609, in Brown, Genesis, 255. 69 Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council, 19 August 1609, TNA, SP 94/16 f. 161. 70 Zuñiga to Philip, 23 November, 1609, in Brown, Genesis, 333. 71 Zuñiga to Philip, 8 November, 1609, in Brown, Genesis, 196.

70 determine whether he planned to attack Virginia.72 Fortunately for England, instead of taking advantage of the colony’s weakness to destroy it, Philip and his Councils decided to postpone an attack hoping the colony would come to ruin on its own.

When Cornwallis left Madrid in 1609, his temporary replacement, Cottington, proved to be a capable intelligencer for Atlantic affairs.73 Cottington was attuned to

James’s need to gather the most accurate reports about Philip’s plans for Virginia.

Cottington’s familiarity with the culture of rumor in the Spanish court also proved critical, as rumors about Virginia circulated with increasing frequency and detail in the years following Cornwallis’s departure. But most of these reports were unsubstantiated. Philip had likely delayed a decision on whether to attack the colony until it proved more permanently viable. As Cottington and later Digby described, part of Philip’s strategy was to keep James on edge about the colony by circulating rumors and warning his ambassadors that an attack was perpetually forthcoming.

However, in September 1610, Zuñiga obtained a troubling report from an Irishman,

Francisco Maguel, who had lived in Virginia for nine months. Maguel described the promise of Virginia, noting amicable relations with Algonquians and the great potential of resources and crop cultivation.74 This report renewed discussions in Madrid about an attack on the colony. Apprised of these discussions, by 1611, Cottington assessed that rumors about Virginia were likely based on real plans for attack. News of military preparations in the Caribbean corroborated the gossip at court. Cottington informed Salisbury: “in the

72 Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council, 19 August 1609, TNA, SP 94/16/161. 73 “Cottington, Francis, first Baron Cottington (1579?–1652),” Fiona Pogson in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6404 (accessed January 14, 2016). 74 Report of Francis Maguel, 1 July 1610, in Brown, Genesis, 398.

Havana, are almost built six galleons for war, and will be ready to go to sea by April. Much muttering here is, that those ships shall be employed against the English plantation in

Virginia myself do observe that in the council of the Indies, they daily provide, & dispatch, many land captains for those parts.”75 Cottington kept close watch on these activities, but reports from the West Indies, where he had fewer informants on the ground, were often unreliable. In April, he determined that the ships were unlikely to be used against Virginia

“knowing the poor ability of this State.” He estimated that the rumors were mostly a reflection of Spanish anxieties about the settlement, especially for those with investments in the West Indies who were “here so much troubled as they know not how to behave themselves in the business.”76

Digby arrived in the midst of these activities and worked quickly to improve this area of intelligence. The Spanish agents he hired to intercept dispatches and Council minutes provided him with current and accurate reports of Spanish plans for Virginia and

Bermuda. Digby sent frequent dispatches to James and Salisbury detailing these rumors, his sources, and any corroborating or conflicting reports. Following Salisbury’s death in

May 1612, Digby sent most of his correspondence directly to James. During his first few months as resident ambassador, he sent frequent reports of naval preparations rumored intended for Virginia departing from Dunkirk and Lisbon. But as these rumors became increasingly uncorroborated by new reports from the port cities and the West Indies, Digby estimated that the reports were likely untrue.77

75 Cottington to Salisbury, 10 January 1611, TNA, SP 94/18 f. 9. 76 Cottington to Salisbury, 10 April 1611, TNA, SP 94/18 f. 41. 77 Digby to Sir Dudley Carleton, 2 February 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 16-19; Digby to Salisbury, 2 February 1612, TNA SP 94/19 f. 24-27.

Philip’s constant wavering on Virginia can be explained by a few issues. First, he continued to receive conflicting reports about the state of Virginia. If the colony was on the brink of disaster, as Zuñiga and Velasco insisted, attacking the settlement could be a waste of resources. Furthermore, an attack on Virginia could lead to a dissolution of the peace between England and Spain. Thus, the issue of Virginia needed to be weighed against the greater benefits of the peace and the European balance of power. As a result, by 1610, the Virginia colony was central to the future of Anglo-Spanish relations.

These competing interests are particularly evident in the pressing matter of

European marriage diplomacy. From 1611-1612, James hoped to make a Spanish match for his son and heir, Prince Henry. While Philip was mildly interested in securing this match, he was deeply concerned about the political implications of any matches James might make for Henry and his daughter, Princess Elizabeth. Furthermore, Philip briefly debated proposing a marriage between himself and Princess Elizabeth. The possibility of making one or even two matches with England required a clear vision of the future of

Anglo-Spanish relations. Virginia complicated this matter.

In the spring of 1612, Philip informed Digby that Zuñiga, the former ambassador, would soon be travelling to England to serve briefly as Extraordinary Ambassador.78 The purpose of this visit, he told Digby, was to brief James on the newly negotiated match between King Philip’s daughter Anne and King Louis XIII of France and to continue discussions for a possible match between Prince Henry and Philip’s younger daughter

Maria Ana. Digby was skeptical of Zuñiga’s assignment. Just days prior he heard a rumor at court that preparations were underway for a secret diplomatic visit to England —most

78 Digby to Salisbury, 9 March 1612, TNA, SP 94/19/ f. 46.

73 likely to be led by Marquis Spinola—to discuss a possible marriage between Princess

Elizabeth and King Philip. Digby already had his doubts about this report, writing to James:

“I should proceed so distrustfully with them, as to deny that there was really any such intent. Which makes me to mistrust that this is purposely thrown abroad, to beguile the world, and that other things may go on with greater stillness, whilst men’s tongues & thoughts are taken up with this.”79 Aware that statesmen deliberately fed him rumors, and attuned to the realistic possibility that this was a ploy, Digby set out to learn the true purpose behind Zuñiga’s visit.

Digby called on his confidants and agents at court, and within a few days informed

James that he had uncovered compelling intelligence. The true purpose of Zuñiga’s visit was to persuade the king to remove the fledgling English settlement in Virginia.80 If James refused, Philip instructed Zuñiga to warn James that he intended to remove it by force. This report was further corroborated by intelligence Digby gathered a few days later, which claimed that the naval commander, Don Diego de Brochero, had offered to lead the expedition against Virginia, and 200,000 crowns had been sent to Lisbon to finance the preparation of the Armada.81 On May 24, while Zuñiga was en route to London, Digby had further information: “It is confirmed unto me by several persons, that Don Pedro de Zuñiga, hath commission to move his Majesty for the removing of our Plantation from Virginia.”82

Apprised of the suspicious nature of his visit, James was extra vigilant of Zuñiga’s movements in England. James became alarmed when Zuñiga continued to delay his departure from England, citing the summer heat in Spain. Meanwhile in Spain, with his

79 Digby to Carleton, 2 February 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f.18. 80 Digby to Salisbury, 18 April 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 68. 81 Digby to Salisbury, 28 April 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 70. 82 Digby to Salisbury, 24 May 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 83.

74 usual diligence, Digby probed his Spanish sources and employed spies to copy dispatches that might contain further details of Zuñiga’s instructions. On September 1, Digby informed the king that Zuñiga’s excuse “is a very frivolous and idle one.” He learned by

“private means” that “when he was sent from hence he had three businesses in which he was instructed to carry himself.”83 Digby identified the three items of business that Zuñiga was ordered to accomplish. First, Zuñiga was instructed to delay the marriage negotiations between Princess Elizabeth and Frederick of the Palatinate, while discovering if the princess would be amenable to converting to Catholicism for a marriage to King Philip.

Secondly, Zuñiga was to gage James’s interest in the proposal from Charles Emmanuel I,

Duke of Savoy for matches of Prince Henry with his eldest daughter and Princess Elizabeth with the Prince of Piedmont.84 The third matter of business (itemized as second in his letter) was the Virginia colony. Zuñiga was instructed “not to make any proposition unto your

Majesty, but upon second directions from hence, when he should have learned and advertised, what your Majesty’s inclination was, and what your answers like to be.”85

Digby assured James that he would attempt to intercept any of Philip’s correspondence arriving from London to learn if Zuñiga had acquired meaningful intelligence.

Twelve days later, Digby updated James on his investigation. While he had little to add, he did have “stronger confirmations of what I then wrote.” Digby reported a “general rumor” that peace between England and Spain was “not like to be of long continuance.”86

Digby described the rumor as “universal” in court and in popular audiences, which had

83 Digby to James, 1 September 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 143-144. 84 Digby later added that Zuñiga was also instructed to gain better knowledge of the experience of English Jesuits and priests in England. 85 Digby to James, 1 September 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 143. 86 Digby to James, 13 September 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 147-148.

75 become worrisome to English merchants, many of whom had begun preparations to leave

Spain. Digby deduced the cause of this report: “the chief reasons I can attain to, are two:

First it is here held for certain that this king will not permit our Plantation at Virginia, and the Bermudas, in so much that it is here publically and avowedly spoken in the Court, that they will shortly attempt the removing of them.” Digby then detailed reports of letters he had seen from Don Luis de Fajardo, captain of the armada, who was to shortly depart from

Cadiz to Havana, from where it was likely he would lead an attack on Virginia. But Digby did not give too much “credit” to this rumor because he had also heard of a “resolution taken” that Don Diego Brochero, of the Council of War, would lead the enterprise from

Lisbon. Digby vowed to “use all the diligence, [he] may to attain unto the truth…which will be better done, by having a careful eye, unto their preparations, then by the Intelligence are here more than in all other places Extraordinary heedy87 and reserved.”88 For the next two months, Digby received reports with similar rumors. Writing weekly to James and

Secretary of State Sir Thomas Lake, Digby detailed all preparations of ships and advertisements for sailors, while probing his informants at court and in port cities to gather intelligence about alleged Virginia attacks. Digby’s reports grew increasingly detailed and conflicting, leading him to believe that men at court were deliberately feeding him false reports as a method of intimidation. In October 1612, Digby even received a report he knew to be false from Seville that the colony had been overthrown.89

87 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, heedy is defined as “Heedful, attentive, careful, cautious,” OED Online, "† heedy, adj,” accessed March 20, 2015, http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/85429. 88 Digby to James, 13 September 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 147. 89 Digby to Carleton, 10 October 1612, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 157.

Digby and Cottington’s assessments were correct. Philip delayed his decision about

Virginia until he acquired sufficient intelligence about the settlement. Philip hoped to gain further confirmation from sources on the ground before authorizing an attack. To do so, in the spring of 1611 he sent a reconnaissance mission to Virginia to verify Ambassador

Velasco’s reports.

Under the leadership of Don Diego de Molino, the ship La Nuestra Señora del

Rosario, set off to Virginia under the guise of recovering the artillery of a ship thought to have wrecked near Florida. On board the ship was an Englishman called James Limry, who was a spy for Spain. When Molina disembarked in Virginia, taking Limry and his ensign,

Marco Antonio de Perez, to survey the colony, the acting governor, Sir Thomas Dale, captured the men. Worried about “the danger likely to befall them from their weak and unfortified state,” especially if the men were freed to make their report, Dale detained them until he received further instructions from England. 90 News of their capture soon reached

Spain. Hugh Lee, the resident consul and intelligence agent in Lisbon was pleased by the capture of Limry and was especially relieved “that he returned not to make report of what was committed to him in charge.”91

The incident was not a complete victory for England. When Molina and Limry failed to return to La Nuestra Señoria del Rosario, the Spanish sailors took John Clarke, an English pilot who had been sent aboard to bring in the ship, to Havana as a hostage.

Digby was responsible for locating and freeing Clarke, a task made difficult by the limited information Spanish authorities provided to him. Digby instead relied on his wider network

90 Dale to Cecil, 17 August 1611, TNA, CO 1/1, f. 11-12. 91 Lee to Wilson, 2 November 1611, Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1675-1676, also Addenda, 1574-1674, ed. W. Noel Sainsbury (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1893), 41.

77 of Atlantic and European contacts with Caribbean connections for intelligence. In

November, Digby finally received a report detailing the captive’s condition. “This news cometh by a Frenchman and an Irishman,” reported Digby, “who say they spoke with this

English Pilot at the Havana where he was prisoner, and they say that he is now brought secretly to Seville in this last fleet, where I will use all diligence for the freeing of him and sending him speedily home.”92 Digby confirmed this report to Salisbury in December when he received word from “another Englishman that saw him and spake with him there.”93

According to the transcript of his interview, Clark provided detailed intelligence during his interrogation in Havana. He described the colony’s defenses and provisions. He even erroneously claimed to have found gold.94

Meanwhile, Spanish agents were busy crafting their narrative of events and attempting to free their captives. On November 15, 1611, Philip wrote to his ambassador in England instructing him to tell James that his men had been “in search of a ship which sailed from the port of Cartagena of the Indies” which was thought to have passed through

Florida. The men landed “in good faith” where they were taken by “certain

Englishmen…who say that by order of the King of Great Britain they have set foot in the part of that coast which they call Virginia.” Philip was eager to have the matter resolved, commanding his ambassador to “inform [him] immediately of the offices which you shall have done in this matter, and what shall be its result.”95

92 Digby to Salisbury, 4 November 1611, CSP Colonial Addenda 1611, 41. 93 Digby to Salisbury, 13 December 1611, CSP Colonial Addenda 1611, 42. 94 Andrew Gardner, “John Clark’s Tale,” in 1607: Jamestown and Virginia, ed. Dennis Montgomery (Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg Foundation 2007), 107. 95 Philip to Velasquez, 4 November 1611, CSP Colonial Addenda 1611, 41-42.

This incident increased tensions over Virginia. By detaining Spanish pilots, Dale exercised authority over Virginia territory. Philip considered the settlement of Virginia to be a clear breach of the peace and instructed his ambassador in England “to express to the said King the just resentment which I feel at the seizure of these men.”96 At the same time,

Digby asked Salisbury to instruct him how to proceed in petitioning for the release of the

English pilot, believing “this accident of demanding his liberty will set the main question on foot.”97

How the Starving Saved Virginia

The failure of La Nuestra Señora del Rosario’s reconnaissance mission had not deterred Spanish intelligence gathering about the Virginia colony. In fact, it only encouraged further intelligence efforts. As Charles Carter has shown, King Philip’s intelligence program was well-developed and effective. The Spanish Ambassador in

London—as Digby would soon discover—relied on his well-placed pensioners to gain valuable information. The ambassador also had his own networks of spies working at court and in port cities.

The arrival to England of Don Diego de Molina, the Spanish prisoner held captive in Virginia further settled the issue. The Spanish ambassador, Gondomar, had cleverly negotiated the prisoner exchange to provide Spain with a few days’ lead in intelligence gathering. Molina’s reports, along with the reports of those aboard the ship he arrived in, confirmed the dire circumstances in Virginia. According to Molina, fewer than three hundred people remained to man the forts and those on board complained that the colonists

96 Ibid. 97 Digby to Salisbury, 13 December 1611, CSP Colonial Addenda 1611, 42.

79 had not discovered resources to mine or harvest. Furthermore, he described the Powhatans as brave fighters who were growing restless with the presence of the colonists. 98

Despite the desperation Molina described, the Virginia colony’s situation was actually much improved from earlier devastation. Beginning in the autumn of 1609, a starving campaign led by chief Powhatan nearly destroyed the colony. The tribes under

Powhatan’s rule stopped trading food to the English and attacked colonists on hunting parties. Unable to stock food and supplies for the winter, fewer than one-fifth of the 500 colonists living in Jamestown survived to see the following spring. In May 1610 two

English ships arrived carrying colonists, supplies, and a new temporary governor, Thomas

Gates. To their surprise, they found the colony in a dire condition. Without the supplies to revive the colony, Gates decided to abandon it. However, while leaving the harbor they met an arriving fleet of three ships led by De La Warr, the colony’s new governor, who ordered them to return to their settlement. De La Warr’s cargo of 150 settlers and a great store of supplies provided initial relief, but relations with the Powhatans remained tense.

When De La Warr left the colony in March 1611 the colonists and the Powhatans were in a state of war. Arriving the following summer, Molina and his men encountered a surviving albeit fragile colony.

James and Digby were fully aware of the impact of Molina’s testimony. In early

September, Digby wrote to James that “the Spanish Ambassador in England has received letters from Molina the Spaniard that is there, of the misery and distress in which they live so that it is determined by this Council not to speak any more in that business being a thing

98 Don Diego de Molina to Velasco “from Virginia,” 8 July 1613, Mss. Carter, The Johns Hopkins University.

80 they suppose which shall die of itself.”99 While James and Digby were relieved that Philip did not find this an opportune moment to remove the colony, they were concerned that information about the state of the colony, which they had worked hard to protect, had been discovered.

While Digby’s intercepted dispatches confirmed that Virginia was temporarily safe from Spanish attack, the reports he received from his agents in port cities suggested otherwise. English consuls and merchants believed that the naval preparations they witnessed were intended for Virginia. Furthermore, in Spain, proclamations soliciting sailors for a voyage to Virginia circulated publicly. Worried that James might give credit to such reports, Digby assured him that “those that I employ; send me word that they every day grow more doubt that there will be something attempted against the Plantation in

Virginia.” He reminded James that while an attack against Virginia was likely at some point in the future, these rumors served to intimidate the English.100 With intelligence that obviated an imminent attack, King Philip turned his attention to the newest English Atlantic threat—the English colony in Bermuda.

The islands of Bermuda were discovered by the Spanish navigator Juan de

Bermúdez in 1503. The islands’ dangerous reefs and surrounding rough currents repelled

Europeans who called them the “Devil’s Isles.” The islands were generally uninhabited until 1609, when Sir George Somers, sailing in the fleet to Virginia with Sir Thomas Gates, carrying colonists and supplies, noticed a leak on his ship the Sea Venture. A skilled captain and admiral of the Virginia Company, Somers deliberately drove the ship into the reefs to the east of the islands, saving the lives of all passengers aboard. Stranded in Bermuda, the

99 Digby to James, 3 September 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 33-34. 100 Digby to James, 5 March 1613, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 293.

81 colonists and crew spent ten months on the island building new ships. Leaving several people behind to secure England’s claim to the islands, Somers and the rest of the settlers sailed to Virginia. Somers later returned to Bermuda to gather additional supplies for the

Virginia colonists, but fell ill and died there.101

News of the Sea Venture soon reached England and members of the Virginia

Company were eager to amend its charter to include Bermuda, which they called the

Somers Isles. The islands were given a governor, Richard Moore, who arrived in 1612 with additional colonists. The Company initially hoped to develop a lucrative trade in ambergris and pearls, but without a dependable stock to serve this trade, they instead established a stable agricultural industry. Despite the Company’s commitment to settlement and trade, the colony’s location along Atlantic trade routes led Spanish ministers to believe Bermuda would primarily serve as a privateering base against Spain’s treasure fleet. Shortly after the arrival of English colonists in Bermuda, Spanish ministers began to discuss plans to attack the colony.

In August 1613, Digby informed James that while he did not believe Spain had any imminent plans for an attack against Virginia, the Bermuda settlement was a likely target.

He reported to James that the Council of War and the Council of State “have sat about the overthrowing of our new plantation in the Bermudas; of the resolution taken therein Your

Majesty shall I hope by my next week be particularly advertised.”102 On September 3,

Digby told James that plans to attack the colony were moving forward: “it is resolved on that the English must be removed, but the manner how it shall be done is not yet fully

101 Jean Kennedy, Isle of Devils: Bermuda under the Somers Island Company, 1609-1685 (London: Collins, 1971). 102 Digby to James, 3 September 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 33-34.

82 determined.” Digby described two plans: one that would depart from Spain with “five of this king’s Galleons- called the squadron of Dunkirk with two thousand men;” and the second from Havana, led by its governor, “to which I find most of the Council is inclined.”103

Digby detailed his method for deciphering rumor from report. He kept a close watch on the Council of War and naval preparations in port cities. He also identified sailors with experience in Bermuda “whom [he] will cause a vigilant eye to be had.” Through these combined strategies he could identify deliberate rumors to determine the accuracy of reports. To be cautious, James promptly warned the Bermuda colonists of a possible

Spanish attack and they began to set up defenses.

For the next year, Digby continued to receive reports from merchants and consuls about plans for attacks against Bermuda. He continued to watch the preparation of ships and mined his sources for any available information. When he lacked credible intelligence,

Digby followed the movement of resources and goods to determine Spanish plans. For example, in January 1614 Digby informed James that “eighteen or twenty” ships were being supplied with materials of “lime and stone, & other things for building.” Digby believed these supplies would be used for an attack against the Dutch on the coast of Guinea and also for an attack on Bermuda. He explained how he drew this conclusion. Whereas in

Guinea, “they have already the Castle of Mina and intend only to raze the fort of those of

Holland,” in Bermuda, the Council of War had decided “that whensoever they of Spain should remove those of England that there should be certain fortes built there for the keeping and holding of the Islands that they of England might not at any time regain them.”

103 Ibid.

Thus, Digby concluded, “materials for building to be a great deal more proper for

[Bermuda].” He encouraged James to warn the colonists “to prepare the best they can for their own defense.” But, Digby cautioned, he had “rather a jealousy by reason of these provisions, then any other certainty.” He employed spies to track the movement of men appointed to the Bermuda enterprise and reported to James that these men made “no kind of preparation of show going with these ships.104

As these letters detail, Digby was told that the Council of War was determined to use military action against the Dutch in Mina and the English in

Bermuda. But as Digby was well-aware, he was often misinformed in order to cause fear and hesitation.105 Digby had to rely on more creative strategies of deduction.

For Bermuda this required following building materials used for an unspecified fortress. To further confirm these details, Digby followed the movements of the captains of the alleged enterprise and his sailor spies who were likely to be employed in a Bermuda venture.

Fortunately for Digby, James, and the Somers Isles colonists, a Spanish attack against Bermuda never materialized. This failure was perhaps due to financial issues (which Digby often noted throughout his time as ambassador) or the more pressing Dutch conflict. Over the next five years, an occasional rumor at court or in a port city about preparations for an attack against Bermuda surfaced, which the English ambassador would report and discredit. But the threat to

104 Digby to James, 8 January 1614, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 231-232. 105 Digby to James, 5 March 1613, TNA, SP 94/19 f. 293-4.

Bermuda was for the most part mitigated. Toward the end of the decade, the Anglo-

Spanish Atlantic contest turned to Guiana.

Sir Walter Raleigh and the Guiana Scandal

Since Virginia was located on the fringes of the Spanish Empire, James could claim with confidence (as he often did) that it did not violate the terms of the Treaty of London.

But claims to Guiana, located adjacent to the West Indies and Spain’s mainland South

American empire, could not be so easily made. Therefore, when Sir Walter Raleigh, famed colonizer and privateer, proposed a venture to explore Guiana in 1617, King Philip immediately lodged objections. Cottington, the resident ambassador in Spain, and Digby, who was back in England working on negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish marriage agreement, disapproved of Raleigh’s expedition. They were worried that it would upset the already fragile peace between England and Spain. They were right: as soon as news of

Raleigh’s venture reached Spain, Cottington was bombarded by objections. Worried about the fall-out should Raleigh disobey his orders, Cottington tracked Raleigh’s movements through his sources in port cities and by intercepting Philip’s dispatches.

Guiana’s potential for resource exploitation had captivated the imaginations of

Elizabethan explorers. Men who whetted their appetites for discovery from the stories of adventurers or as sailors for an earlier generation of great navigators were drawn to the mythic splendor of this space, the rumored location of El Dorado. In the final decades of the sixteenth century, Guiana attracted a host of ambitious explorers. In 1594 Sir Robert

Dudley explored a bit of the Orinoco River, but summarized the voyage as “so common …

85 as it is not worth the recording.”106 His brother-in-law, Richard Hakluyt, thought otherwise and eagerly publicized the voyage, possibly inspiring the jealousy of Sir Walter Raleigh.107

In 1597, the seasoned seaman John Ley explored the lower reaches of the rivers around the

Wiapoco River for potential routes to El Dorado.108

Raleigh first set sail for Guiana in 1598, where he crossed paths with Ley’s exploration. A former favorite of Queen Elizabeth, Raleigh had previous careers as a courtier, colonial projector, and propagandist. However, in the early 1590s his marriage scandal found him briefly imprisoned in the Tower and with little power and influence.

Raleigh turned his sights to Guiana, where he hoped the discovery of mines would win him favor with his queen. His exploration was a failure; he returned home with neither the spoils of El Dorado nor Spanish plunder. He did, however, carefully map his journey and encounters on the Amazon River. His published account of the voyage, The Discovery of

Guiana (1596), which claimed Guiana for England, was an impressive piece of promotional literature that reached a wide European audience. It was quickly translated into Dutch, which may partly explain the arrival of Dutch settlers in the Amazon in 1598.109

Early in James’s reign, a few Englishmen established small settlements in Guiana.

In 1604, Charles Leigh, a merchant and sea captain with diverse colonial interests,

106 The voyage of Robert Dudley … to the West Indies, 1594–1595, ed. G. F. Warner (London: Hakluyt Society, 2nd ser, 1899), 67. 107 “Dudley, Sir Robert (1574–1649),” Simon Adams in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8161 (accessed January 14, 2016). 108 Joyce Lorimer suggests that interest in the Wiapoco by early seventeenth-century colonial projectors was due to Ley’s account of the river. Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement on the River Amazon, 1550-1646 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1989), 26. 109 Discoverie was widely read in England and on the Continent. Latin, Dutch and German translations were printed within five years of its original publication; “Ralegh, Sir Walter (1554– 1618),” Mark Nicholls in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, September 2015, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23039 (accessed January 14, 2016).

86 established a small colony on the Wiapoco River. While the colony found initial success through collaboration with local Arawaks and Dutch settlers, Leigh found his crew less interested in settlement than Caribbean privateering and abandoned the settlement after two years.110 In 1609, Richard Harcourt, under the patronage of Prince Henry, received a patent from the Privy Council to establish a plantation in Guiana. The settlement lasted between six and eight years. The following year, Sir Thomas Roe, a colonial investor and projector most notably tied to the East India Company, sailed on a reconnaissance mission to Guiana in search of El Dorado. Roe was likely also under the patronage of Prince Henry.

While returning empty handed, Roe invested in the ventures of his crew members who returned to Guiana, including Matthew Morton, who settled a colony on the Amazon River in 1611. Guiana received similar attention by Dutch traders, who constructed small settlements in the first decades of the seventeenth century. By the mid-1610s, the English,

Dutch, and Irish constructed small settlements in Carib and Arawak lands.111 Each of these were small settlements, but played a significant role in the illicit tobacco trade.

The persistent investment of English subjects and resources in discovery and settlement, including the patronage of the royal family, demonstrates the place Guiana occupied in the English imperial imagination. Apart from occasional complaints, these

English settlements were largely ignored by Spain. Most settlements were small, and, apart from Harcourt’s patent, lacked official authorization by the English crown. However, a

110 “Leigh, Charles (bap. 1572, d. 1605),” Joyce Lorimer in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16376 (accessed January 14, 2016). 111 In 1610, Phillip Purcell settled fourteen Irishmen in the region, possibly alongside one or two English factory settlements. Zeelanders also settled in the Wiapoco River in 1612, and there is evidence that they traded with Harcourt’s settlers. The settlements were prosperous for a period of time, reaching their peak between 1620 and 1625. See Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement, 46.

87 newly proposed voyage to Guiana by the famed explorer and Spanish antagonist, Sir

Walter Raleigh, did not go unnoticed.

As early as 1607, Raleigh, a prisoner in the Tower for his alleged role in the Main

Plot, envisioned a second voyage to Guiana as a way to regain royal favor. After years of lobbying, he was released from the Tower in 1616 to design his voyage. Raleigh assured

James that he would not attack Spanish territories, but his actions on the ground suggest otherwise. Under the command of his lieutenant Lawrence Keymis, Raleigh’s men took the town of San Thomé by force. In the struggle, the Spanish governor and Raleigh’s elder son were killed. Holding the city under occupation, forces led by Raleigh’s nephew George made three trips up the Orinoco River in search of gold and silver mines. But after twenty- nine days and few spoils, Keymis’s forces burned San Thomé to the ground. With his failure cemented, Keymis committed suicide. In desperation, Raleigh tried to mount another expedition and even briefly contemplated attacking Spain’s West Indies fleet. But his men refused and he was forced to sail back to Plymouth.

James ordered Raleigh’s arrest in Plymouth on the charges of violating the king’s orders and compromising the peace between England and Spain. He quickly mounted a defense, writing his Apology for the Voyage to Guiana, in which he argued that Guiana was English territory. James rejected Raleigh’s apology and ordered him to be interrogated and tried. The Privy Council and Sir Henry Montagu, lord chief justice in the court of

King’s Bench, sentenced Raleigh to death. He was executed on October 29, 1618.

As previously described, this entire affair, from the first whispers of Raleigh’s intention to mount an expedition to Guiana until his execution, drew fierce objections from

King Philip and his ministers. Worried that Raleigh would disobey his orders, James

88 closely followed reports of his movements. From England, Digby entreated his agents for any news from the West Indies as Raleigh’s exploration progressed. In Madrid, Cottington closely tracked Raleigh’s movements through his Atlantic agents and by intercepting

Spanish dispatches.112

In the weeks following, reports of Raleigh’s attack on San Thomé reached Spain.

Cottington recognized that this attack was a serious international incident that would strain

Anglo-Spanish relations. He worked quickly to obtain accurate reports to best prepare

James to deal with the Spanish ambassador. This race was for intelligence: Cottington informed Secretary Lake that when the first report of Raleigh’s attack reached court a messenger was “suddenly dispatched for England to the Spanish Ambassador.”113

Recognizing that the dispatch contained critical information, Cottington quickly intercepted the dispatch in order to warn James.

Hoping that his copy of the dispatch would reach England before King Philip’s,

Cottington sent two copies, one by way of Flanders and the second through Paris. To expedite the process, Cottington had “written very earnestly unto the Postmaster of Paris

(Monsieur Louett) to send it away with all diligence.”114 Cottington’s strategy worked.

Digby, who was then in England, received the dispatch with Cottington’s report from

Madrid, giving James time to prepare for the ambassador’s complaints.

As news of Raleigh’s attack spread throughout Spain, Philip and his ministers directed their outrage at Cottington, who was unprepared to field these complaints. While he had been given instructions for how to navigate tensions over Virginia and Bermuda, he

112 Cottington to Lake, 3 May 1618, TNA, SP 94/23 f. 33. 113 Cottington to Lake, 31 May 1618, TNA, SP 94/23 f. 43. 114 Cottington to Lake, 31 May 1618, TNA, SP 94/23 f. 43.

89 had little direction about Guiana. Cottington worried that an incident this violent and directly contrary to the terms of peace could lead to war. He was particularly worried about how Philip interpreted James’s role in the expedition. Cottington informed Lake: “this whole court is scandalized, with the commission given to Sir Walter Raleigh, which he published in all parts, as if his Majesty had given him authority, to invade any of those dominions of this king’s in America.” As James’s representative in Spain, Cottington had to explain Raleigh’s commission to Philip and his Councilors, but he had little guidance on which to draw. Cottington complained to James: “I was never made acquainted with anything in that business, nor know I the ground of Sir Walter Raleigh’s proceedings, yet have I hitherto so excused his Majesties proceedings and intentions in it, as no complaint hath gone thither till now there it grows so insufferable.”115 Unlike the issues of Virginia and Bermuda, without directions from James on how to navigate the matter, Cottington was ill-equipped to negotiate this Atlantic dispute.

Philip took Raleigh’s offenses seriously. He suspended trade with English ships until the case was resolved. 116 Fortunately for Cottington, Raleigh’s brief and transparent trial satisfied Philip. Moreover, James assured Philip both publicly and privately of his commitment to peace between England and Spain. He issued a series of proclamations that detailed Raleigh’s crimes. In one proclamation he signaled amity with Philip, referring to him as “our dear Brother the King of Spain,” and recognizing “his Dominions and Interests in that Continent.”117

115 Ibid. 116 Cottington to Carleton, 25 June 1618, TNA, SP 94/23 f. 37. 117 James I, A proclamation declaring His Maiesties pleasure concerning Sir Walter Rawleigh, and those vvho aduentured vvith him, (London, 1618), 1. STC 8569.

James also used the same medium to clearly demarcate the limits of Spain’s authority in the Americas. A second royal proclamation attributed to Sir Francis Bacon reaffirmed James’s commitment to “Noble and Generous enterprises, for Plantations,

Discoveries, and opening of new Trades.”118 Thus while condemning Raleigh, James was careful to separate Raleigh’s crimes against Spain from the legitimacy of his imperial project. For English projectors, Guiana was still open for settlement. James recapitulated this position the following year when he approved plans for another colony in Guiana.

The End of Peace

When Sir Walter Aston replaced Sir John Digby as resident ambassador to Spain in 1620, King James presented him with a list of the duties he would perform.119 These instructions, which were markedly more detailed than those presented to Cornwallis and

Digby, illustrate the infrastructure and style of intelligence practices that had been developed over the last fifteen years. James acquainted Aston with how to gather secret intelligence: “you are to give an eye to the motions of that King and State within itself.

And Inform yourself from time to time of all such Preparations as shall there be made, which will be of three sorts; Money, Men, and Shipping.” To attend to money, James instructed, “observe if that King shall raise any great Sums of Moneys, how they are like

118 Francis Bacon, A declaration of the demeanor and cariage of Sir Walter Raleigh, Knight, as well in his voyage, as in, and sithence his returne of the true motiues and inducements which occasioned His Maiestie to proceed in doing justice upon him, as hath bene done (London, 1618), 1. STC 20652.5. 119 “Aston, Walter, Baron Aston of Forfar (1584–1639),” A. J. Loomie in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/828 (accessed January 14, 2016). Aston was appointed as resident ambassador to Spain on 11 November, 1619, but did not take up his post until 1620.

91 to be disposed of and whither remitted, for by that means it will easily be guessed for what purpose they were raised.”120 To observe men and shipping, James suggested that Aston should enhance his intelligence through “some Correspondents in all the Principal Ports of

Spain who may give you particular and certain Intelligence of all such provisions of men victuals or shipping as at any time may be making.” These agents could offer insight on their intended destination: “if their rendezvous be at Cadiz, Seville, or the South parts of

Spain, especially if there shall be any preparation of Galleys, it is probable that their design is either upon some part of Africa, or in the Mediterranean Sea.” But, James stressed, “if you find Forces by Sea providing at Lisbon or any of the King of Spain’s Ports on this side the Northern Cape, then it may be thought that the Action is intended towards these parts of the World. And therefore you shall in such case, be careful to give us particular and speedy Advertisement thereof.”121

The complex climate of observing and reporting multiple hemispheric threats to

Spain as relevant to the interests of England was difficult to navigate. In the 1620s, such activities to observe included: Ottoman and Dutch rivalries in the Mediterranean and North

Africa, the Dutch War in the north, the Thirty Years War conflict to the east, and the multiple imperial contests in the Atlantic west. Fortunately for Aston, the intelligence networks and practices developed over the last fifteen years, principally to track Atlantic information, provided him with an infrastructure capable of this complex task.

From 1620 to 1624, Atlantic competition was no longer a central tension in Anglo-

Spanish affairs. There were a few disputes over Roger North’s ill-fated attempt to settle a colony in Guiana in 1620 and the negotiation of reparations over the wreck of a Spanish

120 Instructions for Sir Walter Aston, 5 January 1620, TNA, SP 94/23 f. 289. 121 Ibid.

92 ship, the San Antonio, near Bermuda in 1621.122 But Spain’s principal Atlantic rival during these years was the Dutch Republic. In 1621, the Twelve Years’ Truce between the

Habsburg rulers of Spain and the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic expired.123

As a result, the Dutch immediately set up the West India Company which engaged in a sustained privateering campaign in the Caribbean and set up trading posts and colonies in the Americas.124 England’s diplomatic correspondence, which described these disputes, reveals the primacy of the perceived Dutch threat in the Atlantic.125

Another critical concern of the English embassy in Madrid was the Thirty Years

War. Initially a religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics in the Holy Roman

Empire, England and Spain sympathized with opposing sides in the war. King James was particularly concerned during these early years of the war, known as the Palatinate phase

(1621-1625), because his daughter, Elizabeth was married to Frederick V, the Elector

Palatine, whose acceptance of the Bohemian crown had precipitated the war.126 As a

122 On Captain Roger North voyage in the diplomatic correspondence see, Digby to Weston, 1620, TNA SP 94/24 f. 82; On the wreck of the San Antonio in Bermuda see Testimony of Edward Soame, master of the James, 22 February 1621, TNA, SP 94/24 f. 109-110; Remonstrance of Diego Ruiz to Gondomar, 15 February 1622, TNA, SP 94/25 f. 23-24; Order at Somers Islands Court, for Count Gondomar, 18 February 1622, TNA, SP 94/25 f. 25; Spanish Ambassador and Bermuda Company, 1622, TNA, SP 94/25 f. 362. 123 Peter H. Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy: A History of the Thirty Years War (New York: Allen Lane, 2009), 317; Randall Lessefer, “Introduction” in The Twelve Years Truce (1609): Peace, Truce, War and Law in the Low Countries at the Turn of the 17th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2014), ed. Lessefer, 1. 124 Siegfried Huigen, “Introduction,” in The Dutch Trading Companies as Knowledge Networks, ed. Huigen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 3. 125 Aston to Calvert, 16 July 1621, TNA, SP 94/24 f. 243-244; Aston to Carleton, 22 October 1622, TNA, SP 94/24 f. 42; Extract out of Spanish Counsels, how to subdue the Dutch, c. 1625, TNA, SP 94/32 f. 73-90; Aston to Thomas Wilson, 6 June 1622, TNA, SP 94/25 f. 104-105. By 1624, there is abundant correspondence about the Dutch in the Atlantic and Spain’s preparation of a fleet for Brazil, see TNA, SP 94/31 and TNA SP 94/32. 126 On the Palatinate phases of the war, see chapter 10, “Ferdinand Triumphant, 1621-1624,” in Wilson, Europe’s Tragedy, 314-351.

93 consequence, English diplomats endeavored to gather intelligence on Spain’s involvement in the war.127

The final critical issue in Anglo-Spanish affairs, evidenced in the correspondence, concerned the Spanish Match, the principal catalyst of the 1625 to 1630 Anglo-Spanish

War. The negotiations for the match between Prince Charles and Infanta Maria Ana had been in progress for at least a decade.128 For James, the match promised the longevity of a

European alliance and a large dowry. Philip hoped a match would help to better secure the

Indies. But in the early 1620s, Philip appeared to back off the match. In order to expedite the match, Prince Charles and George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham undertook an ill- advised incognito visit to Spain in 1624. The trip was a disaster. Charles was not allowed to see his intended and he left Spain without his bride, convinced the negotiations were disingenuous. Details of the ridiculous ordeal spread quickly throughout Europe and were publicly humiliating for the Stuarts. As a result, in March 1624, at the urging of Charles and Buckingham, England declared war on Spain.

War signaled the end of routine diplomacy. With the embassy in Madrid withdrawn, James and his Council needed to rely on the networks they had established to prepare for Spanish attacks. The Secretaries of State continued to receive bills of lading for the West Indies fleet and news of naval preparation, as well as renewed rumors of Spain’s plans to attack Virginia.129 Secretary Sir Edward Conway was especially effective in

127 For diplomatic correspondence about the Palatinate, see TNA, SP 94/28 and TNA, SP 94/29. 128 Account of the Spanish proceedings about the Match 1611-1620, 11 February 1624, TNA, SP 94/30 f. 109. 129 Information of Richard Overhaye, 30 May 1626, TNA, SP 94/33 f. 190; Information of Henry Hassard, 1626, TNA, SP 94/33 f. 212-215.

94 gathering a great deal of Spanish news from his foreign agents.130 But without a stable network in Spain to corroborate information, Conway’s reports were much more likely to contain rumor and misinformation.

War with Spain also presented an opportunity for a direct and comprehensive approach in the West Indies. As will be discussed in chapter five, by 1626, James’s successor, Charles I, had issued hundreds of letters of marque for West Indian piracy and approved patents for myriad colonies including one in Guiana. By the time Charles and

Philip IV negotiated peace in 1630, Charles had established an imperial program that he would continue to develop until the end of his reign. The reestablished English embassy in

Madrid resumed its Atlantic intelligence programs. English diplomats and their networks in Spain continued to labor to support Charles’s imperial project.

Conclusion

As this chapter has demonstrated, from 1604 to 1625 Atlantic disputes frequently complicated Anglo-Spanish affairs. Through sophisticated intelligence practices, English diplomats in Spain routinely negotiated these tensions. On a weekly basis, ambassadors and their secretaries corresponded with their agents in all of Spain’s principal port cities and their Atlantic counterparts. They were responsible for tracking the movement of

Spain’s West Indies fleet and collecting information from sailors and spies. By the mid-

1610s, the English embassy was the nexus of a complex Atlantic intelligence network. This network proved particularly useful when Spain considered attacking Virginia and

130 TNA, SP 94/34. Much of this volume is written in French, Italian and Spanish and is written in cipher which suggests that the Secretaries of State are drawing from their foreign agents in those states to acquire news from Spain.

Bermuda. English diplomats were largely successful in navigating a culture of often deliberate rumor and misinformation to better inform the Crown and colonists of impending attacks. Improved intelligence practices also helped diplomats to better inform the Crown of how to negotiate Spanish Atlantic grievances in England. By intercepting important correspondence, James was better positioned to arbitrate Spanish complaints over English efforts to discover and colonize Guiana.

James I’s efforts to defend England’s fledgling colonies through diplomatic intelligence networks clearly demonstrates the king’s interest in the early imperial project.

In defense of Virginia and Bermuda, and in pursuit of Guiana, James articulated a clear imperial policy that supported commercial and colonial ventures in places without Spanish settlement. In doing so, James attempted to reconcile the maintenance of Anglo-Spanish peace with the pursuit of an imperial project. This intelligence program helped to defend

England’s colonies from foreign attacks. To defend their reputation at home, James deployed additional practices of information management through the printing press and the pulpit.

Chapter Two

The Printing Press and the Pulpit: Imperial Propaganda for England's National Project, 1607-1623

When English colonists settled in Virginia, enthusiasm and investment were high at home. But the early years of the settlement proved arduous. Difficult environments, conflicts with the Powhatans, and threats from European competitors challenged colonists, while investors complained of minimal returns. Ships returning from Virginia carried letters and dispatches detailing the settlement’s unfortunate beginnings. These reports spread quickly and widely throughout England, worrying the Crown and the Virginia

Company about the effects this information could have on future investment and immigration. In response, James I deployed his best resources for information dissemination—the printing press and the pulpit—to improve the reputation of the Virginia enterprise.

While many of England’s infant colonial projects struggled, James and his government dedicated far more resources to the protection and promotion of Virginia than to others. The king believed that if Virginia succeeded, England would finally be able to compete with Spain in the Americas. Therefore, controlling the narrative about the colony was paramount. When negative reports about the colony reached England, spreading quickly and widely, James (through his Council for Virginia) and the Virginia Company published promotional materials, ranging from broadsides to sermons. Through these materials, James and the Virginia Company hoped to convince English subjects that participation in the Virginia enterprise was a national, moral, and Christian imperative.

In addition to this printed propaganda, James and his Privy Council also used the resources of the Church of England to encourage investment in Virginia in 1616 and in

Newfoundland in 1620. In both cases, Crown and Council used the reach of the Church of

England to promote these colonial enterprises. They ordered that parish ministers deliver sermons praising the ventures and take up collections to support the colonies. In the case of Newfoundland, the Privy Council also ordered the publication and distribution of promotional literature.1

James and his Privy Council’s efforts to control Atlantic print culture by printing and circulating colonial propaganda not only demonstrates the state’s efforts to promote

England’s imperial project but also enriches our knowledge of the culture of information surrounding English colonial activities. As this chapter will demonstrate, English people gathered and shared diverse types of Atlantic information with great enthusiasm. When this news was considered deleterious to colonial endeavors, James and his government attempted to counter these reports through a multifaceted print campaign. These measures were part of a broader struggle by the Stuart monarchs to negotiate an acceptable boundary between the state’s control over information and growing consumer demand for foreign and Atlantic news. Like “dangerous” foreign news, information about England’s fledging colonies, most notably Virginia, needed to be guarded to protect the colony from European competitors and to encourage investment and emigration for England’s most promising project.

1 Privy Council to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 30 June 1621, in J.V. Lyle, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England: Volume 37, 1619-1621 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1930), 419.

Recent studies of print culture offer historians a deeper understanding of how print operated in early modern England. Work on the Stationers’ Company of London reveals the mechanics of that body institution and relationships among its constituents. One recent study of the King’s Printing House offers a long overdue examination of the relationship between the Stuart kings and their official printers, who held the monopoly to print lucrative texts such as bibles. Historians and literary critics have also examined print culture in the Atlantic context, following the movement and reception of popular travel narratives and religious texts. Yet these studies have overlooked two critical aspects of early seventeenth-century print culture: the great body of printed ephemera and the

Crown’s relationship to this genre. These materials included sermons, broadsides, pamphlets, and proclamations. Such materials could be cheaply printed and purchased, thereby reaching wider audiences than the more expensive books published by the king’s printers. Cathy Lynn Preston suggests that these materials have been under-analyzed because they are viewed as “‘Dirtied’ by their ephemeral nature, their associations with mass-production, and their everyday uses.” As a result, “such materials have often been mapped by hegemonic print culture as its low ‘other.’”2 For these reasons, Thomas Bodley famously wanted to exclude pamphlets from the library he endowed.3 But these were precisely the reasons why James I and his Privy Council adapted these types of materials to present new propaganda. These materials were cheap, could be mass-produced, and thereby able to reach much larger audiences than any other type of print. By focusing this

2 Cathy Lynn Preston “Introduction” in The Other Print Tradition: Essays on Chapbooks, Broadsides, and Related Ephemera, ed. Cathy Lynn Preston and Michael James Preston (New York: Garland Pub, 1995), x. 3 Alexandra Halasz, The Marketplace of Print: Pamphlets and the public sphere in early modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1.

100 analysis on these promotional materials—published by order of the Crown’s Council for

Virginia—it is clear that James and his Privy Council were far more engaged with colonial promotion and cheap print than historians have previously imagined.

The Culture of Information in Early Modern England

In the early seventeenth century, information in England spread through a variety of media. Nicole Greenspan describes the boundaries separating news media as

“porous….the distinctions among print, written and oral cultures were blurry ones.”4 The continued growth in inexpensive printed news made newsbooks, separates, broadsides, ballads, and other ephemera increasingly accessible to a wider audience. As people travelled from the metropole to the countryside and back again, they carried with them news as well as a litany of gossip. Despite the growth in the printed news industry, most news was transmitted orally and contained information from printed and written sources.

The fluidity of this media meant that access to news was hardly restricted to metropolitan, literate subjects.

The state classified much of the news about the colonies that spread orally as

“rumor.” While considered gossip and hearsay, much of this information contained kernels of truth.5 By classifying these oral transmissions as rumor, James and his Council drew on the popular negative connotations associated with the genre. Rumors were the byproduct of an unverified and unreliable popular news culture and served idle persons and

4 Nicole Greenspan, Selling Cromwell's Wars: Media, Empire and Godly Warfare, 1650-1658 (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2012), 3. 5 The wide-spread and rapid circulation of these rumors, as Luise White puts it, “gives the genre its authority,” see White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and History in Colonial Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 8.

101 gossipmongers. Indeed, the playwright Ben Jonson and writer Robert Burton vilified newshounds and the unsubstantiated rumors they perpetuated.6 Therefore, by classifying unflattering news about the colonies as rumors, James could discredit them.

London was the hub of diverse foreign and domestic news networks, including reports from English colonies. Residents and visitors eagerly soaked up news and gossip.

The main aisle of St. Paul’s Cathedral, popularly known as Paul’s Walk, and the Royal

Exchange were places of vibrant foreign and domestic news sharing. Gentlemen, diplomats, and merchants gathered in these places to hear the latest reports. By 1631, one visitor could observe: “Men will tell you more than all the world, betwixt the Exchange,

Pauls and Westminster.”7 Inns, ale houses, and taverns were also common spaces where men and women exchanged information orally. Newshounds frequented these spaces, as well as the docks, where they solicited sailors and merchants for reports from afar. As a young aspiring navigator, Matthew Moreton, who would later settle a colony in Guiana, frequented the docks and City to keep his father in Cheshire abreast of news from abroad.8

Travelers from various nations also disseminated foreign news as they moved from the capital to the countryside.9 They carried with them both valuable information and idle gossip.

6 Roger Chartier, Inscription and Erasure: Literature and Written Culture from the Eleventh to the Eighteenth Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 53. 7 John Smith, Advertisements from the unexperienced planters of New England (London, 1631), quoted in H.S. Bennett, English Books and readers, 1603-1640 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 179. 8 F.J. Levy, “How Information Spread among the Gentry, 1550-1640,” Journal of British Studies 21:2 (1982): 21. 9 Adam Fox, “Rumour, News, and Popular Political Opinion in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Culture,” Historical Journal 40 (1997): 605.

102

English men and women also shared information about Atlantic activities, and in particular, England’s colonies, through manuscript news networks. Newsletter writers penned reports compiled from foreign newsletters as well as sources on the ground which they sent to their often wealthy subscribers.10 Some of this news circulated orally and eventually filtered into printed newsletters or separates compiled in England, just as topics of rumor and gossip found their way into all of these media. Manuscript newsletter writers eagerly collected news from diverse sources as well as official reports from the government to share with their customers. Joad Raymond characterizes these newshounds as “brokers or intelligencers between politicians or governments and readers.”11

In the early seventeenth century, statesmen, courtiers, and merchants were involved in manuscript newsletter writing. Perhaps the best known letter-writer, John Chamberlain, kept contacts well informed of continental and Atlantic news. During the first years of the

Virginia colony, Chamberlain reported as each ship returned home. He also closely tracked

English attempts to explore Guiana. Chamberlain prided himself on being among the first to report news as ships arrived in London.12 Another manuscript news writer, Reverend

Thomas Lorkin, also shared news from Virginia, Bermuda, and Guiana. For example, writing to his frequent correspondent, Sir Thomas Puckering, in July 1613, Lorkin reported: “There is a ship come from Virginia, with news of their well-doing.” This news

10 Sabrina Baron, “The Guises of Dissemination in Early Seventeenth-century England,” in The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe, ed. Brendan Dooley and Sabrina Baron (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 41-56. 11 Joad Raymond, News Networks in Seventeenth Century Britain and Europe (London: Routledge, 2006), 14. 12 Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 3 September 1616, The Letters of John Chamberlain: Volume II, ed. Norman Egbert McClure (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1939), 2:21- 23.

103 included a detailed narrative of the capture of Pocahontas.13 Like many Londoners of means, Lorkin was involved in the Virginia Company and made it his business to gather the most current reports from the colony.14

By the 1620s, some manuscript newsletter writers, including the prolific John Pory, were professionals who kept their paying subscribers well-informed of news from far-flung places. Pory was well connected; his contacts included Chamberlain, Sir Dudley Carleton,

Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, and George Abbott, Archbishop of Canterbury.15 Pory had a long list of subscribers and we know John, Viscount Scudamore paid him £20 annually to keep him abreast of news at court and abroad.16 As a former student of Richard Hakluyt,

Pory was especially interested and skilled in reporting Atlantic activities. Pory had intimate knowledge of the first days of the Virginia colony. When Captain Newport returned from bringing the first colonists to Virginia in 1607, he carried back a letter to Pory from a

“Dutchman” who had settled among the English.17 Pory also had eyes and ears in port cities. He often sent detailed reports from ships that had recently returned from Virginia and Bermuda.18

In 1618, on the recommendation of Warwick, the Virginia Company appointed

Pory secretary of the Company resident in the colony for three years. For the Company leaders in London, this guaranteed frequent detailed reports from someone on the ground.

13 Reverend Thomas Lorkin to Sir Thomas Puckering, July 1613, The Court and Times of James I, ed. Thomas Birch (London: Henry Colburn, 1849), 262. 14 Lorkin to Puckering, 24 November 1618, in Court and Times, Birch, 109-110. 15 Richard Cust, “News and Politics in Early Seventeenth-Century England,” Past & Present, 112 (1986), 63. 16 Levy, “How Information Spread among the Gentry, 1550-1640,” 22. 17 William S. Powell, John Pory, 1572-1636: The Life and Letters of a Man of Many Parts (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 52. All references to Pory’s letters will be from the microfiche appendix to Powell’s book. 18 Pory to Carleton, 25 October 1618, in Powell, John Pory, 38.

104

Pory regularly wrote to Sir Edwin Sandys, a company official, about colony politics, the health of the colonists, and economic developments. He reported also to Henry

Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton, about relations with the Powhatans. Pory also often wrote to Sir Francis Wyatt, providing updates on each English enterprise, including

Canada, New Plymouth, Massachusetts, and Newfoundland. For Pory’s contacts, his appointment in Virginia provided a unique opportunity to gain credible intelligence on progress in the colony. For example in July 1619, Pory sent to Carleton a detailed “report of the manner of proceedings in the General Assembly convened at James City.”19 In

September 1619, Pory recounted the context of Captain Argall’s West Indian contests with

Spanish ships.20

In 1622, Pory left the colony for England, returning by way of New Plymouth.

There he took detailed notes for a narrative which he later published. He sent his notes to

Southampton describing the land, cultivatable commodities, and indigenous people.21 Pory continued to report Atlantic (and also East Indian) news after his return to London. He likely continued to frequent the docks and ports, as he often cited the reports of various sea captains, even after his news writing business became firmly established in St. Paul’s churchyard.

People outside of London also eagerly collected and trafficked in news. In the early seventeenth century, an increasingly educated gentry found it fashionable to record the news they collected in diaries and commonplace books.22 Many literate men and women of the middling-sorts also practiced similar activities of collecting and recording. Their

19 Pory to Carleton, winter 1619, in Powell, John Pory, 52. 20 Pory to Carleton, 30 September 1619, in Powell, John Pory, 63. 21 Pory to Sir Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton, 13 January, 1623, Powell, John Pory, 98. 22 Cust, “News and Politics,” 63.

105 news diaries, journals, and commonplace books are important sources for tracing how news was transmitted and valued. Historians have used these sources to trace the circulation of news and locate an emerging “public sphere” in which subjects in far-flung counties were well aware of important domestic and foreign events.23 Indeed, in the early seventeenth- century, men and women came together in public spaces to share news. But to call this an emerging public sphere suggests that people came together to debate issues in order to influence politics.24 Thus, in the examples examined here, it is perhaps more apt to discuss a “popular sphere,” in which popular opinions circulated and provoked discussion, instead of a politically conscious “public sphere.”

Even as we evaluate the many materials in which English people recorded news, we can also trace the transmission of Atlantic reports. John Rous, a resident of Suffolk, recorded a wealth of Atlantic activities in his news diary from 1625 to 1642. While not personally invested in the colonies, among his entries were reports from English colonies in St. Christopher, Canada, and New England. He also reported sea battles and prizes won from Anglo-Dutch and Spanish-Dutch Caribbean contests.25 Living in close proximity to the Earl of Warwick, Rous was privileged to hear a frequent stream of news from London and from abroad, particularly regarding Warwick’s involvement in Atlantic enterprises.

23 See Peter Lake and Steve Pincus, “Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England,” Journal of British Studies 45:2 (2006), 270-292; Peter Lake and Michael Questier, “Puritans, Papists, and the ‘Public Sphere’ in Early Modern England,” Journal of Modern History 72.3 (2000): 587–627; Richard Cust, “‘The Public Man’ in Late Tudor and Early Stuart England,” in The Public Sphere in Early Modern England, ed. Lake and Pincus (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Halasz, Marketplace of Print, 1. 24 Arlette Farge, drawing from Jürgen Habermas, suggests that “if that [public] sphere was suppressed, then it must at least have existed.” Colonial propagandists’ efforts to suppress a pervasive culture of rumor and orality suggests a similar phenomenon. See Farge, Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth Century France (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 1. 25 John Rous, Diary of John Rous: Incumbent of Santon Downham, Suffolk from 1625-1642, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green (London: Camden Society, 1856).

106

For example, in October 1629, Rous recorded news “brought today by Lees, by the earl of

Warwick’s coachman (who returned from the earl at London that day).” Rous described

Warwick’s latest sea-battle in great detail. “That the earl was likely to have a great prise of

6 shippes of the silver fleete;” Rous recounted, “who, being beaten by the Hollanders at the West Indies, yet able to stand out, at the coming in of a ship or [two] of the earl’s, upon the first broadside, yeelded.”26

William Whiteway, a member of parliament from Dorchester, in Devon— interested, but not personally invested in the colonies—also recorded European Atlantic contests in his diary. His entries included detailed accounts of the travails of Captain Kirke in Canada as well as reports from New England. Whiteway was well informed in the nuances of Continental and Atlantic politics. For example, in September 1629 Whiteway worried that the freshly signed peace between England and France “was somewhat shaken by the taking of the French plantation at Canada by Captain Kirke, who left there 150 men well-fortified.”27 To Whiteway, Atlantic imperial rivalries were not confined to distant fringe contests, but were deeply entangled in European politics. As these examples reveal, many English subjects had access to a wealth of information about diverse English colonial activities through media other than print. In London and in the countryside, reports of

English colonial activities were shared through manuscript and oral sources.

26 Rous, Diary, 45. 27 William Whiteway, William Whiteway of Dorchester, His Diary 1618-1635, ed. David Underdown (Dorchester: Dorset Record Society, 1991), 106.

107

James I & Printers

The relationship between the early Stuart kings and printers was complicated; the privileges of printers changed according to the political climate. While James held no greater authority over print than had Queen Elizabeth, he issued far more proclamations restricting printing practices. Like Elizabeth, James patronized certain printers to ensure the printing of certain types of books, including religious texts, and prohibit the printing of others, including news and foreign affairs, thereby controlling highly political ground in the landscape of print culture.28 James first engaged the issue of censorship shortly after his ascension by cancelling all patents and monopolies granted by Elizabeth with a royal proclamation in May 1603. This cancellation included patents granted to the Stationers

Company of London. By privileging printers, James could, as Cyndia Clegg describes,

“continue an economy of privilege—but to his own patentees.”29 There were also formal practices that aided state censorship. In the early seventeenth century, texts required both authority and entrance in order to be printed. Authority came from a pre-vetting process performed by government or ecclesiastical officials who served as pre-publication licensers. Texts were entered into the Register of the Stationers Company with a note confirming the authorization of the pre-publication authority and to ensure copyright in published material.30

When James ascended the English throne, he was also quick to make sure that his own works were read by the public. He instructed John Norton, the king’s official printer,

28 Cyndia Clegg, Press Censorship in Jacobean England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21. 29 Ibid., 39. 30 Peter Blayney, “The Publication of Playbooks,” in A New History of Early English Drama, ed. John D. Cox and David Scott Kastan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 399-400; Clegg, Press Censorship, 32.

108 to print copies of the manual for governing authored by the king, Basilikon Doron, so it was on sale by the time he reached London in May 1603 to take the throne. James believed that he could use print to shape his public perception. He engaged widely with licensing and censorship and sought to curb seditious speech and rumor through the control of print culture.31 Graham Rees and Maria Wakeley argue that “James was unusual among monarchs in the high confidence he placed in the printed word…especially when the word was his own.”32 Rees and Wakely also suggest that through print, James may have hoped to “define a national culture.”33

In his propaganda, James evoked Elizabethan national discourse articulated in the works of Richard Hakluyt, William Camden, Sir Edward Coke, and John Speed.34 As

Richard Helgerson has said of a canon including these authors, “never before or since have so many works of such magnitude and such long-lasting effect been devoted to England by the members of a single generation.”35 These authors unified the concept of the nation, based on shared language and history, into a single idea.36 The propaganda published by

James’s Council for Virginia drew on this concept of the nation, conceived, in Benedict

Anderson’s words “as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”37 As we will see, colonial propaganda appealed to English subjects’ shared history (drawn from both a Roman and

31 Graham Rees and Maria Wakeley, Publishing, Politics and Culture: The King’s Printers in the Reign of James I and VI (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 15. 32 Ibid., 3. 33 Ibid., 15. 34 Texts include Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England, Camden’s Brittania, Speed’s Theater of the Empire of Great Britain, Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations of the English Nation,; see Richard Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 35 Helgerson, Forms of Nationhood, 1. 36 Ibid., 8. 37 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991), 7.

109 an English past), religion, cultural values (particularly notions of idealized masculinity), and civic responsibility. James extended this Elizabethan concept of the nation, drawing from this horizontal relationship as well as a vertical one, from the king to his subjects.

To print authorized state business, James had his own designated printer, Robert

Barker, who for many years partnered with John Bill and Bonham Norton. The King’s

Printers held privileges from the king to print all bibles in English and documents pertaining to official Crown business, such as proclamations and statutes.38 At times, James issued proclamations to clarify colonial policies. He issued multiple proclamations prohibiting domestic tobacco cultivation to stimulate the Virginia and Bermuda tobacco trades. He also circulated proclamations denouncing interloping39 in Virginia and New

England.40 James also printed proclamations to control messaging and dispel rumors about colonial incidents, particularly after Raleigh’s seizure of San Thomé and his subsequent trial (1618), as well as Roger North’s unsanctioned voyage to Guiana (1620).41

James also issued proclamations to dispel rumors and control speech. In March

1606, James issued a proclamation to clarify a rumor that he had been slain at Woking.42

38 Proclamations were “the weightiest government pronouncement short of a parliamentary statute,” see Gerald Aylmer, The King’s Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-1642 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 16. 39 “The action of interlope v.; esp. unauthorized trading within the sphere of action of a chartered company.” OED Online, "interloping, n," accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/97943. 40 Proclamations concerning Virginian tobacco: 30 December 1619; 29 September 1624; 2 March 1625, proclamation concerning New England interloping, 6 November 1622 in Stuart Royal Proclamations: Volume I, ed. James Francis Larkin and Paul L Hughes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 457-458, 600-606, 626-632, 555-557. 41 James I, A Proclamation declaring his Majesties pleasure concerning Sir Walter Rawleigh, and those who adventured with him, 9 June 1618; James I, A Proclamation declaring his Majesties pleasure concerning Captaine Roger North, and those who are gone foorth as adventurers with him, 15 May 1620, in Stuart Royal Proclamations, ed. Larkin and Hughes, 391-393; 476-478. 42 James I, “A Proclamation touching a seditious rumour suddenly raised,” 22 March 1606, in Stuart Royal Proclamations, ed. Larkin and Hughes, 134.

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To control licentious speech, particularly anti-Spanish rhetoric, James issued multiple proclamations. In 1620 and 1621, the king warned his subjects “from the highest to the lowest, to take heede, how they intermeddle by Penne, or Speech, with the causes of State, and secrets of Empire, either at home, or abroad.” James reminded his subjects to “containe themselves within that modest and reverent regard, of matters, above their reach and calling, that to good and dutifull Subjects appertaineth.”43 As this proclamation suggests, in order to protect the kingdom, protecting information was the responsibility not only of the king but also of all subjects.

To print colonial propaganda, most of which was ephemera, the King’s Printing

House contracted out its work to additional printers. While historians have successfully recovered the familial, kinship, and professional networks that bound printers together, identifying precisely which printers were contracted as assigns (or subcontractors) by the

King’s Printers is more difficult to determine. Noting that Robert Barker sometimes had entire books printed by assigns, Peter Blayney suggests that “bibliographers may need to take more serious account of this practice.”44 This oversight could explain why works printed by assigns of the King’s Printers, particularly Felix Kingston, have not previously been connected to the Crown. From 1613 to 1622, Kingston was the leading printer of materials for both the king’s Council for Virginia and the Virginia Company.45 While he

43 James I, A proclamation against Excesse of Lavish and Licentious Speech of Matters of State, 24 December 1620, in Stuart Royal Proclamations, ed. Larkin and Hughes, 495-496, esp. 496; James I, A proclamation against Excesse of Lavish and Licentious Speech of Matters of State, 26 July 1621, in Stuart Royal Proclamations, ed. Larkin and Hughes, 520-1. 44 Peter Blayney, The Texts of King Lear and their Origins: Volume I: Nicholas Okes and the First Quarto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 50. 45 In the 1630s, Kingston is listed as an assign of John Bill, the junior partner in the King’s Printing House, for printing bibles, an important and lucrative contract. These include: John Speed, The Holy Bible (London: Robert Barker, Assigns of John Bill, Felix Kingston, John Bill,

111 would later serve as an assign on more lucrative contracts, such as printing bibles, during the early years of his career, in order to ingratiate himself with the King’s Printing House,

Kingston took on their less lucrative work, including colonial ephemera.

While Kingston clearly enjoyed a privileged position with Crown and Council, little is known about him. He was the son of a printer and appears have been well connected within the Stationers Company. In 1618, along with Matthew Lownes and Bartholomew

Downes, Kingston received a Privy Seal as one of the King’s Printers in Ireland. Later,

Kingston served as Master of the Company of Stationers from 1635 to 1636.46 Kingston was interesting in printing texts about the colonies. He was the principal printer of materials for the Virginia Council and the Virginia Company. Kingston also printed Hakluyt’s

Virginia Richly Valued (1609) and the Worthy and Famous History…of that great continent of Terra Florida (1611). Kingston was the printer of choice for James’s colonial propaganda. In addition to printing dozens of pamphlets and broadsides for James’s

Council for Virginia, Kingston printed Captain Richard Whitbourne’s A Discourse and

Discovery of Newfoundland (1620) for the Privy Council. Furthermore, in 1621 Kingston printed 500 copies of a manual on planting mulberry trees for the king. It was written by the king’s gardener, John Bonoeil and the copies were sent to the Virginia colonists.

Therefore, through printers such as Kingston, James and his Privy Council actively promoted colonial enterprises.

Rumor and Promotion: The Virginia Colony

1634) and New Testament of Our Lord and Saviour Iesus (London: Robert Barker, Thomas Sternhold, Assigns of John Bill, John Hopkins, William Whittingham, Felix Kingston, 1630). 46 Henry R Plomer, ed, A Dictionary of the Booksellers and Printers who were at work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1641-1667 (London: Blades, East & Blades, 1907), 109-110.

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As we saw in “Setting the Stage,” in the years preceding and immediately following the settlement of Virginia, the king and Company promoted the colony through mostly descriptive texts. But, in 1609, when news of the colony’s challenging beginnings reached

England, the tone of promotional materials became defensive. Instead of simply praising the health of the land and the various resources and commodities most suitable for Virginia, these virtues were situated in refutation of reports to the contrary. To make matters worse, news of the wreck of the Virginia-bound Sea Venture on Bermuda in 1609 cast greater doubt on the future of the enterprise. In order to counter negative reports and dispel rumors, the Crown, the Council for Virginia, and the Virginia Company engaged in an intense print campaign from 1609 to 1612. James, through his Council for Virginia, published a series of reports and pamphlets that addressed and contested these rumors. These publications corroborated the literature printed by the Company and emphasized the king’s personal support for the enterprise.

The quantity of published materials aimed to dispel rumors about the Virginia and

Bermuda colonies reveals that much of the news about the colonies was transmitted orally.

As we will see, this news (which the king called rumor) included reports about poor soil, conditions of starvation, the absence of law and order, and hostile Powhatans. In order to contest these rumors, promoters emphasized Virginia’s potential to transform enthusiasm about the colony into investment. Most of this promotional literature shared a similar form.

Texts contained detailed descriptions of the land and potential commodities, likening each feature to similar features in England and Europe. This literature frequently included descriptions of Amerindians, often characterizing them as peaceful and amenable to religious conversion. As we will see, propagandists argued that by immigrating to and

113 investing in Virginia, English men and women would be performing the work of God and nation.

Colonial propaganda portrayed England’s imperial project as a national undertaking through a few distinct themes. First, propagandists drew from historical models of empire to demonstrate the potential of England’s colonial ventures. They did this in two ways: first, by using Rome as the model in which colonies were critical to the strength of the nation, and secondly, by turning to a national past located both in ancient

Britain and in heroic accounts of Queen Elizabeth’s explorers and privateers. Propaganda also appealed to contemporary notions of masculinity, by framing criticism of colonial ventures (most commonly Virginia) as a symptom of effeminate weakness. All of these themes were interwoven in a Protestant proselytizing mission and stood in contrast to

Spain’s Catholic and allegedly brutal conquest.

The Virginia Company’s campaign included printing sermons that both dispelled popular reports and encouraged public support for the colonies. As both written and oral media, sermons permeated boundaries of oral and printed information transmission. These sermons were both given and printed in London, where they could reach the widest audience. In 1609, William Crashaw, William Symonds, and Robert Gray each wrote sermons dedicated to the Virginia Company.47 Crashaw, an influential and well-connected preacher of the Inner and Middle Temples of London, was personally invested in the colony.48 Symonds was a veteran Church of England clergyman. His patron was Robert

47 Joshua Eckhardt, ed, “The Virginia Company Sermons” in British Virginia (Richmond: Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013), digital text, 1. 48 “Crashawe, William (bap. 1572, d. 1625/6),” W. H. Kelliher in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, October 2009, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6623 (accessed January 14, 2016).

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Bertie, Lord Willoughby, who was also Captain John Smith’s patron. It was likely either

Willoughby or Crashaw who enlisted Symonds’s support of Virginia.49 Gray was a rector in Cheapward, London, but was not a member of the Company. These ministers framed support for the Virginia colony as a Christian moral imperative, tied both to the propagation of the Church of England and a collective national undertaking. Indeed, these two ideas were bound together. These ministers adopted what Douglas Bradburn describes as a

“Protestant apocalyptical rhetoric,” an eschatological perspective that encouraged English

Protestants to locate a providential design in English and ancient history.50 This design, as these ministers argued, paired well with empire building. England was not only, like Israel, the chosen nation, but also the natural protector of the Reformation and thereby responsible for propagating the Protestant Religion in America.

Symonds devoted his sermon to “the benefit and use of the colony, planted, and to bee planted there, and for the advancement of their Christian purpose.”51 He framed his sermon around God’s commandments to Noah’s sons and Abraham’s children to colonize the earth.52 Symonds also used the black legend to address Virginia’s critics, arguing that

“if these obiecters had any braines in their head, but those which are sicke, they could easily finde a difference betweene a bloudy inuasion, and the planting of a peaceable Colony.”53

Symonds also used the example of Rome, asking his parishioners and readers: “Is onely

49 “Symonds, William (b. 1556, d. in or after 1616),” Stephen Wright in ODNB, online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Oxford: OUP, 2004, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/26892 (accessed January 14, 2016). 50 Douglas Bradburn, “The Eschatological Origins of the English Empire,” in Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old Dominion, ed. Bradburn and John C. Coombs (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 16. 51 William Symonds, Virginia. A Sermon Preached at White-Chappel (London: I. Windet, for Eleazar Edgar, and William Welby, 1609). STC 23594. 52 Ibid., 7. 53 Ibid., 15.

115 now the ancient planting of Colonies, so highly praised among the Romans, and all other nations, so vile and odious among vs, that what is, and hath bene a vertue in all others, must be sinne in vs?”54 Likening Virginia to Mesopotamia, Symonds urged his parishioners to “look seriously into the land, and see whether there bee not just cause, if not a necessity to seek abroad.”55

William Crashaw’s sermon was dedicated to his guest of honor, Thomas West,

Baron De La Warr and his upcoming voyage. Crashaw extolled arguments similar to

Symonds, particularly by contrasting English and Spanish treatment of Amerindian populations. Crashaw however, also spent a great deal of time contending popular objections and rumors about the settlement. Crashaw blamed “Papists” for “most malignantly and malitiously report[ing]” the conditions in the colony. He assured his audience that there were “thousands in this citie and kingdome, who if they knew the truth, would be more willing to assist it.”56 Crashaw scolded those who abstained from investment, “hold[ing] all damned that are not adventurers to Virginea, and it is a sure signe of a prophane man, if he be not an undertake[r] in that action.” Crashaw framed Virginia as a space where the best Christian work could be performed. Arguing that that the colony

“is not only a lawfull, but a most excellent and holie action,” he asserted that “every man” should be “bound to assist.” Crashaw offered a few ways to contribute “either with his

Countenance, Power, and Authoritie (as doe our gracious Soueraigne and noble Prince) or

54 Ibid., 15. 55 Ibid., 19. 56 William Crashaw, A Sermon Preached in London before the right honorable the Lord Lawarre, Lord Governor and Captaine Generall of Virginea, others of his Majesties Counsell for that kingdome (London: W. Hall for William Welby, 1610), D1r-D1v. STC 6029.

116 with their persons, as some; or with their purses, as others of the Honorable and godly vndertakers: or with their prayers and best wishes, as al, I hope, doe, that loue the Lord.”57

Crawshaw also tied the Virginia enterprise to a national project. Addressing rumors about “the hard and miserable conditions of them that goe and stay there,” Crashaw contended “there never was noble action that was not subject to these miseries.”58 He reminded his audience of England’s own past, “whereby our forefathers conquered kingdomes, subdued their enemies, conuerted heathen, ciuilized the Barbarians, and setled their common-wealths.” These “forefathers” endured “pinching miseries” of hunger and inadequate shelter necessary to build a civilization.59 English men’s unwillingness to suffer in order to achieve a similar “excellen[ce]” in Virginia, “discovers the pusillanimity, the baseness, the tendernesse and effeminatenesse of our English people: into which our nation is now degenerate, from a strong, valiant, hardie, patient and induring people, as our forefathers were.”60 By tying masculinity to nation and empire, Crashaw framed Virginia as a redemptive space where Englishmen could find virility and moral improvement and regenerate a wayward English nation.

Daniel Price, chaplain to Prince Henry, a champion of colonial expansion, titled his sermon Sauls prohibition staide. Or The apprehension, and examination of Saule And the inditement of all that persecute Christ.61 By evoking Saul, God’s appointed king who established the Kingdom of Israel, Price drew from an apocalyptic vision. Price’s sermon

57 Ibid., D1r. 58 Ibid., F4r. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., F4v. 61 Daniel Price, Sauls prohibition staide. Or The apprehension, and examination of Saule And the inditement of all that persecute Christ, with a reproofe of those that traduce the honourable plantation of Virginia (London: John Windet for Matthew Law, 1609). STC 20302.

117 deployed tropes similar to those of Crashaw and Symonds, but went to greater lengths to reproach those who criticized the enterprise. Decrying “the lying speeches that have injuriously vilified and traduced a great part of the glory of God,” Price argued “the

Virginian desireth it, and the Spaniard denuyeth us, and yet our own lassie, drousie, yet barking countrimen traduce it.”62 In one breath, Price chastised the “lazy” English subject with loose, slandering tongues, drew on anti-Spanish sentiment, and invoked Protestant responsibility.

In addition to these sermons, the Company enlisted authors to convince readers of

Virginia’s benefits for England’s trade and imperial ambition. For example, in Nova

Britannia (1609), dedicated to His Majesty’s Council for Virginia, Robert Johnson framed

Virginia as a part of England’s legacy of maritime exploration and participation in the enterprise as a civic duty of Englishmen. Johnson, an alderman of London and son-in-law of Company leader Sir Thomas Smythe, began his work by acknowledging his “own error standing out so long… of this noble enterprize.” By presenting what he described as an accurate rendering of the Virginia colony, Johnson sought “to rescue our enterprize from malicious ignorance, and to still their murmurings with reproofe.” Johnson emphasized the venture as a national project, spearheaded by a “mighty Prince, (such as ours)” that required

“the whole State to take in hand.”63 Johnson emphasized Virginia’s significance to

England’s share of Europe’s mercantile economy, noting how many of England’s mariners and ships, for “want of imploiment” and use, were “made away to forreine nations…to

Tunis, Spaine and Florence, and to serue in courses not warrantable.” Would it not be

62 Ibid., 22. 63 Robert Johnson, Nova Britannia Offring most excellent fruites by planting in Virginia. Exciting all such as be well affected to further the same (London, 1609), B4r.

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“better,” Johnson asked, if “their natiue countrey, and not forreine Princes, might reape their fruit, as beeing both exquisite Nauigators, and resolute men for seruice, as any the world affords?”64 English ships should not be devoted “to small and little Shipping (as wee dayly doe beginne),” but instead, he suggested, “shall reare againe such Marchants Shippes both tall and stout, as no Forreine Sayle that swimmes shall make them vaile or stoope.”

Do this, Johnson argued, and “this little Northerne corner of the world” would be “in short time the richest Store-house and Staple for Marchandize in all Europe.”65

Johnson also described a range of promising industries. He first drew attention to the luxury trades, noting the presence of silkworms and Mulberry trees in Virginia,

“whereby Ladies, Gentlewomen and litle children, (beeing set in the way to doe it) may bee all imploied with pleasure, in making Silke, comparable to that of Persia, Turkey, or any other.” There was also hemp for cordage, “an excellent commoditie, and flaxe for linnen cloth.” He noted the importation of “skillful workemen from Forraine parts” to teach

English colonists how to cultivate diverse commodities, including, “Tarre, Turpentine,

Sope-ashes, Deale, Wainscott, and such like.”66 Likening the climate to that of Italy,

Johnson pointed to the prospect of planting sugar cane, rapeseeds (for oil), oranges, lemons, cotton, olives, and sumac. Johnson also addressed the “vndoubted hope” of finding cochineal, indigo, pearls, “rich Treasure,” and perhaps even “the South Sea, leading to

China.”67

Hoping to capture further investment, the Company also published a series of promotional broadsides and pamphlets. These broadsides intended to solicit immigrants

64 Ibid., D4r. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., C4r. 67 Ibid., E1v.

119 for Virginia by listing the diverse types of skilled workers the colony required.68 The

Company also printed notices identifying important new investors, such as Henry Hastings,

Earl of Huntington, to indicate the Company’s growing support.69 Furthermore, to demonstrate that there was law and order in the colony, Governor Thomas Dale published a description of the laws he helped to codify in Virginia.70 In the same year, Robert Johnson also wrote a sequel to Nova Britannia, titled The New Life of Virginia, published “by the authoritie of his Majesties Counsell of Virginea.” Johnson once again challenged the derisive reports about Virginia and offered his thoughts on how plantations should function and be governed.71

Colonists also wrote their own encouragements for the enterprise. For example,

Richard Rich, the brother of Sir Nathaniel Rich and cousin of Robert Rich, Earl of

Warwick, wrote Newes from Virginia The lost flocke triumphant (1610), commemorating the “happy arrival” to England of Sir Thomas Gates and Christopher Newport. In his opening poem, Rich first addressed the critics: “For scandal cannot doe us wrong/God will not let us fall.” He also signified sovereignty through possession by reminding his readers that the space was open to settlement. Rich then described the commodities the colony had produced and the returns that investors should expect. Finally, Rich reminded his readers of the kind of men who adventured: “The number of Adventurers/that are for this

68 Virginia Company of London, For the plantation in Virginia. Or Nova Britannia (London: John Windet, 1609). STC 24831. 69 Virginia Company of London, Whereas [Henry Erle of Huntington] hath paid in ready mony to Sir Thomas Smith, Knight, Treasurer of Virginea [sic], the somme of [fortye powndes] for his adventures towards the said voyage (London, 1610). STC 24830.5. 70 “Dale, Sir Thomas (d. 1619),” Basil Morgan in ODNB, online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Oxford: OUP, 2004, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/7017 (accessed January 14, 2016). 71 Robert Johnson, The new life of Virginea declaring the former successe and present estate of that plantation, being the second part of Nova Britannia (London: Felix Kingston for William Welby, 1612). STC 14700.

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Plantation/Are full eight hundred worthy men/some noble, all of fashion.”72 By tying character and rank to investment, Rich attempted to offset rumors of desperation with airs of exclusivity.

Through these diverse materials, the Virginia Company hoped to improve the reputation of their struggling colony. By publishing sermons, the Company framed the colony as a Christian moral imperative. Works with largely secular arguments, such as

Johnson’s Nova Britannia, emphasized the colony’s civic mission, rooted and trade and connected to both a national and classical past. Andrew Fitzmaurice argues that through works like Nova Britannia, the Virginia Company articulated a distinctly civic ideology that was “neo-Roman and specifically classical and Italian republican in its intellectual alignments.”73 Additional printed notices challenged specific alleged misconceptions that the colony was in disorder, underfunded, and populated by rogues. All of these materials sought to contradict rumors about the problems in Virginia and to encourage investment and immigration to the fledgling colony.

Crown Propaganda

72 Richard Rich, News from Virginia, The lost flocke triumphant (London: Edward Allde, 1610). STC 21005. On Rich’s interesting use of fashion, there are a few definitions we can turn to from the OED; “Conventional usage in dress, mode of life, etc., esp. as observed in the upper circles of society; conformity to this usage. Often personified, or quasi-personified.” "fashion, n.". 9a. The first OED recorded use is in Shakespeare’s Hamlet (1604). This poem could also refer to an older meaning of fashion, 12. (man, woman) of fashion: (In early use often more fully of high fashion, of great fashion, of good fashion.) “Of high quality or breeding, of eminent social standing or repute. [Compare sense 4 and Old French gens de (bonne) façon.] This gradually merges into the current sense 2b. That moves in upper-class society, and conforms to its rules with regard to dress, expenditure, and habits.” n. 12. In his Apology for Guiana, Raleigh pairs “men of fashion and Gentlemen.” OED Online, “fashion, n,” accessed December 10 2015, http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/68389. 73 Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Civic Solution to the Crisis of English Colonization, 1609-1625,” The Historical Journal 42.1 (1999): 26.

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While the Crown authorized, encouraged, and, at times, published many of these materials, King James and his Privy Council simultaneously conducted their own propaganda campaign to support the Virginia enterprise. This campaign complemented and reinforced the Company’s message, while also clearly emphasizing the Crown’s personal investment in the future of the colony. Through his Council for Virginia, the Crown’s body for overseeing colonial affairs and Company matters, King James took a direct role in shaping the message about the Virginia colony.

From 1610 to 1613, the Council for Virginia published a range of promotional materials including pamphlets and broadsides. The Council’s main goal was to dispel the rumors about the colony. In one 1610 broadside, the Council attributed negative reports to a group of “unruly youths,” who had been sent to Virginia but managed to return to England using “stealth to get abord the ships returning thence.” The Council suggested that on their return to England, these youths had spread rumors “in all places where they come, (to colour theire owne misbehavior, and the cause of their return with some pretence) most vile and scandalous reports, both of the Country it selfe, and of the Cariage of the businesse there.” The Council criticized those who spread these rumors, describing them as “men that seeme of better sort, being such as lie at home, and doe gladly take all occasions to cheere themselves with the prevention of happy successe in any action of publicke good, disgracing both the actions and actors of such honourable enterprises, as whereof they neither know nor understand the true intents and honest ends.”74 The Council criticized the laziness of those who reproached the project and spread rumors at home, while industrious men toiled in Virginia for the honorable, national enterprise. The Council concluded by

74 Council for Virginia, A publication by the counsel for Virginea, touching the plantation there (London: Thomas Haveland for William Welby, 1610). STC 24831.7.

122 reminding readers of the king’s personal support and news that ships had recently been sent to furnish the colony with additional supplies.

The Council published an additional four reports in 1610. One report, A True declaration of the estate of colonie of Virginia, also devoted considerable time to dispelling

“such scandalous reports” about Virginia. Advising readers against listening to such rumors, the authors warned “there is a great distance, betwixt the vulgar opinion of men, and the judicious apprehension of wise men.” Rumor and wisdom “have divided the universal spirits of our land, whilst (in the honorable enterprise for plantation in Virginia) some, are carried away with the tide of vulgar opinion, and others, are encouraged, by the principles of religion, and reason.”75 Again enlisting classical examples and imperial rhetoric, the Council addressed a host of rumors, from general poverty in the colony to reports of cannibalism.76 The Council then employed ancient examples of successful empires, including Babylon, Greece, and Rome, to frame England’s imperial trajectory in

Virginia. Furthermore, the Council reinterpreted the wreck of the Sea Venture as an example of divine intervention whereby God showed the English people they were chosen to colonize Bermuda. To other Europeans, Bermuda was “accounted as an inchanted pile of rockes and a desert inhabitation for Divels,” but when discovered by England “all the

Fairies of the rocks were but flocks of birds, and all the Divels that haunted the woods, were but heards of swine.”77 Far from unfortunate, the wreck of the Sea Venture was evidence of England’s divinely ordained purpose in the Americas.

75 Council for Virginia, A true declaration of the estate of the colony in Virginia with a confutation of such scandalous reports as have tended to the disgrace of so worthy an enterprise (London: Eliot's Court Press and William Stansby for William Barret 1610), 1-2. STC 24833. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid., 1-2.

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Apart from promotional rhetoric, the Council also published much more practical reports to advertise the lottery and solicit skilled colonists.78 For example, the Council printed a notice reporting a ship preparing for Virginia that would carry “none but honest sufficient Artificers, as Carpenters, Smiths, Coopers, Fishermen, Brickmen, and such like.”79 By specifically seeking out skilled workers, the Council hoped to demonstrate the types of “honest” men who populated the colony. Each of these solicitations for colonists contained a “recent” report from Virginia, describing new investment and increased supplies. Finally, like the example above, the Council listed the types of skilled workers they sought to enlist.

The Council also encouraged notable colonists to publish their own optimistic reports. For example, De La Warr, as governor of Virginia, with permission of the Council, published an account of his time in the colony. De La Warr reported the “true” state of the colony in light of the “coldnesse and irresolution” towards the enterprise “since [his] comming into England.”80 De La Warr assured the Council and his readers (although less hyperbolically than others) of the quality of land, the availability of resources and commodities, and the infrastructural improvements he made in his short tenure.

The Council also published promotional literature from Virginia minister

Alexander Whitaker. In Good Newes from Virginia (1613), Whitaker deployed nearly all

78 Virginia Company of London, For the Plantation in Virginia. Or Nova Britannia (London: Printed for John Windet, 1609), 29. STC 24831. 79 Council of Virginia, By the councell of Virginea whereas the good shippe called the Hercules, is now preparing, and almost in a readiness with a necessarie provisions, to make a supplie to the Lord Governor and the Colonie in Virginea (London: T. Haveland for F. Welby, 1610), 1. STC 24831.3. 80 Thomas West, Baron De La Warr, The relation of the Right Honourable the Lord De-La- Warre, Lord Gouernour and Captaine Generall of the colonie, planted in Virginea (London: William Hall for William Welby, 1611), 3. STC 25266.

124 the tropes of previous Company and Council literature. Perused and published “by direction” of the Council, Whitaker, endeavored to dispel “the calumnies and slanders, raised upon our Colonies and the Country itself.” “These being devised by the devil,”

Whitaker accused, “and set abroach81 by idle and base companions, are blowen abroad by

Papists, Players, and such like, till they have filled the vulgar eares.”82 To abandon the colony and leaving behind “riches other men shall gather” would make England “a scorne among Princes, and a laughing stocke among our neighbour Nation.” Whitaker roused his audience, commanding, “Awake you true hearted English men, you seruants of Iesus

Christ, remember that the Plantation is Gods, and the reward your Countries.” He asked his audience to be patient for results and “liberally supplie a little space [for] this your

Christian work.”83 Whitaker’s account reinforced the upstanding reputation of the colony’s governor and described a detailed list of Virginia’s commodities. He renewed hopes of finding mines, noting the good fortune of iron, steele, and antimonium,84which “haue rather offered themselues to our eyes.”85 Like the Council’s earlier publications, Whitaker also

81 “In or into a broached or pierced condition, so as to let liquid flow out; (of liquid) flowing freely, as from a broached cask. Chiefly in to set abroach.” 1a. "abroach, adv.". OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/593?rskey=zVd2am&result=2&isAdvanced=f alse (accessed January 14, 2016). 82 Alexander Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia (London: Felix Kingston for William Welby, 1613), A2r. STC 25354. 83 Whitaker, Good Newes, 33. 84 “One of the elementary bodies, a brittle metallic substance, of bright bluish white colour and flaky crystalline texture. Its metallic characteristics are less pronounced than those of the metals generally; and it forms the fourth member of the natural series nitrogen, phosphorus, arsenic, antimony, bismuth, and some others, which are in different combinations triads and pentads. Symbol Sb (Stibium),” "antimony, n.". OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press; An astringent bole, of fatty consistence and reddish colour, obtained from Lemnos; formerly esteemed as a medicine and antidote; sphragide; known also as †sealed earth sigillate earth, Lemnian earth. "terra sigillata, n.". OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/199522?redirectedFrom=terra+sigillata (accessed January 14, 2016). 85 Whitaker, Good Newes, 39.

125 recounted “the marvelous and indeed miraculous” landing of the Sea Venture in Bermuda.

To Whitaker, the event was divinely ordained “as never ship came there that perished not.”86 Whitaker’s report held an air of authority: his information came directly from

Virginia, he was a man of God, and his authority to print his tract derived from King

James’s Virginia Council.

From 1613 to 1620, the Virginia Council and the Virginia Company continued to publish promotional literature about the Virginia and Bermuda colonies.87 These works were generally narrative accounts of those living in or who had recently travelled to the colonies confirming progress on the ground. However in 1619, the spread of disease increased the death rate in some plantations. This news spread quickly throughout England, evidenced by the significant growth in promotional literature aimed to counteract these reports.

In 1619, the Company began to issue annual updates on positive developments in

Virginia. These reports informed readers of new investments, supplies, and conditions on the ground. The first report detailed notes of shipping and the commodities they intended to produce. To demonstrate their commitment to proselytizing, the Company also noted

Nicholas Ferrar’s endowment of £300 to educate ten Algonquian children.88 Another

86 Whitaker, Good Newes, 4. 87 Council for Virginia, Whereas sundrie the aduenturers to Virginia, in their zeale to that memorable worke, the plantation of that country with an English colony (London: Felix Kingston, 1613). STC. 24833.6; Council for Virginia, A briefe declaration of the present state of things in Virginia (London: Thomas Snodham, 1616). STC 24834; Council for Virginia, Whereas vpon the returne of Sir Thomas Dale Knight, (Marshall of Virginia) the Treasurer, Councell, and Company of the same, haue beene throughly informed and assured of the good estate of that colony (London: Thomas Snodham, 1617). STC 24839; Virginia Company, A declaration for the certaine time of dravving the great standing lottery (London: Felix Kingston for William Welby, 1616). STC 24833.8; Ralph Hamor, A true discourse of the present estate of Virginia (London, John Beale for William Welby, 1615) STC 12736. 88 Virginia Company of London, A note of the shipping, men, and provisions, sent to Virginia, by the treasurer and company, in the year 1619 (London: Felix Kingston, 1619). STC 24842.

126 report described the arrival of Italian immigrants to make bread and glass, the immigration of women to serve as planters’ wives, renewed supplies, and a developing fur trade.89

Unfortunately for the Company, the king’s suspension of the lottery in 1621, further increased their need for investment. The lottery had grown contentious over time. It was enacted in London in 1612 and from the start drew less participation than the Company had hoped. Without the yield they desired, the Company had to postpone the lottery in

1615 or else take a loss on the prizes they had purchased. In order to inform participants, the Company printed multiple Declarations to explain why the drawing had been postponed. After the failure of the London lottery, a series of “running’’ lotteries were held throughout England. These events were both popular and lucrative for the Company.90 But despite the success of the “running” lotteries, many Company members, including

Treasurer Sir Thomas Smythe, worried about the moral implications of continuing the lottery. But Sir Edwin Sandys replaced Smythe in 1619 and revived the lottery for another year. This decision was very unpopular; Sandys even asked the Privy Council to issue a proclamation forbidding public criticism of the lottery, which they subsequently printed.91

But when the lottery came under further review in parliament during a general debate over the king’s proclamations, James decided to suspend the lottery.92

89 Virginia Company of London, A note of the shipping, men, and provisions, sent and provided for Virginia, by the Right Honorable Henry, Earle of South-hampton, and the Company and other privater adventurers, in the yeere 1621 (London: Felix Kingston, 1622). STC 24843. 90 The running lotteries yielded £29,000. See Robert C. Johnson, “The Lotteries of the Virginia Company, 1612-1621,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 74.3 (1966): 287; Samuel M. Bemiss, ed., The Three Charters of the Virginia Company of London, with seven related documents: 1606-1621, (Williamsburg: Virginia 350th Anniversary Celebration, 1957), 92-93. 91 Johnson, “Lotteries of the Virginia Company,” 288. 92 Wallace Notestein, Frances Helen Relf, and Hartley Simpson, ed., Commons Debates 1621 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935), II, 121-122; IV, 90; Sir Edward Nicholas, Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons in 1620 and 1621 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1776), I, 80-81; Johnson, “Lotteries of the Virginia Company,” 287.

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James issued a proclamation to announce its suspension, just as he had to announce its establishment.93 The cancellation of the lottery eliminated an important revenue stream for the Company, and was especially damaging given a recent fatal spell of disease in

Virginia. To encourage additional investment, the Company revived its practice of printing sermons, enlisting Patrick Copeland and John Donne to contribute quartos in 1622.94

Copeland’s first sermon, Virginia’s God be thanked, assured investors that positive yields were forthcoming. He asked his audience to consider the anticipated spoils, “Haue you not now great hopes of abundance of Corne, Wine, Oyle, Lemmons, Oranges, Pomegranats, and all maner of fruites pleasant to the eye, and wholesome for the belly? And of plentie of Silke, Silke Grasse, Cotton-wooll, Flax, Hempe &c. for the backe?”95 He also reminded readers of Sandys’s optimistic accounts of the iron, glass, and salt works. Copeland described Virginia as endowed with desirable raw materials, but warned that only with the support of investors and colonists, could these materials be transformed into lucrative commodities. Recognizing that his audience valued fresh information, Copeland summarized recent reports from Virginia, including John Pory’s favorable description of southward discoveries.96 In the same year Copeland also published an account of the

93 James I, Whereas at the humble suit and requoest of sundry our loving and well disposed subjects, intending to deduce a colony, and make a plantation in Virginia (London: Robert Barker and John Bill, 1621), 1. STC 8660. 94 John Donne, Three sermons upon special occasions preached (London: Printed for Thomas Jones, 1623). STC 7057. 95 Patrick Copeland, Virginia’s God be thanked, or A sermon of thanksgiving for the happie successe of the affayres in Virginia this last yeare (London: Felix Kingston, 1622), 13-14. STC 5727. 96 Ibid., 12-14.

128 money he gathered at the Cape of Good Hope to support the building of a free school in

Virginia.97

James’s Council for Virginia also again began printing encouragements in 1619.

This time, the Council’s materials further emphasized their royal authority, displaying

James’s coat of arms between the author line and the text. Broadsides printed jointly were titled “By the treasurer, Councell and Company for Virginia” and displayed James’s image to the left of the authors and the Virginia Company crest to the right.98 Accordingly, works printed only for the Virginia Company displayed only the Company’s crest. For readers, this made the authority of the text immediately apparent.

By the treasuror, councell and company for Virginia, A proclamation for the erection of guest houses, 17 May, 1620 (London: Felix Kingston, 1620). STC 24841.

97 Patrick Copeland, A declaration how the monies (viz. seventy pound eight shillings sixe pence) were disposed (London: Felix Kingston, 1622). STC 5726. 98 By the treasuror, councell and company for Virginia, A proclamation for the erection of guest houses, 17 May, 1620 (London: Felix Kingston, 1620). STC 24841.

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Council for Virginia, A declaration of the state of the colonie and affaires in Virginia with the names of the adventurors, and summes adventured in that action (London: Thomas Snodham and Felix Kingston, 1620). STC 24841.4.

This impact of these graphics were evident to readers. James’s image was known to his subjects, as was his coat of arms; it was displayed in churches, on the liveries of royal servants, and on proclamations and other official documents. Helen Hackett reminds us that images of the monarchy “may have been more present to their subjects in other media which are less available to the modern scholar in a research library, such as coins of the realm, weekly sermons from the pulpit of the national Church over which they presided, and ceremonies or events at which either the symbolic or real presence of the monarch was on display.”99 Combining image and text made the impact of these materials more powerful. Roger Chartier explained that in the early modern period “power was

99 Helen Hackett, “Dreams or designs, cults or constructions? The study of images of monarchs,” Historical Journal 44:3 (2001): 812; Keith Jeffery, “Crown, communication and the colonial post: Stamps, the monarchy and the British empire,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 34.1 (2006): 45-70; See also John M.T. Balmer, Stephen A. Greyser, and Mats Urde, "The crown as a corporate brand: insights from monarchies," Journal of Brand Management 14.1 (2006): 137-161.

130 illustrated…decisions and acts all passed massively into print in pieces combining image and text.”100 Moreover as materials Roger Chartier termed “publicly exposed writings,” available to both literate and illiterate audiences,” they reached a wider audience.101

In addition to these annual reports, in 1620 and 1621, the Council for Virginia printed pamphlets acknowledging the colony’s distress. These pamphlets described forthcoming improvements to the colony, including sending more resident clergymen and additional resources to stimulate the iron, silk, wine, and salt industries.102 One pamphlet attended principally to rumor, assuring the public that they had identified “those Letters and Rumours to have been false and malicious, procured by practice and suborned to evil purpose.” Moreover, the Council informed their readers that “by the testimony upon Oath of the chief Inhabitants of all the Colony; by whom we were ascertained,” Virginia was indeed “rich, spacious, and well watered; temperate as of the Climate; very healthful after men are a little accustomed to it; abounding with all Gods natural blessings.”103

The Crown also sent printed materials directly to Virginia to improve agricultural cultivation. In 1622, Felix Kingston printed a letter from the king to the Earl of

Southampton “commanding” him to set up silk works and to plant grape vines. Included were the 500 copies of the aforementioned instructions by the king’s gardener, John

100 Roger Chartier, ed., The Culture of Print: Power and the Uses of Print in Early Modern Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 233. 101 Roger Chartier, “Introduction to Translation,” in Fernando J. Bouza Alvarez, Communication, Knowledge and Memory in Early Modern Spain (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), xii. 102 Council for Virginia, By the treasurer, councell and company for Virginia [A proclamation for the erection of guest houses, 17 May, 1620] (London: Felix Kingston, 1620). 103 Council for Virginia, A declaration of the state of the colonie and affaires in Virginia with the names of the adventurors, and summes adventured in that action (London: Thomas Snodham and Felix Kingston, 1620). STC 24841.4.

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Bonoeil, for how to make silk, plant grape vines, and dry figs.104 James’s endorsement of the silk industry in Virginia was an extension of his efforts to sponsor luxury trades and manufactures. As Linda Levy Peck has shown, in the early seventeenth century, the Crown promoted all sorts of domestic luxury industries, including glass, silk, and tapestry.105

Indeed, in 1607, James ordered all those in England with the ability to do so to plant mulberry trees. He even published Instructions for the Increasing of Mulberry Trees (1609) and promoted the publication of Nichlas Geefe’s translation of Olivier de Serre’s book The

Perfact Use of Silk-Wormes and their Benefit (1607).106 Thus, James drew on the popularity of the luxury trades to make Virginia more desirable. In a letter accompanying the pamphlets, Southampton recognized the authority of Thomas Hariot, credited as a “great

Mathematician” and former Virginia resident to corroborate the promise of luxury goods.

Southampton assured readers that Hariot determined that Virginia was “seated in the same latitude that Persia is,” and thereby a suitable environment to cultivate luxury commodities.107

But hopes that these printed efforts would stimulate cultivation and investment in the fragile colony were short lived. On March 22, 1622, chief Opechancanough led a series of surprise coordinated attacks on over thirty English settlements in Virginia, killing around one-fourth of the colonists and taking twenty women hostage. The colony would have been completely destroyed had it not been for the help of two Algonquian informants: Chauco,

104 John Bonoeil, His Majesties gracious letter to the Earle of South-Hampton (London: Felix Kingston, 1621), 63. STC 14378. See also Linda Levy Peck, Consuming Splendor: Society and Culture in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 100- 102. 105 Peck, Consuming Splendor, 74. 106 Ibid., 95. 107 Bonoeil, His Majesties gracious letter, 63.

132 a Pamunkey man, and a young boy.108 By the summer, news of the massacre reached

England.109 On July 12, 1622, Thomas Locke informed Reverend Joseph Mead: “all our people in Virginia, in all places…on March 22nd, at eight in the morning, under pretense of friendship, have been murdered by the natives.” Locke credited the young Algonquian boy with saving the surviving colonists.110 The following day, Chamberlain informed

Carleton of a ship “come from Virginia with ill news, that the savages have by surprise slain about 350 of our people there.”111 Since Thomas Locke and Chamberlain reported the events within a day of one another, it is clear that that once the ship from Virginia arrived, news of the attack spread quickly.

The Virginia Company quickly responded by printing A declaration of the state of the colony and affairs in Virginia, written by the Company’s current secretary, Edward

Waterhouse. Waterhouse lamented “the fame of our late unhappy accident in Virginia.” He addressed that news of the attack “hath spread itself…into all parts abroad, and as it is talked of of all men.” The narration included an account of the events followed by a list of the deceased. He reminded his readers “Yet I not thought it amiss (since I am to express some late Accidents) before-hand to sum up the benefits of that Country; partly because they daily increase by new Discoveries made, to the glory of our most gracious King, and ever renowned to all posterity, for the founding and supporting of this most Royall and

108 Karen Kupperman, Indians and English: Facing Off in Colonial America (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2000), 196; see Edward Waterhouse, “A Declaration of the State of the Colony;” John Smith, Generall Historie, 297; and Helen C. Rountree, Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1500-1772 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1992), 188-192. 109 News sent from the colony in late April reached London by mid-July. 110 Thomas Locke to Reverend Joseph Mead, 12 July 1622, in Birch, Court and Times, 231. 111 John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 13 July 13 1622, in Letters of John Chamberlain, 446.

133 blessed work of plantation.”112 Emphasizing the Crown’s continued support of the endeavor legitimated the Company’s persistent efforts to improve the colony.

Since only a single text about the massacre was published, it is likely that James ordered the Stationers Company to make sure nothing else about the attack made it to print.

Considering the overwhelming number of publications after the earlier rumors about the colony, the absence of print is suggestive of censorship. Jacobean censorship was ad hoc and uneven, but censoring printed information about the Virginia massacre is fairly consistent with James’s crisis and response attitude towards censorship.113

The Virginia massacre had exposed the colony’s weakness and in the fall-out, tensions among leadership grew unmanageable. In April 1623, the ousted Bermuda colony governor, Captain Nathaniel Butler, brought to the Privy Council his work The Unmasked

Face of our Colony in Virginia as it was in the Winter of the year 1622. In his narrative,

Butler revealed that despite the previous years’ efforts, the colony remained in a disastrous state. Butler’s account was confirmed by dozens of letters from the colony. The Privy

Council determined that the situation required drastic action; they began the investigative process that would eventually lead to the dissolution of the Virginia Company.114

Church, State & Print

112 Edward Waterhouse, A declaration of the state of the colony and affairs in Virginia (London: G. Eld, for Robert Mylbourne, 1622), 1. STC 25104. 113 Sabrina Alcorn Baron, ““The Board did think fit and order”: The structure and function of the Privy Council of Charles I, c. 1625-1641, with special reference to the Personal Rule” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1995), 274. 114 Frank E. Grizzard, Jamestown Colony: A Political, Social, and Cultural History (Santa Barbara: ABD-CLIO, 2007), liv-lv.

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The Crown’s printed promotional campaign was only one aspect of the state’s efforts to improve the reputations of colonial ventures among English subjects. To encourage investment in the Virginia colony (1616) and the Newfoundland colony (1621), the Privy Council used the resources of the Church of England. Through the assistance of

George Abbott, Archbishop of Canterbury, the Privy Council ordered the ministers of each parish to praise these colonies in their sermons and asked them to take up collections in support of the colonies. In the case of Newfoundland, Archbishop Abbott also ordered parishes to distribute promotional literature printed by the Privy Council. By employing the resources of the Church of England, the Council further endeavored to change the narrative around these colonial enterprises.

The Church of England was the Crown’s most effective organ for information dissemination. The Act of Uniformity mandated that all subjects attend weekly services.

Therefore, by dissemination information via the Church, James could reasonably assume that his message would be communicated to a wide audience. In addition to transmitting his message orally through sermons, the instructions sent to each parish were printed as broadsides. Like proclamations, broadsides could be nailed to church doors or posted in public places. Literate subjects could then read the Archbishop’s message for illiterate audiences.

This practice was first employed in 1616. George Newman, the Commissary

General of the see of Canterbury, sent a printed a notice to parish ministers and churchwardens, requesting that during services, sermons should include an encouragement for the Virginia colony and collections be taken up to aid the Company’s endeavors. The notice was printed as a broadside with a blank bracketed space where Newman or his

135 secretaries could fill in the names of the parishes. This format allowed Newman to quickly

115 dispatch these instruction s to numerous parishes under Canterbury’s supervision.

The notice included two sections: the first section provided the Privy Council’s instructions to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the second section included Newman’s instructions to ministers and churchwardens.

In the first section of the broadside, the Privy Council described Virginia’s Christian moral imperative. Those “who wish to the increase of the Christian religion” should assist the colony, “and therein make experience of the zeale and devotion of Our well minded subjects, especially those of the clergy.” The Council “require[d]” them to “write your

Letters to the several Bishops of the Dioceses in Province,” who in turn would order “the

Ministers and other zealous men in your Dioceses” to encourage others to donate “both by

115 G. Newman to the minister and church-wardens of [Bethersden] (London: T. Snodham, 1616), VHS, VHS Broadside 1616:1.

136 their owne example in contribution, and by exhortation of others.” Framed as an enterprise

“to the increase of the Christian religion,” parish ministers should be naturally included to participate. “Well minded subjects” and “zealous men” should also join this effort of

Christian charity. Through both their “owne example” and by personally appealing to others within their parish, the Council hoped to collect “liberall” donations.

The second section, signed by Newman, recapitulated the details of the collection and offered further advice on the most effective methods for collections. “Amongst well disposed people of your Parish,” Newman suggested, go “from house to house, or in the most effectual manner, for the furthering of so godly and Christian a worke.” He also instructed ministers: “in your Sermons or otherwise, by exhortation, to stirre up the devotion of godly people, to the advancing of a work so much tending to the glory of

Almighty God, the propagation of Christian Religion, the reducing of barbarous people to the knowledge of God and Civilitie, and lastly, to the honour of the Kings Majestie and this Nation.” Appealing to God and Nation, these sermons should portray the colony into the divinely purposed project for England. Furthermore, to dispel rumors about Virginia, the Council recommended a positive message: “To signifie vnto them, that the plantation of Virginia being now brought at length to some reasonable abilitie, to subsist by itselfe in a contented state of life, and yearely by the increasing by new supplies, the Counsell of

Virginia have undertaken before the Lords and others of his Majesties Privie Counsell, forth-with vpon the receipt of the monyes to be collected, to erect a Colledge there.”116 By reminding readers that the directives were from the Privy Council, and that contributions

116 Ibid.

137 would be put toward Christian purposes, the Council moved the narrative away from the

Company and towards God and the nation.

Apart from a manuscript letter from James to Tobias Matthew, Archbishop of York, with nearly identical text to the first section of this broadside, only scant evidence around these efforts survives.117 As ephemera, these broadsides were more likely discarded after they served their purpose than they were to be saved. From Virginia Company records it is clear that collections were taken up in many parishes and delivered to the Company treasurer. The proceeds were sufficient enough to initiate plans for a college at Henrico to convert and educate Algonquian children. The Company set aside land and brought thirty tenants over from England to work on the college. Unfortunately, Henrico was almost entirely destroyed during the 1622 massacre and any efforts to revitalize the project were negated by the dissolution of the Virginia Company in 1624.118 The College of Henrico was also the last attempt by the English government to convert Virginia’s natives.119

Despite the failure of Henrico College, and likely because of the success of the parish collections, the Privy Council again employed the Church of England’s bishops to support the Newfoundland colony. The instructions were similar: they asked ministers to praise the venture and take up collections for the enterprise. This time, however, the Privy

Council went further. Perhaps because the Newfoundland enterprise was less widely publicized than the Virginia colony, the Privy Council also ordered publication and

117 Peter Walne, “The Collections for Henrico College, 1616-1618,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 80.3 Part One (1972): 259-266. 118 Robert Hunt Land, “Henrico and Its College,” William & Mary Quarterly 18.4 (1938): 496. 119 Rebecca Anne Goetz, The Baptism of Early Virginia: How Christianity Created Race (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 91.

138 distribution of Captain Richard Whitbourne’s A Discourse and Discovery of Newfoundland throughout England’s parishes.

The Newfoundland colony was a very different type of venture than the Virginia colony. English fisherman had consistently fished and seasonally settled the territory of

Newfoundland for decades, with sporadic attempts to settle the colony more permanently.

However, in 1620, James granted Sir George Calvert, one of his Principal Secretaries of

State, a patent for Newfoundland. It is likely that Calvert encouraged the Privy Council to further promote the enterprise. Whitbourne’s practical experience made him an excellent advocate for Newfoundland. An experienced seaman, Whitbourne received a commission from the Court of Admiralty in 1615 to investigate alleged abuses in the Newfoundland fishery. He sailed to Newfoundland on a judicial circuit where he attempted to negotiate disputes and establish order.120 He returned to Newfoundland in 1618 as the governor of the colony in Renews and successfully reorganized the colony.121

Whitbourne’s narrative included themes common in promotional literature. He described the climate and commodities suitable for the cultivation of trade, opportunities to convert its people, and the need for skilled men. He also connected his Newfoundland venture to a greater network of English colonies, where Newfoundland could serve as a safe harbor for the relief of English ships “sailing to and from Virginia, & the Bermuda

Ilands,” in the events of “extremity” or to “at other times refresh themselves in their

120 His judicial circuit was the first attempt to institute formal courts in Newfoundland. He adjudicated disputes and received presentments from 170 of the 250 English captains who were fishing there. See “Whitbourne, Sir Richard (1561–1635),” Christopher English in ODNB, online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, Oxford: OUP, 2004, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29230 (accessed January 14, 2016). 121 Ibid.

139 voyages.”122 Whitbourne’s approach to promotion was generally practical; he avoided the hyperbolic language ubiquitous in these types of narratives.

On June 30, 1621, the Privy Council sent a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury requesting his assistance in the distribution of the Discourse printed “from order of us.”

Whitbourne hoped that his Discourse “may be published throughout the kingdom for the furtherance and advancement of the said plantation.” Agreeing that his book could improve contributions, the Council “have thought fit earnestly to recommend him unto your lordships good favour, both for the distribution of his books within that province of

Canterbury unto the severall parishes thereof.123 In addition to “ordering” the publication of this work and guaranteeing its distribution through the Church, the Council also asked that Abbott encourage his parishioners to provide charitable donations so that Whitbourne

“might reape by his Lordshipp’s assistance some profit of his labours from such voluntarie contributions as shalbe willingly given and collected from within several parish churches…for the service of their countrie.”124

The choice of “countrie” here is another compelling example of an appeal for

England’s national project. Whereas in support of the Virginia Company, the Council asked parishioners to contribute for reasons of their religion first, and their country second, the more persuasive argument for Newfoundland was as a national project. As a fishing colony, Newfoundland might serve to convert small groups of Amerindians, but

Whitbourne (or the Privy Council) could hardly frame the enterprise as a principally

122 Richard Whitbourne, A Discourse and Discovery of Newfoundland (London: Felix Kingston for William Barret, 1620), 18. STC 25372 123 Privy Council to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 30 June 1621, in J.V. Lyle, ed., Acts of the Privy Council, 1619-1621 (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1930), 419. 124 Ibid., 421.

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Christian endeavor. Instead, as Virginia Council and Company materials had previously done, by providing assistance to Whitbourne and his Newfoundland venture, subjects’ contributions were in “service of their countrie.”125

Just as in the case of the Virginia colony, the Privy Council made similar requests of other bishops in the see of Canterbury. It is clear that the Privy Council asked George

Montaigne, Bishop of London to contribute to this effort. In 1622, after the Privy Council printed another run of Whitbourne’s Discourse, Montaigne published a notice describing the Council’s orders along with a general encouragement of the text and the Newfoundland colony.126 His notice included recommendations for how to gather the greatest amount of money. Montaigne suggested that collections be taken “upon some Sabbath day, in the time of Divine Service, and when no other Collection is to be made,” in order to “seriously stir up and exhort them to extend their bountiful liberality herein.” He encouraged churchwardens to go “from seat to seat,” and also to the homes of parishioners whom were absent from services.127

The Bishop of London’s precise instructions suggests that he hoped to gather a large collection, both at church and by visiting parishioners’ homes. London had the largest population density in the country and was also the best place to solicit colonists for

Newfoundland. Dedicating additional resources to collection efforts there was both wise and strategic. By printing his letter Montaigne ensured that his message would reach beyond the walls of his church. By using both the printing press and the pulpit, the Privy

125 Ibid. 126 Whitbourne’s Discourse had three print runs: in 1620, 1622, and 1623. 127 Church of England, Bishop Montaigne, George, by the diuine prouidence, Bishop of London, to all and singuler archdeacons, deanes, and their officials, parsons, vicars, curates, churchwardens (London: Felix Kingston, 1622), 1. STC 25375a.7.

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Council guaranteed that their encouragement of the Newfoundland colony would reach a large audience of both literate and illiterate subjects.

It is important to recognize that although the Church and its networks were institutionalized resources of the Crown, the Crown rarely used the Church in this way.

Instructing the Church of England to take up collections in support of England’s colonial enterprises was an uncommon measure. Only on a few occasions during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had English monarchs approved such efforts. Elizabeth I had ordered two collections: first, in 1568, for victims of religious persecution in the Netherlands and

France, and again 1580, for victims of Montpellier.128 James authorized only five collections: shortly after his ascension he approved a collection for the “beleaguered” citizens of Geneva, who were threatened by the Duke of Savoy and, in 1618 he authorized relief for those in Wesel in Germany, impoverished by Spanish occupation. During the

Thirty Years War, James approved three collections for the relief of ministers exiled from the Palatinate.129 By assisting desperate coreligionists and their ministers, these collections worked well within James’s global Protestant vision. Therefore while the collections taken for the Virginia and Newfoundland colonies emphasized England’s Protestant imperial mission, this type of collection for a national project was entirely unprecedented.

Conclusion

James and his Privy Council hoped to shape the narrative around England’s fledgling colonial enterprises by managing the dissemination of information about

128 Thomas L. Auffenberg, "Church-State Philanthropy: English Charity Briefs and the Relief of Persecuted Continental Protestants," Journal of Church and State 21.2 (1979): 289. 129 Ibid.

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England’s imperial project. Far from leaving the work of promotion to colonial projectors alone, James employed his best resources for large-scale domestic information management: the printing press and the pulpit. Recognizing that information spread through a variety of media, Crown and Council attempted to reach the greatest audience possible by disseminating their message through sermons both orally and in print.

The work of Crown and Council to control information about England’s fledgling empire also provides tremendous insight into the ways information about far-flung places spread throughout England. Many people in early seventeenth-century England were mobile and even those whose lives were exclusively parochial, frequently encountered people with great mobility, thereby gaining access to the news they carried. Travel and migration between England and the colonies moved in both directions. From sources as diverse as the letter-writing newshound John Pory, who held a temporary post in Virginia, to the troublesome youths who allegedly spread rumors by word of mouth about the colony as they moved from metropole to the countryside, English men and women could learn about England’s Atlantic activities. Attempting to control the reports and rumors these subjects carried was a matter that perplexed Crown and Council. England’s imperial project required active participation and supervision, through investment and emigration, from

English men and women. By tying colonization to God and the welfare of the nation, and dedicating their best resources to spread this message, James and his Council communicated an imperial ideology to English subjects.

James and his Privy Council also knew that print alone could not control the narrative around England’s imperial enterprise. In seventeenth century England, the most common medium for information transmission was oral. The Church of England,

143 established in the far corners of the country, was the most powerful organ for information dissemination through sermons that every subject was legally required to attend. By deploying the resources of the church, James could guarantee that most of his subjects would hear his message. Thus, by employing a far-reaching strategy of imperial public relations, through the printing press and the pulpit, James communicated to his subjects his commitment to England’s Protestant and national imperial project.

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Chapter Three

From Antiquaries to Archivists: Sir Thomas Wilson and the State Paper Office

"Forasmuch as the preserving and well ordering of papers and records, especially such as concern matters of state and council, as well respecting the negotiations with foreign Princes, as other instructions and directions for some causes, is a matter of great consequence to us and our estate, not only in respect of secrecy and keeping them from the view and knowledge of man, but also for that good use may be made of them for future direction of such we shall employ hereafter in our public services both at home and abroad."1

James I, on the State Paper Office, March 15, 1610

In 1606, James I appointed Sir Thomas Wilson, a client of his Principal Secretary of State Salisbury, to the position of Keeper of the State Papers. Wilson was an ambitious agent who saw the State Paper Office as a means to advancement within James’s administration. Wilson dedicated all his energies to his position, and within a few years, radically transformed the archive.

As we will see, archive building was central to the early Stuart kings’ comprehensive project of information management. As European powers navigated a wider geopolitical area, competing for trade and territories in an Atlantic and indeed global setting, diplomacy and international relations relied more frequently on establishing legal precedent through archival evidence. Possessing the material evidence from which to draw precedent put states at a competitive advantage. Therefore, in the early seventeenth century, the heads of European states purchased libraries, manuscripts, and record collections, as well as kept leading scholars under patronage.2 Archives like Wilson’s State Paper Office,

1 Frederick Devon, Issues of the Exchequer: being payments made out his majesty's revenue during the reign of King James I (London: John Rodwell, 1836), 307. 2 William Stenhouse “Thomas Dempster, Royal Historian to James I, and Classical Scholarship in Early Stuart England,” Sixteenth Century Journal 35.2 (2004): 395-410; David J. Sturdy, Science

145 organized to help statesmen consult matters of precedent, could more effectively aid domestic and foreign policy matters in seventeenth-century England.

Despite his productive career, Wilson has largely been ignored as a Jacobean innovator. Scholars drawn to his work have generally neglected its significance. In 1936,

F.J. Fisher edited and published Sir Thomas Wilson’s unfinished 1606 manuscript The

State of England. In his explanation of why he had chosen to edit a mostly unknown text written by an obscure author, Fisher disclosed: “Wilson himself was scarcely an important person, but the circumstances of his life bred in him habits of thought that make his comments on society more illuminating than those of worthier and abler men.”3 Rendering

Wilson unimportant, but his privileged access and intelligent insight useful, Fisher determined that Wilson’s assessment of English society and politics might prove meaningful to scholars.

With regards to rank and title, Fisher’s assessment was correct. Despite his privileged connections, Wilson never rose above the position of Keeper of the State Papers, becoming a knight only in July 1618 at the age of 58. Wilson’s work however, was very important. As Keeper of the State Papers, he transformed a formerly neglected office into an accessible archive.

Wilson took disorganized materials out of dusty chests and trunks and began to organize and catalogue them. He then annotated these papers and bound them into books. In 1618, he secured apartments in Whitehall Palace which he transformed into a working archive.

Wilson put his archive to use, preparing materials to inform domestic and foreign policy,

and Social Status: The Members of the Academie Des Sciences 1666-1750 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1995), 39-41. 3 Thomas Wilson, “The State of England (1600),” in The Camden Miscellany, Volume XVI, ed. F.J. Fisher (London: Office of the Society, 1936), v.

146 sometimes by request and other times on his own initiative. Such topics included: collections of medieval and early modern marriage treaties, documents pertaining to the

Law of the Sea, and various aspects of freedom of trade.

At the state level, Wilson’s work in the State Paper Office demonstrates the

Crown’s interest in exercising jurisdiction over its own paper trail, evidence that needed to be preserved and protected to serve domestic and foreign policy. This protection of information was also a defensive strategy. As we will see, state papers in the hands of

James’s opponents, made accessible by libraries like Sir Robert Cotton’s, could be dangerous weapons used to undermine his authority. During his lifetime, Cotton amassed a personal library that included many papers belonging to state ministers and copies of international treaties. Crown and Council often used Cotton’s library and his expertise on antiquarian topics to inform domestic and foreign policy. However, as archives became highly politicized, particularly during tensions between Charles I and parliament over the

Petition of Right, Cotton and his library came under intense scrutiny. In 1629, amid these controversies, and on the charge that he had circulated a seditious pamphlet, Charles confiscated Cotton’s library. Thus, over the course of his career, Cotton went from serving as a consultant for the king and his Council to a dangerous enemy of the Crown. His library, once a tool for statecraft, was by the end of his life, an unguarded arsenal of paper artillery that could potentially be deployed against the king and the kingdom.

Wilson’s difficulty in wresting state papers from the hands of Cotton and individual statesmen remind us of the unclear boundary between the property of the state and private subjects in early modern England. Many state agents held multiple posts or were semi- professionals, who engaged in both public and private business. The blurred boundaries

147 between private and public duties, and the debate over whether the papers of statesmen were state or private property, created significant challenges to early bureaucrats like

Wilson. However, as antiquarianism became politicized, and the Crown showed greater interest in accumulating materials for precedent, Wilson found greater support in his work as Keeper. By determining these papers to be the property of the state, because their secretaries were foremost servants to the Crown, James and Charles began to move towards a more modern, centralized state model.

This chapter follows the career of Sir Thomas Wilson with close attention to his work as Keeper of State Papers, particularly his efforts to organize the archive, wrest papers from secretaries and private individuals, and craft arguments of legal precedent. This chapter also examines Wilson’s conflict with Sir Robert Cotton which foreshadowed

Charles’s seizure and closure of Cotton’s library in 1629. I argue that Wilson’s efforts were part of a broader push from the Crown to shift the control of information from private hands to state control. But these efforts were not simply about possession. Once papers were held by the state, they could be more readily put to use in state projects. As dusty papers were taken out of trunks and placed on open shelves, their materiality was permanently altered.

With Wilson’s bindings and annotations, not unlike modern finding aids, records could then be easily searched and used to craft domestic and foreign policy.

This work became increasingly important as European powers sought control over territories and trade in the Americas and the East Indies. In their efforts to colonize lands and control seas, European monarchs dug deep into their archives for the evidentiary base for their jurisdiction, discovery, and possession. This chapter will therefore conclude with a discussion of how these materials underpinned Atlantic and global international disputes,

148 especially concerning the Law of the Sea. By acquiring and collating materials to aid these negotiations in the State Paper Office, James and Charles were able to more easily negotiate complex international disputes over far-flung territories.

Archives and Empire

In early modern Europe, constructing efficient archives was a powerful tool for state building. From the mid to late sixteenth century, the governments of Spain, France, and Florence made their archives more accessible to their monarchs and principal statesmen.4 In early modern Venice, powerful elites with access to political information created organized archives to house their records.5 Once they were organized, accessible archives could more easily aid statecraft. Jacob Soll’s excellent examination of Jean-

Baptiste Colbert’s transformation of the French archives reveals this process in action.

Manipulating feudal archives provided an advantage to monarchs when negotiating early modern diplomacy. Moreover, training archivists and librarians as bureaucrats replaced the state’s need for antiquary consultants. State archives were therefore useful institutions for negotiating more complicated foreign policy and wider, even global geo-political interests.6 It is no accident that during a period of empire building, the Crown also allocated resources to archives.

4 Nicholas Popper, “From Abbey to Archive: managing texts and records in early modern England,” Archival Science 10 (2010): 256. 5 Filippo De Vivi, “Ordering the archive in early modern Venice (1400-1650),” Archival Science 10 (2010): 232. 6 Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

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As this dissertation argues, improved practices of information management were central to modern state formation and empire building. As Elizabeth Mancke argues, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the English government institutionalized imperial ventures as part of foreign policy. Imperial policy therefore became entangled in complicated and shifting international politics.7 King James recognized that negotiating a more complex foreign policy required a deeper understanding of geo-political history and politics, which needed to be supported by legal precedent. By creating a permanent archive with accessible materials prepared for this type of use, James held an advantage in the

European contest for Atlantic and global spaces and resources.

The Elizabethan Archives & the Society of Antiquaries

Elizabeth I took formative steps towards improving England’s record keeping. She recognized the political power of archives and endeavored to protect and enhance the state’s record collections. She created the State Paper Office in 1578, choosing, as its head, the capable diplomat, writer, and antiquary, Dr. Thomas Wilson.8 Dr. Wilson possessed a deep interest in preserving the records of the past, but was distracted by his other responsibilities in Elizabeth’s government. But Elizabeth’s project of archive building differed from James’s project in two ways. First, while Elizabeth created positions like the

Keeper of the State Papers, she did not devote the resources to make them successful.

7 Elizabeth Mancke “Empire and State,” in The British Atlantic World, ed. Braddick, 195. 8 A.F. Pollard clarifies Sir Thomas Wilson was most likely unrelated to Dr. Thomas Wilson. While some have claimed that Sir Thomas was Dr. Wilson’s nephew, there is no corroborating evidence and Sir Thomas was not mentioned in Dr. Wilson’s will. A.F. Pollard, “Wilson, Sir Thomas (d. 1629).” Rev. Sean Kelsey. In ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004, online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29690 (accessed January 14, 2016).

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Secondly, Elizabeth improved record keeping through collaboration, instead of conflict, with the Society of Antiquaries. In fact, many of her leading archivists were both government record-keepers and private collectors.

The Society of Antiquaries, a society of learned men composed of lawyers, record keepers, heralds, and gentlemen, who met to discuss a range of antiquarian interests, including history and heraldry from 1586 to 1607, researched and discussed a variety of topics. 9 Its founding members included antiquaries such as Sir Robert Cotton and John

Stow and the Society enjoyed the patronage of Matthew Parker, Archbishop of Canterbury, himself an avid collector. The Society was particularly interested in the origins of things, such as titles, customs, offices, and later, institutions.10 Early in James’s reign, the Society turned its attention to the history of institutions, including parliament. This type of research is where the tension between the Crown and the Society rested. Kevin Sharpe suggests that

“as the past became a disputed text, the custody of records became a political question.”11

Wilson, positioned to confiscate such records, became an integral actor in these politics.

During her reign, Queen Elizabeth approved efforts to protect medieval manuscripts from destruction and dispersal.12 This effort functioned from the top-down.

Elizabeth ordered her leading Councilors to gather political and religious manuscripts, so that they could be used in government propaganda. Archbishop Parker gathered and

9 Peck, Northampton, 102. 10 In the 1590s, such topics included: coins, seals, the histories of titles (dukes, earls, viscounts, barons, and knights) and history of legal institutions, such as the Inns of Court, and the title of esquire, the privileges of towns and parishes, and ceremonies such as funerals. See Thomas Hearne, Collection of curious discourses, Volume 1 (London: Printed by and for W. and J. Richardson, 1771). 11 Sharpe, “Introduction,” in Sir Robert Cotton as Collector, ed. Wright, 14. 12 Paul Slack, “Government and Information in Seventeenth-Century England” Past & Present 184 (2004): 38.

151 harnessed works of early church historians to more securely establish Elizabeth’s church settlement. Elizabeth’s most trusted councilor, William Cecil, Baron Burghley, acquired and protected historical materials to counter Elizabeth’s domestic and foreign adversaries.13

Elizabeth also employed intelligent and capable record-keepers in her government.

Arthur Agarde, clerk of the Exchequer, appointed first as deputy chamberlain in 1570, organized hundreds of public records housed in the Treasury.14 Agarde was a learned and practicing antiquary. He was a member of the Society of Antiquaries, where he delivered papers on a range of antiquarian topics, including the history of shires, the offices of the high steward, constable, and earl marshall, the history of Christianity in Britain, and the origins of seals.15 As clerk of the Exchequer, Agarde compiled inventories, catalogues, and calendars of the records in his keeping.16 Subsequent instructive texts on record keeping, such as Thomas Powell’s revised Repertorie for Records (1631), drew almost entirely from

Agarde’s inventory. Agarde systematically described how he organized records and precisely where they could be found, a practice resembling modern finding aids. He organized his records according to a series of broad categories, which Wilson later adopted.

17 Another Elizabethan record-keeper, William Bowyer, also drew up catalogues for state papers and could cite precedent from his records.18

13 Francis Wormald and Cyril Ernest Wright, The English Library before 1700: Studies in its History (London: Athlone Press, 1958), 170; F. Smith Fussner, The Historical Revolution: English Historical Writing and Thought, 1580-1640 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 24. 14 Maggie Yax, “Arthur Agarde, Elizabethan Archivist: His Contributions to the Evolution of Archival Practice,” The American Archivist 61.1 (1998): 57. 15 Yax, “Arthur Agarde,” 61. 16 Ibid., 63. 17 Ibid., 66. 18 Fussner, Historical Revolution, 83.

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Many of these Elizabethan record keepers were also antiquaries. Sir Robert Cotton,

Dr. Wilson, William Lambarde, William Bowyer and his son Robert (who became Keeper of the Tower records in 1604) were all active in the Society of Antiquaries.19 In their work as servants of the queen’s government, these men took formative steps to organize the state’s records. While Elizabeth allowed the Society to convene, she was not interested in enhancing their status. She rejected their 1589 petition for a charter of incorporation to establish an academy and library.20

James was far more threatened by the work of the Society of Antiquaries. From early in his reign, he vocally disapproved of the Society’s activities and he officially dissolved the Society in 1607. While the last official recorded meeting of the Society occurred that year, according to the famous antiquary Sir Henry Spelman, some of the members continued to meet informally until 1614, when James again forbade the society from convening.21 James was particularly concerned about the members’ recent interests: the examination of the origins and development of state institutions, particularly parliament. To aid these intellectual projects, Society members gathered manuscripts to inform their reports and papers, many of which were housed in Cotton’s library.22 James was concerned both with the pursuit of these manuscripts (which he asserted belonged to the state), and that these projects could undermine royal authority and increase the power of parliament. However, according to Spelman, the Society of Antiquaries had resolved

“neither [to] meddle with matters of State, nor of Religion.” James, however, was not

19 Ibid., 76. 20 Donald R. Dickson, The Tessera of Antilia: Utopian Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in the Early Seventeenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 8. 21 William Stenhouse, “Thomas Dempster, Royal Historian to James I, and Classical Scholarship in Early Stuart England” Sixteenth Century Journal 35.2 (2004): 404; 397. 22 Hearne, Collection of curious discourses, Vols. 1 and 2.

153 convinced. The Society of Antiquaries never regained official recognition under the

Stuarts.23

But as we will see, James’s disapproval of the Society of Antiquaries had little to do with any dislike for antiquarian studies in general. James himself possessed a deep interest in Greek antiquity and patronized scholars expert in this field, such as Isaac

Causabon. James approved of Edmund Bolton’s 1617 proposal for an “academ roial,” which with royal patronage would produce a history of England.24 However, he was firmly opposed to any private pursuits with contemporary political implications that could undermine his authority as king.

James I: King of Scholars

To enhance his archives and prevent state papers from finding private owners, King

James both seized and purchased manuscript collections. James’s interest in accumulating and protecting manuscripts was known amongst European monarchs. The Spanish ambassador to England, the conde de Gondomar, worried about both James’s efforts to obtain manuscripts and the simultaneous growth of private libraries in England. James in turn thwarted Gondomar’s persistent efforts to purchase manuscripts and rare books for

Spain.

In a 1618 report to Philip III, Gondomar described his deep frustration with these efforts. He complained that “all the libraries belonging to the Roman Catholics through

23 Stenhouse, “Thomas Dempster,” 404; Henry Spelman, Reliquiae Spelmanniae (London: Browne, 1723), 69-70. 24 D.R. Woolf, The Idea of History in Early Stuart England: Erudition, Ideology, and "The light of truth" from the accession of James I to the Civil War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 191-92.

154 the land are at [England’s] command, from whence they have all such collections as can require gathered to their hand, as well from thence as from all the libraries of both universities.” To compete with English archive building, Gondomar had made “it a principal part of [his] employment, to buy all the manuscripts, & other ancient & rare authors out of the hands of the heretics, so that there is no great scholar lies in the land, by my Agents are dealing with his books.”25

But James continually obstructed his efforts. Gondomar claimed he had arranged to purchase Isaac Casaubon’s library, “had not their vigilant King (who foresees all dangers, & hath his… business in every place) prevented my plot.” According to

Gondomar, James had sent “that torturer of ours (the Bishop of Winchester26) to search & sort the papers, & to seal up the Audience: Giving a large & princely allowance for them to the relief of Casaubon together with a bountiful pension & provision.” With Casaubon’s collection secured by James, Gondomar turned his attention to his next target: Cotton’s library. He emphasized to Philip “that whensoever it come to be broken up (either before his death or after) the most choice & singular pieces might be gleaned & gathered up, by a

Catholic hand.” Gondomar explained his attention to archive building: “[n]either let any man think that defending this love to petty particulars is unworthy an Ambassador, or of small avail for the ends that we aim at; since we see every mountain consists of several lands, & there is no more profitable conversing for statesmen, then amongst scholars &

25, Gondomar’s Report on the negotiations in England, 1618, TNA SP 94/23 f. 110-131. 26 Because it is unclear precisely when this event occurred, the Bishop of Winchester could either be Thomas Bilson (1597-1616), James Montague (1616-1618) or Lancelot Andrewes (1618- 1626).

155 their books, especially where the king [James] for whom we watch is the King of

Scholars.”27

As this letter reveals, James’s “vigilance” over manuscript collection and trading was wise. Gondomar, a skilled diplomat, kept a close watch on Jacobean England’s largest manuscript collectors, angling to acquire their libraries at the first available opportunity.

Gondomar’s interest in acquiring Cotton’s library suggests that whether or not this library was dangerous at home, it certainly could be dangerous abroad. Gondomar may have realized the power of Cotton’s library when he participated in the early Anglo-Spanish marriage negotiations in 1615. In these negotiations, the details of Cotton’s manuscripts

(as relevant to the interests of Spain) would have been known to Gondomar. This letter was intercepted, translated, and sent back to England by the English Ambassador in Madrid,

Sir John Digby. From this intelligence, James was apprised of Gondomar’s interest in purchasing books and manuscripts in England.

James kept a close watch on both foreign and domestic manuscript collectors. His librarians, Sir Peter Young and his son, Patrick Young, expanded and protected the collection. James blocked Sir Thomas Bodley’s scheme to remove a large collection of books from the Royal Library to his own collection in Oxford.28 James’s son, Prince Henry, purchased John, Baron Lumley’s excellent library to enhance the Royal Library’s collection.29

Wilson enthusiastically joined these efforts; he became James’s principal defender of records. While antiquaries like Cotton and John Selden might have been mostly

27 Gondomar’s Report on the negotiations in England, 1618, TNA, SP 94/23 f. 110-131. 28 James P. Carley, “The Royal Library as a Source for Sir Robert Cotton’s Collection: A Preliminary List of Acquisitions,” The British Library Journal 18.1 (1992): 52. 29 Fussner, The Historical Revolution, 65.

156 interested in using their collections for private means or to assist Crown and Council as consultants, the quasi-public access they allowed to their collections meant that privileged or even “secret” information could fall into the hands of domestic adversaries or foreign enemies. James gave Wilson a broad definition of papers that belonged to the state, guaranteeing that Wilson had the power to intervene in the manuscript trade.

Wilson’s Early Career

Wilson’s early career was an education in matters of intelligence and information management. He began his career as an intelligencer, working as a foreign agent in service to Salisbury. In 1601, Salisbury sent Wilson to Florence to assist with diplomatic negotiations with the Ferrara, Venice, and other Italian states, where his principal task was to discover plots against England and Ireland by Catholic parties.30 The work was dangerous; Wilson often feared for his life and was eager to complete his assignment.31

Wilson returned to England in June 1603. The following year Salisbury sent him to

Bayonne to serve as consul for matters relating to Spain until Ambassador Cornwallis arrived in 1605. With peace newly signed, Wilson principally served as an intelligence agent. While his time in Spain was brief, he established strong relationships with the other resident consuls who stayed longer at their posts. As Salisbury’s secretary at home, Wilson maintained frequent correspondence with England’s agents in Spain. Wilson remained intimately connected with his contacts abroad. Richard Cocks, a merchant and intelligence agent, wrote at least weekly to Wilson from 1606 to 1607.32 B. Bourdet, an informant in

30 Pollard, “Wilson,” ODNB. 31 Pollard, “Wilson,” ODNB. 32 TNA SP 94/12.

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Bayonne, wrote to Wilson “in accordance with the promise he made at Wilson’s departure from Bayonne.”33 Hugh Lee, the English consul in Lisbon, wrote to Wilson almost weekly.

Lee kept Wilson particularly abreast of the movement of Spain’s West Indies fleets and

Spain’s threats against Virginia and Bermuda.34 Wilson also updated those abroad from his perch, such as Sir Thomas Parry, English Ambassador to France, with news from court.35

Wilson maintained and developed his network of contacts abroad even after his service to Salisbury ended and he began his work as Keeper of the State Papers. For example, Richard Cocks, his former intelligence contact in Spain, kept him informed of affairs in places as distant as Japan, where Cocks traded from 1618 to 1620. In 1622, Sir

Walter Aston, then the resident ambassador in Spain, wrote often to Wilson about Spanish affairs, providing detailed accounts of European West Indian conflicts.36 Wilson was also a contact for the prolific manuscript news writer John Chamberlain. Indeed, Wilson was

Chamberlain’s source for news of the Virginia Massacre, which he quickly dispatched to his correspondents.37

As Salisbury’s secretary, Wilson attended sessions of parliament and the committee for the union of England and Scotland, keeping minutes and supplying notes for his employer.38 He collected materials for Salisbury to consult on domestic and foreign policy, often borrowing items from Cotton’s library.39 Wilson’s diverse roles allowed him to

33 B. Bourdet to Thomas Wilson, 17 March 1603, Hatfield House, Salisbury Papers, no. 632, 262. 34 Wilson and Lee’s correspondence is found in both TNA, SP 89/3-4 (State Papers Foreign, Portuguese) and TNA, SP 94 12-18 (State Papers Foreign, Spanish). 35 Wilson to Sir Thomas Parry, 5 August 1603, BL, MSS Cotton Caligula E/X f. 226. 36 Aston to Wilson, 6 June 1622, TNA, SP 94/25 f. 104-105. 37 Chamberlain to Carleton, 13 July 1622, TNA, SP 14/132, f. 31. 38 Pollard, “Wilson,” ODNB. 39 See Colin Tite, The Early Records of Sir Robert Cotton’s Library: Formation, Cataloguing, Use (London: The British Library, 2003).

158 familiarize himself with many aspects of Jacobean politics and diplomacy, evident in his many memoranda as Keeper.

Keeper of the Papers

Wilson’s expansive state service made him an excellent candidate for Keeper of the

State Papers. James first appointed Wilson jointly with Levinus Muncke, a Council staffer, but by 1610, he named Wilson as the sole Keeper. Wilson worked hard to make the State

Paper Office functional. By 1618, Wilson’s archive was an accessible library for Crown,

Council, and other statesmen. He secured apartments at Whitehall, consisting of two rooms, three closets, and turrets.40 His work was temporarily disrupted by the fire at

Whitehall in 1619. Fortunately, his papers were not destroyed, but were “cast into disarray.”41

James’s 1610 patent outlined the responsibilities of the office. He instructed Wilson to take the papers of Salisbury, Burleigh, and those held by Lake, and to “reduce all such papers…into a set form or library, in some convenient place within our Palace of Whitehall, to be at all times the readier for our use, and for the use of any of our Principal Secretaries hereafter, for the better enabling them to do us service.”42 At Whitehall Palace, the library

40 F.S. Thomas, A History of the State Paper Office: A View of the Documents Therein Deposited (London: J. Petheran, 1849), 8; Sabrina Alcorn Baron also notes that the in 1618, the keeper of the Council chest was assigned a room for storing the Privy Council’s records and papers. After 1630, the Council’s collection of stored materials grew and included a number of trunks, boxes, and bags containing statutes, proclamations, maps, surveys, etc. See Baron, ““The Board did think fit and order”: The structure and function of the Privy Council of Charles I, c. 1625-1641, with special reference to the Personal Rule” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1995), 137. 41 Thomas, History of the State Paper Office, 8. 42 Patent of James I, 15 March 1610, in Thomas, History of the State Paper Office, 7.

159 was strategically located to aid Privy Councilors in their work. Wilson diligently organized and arranged the papers, binding them up into annotated books. In an annotated version of his catalogue, Wilson described his method: “All these books & papers before mentioned have been sorted out of confusion & bound up by myself and my servants, & placed in the form aforesaid according to their countries and times, whereof I have made books of particular Registers for every country.”43 He arranged the papers according to subject and geography in the classical Latin: I Britania Australis (Southern Britain/England); II

Britania Septentrionalis (Northern Britain/Scotland); III Gallia (France); IV Hybernia

(Ireland); V Italia (Italian States) VI Hispania et Flandria (Iberian Peninsula and the

Spanish Netherlands); VII Germania, Dania et Hanseatica, Urbes (German principalities,

Denmark and the Hanseatic League, Upper Rhine); VIII Polonia (Poland, Russia, Sweden)

IX Provincia Unita (Dutch Republic) and X Turcomania, Barbaria et India, (Turkey,

Barbary Coast- North Africa, India).

[Arthur Agarde’s Compendium, 1610]

43 Wilson, “Generall heads of things in the office of the Papers,” 29 July 1618, NRO, Fitz Hatton Papers, FH 3752.

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Wilson’s categorization was consistent with contemporary wisdom on how to organize records. For practical purposes, public records in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were divided into two groups. The first category, arcana imperii, contained documents concerned with matters of state and of the crown. The second category included various legal and financial records principally concerned with the rights and interests of the crown, including matters such as titles, land tenure, bureaucratic precedent, and acts of parliament.44

The first category, Britania Australis, contained the greatest number of papers.

Wilson organized these papers into seven categories. The first subsection, “Regalia,” was further subdivided into: “Matters concerning the Crown and the revenue;” “Matters of

Power derived from the king to others,” including Letters, Patents, Commissions, Privy

Seals, etc; “Records concerning the Crown’s lands and leases;” and “Customs, Impositions,

Loans, etc.” The second section, titled “Legalia,” contained copies of “ancient & modern

Acts & orders of Parliament” including proclamations, edicts, decrees, and books of laws and statutes. The third section, titled “Ecclesiastica,” contained books and records concerning the church. The fourth section, titled “Militaria,” subdivided into land and sea, included orders and commissions for domestic defense, “voyages & discoveries,” and records pertaining to the navy. The fifth section, titled “Politica,” contained books of the

Privy Council, instructions for foreign and domestic service, papers concerning courts, and other aspects of governance. The sixth section, titled “Criminalia,” contained records of treason, felonies, and other crimes, as well as records of the court of Star Chamber. The

44 Fussner, The Historical Revolution, 69.

161 seventh and final subsection, titled “Mechanica,” contained trade, manufacturing, and merchant records.

This order may reflect James’s interests and priorities for his government. Wilson ordered the three largest arms of James’s government, beginning first with royal powers, followed by legal powers (particularly in relation to Parliament), and then powers of the church. Following the three central governing bodies, the fourth category, “militaria,” encompassed not only military matters, but also “voyages & discovery” and Law of the

Sea.45 It is interesting that this category precedes “politica,” which included the Privy

Council and foreign service.

For the rest of the categories (II-X), Wilson detailed the records in his possession.

The order of the categories was likely determined by a combination of foreign policy importance and the numbers of papers he had for each territory or polity. Wilson then annotated his final two categories. Section XI, titled “Tractatus Principum,” contained books of treaties between England and foreign nations. For this category, Wilson not only organized and annotated the papers he inherited with the office, but also Salisbury and

Burghley’s papers “and many of them recovered out of other men’s hands in his time, by my industry and procurement.”46 The final category, “Mixta,” contained “Twenty cuppords” of Henrician state papers.47

As his catalogue details, Wilson’s organization aimed to make his papers useful to the king and his Councilors. He thoughtfully organized his papers according to Agarde’s

45 See R.B. Wernham, “The Public Records in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” in English Historical Scholarship in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), ed. Levi Fox, 11. 46 Wilson, A note of the course kept in the office of papers, 29 July 1618, NRO, Fitz Hatton papers, FH 3753. 47 Ibid., f. 6-7.

162 model. By adopting this model, his system was consistent with the Exchequer records and would be familiar to Councilors and their clerks working in both collections. The order of his categories suggests that he tailored his methods to James’s needs. His industriousness in procuring foreign treaties—the evidentiary basis for international negotiations— demonstrates his hope that his papers would be immediately put to use.

Acquisition and Recovery

Wilson’s second most important task was recovering lost state papers from the hands of former Secretaries of State and private subjects. According to Wilson, the office was designed specifically for this purpose: “because when Secretaries of State became persons of importance, it was found inconvenient to have the papers in private rooms, or in the hands of servants, who often embezzled them on charge of secretaries.”48 Wilson targeted the papers of both former and outgoing secretaries.

The tendency of statesmen to take their papers with them when they left office was not unique to James’s administration. In 1592, Robert Beale, a Privy Council clerk, complained that Walsingham’s papers and books had been carried away “whereby no means are left to see what was done before or to give any light of service to young beginners, which is not well.”49 Wilson’s office was designed specifically to address this problem. His Oath of Office emphasized the importance of this duty: “[to] preserve the papers from damage or theft; to keep secret such things therein contained as it is for the

King's service to conceal; and to recover any papers or records that may be detained from

48 Wilson to George Calvert, 1622, TNA, SP 15/42 f. 91. 49 Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 230.

163 the office.”50 By acquiring these papers, Wilson would protect confidential intelligence and state secrets. Fussner describes the Oath taken by Wilson as “necessarily more elaborate than most, for he had to guard state secrets.”51

As he described in his catalogue, Wilson was unable to obtain all of Salisbury’s papers. He did however secure all the foreign treaties from Salisbury’s collection. He worked hard to acquire the papers of other aging Secretaries, including Sir Robert Naunton and Thomas Howard, Earl of Suffolk before they were dispersed among private hands.52

With Naunton’s papers, Wilson tried to make this policy mandatory. In 1623, when Sir

Robert Naunton left office, Wilson asked the king to order Naunton to deliver his papers directly to him.53 Wilson also successfully reclaimed the papers of a few former

Secretaries. For example, in 1619, Wilson obtained a warrant for the seizure of forty-five packets of the papers of Sir William Davison, an Elizabethan diplomat, Privy Councilor, and briefly Secretary of State, found in the hands of Ralph Starkey. This set of papers was an important recovery; Starkey was an avid collector of antiquarian and contemporary papers. He eagerly collected official state papers, many of which he transcribed. Like

Cotton, Wilson found Starkey’s collection, particularly its state papers, “injurious” to his own office. Starkey’s papers could contain privileged information, so it was critical that they remained in the right hands.54

50 Oath taken by Thos. Wilson, to serve the King truly as Keeper and Registrar of State Papers, undated 1612, TNA, SP 14/94 f.192. 51 Fussner, The Historical Revolution, 77. 52 Wilson also obtained a warrant from Secretary Lake to seize the papers of Captain Edmond Bruce, BL Harleian MS, 286 f. 286, 10 August 1619; Lake to the Executors of Captain Edmund Bruce, 1617, TNA, SP 15/41/91. 53 Wilson to James, 1623, TNA, SP 14/137 f. 32. 54 “Starkey, Ralph (d. 1628),” Louis A. Knafla in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, September 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/26317 (accessed January 14, 2016).

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Despite his efforts, some substantial collections of papers remained beyond

Wilson’s reach. Strikingly, some papers that eluded Wilson to this day remain out of the hands of the state. For example, he failed to obtain Lord Burghley’s domestic papers (now at Hatfield House), Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s manuscripts (now at the Huntington

Library), and those of Secretary Sir Edward Conway, whose contents are now dispersed among various collections.55 Wilson complained that Secretaries who borrowed state papers from him failed to return them. This failure was especially problematic, as some of these men died and their papers then moved through family hands.

Wilson versus Cotton

Wilson was determined that make sure that personal collections did not compete with, or undermine, his state project. Wilson’s resolve to recover state papers brought him into conflict with Stuart antiquaries. In the early seventeenth century, Sir Robert Cotton was perhaps the greatest antiquary and collector of manuscripts. Wilson’s relationship with

Cotton was complicated. While Wilson’s primary goal was to wrest state papers from

Cotton in order to prepare comprehensive materials for precedent, in actuality he often needed to borrow Cotton’s papers.

Wilson and Cotton occasionally worked together over the years, particularly during

Wilson’s service to Salisbury. Cotton was for many years Northampton’s advisor, who was

Salisbury’s aid from 1603 to 1612.56 Together they drew together materials for precedent and prepared tracts on government reform and foreign policy. Wilson also borrowed

55 Daniel Starza Smith recently reconstructed the “damaged and dispersed” Conway papers for his book, John Donne and the Conway Papers: Patronage and Manuscript Circulation in the Early Seventeenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4. 56 Peck, Northampton, 79.

165 manuscripts, collections of treaties, and matters of precedent from Cotton’s library. As

Cotton’s loan list details, Salisbury sent him to Cotton’s library to gather materials relating to Spain (during peace negotiations), navigation, France, and fishing.57 Wilson’s experience in Cotton’s library may have informed his organizational choices. Like Cotton, he bound up collections of treaties, marriages, and maps into books.

Wilson and Cotton also shared cosmopolitan interests. Manuscript newsletter writers, such as John Pory, kept them abreast of foreign news.58 Cotton was also interested in colonial affairs, procuring reports from Virginia and Bermuda.59 But to Wilson, Cotton represented an old way: Cotton served as a consultant when his personal expertise or his library’s collections could assist Crown matters on a particular subject. Wilson was foremost a bureaucrat, before state service was fully professionalized. He was completely devoted to this work, believing that the Crown’s interests superseded private passions.

Convinced that the State Paper Office could not effectively aid the state while Cotton’s library competed with it, he endeavored to destroy it.

Cotton could not have anticipated that intellectual pursuits would draw him into conflict with the Crown. Cotton was an ardent supporter of James’s claim to the throne, adding Bruce as his middle name to emphasize his Scottish ancestry and an active harmonious relationship with the past.60 He wrote a treatise to support this claim, likely contributing to his knighthood in May 1603. Early in his reign, James occasionally solicited

Cotton’s expertise. In 1603, Cotton crafted position papers both for and against the peace

57 See Tite, The Early Records of Sir Robert Cotton’s Library. 58 John Pory to Robert Cotton, undated, BL, Cotton Julius, C III. 59 [undated “Fryday morning”], John Haryngton, 1609, BL, Cotton Julius, C III, 187. 60 Colin Tite, The Manuscript Library of Sir Robert Cotton: The Panizzi Lectures (London: The British Library, 1994), 6.

166 with Spain. From 1608 to 1609, Cotton participated in a commission investigating abuses in the royal navy.61

Like Wilson, Cotton used his growing library to identify places where James and his Privy Council might increase government revenue.62 Cotton’s relationship with the Earl of Northampton ensured that his suggestions were seen by the right eyes. After the death of Northampton, Cotton used his relationship with the Howards and their connection to the royal favorite, Sir Robert Carr, to continue in his role as an advisor to Privy Councilors. At times, the Privy Council borrowed books in Cotton’s possession.63

Linda Levy Peck aptly describes Cotton’s loan lists as “as a roll call of the political and intellectual elite of early seventeenth-century England.”64 His loan list contains 270 distinct records of loans. Cotton loaned a range of books and manuscripts, including, religious texts, medieval records, collections of hundreds of maps, and volumes on domestic laws and foreign treaties. As Peck points out, his list of borrowers was just as diverse, including archivists (Starkey, Patrick Younge, Bowyer, and Agarde); antiquarians

(Camden and Selden); privy councilors and statesmen (Sir Henry Montagu, Thomas

Howard, Earl of Arundel, Calvert, Sir Julius Caesar, and Sir Richard Weston) and many other men of rank.65

Cotton’s loan list also identifies many items that perhaps he should not have possessed. For example, Cotton had tracts written by Councilors during their time in office

61 “Cotton, Sir Robert Bruce, first baronet (1571–1631),” Stuart Handley in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/6425 (accessed January 14, 2016). 62 Cotton drew up “Means for raising the king's estate” in 1610 or 1611 to offer suggestions for how the royal revenue could be increased, see Handley, “Cotton, Robert.” 63 E. Wotton, Nottingham, and W. Knollys to Cotton, 4 May 1610, BL, Cotton Julius, C III, 203. 64 Peck, Northampton, 103. 65 See Tite, The Early Records of Sir Robert Cotton’s Library.

167 including one from Burghley on the state of the kingdom during Elizabeth I’s reign.66 He possessed many calendars and copies of the Tower records as well as “Parlament books,” which included medieval and contemporary notes, orders, and minutes of parliament.67

Indeed, Robert Bower, clerk of parliament, frequently borrowed materials related to parliament from Cotton’s library.68

Cotton’s relationship with James and his Privy Council first began to deteriorate in

1615 after Cotton participated in the early negotiations for a Spanish Match. When these negotiations broke down, perhaps in an effort to assign blame, the Privy Council investigated Cotton about his role in the match. In a letter to George Abbott, Archbishop of Canterbury, James expressed concern that Cotton had “amasse[d] together, divers secrets of State, hath communicated them to the Spanish Ambassador [Gondomar], who hath cause[d] them to be copied out, and translated, into the Spanish tongue.”69 It is unclear whether Cotton had communicated with Gondomar about these things; it is not unlikely that they would have spoken at court, where for many years, Gondomar was a permanent fixture. From Gondomar’s earlier letter, it is certain that he had his eyes on Cotton’s collection. In order to confirm his suspicions, James authorized his Secretaries of State,

Winwood and Lake, to “call before you the said Sir Robert Cotton, and if you find, by lawful and sufficient proof, the information to be truly grounded.” He ordered them “to seize upon all his papers, and manuscripts, in our name and to do use, and to cause[d] them to be brought into our paper chamber at Whitehall, here to be reserved, and digested in

66 Ibid., 32. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid 69 James to Archbishop Abbott, with instructions to send to Winwood and Lake, 26 October 1615, NRO, ZA 421.9/1.

168 order.”70 The charges against Cotton were dubious. Yet, as this letter suggests, James had grown very concerned about Cotton’s collection, particularly the “secrets of state” that might be in his possession. By authorizing an inquiry into his role in the match negotiation,

James could conduct a complete search of Cotton’s collection.

As previously described, Wilson often required Cotton’s assistance in locating manuscripts.71 While Wilson’s correspondence with Cotton was polite, Wilson’s letters to others reveal his deep frustration with Cotton and his library. In 1614, Wilson wrote to

Winwood about the manuscripts of the late Arthur Agarde, “including a book on the exemption of the Kings of England from the power of the Pope, abstracts of treaties, and other State matters.”72 In his position as record-keeper, and as a member of the Society of

Antiquaries, Agarde had amassed an important collection of records. Agarde often worked closely with Cotton: Cotton supplied Agarde with many “originals of treaties which heretofore have been carelessly lost out of the King’s Treasuries.”73 Agarde’s “State of the

Treasury Records” which would comprise his Compendium (1610) owed much to Cotton’s collection and expertise in locating records. As previously discussed, in the final years of his career, Agarde organized and indexed all the records in his collection. Acquiring these records would constitute a significant victory for Wilson and his office.

Cotton alleged that these manuscripts were left to him in Agarde’s will. Wilson argued that even if this were the case, these manuscripts should belong to the state “as otherwise they may be suppressed when most wanted.”74 Furthermore, Wilson did not want

70 Ibid. 71 Wilson to Cotton, 1611, BL Cotton Julius, C III, 403. 72 Wilson to Winwood, 24 August 1614, TNA, SP 14/81 f. 121. 73 Quoted in Fussner, Historical Revolution, 79. 74 Wilson to Ralph Winwood, 24 August 1614, TNA, SP 14/81 f. 121.

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Cotton exercising influence over the Keeper of the Exchequer Records. The following year,

Wilson encouraged his son-in-law, Ambrose Randolph, to seek this position. In a letter to

Randolph he claimed that, “[i]t would be dangerous to the State should Sir Robert Cotton, who will strive for it, succeed to put in a person devoted to him. He already injures the keepers of State Papers, by having such things as he hath cunningly scraped together.”75

Kevin Sharpe suggests that Wilson’s anxieties about Cotton stealing papers “were not entirely unsubstantiated.” According to Sharpe, Cotton may have retained some of Sir

Edward’s Coke’s papers after participating in an investigation of his papers, and “it is certain Cotton kept books belonging to the City of London.”76

As the battle for Agarde’s manuscripts reveals, in pursuit of their private interests, antiquaries acquired substantial collections of manuscripts that technically belonged to the

Crown. Wilson was particularly concerned with the original copies and abstracts of treaties that were among Agarde and Cotton’s collections. One of the central purposes of the State

Paper Office was to have an organized, searchable archive in order to assist the Crown and

Privy Council in foreign negotiations. As we will see, success in these negotiations depended on the Crown’s ability to demonstrate legal precedent drawn from former and existing treaties. Therefore, when these documents were dispersed into private hands, the state’s ability to conduct successful foreign policy was diminished.

Establishing Legal Precedent and the Law of the Sea

As the opening epigraph illustrates, James improved the State Paper Office principally to enhance his government’s ability to more effectively create and defend

75 Wilson to Ambrose Randolph, 24 August 1615, TNA, SP 18/81 f. 120. 76 Sharpe, Sir Robert Cotton 1586-1631, 65.

170 policy. James believed a “well order[ed]” archive could prove particularly useful in “the negotiations with foreign Princes.” This aspect of archive building was “a matter of great consequence… not only in respect of secrecy and keeping them from the view and knowledge of man, but also for that good use may be made of them for future direction…in our public services both at home and abroad.”77 Therefore, once Wilson completed an initial survey of the state papers, he began to attend to this work.

James entrusted Wilson with sorting and annotating records for crucial matters of legal precedent, particularly for disputes concerning foreign treaties.78 From 1614 to 1619, one of Wilson’s primary responsibilities was transcribing and translating England’s treaties with foreign nations.79 In 1617, James ordered Wilson to transcribe treaties pertaining to the marriages of English princes with foreign consorts for Sir John Digby. Wilson reported to the king that he “has ventured to present His Majesty with a rhapsody thereon, extracted from the English Chronicles, the writings of Lord Burleigh, and the original treaties and documents in the State Paper Office.”80 In June 1616, Wilson sent Lord James Hay (later

Earl of Carlisle) abstracts of marriage treaties between English kings and foreign princesses, suggesting “a French marriage would be best, and hopes he will have it to negotiate.” Wilson acutely speculated that the Spanish match was merely a ploy “to divert us from France,” the conclusion reached by Charles and Buckingham in 1624.81

77 James I, 15 March 1610, in Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, 307. 78 Agarde had begun some of this work: in 1611, along with George Austen, he drafted a catalogue of treaties of peace and commerce made between England and other countries by order Salisbury. This catalogue, still extant, referred to treaties ranging from twelfth century to 1607, see Fussner, The Historical Revolution, 73. 79 Wilson to Commissioners of the Treasury, 5 October 1619, TNA, SP 14/110 f. 161. 80 Wilson to James, undated 1617, TNA, SP 14/94/189. 81 Wilson to Lord Hay, June 1616, TNA, SP 14/87/183.

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Wilson described how secretaries were “constantly calling for abstracts, transcripts, etc.” In addition to foreign treaties, he compiled records into books, including on the history of admiralty and the position of Earl Marshal.”82 At times, Wilson prepared arguments based on his research. In 1624, Wilson reviewed trade clauses in treaties between England,

Scotland, and the Ottoman Empire. He navigated conflicting treaties and charters, and presented James with a nuanced legal argument for English and Scottish rights to free trade in Ottoman territory.83

But the most critical and pressing matters of foreign policy to which Wilson’s archive attended was the European dispute over the Law of the Sea. This dispute was a central issue in European politics. As European powers competed for trade and territory in

Europe, America, and the East Indies, they developed and articulated arguments to support their claims to these spaces. Staking and defending these claims required evidence that established precedent of discovery and possession. In August 1614, Archbishop Abbott and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere commanded Wilson to search his records relating to the king’s jurisdiction and rights over the seas and coastal fisheries. In their memorandum to

Wilson, Abbott and Ellesmere described England’s alleged jurisdiction for the North Sea fisheries and a desire to push out the Dutch. They then asked Wilson “seek unto such

Precedents, and Records as concerns his Majesties power, right and sovereign jurisdiction of the seas, and fishing upon the Coast” for “his Majesties special service.”84 Abbott and

Ellesmere had been “informed there are many of that kind among the Records in your

82 Wilson to George Calvert, 1622, TNA, SP 15/42 f. 91; these are some of the topics that the Society of Antiquaries explored in the 1590s. Wilson may collected records on the agenda set by the Society of Antiquaries to prevent competition on areas of contemporary interest. 83 Statement of Thomas Wilson, undated [1624], TNA, SP 14/180/34. 84 George Abbott and Thomas Egerton to Thomas Wilson, 24 August 1614, TNA SP 14/77 f. 149.

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Custody.”85 Considering European competition for the North Sea, and its importance to

Jacobean foreign policy, it appears that Wilson had already begun collecting these materials.

This investigation was chiefly in response to Anglo-Dutch competition for the

North Sea fisheries. James argued that these fisheries were well within England’s jurisdiction. Due to the lucrative herring trade, these waters became increasingly popular and competitive in the early seventeenth century.86 Spanish, French, Russian, and Dutch fisherman frequented these fisheries and were sometimes expelled by English fishermen.

Since 1601, John Keymer made clear to Queen Elizabeth that there was more wealth to be gained from herring fishing, in which the Dutch engaged in, than from Spain’s fishing in the West Indies. Around 1605, Keymer presented King James with similar observations about the Dutch fishing industry, arguing that much of their profits came from herring caught in British waters. Again, in 1622, he presented James with a proposal to increase revenue in this trade and later that year a commission including Prince Charles and

Buckingham heard Keymer’s propositions. Indeed, from 1610 to 1636, competition over the North Sea fisheries was one of the main sources of Anglo-Dutch dispute, requiring numerous diplomatic missions to negotiate the matter.87

To European powers, negotiating the Law of the Sea held far-reaching consequences for global trade and empire. In the early seventeenth century, European kings, jurists, and scholars sought to reconcile the desires of their representative states with

85 Ibid. 86 Anita McConnell, “Keymer, John (fl. 1584–1622).” Anita McConnell, in ODNB, online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman. Oxford: OUP, 2004. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15500 (accessed January 14, 2016). 87 Hugh Dunthorne, Britain and the Dutch revolt, 1560-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 113.

173 persuasive theories and policies. In addition to disputes over North Sea fisheries, European powers argued cases for their rights to fish, trade, and colonize territory in the Americas and the East Indies. Kings and statesmen often amended their arguments to accommodate their desires and position in each of these contests.

The complicated geo-politics present in these negotiations are particularly salient in a 1613 debate between Sir John Digby, the English ambassador in Spain, with an unnamed Spanish secretary. In early September, Digby received letters from merchants in

San Sebastian, who reported the complaints of Spanish fisherman recently expelled by

English fisherman from Greenland. In retaliation for these alleged abuses, the Spanish fishermen in San Sebastian embargoed the goods of English merchants and even

“threaten[ed] their persons with danger.”88 Digby brought this matter to the attention of

Spanish ministers. But during his negotiation of this grievance, a broader debate about rights of possession over land and seas by European monarchs emerged.

Digby recounted how the secretary “fell suddenly into a great complaint” over the incident. He claimed that Spain “ha[d] for so many years fished in the Northern Sea,” a space in which “no Prince had challenged any particular Dominion.” Yet now, he complained, James simultaneously prohibited Spanish subjects from the North Sea while

“giv[ing] permission to his subjects to plant & inhabit in Virginia, and the Islands of the

Bermudas which had for many years been esteemed & known to belong unto the conquest of Castile.” Harnessing arguments for possession based on discovery and use, he concluded that it was “strange” that James “should at the same time suffer his people to possess themselves of what was rightly the King of Spain’s and should forbid the Spaniards from

88 Digby to Lake, 4 September 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 41.

174 that which they had so long used and which he knew not what particular claim his Majesty could pretend.”

As the Spanish secretary reminded Digby, how could James both claim jurisdiction over a foreign space and then deny Spain’s rights to the same? His contention that “no

Prince had challenged any particularly Dominion” in the North Sea while the Americas were “known to belong unto the conquest of Castile,” drew on both rights of discovery and possession.

Digby replied “only as by way of discourse & as of a private man” that England had long discovered “those parts” whereas “the Spaniards were never there until the last summer when an Englishman led them thither.” While Digby posed his answer as his personal opinion, without formal “instructions,” he restated James’s position on overseas sovereignty. England laid claim to the North Sea based on first discovery and possession, conferred through primary and active use. By claiming that an “Englishman led [Spanish sailors] thither,” Spain could not make a case for sovereignty on the basis of discovery.

Digby explained how he defended England’s claims to Virginia and Bermuda. He knew that he “could no way yield unto him that either Virginia or the Bermudas either were…parts of the conquest of Castile but that they [were…]89 of the first Possidents.”90

So Digby inverted his argument, positing, “if I supposed what is said of the whale fishing was to be debated and disputed in the same nature as the Indies were, which the Crowne of Castile without controversy discovered and possess[ed], and that then he would see that

89 Due to a ripped page, two words are missing. The first word is most likely “were” and the second word is undecipherable. 90 A possessor." "† possident, n. and adj." OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/148378?redirectedFrom=possident (accessed January 14, 2016).

175 his Majesty only followed their own footsteps.” As evidence to this point, Digby reminded the Secretary “that there were at the present diverse of his Majesty’s subjects in their

Gallies for having offered to trade to the Indies being only taken in the way thither.” Digby held him to this point: “And that I conceived the same reason of being the first Possident was equally to hold in both, And that as his Majesty had followed their example on reserving the trade of his discoveries unto his own subjects so he would willingly give access unto them, when they should hold it fit to permit the like unto theirs.”91

Digby, often clever in a debate, brilliantly avoided conceding any ground in

America. By shifting the argument to rights of possession, a right which he claimed Spain maintained in neither Virginia nor Bermuda, Digby drew the focus back the North Sea and the West Indies. Open up the West Indies, Digby offered, and surely James would open up the North Sea.

Digby’s explanation certainly did not satisfy the Spanish secretary, who, according to him “seemed to grow a little warm.” He restated Spain’s claims to the America based on discovery and reminded Digby of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Digby immediately dismissed this argument, remarking “that for the Popes Donation that was grown to be so slightly esteemed, that it was almost left to be alleged by them.” Digby also contended

Spain’s claims of discovery, suggesting that Norway had explored and claimed America long before Spain “as would appear upon their records.” Given these conflicting claims to discovery, Digby argued that the only viable method to establish sovereignty was through possession. This argument would “be as favorable to his Majesty in this case, as to them in their Indies.”92 Drawing attention to competing claims of discovery, in which both Norway

91 Digby to Carleton, 7 November 1613, TNA, SP 94/20 f. 151-156. 92 Ibid.

176 and Spain allegedly possessed conflicting records establishing legal precedent, suggests that well-stocked archives were critical to negotiating disputes over distant territories.

Wilson equipped his archive to provide aid in such disputes. In the early seventeenth century, claims to territories and seas were frequently articulated by jurists.

The Anglo-Dutch dispute over the Law of the Sea played out most famously in Hugo

Grotius’ Mare Liberum (1609) and John Selden’s Mare Clausum (written in 1618 but not published until 1635). Grotius wrote Mare Liberum in the immediate context of the Dutch-

Spanish peace negotiations and served as an attack on Spain’s proscriptions over the

Americas, Portugal’s claims to the East Indies, and England’s claim over the North Sea fisheries. 93 Grotius argued against any state’s ability to lay such a claim. Selden, on the other hand, argued that England could lay claim over certain seas. According to Selden,

England’s rights extended west into the Atlantic Ocean until the coasts of North America and Greenland. As Jonathan Ziskind explains, “Selden not only had to argue that the appropriation of the sea is possible, but also determine and expound the particular dominion of the English monarch.”94 The dominion Selden asserted corresponded directly with

England’s immediate imperial interests.

The incommensurability of these arguments made negotiating these disputes very difficult. When debating the North Sea fisheries, England claimed jurisdiction over the seas whereas the Dutch claimed the waters were for “public” use. Alternately, when debating over rights to the East Indies, each state made the opposite claim: the Dutch claimed

93 See Mónica Brito Vieira, “Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden's Debate on Dominion over the Seas,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 64.3 (2003): 361-377. 94 Jonathan Ziskind, “International Law and Ancient Sources: Grotius and Selden,” Review of Politics, 25.4 (1973): 538.

177 jurisdiction while the English argued for “public” access.95 These juridical theories needed to be bolstered by records to support historical rights of discovery and possession.

The immediate context of Wilson’s compilation of records pertaining to the Law of the Sea extended beyond the Anglo-Dutch North Sea dispute. From 1613 to 1615, the Privy

Council also negotiated disputes with French fisherman in Greenland and Newfoundland.

In January 1614, the French ambassador, Samuel Spifame, sieur de Buisseaux, complained of English attacks on Frenchmen off these coasts.96 This dispute was exacerbated when

Captain Samuel Argall, an English adventurer and naval officer, attacked and destroyed a

French settlement in Acadia. The Council answered the ambassador’s complaints by making an argument for England’s jurisdiction over the seas around Greenland and rights of discovery for the eastern seaboard of North America.97 To support these claims, the

English Ambassador to France, Sir Thomas Edmondes, presented the French Secretary of

State, Nicolas de Neufville, Seigneur de Villeroy, with a twenty-one page memorial of complaints made by English subjects against the French in the Atlantic waters and territories containing “as many, both general and particular, complaints as he could call to remembrance.”98 Edmondes’s complaints described all the English ships attacked and seized by the French in the past few decades. Drawing on all the evidence he could muster,

Edmondes framed Argall’s attack as part of the wider immediate context of Anglo-French

Atlantic disputes, where French ships had encroached England’s fisheries in

95 Dunthorne, Britain and the Dutch Revolt, 113. 96 Privy Council to Sir Thomas Smith, 4 January 1614, in Acts of the Privy Council of England: Volume 33, 1613-1614, ed. E.G. Atkinson (London: Majesty's Stationery Office, 1921), 316. 97 Answer to the French Ambassador, 23 January 1614, Acts, 1613-1614, ed. Atkinson, 329-330. 98 Edmondes to Winwood, 30 December 1614, TNA, SP 78/87/52.

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Newfoundland and Greenland.99 To support England’s claims of possession over

Greenland based on discovery, the Privy Council pointed out that Russian fisherman called the land “King James his Newland.”100 The Privy Council authorized a commission led by

Thomas Smith and the Court of Admiralty to negotiate this dispute.101

Disputes over the Law of the Sea continued throughout the seventeenth century.

The English, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese debated these issues in hopes to establish trade and settlements in the Americas and the East Indies. The positions articulated by

Grotius and Selden were the subjects of continuous debate. Disagreements over the rights and boundaries of seas also led to military confrontations. These issues were central to the first and second Anglo-Dutch Wars from 1652 to 1654 and from 1665 to 1667.

To James I, establishing sovereignty over these waters was central to his imperial project. During his reign, debates over England’s interpretation of the Law of the Sea were found in the Anglo-Spanish disputes over the Americas and the North Sea Fisheries,

Anglo-French disputes over Greenland and Canada, and Anglo-Dutch disputes over the

North Sea and the East Indies. James’s policies were inconsistent: he constructed arguments for the position that best served England’s interests for specific spaces.

Therefore, by having Wilson draw together all the relevant materials to negotiate the Law of the Sea, James, his Privy Council and his foreign ambassadors, were better prepared to defend and promote England’s interests across the globe.

99 These disputes are further outlined in Privy Council to Sir Thomas Smith, 4 January 1614, TNA, PC 2/27/116. 100 Privy Council to Sir Daniel Dunn, 17 October 1613, in Atkinson, ed., Acts of the Privy Council, 1613-1614 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1921), 235-6, 10 January 1614, Acts, 1613-1614, ed. Atkinson, 322. 101 Council to Dunn, Acts, 17 October 1613, in Atkinson, ed., Acts, 1613-1614, 235-6.

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Wilson’s Late Career

Wilson hoped that by making the State Paper Office an effective resource for the

Crown, he would be rewarded with a more lucrative and high-ranking assignment. In 1616,

Wilson reached out to Sir George Villiers, the current favorite of James I, with hopes that he would speak to the king on his behalf. He sent the favorite a catalogue “of the heads of principal matters in the State Paper Office,” offering to make particular collections on any subject Villiers would like. Wilson then asked him to further his suit as a candidate for the position of Master Extraordinary of Requests.102 In his note to the king’s powerful favorite he included a letter to the king, in which he described his hopes that the work he had performed as Keeper would merit his appointment to a higher position. Wilson described how he had spent twenty-six years in the service of the king, at home and abroad. He noted the great lengths to which he went to arrange and abstract the State Papers office “for business of State.” He declared “the highest bound of my ambition…[is] to do your Majesty such acceptable service.” 103 Unfortunately, Wilson was not appointed as Master

Extraordinary of Requests. Despite this discouragement, he continued to perform his work as Keeper with diligence and ambition.

Wilson also continued to use his position to identify and suggest new offices to improve government revenue. His timing was apt, since in 1616 James authorized a commission to investigate the navy, the first of a series of commissions to curb corruption and increase government revenue. In 1617, Wilson suggested to the king that he create an office to transcribe and search the cartularies of dissolved abbeys and monasteries to

“prevent their alienation from the Crown, or needless litigations about them, for want of

102 Wilson to Buckingham, 10 August 1616, TNA, SP 14/88/82. 103 Wilson to James, enclosed in Wilson to Buckingham, 10 August 1616, TNA, SP 14/88/83.

180 access to the title deeds.”104 In 1618, Wilson sent a petition to James recommending that he establish an office of “The Register of Honour,” which would prevent frequent disputes about precedent among knights and their wives.105

During this time, Wilson was appointed to an interesting position: he was selected to watch over Sir Walter Raleigh in the Tower of London after his disastrous raid in Guiana.

Wilson was chosen in the hope could elicit an admission of guilt for Raleigh’s trial. Wilson enthusiastically took to the assignment, especially because he reported directly to the king.

Wilson acquired meaningful intelligence in his interrogations, boasting to the king, “[y]our majesty may be pleased to receive here his letter wherein [Raleigh] voweth to me that he hath laid open all the years closest of his heart and knowledge.”106 Wilson reported to James that he had done his best to solicit what he could from “this arch-hypocrite.”107 In this role, he also enhanced his own office by seizing all of Raleigh’s books, globes, and mathematical instruments.108

Following the Raleigh interrogations, and for the remainder of his career, Wilson continued his work as Keeper of the State Papers. Instead of petitioning further for government appointments, he tried to supplement his salary by investing in other businesses. In 1621, Wilson requested a patent for himself and John Pory to print a periodical news gazette and to oversee the printing of all “books of humanity.”109 Wilson

104 Wilson to James, undated 1617, TNA, SP 14/94/188. 105 Wilson to James, 1618, TNA, SP 14/104/145. 106 Memoranda [by Thomas Wilson] of conversations with Raleigh, &c., since 19 September 1618, TNA, SP 14/99/119. 107 Wilson to James, 18 September 1618, TNA, SP 14/99/199. 108 Warrant to Wilson, 4 November 1618, TNA, SP 14/103/119. 109 Wilson, Statement [by Sir Thos. Wilson] of the advisability of printing a gazette of news in England, as already done in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, Undated [1621], TNA, SP 14/124/230.

181 and Pory’s request was timely. As they noted in their proposal, other European states had already begun to print state-sanctioned gazettes in order to educate their subjects and prevent the spread of misinformation. Wilson also wrote a history of the revenues of the chief powers in Europe and a collaborative history of Ireland. Wilson also a colonial adventurer. He was an original subscriber to the Virginia Company and tried to acquire land in Ulster in 1618.110

The End of Cotton’s Library

The ascension of Charles I did nothing to improve the position of the aging Wilson.

But he may have found satisfaction in Charles’s attitude toward the library of his longtime adversary. At the beginning of Charles’s reign, it seemed that Cotton held some favor with the king. Shortly after his ascension, this king asked Cotton to provide evidence proving

“the kings of England have used to be present in the time of the debates and examples of causes and questions in Parliament as well as at other time.”111 In 1626, in the service to the king, Cotton reviewed John Gilbert’s scheme to increase the Crown’s revenue by debasing the coinage. In 1627, Charles appointed Cotton to a commission on the navy.112

While Cotton curried favor with the king he simultaneously found conflict with the king’s favorite, Sir George Villiers, now the Duke of Buckingham. In 1626, it appears that

Cotton provided the House of Commons with precedents for the impeachment of

Buckingham, who in turn, advised Charles to close Cotton’s library. Furthermore, his

110 Pollard, “Wilson,” ODNB. 111 Chris Kyle and Rosemary Sgroi, “Cotton, Sir Robert Bruce (1571-1631),” in The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1604-1629, ed. Andrew Thrush and John P. Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 112 Select Tracts and Documents Illustrative of English Monetary History, ed. W.A. Shaw (New York: A.M. Kelly, 1967), 23-9; Court and Times of Charles I, ed. Birch, 145-6.

182 review of John Gilbert’s scheme, sponsored by Buckingham, turned out to be a failure.

Cotton spoke against it before the Privy Council, embarrassing Buckingham in the presence of the king. Moreover, Cotton’s investigation into the navy, of which Buckingham was the admiral, also threatened Buckingham’s position.

To make matters worse, in 1627 the Council examined Cotton about the controversial book, A Short View of the Life of Henry III. The Council believed the text to be a thinly-veiled attack on Buckingham. Cotton claimed to have nothing to do with its publication and presented evidence that the text was written prior to 1614, before

Buckingham became James I’s favorite.113 The Council appears to have bought his defense.

In January 1628, at the Council’s request, Cotton wrote and published The Danger wherein the Kingdom Now Standeth and the Remedy. In this pamphlet, Cotton proposed that a

Parliament be called, believing that Charles could get Parliament on board with his policies.

This proved to be unrealistic, and in turn, threatened Cotton’s position with the king.114

In 1629, Cotton’s position took a turn for the worse. Charles ordered the closure of

Cotton’s library on the dubious charge that Cotton had circulated a seditious paper which advocated tyranny by an absolute monarch. The pamphlet was found in Cotton’s library but there is little evidence he circulated it. Instead, his arrest and the closure of his library likely had more to do with the heated parliamentary sessions of 1628 to 1629, where leaders had consulted Cotton’s library to craft arguments for the rights and liberties of parliament in the Petition of Right. Indeed, Cotton’s library was often used by Members of Parliament.

In 1622, he moved his popular library close to Parliament, so that it was more accessible

113 Kyle and Sgroi, “Cotton, Sir Robert Bruce.” 114 Kevin Sharpe, Remapping Early Modern England: The Culture of Seventeenth-Century Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 331; Kyle and Sgroi, “Cotton, Sir Robert Bruce.”

183 for its members.115 Members of Parliament took advantage of this convenience, often visiting Cotton’s library to investigate legal precedent for the powers of their institution, a practice which increasingly upset the king.

Following his arrest, the Privy Council ordered a thorough search of the library by a committee, headed by Sir Edward Coke and Sir Henry Vane, and had William Boswell

(future Keeper of the State Papers) create a catalogue with Cotton’s help.116 Thomas

Meautys, clerk of the Privy Council, and Laurence Whitaker, clerk of the Privy Council extraordinary were given warrants to accompany Cotton to his house “and to assist him in searching amongst these papers in his study or elsewhere, for his certain notes or drafts in for an answer to a proposition pretended to be made for his majesties service.” They were also ordered to “seek diligently amongst his papers…in order to locate any such notes as also for copies for the said Proposition. And for other writings of that nature which may import prejudice to the government and his Majesties service.”117 The closing of Cotton’s library was notable news. Sir George Gresly described to Sir Thomas Puckering how “Sir

Robert Cotton’s study and writings were suddenly seized upon….The cause of all this is not as yet certainly known, but the rumour is for suspicion of compiling some libelous book, or for conveying a defamatory precedent into the King’s Bench Court.” Gresly also noted that Meautys and Whitaker confiscated John Selden’s papers when he was imprisoned following the March 1629 dissolution of Parliament.

115 Sharpe, Sir Robert Cotton, 74. 116 [Meeting] At Whitehall, 24 November 1630, TNA, PC 2/40 f. 179; Sharpe, Sir Robert Cotton, 81-82. 117 A warrant directed to Sir Thomas [Meautys], Esquire, Clerk of the Counsel in ordinarie, and Laurence Whitakers esquire, Clerk of the Counsel Extraordinary, 13 November 1639, in R. F. Monger and P. A. Penfold, ed., Acts of the Privy Council, 1629-1630 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960), 176.

184

Cotton tried to mount a defense. In an undated letter, likely written after November

1629, after his library was locked but before he was brought before the Council, Wilson detailed his service to the Crown. Cotton described his past service to the Crown, including:

“Project of the Baronetts;” collections of records relating to the king’s revenues, the Navy commission, the Spanish Match, and parliament.118 His appeals to the king were successful.

Cotton was released from prison as part of a general pardon to celebrate King Charles’s birthday on May 29, 1630. Cotton retired to the country, spending the final year of his life managing his country estate in Huntingdonshire.119

Wilson died in 1629, only a few months before Charles closed Cotton’s library.

While he did not live to see its closure, one can assume he would have been pleased. To the greatest advocate of the State Paper Office, Cotton’s library posed too much of a threat to the interests of that office. While James and Charles often considered Cotton as useful consultant, once his library became a tool to those in the business of subverting the Crown’s authority, particularly parliament, Charles showed little hesitation in shutting it. Thus, in a state increasingly interested in exercising power through information management, spaces like Cotton’s library were potential dens of sedition. As precedent became increasingly useful for negotiating foreign and domestic policy, and consolidating the Crown’s authority in the face in opposition, materials for these purposes were safest within agencies of the state.

Conclusion

118 Nigel Ramsay, “Sir Robert Cotton’s Services to the Crown: A Paper Written in Self Defense,” 66-80. 119 Kyle and Sgroi, “Cotton, Sir Robert Bruce.”

185

During his nearly twenty years as Keeper of the State Papers, Sir Thomas Wilson transformed trunks of disorganized and neglected papers into a useful archive filled with books of organized and annotated records. Putting his archive to use, James instructed

Wilson to assist with domestic and foreign policy, most notably for the Law of the Sea.

This work had important implications for Atlantic empire building, by providing access to the materials requisite to negotiate international disputes. By creating an office for these purposes and by wresting control of state papers from Secretaries of State and antiquaries such as Sir Robert Cotton, James and Charles exercised greater control over information management.

For James, the expansion of the State Paper Office represented a shift towards improved administration and modern state building. James was a frugal king. He was not thrifty with his household or his favorites, but the depleted purse of his monarchy meant that he favored, when possible, reducing government spending. While Wilson’s funds were limited, James’s attention to the State Paper Office reveals his interest in assembling the resources at or near his disposal to better equip himself to negotiate foreign policy.

James’s commitment to the State Paper Office was varied: he appointed Wilson to radically transform the office, gave him the space in Whitehall for a library that was accessible to his Privy Councilors, and made use of Wilson’s archive. However, as was typical of James, he failed to allocate the funds necessary to make the office the best it could be. But this was precisely James’s strategy for information management: he employed and improved the resources at his disposal to further his international and imperial ambitions. He expected results without sufficient capital investment, relying on exceptional and ambitious agents like Sir Thomas Wilson and Sir John Digby in Spain. For

186 the most part, these efforts were largely successful. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, the needs of England’s growing empire required more aggressive and sustained state supervision of the sources of information.

187

Chapter Four Making a Royal Colony: The Virginia Commission, 1623-1625

James 1st, having judicially repealed the Letters Patent of incorporation to the Company of Virginia, and undertaken the government, the King declares that the territories of Virginia, the Somers Islands, and New England shall form part of his empire and the government, of Virginia immediately depend upon himself. That Councils shall be established for the immediate care of the affairs of that colony, one in England, the other subordinate and resident in Virginia. That all public officers and ministers shall be maintained at the King's charge; all tobacco be taken by the King, and that strict observance of the proclamation of 9 April 1625, touching tobacco, be enforced.1

Proclamation for settling the plantation of Virginia, May 13, 1625 (emphasis mine)

On May 24, 1624, James I officially dissolved the Virginia Company and made

Virginia a royal colony. Plans for the dissolution had been underway for some time; three months earlier the king had revoked the Company’s charter. By making Virginia a royal colony, James revised his imperial strategy, and with the support of his Privy Council, attorney general, and leading jurists, dramatically reshaped the structure of the Virginia colony. By making the Virginia colony an arm of his government under his direct supervision, James exercised direct imperial control as he had never done before.

James’s decision to make Virginia a royal colony came as little surprise to the

Virginia Company. The years immediately preceding had been disastrous for Virginia, characterized by misfortune on the ground and mismanagement in London. The 1622 massacre publicly exposed the colony’s weak defenses, undermining efforts by both James and the Virginia Company to garner new investment and colonists. Moreover, political

1 James I, Proclamation for settling the plantation of Virginia, 13 May 1625. STC. 8774.

188 infighting among the leadership of the Virginia Company based on loyalties and competing approaches to governance had created two hostile parties—those who favored the former administration of Sir Thomas Smythe and those who supported the current leadership of

Sir Edwin Sandys. In their efforts to draw James and key adventurers to their respective sides, both parties launched public defamatory campaigns that laid bare the weaknesses of the colony. These public quarrels frustrated and embarrassed the king who quickly grew tired of these partisan antics. In April 1623, James launched an official commission to investigate the abuses of the Virginia Company.

As we will see, James’s investigation was far-reaching. In London, his appointed commission seized all of the written records of the Company. In Virginia, investigators slogged through additional evidence, surveyed the land and settlements, and interviewed colonists. They were especially concerned about the mismanagement of finances and the company’s ability to gather sufficient revenue to support the colony. By misappropriating funds and misrepresenting the state of the colony, the Company threatened to ruin the reputation of what James had pitched to his subjects as a national project. Therefore, James announced his intervention, investigation, and revocation of the charter to his subjects. He also took the Virginia Commission’s recommendations seriously. James and his Council appointed additional commissioners expert in matters of trade and finance to craft a comprehensive plan for the new colony.

The Virginia Commission was part of James’s wider undertaking of state centralization in order to better manage England’s broader geopolitical concerns. In both

1608 and 1618 James authorized commissions of inquiry into alleged abuses within the navy. The 1608 commission exposed the endemic culture of corruption, but failed to repair

189 it.2 During the commission’s proceedings, James’s behavior suggests he did not want to risk offending his favorites by finding fault with the navy’s leadership.3 The 1618

Commission was entirely different. Composed of men knowledgeable in matters of commerce, finance, and maritime affairs, James’s commission conducted a rigorous examination of the navy’s finances, interviewed many witnesses, and returned a thorough report. On the advice of the commission, James replaced the entire Navy Board and attempted to repair the culture of corruption. For the next seven years, these changes proved successful. Unfortunately, the stress placed on the navy during the 1625 to 1630 Anglo-

Spanish War revealed the need for further reform.

Perhaps the immediate success of the 1618 Commission emboldened James to aggressively address the problems of the Virginia Company. Apart from the 1618 Navy

Commission, whose directives were also far reaching, the Virginia Commission was unmatched in its scope, resources, and exhaustive recommendations. At every turn, James and his Privy Council humbled the arrogant behavior of the Virginia Company’s leadership, many of whom were powerful men at court and in trade, reminding them of his commitment to England’s budding empire. As with the 1618 Navy Commission, the need for reform was met with increased state centralization and expanded bureaucracy. While the early modern state was capable of supporting the nascent empire, by relying on intelligence systems and the expertise of statesmen who were also colonial adventurers, by

1622 the needs of Virginia especially were no longer met by this structure. During the years of hardship in Virginia the weaknesses of the early modern state—where private interests

2 Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Jacobean England (Boston: Taylor & Francis, 1993), 100. 3 Alan P. McGowan, The Jacobean Commissions of Enquiry, 1608 and 1618 (London: Navy Records Society, 1971), xv.

190 superseded those of the state—were exposed. James and his Privy Council realized that in order to satisfy England’s broad geo-political aspirations, they would need to build a stronger centralized state.

The dissolution of the Virginia Company has not escaped the interest of historians.

In colonial American historiography, the revocation of the Virginia Company’s charter has largely been explained as a great struggle between the government in England and democracy in Virginia, won by Sir Thomas Smythe’s “court party” over Sir Edwin Sandys’

“patriot party.”4 In this interpretation, King James supported the demands of his preferred party. However, this interpretation is, for the most part, based on inadequate and often misinterpreted evidence. In the only work singly devoted to these events, Wesley Frank

Craven challenged this interpretation of the dissolution of the Company. He argued that while political infighting within the Company was a great precipitant of the dissolution,

Sandys’s failure to effectively solve the colony’s broader problems (i.e. supporting new immigrants, establishing new trades, and negotiating a tobacco monopoly) ultimately led to the Company’s demise. Craven’s work is an excellent corrective to our understanding of this period, but by focusing so closely on Company politics, he overlooks the critical participation of the king as well as the work of the Commission he authorized.

In this chapter I will argue that James revised his imperial strategy in order to rescue

Virginia and ensure the success of his most valued colony. As the first three chapters have shown, in order to manage his imperial project, James employed and improved his existing resources for imperial information management, including intelligence programs, print culture, the Church of England, and the State Paper Office. This strategy was largely

4 Wesley Frank Craven, Dissolution of the Virginia Company: the failure of a colonial experiment (Gloucester, MA: P. Smith, 1964), 3.

191 consistent with James’s general approach towards governance. He ordered his Principal

Secretaries and Privy Councilors to manage colonial activities, while simultaneously drawing from private resources, such as joint-stock companies, to provide additional financial resources for empire building. However, as these resources proved insufficient for effectively managing the troubled Virginia colony during the early 1620s, James adopted a far more hands-on approach to imperial management. By creating the Virginia

Commission to gain intimate knowledge of the mechanisms of the colony, James and his government became much more capable of directly governing a distant colony.

James ordered the Virginia Commission to gather the most accurate information about the colony and the Virginia Company to control its written record and narrow channels of information. The Commission’s investigation stemmed not only from reports of mismanagement on the ground, but also from the deliberate dissemination of negative reports by Virginia Company members. Company members wrote, published, and distributed materials presenting conflicting accounts of the state of the colony that were damaging to the enterprise in their efforts to lobby the Crown in favor of their preferred party. These activities required James to step in, not only to stop the spread of these reports, but also to determine which reports were most accurate.

Having declared that England’s American territories were “part of his empire”

James’s intervention in and subsequent takeover of the Virginia colony signaled a clear shift towards a larger, more centralized state. 5 James also hoped that by making Virginia a royal colony he could rehabilitate the colony’s reputation. As we will see, both factions in the Company designed campaigns to besmirch the reputation of the opposing party. But

5 James I, Proclamation for settling the plantation of Virginia (London, 1625). STC 8774.

192 when these debates grew public, they threatened the future of the colony. As chapter two demonstrated, to James and his government, the public’s perception of the colony was paramount to its success. The Virginia Company initially offered James a low risk path to empire building. But in this approach, the Company put its own political interests ahead of the colony’s well-being (and in the process further tarnished the reputation of the colony),

James could no longer sub-contract empire building to the Company. As James informed his subjects in a 1625 proclamation, the project of Atlantic colonialization did not belong to the diverse adventurers of joint-stock companies—it belonged to the Crown and the state of England.6

Company Politics

To understand James’s revocation of the Virginia Company charter, we need to first analyze the internal politics that led its dissolution. Factionalism within the Company grew out of a frustration from the failure to establish sustainable trades, negotiate peace with the

Powhatan Indians, and curb disease and hunger. The growing division among Company elites consequently exacerbated these tensions, leading to uncertainty and instability on the ground in Virginia. Company debates, which became well known in the royal court, parliament, and also in public, were an embarrassment to the Jacobean government’s enterprise.

By the early 1620s, the fragile state of the Virginia colony had become a great source of tension between members of the Virginia Company. Early hopes for the success of the Company had been dashed by low crop yields, conflict with the Powhatans, failure

6 Ibid.

193 to set up new industries—such as the iron works—and deadly spells of disease, such as the

1618 bout that killed many colonists. These challenges required the Company to frequently replenish resources and people, which was costly. In response to these persistent problems, adventurers in England debated new strategies to improve the conditions in Virginia.

These debates quickly turned from problem solving to placing blame. Many adventurers pinned much of the colony’s failures on the Company treasurer, Sir Thomas

Smythe. Smythe was one of Jacobean England’s principal merchants and a leader of colonial enterprises. He was a key promoter of the East India Company’s first voyage and served as governor of the East India Company for most of the time between 1603 and 1621.

He was also governor of the North-West Passage Company (1612) and was a leading promoter of this Company’s ventures. Smythe’s house on Philpot Lane served as a meeting space for these diverse colonial enterprises.7

Smythe dedicated his greatest energies to the Virginia and Bermuda colonies, where he was a chief investor from the beginning. He was treasurer of the Virginia colony from 1609 until 1619 and governor of the Somers Isles Company from 1615 to 1621. While an adept and capable treasurer for the Virginia Company, Smythe lost support as the

Company’s financial state worsened. Smythe maintained the support of the wealthy

London merchants, but many small adventurers found new leadership in Sir Edwin

Sandys.8

As the opposition leader, Sandys was a curious choice. Born in Worcestershire and well-educated in London at the Merchant Taylors School and at Oxford University, Sandys

7 “Smythe, Sir Thomas (c.1558–1625),” Basil Morgan in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25908 (accessed January 14, 2016). 8 Morgan, “Smythe,” ODNB.

194 made little splash in his early career. He found influence only after he turned his attention to English colonial enterprises. Sandys was an early and sizable investor in both the

Virginia and East India Companies. From the beginning of these enterprises he sought out leadership positions within their Companies. Sandys’s dedication to these ventures did not go unnoticed. In 1606 he was appointed to James’s Council for Virginia, a body composed mostly of influential diplomats and courtiers. He took an active role in the Council, likely drawing up the second charter with Sir Francis Bacon in 1609.

In the business of colonies, Sandys was closely aligned with his distant kinsman,

Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton. Throughout the mid-1610s Sandys and

Southampton worked together to improve diverse colonial enterprises. They negotiated and arranged for the Leiden puritans to settle in New England, invested heavily in Bermuda plantations, and sent 310 new immigrants to Virginia, nearly doubling the colony’s population after a terrible wave of disease.9 While Southampton lobbied for their interests at court, Sandys lobbied for Company interests in parliament. It is likely there where

Sandys drew the support of many adventurers.

As the first non-merchant elected treasurer of the Virginia Company, Sandys’s election signaled a new direction in Company leadership. During his years as treasurer,

Sandys instituted widespread reforms within the colony. He made many efforts to diversify the economy, promoting different crops, particularly the cultivation of maize in order to feed the colonists. He also devoted many resources to establishing iron works, including sending over a hundred men with experience in that industry. But if any of these efforts were successful, nearly all were undone by the devastation of the 1622 Virginia massacre.

9 Theodore K. Rabb, Jacobean Gentleman: Sir Edwin Sandys, 1561-1629 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 330.

195

Sandys’s only success was in improving immigration: he arranged for the transportation of nearly 4,000 people to the colony. Theodore Rabb suggests that without this immigration, the Virginia massacre might have completely destroyed the colony.10

For most of the 1610s, Sandys worked well with other Virginia Company leaders, including Sir Thomas Smythe. In 1618, Smythe and Sandys worked together to diversify agriculture and set new rules for land distribution. But later that year, the two came into conflict over three principal issues. First, Smythe objected to Sandys’ choice of George

Yeardley as governor.11 Secondly, Sandys conducted an audit of the Virginia Company’s finances, which stripped Smythe of his position as treasurer, and opened up the position for himself.12 Thirdly, Sandys tried (and failed) to challenge Smythe’s positions as governor of the Bermuda and East India Companies.

In London, Sandys’s relationship with colonial investor, Robert Rich, Earl of

Warwick, also soured. Warwick had not begun as an opponent of Sandys, but the two increasingly came into conflict during Sandys’s time as treasurer. They officially fell-out after Sandys attempted to seize one of Warwick’s ships, claiming it was used for piracy.

Despite Anglo-Spanish peace, Warwick still bankrolled ships for plunder in the West

Indies, and he had hoped to use Bermuda and Virginia as safe harbors for these ships.

Sandys disagreed with these activities and in 1618 he ordered the seizure of Warwick’s ship the Treasurer in Virginia. Fortunately for Warwick, the captain and ship escaped the

Virginia harbor before the seizure, but he did not take this attack on his property lightly.

10 Ibid., 329. 11 Ibid., 335. 12 Ibid., 338.

196

Following this incident, Smythe lobbied King James to remove Sandys as treasurer.

His efforts were successful. But the king’s new appointment, Sandys’s close ally, the Earl of Southampton, meant that little changed. With Southampton’s support, Sandys and the

London merchant John Ferrar (brother of Company secretary Nicholas Ferrar) continued to exert great influence over the Company for the next four years.

During these years party lines were cemented. Sandys and Southampton found influential allies in William Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire, Edward Sackville, Earl of

Dorset, and Nicholas and John Ferrar, forming what Craven termed the “patriot party.”13

On the other side was the so-called “court party” of Sir Thomas Smythe, Alderman Robert

Johnson, Nathaniel Rich, and the Earl of Warwick.14 Gaining the support of Warwick may have turned the tide against Sandys. Warwick was not only a powerful force within the

Virginia Company, but also influential at court. With Warwick committed to curbing the power and influence of Sandys and Southampton, Company tensions worsened.

Warwick and Smythe openly criticized Sandys’s economic policies. They drew attention to the failure of Sandys’s vital economic projects: the iron works and silk production. Warwick and Smythe accused Sandys of sending immigrants without adequate supplies for maintenance. 15 To bolster their claims, they employed Captain Samuel Argall, the former governor of Virginia, as their aggressive protagonist. Argall led successful

13 The “patriot party” likely earned its moniker because of the dedication of nineteenth-century historians of early America to search widely for the origins of the American Revolution, often citing the establishment of the House of Burgesses (1618) as a democratic scheme. But, as Craven argues, this body was created mostly to stop complaints about martial law from reaching England, especially during years where the Crown and Company were working hard to gather further investment in the colony, Craven, Dissolution of the Virginia Company, 3. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid, 180.

197 attacks against Sandys’s government, spreading unfavorable rumors and petitioning the

Privy Council about his leadership.16

The Tobacco Monopoly

When the English settled the Virginia colony, cultivating tobacco was not a priority.

The initial hope was to find mineral resources. After failing to do so, the Company in

London and the colonists on the ground shifted their attention to potentially lucrative trades, such as silk and iron production. The Virginia massacre crippled both of these initiatives. The only promising industry that survived the massacre was the cultivation of tobacco. For the Company, establishing a successful tobacco monopoly would both stabilize the colony and provide customs revenue for the Crown. Thus, Sandys and the

Company leadership pinned their hopes for success of the colony on the tobacco crop.

James’s attitude towards tobacco changed dramatically over the course of his reign.

James was initially a vocal opponent of the crop. In 1604 he published a pamphlet A

Counterblaste to Tobacco, in which he argued “there cannot be a more base, and yet hurtfull, corruption in a Countrey, then is the vile vse (or rather abuse) of taking Tobacco in this Kingdome.”17 But as other promising crops failed, and John Rolfe found unparalleled success in tobacco cultivation, James began to support the tobacco trade.

Sandys believed that securing a tobacco monopoly would greatly improve the

Company’s revenue and Virginia’s economy. In the 1621 Parliament he lobbied hard for the monopoly, arguing against the importation of Spanish tobacco. He found the greatest opposition in the financial reformer Lord Treasurer, Lionel Cranfield. Cranfield argued

16 Ibid, 123. 17 James I, A counterblaste to tobacco (London: Robert Barker, 1604). STC 1277:05.

198

“his Majesty would avoid the Excess and Waste that is used in taking of it, and retain in the Kingdom the Money that is carried away by the bringing in of that Weed.”18 Cranfield thought a tobacco monopoly made both bad economic sense and would offend the free trade clause with Spain in the Treaty of London (1604).19 Ultimately, Sandys was successful. Parliament passed a protectionist bill against Spanish tobacco. But in the process Sandys made enemies of both James and Cranfield by offending the king’s policy towards Spain. In June 1621 Sandys, along with Southampton and John Selden, were arrested on the charge of hindering the king’s aims in parliament, but shortly thereafter were released.20

Therefore, during negotiations the following year over the tobacco monopoly,

Cranfield drove a hard bargain against the Virginia Company. On June 29, 1622, on behalf of the Company, Southampton and Sandys presented Cranfield a first draft of their proposal for the monopoly. In exchange for administering the monopoly, the Company requested three major concessions: the end of the importation of Spanish tobacco, a regulation of prices, and James’s encouragement of the industry. Cranfield was a tough negotiator and answered this proposal with terms much more favorable to the Crown. While the Company would still be responsible for all freight charges, Cranfield demanded that James receive a third of all profits, while continuing to import a set amount of Spanish tobacco.

On July 1, Company members met with Cranfield to discuss the Crown’s offer.

While clearly offended by the terms offered, the Company eventually conceded on all

18 The Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons in 1620 and 1621, Volume 2, ed. Sir Edward Nicholas, Thomas Tyrwhitt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1766), 190. 19 Menna Prestwich, Cranfield: Politics and Profits Under the Early Stuarts, The Career of Lionel Cranfield, Earl of Middlesex (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 309-310. 20 Rabb, Jacobean Gentleman, 261.

199 points. Unsatisfied, the following day, Southampton and Sandys again met with Cranfield.

The meeting was successful: Cranfield agreed to soften his terms. The state would agree to import tobacco for only the first two years of the monopoly, and the king would take a third of the Company’s crop, not the total yield that included tobacco grown by private planters.

Fairly satisfied with this agreement, the Somers Isles Company endorsed a contract on the same terms on July 10.

But on November 6, Lord Treasurer Cranfield, now Earl of Middlesex, proposed an additional condition. He demanded that the Spanish tobacco the Company was responsible for importing should be of the finest quality. On November 27, Middlesex further clarified this condition: if the Company could not get 80,000 pounds of the finest quality Spanish tobacco in two years, the Company would continue to import Spanish tobacco for a third year. In exchange for this amendment, James no longer required fixed prices. The Company accepted these concession and the terms were agreed on.21

Eager to begin the business, Southampton announced to the Company the plan for managing the monopoly. Sandys and John Ferrar would oversee the business and in return for their work would receive sizable salaries: £500 for Sandys and £400 for Ferrar. These salaries would increase the total annual expenses to £2000. This news was met with a

“general silence.”22 While many adventurers felt that the salaries were excessive, the

Company approved these appointments and salaries.

Despite the vote, the issue of salaries continued to provoke heated discussions at

Company meetings. Under intense pressure, particularly by one outspoken stockholder,

Samuel Wrote, Sandys resigned as director of the contract. But the debate continued. James

21 Ibid., 362. 22 Ibid., 363.

200 even sent a message to the Company informing them of his displeasure with the suppression of free speech at their meetings.23

Perhaps cautioned by this conflict, Middlesex informed Southampton that the proclamation announcing the tobacco contract would be delayed for another three to four months. This delay proved critical for the opposition. Warwick took the lead in undermining the contract. On February 24, Warwick joined the Sandys party in a meeting with Middlesex. He brought with him the customs farmers, led by Sir John Wolstenholme, who argued that the contract would decrease their profits. Middlesex replied that the king had only hoped to help the Company and not offend the customs farmers.24 The Privy

Council summoned both parties to appear before them on March 1, but the meeting concluded without resolution.

Later that month, Middlesex added another condition to his terms, insisting that all tobacco must pass through London to pay customs taxes before being sold elsewhere.25

Warwick was perhaps responsible for this demand. Theodore Rabb suggests that Warwick may have informed the Council that the condition was feasible. But this condition would be very costly for the Company to implement. Sandys and Southampton asked the Privy

Council to reconsider this condition, but it refused to bend. Warwick’s challenge to the tobacco contract was timed perfectly with a broader campaign led by his party to undermine the power of Sandys and his allies.

Crown Intervention, Information Gathering, and Public Scandal

23 Ibid., 24 Ibid., 69-70. 25 Ibid., 372.

201

While the tobacco contract was a strategy to stabilize the Virginia colony and improve the Company’s finances, the factionalism that emerged in those negotiations further acquainted James with the dysfunction within the Company. He also became more intimately aware of the problems on the ground in Virginia. Therefore, in order to better understand how the situation could be remedied, he ordered his Council for Virginia to investigate. James also sent auditors to Virginia to survey the conditions on the ground.

The investigators were also instructed to digest “the olde accounts…to cause the Secretary or Booke-keeper, in a severall Booke, to set downe particularly and exactly the names of all the Adventurers, with their severall sums adventured: as also what is paid, or yet remaining unpaid.”26 By settling the accounts of the Company, James could better understand its financial condition.

Considering the tension within the Virginia Company, the Council for Virginia worried that members might work to misrepresent the commission’s purpose. Therefore, in a statement to Virginia authorities they specifically addressed the spread of misinformation. They ordered that “no man shall presume to intercept Letters, written by, or to, the Council or Company; or to spread false rumors, upon sinister intent, to the wrong of the Council, Company, or Colony…[or] the offender shall be disfranchised.”27 They also described how the Commission would operate and specifically emphasized the Privy

Council’s personal involvement, in which the commission would report to the Council “all matters of extraordinary and greatest importance concerning the State.”28 In order to conduct a successful investigation, while maintaining stability in Virginia (and compliance

26 Council for Virginia, A Declaration of the State in Virginia, 22 June 1620, Records, ed. Kingsbury, 351. 27 Ibid., 357. 28 Ibid., 345.

202 from Company members in England), James and his Council needed to effectively manage the dissemination of Atlantic information.

Despite this proclamation and James’s broader efforts to control the spread of information about the colony, Company members continued to lobby publicly for their personal and factional interests. Both sides launched defamatory campaigns that included lengthy accounts of the disastrous conditions on the ground in Virginia. They both also noted the same systemic failures, but provided timelines that pinned the blame for these failures on the leadership of the opposition. Instead of currying favor with the king, these campaigns made clear to James (and the public) the Company’s dysfunction. These embarrassing quarrels likely contributed to James’s decision to intervene more permanently in the affairs of the Virginia Company and colony.

The first public attack was launched by the Smythe party through the publication of Nathanial Butler’s pamphlet, The Unmasked face of our Colony in Virginia as it was in the Winter of the yeare 1622. Butler had served as the governor of the Somers Isles colony from 1619 to 1622 and was closely aligned with Warwick. In the winter of 1622, Butler travelled to Virginia with orders from the Company to lead a force of eighty men against the Powhatans. Unbeknownst to the Virginia governor, he was also instructed by Warwick to gather evidence on the poor condition of the colony.29 Butler’s report was a scathing account of the conditions in the colony and the failure of its leadership. Butler presented his account to the Privy Council on April 23, 1623. Butler emphasized four areas in particular that needed reform: infrastructure, resources, industries, and government.

29 “Butler, Nathaniel (b. 1577, d. in or after 1643),” Andrew Thrush in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2009, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2958 (accessed January 14, 2016).

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In his account, Butler first detailed the structural inadequacies of the plantations, which he claimed were both dangerous to current inhabitants and ill equipped for new arrivals. “The plantations,” he described, were “generally seated vppon meer Salt Marishes full of infectious Boggs and muddy Creeks and Lakes and thereby subiected to all those

Inconvenyencies and diseases, which are soe commonly found in the most vnsound and vnhealthy partes of England.” Butler claimed that many plantations were situated near shallow water where “boats could not enter” causing goods to spoil and forcing inhabitants to the “continuall wadinge and wetinge of themselves.” Butler also claimed that when new colonists arrived, which occurred most often in winter, they found “neither Guesthouse Inn nor any the like place to shroud themselves.” Butler described the homes of colonists as

“generally the worste as ever I sawe [of] the meanest Cottages in England.”30 Furthermore, two of the oldest settlements, Henrico and Charles City, were “wholly quitted and left to the spoyle of the Indians who not onely burned the houses said to be once the best of all others.”31 Butler’s description of the colony’s infrastructure exposed two critical problems.

First, the entire foundation of the colony was engineered for failure, and second, that James had been grossly misinformed of the state of the colony.

Butler then claimed that the colony’s economy was in crisis. Necessities for sustenance, such as corn, were so scarce that the prices had skyrocketed, leaving all bargaining power in the hands of Algonquians. This account was contrary to the claims made in the Company’s “printed Bookes” which had alleged that there was “a great forwardnes of divers and sundry commodities.” Butler stated that he found “not any one of

30 Nathaniel Butler, The Unmasked face of our Colony in Virginia as it was in the Winter of the yeare 1622, presented to the Privy Council on 23 April 1623, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 374-5. 31 Ibid, 356.

204 them soe much as in any towardnes.” Moreover, he claimed that these “bookes” were so ridiculous, that when read by colonists they were “laughed to scorne and every base fellow boldly gave them the lye in divers particulars.”32

Finally, Butler argued that there was inadequate law and order in Virginia.

According to its charter, the colony needed to be governed by the laws of England.

However, Butler claimed the governor was largely “ignorant” of those laws.33 He even claimed that some laws were “willfully” disregarded. To support this claim, Butler wrote that some men with legal expertise were excluded from government.

To bolster Butler’s claims, Smythe and his allies provided corroborating reports.

Alderman Robert Johnson supplied a petition to the Privy Council that affirmed Butler’s account. Furthermore, Warwick drew up a list of eighty adventurers opposed to Sandys’s leadership. As we shall see, to ensure that his party succeeded, Warwick sought the role of an advisor to the commission of inquiry.34

The Privy Council was very concerned with Butler’s account of the colony. The

Council sent a copy of Virginia Unmasked to the governor of Virginia and demanded a response. The governor, Council, and assembly sent a detailed rebuttal, in which they vehemently denied Butler’s allegations. They characterized Butler’s account as “full of slanders and notorious untruths, proceeding from the malice of his corrupted heart.”

Virginia authorities also questioned Butler’s motives, asserting that “Butler's spleen proceeded from not being admitted one of the council.”35

32 Ibid., 375. 33 Ibid., 376. 34 Rabb, Jacobean Gentleman, 374. 35 The Governor, Council, and Assembly of Virginia to the King, February 1623.TNA CO 1/2/20.

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They then systematically refuted each claim made in Virginia Unmasked.

Regarding the land and infrastructure, Virginia authorities claimed that the plantations were “for the most part, high and pleasantly seated, the soil rich, the air sweet, and the climate healthy.” They argued that “Butler traduces one of the goodliest rivers in the habitable world; most commodious for landing.” The colonists were provided for and well kept; their homes “built rather for use than ornament, and fit to accommodate men of good quality.”36

In their refutation of Butler’s claims that newcomers were mishandled and neglected, Virginia authorities contextualized and countered each aspect of the claim. They defended the timing for arrivals of new colonists, explaining that “winter is the only proper time for the arrival of new comers,” and emphasizing that new colonists were shown “the greatest hospitality.” The Virginia authorities claimed that prior to the massacre, they had worked to improve accommodation for new arrivals, including “the building of a fair Inn in James City.” Unfortunately, following the attack, they were forced “to direct that care to housing themselves.” They also claimed that Butler’s account was dated. Contesting

Butler’s description of a landscape of eradicated settlements, they stated that of late

“buildings have everywhere increased.”37

Virginia authorities also challenged Butler’s characterization of the economy. They alleged that “the colony was not in any distress for victuals in the winter of 1622; corn was then bought by their accuser at 8s. the bushel, a cheaper rate than it sold for in England.”

Moreover, “trade has been free to all.” They did acknowledge that the massacre had thwarted certain industries, claiming that “until the massacre and succeeding mortality,

36 Ibid. 37 Ibid.

206 vines and mulberry trees were being planted throughout the country. Iron and glass works were in great forwardness, but are now interrupted, and the people are forced to follow that contemptible weed, tobacco, to enable them to sustain their continual wars with the Indians, and to support themselves.”38 They remained hopeful that their current efforts would revitalize the industries destroyed by the massacre.

Finally, Virginia authorities countered Butler’s account by sending an equally scathing account of Sir Thomas Smythe’s tenure to the Privy Council. According to their report, the conditions in Virginia during Smythe’s leadership were far more desperate than the conditions Butler had described. Colonists had starved: “the allowance of food in those times for a man was loathsome and not fit for beasts; many fled for relief to the savages but were taken again, and hung, shot, or broken upon the wheel.” The colonists were so forlorn and desperate: “many dug holes in the earth and hid themselves till they famished.

So great was the scarcity that they were constrained to eat dogs, cats, rats, snakes, & c. and one man killed his wife and powdered her up to eat, for which he was burned. Many fed on corpses.” Furthermore, the death toll was astounding and “many born of ancient houses perished by famine.”39 Smythe was treasurer during years of hardship, particularly from

1609-1612, so Virginia authorities would have plenty of evidence to draw on in their report.

But their hyperbolic language and examples made clear that their allegiance was to the

Sandys administration (whom they in many ways currently served) than it was to James and his Council’s mission to find the truth.

Virginia authorities also attacked morale on the ground under Smythe’s leadership.

They claimed that during the years in his charge, “the people breathed execrable curses

38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.

207 upon Sir Thomas Smythe.” Furthermore, the conditions had been so pitiful, that the

Assembly “declare[d] that rather than live under the like government, they would desire the King to send Commissioners with authority to hang them.”40 This account was

"affirmed to be true," and signed by Sir Francis Wyatt, Governor, Captain Francis West,

Sir George Yeardley and other assemblymen, as well as thirteen "eye witnesses or resident in the country when every particular within written was effected."41 By deploring the state of the colony under Smythe’s leadership, Virginia authorities (loyal to the Sandys faction) created a narrative of success under Sandys’s administration.

These antithetical accounts of the state of Virginia and the conditions under different leadership angered both parties and exacerbated factional politics. To further complicate matters, individual colonists took advantage of this division to further their own interests. For example, John Bargrave, a Virginia colonist and Sandys supporter, presented a petition to the Privy Council over alleged abuses to his estate during Smythe’s government.42 Bargrave complained that the Company ignored the patent for his land in

40 The Governor, Council, and Assembly of Virginia to the King, Enclosure 2, "Answer of the General Assembly in Virginia to the Declaration of the state of the colony in the twelve years of Sir Thos. Smythe's government, exhibited by Alderman Johnson, and others,” April 1624, TNA CO 1/3/12. 41 Answer of Sir Thos. Smythe and Robt. Johnson, alderman, to the petition of Capt. John Bargrave, exhibited by way of complaint to the Commons Committee of Grievances, enclosure 2 April 1624, TNA CO 1/3/12. 42 31 October 1622, in J.V. Lyle, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England (Originally published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1932), 31. Captain John Bargrave obtained a patent for his land on 17 May 1620, but by 1621 became involved in a land dispute with his neighbor, Captain John Martin. Bargrave complained to the Company about Martin, but Company officials claimed that Bargrave’s patent was invalid. Following this dispute, Bargrave became extremely vocal about his dislike of the Company and its leadership. See Martha W. McCartney, Virginia Immigrants and Adventurers, 1607-1635: A Biographical Dictionary (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 2007), 65.

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Virginia and laid charges against Alderman Johnson for “indirect dealing.”43 Bargrave publicized his grievances; forcing Smythe to entreat Secretary Conway to attend the next

Grand Committee of Grievances of Parliament, in order “to help stop the clamorous tongue of Bargrave.”44

The reports from both factions were embarrassing to the enterprise. James and his

Council were alarmed by these competing accounts of Virginia. In both accounts, factions revealed that they had withheld important details about the colony’s conditions from James, the Privy Council, and the Council for Virginia. They highlighted deplorable conditions and failures to innovate that they never brought before those parties. Considering the gaps between the official record they presented to James and his government, clearly neither account could be considered credible. Therefore, the Virginia Commission would need to independently determine the true state of Virginia.

The Virginia Commission

James and his Privy Council set out to investigate the matter thoroughly, first by taking immediate measures to improve the conditions on the ground. In addition to the auditors sent previously to Virginia, James’s Council for Virginia appointed Richard

Norwood, the initial surveyor of Bermuda for the Somers Isles Company, as “engineer” of the colony.45 Norwood was instructed to conduct a survey identifying the structural inadequacies in the colony. Norwood was sent to the Netherlands to become acquainted

43 Answer of Sir Thos. Smythe and Robt. Johnson, alderman, to the petition of Capt. John Bargrave, exhibited by way of complaint to the Commons Committee of Grievances, April 1624, TNA CO 1/3/12. 44 Petition of Capt. John Bargrave to the House of Commons, 22 April 1624, TNA CO 1/3/ 11 and SP 14/163/28. 45 His Majesty's Council for Virginia to Sir Dudley Carleton, 29 March 1623, TNA SP 84/9/62.

209 with the “store of ingenious inventions of that kind” in order to “improve that quality of his for the better performance of the service he hath undertaken.”46 Norwood’s survey was designed to help the Virginia Commission develop immediate and future improvements.

Once in the colony, the king instructed Norwood to “peruse the whole Colony” in order to “render to his Majesty an exact account of the present state thereof.” His survey was to cover demography, people and animals, the availability of food, transportation, relations with the Powhatans, and fortifications, in order to answer these questions: “What hopes may truly and really be conceived of that Plantation [and] The directest means how to attain to those hopes.”47 The ultimate goal of this survey was to “extract such Maxims and conclusions as whereby that Colony in a few years may be brought to the flourishing estate of a kingdom, and may yield both honor, and Revenue to his Royal Majesty.”48 As a surveyor and engineer, Norwood would use his experience to “[set] out the forms of towns and fortifications as also in framing of sundry useful and necessary engines.”49 As these instructions suggest, the goal of this initial survey was to gather accurate and current information on these aspects of the colony in order to identify both practical solutions and a long-term plan for the colony.

Meanwhile in London, James and his Privy Council selected members for the

Virginia Commission. They appointed men with colonial interests and experience, as well as those who served on the 1618 Navy Commission, hoping to assemble a knowledgeable group that was, for the most part, likely to be impartial. On April 14, 1623, Sir Nathaniel

46 Ibid. 47 Unnamed letter, “Head of Inquiry in Virginia by the Commissioners There,” endorsed by Nathaniel Rich, April 1623, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 81. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.

210

Rich drafted instructions for the Commissioners selected to investigate Virginia. To conduct their investigation, they would require “all the Records of the Court…with the

Duplicates thereof…[so] that is may [be] discovered whether there be any differences between them.”50 This attention to detail would help the Commissioners to determine whether the Company had been closely following the Crown’s orders. They required “all public letters which came from Virginia and may be produced, and that it may be examined upon oath whither those letters were written by Instructions from hence or no.” James instructed them to determine whether “the vast and wild project of Sir E[dwin] S[andys] have ruined plantations”; and to investigate the lottery; and “How the Country is planted, whether upon the general stock or private men.” Furthermore, the king instructed them to investigate the causes of the massacre, in order to determine if it was caused by Company mismanagement and poor diplomacy by the colonial government.51 Finally, in order to determine whether the Company had followed royal proscription, the Commissioners were

“to examine whether all that have gone to the plantations have taken the Oath of

Supremacy.”52

James officially authorized the Virginia Commission on April 17, 1623.53 The

Commission was formally instructed “to examine by oath and otherwise by all lawful means and ways to make inquiry of the true estate of the plantation both of Virginia and the Somer[s] Islands…from the very beginning of those plantations unto the present time.”

The original commission included an investigation into the affiliated Somers Isles

50 Sir Nathaniel Rich, Draft of Instructions to the Commissioners to Investigate Virginia Affairs, 14 April 1623, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 116. 51 Ibid, 118. 52 Ibid. 53 16 April 1623, in J.V. Lyle, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England, (Originally published by His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1932), 469.

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Company. But in practice, the investigation only pertained to Virginia. Ultimately, the

Somers Isles Company, which since 1616 held its own charter, was left alone and continued to administer the colony until 1684. The Privy Council wrote to the governor and councilors in Virginia, informing them that the king had taken into his “royal care, the redress” of grievances in Virginia and “for the establishing of fit directions and orders for the future” of the colony.54 It ordered Sir George Yeardley, the governor of Virginia, to cooperate with the investigation. The Privy Council also ordered the Company to comply fully. A receipt for the court books, delivered to the Privy Council on April 21, 1623, suggests that they initially yielded to this request.

With the future of the colony uncertain, the Privy Council went to great lengths to ensure that the work of the Virginia Commission would not be frustrated by false reports and misinformation. They ordered that in Virginia “there be no discouragement taken or apprehended by any loose advertisements from any person, proceeding from fractious humors or private ends.”55 Colonists were directed not to write private letters about anything “other than his own business.”56 They were particularly worried that Virginia and

Bermuda residents might be discouraged “by particular advertisements that may proceed from any factious hands or private ends.” The Council also wrote directly to Virginia colonists encouraging them to “exhort and admonish them to live together in concord and unity and to employ their endeavors jointly for the public good of those plantations.”57

Maintaining control of the movement of news and rumors was paramount.

54 28 April 1623, in Lyle, ed., Acts, 475. 55 Ibid. 56 Order of the Privy Council, 17 April 1623, TNA CO 5/ 13/54. 57 Ibid.

212

In order to better account for the news arriving from Virginia, to aid the

Commissioners in their investigation, and to gain an intimate understanding of the immediate conditions on the ground, between April and June 1623, the Privy Council took testimony from seamen returning from Virginia.58 Their testimony suggests that most of the questions the Council asked concerned the interests of the Commission, including fortifications and defense, the importation of supplies, and the protection of trade. These sailors claimed that the landing in Virginia was “very bad both for men and goods.” They reported that “they have seen goods so landed from the Abigail this Voyage right Against the companies store houses and governors house, Armors, swords, muskets, trunks and such like goods, lye a fortnight together uncared for, every tide being overflowed with water and the trunks ready to be swallowed.” They provided testimony about colonists’ preference for Smythe’s administration, when trade conditions with Algonquians were much better.59 The sailors also attested to the condition of newcomers, describing how on their recent voyage, “some passengers out of the Abigail have died in the streets at James

Towne, and so little cared for that they have lien until the hogs have eaten their Corpse, and in general little care of ought but extorting upon the people.”60 These last two statements, regarding the colonists’ preference for colonial leadership, and the condition of newcomers, suggests that the Council investigated the claims made in Butler’s account.

The sailors’ testimony also supported claims made by the Smythe party that the colony was

58 Statements of Seamen as to Conditions in Virginia, Between April and June 1623; From the Attestation of diuers sufficient and vnderstanding sea men, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 93. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid, 94.

213 currently in disarray. But more importantly, this testimony further convinced the

Commission that direct intervention was necessary.

While the Commission’s investigation was getting underway, in England disputes between Company factions intensified. These tensions were palpable at court. On April 19,

1623, John Chamberlain described to Sir Dudley Carleton the “great faction fallen out in the Virginia companie.” According to Chamberlain, the members of the factions were well- known. Indeed, he accurately listed to Carleton the leaders on both sides. Furthermore,

Chamberlain informed Carleton that both parties had gone “before the King with their accusations and allegations, where Sir Edward Sackville carries himself malapertly and insolently that the King was fain to take him down soundly and roundly, but I hear that by means of the Lord Treasurer he made his peace the next day.”61 These displays of factionalism and “insolen[ce]” directed at the king continued to work against the interests of the Company.

As these tensions continued at court, in parliament, and in public, the commission expanded the scope of their investigation from basic reforms the Company could implement to a more comprehensive overhaul of the colony. The appointed commissioners included Sir William Jones, Sir Nicholas Fortescue, Sir Henry Bourchier, Sir Henry Spiller,

Sir Francis Gofton, Sir Richard Sutton, and Sir William Sytt. Fortescue had experience on a range of commissions: the 1618 Navy Commission, the 1622 inquiry into defective titles to lands granted by the Crown in Worcestershire, a 1623 special commission into piracy,

61 Chamberlain to Carleton, 19 April 1623, The Letters of John Chamberlain: volume II, ed. Norman Egbert McClure (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1939), 492.

214 and a 1623 investigation into the governments of Ireland.62 Bourchier and Gofton had experience in Ireland; Bourchier was born and raised in Ireland, and Gofton held land in the Ulster Plantation. As affiliates of a much more successful plantation colony, their experience in Ireland might prove useful in rehabilitating the Virginia colony.63 In the minutes of the Privy Council, Jones was listed as lead commissioner: in October 8, 1623, he submitted a preliminary report to the board.64 However, later that month Jones was granted leave from the commission “by reason of his other employments for his Majesties service.”65 But this change in leadership did not disrupt the Commission’s work. Instead, the Privy Council ordered the Commission to submit a precise schedule of meetings, “for the better expediting thereof… so as that service may be the more orderly and certainly prosecuted.”66

The Privy Council further instructed the commissioners to “examine the whole business, from the beginning of Sir Thomas Smythe’s government.”67 It again instructed the principal adventurers of the Virginia Company to assist the commissioners. The Privy

Council ordered each party to write their account of “such abuses and grievances either in point of government; misemployment of moneys or the like,” avoiding all “bitterness and sharpness of stile or other impertinent provocation tending rather to revive and kindle

62 G. K. Fortescue, “Fortescue, Sir Nicholas (1575?–1633),” rev. Stephen Wright, in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9946 (accessed January 14, 2016). 63 “Bourchier, Henry, fifth earl of Bath (c.1587–1654),” Victor Stater in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, May 2006, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/66562 (accessed January 14, 2016). 64 8 October 1623, J.V. Lyle, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England: Volume 39, 1623-1625 (London: His Majesty’s Stationers Office, 1933), 96-97. 65 15 October 1623, Lyle, ed., Acts, 1623-1625, 98. 66 Meeting at Whitehall, 15 October 1623, TNA PC 2/32 f.125. 67 Lord Treasurer Middlesex to Sec. Conway, 18 April 1623, TNA SP 14/217/88.

215 former heats and distractions between the said two companies than in any ways conducting to the work and service intended.”68 The Privy Council instructed them to thoroughly analyze the lottery, “how the lottery first came to be invented, and by whom, when did they begin, who directed their business, and who were employed as Agents in it, what fraud or abuses were committed in the carriage of them, how were the said lotteries furnished, and by whom, whether upon the public stock, or by private men.”69 James and his Council’s interest in how much “public stock” was invested was important; James worried about betraying the public trust and the reputation of the colony as a national project.

As Butler’s account claimed, and the sailors confirmed, the poor treatment of newcomers in Virginia needed to be addressed. The Council ordered the commissioners to inquire carefully “whether the sending of so many people hath not indiscreetly wasted the whole public stock, and been a means to cast away the lives of so many of His Majesties

Subjects, therefore to know what Intelligence they kept with the chief of the Colony there.”70 These instructions reveal that Crown and Council believed they had been misled by the Company and were concerned about the impact of the Company’s lack of transparency on those who invested or immigrated to the colony in service to the nation.

Unfortunately for the Sandys party, in their efforts to challenge Butler’s account, they disobeyed the Privy Council’s orders to keep all Company matters private. Offended by their insolence, the Council declared that Sandys, William Cavendish, Earl of

Devonshire, and Nicholas and John Ferrar, among others, had “contrived and set down in

68 17 April 1623, in Lyle, ed., Acts, 491. 69 “A note of some things fit to be inquired into by the Commissioners for the better discovery of the true estate and Condition of the Plantations, and of the proceedings and carriage of that business,” May 1623, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 153. 70 Ibid.

216 writing and caused publicly to be read a long and impertinent declaration consisting for the most part of bitter and unnecessary invectives and aspersions upon the person of the Earle of Warwick and others whom they styled his instruments and agents.” The Privy Council was forced to call the accused before them and determined that those parties “should be forthwith restrained of their liberty and confined to their several lodgings or houses (as persons guilty of a contempt against the directions and commands of this Table) where they are to remain until his Majesty or this Board shall give further order.”71

With members of the Company’s leadership quarantined, the commissioners were free to seize all the written evidence about the Company. On May 22, the Privy Council ordered that “all charters, books, letters, and any other writings, belonging or relating to the plantations of Virginia and the Somers Islands be delivered to the Commissioners for those plantations.” Furthermore, they commanded that all “boxes and packets of letters” arriving to England from Virginia be delivered to the Commission in order “to be by them broken open, perused, and disposed of, as they shall find cause.72 In addition to the appointed commissioners, the king also ordered that Privy Councilors “diligently and daily to attend to the business of Virginia, until it be fully agreed and concluded.”73

During Commission’s investigation, the Privy Council ordered Company members to resolve their problems or face further sanctions. But they were clearly unable to do so.

During the first months of the Commission’s investigation tensions between Company members grew increasingly heated and public. John Chamberlain described the factional tensions as “so violent, as Guelfs and Ghibellines were not more animated one against

71 17 April 1623, Acts, ed. Lyle, 490-1. 72 Order of the Privy Council, 22 May 1623, TNA SP 14/147/88. 73 Sec. Conway to Sec. Calvert, 30 June 1623, TNA SP 14/147/88.

217 another.” According to Carleton the two sides were no longer communicating: “they seldom meet upon the Exchange, or in the streets, but they brabble and quarrel.”

Foreshadowing the Commission’s report, Chamberlain concluded, “if that society be not dissolved the sooner, or cast in a new mold, worse effects may follow than the whole business is worth.”74

On July 2, the Privy Council received an initial assessment from the investigators on the ground “that make a map of the colony's misery.”75 They described the contents of recent letters from Virginia, which made clear “that unless by your Majesties special care and providence it be forthwith relieved and some better course taken…in all probability is like to come to utter ruin.” The financial situation was dire: “great Sums of money which in that action have been employed a great part whereof hath been drained from your people in general.” Furthermore, colonists and migrants had not been properly accounted for. The

Commissioners found “good reason to believe that there are now very few persons left in the Colony but how many we cannot certainly come to the knowledge of by reason that the

Catalogue of their names (which was wont to be yearly sent from thence) is this year either not sent or at least concealed from us”76 This neglect would be met with stricter conditions and direct oversight following the dissolution of the Company.

The Privy Council showed these letters to members of the Virginia Company and began to take measures for the immediate relief of the colony.77 The Council set down rules

74 Chamberlain to Carleton, 26 July 1623, in The Chamberlain Letters: A Selections of the Letters of John Chamberlain concerning life in England from 1597 and 1626, ed. Elizabeth McClure Thomson (London: John Murray, 1965), 226-227. 75 Lord President Mandeville to Sec. Conway, 2 July 1623, TNA CO 1/2/35. 76 “Draft for the Commissioners of a Preliminary Report on the Condition of the Colony,” June or July 1623, to the king, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 215. 77 Lord President Mandeville to Sec. Conway, 2 July 1623, TNA CO 1/2/35.

218 to improve the government in Virginia while the Company “begged” for an extension to determine their course of action. The Privy Council enumerated their far-reaching and detailed rules:

(1) Forts to be erected in places healthful, and best for safety and defense; (2) Guest houses for harboring of sick men and receiving of strangers; (3) Towns and places for habitation to be seated near adjoining, that they may be a strength to one another and the strongest, most fertile places to be chosen; (4) Ships, pinnaces, and barges to be maintained at the common charge, and to be employed for trade, defense, and discoveries, to the use of the public; (5) provisions for necessary food to be cared for, before matters of profit; (6) The men to be divided into three parts: as building of storehouses for victuals, places of strength and such like, some in sowing and planting of corn, roots, and other fruit. And some to be for strength and discovery and all that are thus employed for public works, to be maintained upon the public course; (7) none of the natives to be taught to shoot in guns, or suffered to have any pieces, nor to be allowed to dwell in places between us and the sea coasts; (8) men of experience in government, and able men of service, to be sent thither, and some that best know that country, to be used for Commanders there; (9) churches and schools to be erected in fit places of best access. The Privy Council required that Virginia authorities report to the king “all matters of great importance concerning their plantation, and their directions to be followed.”78

The Privy Council specifically ordered that the Company take up a collection for the immediate relief of the Virginia colonists. But members of the Virginia Company failed to expediently comply with the Council’s orders. They (perhaps woefully) misinterpreted the orders of James and his Council as suggestions that were open to negotiation. Appalled by the actions of the members of the Company, James ordered the Privy Council to conduct a “strict examination to sift out whether the refusal of the Virginia Company to comply with the King's request be on account of being bound by their laws, or a pretext to color a willful breach of His Majesty's commands.” James also instructed Attorney General Sir

78 Lord President Mandeville to Secretary Conway, 2 July 1623, enclosure I, TNA CO 1/2/35.

219

Thomas Coventry “to examine into the foundation and limitations of their commission and behavior, and to inquire whether, in such extreme conduct, the commission is not void.”79

The Privy Council again recapitulated their demands for the relief of the colonists, this time setting strict terms. Concerned first with famine, the Council asked Company members to provide victuals, collecting from members, “700l., to be laid out in meal80 and immediately dispatched, and another sum of 1,800l….for the supply of particular hundreds and private persons there.”81 The following day, on July 5, 1623, James instructed the Privy

Council to ask that the Company to explain how they “will put in execution those rules for better government, and whether they did not make a pretext of their constitutions to break his commands.”82 The Company replied that they “would presently do for the relieving of the poor souls in Virginia,” with the money they had collected for relief. While unhappy with the attitude of Company members, Henry Montagu, Viscount Mandeville was cautiously optimistic that the Company would cooperate, remarking that he “did not expect to have found the Company so forward, but thinks they are willing to hold their government.”83

By mid-July, the Commission delivered an initial report derived from the letters of the investigators in Virginia and their examination of the Company’s papers thus far. James and his Council, clearly concerned, began to consider what they would do after the

Commission delivered its final report. The Privy Council appointed Oliver St. John,

79 Conway to Lord Treasurer Middlesex, 3 July 1623, TNA SP 14/148/19. 80 food, likely grain, see "meal, n.1". OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/115408?rskey=8nlLvK&result=1&isAdvance d=false (accessed January 14, 2016). 81 Order of the Privy Council upon a representation of Lord Cavendish and others of the Virginia Company Place of Origin, 4 July 1623, TNA CO 13/54/214. 82 Conway to Lord President Mandeville, 5 July 1623, TNA SP 14/148/33. 83 Mandeville to Conway, 5 July 1623, TNA CO 1/2/40.

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Viscount Grandison, the lord deputy of Ireland, George, Baron Carew and Arthur, Baron

Chichester (former lord deputy of Ireland) to read the notes of the commissioners and “to frame such orders as they conceive most fit for regulating the government of Virginia, to be advised on by the Privy Council.”84 The Council also instructed Attorney-General

Coventry to examine the patents of Virginia and Somers Isles companies and to prepare “a better form of government.” To assist him in this work, Coventry was given the same

“notes and directions” delivered to Grandison, Carew, and Chichester, the report of the

Commissioners and the “rules drawn out by the Privy Council for strengthening the government of Virginia.”85

Attorney General Coventry and Solicitor General Heath “diligently perused” the letters patent of Virginia and Bermuda as well as the aforementioned reports. They recommended that as “soon as the order of government has been determined upon, the

King should, by proclamation, command the forbearance of the execution of those letters patent, and of the authority thereby committed to the Company; and should they not voluntarily yield up their privileges legal proceedings may be taken against them for calling in their patent.”86 In a letter to Secretary Conway, Middlesex noted that while the Company would be allowed to continue meeting for the next month (or until the members of the Privy

Council attendant to the king returned) James would also “perceive his own power of resuming the government, and settling it for the public good.87

On October 8, 1623, the Privy Council, “declaring the King's resolution, because of the distressed state of Virginia occasioned by miscarriage of the government,” ordered

84 Order of the Privy Council, 22 July 1623, TNA CO 5/1354/223. 85 Mandeville to Conway, 28 July 1623, TNA SP 14/149/76. 86 Coventry and Heath to the King, 31 July 1623, TNA CO 1/2/43. 87 Ibid.

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“by a new charter to the adventurers and Company of that plantation, to appoint a Governor and twelve assistants resident in England dependent on the Privy Council and to be chosen by the King the first time, unto whom the government of the Company and colony shall be committed.” They also ordered a similar body to be created in Virginia, including “a

Governor and 12 assistants resident in Virginia to be nominated by the Governor and assistants in England”88 While the king recalled the charter, he instructed the

Commissioners to continue their current investigation.89 Following this announcement, many petitions were delivered to the Commissioners for examination, amounting to “a trunk of writings locked up under the custody of one of the clerks of the Privy Council.”90

The members of the Virginia Company immediately objected to the news that their charter had been revoked. Describing the revocation of their charter as “of such great weight and consequence,” they asked that the motion be stalled until the next Quarter Court on November 19. The Company cited the complicated nature of the patent, granted to

“above 1,000 persons…as also unto 60 several companies of London and other corporate towns.”91 The Privy Council refused and ordered the deputy and representatives of the

Virginia Company to appear before it on October 20, where they were to “deliver a final answer as to whether they will be content to surrender their former charters and accept of a new charter with the alterations mentioned in the Order of Privy Council.”92 The

Company ignored these orders and instead responded to an earlier request, agreeing “to change only the frame of government and manner of the plantation for the good of the

88 Order of the Privy Council, 8 October 1623, TNA CO 1/2/45. 89 Ibid. 90 Warrant from the Commissioners for Virginia, 7 November 1623, TNA CO 1/2/49. 91 Answer of the Virginia Company in Court assembled to the Privy Council, 15 October 1623, TNA CO 1/1/234. 92 Order of the Privy Council, 17 October 1623, TNA CO 5/1354/ 235.

222 people, and to preserve and secure private interests.” Furthermore, many Company members also refused to submit their charter until the Quarter Court. The Privy Councilors,

“ill pleased with this reply,” ordered the Company “to bring a direct answer on Monday next, when if they do not surrender the patent the Attorney General is directed to take a course to revoke it.”93

On October 20, the Virginia Company responded. Nine of the representatives agreed to deliver the charter whereas approximately “three score” representatives declined.94 The attorney general issued a quo warranto writ95 against the Company “for the questioning of their charters.” The Company was ordered to return an answer by

Christmas Eve. To expedite this process the Commission temporarily returned to them all the books and records they had confiscated during their investigation.96

Worried that the insolence of Company members might diminish morale in Virginia further, on the same day, the Council published a pamphlet, delivered to Virginia by John

Pory, “that the King has no other intention in reforming and changing the present government of Virginia, than the remedying bad effects that tend to endanger the whole plantation.” They clarified “that every man's estate shall be fully preserved, and if anything

93 Mandeville to Conway, 17 October 1623, TNA SP 14/153/67. 94 Answer of the Virginia Company to the Privy Council, 20 October 1623, TNA CO 1/2/47; “The names of those who held up their hands to surrender the patent were: Sir Sam. Argoll, Sir Thos. Wroth, Captain Jo. Martin, Mr. Canning, Mr. Woodall, Martin the Armenian, Molasco the Pole; the other two not known. It is doubted whether Martin and Molasco ought to have voice,” in Schedule of the names of those present at an extraordinary Court of the Virginia Company, by appointment of the Lords, touching the surrender of the charters; distinguishing those who held up their hands for and against” 20 October 1623, TNA CO 1/2/48. 95 Originally: a royal writ obliging a person to show by what warrant an office or franchise is held or claimed (now hist.); freq. as writ of quo warranto. Later: a legal information or action challenging an alleged right to hold an office or to exercise a power (usu. attrib.), in "quo warranto, n.". OED Online. December 2015. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/view/Entry/156928?rskey=G2pHrK&result=1&isAdvanc ed=false (accessed January 14, 2016). 96 21 November 1623, in Lyle, ed., Acts, 119-120.

223 be defective, better secured; and commanding that the ships intended for Virginia be with all speed sent away for relief of the plantation.”97 This Council ordered that Virginia authorities distribute the pamphlet throughout the colony.98

Following the announcement of the revocation of the charter, Crown and Council also immediately employed additional agents on the ground in Virginia to take a survey of the colony. In addition to the auditors (whose work was largely financial in nature), the

Council wrote to their trusted agents already in Virginia—John Harvey, John Pory,

Abraham Percy, Samuel Matthews, and John Jefferson—instructing them to conduct a survey of the state of the colony, including a “diligent account” of the land, people, and cultivatable trades.99 They were to inquire about the “present state” of the colony, answering the many points formerly set out by the Privy Council. But this survey was more about gathering information than making recommendations. The Council asked the survey team to answer the following questions: “how many several plantations there be and which of them be public and which private and particular, what people, men, women and children be in each plantation, what fortifications or what place is best to be fortified, what houses and how many, what cattle, what arms, ammunition and ordinance, mounted and serviceable, what corn and other.”100 With a current and precise account of the people plantations, animals, arms, and fortifications, the Privy Council and Virginia

Commissioners were better equipped to prepare a plan for the future of the colony.

Managing Uncertainty

97 Order of the Privy Council, 20 October 1623, TNA CO 5/1354/237. 98 Ibid. 99 24 October 1623, in Lyle, ed., Acts, 107-8. 100 Ibid.

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With Company members up in arms about the revocation of their charter, and divided over whether to submit to it, James was worried about how stockholders would react publicly. The Virginia Commission would take many more months to determine how to restructure the colony, leaving the adventurers in a state of uncertainty. James and his

Privy Council were also worried about how news of the news charter’s revocation would be received in Virginia. In an effort to prevent the spread of rumor and misinformation,

James endeavored to silence those likely to spread such information and communicated his involvement in Virginia Company affairs directly to his subjects.

First, to prevent both false and negative reports from spreading into England, the

Privy Council tried to monitor reports and letters arriving from Virginia. In December,

1623, the Council ordered the deputy governor of the Company “to seize all letters, public as well as private, in a ship lately arrived from Virginia, and to send them immediately, unopened, to their Lordships.”101 But these efforts could not police the behavior of unhappy adventurers, who were further divided over the issue of submitting their charter. For example, in early January 1624, Thomas Keightley brought an action against William

Canning for “striking him on the Exchange, which arose out of a quarrel in Court the day before.” Keightley had accused Canning of “bringing many to prove that Keightley declared it to be neither just nor honest to deliver up the patent.”102

While Company members continued to disobey the Crown’s orders, the leadership in Virginia complied with the Privy Council’s directives. They readily supplied their documentary evidence to the Privy Council and commissioners and distributed the Privy

101 The Privy Council to the Deputy Governor of Virginia Company, 30 December 1623, TNA CO 5/1354/ 252. 102 Attorney General Coventry to the Privy Council, 8 January 1624, TNA SP 14/158/256.

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Council’s pamphlet to colonists.103 They also requested updated reports from the Privy

Council in order to write “four propositions concerning the present state of the colony.”104

While perhaps a bit inconvenienced by these demands, they understood “had the[y] refused to answer it…it would have shown discontent, or been at least uncourteous.”105

As many members of the Virginia Company were also members of parliament, the issues of the patent also spread to a divided parliament. On May 6, 1624, the Virginia

Company presented a petition to the House of Commons. They complained that “that now when the material difficulties of plantation are passed over, there are many oppression of late used by the Lord Treasurer [Middlesex] for his own private ends to the hindrances of trade there and tending to the destruction of that plantation.”106 The Sandys party accused the commissioners “appointed by the King to report upon the cause, with extreme partiality, and accused Sir Nath[aniel] Rich of being an active ill-instrument among them.” They further claimed that the Spanish ambassador Gondomar and his agents had “used their utmost endeavors to destroy the Company and their plantation.” They also maintained that

Middlesex sent Sandys out of London in the king’s name during the time he was to be examined by the commissioners, in order to prevent his testimony. Fortunately, they alleged, the king “disavowed it, and gave Sandys liberty to return.” According to Sir

103 “Have already given thanks to the King for his tender care over them, and answered the letters and orders of the Privy Council. When their consent to the surrender of the patent is required, will be the proper time to reply. Conceive the King's intention to change the Government has proceeded from misinformation, which they hope may be altered upon their more faithful declarations,” Gov. Sir Fras. Wyatt, the Council and Assembly of Virginia, to the Commissioners, 2 March 1624, TNA CO 1/3/262. 104 Ibid. 105 The Commissioners to the Governor, Council, and Assembly of Virginia, 3 March 1624, TNA CO 1/3/268. 106 Diary of Edward Nicholas, 6 May 1624 f. 178, TNA SP 14/166, in Proceedings in Parliament 1624: The House of Commons, Transcriptions of the Commons' Journals and private diaries covering the final Parliament of the reign of James I, ed. Philip Baker (London: British History Online, 2015).

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Francis Nethersole, after hearing this testimony from the Sandys party, Members of

Parliament “many, at first unwilling, were now content to have [the report of the

Commission] ripped up.” Sir Nathaniel Rich complained on the floor “that the petition says that this petition tends only to the reviving of a number of wranglings which the King and

Council thought.” The House ordered that this matter would be heard in the Star Chamber, where “all that will come shall have voice, saving those that are of the company of Virginia or have interest therein.”107

On May 9, 1624, the Speaker of the House of Commons, Sir Thomas Crew, read a letter from the king concerning the Virginia petition. James asked the Commons not to

“trouble themselves” with the petition, “as it would renew the factions of the Company which in settlement by His Majesty and the Privy Council.”108 The letter was, according to

Sir Isaac Wake, “received with universal applause.”109 The following day, John

Chamberlain informed Dudley Carleton, that King James, concerned over the debates, wrote a letter the House of Commons, asking “to rid them of a thorny business touching

Virginia and the Somers Islands. It was like to have bred much faction among them, to prevent which, the King has reserved the whole cause to his own hearing.”110 The petition, by general resolution, was withdrawn.111

107 Diary of Richard Dyott, Staffordshire Record Office, 6 May 1624, MS D661/11/1/2, f. 95, in Proceedings in Parliament 1624. 108 Journal of the House of Commons, 9 May 1624, PA, HC/CL/JO/1/14 f. 19, in Proceedings in Parliament 1624. 109 Sir Isaac Wake to Secretary Edward Conway, 9 May 1624, in CSP Colonial Series, 1574- 1660, ed. Noël Sainsbury (London: Longman, Green, Longman, & Roberts, 1860), 60; Sir Francis Nethersole to Carleton, 6 May 1624, TNA SP 14/164/46. 110 Chamberlain to Carleton, 30 April 1624, TNA SP 14/163/74. 111 Journal of the House of Commons, 9 May 1624, PA, HC/CL/JO/1/14, f. 19, in Proceedings in Parliament 1624.

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A Royal Colony

None of these debates improved the position of the Virginia Company. By mid-

1624, as it became clear to adventurers that the Privy Council would not return their charter, these tensions become less visible. But the future of the colony was still unsettled. James and his government needed to formulate a comprehensive plan for its new governance. The

Commission had made it clear that the Company had grossly mismanaged the colony and had misrepresented its condition to the king and the public. Members of the Company had further worked against their own interests by disobeying the Privy Council and bringing the issues to parliament. Therefore, as the Company, in its current state, was clearly unable to resume management of the colony, James, along with his Council and leading jurists, were left to determine precisely how this “royal colony” would be governed.

Drawing from the advice and experience of the Virginia Commission, in July 1624,

James appointed additional commissioners, composed of high-ranking men including the

Lord President of the Council and former Lord Treasurer, Edward Montague, Viscount

Mandeville, William, Baron Paget and Arthur, Baron Chichester, former Lord Deputy of

Ireland, to “resolve upon the well-settling of the colony of Virginia, and to give order for the government.”112 They were ordered to “certify their proceedings to the King…His

Majesty being resolved to renew a charter, with former privileges and amendment of previous imperfections.”113 Creating a royal colony was no small task. To become better acquainted with managing Virginia, the Commission needed to gather all relevant information. They borrowed “all the patents, books of accounts, and invoices, concerning

112 “Chichester, Arthur, Baron Chichester (1563–1625),” John McCavitt in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5274 (accessed January 15, 2016). 113 Order of the Privy Council, 24 June 1624, TNA CO 5/1354/282.

228 the late corporation, and the lists of the people in that colony” from John Ferrar, former secretary of the Virginia Company.114 The Commission had power “to send for all such persons as can give information therein.” They were to “take into their consideration these general & essential things, for the future…What course is fittest to settle the government there…What supply is necessary, for the subsistence of the persons now inhabiting in that

Colony or which shallbe sent thither…[and] What is fit to be done for the Defense of the

Inhabitants against the Savage & others, that they may the better intend their plantation with security.” To inform the public of their proceedings, and control the narrative in

England, they were instructed to draft “some publication made in form heretofore used at the exchange giving notice of his Majesties Commission.”115

The Committee continued to meet weekly at Sir Thomas Smythe’s house where all the “charters, writings, and seals of the Company” were made available to them. The

Committee was granted power “to examine persons able to give information therein, and report to be made upon the fittest course to settle the government, the necessary supplies, defense against the savages, and the commodities that can be raised.” The committee was instructed to “take into consideration how the plantation now stands, and how it did stand at the bringing of the quo warranto, and what transactions and grants have been made since that time, and by whom.” The Committee also requested a detailed report of the colony’s history and present state from the Assembly in Virginia.116 During the investigation, all

114 Ibid. 115 Commissioners for Virginia. Orders Set Down at Meeting, 16 July 1624, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 499. 116 Petition of Gov. Sir Fran. Wyatt, the Council and Assembly of Virginia to the King, July 1624, TNA CO 1/3/299.

229 ships departing for Virginia were instructed “to repair to the Commissioners to receive directions, as they did before from the Company.”117

The Committee called on principal statesmen and jurists, including Sir Thomas

Edmondes, Sir John Suckling, Sir George Calvert, Sir Edward Conway, Sir Richard

Weston, and Sir Julius Cæsar, to restructure the colony and craft a comprehensive plan for the future. They asked these men to take into “consideration the state of said Colony and

Plantation, as well for the safety of the people, strength of the place, and government there, as for the managing of the business here in England.” To send supplies to the colony, they were empowered “to execute authorities, privileges, [etc.], mentioned in said Letters

Patent, and to take into their hands goods and money in the hands of any persons for the public use of said Colony, or of said pretended Governor and Company.” The Committee was encouraged to confer “with the adventurers or planters” for the “advancement” of

Virginia. Furthermore, they were instructed to “appoint [sub] Committees for the preparation of affairs; also to set down such matters as they think most necessary for settling the Government of said Colony” to better determine what should be included in the governing structure.”118

On July 15, 1624, the Privy Council informed the Virginia Company that the colony would be ruled directly by the king and his appointed Committees. Outlining the investigative Committee’s report, the Council determined that the “country appeared to be fruitful and healthful, and that, if industry were used, it would produce many staple and good commodities.” As the colony had, under direction of the Company “had yielded few

117 Mandeville to Conway, July 1624, enclosure 1, Orders set down at a meeting of the Commissioners for Virginia, the Commission being sealed on the 15 July 1624, TNA CO 1/3/290. 118 Letters Patent, 15 July 1624, TNA C 6/2327/4.

230 or none,” the Committee determined that the blame “must fall on the Governors and

Company here.” The colonies were to the king “of great importance and would, as they hoped, remain a lasting monument of his Majesty's happy government.” Thus, James, “in consideration of the premises…by advice of his Privy Council” resolved “by altering the

Charters of said Company, to settle such a course as might best secure the safety of his people there, and cause said plantation to flourish.” Thus, in the interest of the colony and his subjects who resided there, James would manage the colony directly.

To prevent further scandal from former Company members, James communicated the Commission’s report to the public. In July 1624, the Commission published a proclamation, declaring their intention “for the present ordering of the affaires of the

Colony and Plantation of Virginia, until his Majesty shall make a full and absolute settlement.”119 The Privy Council ordered that the proclamation be distributed in spaces frequented by merchants and traders, such as the Royal Exchange.120

James and his Council immediately took charge of the governance of the colony.

The correspondence between Governor Yeardley and the Privy Council suggests that the leadership in Virginia kept the Council abreast of the issues on the ground. In October,

Yeardley presented the Privy Council with an account of the state of Virginia. He described the country as “in great distress for want of necessary supplies.” He asked “to attend the

Privy Council, to declare the true state of the colony [and] that orders may be taken for its present and future subsistence.”121

119 Virginia Commission, His Majesties Commissioners for Virginia (London: Felix Kingston, 1624). STC 24844.3. 120 Mandeville to Conway, July 1624, TNA CO 1/3/290. 121 Petition of Sir George Yeardley to the King, 4 October 1625, TNA CO 1/3/46.

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The Council answered with a thorough list of changes to practices and governance of the colony as well as forthcoming provisions. They agreed to provide the colony with supplies for defense including “munition, apparel, tools, and other provisions.” A new government would be established and “none of those complained against, nor any factious persons, to have hand in [it].” Furthermore, “no contracts [were] to be forced upon the people, who should have liberty to make the best of their labor.” To bolster the population,

“great numbers of people to be sent over, and those of worth encouraged to go.” To stimulate the economy, they ordered that staple commodities would be “free of custom for a certain time.” Finally, soldiers would be sent, “[t]he first supply should be sent away with all speed, to prevent the people perishing either by the savages, or the severity of the winter; the supply of soldiers should arrive in Virginia before the end of March.”122 As these instructions made clear, the colony would no longer function as it had under the Company.

The Crown, through the Virginia Commission, sought the aforementioned areas of mismanagement. Since the Commission had attributed blame to both the Company and the governor of the colony, the incumbent Yeardley had better comply with these reforms or risk replacement.

The Final Tobacco Settlement

The final matter for the Virginia Commission was the tobacco settlement. With the

Company no longer in charge of the monopoly, the Commission sought a settlement that best served the interests of the Crown.123 Anxious about what this meant for those in

122 Divers heads, wherein the Privy Council are to be moved [by Sir Geo. Yeardley] concerning Virginia, October 1625, TNA CO 1/3/47. 123 The dissolution of the Company allowed the Crown to avoid having to settle the issue of the tobacco monopoly amid the debates of monopolies in 1624. In these debates, according to Sir

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Virginia, both the colony’s leadership and individual planters petitioned the Council with their interests. In February 1624, the authorities in Virginia asked for support in making tobacco the primary crop by granting to their colony its “sole importation.” They argued

“Nothing will give more life, or a steadier advancement to the plantation.”124 They also asked to be able to export tobacco directly to foreign markets without shipping it first to

England.125

James and his Council held many meetings to formulate a new tobacco settlement that would satisfy both leading planters and the Crown. In July, the House of Commons petitioned the Council against the importation of foreign tobacco into England.126 Solicitor

General Heath issued a statement declaring that the king would grant this request as well as prohibit tobacco growing in England while determining whether “it may further trade and bring money into this realm, is willing to contract with the Governor and Company of

Virginia and the Bermudas for the import of a sufficient quantity for England and

Ireland.”127 Finally, in July 1624, James issued a proclamation announcing the settlement.

Despite his belief that tobacco use “tend[s] to the corruption both of the health and manners of Our people,” James framed the settlement in the interests of the nation and empire.

“Neuerthelesse,” he stated:

Thomas Wentworth, the king said “that he would never impose upon any native commodity again.” Therefore, as a non-native commodity, had the Company survived, the tobacco monopoly could have been reissued according to the Statute against Monopolies 21 Jac 1 c 3 (25 May 1624). Diary of Richard Dyott, Staffordshire Record Office, MS D661/11/1/2, in Proceedings in Parliament 1624. 124 Governor Sir Franic Wyatt, the Council and Assembly of Virginia, to the Privy Council, 28 February 1624, TNA CO 1/3/4. 125 Reasons offered to the Privy Council against Sir Edwin Sandys' contract and joint stock for the Virginia and Somers Isles tobacco, and against the monopoly of tobacco, 20 March 1624, TNA CO 1/3/10. 126 Statement by Heath, July 1624, TNA SP 14/169/6. 127 Ibid.

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because Wee haue beene earnestly and often importuned by many of Our louing Subiects, Planters and Aduenturers in Virginia, and the Sommer Islands, and lately by Our Commissioners for Virginia, that We would be pleased to take into Our Royall care that part of Our Dominions, by Our Royall authoritie, and by the industrie of Our loyall Subiects, added to the rest of Our Empire, for the propagation of Christian Religion, and the ease and benefite of this populous Realme, and to consider, that those Colonies and Plantations, are yet but in their infancie, and cannot be brought to maturitie and perfection, vnlesse We will bee pleased for a time to tolerate vnto them the planting and venting of the Tobacco, which is, and shall be of the growth of those Colonies and Plantations; We, taking into Our Princely consideration these, and many other important reasons of State, haue beene graciously pleased to condescend to the desires and humble petitions of Our louing Subiects in this behalfe.128 The proclamation prohibited the growth of tobacco in England and Ireland.129 But it still included the important clause that all tobacco must come to England to pay customs before being sold elsewhere.

For the tobacco settlement to be lucrative for the state, it required strict oversight by customs agents, comptrollers, and other officers in England’s major port cities. James and his Council would closely observe this trade, increasing another important aspect of the state’s central oversight of England’s colonies.

Moreover, by requiring all ships to move strictly between colony and metropole,

James employed a mercantile policy that closely foreshadowed Cromwell’s 1651

Navigation Acts.

Conclusion

The following May 1625, James finally issued a proclamation announcing his plans for royal governance of the Virginia colony. He declared “that the territories of Virginia, the Somers Islands, and New England shall form part of his empire and the government,

128 James I, A Proclamation Concerning Tobacco (London, 1624). STC 1876:08 129 Ibid.

234 of Virginia immediately depend upon himself.” For its careful governance, “Councils shall be established for the “immediate care of the affairs of that colony, one in England, the other subordinate and resident in Virginia.” All officers would be maintained “at the

King’s charge.”

From the view of state building, the settlement was a clear move towards a centralized relationship between the Crown, its central government, and its empire.

Between the Virginia Commission, the Privy Council, and the oversight provided by the attorney general, the state exercised considerable oversight of the Virginia colony. With the responsibility of governing a royal colony, the Crown provided Virginia with extra resources for trade and defense. As will be discussed in chapter six, over the next decade,

Charles I and his central government enacted measures to closely manage aspects of

England’s Atlantic empire.

For the adventurers of the Virginia Company, the dissolution of the company was a great loss. It was not the end of colonial companies, but it was a strict warning to the adventurers of other companies. These bodies were only valuable if they assisted the building of empire. If they were unable to manage this responsibility or worse, impeded the growth and success of the colonies they supported, they were no longer useful to the

Crown. For James, and his son and successor, Charles I, the interests of empire superseded those of individual companies, projects, and projectors.

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Chapter Five

“Dangerous” Subjects and “Domestic Enemies:” Colonial Defense during the Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Powhatan Wars

In the spring of 1626, one year after the Crown officially took over the colony, Sir

George Yeardley sailed to Virginia to serve his third term as governor. He carried with him instructions from the Privy Council to the colonists in Virginia, warning that they “should expect the daily coming of a foreign enemy.” The Council instructed Yeardley to distribute a proclamation throughout the colony, commanding “that no one should board any ship without [his] authorization…lest by that means they be surprised, to the great prejudice if not the overthrow of the whole plantation.”1 The Council cautioned Yeardley of an imminent Powhatan attack and ordered him to “strictly forbid” all colonists from “parlay, commerce or trade with them.”2 Yeardley’s final term as governor would be defined by the fear of war on two fronts: from the “foreign enemy” of Spain and the “enemy” within, the

Powhatan Indians.

Shortly after becoming a royal colony, two simultaneous wars threatened Virginia: the Second Anglo-Powhatan War (1622-1632) and the Anglo-Spanish War (1625-1630).

The Anglo-Powhatan War began with a devastating blow to the colony: the 1622 massacre nearly destroyed the population and left physical defenses damaged and unmanned.

Colonial forces responded by plundering Powhatan villages and burning their cornfields.

Powhatan forces met this aggression with further reprisals. This cycle continued for the

1 Instructions to Sir George Yeardley, in J.V. Lyle, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England, Volume 40, 1625-1626 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1934), 436-9, esp. 438. 2 Ibid.

236 rest of the decade, creating a climate of perpetual fear and mistrust between the English and the Powhatans.

During these same years, Anglo-Spanish relations rapidly deteriorated. After over a decade of negotiations, the marriage agreement between Prince Charles and the Spanish

Infanta Maria Ana dramatically (and publicly) failed. Embarrassed and enraged, Charles and Buckingham returned to England advocating for a French match and war with Spain.

At their insistence, James declared war on Spain in March 1624 and summoned parliament to fund the war. While parliament generally supported a war with Spain, some Members of Parliament worried that if they approved the funds, James would misappropriate them, as he had done before. But James died in March 1625, leaving foreign policy matters to his son and heir Charles I. Charles believed that if he followed parliament’s foreign policy recommendations, they would approve the funds necessary for a military expedition.3

Therefore, he immediately began plans for war.

War with Spain had significant political consequences, drawing England into what would become known as the Eighty Years’ War. To commence war with Spain, the Duke of Buckingham, Lord High Admiral of England, proposed a military expedition to attack both Cádiz and Spain’s West Indies fleet. But the expedition was disastrous—complicated by poor weather conditions, insufficient supplies, and inept command. At home, the Cádiz

Expedition was viewed as a humiliating failure, while in the Atlantic, the attempted raid on Spain’s West Indies fleet put English colonies in a vulnerable and precarious position.

The possibility of attacks from both Spanish and Powhatan forces heightened fears of spies and sympathizers. In order to protect colonists from both enemies, the Privy

3 Kenneth Andrews, Ships, Money, and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 145.

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Council ordered colonists and merchants to be extra-vigilant of suspicious newcomers.

Self-policing was an important aspect of the Crown’s approach to governance, and was especially useful in far-flung territories. Virginia authorities identified “borderlands” that required observation and protection, including Algonquian lands, Anglo-Powhatan borders, Virginia’s coasts, and the West Indian waters.4 Familiar with both the mundane and the irregular, colonists could provide useful intelligence in order to help identify suspicious activity and potential threats.

To protect English colonists from the greater threat, an attack from Powhatan forces, authorities in Virginia narrowed channels of information between English colonists and their Powhatan neighbors. The Virginia Council and Assembly crafted protocols for how best to prepare for an attack. They issued and distributed proclamations throughout

Virginia’s English settlements. Furthermore, like West Indian waters, “Indian” spaces and their borderlands were generally off-limits for colonists. Authorities prohibited ordinary colonists from consorting with Powhatans and ordered them to keep continual watch over their homes and settlements. Authorities only permitted colonists with special license, most of whom had prior experience as translators or intermediaries, to cultivate relations with

Powhatans as go-betweens in order to keep authorities apprised of any imminent threats.

But, while these policies of alienation and segregation aimed to protect colonists, they also increased antipathy towards Amerindians and contributed to xenophobia.

4 James Merrell demonstrates how the American woods terrified colonists: “In colonial times that grip was almost unimaginably more powerful than it is in our day. Sailing from lands where people had beaten the forest back, perched on the edge of a vast and unknown continent, European immigrants cringed before America’s shaggy countenance,” Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the American Frontier (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 23.

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This chapter examines the policies and practices deployed by the Jacobean,

Caroline, and colonial governments to protect information during times of crisis. Without sufficient military defenses for England’s Atlantic colonies, the Stuart kings relied on colonial governments to self-police and collaborate on the ground. In addition to ordering colonists to stand guard over their settlements, Charles I and his Council ordered subjects to protect channels of information and guard privileged imperial knowledge. In the war with Spain, this meant closely observing and reporting questionable newcomers. The results were generally successful: Virginia authorities quickly identified suspicious arrivals, who were then investigated, and either permitted to stay or sent back to England.

This analysis includes two case studies. The first case study examines the inquiry into

Simon Tuchin, an English captain who was expelled and subsequently barred from Virginia in May 1625 because he was deemed to be “dangerous to the colony.” Shortly after his arrival to Virginia (which occurred as preparations for the Cádiz Expedition were underway), colonists reported their suspicions of Tuchin to the authorities. Tuchin was accused of harboring Spanish sympathies and surveying the land and waters to aid Spanish purposes. The testimony taken at the General Court in Jamestown demonstrates the success of self-policing and the willingness of colonists to inform on suspicious newcomers. The second case study analyzes the Court’s inquiry into a group of Englishmen who arrived in

Virginia after abandoning a Dutch privateering expedition only a few months later. The

Court’s investigation into their commission, and testimony given by sailors aboard, further demonstrates the colonial government’s rigorous practice of self-policing and the careful examination of English outsiders.

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This chapter will then examine the policies of information management, crafted and enforced simultaneously, in order to protect colonists from a Powhatan attack. During the

Anglo-Spanish War, the daily threat of an attack from Spain compounded anxieties of a possibly imminent Powhatan attack. While protecting channels of communication between ordinary colonists and Powhatans was critical, the Council also took proactive measures to improve intelligence gathering. They solicited frequent reports from their informants and trained potential Powhatan allies as interpreters and guides. Like the policies of the

Caroline government in England, the Virginia Council hoped that improving practices of information management would enable their limited resources of defense to work harder and reach farther.

But these policies also had devastating unintended consequences. Fears of secret

Spanish agents placed many newcomers under undo suspicion. The threat of Powhatan attacks led to anti-Indian anxieties and persecution. As the final case study will demonstrate, when coupled together, these fears created a dangerous climate of heightened xenophobia. In 1627, Captain Samson brought a group of enslaved Carib Indians to

Virginia. Fearful that the Caribs would join the Powhatans in the war against the colonists, the Virginia Court ordered their imprisonment and execution. These anxieties were self- fulfilling. Fearful of slavery and death, many of the Caribs fled the colony into Powhatan territory. While it is unclear whether they were recaptured and executed, their sentence, drawn from fear and a dangerous combination of pan-Indian xenophobia, was a result of policies of hyper-vigilance, alienation, and segregation. Moreover, the colonial government’s anti-Indian sentiments thwarted its efforts to establish a long-term, reliable intelligence program.

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The Early Caroline Imperial Project

The Anglo-Spanish War provided a dramatically different geopolitical context for

Virginia that required both greater protection of the colonies as well as the opportunity to pursue new Atlantic territories and trade. Without a military force or budget to devote to both these aims, gathering and policing sensitive Atlantic intelligence was critical. In order to fully understand the policies and practices on the ground in Virginia, it is important to sketch out Charles I’s wider Atlantic program during the 1625 to 1630 Anglo-Spanish War.

By placing policies of information management on the ground within Charles’s wider imperial project, it is evident that self-policing was part of a collaborative and comprehensive design to protect and expand England’s empire during these years of conflict.

Following his father’s death in late March 1625, Charles I made war with Spain his first priority as king. During the summer and fall of that year, Charles ordered ships and sailors to prepare for an expedition against Spain. To aid this endeavor, Charles stayed many ships and men in the Newfoundland trade for “the security of the kingdom.”5 In the port of Southampton, the Crown ordered the mayor and sheriffs to impress men on ships intended for Virginia.6

In October 1625, with 100 ships and 15,000 sailors and soldiers, Sir Edward Cecil left England in command of the expedition against Spain. The plan was to attack Spain’s

5 ships stayed for HM service, and to stay until 10 April because of the king’s death; 500 mariners needed for the security of the kingdom, Newfoundland ship expected and men should be stayed, 28 March 1625, in Lyle, ed., Acts 1625-1626, 180 6 ship for VA at Southampton, mayors, sheriffs urged to impress all men of that ship, November 1625, in Lyle, ed., Acts 1625-1626, 235.

241 treasure fleet and assault Spain’s coastal towns with the hopes of weakening the supply chain of resources allocated to occupying the territory of Charles’s brother-in-law, the

Elector of the Palatinate. But the expedition was doomed from the start. Stormy weather damaged ships and delayed departure. Furthermore, Spain’s treasure fleet had sailed a different course and could not be easily attacked. Cecil was forced to revise his plan and sail directly to Cádiz. There, Cecil took the harbor fort, but found the city well-fortified and armed. To make matters worse, on landing Cecil found that he had inadequate food and drink for his men. He made the disastrous mistake of allowing his men to raid the wine vats in town, which led to drunkenness and incapacitation. Realizing his men were unable to fight, Cecil ordered his forces to retreat. He tried to save face by intercepting Spain’s returning West Indies galleons, but this too failed. Cecil returned home defeated. The expedition was embarrassing and expensive, costing approximately half a million sterling.7

The preparations for the Cádiz expedition put stress on England’s colonies.

Charles’s impressment of ships engaged in the colonial trade left fewer men for defense and an irregular schedule for the delivery of supplies. 8 With England’s naval strength committed to the expedition, protecting the colonies from within, through practices of information management, became even more critical.

Charles and his Councilors recognized that war with Spain left the Virginia colonists especially vulnerable. In order to institute new colonial policies and projects, the

Caroline government needed to obtain the most comprehensive and accurate information from and about the colonies. Like James before him, Charles gathered surveys, maps, and

7 Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money, and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 8. 8 14 November 1625, in Lyle, ed., Acts 1625-1626, 235.

242 other intelligence, and protected them from England’s imperial rivals. In the late 1620s,

Charles ordered his leading Councilors and jurists to interpret this information in order to generate consistency among patents, draft position papers on how to build productive plantations, and develop strategies for how to best compete with other European powers in the Atlantic.

In Europe, England allied with the Dutch in the Cádiz expedition. However, in the

West Indian contest, both the English and Dutch were scrambling for trade routes and territories. Recognizing both the danger and opportunity that this new geopolitical context provided, Charles and his Privy Council ordered a series of position papers to direct

England’s Atlantic program. Secretary Edward Conway and Sir George, Baron Carew gathered all the maps, relations, and papers from Virginia to restructure the colony’s government.9 Attorney General Heath drafted arguments for increased English presence in the West Indies in order to counter Spain and the Dutch Republic.10 As allies, England was able to openly compete with the Dutch in the Atlantic, while also cooperating with them to work against the interests of Spain. For example, in September 1627, Charles made a deal with the Dutch West India Company, allowing for mutual access to ports and harbors to promote trade in the Atlantic and provide protection against their “common enemy.”11 This agreement allowed hundreds of licensed English privateers to move more easily through the Atlantic.12

9 Secretary Conway to Smythe, 29 April 1625, TNA CO 1/3/39. 10 Memoranda by Attorney General Heath, April 1625, TNA CO 1/3/37. 11 7 May 1627, in J.V. Lyle, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England, Volume 43, 1627-1628 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1940), 8-9. 12 Warrants for Issuing Letters of Marque or Commissions to take Pirates, undated [1627], TNA SP 16/115 f.10. According to this report, over 860 letters had been issued.

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Charles also took advantage of the context of war to approve diverse new projects.

In the West Indies, Charles granted the Earl of Carlisle rights to settle over twenty islands including St. Christopher, Barbados, Antigua, Montserrat, Barbuda, and Nevis. He approved the patent of the Providence Island Company, whose members included Sir

Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, to settle a colony on an island off the Mosquito Coast in

1629. The king also approved a patent for the Guiana Company, the revitalized Amazon

Company, led by Captain Robert North and supported by the Duke of Buckingham. In

North America, Charles approved the Massachusetts Bay Company (1628) and expanded the English presence in Canada (1629). In the context of war, these settlements were increasingly vulnerable to attacks from Amerindians as well as from Spain.

England’s fledgling West Indian colonies were especially open to attacks from

Spanish forces. To protect these colonies, Sir Edward Coke prepared arguments for a company to defend the West Indies and “abate the pride and terror of the Spanish pretended

Empire.”13 Charles also ordered the delivery of guns, ordnance, and powder to settlements in Virginia and Bermuda. He allocated resources for building defensive forts, especially in

Bermuda, to defend colonists from Spanish attack. These efforts were especially critical during the first years of the war, from 1625 to 1626.14 But these resources were limited and colonists struggled to develop successful settlements.

Policing Trans-Imperial Subjects and the Examination of Simon Tuchin

13 Propositions [in the handwriting of Sir John Coke] for incorporating a company for defense and protection of the West Indies, 14 April 1625, TNA SP 16/1/59. 14 August 1626, in J.V. Lyle, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of England, Volume 41, 1626 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1938), 216; 219-221; Petition of John Preen, Capt. of the Peter and John, bound for Virginia, to the Privy Council, September 1626, TNA CO 1/4/14.

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In the months following England’s declaration of war against Spain, James and his government further narrowed channels of information between England and the colonies.

James could not be certain that Philip IV would not attack England’s Atlantic territories.

As the oldest settlements with the greatest potential for trade, Virginia and Bermuda were the most likely targets and indeed, both colonies were vulnerable. Virginia was still recovering from the devastation of the 1622 massacre and lacked strong physical defenses.

Bermuda was well-fortified, but was still left exposed to a seaborne attack from Spanish ships en route to and from the West Indies. The Jacobean and Caroline governments were most concerned about an attack on Virginia, the largest English colony. Therefore, while scrambling to protect the colonies, James, and shortly thereafter Charles, relied on intelligence capabilities and vigilance on the ground to both gather and protect imperial knowledge. The case of Simon Tuchin demonstrates the success of collaborative self- policing in order to protect critical imperial knowledge from falling into Spanish hands.

In the fall of 1624, Simon Tuchin, an English subject living in St. Malo in Brittany, arrived in Virginia on the ship the Due Return, eager to collect the tobacco his brother, the ship’s deceased captain, had arranged to buy. As an unapologetic Catholic, Tuchin quickly drew suspicion from multiple Virginia colonists. They complained to authorities that

Tuchin was seen surveying the rivers and harbors of Virginia for Spanish intelligence and had plans to sail to the West Indies. The General Court deposed Tuchin and heard the testimony of complaining witnesses. After deliberation, the Court ordered Tuchin to leave

Virginia having determined that he was “dangerous to the colony.”15 Tuchin was sent back to England where, on arrival, clerks of the Privy Council examined him further.

15 Gov. Sir Francis Wyatt and Council of Virginia to the Earl of Southampton and Council and Company of Virginia, 10 January 1625, TNA CO 1/3/34.

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Tuchin’s examination and the testimony against him suggests that to colonists and

Virginia authorities, Tuchin failed to demonstrate that he was a suitable colonial subject.

He had many marks against him: he was an unapologetic Catholic of ill-repute and had traded in Spain. Furthermore, the accusation that Tuchin intended to sail to the West Indies made his voyage illegal. In order to prevent interloping and customs evasion, all ships were commanded to sail directly from colony to metropole.16 Preventing English ships and subjects from making unauthorized journeys to the multinational, entangled space of the

West Indies, where contraband trade thrived, was paramount to the protection of England’s empire.17

Tuchin had first sailed for Virginia under the command of his brother Edmund, master of the ship the Due Return.18 Edmund had been granted permission to travel to

Virginia by the failing Virginia Company. During the journey Edmund died, leaving Simon as the ship’s master. Consequently, while Edmund possessed the required authorization to trade in Virginia, and was acquainted with merchants there, his brother Simon was a stranger. This lack of familiarity is perhaps why colonists quickly reported him. The

General Court in Virginia immediately launched an investigation into Tuchin’s motives and movements. Members of the court examined witnesses who testified to Tuchin’s suspect background, activity and behavior in the colony, and his intention to travel from

Virginia to the West Indies.

16 James I, A Proclamation Concerning Tobacco (London, 1624). STC 1876:08. 17 Eliga Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery,” The American Historical Review 12.3 (2007): 764-786. 18 Edmund Tuchin, according to Colonial State Papers or Captain Anthony Tuchin in CSP domestic.

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The testimony against him, taken in late November 1624 at the General Court in

Jamestown presents a fairly consistent portrait of an unlikeable and untrustworthy man.

Therefore, the Court’s first priority was to determine Tuchin’s national loyalties. Three men testified that Tuchin had been banished from England and/or Ireland.19 While first identified as an Irishman, Tuchin was more likely, as he claimed in his testimony, an

Englishman. In practice however, he appears to have fashioned himself as originating from whichever nation most suited his circumstance. This issue became central to Tuchin’s case with the Privy Council.

The second charge brought by deponents in Virginia was the instability of Tuchin’s familial and kinship networks. Edward Peppret testified that Tuchin said, “I come of a good kindred, I dare not show my face where I was born, I care not if all my kindred were hanged.” George Rugless corroborated Peppret’s statement.20 Tuchin’s testimony given to the clerks of the Privy Council neither confirmed nor corroborated these accusations.

Tuchin did show concern for his nuclear family when he later petitioned for his release in order to care for his wife and children.21

These questions of national origin and character were enough to warrant his motivations as suspicious. Tuchin’s loose lips about his own background were problematic.

As the records of the General Court suggest, reputation and trustworthiness were central to belonging in the colony. Colonists were fearful of attacks from Spain and Powhatans and, in a context where all men were expected to protect the colony, each colonist needed to adhere to the standards of conduct and ethics. Those who failed to meet these expectations

19 3 January 1624, in H.R. McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of the Council and General Court of Virginia, 1622-1632, 1670-1676 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1924), 40. 20 30 November 1624, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 34. 21 Petition of Simon Tuchin to the Council, 4 June 1625, TNA SP 16/3 f. 45.

247 threatened the order and cohesion on which the colony’s survival depended. Each resident of the colony closely observed their neighbors and willingly testified against each other in court. Matters such as drunkenness, domestic abuse, and slanderous speech were frequently heard by the General Court.22 By his willingness to forgo national and personal loyalties,

Tuchin failed the litmus test for admission into Virginia.

Tuchin’s movements in Virginia cast further suspicion on his motives. Peppret testified that he had seen Tuchin surveying the territory, claiming he “hath been very diligent in founding of this River as also in inquiring after the Channels of other Rivers within the bay.”23 Considering Tuchin’s Catholicism and prior experience in the Spanish trade, the Court was concerned that Tuchin would share or sell this information to Spanish agents. These claims were compounded by testimony that Tuchin planned to sail to the

Spanish West Indies. This charge, sworn by Peppret and Rugless, made him especially dangerous. First, if this was true, Tuchin was, as we have seen, in violation of the laws of

England. Tuchin’s intention to sail to the West Indies suggests that he was an interloper, interested in selling his merchandise, mostly tobacco, to subjects of other European states.

Furthermore, if the claim that Tuchin both possessed surveillance about Virginia and intended to sail to the West Indies was true, he could not be allowed to leave Virginia freely. The West Indies was still principally Spanish territory and, if he had any Spanish sympathies, he would there find occasion to share his information about Virginia.

Considering the gravity of these charges, the Virginia Court sent notice of the testimony they gathered to the Privy Council as well as their intention to send Tuchin back to England for further examination.

22 See McIlwaine, ed., Minutes. 23 30 November 1624, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 33-34.

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Once in England, Tuchin was examined by the clerks of the Privy Council, Sir

William Beecher and John Dickenson. His testimony provides an interesting account of his colorful Atlantic career. Tuchin was forthright about the charges laid against him, providing a fairly detailed account of his activities and movements over the past few years.

He confessed to traversing the Mediterranean and Atlantic with religious and national loyalties worrisome to English authorities. As a result, Tuchin’s testimony only further damaged his cause.

Tuchin confessed that he was a Roman Catholic “and hath been so these twenty years.” During this time he claimed to have “for the most part frequented the Seas, and made sundry voyages into the Dominions of Spain and Portugal.” He admitted to being banished out of Ireland six years earlier for refusing to take the Oath of Allegiance, pledging loyalty to the Crown (specifically above the Pope), “but denieth that he was charged with any other crime.” From Ireland he moved with his family to St. Malo, where he claimed to have worked for some time as a brewer “until he did undertake this

Voyage.”24

With his brother Edmund, master of the Due Return, Tuchin departed from St. Malo with a crew of sailors from England, Guernsey, and Jersey, all whom Tuchin claimed were

Protestants. They first sailed to Ireland, where Edmund Tuchin died, leaving Simon in command of the ship. From Ireland, the Due Return sailed to Madeira, where the crew unloaded the rest of the cargo, and freighted the ship with wines and sugar. From Madeira they sailed to the West Indies, stopping at the island of Dominica, where Tuchin claimed they “bartered with diverse Indians for Victuals, but denieth that he neither saw nor spake

24 Examination of Simon Tuchin, May 1625, TNA SP 16/2 f. 240.

249 with any Spaniards.” Finally, from Dominica, Tuchin sailed to Virginia. Tuchin attempted to explain his movements there. He confessed that once in Virginia he did “sound the river” and “enquire as diligently as he could of the depth and situation of the other out-lets in case he should be driven by tempest to seek out any other harbor.” He denied ever leaving his ship to further survey the land and rivers.

To make matters worse for himself, throughout his testimony, Tuchin confessed to using his religion and multinational networks to secure protection and gain greater access to and protection of Atlantic resources. Before leaving St. Malo, he requested from the

Prior of the English Benedictines to “depend on the Spanish Benedictines” for letters of testimony confirming that he was a Roman Catholic “and had suffered much for his

Religion.” The letters also stated that Tuchin undertook “this Voyage to Virginia only for traffic sake, without any intension of wrong to the King of Spain’s Countries or Subjects.”

He claimed the Benedictine’s letters served as “a Commendation and Protection in case the

Ship should be taken by the Spaniards.” He testified that apart from his brother, he did not acquaint any other merchants with the letters. However, after being “pressed” further,

Tuchin confessed “that there was no probability that he should conceal these letters from the Merchants if he meant to make any use of them to their advantage.”25 In addition to the

Benedictine letters, Tuchin also confessed that while in Ireland he procured a certificate from “diverse Priests” stating “that he was not banished for Treason, but for the Catholic

Religion.” Tuchin claimed that “he doth not remember, whether he had the said Certificate

25 Tuchin also later clarified, “he saith that recalling himself better to mind he doth remember that in the Island of Madera he did acquaint one John le Mayne, a French-man of St. Malo brother in law to one of the adventurers, and Factor of the said Ship, with the said letters.” “The Answer of Simon Tuchin, being examined before Sir William Becher knight; and John Dickenson Esquire, Clerks of the Council,” May 1625, TNA SP 16/2 f. 240.

250 with him in the Ship.” Tuchin’s inconsistent testimony regarding these certificates worried the clerks. Sailing under English flags with Catholic (and perhaps Spanish) letters was not only illegal, but also signaled his willingness to assume flexible identities and loyalties to further his own interests.

The clerks also interrogated Tuchin about his past experience as a Spanish trader while residing in St. Malo. While Tuchin spoke freely about his merchant activities, he denied “that he did ever serve the king of Spain.” But Tuchin’s statement conflicted with testimony taken in the Virginia General Court. John Philip, a man the clerks described as

“a Negro Christened,” testified that Tuchin had been employed from La Mamora, present day Mehdya, to “fetch the ransom of a Spanish lady.”26 Philip claimed that while on a ship with Sir Henry Mainwaring, they captured a Spanish ship near Cape St. Mary, carrying a

Spanish lady and “diverse others.” They brought the ship to La Mamora, where they met

Tuchin, who had arrived on a small boat. Tuchin conferred with the Spaniards held for ransom, and then departed for Lisbon to fetch money for the lady’s ransom, which Philip claimed “accordingly he performed.” This testimony provided further evidence of Tuchin’s willingness to serve many masters and to do so simultaneously.

In the clerks’ examination, Tuchin denied “that he was employed from La Mamora, to fetch the ransom of a Spanish Lady.” Without further evidence, it was difficult to determine the legitimacy of this charge. It is incredibly fortuitous that Philip, now a resident

(and likely an indentured servant) in Virginia would have encountered Tuchin in these unique circumstances in Morocco. But Philip’s service to Mainwaring would have brought him to diverse places. The claim that Tuchin was in La Mamora as a servant of Spanish

26 Philip is identified in his testimony as a “negro christened in England twelve years since,” 30 November 1624, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 33.

251 masters is remarkable testimony that provided damning evidence of Tuchin’s willingness to serve a foreign, enemy master. Tuchin appears to have traversed the Mediterranean and

Atlantic with ease, shifting his identity based on his orders and purpose.

Considering Tuchin’s testimony and the testimony taken in Virginia, the clerks informed the Privy Council that they “rest unsatisfied” with the allegations. They were particularly troubled by the certificates Tuchin carried from the Benedictines in St. Malo and the priests in Ireland. Beecher and Dickenson were concerned that the letters “might well serve for a commendation to himself and for his particular benefit, if his intention were to put his person or peradventure the Shipp into the hands of the Spaniards in the

West Indies, which is not altogether free from suspicion considering the banishment and other conditions of the said Tuchin.”27 Beecher and Dickenson were far more concerned with Tuchin’s intended involvement in the interloping trade. They believed the certificates he carried served this interest ahead of espionage. They referred the case back to the

Council for “[their] Lordships graver Judgements.”28 In June, Tuchin petitioned the

Council for his release.29 While claiming that he was imprisoned on “misinformation,” he agreed never to return to Virginia.

Considering Tuchin’s testimony, barring him from the colonies was in the interest of the security of England’s empire. Quick to identify first as a Catholic, before any nation, in order to gain protection and advantage in Atlantic waters, made him an unfit imperial subject. According to the testimony against him, Tuchin was more likely an interloper than a spy, eager to thwart England’s trade laws by returning to the West Indies. In the context

27 Sir William Becher and John Dickenson, Clerks of the Council, to the Council, May 1625, TNA SP 16/2 f. 329. 28 Ibid. 29 Petition of Simon Tuchin to the Council, 4 June 1625, TNA SP 16/3 f. 45.

252 of the Anglo-Spanish War, men like Tuchin required close monitoring. During preparations for the Cádiz expedition, Crown and Council were particularly anxious about Spanish sympathizers. Men on the ground in Virginia were instructed to be extra vigilant of suspicious newcomers and outsiders. Tuchin clearly stood out as a suspicious and perhaps

“dangerous” character.

The Frigate of the Black Bess of Flushing

Not long after Tuchin was sent back to England, another ship arrived to Virginia under suspicious circumstances. In July 1625, a leaky frigate with a crew of fifteen men landed on its shores. Apart from a Portuguese pilot, most of the men on board were English.

But the conditions under which they arrived were troubling to colonial authorities. The sailors arrived without license to sail in Atlantic waters with a pilot of an enemy state. They claimed to have abandoned a Dutch Man of War, the Black Bess, after their leader, one

Captain Powell, tried to turn them into pirates. The crew was held on suspicion of piracy while they were interrogated and deposed.

Like Tuchin, the arrival of these sailors posed a clear threat to the colony’s security.

They arrived to Virginia during preparation for the Cádiz Expedition piloted by a Spanish imperial subject, the Portuguese pilot. Considering this timing, the crew was immediately placed under suspicion as enemy agents. Like Tuchin, the sailors of the Black Bess had consorted with Spanish “enemies,” traversed the murky extra-national West Indian waters, and lacked the documentation required to enter Virginia. Virginia authorities needed to determine whether these sailors were seditious or loyal English subjects. Narrowing information channels meant prohibiting suspicious outsiders from access to any

253 intelligence that could be gained by visiting Virginia. The General Court’s inquiry was an expedient practice for rooting out intruders.

The testimony of the crew members, taken on July 21, 1625, was fairly consistent.

The sailors claimed to have sailed from Flushing with letters of marque from the Dutch

Republic under Captain Powell of the Black Bess. From Flushing they sailed to the West

Indies where Powell deprived them of sustenance and tried to turn them into pirates. The men escaped on one of the frigates and tried to navigate home. They made it to Florida, where they exchanged the cargo of another frigate they had taken for a pilot on a Spanish ship, who brought them to Virginia.30

With the charge of piracy, the Virginia General Court first sought to determine the origin and command of the men aboard the frigate. The crew claimed that when they abandoned Powell they left behind letters of marque that would have permitted them, as

Englishmen, to sail on a Dutch privateering vessel. These sailors knew that in order to establish legitimacy as sailors with authorized commissions, and not pirates who had overthrown their captain, it was imperative to convince the Court that they were well- informed about Powell’s commission. The first deponent, William Barnes, of Fawley, testified that he “was acquainted that she was a man of war,” but decided to join the [Black

Bess] on the recommendation of Captain Earlsfied who “had seen and perused [Powell’s]

Commission from the States & found it to be sufficient.”31 The second examinant, William

Endrye of “Seversam,” testified that he was shipped at Flushing to Captain Jones “and that he heard Captain Powell’s Commission read…at the Isle of Wight.”32 Testifying that they

30 Helen Josephine Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction in the Seventeenth Century (London: Royal Empire Society, 1931), 71. 31 Examinations taken the twentieth of July 1625, 20 July 1625, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 66. 32 Ibid., 67.

254 had either seen or heard the commission read, the sailors hoped to establish that they were legally permitted to sail in Atlantic waters.

The Court also required that the deponents recount their movements in the West

Indies. Barnes described how the crew sailed around for weeks hoping “to meet with some prize.” Finally, in the “bay of Marycaw they took [a] frigate with a shallop.”33 Barnes stated that Captain Powell put some of the men in the frigate “to man her” for a fortnight.34 This junction was where they planned the mutiny. Barnes testified that “divers of the Company being put to hard allowance, and bad usage by Captain Powell, and [were] required by him to set their hands to Certain Articles that they should go any way he commanded them and to fight against any, either friend, or foe.” By framing the crew’s mutiny as a response to

Powell’s orders that they serve as pirates and submit to an oath that conflicted with their

Oaths of Allegiance as subjects of the king, Barnes hoped to demonstrate his legitimacy as a loyal English subject. William Endrye corroborated Barnes’s testimony, claiming that

Powell “cutting short their allowance and require[ed] them to sign to Certain Articles,

(among which) one was that they should fight against any whether they were friend or foe.”35 Another deponent, Andrew Roe, also testified that Captain Powell “required them to set their hands to Certain Articles.”

The shared language of this testimony suggests that some of it was pre-rehearsed.

All three men phrased Powell’s command as having “set their hands to Certain Articles” and two described his command to “fight against any, either friend, or foe.” While many

33 A large, heavy boat, fitted with one or more masts and carrying fore-and-aft or lug sails and sometimes furnished with guns; a sloop. "shallop | shalloop, n.". OED Online. September 2015. Oxford University Press. 34 20 July 1625, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 67. 35 Ibid.

255 other aspects of the crew’s testimony share a general narrative, their language is mostly unique. By preparing this crucial part of their testimony, the crew hoped to prove their trustworthiness as loyal English subjects.

The crew testified that after Powell’s attempt to turn them into pirates, they

“resolved for to ship themselves into the frigate and so to get home for their Country.”

Barnes claimed that they coerced Captain Jones to “go with them and be their Captain” by threatening him with “force” and reminding him that “he had shipped many of them and was the occasion they came to so great misery.” Barnes further testified that “Captain

Powell knew of their coming away and that they parted from him in the day time.” Barnes testified that they were unable to sail for England “by reason that Captain Jones was unacquainted in those parts and could not get free of the Islands.”36 Barnes claimed that they left Powell sometime in late January.

Since Barnes’s timeline showed that they left the company of the Black Bess in

January, but did not arrive to Virginia until July, the Court was interested to know how they spent time without letters, and in particular, their relationship to the foreign nationals they encountered. The Court was especially concerned to determine if they had been compromised by any Spanish agents. The sailors’ testimony about these encounters suggests that they were well-aware of how problematic the Portuguese pilot was to their case. Barnes clearly specified that they took him on only out of desperation, “because they had long led up and down, and could not get clear.”37 The crew hoped he could take them directly to England, but “not being sufficiently victualed….They resolved to shape their

36 Ibid. 37 Ibid.

256

Course for Virginia.”38 Endrye claimed “they could not recover their men nor putt the

Portugal ashore, whom they were forced to take in to be a Pilot for to bring them out of the

Islands.” By describing the ship’s condition as so desperate that they were “forced” to take the Portuguese pilot, Endrye hoped to distance himself from the Spanish subject.

On July 21, after much deliberation, the Court and Council resolved the fate of the crew.39 They ordered that they be placed as servants, “sent up to James City…[t]o be disposed of by the Governor and Council to such places in the Colony as shall think fit.”40

The Portuguese pilot was given a specific placement, “sent up to that neck of land unto Mr.

Luke Boyse, there to abide…until further order.”41 On September 19, the Council ordered that Captain Bass deliver “some Clothes to the Portugal out of Captain Jones” who had died shortly after he arrived to Virginia.”42

While their initial testimony was fairly consistent, it seems that sometime after

Captain Jones’s death, the sailors’ story began to fall apart. Authorities in Virginia wrote to Charles I’s Commission for Virginia for advice. They cast doubt on Captain Jones’s commission from the Dutch Republic, describing it as “pretended.” They explained that after the case was resolved, “rumors” circulated “contrary to their first examinations” including “mutinies & disorders committed by Jones and some of his Company against

Captain Powell.” Virginia authorities asked the Commissioners to investigate the ship’s commission and any other reports of its voyage, in order to “have more light from England or the Low Countries, according to which, we may the better know how to proceed.” They

38 Ibid. 39 Crump, Colonial Admiralty Jurisdiction, 71. 40 21 July 1625, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 69. 41 Ibid. 42 19 September 1625, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 71.

257 also requested further advice for how to handle the Portuguese pilot “who seems to be expert in all places upon the Coast of the West Indies.” They informed the Council that they would await their advice for “how to dispose of” the sailors.43

Considering the charges against them, the former crew of the Black Bess received a light sentence. They were suspected pirates, who had admitted to abandoning their captain and commission. Since captains held the same power on ships as governors held in land, these actions demonstrated a questionable relationship to authority. If they were not pirates, as the court determined, they had still sailed without license in the West Indies, encountering and bringing with them, a Spanish subject. This multinational space, frequented by suspicious characters engaged in illicit trade, could quickly turn a privateer into a pirate. It is therefore surprising that they were allowed to stay in Virginia, even as servants. It is unclear whether their conditions changed after reports circulated about the inquiry, but a lack of documentation suggests that it did not. This sentence may also derive from their good behavior in Virginia. Unlike Tuchin, whose activities while in the colony were suspicious, all of the sailors’ indiscretions occurred outside of Virginia. Once in

Virginia, according the Court records, the sailors were compliant and repentant.

Despite the differences in their sentences, as the examples of Simon Tuchin and the crew of the Black Bess frigate demonstrate, colonists considered all unexpected arrivals in

Virginia to be suspicious. While all men were English, and sailed under commissions authorized by England, or its ally, the Dutch Republic, the Virginia General Court rigorously examined all suspicious circumstances. The sailors’ time in the West Indies,

43 Governor and Council in Virginia, Letter to the Commissioners for Virginia, 4 January 1626, in Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London: Volume IV (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935), 569.

258 which was principally Spanish territory, required the Court to determine if they were interlopers. Even if the men arrived in these waters with proper letters and authorization, there was the fear that their loyalties had been compromised. With the daily expectation of an attack from Spain, Virginia authorities considered these subjects especially dangerous.

Like Tuchin, the sailors of the Black Bess had consorted with Spanish “enemies,” traversed the murky extra-national West Indian waters, and lacked the documentation required to enter Virginia.

While the suspicious circumstances around the crew of the Black Bess and Simon

Tuchin’s character clearly merited a full investigation, Virginia authorities also questioned familiar ships with inadequate documentation. On December 20, 1625, another ship from

Flushing, the Flyinge Harte, “set out” by Virginia Company adventurers arrived, having

“brought no Commission with them.” Familiar with the adventurers and finding “not any willful error or neglect” the Council offered them “the privilege due to Adventurers.”

However, they asked the Privy Council to “to take into your Considerations and according to your grave wisdoms to prevent the like inconveniences hereafter, and to give us instructions if the like case should happen at any time, What one our parts is to be done.”44

In their efforts to protect colonists, and ensure full compliance with the laws of England and the directives of the Privy Council, authorities in Virginia hoped to obtain specific protocol for each ship arriving to the colony without complete license. As the next chapter will demonstrate, in the late 1620s and 1630s, Charles and his Privy Council enacted strict measures to ensure that each ship, and all passengers onboard, obtained complete authorization before both leaving England and entering the colonies.

44 Governor and Council in Virginia to the Commissioners for Virginia, 4 January 1626, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 567-568.

259

Following the Cádiz Expedition, authorities in Virginia, anxious about an imminent attack from Spain and the Powhatan Indians, also asked the Privy Council to send supplies to augment their defenses. In January 1626, the governor of Virginia asked the

Commissioners for Virginia to send them materials for fortification, describing their present state as “utterly unfortified against a foreign Enemy, which we are now always to expect…[and] our store of powder and munition (of late so scantily supplied) is so extreme[ly] short.” Their defenses were not only insufficient for an attack from Spain, but were also “not sufficient to secure our Plantations against our Domestic Enemies much less for defense against Invasion, prosecution against the Treacherous Savages.”45 Furthermore, on April 6, 1626, the governor and Council in Virginia asked that the Privy Council send

“no less” that five hundred soldiers, along with the necessary weapons and supplies, to “be yearly sent over for certain years.” These soldiers would enable “great and important work…the surprising the Indians, discoveries by sea and land, [and] fortification against a foreign Enemy.”46 The Virginia Council ordered strict and thorough protocols in the event of an attack. The “daily expectation” of enemy attack required hypervigilance and the protection of information. While war with Spain lasted until 1630, the threat from Spain mitigated over time. After a reprisal for Cádiz failed to materialize, the authorities in

Virginia turned their attention to their other “enemy:” the Powhatan Indians.

The Enemy from Within

45 Ibid., 568. 46 Governor and Council in Virginia to Privy Council, 6 April 1626, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 572.

260

On orders from the Crown, Virginia authorities ordered strict protocols to protect

English settlements from Powhatan attacks during the Second Anglo-Powhatan War. Since the colony’s inception, the possibility of an attack from Spain was neither the single nor the greatest threat to the Virginia colony and its English inhabitants. From the first days of

England’s invasion of Virginia, colonists’ relations with the Powhatans were complicated.

As Ian Steele notes, both the English and Powhatan empires were expanding.47 Chief

Powhatan was first confident he could eliminate the English because his people outnumbered the colonists 140 to 1.48 But unsure of their motives, or if they intended to stay, he also engaged in diplomacy.49

Following the 1622 massacre, the government in Virginia declared a state of war against the Powhatan Indians. Colonial forces responded by plundering Powhatan villages and burning their cornfields. Hoping to end the conflict, chief Opechancanough sued for peace in 1623. He had hoped that the massacre would end the English invasion, but instead, as Steele notes, “the massacre became the justification that clarified and accelerated the process.”50 Colonists agreed to meet to discuss the terms of a settlement, but the meeting was a ruse to attack the Powhatans in retaliation for the massacre. Over the next few years, colonists continued to raid cornfields and assault villages and hunting groups, while

Opechancanough assembled forces composed of allied groups.

47 Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 37. 48 Steele, Warpaths, 40. 49 Martin H. Quitt notes that Powhatan took the absence of women as evidence that the English did not plan to stay permanently in Virginia, Quitt, “Trade and Acculturation at Jamestown, 1607-1609: The Limits of Understanding,” William and Mary Quarterly 52.2 (1995): 234-235. 50 Steele, Warpaths, 47.

261

War with the Powhatans was unlike a European war; it consisted of a series of attacks against crop stores and villages, not pitched battles between organized military units. Powhatan forces met attacks by the colonists with punctuated reprisals. Frederic

Gleach describes the goals of these attacks as either preemptive or reprisals, the purpose of which was revenge instead of conquest.51 Perhaps because they were unfamiliar with this type of warfare, colonists consistently miscalculated and underestimated the military strength of Powhatan forces, routinely working against their own self-interest. 52 While dependent on Powhatans for much of their food, they attempted to starve out the Powhatans by preventing successful planting and destroying fields of crops.53 Furthermore, this prolonged war of punctuated attacks heightened antipathy towards the Powhatans, creating a pan-Indian anxiety that ruined potential trading partnerships.

Powhatan diplomacy was similarly erratic. It frequently vacillated between violence and coexistence with English colonists.54 The fledgling colony was at first a small threat to Powhatan; he tried to incorporate it as a subordinate group within his chiefdom.55

Captain John Smith’s experience in Powhatan’s captivity reveals this policy: when he was released he claimed that chief Powhatan “proclaimed me a werowanes.”56 But once it

51 Frederic W. Gleach, Powhatan's World and Colonial Virginia: A Conflict of Cultures (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 161. 52 Karen Kupperman, Settling with the Indians: the Meeting of English and Indian Cultures in America, 1580-1640 (Totawa, N.J.: Rowan & Littlefield, 1980), 179. 53 Gleach, Powhatan's World, 161. 54James D. Rice, “Escape from Tsenacommacah: Chesapeake Algonquians and the Powhatan Menace,” The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550-1624 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 120. 55 Rice, “Escape from Tsenacommacah,” 120. 56 “A chief of the Indians of Virginia and Maryland in early colonial days,” in "werowance, n."OED Online. June 2015. Oxford University Press; “The exchange of a Christian for a Salvage,” in John Smith, Proceedings of the English Colonie in Virginia (London, 1612).

262 became clear that the English were not leaving, Powhatan’s attitudes and policies towards

English colonists changed.57

But while the Privy Council and colonial authorities declared the “Indians” to be enemies, they understood that they still needed Algonquians as partners, go-betweens, and informants. Beginning in 1608, young colonists were sent to live with Powhatans in order to train as interpreters and emissaries. Thomas Savage was the first young man to participate in the Anglo-Powhatan exchange.58 Smith described Savage as well-loved by the Powhatans, particularly by Pocahontas and her brother. Savage was a valuable emissary who proved critical in securing a prisoner exchange in May 1608. Colonial leaders also sent Henry Spelman to live with the Powhatans in 1609. Smith first took Spelman to broker a peace between Parahunt, the grown son of Pocahontas and werowance of several villages near Jamestown, and a group of colonists residing nearby.59 Over the next fourteen years,

Spelman’s experience as an emissary would help him to cultivate successful trading relationships that proved crucial to colonists during times of hardship.

Colonial authorities assigned a third young colonist, Robert Poole, to be an interpreter for the Indians in 1614. He was instructed to broker peace between chief

Opechancanough and the Pamunkeys. Poole was an ambitious agent, acutely aware of the potential power he held as an intelligence broker. After the massacre, Poole used his influence to delay the release of hostages to further his own agenda. Frederick Fausz suggests that in order to maintain his role as the key negotiator for Anglo-Indian relations,

57 Quitt, “Trade and Acculturation,” 234-235. 58 Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 77. 59 J. Frederick Fausz, “Middlemen in Peace and War: Virginia’s Earliest Indian Interpreters, 1608-1632” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 95.1 (1987): 45.

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Poole perpetuated colonists’ belief in “native treachery” by “increasing misunderstanding between the cultures.”60 Agents like Poole complicated an already strained diplomatic relationship characterized by mutual misunderstanding.

The Indian allies of English colonists were also important brokers in the Anglo-

Powhatan relationship. As described in chapter two, in the 1622 massacre, the English identified two heroic allies who prevented the Jamestown colonists from being slaughtered.

The first, Chauco, only reappears in the records in early 1623, when he returned to

Jamestown as an emissary of the “great king” with a message that the king hoped to end the bloodshed.61 The other hero, only identified as “an Indian belonging to one Perry,” the colonists credited with saving the Jamestown inhabitants. The young man lived with

Richard Pace, with whom he lived, described as a father-son relationship, suggests that some bonds forged between Indians and colonists were lasting and strong.62

The experiences and activities of English go-betweens are easily recoverable, captured in John Smith’s works and recorded in the proceedings of the Virginia Council and the General Court.63 Recovering the experiences and activities of their Algonquian counterparts is much more difficult. Like “Perry’s Indian boy” in the same sources,

Algonquian go-betweens were often unidentified by name, referred to simply as “an Indian we trust.” Members of the Virginia Council recognized the importance of maintaining relationships that could yield meaningful intelligence, but their general mistrust of

Amerindians likely alienated potential further agents and allies. Thus, while prohibiting

60 Fausz, “Middlemen in Peace and War,” 59. 61 Kupperman, Settling with the Indians, 196. 62 Ibid. 63 John Smith, The Generall Historie, in The Complete Works of Captain John Smith (1580- 1631), in Three Volumes, Volume II, ed. Philip L. Barbour (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).

264 most colonists from employing or consorting with Algonquians, the Council also employed specific traders to cultivate and maintain relations with potential informants and interpreters.

This relationship was mired with complications from English stereotypes. For example, the Powhatans and other Algnquian groups taught the colonists “pidgins” in order to communicate more effectively, but colonists like Smith, mistook this as evidence that their language was simple.64 Considering Powhatan’s shrewd and adept diplomacy, it is likely that some Powhatan go-betweens were planted agents, and just as likely that like

Robert Poole, these go-betweens provided intelligence in order to further their own agendas. These misunderstandings often led the English colonists to underestimate the political and military acumen of their Powhatan neighbors.

The Virginia government’s attempts to satisfy these competing yet interdependent agendas resulted in policies that were muddled and contradictory. This tension was especially evident in the aftermath of the massacre. On January 20, 1623, the Council in

Virginia wrote to the Virginia Company about its strategy to contend with the Powhatan threat. “By conference of former experiences with those of ours upon the Savages,” the

Council described, “it is most apparent that they are an enemy not suddenly to be destroyed with the sword that by reason of their swiftness of foot, and advantages of the wood, to which upon all our assault they retire.” Without military forces to mount a successful counter-attack and with fear of future reprisals, the Council hoped “by the way of starving and all other means that we can possibly devise we will constantly pursue their extirpation.”

Through punctuated attacks, the Council boasted, “Computation and Confession of the

64 Kupperman, Indians and English, 86.

265

Indians themselves we have slain more of them this year, then hath been slain before since the beginning of the Colony.”65

This letter suggests that the Powhatan strategy of punctuated attacks, coupled with a far superior knowledge of the land and “advantages of the wood,” posed a serious threat to the Virginia colonists. Not knowing when or from where an attack would be launched caused considerable anxiety among colonists. The fear on the ground was palpable. In

March 1623, colonist Richard Frethorne wrote a letter to his mother and father, describing how “people cry out day, and night, Oh that they were in England without their limbs and not care to lose any limb to be in England again, yes though they never beg from door to door, for we live in fear of the Enemy every hour.”66 As colonists learned from the massacre, their only hope for avoiding their own “extirpation” was by acquiring intelligence and warning from Algonquian collaborators and go-betweens.

In the same letter to Virginia authorities, the Council also reproached the

Company’s role in promoting an Anglo-Powhatan relationship that ultimately led to the massacre. But the Virginia Council reminded the Company their instructions “to win the

Indians to us by [a] kind entertaining them in our houses and if it were possible to [c]ohabit with us.” These instructions had put the Virginia Council in an “impossible” place to effectively “watch and ward to secure us against secret Enemies that live promiscuously amongst us, and are harbored in our bosoms, all Histories and your own Discourse may

Sufficiently inform you.”67 This general Indian anxiety about “secret [e]nemies” within

65 Council in Virginia to Virginia Company of London, 20 January 1623, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 10. 66 Richard Frethorne, letter to his father and mother, 20 March 1623, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 58. 67 Council in VA to VA Company of London, 20 January 1623, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 10.

266 worried colonial authorities that ordinary colonists would be unable to safely interact with their Chesapeake cohabitants. They also worried that through these exchanges, privileged intelligence could be revealed. Colonial authorities hoped that by restricting Anglo-

Powhatan contact to only trained captains and emissaries, they could prevent further attacks.

Fears of “secret [e]nemies” resulted in policies of segregation and alienation. The

Virginia Council in London frequently made proclamations prohibiting comingling between the English and Algonquians. For example, in July 1626, the Virginia Council ordered that a “strict proclamation be published there & through the whole Colony that no person whatsoever doe parlay or speak any words or make and signs or shows of parlay upon pain of death.” Furthermore, they proclaimed “if any man shall dare to parlay or speak to the enemy it shall be lawful for the Commander in Chief there to call a Marshall’s court

& doe present execution.”68 In September, the Court ordered that no colonist “within the limits of the first Southern Colony of Virginia, shall make use of or employ any Indian or keep them…upon the forfeiture of four hundred pound weight of tobacco for every

Indian.”69 The severity of punishments for consorting with or employing Algonquians reflected the Virginia government’s anxiety about the threat of attack. By de-incentivizing

Anglo-Indian relationships, the Council hoped to limit the information channels around the colonists and their settlements.

Fearful an attack was imminent, the Virginia Council and General Court routinely ordered the construction and maintenance of defenses throughout the colony. In October

1626, the General Court ordered that all “dwelling houses through the Colony be palisaded

68 13 January 1627, McIlwaine ed., Minutes, 135. 69 4 September 1626, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 111.

267 or paled about, defensible against the Indians to be done & finish[ed] before the first day of May next.”70 The Council was very worried about colonists wandering out of the defenses unaccompanied, ordering “[t]hat no man go or send abroad either upon fowling, fishing or otherwise whatsoever without a sufficient party of men well-armed and provided of munition, upon penalty of undergoing severe Censure of punishment by the Governor and Council.”71 Furthermore, the General Assembly ordered “that no man in the Colony go out to his work & labor without their arms & a Sentinel upon them.”72 The Council believed that these proscriptions were critical to ensuring the safety of the colonists. The rules for movements and behavior were very restrictive; the colony was on high alert.

While colonists were prohibited from employing or “parlaying” with their

Algonquian neighbors, certain men were given license to cultivate go-betweens and engage in trade. These men often had both military experience and former roles as emissaries and go-betweens. In May 1623, the governor authorized a commission to Gilbert Peppet “to go into any river, Creek, or harbors, within the bounds and limits of this Colony, there to trade with the Savages for Corn, or any other Commodities they can afford them.”73 In January

1624, the Virginia Council granted Captain Ralph Hamor, former secretary of the colony with many years of experience negotiating Anglo-Powhatan diplomacy “full power and authority, to trade, in any River, or Rivers within the Bay, either upon pledge, if the Savages shall require it, or otherwise.”74 In July 1626, the Council granted a commission to Captain

70 13 October 1626, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 120. 71 7-8 July 1626, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 106. 72 Ibid. 73 Governor in Virginia, Commission to Gilbert Peppet, 12 May 1623, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 189. 74 19 January 1624, the Virginia Council, Commission to Captain Ralph Hamor, in Kingsbury, ed., Records, 448.

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John Stone “to trade with those Indians on the Eastern Shore which Captain Epps shall inform him to be our friend, either for Corn furs or any other Commodities.”75

Continuing the trade in these goods was critical to the success of the colony.

Prohibiting relations between colonists and their Powhatan neighbors, the Council hoped improving trade relations with those farther afield, whose relationships were less tense, might alleviate the commercial strain of the Anglo-Powhatan War. Furthermore, cultivating relationships with other Chesapeake chiefdoms could (as they had in the past) aid in their defense against the Powhatans. Through these commissions, the Council hoped to establish new trading powers, and by granting authorization to those with military backgrounds, they also hoped to reduce the chances of unwanted violent encounters.

In September 1626, William Claiborne proposed a plan to train a group of

Algonquians as go-betweens to improve the colonists’ safety against Powhatan attacks.

Claiborne had arrived to Virginia in 1621 as the Virginia Company’s official surveyor for the colony.76 Following the massacre, the Council relied heavily on Claiborne’s knowledge of the land and the Powhatan people. He served on the Virginia Council of State in 1623 and as Secretary of State in 1625. Claiborne took advantage of fears of a Powhatan attack to further his own interests in establishing a lucrative fur trade with the Powhatans. He hired the boat-builder John Wilcox to build a shallop for training Algonquians as guides to facilitate his monopoly.77 The Court found his plan “reasonable” and granted him “the terms of three years next ensuing the date hereof, have hold and enjoy all the benefit use

75 28 July 1626, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 104. 76 “Claiborne, William (bap. 1600, d. 1677),” John C. Appleby in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/53260 (accessed January 14, 2016). 77 Martha McCartney, Virginia Immigrants and Adventurers, 1607-1635: A Biographical Dictionary (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 2007), 205.

269 and profit of this his project or invention.” To aid him in his work, the Virginia Council gave Claiborne an “Indian lately come in unto us… for his better experience and trial or his invention.” Adhering to Crown protocol, the Council limited Anglo-Indian relationships to authorized agents like Claiborne.78

Although scant, records suggests that some relationships with Algonquian go- betweens yielded fruitful intelligence. For example, in April 1627, the Court received,

“some information now of late from other Indians, we understand there is a purpose in these Indians our enemies to make a general assault upon all of the Plantations this Spring.”

While the specific informants are not clearly identified, it is evident that despite the order that no colonists consort with the Powhatans, the government cultivated and maintained relationships with their Algonquian allies. But with few details, it is difficult to determine the motives of these informants and whether they were credible.

The Council, however, clearly took this report seriously. To prepare for this attack, the Council ordered “that all dwelling houses or plantations be strongly palisaded about and that all men doe carefully stand upon their guard, keep sentinel upon their workmen by day, and keep good watch by night, shutting and making safe the gates of their forts, not suffering any single man to straggle abroad.”79 The breadth and detail of these instructions suggests that the Council truly believed that a threat was imminent. They ordered colonists to prepare for attacks both from within and without. These were war time instructions. The time and labor required for this level of vigilance was substantial.

But a defensive strategy soon gave way to aggression. In July, the Court decided that they would destroy the Powhatans’ crop of corn in retribution for allegedly preparing

78 4 September 1626, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 111. 79 3 April 1626, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 147.

270 an attack. The Council’s plan was to “draw out parties from all our plantations & go upon the Indians & cut down their corn, and further we should set upon them all in one day…the first of August next.” Lieutenant Peppet warned the colonists, “sailing in the good ship called the Virgin into the Pamunky River & to ride there to put the Indians in expectation of our coming thither, whilst the aforesaid business in in doing.” Another attack would follow in October: “there be a sufficient number of men drawn out from all the plantations of the Colony to go to Pamunky or any other parts to take & spoil as much corn as they shall light on, & do what other hurt & damage to the Indians as they may.” The Powhatans met these attacks with reprisals. On September 17, a Powhatan shot and wounded one colonist.80

While the Council debated a retaliatory attack, they decided to “proceed on the same Course concerning the Indians which hath hitherto [been] held until we shall find better opportunity to set upon them.”81 In the meantime, they prohibited colonists in settlements bordering Powhatan lands from planting in territory “both inconvenient & dangerous.”82 On January 31, 1628, awaiting further attack, the Council insisted that the colonists “do strictly and precisely stand upon their guard.” Anyone who failed to keep their guard would be severely punished. Colonists were prohibited from speaking or consorting with any Indians “for the better safety of some of our weaker plantations.” All captains and commanders were to enforce the order that “no persons or planters doe work without sufficient force of men” that “none doe go abroad without sufficient parties” and that “they do severely punish such as shall go from their plantations or houses to other

80 17 September 1627, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 153. 81 Undated, May-September 1628, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 174. 82 13 October 1627, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, a group of colonists want to start a colony in a place “as may be both inconvenient & dangerous” are not permitted to plant there.

271 places without their Arms about them.” Authorities also ordered colonists not kill any

Powhatans until February 20 [presumably when they planned a coordinated attack], after

“that time to esteem them utter Enemies and to take the best advantages they can against them.” They kept colonists well-informed of their orders “so often reiterated and published.”83

In April, after Powhatans killed five colonists, the Council sent “one of the Indians now remaining with us” to the Powhatan “great King” to communicate an Anglo-Powhatan treaty. Restating their current position “that thereas by the last treaty of peace it was agreed on” that none of the Powhatans “should come to any of our plantations or houses nor call or Parlay with our men,” the Council added a diplomatic clause. They stated “[i]f any should come about special business from the great king they should come to the Governor and in other places to the Commander only and that they should steal nothing from us, nor kill or hurt our Cattle among other diverse other things contained in the said treaty.”84

Perhaps intended to protect colonists and their property, this amendment to the treaty contained a necessary provision that allowed for communication in case a diplomatic solution could be offered.

Pan-Indian Anxiety

This continued state of war, characterized by a constant fear of Powhatan attacks, heightened the fear of outside “others.” This anxiety is best illustrated in the horrific case of a group of Caribs brought to Virginia by an English trader, Captain Samson, in October

1627. As non-subjects with West Indian origins linked to the Powhatans by a pan-Indian

83 31 January 1628, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 184-5. 84 April 1629, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 198.

272 anxiety, these Caribs were the casualties of a paranoia brought about rigorous self-policing policies and xenophobia.

Samson arrived in Virginia hoping to sell his Carib captives for a profit. But unlike

African slaves, the Court rejected Samson’s petition for sale. Its members worried that the

Caribs would ally with Powhatans in an attack against them. The Court ordered that

Samson “dispose [of the Caribs], as they may prove to discommodity to the Colony.”85 A few days later, Samson returned to the Court, informing its officers that he did not

“knoweth no way or means to dispose of them.”

The Council debated what to do with the captives. Perhaps the Caribs learned of their precarious fate, because during the deliberations, the Council received “good information” that “the said Indians have run away & hid themselves in the woods attempting to go to the Indians of this Country.” Some of them were caught and “confessed to these motives.” The Council also received information “they have stolen away diverse goods, & attempted to kill some of our people.” Considering the danger they believed these

Caribs posed to the colony and its inhabitants, after a “full & long deliberation of this matter,” the Council judged “them to be presently taken & hanged till they be dead.”86 The

Council’s main reason for this extreme verdict was that the Caribs could “hereafter be a means to overthrow the whole Colony.”87 Their fear of a pan-Indian attack was a symptom of both Amerindian mistrust, xenophobia, and an irrational fear of “outsiders.” The Caribs who escaped and fled the colony likely did so to avoid the fate that could eventually befall them.

85 11 October 1627, in McIlwaine, ed., Minutes, 155. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.

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As we have seen, fear among the government and colonists in Virginia of a

Powhatan attack was widespread. While the colonial government understood the importance of conducting effective Anglo-Powhatan diplomacy and gaining trusted allies and intelligence agents, fears of Powhatan attacks and general mistrust of and antipathy for

Amerindians resulted in a confusing, contradictory, and often ill-conceived strategy towards the management of Anglo-Powhatan relations. Fears deriving from individual incidents muddled more general policies of détente and reconciliation.

In the case of the Caribs sentenced to death in Virginia, irrational anxieties of pan-

Indian collusion, resulted in politics guided by fear. For Anglo-Powhatan relations, the periodic raiding of corn fields during periods of peace-brokering, sent messages of untrustworthiness and mismanagement to Powhatan leaders. Inconsistent policies and attitudes towards the Algonquian inhabitants in Virginia often made information management ineffective on the ground. Unlike the English Atlantic intelligence programs in Spain, which also had to operate on mutual mistrust and skepticism, the added anti-

Amerindian sentiment of the colonial government thwarted its efforts to gain reliable, long- lasting informants.

Conclusion

As these examples demonstrate, the Anglo-Spanish War brought continual expectation of external assaults from Spain, which compounded anxieties about internal attacks from Powhatans. For the early Stuart imperial project, the condition of war presented both opportunities and challenges. It allowed Charles to trade in the West Indies aggressively, but without sufficient military resources to defend these ventures, these

274 fledgling colonies struggled to survive. In Virginia, where colonists had long expected a

Spanish assault even during the 1604-1624 Anglo-Spanish peace, the condition of war heightened fears of such attacks. Colonial governments worked hard to build defenses and, with the help of their king, stockpiled their stores of weapons to defend against attacks.

Both Crown and Council in England and colonial authorities in Virginia understood that these resources were insufficient in the event of an attack. Guarding colonial intelligence was central to providing extra protection for the colonies. James I and Charles

I directed colonial governments to encourage self-policing policies. Each colonist was required to be extra-vigilant of newcomers with suspicious backgrounds. To prevent the comingling of Englishmen and Spaniards, and curb illicit trade, James required all ships to sail only on authorized routes from the colony back to the metropole. Those men who entered the murky transnational space of the West Indies were immediately considered suspicious. As the case of Simon Tuchin demonstrates, the intention to sail through those waters en route back to England was dangerous to national interests. The West Indies could turn a sailor into a pirate, or provide opportunity to leak or sell English intelligence to

Spanish agents. Furthermore, in the case of the sailors from the Black Bess, all encounters with extra-nationals required rigorous examination before subjects were permitted to stay in the colony. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, in order to travel to the colonies, English men and women had to prove that they were loyal subjects. Once in the colonies, subjects on the ground performed a second check based on behavior and reputation to confirm loyalty to the Crown and its imperial project. These efforts reveal that in addition to expecting an organized military invasion, the colonial governments were

275 also very worried about a Spanish attack from within, emanating from weak practices of information management.

To the Virginia government and colonists, the greatest perceived threat from within was an attack from Powhatan Indians. While allegedly working to settle a peace during the

Second Anglo-Powhatan War, English fears of and attitudes towards Amerindians resulted in inconsistent and often contradictory policies toward Anglo-Powhatan relations. Unlike

European wars, the Anglo-Powhatan War was characterized by sporadic attacks that were most often reprisals for acts of aggression. Colonial officials recognized that this type of war required adept intelligence systems. In order to gather critical intelligence, colonial authorities employed Algonquian agents and interpreters, sent their own authorized agents to live with the Powhatans, and approved new models for training these types of agents.

To protect channels of privileged information, ordinary colonists were prohibited from consorting with their Powhatan neighbors. But inconsistent policies often muddled these efforts, and in turn, Anglo-Powhatan affairs suffered greatly.

The self-policing policies ordered by the Crown and Privy Council and enforced by colonial authorities in Virginia reveals yet another way managing information was critical to defending England’s imperial project. As chapter one demonstrated, since Virginia’s establishment, gathering reliable intelligence was the most effective and efficient way to protect the colony. During Anglo-Spanish peace, English diplomats found access to privileged information that allowed them to stay informed of possible Spanish attacks. War with Spain closed these intelligence channels and the likelihood of forewarning. Thus, to protect the colony and prevent privileged information from falling into the wrong hands, each colonist had to be observant of all suspicious activities and persons. These conditions

276 were similar in the war with the Powhatans in which colonial authorities closed many channels of communication while simultaneously cultivating go-betweens and intelligence agents.

The self-policing policies of the 1620s more closely resemble James’s early imperial project, based primarily on information management, than the growing imperial administration that would characterize Charles’s project in the 1630s. While back in

London, the Privy Council, Attorney General, and others debated lofty plans of imperial design, approved diverse patents, and flirted with the idea of forming a national company for the West Indies, these long-term plans did little to protect England’s existing colonies under threat of attack. Without the military resources to defend Virginia physically, James and Charles relied on English colonists to police spaces identified as dangerous borderlands. Authorities in Virginia complied fully with these orders, and their efforts likely played some part in the colony’s safety during these years. However, policies of alienation and segregation also led to a dangerous mix of pan-Indian anxiety and xenophobia. As the next chapter will demonstrate, by the 1630s, Charles met the need for enhanced security with greater central oversight and the tighter policing of migration and trade. This work would no longer fall to ordinary colonists, but was instead performed by trained officers and agents, directed by the Committee for Foreign Plantations.

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Chapter Six

Accounting for Empire: Customs, Lading, and the Great Migration

In the first chapter of his book, The King’s Servants, still the most comprehensive study of Charles I’s administration, Gerald Aylmer remarked: “It is both a paradox and a truism to say that early Stuart England was at one and the same time a ‘much-governed’ country and a country with very little government.”1 Charles certainly expanded his government, empowering an administrative bureaucracy to more efficiently manage the growing demands on the state. However, many of Charles’s efforts to govern were overwhelmed by challenges, notably through his tensions with parliament that ended his reign and life. Charles’s reign has most commonly been interpreted through the lens of these challenges, placing undue focus on the ineptitude of his governance instead of on the work his government did in fact accomplish. By contrast, when examining Charles’s imperial project, it is hard to ignore the dramatic growth in the number of colonies, colonists, and state resources dedicated to supporting his empire. Not all of this growth can be directly attributed to the Crown: Charles’s empire was, as Aylmer put it, both “much- governed” and had “very little government.” The previous chapter demonstrated the latter aspect of Aylmer’s claim. In the absence of resources to defend the colonies physically,

Charles relied on colonial authorities to exploit self-policing among his colonial subjects.

But other aspects of his empire were indeed “much governed” from the center. When

English subjects migrated to the colonies in great numbers in the 1630s, Charles drafted new rules for monitoring Atlantic migration and authorized a Privy Council committee to

1 Gerald Aylmer, The King’s Servants: the Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-1642 (London: Routledge, 1961), 7.

278 oversee their implementation. This growth in migration corresponded with a rise in colonial trade. Charles appointed the same body to closely monitor trade in order to collect accurate customs revenue.

Beginning in the late 1620s, thousands of English subjects migrated from England to its American colonies. In 1630, the colonial population of England’s Atlantic colonies was approximately 9,500; by 1640, that population had swelled to 53,700.2 Emigrants left

England for economic and religious reasons. A recession had devastated important industries such as the cloth trade and the rigid religious policies instituted by Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, led many Calvinists and other non-conformists to leave

England for the Netherlands and the Americas. While immigrants settled in all of the

English Atlantic colonies, Charles was most concerned about those migrating to New

England. From the late 1620s, reports of non-conformity in religion and government in

New England had reached London. As the number of migrants grew rapidly, Charles tightened restrictions for foreign travel and emigration. He required that each subject bound for the colonies provide certification that they had taken the Oath of Supremacy

(acknowledging the king as the head of the church) and the Oath of Allegiance (confirming loyalty to the king ahead of the pope).3 These papers were certified in each migrant’s home parish, and then carried to port cities where they were reviewed by customs officers.

2 Alison Games, Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 4. 3 Michael Questier argues that enforcing the oaths was a way the early modern government exerted its power—a method historians have previously missed. See Questier, “Loyalty, Religion and State Power in Early Modern England: English Romanism and the Jacobean Oath of Allegiance,” Historical Journal 40.2 (1997): 311-329. While the Oath of Supremacy had been in place since Henry VIII’s reign, James instituted the Oath of Allegiance in 1606, after the Gunpowder Plot, a failed assassination attempt against the king led by English Catholics.

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In order to ensure that these regulations received compliance, Charles created a permanent Privy Council committee, the Committee for Foreign Plantations, to review these certificates and passenger lists. Customs agents were also ordered to take an accurate accounting of each ship’s goods, certified through bills of lading. Charles also required that colonial governments enforce compliance on the other side of the Atlantic. The Oaths of

Allegiance and Supremacy were taken once again in colonial ports, and ships departing the colonies were required to fill out bills of lading before they set sail for England. While some of these measures were initiated by James I, Charles also issued proclamations tightening regulations, hired additional agents to ensure compliance, and ordered that the

Committee for Foreign Plantations scrutinize all documentation weekly. The Committee took this responsibility seriously. They routinely stayed ships until each passenger met all the requirements for migration. Thus, one of the consequences of the Great Migration and the corresponding growth in colonial trade was the establishment of an administrative bureaucracy to meet the needs of a growing empire.

The Great Migration

Charles I’s efforts to oversee colonial migration is evidenced by the numerous certificates, passes, and ship registers that populate the State Papers for the 1630s. These ship registers provide the bulk of the evidentiary basis for historians examining the thousands who migrated to New England during these years. In order to determine the religious affiliations of those who participated in this migration, these documents have been

280 interrogated for what they include, overlooking the curious fact that they survive at all.4

For example, Robert Charles Anderson published three volumes on New England immigrants in the 1630s relying heavily on these ship registers and migration certificates.5

While ship registers were recorded after 1621, for the first two decades of English Atlantic colonization, they are scanty in the records. But in the 1630s, these records become voluminous, found among port records, and also among those of the Privy Council, where the Committee for Foreign Plantations examined them bi-weekly. This type of administrative oversight was a feature unique to Charles’s imperial management.

The 1630s was the decade of largest population growth in the colonies in the seventeenth century.6 Charles and his Councilors closely observed this migration, and were especially watchful over immigrants to New England. A great number of New England immigrants were non-conformists, whom contemporaries called “puritans.” The term puritan was a catch all term (often used dismissively by contemporaries) to describe non- conformists in sixteenth and seventeenth-century England.7 The term generally referred to those who adopted the Reformed theology of Calvinism and preferred a presbyterian form of church polity.

4 T.H. Breen and Stephen Foster, “Moving to the New World: The Character of Early Massachusetts Immigration,” William & Mary Quarterly 30.2 (1973): 189-222; Kevin Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 751. 5 Robert Charles Anderson, The Great Migration Begins: Immigrants to New England, 1620- 1633 (Boston: New England Historical Genealogical Society, 1995). 6 Games, Migration, 4. 7 Alden Vaughan perhaps put it best: “Any study of Anglo-American puritanism confronts at the outset a confounding problem of definition: the movement was so amorphous, so multifaceted, and so dynamic that any definition of it and its adherents seems inadequate,” in The Puritan Tradition in America, 1620-1730, ed. Vaughan (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1972), xi.

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The great influx of puritans has captivated historians of colonial New England, many of whom described this period of migration as a “Puritan Exodus,” in which puritans were compelled to leave England for the Netherlands or New England to escape the oppressive policies of Archbishop Laud. Indeed, the migration of puritans directly coincided with the rapid acceleration of anti-Calvinist policies and practices within the

Church of England under his direction. 8 Laud was bishop of London from 1628 and became archbishop in August 1633. In these positions Laud rigorously enforced policies of uniformity of worship among English subjects.9

But religion was not the only catalyst for this migration. In the 1630s, a recession damaged many trades, encouraging many to seek opportunities elsewhere. Thus, while many migrants could be called puritans, the religious beliefs among them were actually quite diverse. Games notes that much of the friction in mid-1630s New England was caused by a challenge to the emerging rigid puritan orthodoxy in New England churches from many of the newly arrived migrants.10 Indeed, many new arrivals in the mid-to-late 1630s complained to Crown and Council about the church and government in New England. By

8 Historians of seventeenth-century England have challenged the notion of a “Puritan Exodus.” Kevin Sharpe describes the history of the “Puritan Exodus” as “one of the triumphs of myth over evidence, and of nationalist historiography over research.” Sharpe, Personal Rule, 751. Sharpe, among others, notes that a greater number of migrants travelled to the Caribbean and Chesapeake, and that very few ordained puritan ministers migrated to New England. Looking at the same data, the Atlantic historian Alison Games offers a more nuanced interpretation. She suggests that while puritan migration was indeed a “true diaspora,” the density of the puritan population in New England was higher than in other colonies. See Games, Migration, 134. 9 Richard Cust, Charles I: A Political Life (New York: Routledge, 2014), 33. Historians are divided as to whether to attribute these policies to Charles or Laud. Sharpe argues that Laud was following Charles’s directives, while Richard Cust asserts that Laud successfully steered Charles in the direction of his preferred policies. But whether this anti-Calvinist program was the conviction of Charles or Laud, these policies undid the “religious middle ground” that James I had worked to maintain. See Cust, Charles I, 144. 10 Games, Migration, 138.

282 closely monitoring colonial migration, Charles endeavored to prevent the emigration of religious radicals in order to protect authorized migrants from their corrupting influence.

Background: Management and Reform

Charles’s efforts to improve imperial administration were only one aspect of his larger program of administrative and financial reform. Indeed, the Committee for Foreign

Plantations was just one of a number of Privy Council committees created to improve various departments of Charles’s government. In 1629, reformed areas included the royal household below stairs, the Wardrobe, the Ordnance Office, and the royal armoury. In the mid-1630s, Charles reformed the posts and dramatically reformed the Treasury, known as the Exchequer.11 Charles also continued his father’s efforts to improve the royal navy. He used funds levied through ship money, a medieval special assessment originally designed to gather taxes on coastal towns during emergencies, to patrol the herring fisheries in the

North Sea and force Dutch fisherman to pay for licenses to fish in waters the Crown claimed were under England’s jurisdictions.12 After the Anglo-Spanish War, Charles, hoping to strengthen central oversight of the colonies, more consistently turned to Council committees as investigative and adjudicating bodies. Charles used committees to make use of and divide up the talents of the Privy Council. He appointed committees on trade,

Ireland, the militia, and military preparations and, from the mid-1630s, foreign plantations.13 These reform efforts signaled Charles’s general impulse to improve and

11 Aylmer, King’s Servants, 63. 12 Andrew Thrush, “Naval Finance and the Origins and Development of Ship Money,” in War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650, ed. Mark Charles Fissel (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 133-162. 13 Charles Andrews, British Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade and Plantations, 1622-1675 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1908), 13; Aylmer, King’s Servants, 21.

283 centralize his administration. He met matters of imminent concern, such as the rise in colonial migration, with greater attention and resources.

To manage overseas migration, customs and port agents in England and their counterparts in the colonies reported back to the central government through the

Committee for Foreign Plantations. Charles published proclamations to ensure that all of these administrators were informed of this chain of command. Colonial governments, appointed directly by Crown and Council, were ordered to bring all matters to the

Committee. The Committee closely tracked the movement of all people and ships from the metropole to the colonies through the reports from colonial governments and by frequently reviewing special licenses to travel. This administrative management of empire required an accurate rendering of information, supported by thorough documentation. The tremendous number of bills of lading, ship registers, and travel licenses that populate the government records of this era reveal that the government of Charles I was intimately involved in the management of empire. Despite the often-cited claims by historians that the early Stuart kings their “accidental” empire with salutary neglect, by the mid-1630s the

English empire was governed, however ineffectually, at its core by the Crown and its government.

The New England Committees

In 1632, the Privy Council heard the petitions of Thomas Morton and Philip

Ratcliffe, who complained about the conduct of authorities in the Massachusetts Bay

Colony. Morton had been banished from the colony for multiple offenses, including suspicion of murder, and Ratcliffe had been whipped, banished, and had his ears cut off for

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“uttering malicious and scandalous speeches against the government and the church of

Salem.”14 Morton and Ratcliffe’s petitions included accusations that the government in

New England intended to incite rebellion and endeavored to become separate from the church and government of England. Considering the weight of these claims, the Council held a lengthy debate “upon the whole carriage of the plantation of that country.” The Privy

Council appointed a sub-committee of twelve men, called the Committee for New England, led by Richard Neile, Archbishop of York and close ally of Laud, to thoroughly investigate the matter. The Privy Council ordered the Committee to review the colony’s patent and “to examine the truth” of the matter before reporting back to the Council.”15

Morton and Ratcliffe’s petitions drew further attention to larger concerns about

New England’s government. In 1630, colonists returning from New England complained that it was run by “Brownists [separatists] in religion and ill-affected to our state at home.”16 The leaders in New England were especially worried when they learned that

“these reports have won credit with some who formerly wished us well.”17 New England authorities endeavored to keep these reports from reaching England, but the drastic measures they took to do so only worsened their reputations at home. Like Ratcliffe, Henry

Linne suffered a whipping and banishment from Boston in 1631 “for writing into England falsely and maliciously against the government and execution of justice here.”18 Charles

14 John Gorham Palfrey, History of New England: Volume 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1858), 351. 15 Andrews, British Committees, 15. 16 While many of the Mayflower passengers were separatists and labeled Brownists (after Robert Brown), claiming the colony was run by Brownists emphasized radical separatism. 17 John Noble, Records of the Court of Assistants of the Massachusetts Bay 1630-1692 (Boston: County of Suffolk 1901-28), cited in David Cressy, Coming Over: Migration and Communication between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 22. 18 Cressy, Coming Over, 22.

285 wanted nothing less than he wanted a colony devoted to disobedience and separatism. Thus, the proliferation of these types of reports merited a full investigation, whereby the

Committee would “examine the truth of the aforesaid Information.”19

But Morton and Ratcliffe’s case was quickly undermined by the testimony of members of the Massachusetts Bay Company in England, who confirmed that they were indeed fringe characters. The senior Secretary of State Sir John Coke also received a letter from Captain Thomas Wiggin, who had recently arrived from New England, describing the pair as “scandalous characters and “their information false.”20 On January 19, 1632, the

Committee for New England submitted their report, which determined that “most things were denied,” and instructed the colonists to “go on cheerfully with their undertakings.”21

While Morton and Ratcliffe’s case was dismissed, by 1634, complaints of a similar nature were again brought before the Privy Council. The Council appointed another commission, which had a broader scope, called the “Lords Commissioners for Foreign

Plantations,” (or Committee for Foreign Plantations).22 The Committee was composed of

Laud, Neile, Secretaries Coke and Sir Francis Windebank, along with other Privy Council members.23 According to its commission, the committee was supposed to meet weekly in the presence of the king. The Committee was authorized to make laws for the colony, but it mostly reviewed existing legislation and heard petitions from subjects.24 Charles

19 19 December 1631, in W.L. Grant ed. et al., (Acts of the Privy Council: Colonial Series, Volume I, 1613-1680) Hereford: Anthony Brothers, 1908), 183. 20 Medford Historical Register, Volumes 9-10 (Medford, MA: Medford Historical Society, 1896), 7. 21 19 January 1632, Acts: Colonial Series, ed. Grant, et al, 184-185. 22 This Committee will henceforth be referred to as the “Committee for Foreign Plantations.” 23 1 June 1634, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 202. 24 Ken Macmillan, “Imperial Constitutions: Sovereignty and Law in the British Atlantic,” Britain’s Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c. 1550-1850, ed. H.V. Bowen et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 82.

286 recommissioned the Committee on April 10, 1636 and thereafter it sat as an active body until August 1641.25 He granted it wide-ranging powers. In addition to making laws, the

Committee had the power to remove governors, appoint judges and magistrates, establish courts, impose penalties for ecclesiastic offenses, and held all power over patents and charters.”26

The work of the Committee for Foreign Plantations has been largely discredited by historians. Despite its far-reaching scope and function as a coercive body, Charles Andrews nevertheless described it as “impotent.”27 Ken Macmillan finds the commission largely in line with early Stuart imperial oversight, which he asserts “mirrored closely the contemporary and preferred ‘weak state’ model of English constitutionalism.”28 But

Macmillan also points out that after the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, Charles II’s

Council of Trade and Plantation (1675), and its successor, the Board of Trade (1696), performed the same type of work as the Committee for Foreign Plantations..29 Therefore, perhaps as a coercive body, the work of the Committee was unremarkable. But as we will see, with regards to its oversight of colonial migration, the Committee for Foreign

Plantations was an important body for the management of colonial affairs.

Managing Migration

The complaints brought before the Privy Council in the late 1620s and early 1630s nearly ruined the New England colony. By 1634, the arrival in England of frequent rumors

25 Andrews, British Committees, 16. 26 Ibid., 16-17. 27 Ibid., 17. 28 Ken Macmillan, “Imperial Constitutions,” 82. 29 Ibid.,, 83.

287 of nonconformity to the Church of England, and the persecution of those who did not ascribe to Calvinist practice in New England, led to a complete review of the Massachusetts

Bay Company’s patent. In October 1634, the Committee for Foreign Plantations ordered that “all the patents or grants of Plantations” be reviewed, in order to sort out “whether they be originals, or antique copies.” They were assisted by the Attorney General, who was ordered to “carefully peruse and consider the aforesaid grants” and to send the Committee any aspects “fit to be added, detracted or altered in any of them.”30 Over the next years, the

Committee continued to investigate and examine the issues of Massachusetts Bay charters.

In February, 1635, the Committee for Foreign for Plantations directed the Attorney-

General to question “the Patent for the Massachusetts Bay” by issuing a quo warranto writ that required the Company to explain their rights and privileges.31

But while the Committee for Foreign Plantations continued to negotiate the broader issues of imperial sovereignty, the pressing matter of migration to New England needed attention. In February 1634, the Privy Council began to stay ships for New England, chiefly concerned with passengers “whom diverse persons know to be ill affected, and discontented, as well with the Civil as Ecclesiastical Government.” The Council worried that the immigrants “could be to the ruin of the plantation.” They ordered that “several

Masters and freighters” of these ships “should attend the Board on Wednesday next in the afternoon,” bringing with them “a List of the Passengers and Provisions in each ship.”

30 Order of the same, directing the Attorney-Gen and other King’s Counsel to peruse all patents and grants of plantations and certify “what they shall conceive fit to be added, detracted, or altered in any of them, 18 October 1634, BodL, Bankes Mss 8/8. 31 Order of the Lords Commissioners for the Plantations, 3 February 1635, BodL, Bankes MS 8/7.

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Furthermore, the Massachusetts Bay Company adventurer Matthew Cradock was instructed to “cause the Letters Patents for that Plantation to be brought to the Board.”32

This was not the first time a ship had been stayed after its passengers failed to meet the requirements for migration. In October 1633, the Council stayed a ship bound for the

Maryland colony after it was reported that some of the passengers had not taken the Oath of Allegiance. The Privy Council looked into the matter and, after they found this report untrue, permitted the ship to sail.33 Like New England, colonists emigrating to Maryland were subject to increased suspicion and scrutiny due to the religious affiliation of some of its settlers. Charles and his Council were well aware (and apprehensive) about the migration of Catholics to Maryland. The previous year, two ships bound for Maryland, The

Ark and The Dove, were chased down by the navy and forced to return so that its passengers could take the oaths. It appears that in order to avoid taking the oaths, many Catholic passengers first went to the Isle of Wight, where, after obtaining permission to leave

London, the ships picked up them up.34 But as a relatively unpopular destination for aspiring colonists, Maryland migrants were not of great concern to the Council. Over the next few years, most of the ships subject to extra scrutiny were those bound for New

England.

During the Committee’s investigation into the Massachusetts Bay patent, they stayed many ships bound to New England. On February 22, 1634, the Council produced a warrant to stay New England ships.35 After reviewing the passenger list on February 28,

32 21 February 1634, Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 199. 33 22 February 1634; 31 October 1633, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 200; 192. 34 Coldham, Book of Emigrants, 104; William Hand Browne, George Calvert and Cecilius Calvert, barons Baltimore of Baltimore (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1890), 40. 35 22 February 1634, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 200.

289 the Committee decided that the ships would be allowed to depart for New England, but with strict conditions. There was to be “no blasphemy, Church of England prayers to be said, [and] only expressed cleared persons to be allowed on board, upon return certify their names”36 Therefore, while the Council was hesitant to disrupt colonial trade to the disadvantage of colonists and customs revenue, their strict instructions suggest that the matter of nonconformity was taken seriously.

In order to improve their process for authorizing migration to ensure that undesirable subjects did not make it aboard ships bound for the colonies, the Committee ordered port officers to follow more rigid screening practices for migrants and travelers. In

December 1634, the Committee directed the officers of the Port of London to require all subjects bound for the plantations from London to present proof that they did not owe taxes.37 Like religious dissidents, the colonies were not a place for evasive subjects. As the previous chapter showed, exhibiting trustworthiness was central to belonging in the colonies. Providing evidence on this point was required before leaving the capital. Early in

1635, the Committee further tightened protocol for migrants. Their timing was well placed; almost 5,000 people left port of London for England’s American colonies in 1635.38

To familiarize hopeful migrants with these tighter restrictions that same year Charles

I issued a proclamation explaining the new rules. This proclamation was the first of a series

36 28 February 1634, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 201. 37 Games, Migration, 19. While in line with his broader reforms to tighten restrictions for colonial migrants, Charles also began to levy taxes for ship money on all English subjects. In 1634, he used the medieval levy to collect money to enhance his own coffers and raise money for the navy without having to call parliament. The tax was widely unpopular and some counties refused to pay. Demanding payment from the thousands of migrants may have been a way to ensure payment of these funds. See Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1982), 130-131. 38 Games, Migration, 1.

290 of proclamations that endeavored to tighten controls on migration and ensure stricter authority over migrating subjects. Similar (although far less detailed) orders had been set before. A

1606 Act passed “for the better discovering and repressing of popish recusants” included a clause requiring that every subject who left England “to serve any foreign prince” must first

“take the oath.”39 Charles’s 1635 proclamation clarified and expanded these restrictions, while dedicating additional resources to ensure that they were closely followed. Charles framed the new regulations as part of national defense, protecting subjects from “what danger might ensue to this State, if Our Subiects might at their pleasure passe and depart out of this Realme, into the Kingdomes, Countreys, and Dominions of forraine Kings or States.” Subjects who desired to travel “shall not at any time hereafter, without the speciall licence of us, or of six, or more of Our Priuie Councill, vnder their hands (whereof one of Our principall Secretaries to be one) passe or depart out of this Our Realme of England… vpon such corporall, and other great and heauie paines and penalties, as by the Lawes or Statures of this Realme may be inflicted vpon them.”40

By requiring the signatures of “six or more Privy Councillors” Charles hoped to prevent any gap in oversight by the Council and Committee. He also laid responsibility for enforcing these policies on the port officers, commanding “all Our Officers and Ministers in

Our seuerall Ports of this Realme; that hereafter they suffer none of our said Subiects to passe without such licence.” They exacted strict penalties on ship owners and captains who disobeyed these orders. Anyone caught transporting subjects without license obtained from

39 Transcript of three registers of passengers from Great Yarmouth to Holland and New England, 1637-1639, ed. C.B. Jewson and Henry Hill (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1964), 7. 40 Charles I, A proclamation to restraine the kings subiects from departing out of the realme without licence (London, 1635). STC 9037.

291 the Privy Council “and duely entred with the Officer of the Port,” risked “paine of Our high displeasure, and such forfeitures, and losse of Office, ship or vessell, and other penalties.”41

Printing and disseminating these orders through a proclamation ensured that these laws would be more closely followed.

In accordance with this proclamation, Charles instructed port officers to diligently record the ship registers of those bound for America.42 He required them to provide a list of names of the passengers on each ship and certify whether those passengers had been administered the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. Charles also instructed customs officers to obtain each passenger’s name, domicile, birthplace, occupation or quality, age, destination, reason for journey, and anticipated date of return.43 Most were intended for

New England, although the Committee examined other registers and logs for ships bound for Virginia, Barbados, St. Christopher, and Providence Island.44

To keep up with the demands for licenses to sail, by the end of 1635, Charles employed additional agents for reviewing and issuing passes. From 1621, King James had required the passenger lists of all ships to be sent to the Exchequer. But this work was assigned through a monopoly to a single man, a Mr. Smithsby, “the king[‘s] servant,” who alone could not handle this responsibility.45 In 1625, the Committee directed “diverse

Officers, and others to examine all Passing, and four of their hands to grant passes, the

41 Ibid. 42 Peter Wilson Coldham, The Complete Book of Emigrants, 1607-1660 (Baltimore, Genealogical Publishing Company, 1987). 43 Transcript, ed. Jewson, 7. 44 See in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series. 45 This monopoly may have been lucrative, Sir Richard Weston complained that the patent was “prejudicial to a Branch of his Place, thereupon Smithsby let the execution gave way.” It seems that thereafter, Anthony Uphill, clerk to Weston performed this work, in 1637 memorial from the customs officers of London recapitulated the practices of registering passes and stated whose authority this responsible fell to, Memorial from “the Customer of London,” 1637.

292 clerk making of them, & giving the oath of Allegiance and certifying them into the

Exchequer.”46 The Committee required passengers to present to port officers certificates from their respective parishes, who would then supply them with a “pass” certifying their conformity to this law, and enter their names in the ship’s register. Local authorities were also central to the process of authorizing migrants. They were best equipped to determine whether members of their communities and parishes were suitable migrants. In small parishes, these authorities would likely know personally, or at least be familiar with, the reputations of non-conformists within their communities. If the approval of their documentation was entered into the register, it served as a first pass for authorization.

Customs officials then submitted these registers to the Exchequer, and a memorandum certifying that the ship had adhered to these regulations was sent to the Committee for

Foreign Plantations. The Committee then reviewed each register, and only with their approval, was the ship authorized to sail to the intended colony.

Charles’s proclamation and supplemental instructions for foreign travel created a complex, vertical chain of bureaucracy from parish ministers to port officers to the king’s

Council. Documentation for those outside of London was carried from the country into the capital. Similar procedures existed in other port cities; the records from Great Yarmouth

(which are impeccably thorough) suggest Charles’s regulations were followed.47 All of this bureaucracy required a tremendous amount of paperwork. While certainly not abundant by modern standards, when accounted for alongside other extant bureaucratic ephemera

(especially with regard to the colonies), the volume of these records is tremendous.48

46 Ibid. 47 Transcript, ed. Jewson. 48 Anderson, The Great Migration Begins. See also Coldham, Complete Book of Emigrants.

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Charles ensured that customs agents thoroughly examined each pass before issuing authorization. In early 1636, Charles also appointed Thomas Mayhew to enter in writing all “passes granted in England and Wales” and gave him strict instructions procedure and the chain of command.49 In June, the Council ordered customs and port officers to adhere to this protocol closely and “not to suffer passengers to ship themselves without a due pass.”50 To communicate these reforms to his subjects, Charles issued an additional proclamation “restrain[ing] the disorderly passing out of the kingdom into America, and commanding that no passengers that are Subjects shall be permitted to go, without license from his Majesty’s Commissioners for Plantations, and that they which are under that degree, bring certificate from two Justices…that they have taken the Oath of Allegiance &

Supremacy, and like testimony from that of the Parish, of every mans conversation & conformity to the discipline of England.” By requiring testimony parishes, the Commission could more effectively identify seditious subjects. As heraldic and church visitation records

(and indeed the Domesday Book) demonstrate, English king’s had long been interested in collecting information about their subjects. Charles and his Privy Council could then easily draw from these rigorous local records to make informed decisions about hopeful emigrants and in the capital and other port cities.

Once approved, these passes were to be submitted “every half year” to the

Committee.51 But the records of the Committee suggest that due to the number of ships bound for the colonies, and especially those intended for New England, they reviewed individual licenses nearly bi-weekly. On January 21, 1636, the Committee reviewed a list

49 Mayhew was given a twenty-one year patent to perform this work. 50 Transcript, ed. Jewson. 51 Memorial from “the Customer of London,” 1637, TNA CO 1/9/78.

294 of passengers and “their oaths submitted.”52 They reviewed another list on February 18,

1636.53

Charles’s proclamation assigned the responsibility for reviewing the documentation of travelers and migrants to customs officers. With the number of migrants increasing annually, customs officers asked the Privy Council to clarify precisely how to arbitrate a variety of cases. The customs officers of London sent a detailed list of inquiries: whether wives, children, and servants were permitted to accompany men who held the requisite certificates for America; how and where the returns were to be made; and whether Virginia colonists would be subject to the same rigorous scrutiny. They also asked for the delineation of responsibilities for giving oaths as the Customs of London was only prepared to administer the Oath of Allegiance.54 The customs officers’ attention to the details of these regulations suggests that they intended to comply with Charles’s orders.

Charles’s oversight of colonial migration also required compliance on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1621, when James I first licensed Smithsby to keep a register of those bound from England to the colonies, he also sent instructions to Sir Francis Wyatt, governor of Virginia, ordering that “every person arriving in the colony should take the oath of allegiance and supremacy.”55 Charles reiterated these orders to Sir John Harvey in

1628 and again in 1636. Furthermore, in 1632, a captain in Jamestown “was directed to

52 21 January 1636, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 206. 53 18 February 1636, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 206. 54 Transcript, ed. Jewson. Under Elizabeth I, oaths were delivered “before those who have Authority by Common Use to give it.” Therefore, the Customs Office may not have had an authorized agent ready to give the oaths. See William Cawley, The Laws of Queen Elizabeth, King James and King Charles I. concerning Jesuits, Seminary Priests, Recusants, etc. and Concerning the Oaths of Supremacy and Allegiance (London, 1680), 39. 54 Memorial from “the Customer of London,” 1637, TNA, CO 1/9/78. 55 Governor Harvey and Council of Virginia to the Privy Council, 18 January 1639, TNA, CO 1/10/5.

295 keep a register of the name, age, and birth-place of every passenger.” 56 Each migrant needed to obtain a license to leave the colonies, even colonial officials, and those who stole away back to England were punished. For example, in July 1640, the Virginia Council informed Charles and the Committee that Richard Kempe, Esquire, secretary of the colony,

“secretly departed without License into England” after “being questioned for some very scandalous speeches charged upon him against the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury.” To make an example out of this transgression, the governor and Council also encouraged the

Committee to prosecute one “Dyer Master of a Shipp” for “transporting the said Kempe without license, out of the Colony.”57

The Council and Committee also worked to ensure that return migration from New

England was closely monitored. As previously described, New England authorities worried that reports or rumors of misconduct would reach England. In order to prevent these reports from spreading, suspicious colonists were sometimes prevented from returning to England.

Still, reports of this behavior did reach England, which discouraged colonists from migrating there. In order to curb this misconduct, George Burdett recommended to

Archbishop Laud that Charles secure the rivers and harbors “for the King's use, and the port appointed for discharge of ships that bring passengers, in case any be permitted.”

Increasing the security of the ports “would much strengthen the loyal party, as many who go to Massachusetts would go there, but for difficulty of removal.” Maintaining strict authority and control over the ports and the movement of colonial migration was paramount.58 Colonists needed to be able to leave freely, or it would, as Burdett described,

56 Ibid. 57 2 November 1639- 25 September 1640, in in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, ed. Grant, 284-285. 58 George Burdett to Laud, 29 November 1638, TNA, CO 1/9/129.

296 deter “loyal” migrants from settling there. It would also counter Charles’s efforts to manage the flow of information from the colony to England, thereby inhibiting his efforts to effectively oversee the colony.

The number of ships stayed and the subsequent review of their licenses and passenger lists suggest that the Committee took their responsibility of overseeing New

England migration seriously. On March 30, 1638, the Committee stayed eight ships intended for New England. The Committee was concerned about the passengers on board, citing “the frequent resort to New England, of diverse persons ill affected, to the Religion established in the Church of England, and to the good and peaceable Government of this

State.” The Council stayed the ship in order to conduct a more thorough examination. 59

On April 1, Charles and his Council ordered “the stay of all Ships now discovered to be bound for New-England, or that shall hereafter be discovered to be prepared or to intend to go thither, until further order from the Board: And that his Lordship [a Privy Councilor] cause the Passengers and Provisions to be put on Shore, as was directed touching the said

8 Ships.”60 Ultimately, after further review, they decided “upon the reasons by them represented to the Board” to allow the ships to sail.

“Nevertheless,” the Committee stated, “his Majesty well knowing the factious disposition of the People (for a great part of them) in that Plantation, and how unfit and unworthy they are of any support or Countenance from hence, in respect of the great disorders and want of Government amongst them, whereof sundry and great Complaints have been presented to the Board, and made appear to be true, by those that being well

59 30 March 1628, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series. The Council explained their decision about these ships on 6 April 30, 1638, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 229. 60 1 April 1638, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 228.

297 affected both for Religion and Government have suffered much loss in their Estates by the unruly and factious party.” To address these problems, in April 1638, Charles ordered the

Attorney General to draw up a proclamation “expressing his Majesty’s Royal pleasure to prohibit all Merchants, Masters and Owners of Ships from henceforth, to set forth any ship or Ships, with Passengers for New England, till they have first obtained special License on that behalf, from such of the Lords of his Majesty’s most honorable Privy Council, as are appointed for the Businesses of foreign Plantations, by Special Commission.”61

These same proscriptions extended to other English ports. The authorities in Great

Yarmouth were especially rigorous in recording all passes and passenger lists. In Bristol, a hub of colonial Atlantic shipping, merchants petitioned the Committee for license to travel.

For example, in July 1638, a Bristol merchant requested license to transport eighty people to New England with provisions. The Committee approved the request but with the condition that each passenger was thoroughly scrutinized. “None of the said persons shall be shipped,” they ordered “until publicly before the Mayor of Bristol they have taken the

Oaths of Allegiance and the Supremacy.” Requiring public administering of oaths, in addition to the required certificates, served as a second check to ensure compliance. The

Committee also asked that the Lord Treasurer William Juxon, also Bishop of London, send

Bristol’s port officers “any former order of the Board, or other restraint to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding.” 62

Ships built in New England, without previous pass to leave England, were subject to even more rigorous scrutiny. For instance, in July 1638, William Piers, master of a ship called the Desire Shewing, petitioned the Council for permission to go to New England,

61 6 April 1638, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 229. 62 21 July 1639, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 256-7.

298 having recently arrived into the Port of London carrying New England colonists. Because of this origin, Piers’s ship “being wholly built in New England” would be permitted to sail after providing: “true Certificate…qualified according to the Tenor of his Majesty’s former

Proclamation…provided that the said Certificates of the Passengers be first brought to the

Clarke of the Council attendant, to be by him allowed.” Piers was further warned he could

“transport no other Passengers [until they were] first brought to the [clerk] of the Council attendant.”63 While the nature of the restrictions described to Piers were generally the same as those applied to all ships bound for the colonies, because of its origin, Piers had to present all documentation directly to the Council, instead of the customs officers, before he was authorized to depart England.

Just as the Committee scrutinized ships’ passengers, it also scrutinized their cargoes. In April 1628, the Privy Council learned that ships departing from ports in Dorset and Hampshire had misreported on their ship registers the cargo they carried. The Privy

Council sent a letter to the High Sheriffs and Justices of the Peace in Dorset and Hampshire, ordering them to perform “a diligent search” of ships bound for New England, after they had learned “of the great and secret abuses committed in that County and other the Western parts, by the Company of New England.” The Council worried that the Massachusetts Bay

Company used those ships to “send Commodities thither who underhand provide and secretly transport extraordinary quantities of Wheat, Beans, Butter Beer, Cheese Bacon and like Provisions to the great prejudice of the Poor thereabouts, and the enhancing of the

Prices of those Commodities.” This charge was indeed true. The deficient harvest of 1637

63 20 July 1638, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 233.

299 had raised food prices.64 The driving economic purpose of colonies was to provide much- needed resources to England, not to export provisions to the detriment of English subjects.

Thus, by failing to report these provisions, the Massachusetts Bay Company (to whom the

Privy Council assigned blame) not only broke the law but also put the interests of the colony ahead of the nation. The Council ordered that ships be searched “for all such provisions…and that you take view and make stay of all such commodities of Victual as shall be found prepared to be transported.” The sheriffs and justices were also ordered to report to the Council “of what quantity and value they are, and to whom they do belong and in the meantime, to stay them in safe hands till you receive further directions from us.”65

Perhaps in response to these types of infractions, by 1639, the entries in the Privy

Council register suggest that the Committee for Foreign Plantation had begun to require more thorough documentation of cargo leaving England. In 1636, Charles “commanded a fit place for entry of exported goods to be selected, and an officer appointed to keep a register.”66 In addition to certifying that passengers had taken the Oaths of Allegiance and

Supremacy, and ship captains had recorded complete passenger lists, ship entries now frequently included detailed bills of lading, with thorough lists of all commodities being shipped.67 For example, in December 1639, the Committee attached bills of lading for two

64 Andrew B. Appleby, Famine in Tudor and Stuart England (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), 191. 65 17 April 1628, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 230. 66 Governor Harvey and Council of Virginia to the Privy Council, 18 January 1639, TNA CO 1/10/5. 67 “Upon petition of the owners of the Elizabeth, of London, for license to transport to New England passengers provided with the certificate required by proclamation, also goods and cattle; referring it to the Sub-committee for Foreign Plantations for their report.” Order of the Privy Council, 4 January 1639, TNA, CO 1/10/1.

300 ships bound for Barbados.68 On January 17, 1640 it granted a pass for a Bristol ship bound for New England, Newfoundland, and finally Spain (to bring wine back to Bristol), with a detailed cargo list.69 The Committee also recorded similar bills of lading for at least another five ships within the same month.70 It recorded a further eight passes through the spring of

1640.71

While much of the Committee’s energies were dedicated to the oversight of New

England migration and trade, ships bound for Virginia without full authorization were subject to the same scrutiny. While they appear less frequently in the Privy Council’s records, ship licenses and passenger lists were also recorded.72 In 1639, the Committee stayed a few ships bound for Virginia until the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy were taken.73 Colonial authorities checked passengers’ certificates when they arrived in the colony. In April 1639, the Privy Council approved a tax “for keeping a register for every passenger arriving in Virginia and administering the oath of allegiance to them.”74 On July

31, the Committee heard a petition from Virginia merchants and planters “by reason of a

68 22 December 1639, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 270-1. 69 17 January 1640, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 273. 70 Pass to be granted for Bristol ship bound for New England similar pass to another ship, with cargo list; 17 January 1640, pass granted ship bound for New England, to carry additional supplies and people; 19 January 1640, pass granted for ship bound for New England with cargo and people; 26 January 1640, pass for ship bound for New England with permission to trade in Newfoundland and Spain ship, 276, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 274-275. 71 pass for ship bound for New England with cargo, 29 February 1640; pass for ship bound for Barbados with 200 people and cargo, 29 February 1640; pass for ship bound for New England with permission to trade in Newfoundland and Spain and, 10 April 1640; pass, similar to above, 10 April 1640; pass, similar to above, 10 April 1640; pass for ship bound for Newfoundland with cargo, 27 May 1640, similar pass to above, 27 May 1640; ship bound for Bermuda stayed, 15 July 1640, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 280-284. 72 Passes for three ships with provisions bound Virginia, 5 August 1638, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 238-239. 73 28 July 1639, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 258-9; 25 August 1639, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 265. 74 Petition of Captain Richard Morrison to the Privy Council, 8 March 1639, enclosed 2 April 1639, TNA CO 1/10/11.

301

Restraint that no Ships shall go from James River unto Charles River into Virginia.”

Because of this restraint, the “petitioners have been forced to send their goods in open boats to and from the Plantations near Charles River to their great damage discouragement and danger of the loss of their lives and goods.” The Council determined that the ship could sail on the Charles River, on the condition “that all Passengers in her do take the Oaths of

Allegiance and Supremacy [a]nd that a list of all the said Passengers be sent to the Governor and Council in Virginia.”75 These orders suggest that in order to ensure strict compliance and thwart interloping, there were multiple checkpoints in both England and the colonies.

As we have seen, in response to the Great Migration, protocol and restrictions for emigration were tightened. This created a lot of work for the Committee for Foreign

Plantations and the customs officers, who diligently endeavored to satisfy Charles’s demands. While the Massachusetts Bay colony was the primary concern for Charles and his government, and created the bulk of the work, these rules extended to, and were enforced in all of England’s Atlantic colonies.

Admiralty Records and the Bills of Lading

As previous examples have suggested, Charles, in addition to his attention to colonial migration, also more rigorously enforced the regulation of colonial trade.

Interloping and contraband trades were ubiquitous within and between Europe’s Atlantic empires.76 This situation was distressing to the Crown—one of the guiding mercantilist

75 28 July 1639, in Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 259. 76 See Wim Klooster, “Inter-Imperial Smuggling in the Americas, 1600-1800,” in Soundings in Atlantic History, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Patricia L. Denault (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 141-180.

302 imperial policies was that colonial resources were kept out of the reach of other states.77

Interloping covered a range of illegal trade. While piracy was also targeted, Charles was more interested in curbing the more common intra- and inter-imperial provisioning trades, and the misreporting of colonial cargo. The interloping trade was rampant and involved many important London merchants.78 As we will see, further measures were taken to rigorously examine the movement of cargo in order to identify and prosecute interlopers.

By 1630, the substantial growth in colonial trade required closer management. In order to prevent illegal trade and to ensure that accurate customs revenue was collected, the lading of each ship was closely inspected.79 James I had begun work to ensure that the greatest amount of customs revenue was collected. Part of the tobacco settlement for the

Virginia colony aimed to curb customs evasions. James’s 1624 Proclamation concerning tobacco, which required that all goods move only on authorized routes directly from colony to metropole, sought to ensure that customs were accurately accounted for and paid.80

Recognizing that these laws were actively thwarted, Charles sought to tighten protocol for

77 Alvin Rabushka, Taxation in Colonial America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 95. See also Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, plunder, and settlement: maritime enterprise and the genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), and Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: commercial change, political conflict, and London’s overseas traders, 1550-1653 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 78 In the 1630s, leaders of the interloping trade included: Samuel Vassal and Peter Andrews in the Virginia tobacco and provisioning trade; in the West Indies, Edward Thomson, Thomas King, and Thomas Wilkinson were involved in the tobacco and provisioning trade; in Canada, Maurice Thomson and John de la Barre were interloping in the Canadian fur trade; in Massachusetts, Matthew Craddock and Nathan Wright engaged in provisioning trade with the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Craddock was also involved in the Virginia and Barbados provisioning trades. Thomas Stegg and Jeremy Blackman supplied the West Indies with horses from Virginia. Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, 185-188, table 4.2. Despite these activities, the Privy Council’s efforts to curb them largely focused on punishing Canadian and Newfoundland interlopers, particularly due to French complaints. See Grant, ed. et al., Acts: Colonial Series, 290. 79 Michael A. R. Graves and James Frood, Change, Conflict, and Crisis: England, 1558-1660s (Auckland: Macmillan New Zealand, 1996), 102. 80 James I, A Proclamation Concerning Tobacco (London, 1624). STC 1876:08

303 cargo on both sides of the Atlantic. Considering that customs revenue accounted for more than half of the royal revenue in the 1630s, by paying closer attention to collecting customs,

Charles hoped to improve his financial plight.

Port officials and customs officers on both sides of the Atlantic worked to ensure that trade regulations were followed. Like the oversight of migration, ship captains were required to carry paperwork that detailed their cargo, its origin, and its intended destination.

These bills of lading underpinned this trade. Handwritten bills of lading had been used since the time of the Roman Empire, and were used to certify cargo for government authorities, merchant transactions, and legal disputes. By the end of the sixteenth century, these bills began to take on printed form. As the traffic in colonial commodities grew significantly in the late 1620s and 1630s, these were printed in greater numbers. Printing blanks was also lucrative and important printers had monopolies to print them.81 Thus, the needs of colonial trade intersected with the growth of cheap forms of non-commercial and semi-commercial print. Like the numerous certificates, passes, and ship registers that migrants carried, these lading forms and the central oversight they demonstrate, reveal that the management of an Atlantic empire required and depended on the authority inscribed on paper and parchment.

Printed bills of lading could be easily purchased in London at the Royal Exchange.

They were printed on small sheets of paper with blank spaces for details to be filled in, leading contemporaries to call them blanks. Ship captains carried these forms from England

81 “Bourne, Nicholas (b. in or before 1584, d. 1660),” S. A. Baron in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/68205 (accessed January 15, 2016).

304 to diverse colonies and back again. They serve as striking evidence of an Atlantic trade managed from the imperial center.

These types of printing jobs, what Peter Stallybrass terms “little jobs,” are generally associated with the rise of the printing industry in the eighteenth century.82 These little jobs included bills of exchange, mortgage and share certificates, insurance policies, retail vouchers, and receipts for deposits and credit.83 They are striking evidence of the way print culture intersected with business and government administration. While historians have recently identified how the church and state used non-commercial print to improve administration in the late seventeenth century, it is particularly striking to see the use of these early seventeenth-century bills in the historical records where they serve as rare evidence of early printing and use of this type of form. From chapter two, we know that the Privy Council ordered the printing of blanks to send as notices to church parishes in promotion of the Virginia colony. Therefore, as the aforementioned church notices and these bills of lading demonstrate, the state used semi-commercial printed blanks specifically in service to empire building in the early seventeenth century.

Perhaps the study of these bills of lading here falls victim to the larger neglected history of job printing, that is, as ephemera, because as so many are lost, so is their significance. But historians of eighteenth century print culture have stressed the significance of jobbing printing, arguing that printed blanks were a type of ephemera that

“contributed significantly to broader economic and social change.”84 In the 1630s, little

82 Peter Stallybrass, “Little Jobs': Broadsides and the Printing Revolution,” in Agent of Change: Print Culture Studies after Elizabeth Eisenstein, ed. Sabrina Alcorn Baron et al. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007), 315-41. 83 James Raven, Publishing Business in Eighteenth Century England (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2014), 5. 84 Raven, Publishing, 6.

305 jobs were central to signifying authority and securing legal arrangements across the

Atlantic. In addition to bills of lading, bills of indenture also took the form of printed blanks. Sold in England, they were brought to the colonies for use there. Nicholas Bourne, the printer who produced most of the bills of lading, also held the copyright that allowed him to print colonial indentures.85 These were lucrative monopolies, which suggests that the volume that was printed was great. While indentures were important legal documents

(especially when disputed in English and colonial courts), they were primarily financial agreements between individuals. But bills of lading, while useful for facilitating trade between merchants and planters, were also important documents for government accounting and accountability. These bills helped to facilitate English imperial trade and the state’s ability to collect customs revenue.

We know that these bills existed and were used because their contents were recorded by the Committee for Foreign Plantations. But as ephemera, the actual forms appear infrequently in British archives, as well as in the archives of other states. But when they do appear, their shared form and content suggests that these forms were key documents in facilitating the business of imperial trade and customs. A 1939 study by C.R.

Boxer identified three Portuguese Conhecimiertos (bills of lading) with remarkably similar language, separated by many decades: 1623, 1664, and 1708. The 1623 example, which was used in the trade from Goa to Portugal had similar language to the English example, with the key difference being that the Portuguese required six copies instead of three. A

1964 study briefly identified an English bills of lading from 1598 that was used in the trade

85 Baron, “Bourne, Nicholas.”

306 with Spain.86 While evidence of these bills is rare, Boxer suggests that because they were printed, “there must have been thousands of them in common use at the time.”87

The Content of the Bills

[Bill of lading, 1636, TNA HCA 15/1] While most of these forms are extant, it is likely that there were indeed thousands in circulation. In the Admiralty records, in loose disorganized bundles are eight printed bills of lading used in the colonial trade from 1629 to 1636.88 Two of the bills in the

Admiralty records were sold by the patentee that printed them, Nicholas Bourne, at the

Royal Exchange in the mid to late 1630s. Bourne held a lucrative copyright on bills of

86 George Pattison, “Observations on the History of the Bill of Lading,” Mariners Mirror 50.4 (1964): 283-295. 87 C.R. Boxer, "Some Early Portuguese Bills of Lading, 1625-1708," Mariners Mirror 25.1 (1939): 28. 88 This bundle also includes a Dutch bill of lading.

307 lading printed in French, Dutch and Italian, and these colonial bills were an extension of this copyright.89 As printed blanks they were composed of formulaic language with spaces left where the merchant or ship’s captain could fill in the details. They were filled out in colonial ports, suggesting that these trans-Atlantic documents were shown when cargo was loaded in the colonies and again on entry into England.

The first example found in the Court of Admiralty records is dated June 23, 1629.

It was filled out by Rowland Thompson, while he was anchored in St. Christopher in the

Caribbean. With a cargo of tobacco from the planter Jeremiah Blackman, Thompson intended to sail back to London to deliver the tobacco to William Thompson. The tobacco was “to be delivered in the like good order and well-conditioned at the aforesaid place the dangerous and the adventurers of the sea only excepted.” This bill also stated that

Thompson was required to carry “three bills of lading all of this tenor and date the one of which three bills being accomplished the other to stand void.”90 One of these copies would be submitted to the customs officers once in London and the other two were likely for the ship’s captain Rowland Thompson, and the merchant in London, William Thompson.

The two additional colonial bills of lading that appear in the Admiralty records for

1635 share similar language. One does not contain the name or location of its printing, but the other, a bill of lading for Virginia tobacco, includes Bourne’s imprint.91

89 “Bourne, Nicholas (b. in or before 1584, d. 1660),” S. A. Baron in ODNB, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2008, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/68205 (accessed January 14, 2016). 90 bill of lading, 23 June 1629, TNA HCA 15/1. 91 bill of lading, 24 October, 1635, printed by Nicholas Bourne; bill of lading, undated 1635, Virginia; printed English bill of lading, 31 December 1635; from “Ri[v]er of Boubuce” to London, TNA HCA 15/1,

308

[Bill of lading, TNA HCA 15/1] The text of the above bill of lading is fairly representative of the language these bills generally contained. Shipped by the Grace of God in good order, and well-conditioned by ME RICHARD PARSONS, in and upon the good Ship called the TRESTRAM & JOANE OF LONDON [Tristram and Jane] whereof is Master under God for this present voyage JOSEPH BLOWE and now riding at anchor in the RIVER OF JAMESTOWNE and by Gods grace bound for LONDON to say NINE HHEADS OF VERGINIA TOBACCO IN LEAFE being marked and numbered as in the margent, and are to be delivered in the like good order, and well-conditioned at the aforesaid Port of LONDON (the danger of the seas only excepted vnto RICHARD PARSONS or to HIS assignes, he or they paying fraight for the said goods FIVE POUNDE. L TUNE with primage and average accustomed. In witness whereof the Master of Purser of the said ship hath affirmed to three Bills of Lading all of this tenor & date, the one of which three bills being accomplished, the other two to stand void. And so God send the good Ship to her desired Port in safety. Amen. Dated in JEAMES RIVER THE 14TH OF FEBRUARY 1636 THE CONDITION I KNOW NOT ME JOSEPH BLOWE. Sold by Nicholas Bourne at the South entrance of the Royal Exchange Two copies of this bill of lading in the Admiralty records suggests that the order to present three copies of these bills was followed. As this bill certifies, the form was filled out once the tobacco was either purchased or loaded in the James River. It was signed by the ship’s

309 captain, who certified that it had been loaded, but who could not testify to its condition.

That responsibility was left to the merchant or planter who sold the tobacco, Richard

Parsons, who attested to its quality on the form.

While the bills themselves appear infrequently in the records, as previously described, their contents often appear in the Committee’s records for the late 1630s. By the end of the decade, nearly all ship registers were accompanied by the detailed record of all the cargo on board. Therefore, the appearance of these bills of lading in the Admiralty records, coupled with a record of their content in the Committee’s records in the mid-to- late 1630s, suggests that efforts to thwart trade laws were met with stricter oversight of cargo on ships bound for and arriving from English colonies. These are truly trans-Atlantic documents, purchased in centers of commerce such as the Royal Exchange, carried from

England to the colonies by ship captains, filled out in colonial ports by planters and merchants, and finally, carried back to England by other captains, where they were entered into customs registers and sent to Whitehall. These forms also serve as striking evidence of the way print intersected with trade and customs enforcement in order to assist the streamlining of the government’s management of colonial trade and ensure collections of duties. They satisfied both Charles’s agenda to increase central oversight of the colonies and raise royal revenue without calling parliament. Their place among the Admiralty records and their inclusion in the Privy Council records is evidence of successful policies of colonial management by Charles and his government and stands in sharp contrast to received histories of Charles’s reign.

Conclusion

310

When colonial emigration rose dramatically in the 1630s, Charles and his government drafted new rules, created new offices, and crafted new tools to meet the need to accurately oversee emigration. The Privy Council’s Committee for Foreign Plantations, along with customs officers in London and other port cities, performed the bulk of this work. Nearly each week, the Committee reviewed ship licenses and passenger lists to ensure that each migrant satisfied the requirements for colonial travel. Every passenger required documentation that they owed no debts, and had taken the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. Hopeful migrants carried these papers, many of which were certified in their home parishes, from the countryside to port cities, where they were thoroughly reviewed and verified. In order to prevent illicit trade and ensure that accurate customs were collected, the cargo of ships bound for and arriving from England’s colonies received the same scrutiny. Both the Committee for Foreign Plantations and customs officers in

England closely examined bills of lading. These passes, certificates, registers, and bills of lading serve as striking evidence of the improved imperial administration enacted to meet the needs to an expanding empire.

By examining the work of the Privy Council’s Committee for Foreign Plantations, along with the customs officers in England’s domestic and colonial ports, it is fair to suggest that in many aspects, Charles’s empire was in fact, “much governed.” Like his father and predecessor, Charles also did not devote full fiscal and military resources towards furthering his empire. But he did take critical steps to develop a bureaucracy that endeavored to meet the challenges of governing and overseeing an Atlantic empire. While colonial governments still had a great deal of governing autonomy (even after Virginia became a royal colony), the Caroline government met two of its central concerns with

311 regards to its empire—the movement of people and the trafficking of goods that provided much desired customs revenue—with institutional expansion suited to these needs.

Therefore, as this chapter has demonstrated, by the end of Charles’s reign, the state’s interest in managing an empire directly correlated with the establishment of an administrative bureaucracy to support this work, based in no small part on information management.

312

Conclusion

This dissertation has examined how information management lay at the heart of the

English state’s efforts to construct an empire in the Atlantic from 1603 to 1640. As English subjects settled colonies throughout the Americas, the state also developed large networks of informants and spies, built a centralized archive, engaged in censorship and propaganda, and established administrative and bureaucratic bodies, in order to promote and protect the nascent empire. By examining these activities, this study challenges the dominant narrative of the early English Atlantic empire—characterized as a late seventeenth-century project of the fiscal-military state—and reveals the myriad strategies of information management the government employed to further its early seventeenth-century imperial project. By employing information management as a category of analysis, this project has identified spaces of power harnessed by the English state in the absence of strong military power and centralized authority. Intelligence networks, print culture, and archive building, when taken together under a shared analytical framework, are revealed as collaborative and complementary projects. Moreover, by examining these practices as tools for empire- building, this dissertation expands our criteria for the range of actors who contributed to this endeavor. As we have seen, spies, archivists, printers, Amerindian emissaries, and many others, worked under the direction of Crown and Council to further England’s fledgling empire.

In 1625, Sir Francis Bacon, Viscount St. Albans, wrote New Atlantis, the story of an ideal commonwealth. At its center was Solomon’s House, an institution committed to the discovery of knowledge and science. While the legacy of Solomon’s House was the

Royal Society created in 1660, Bacon envisioned it as a broader project of information

313 management. King Solomona, the institution’s founder, often sent intelligence agents to various countries to acquire “knowledge of the affairs of state.” Bacon described its mission in these words, “The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible".92

As J.G.A. Pocock observed in The Machiavellian Moment, effective statecraft included superb intelligence to enhance the sovereign’s ideal knowledge.93 James I was not

Plato’s philosopher-king, but he was, at least to the Spanish Ambassador, Gondomar, a

“king of scholars.”94 Like Bacon, James I and Charles I believed that knowledge, in the hands of the state, produced power. They devoted many resources towards the expansion and improvement of the state’s capacity to manage information. The early Stuart kings’ attempts to control information and increase personal sovereignty and state power demonstrates that they were deeply interested in the possibilities of using this power.

Attention to information management was not completely new—previous English and other European monarchs also sought to improve the information capabilities of the state.

But the triadic relationship between information management, the state, and the burgeoning Atlantic imperial project created a new and substantial engagement in information management. This dissertation offers a serious revision of the Stuart imperial project by examining the many ways the early Stuart kings and their governments used

92 Kimberly Herd Hale, Francis Bacon's New Atlantis in the Foundation of Modern Political Thought, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013), 103 93 John Michael Archer, Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 1-3; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 94 Gondomar’s Report on the negotiations in England, 1618, TNA SP 94/23 f. 110-131.

314 practices of information management to strengthen their position in Europe’s Atlantic contest. Early English empire building varied from the contemporaneous projects of other

European nations. Unlike Spain, James and Charles did not throw the full weight of their government’s resources behind fledgling colonies. Instead, they authorized many colonial ventures—ranging from corporate to proprietary colonies—and the support they provided to each English colony also varied.

The Crowns’ approaches to empire building changed over time. James’s approach was early modern; it was creative, flexible, and inexpensive. James approved many ventures, supporting those that showed the greatest promise—or in the case of Virginia, held the greatest significance to England’s imperial vision. James employed and expanded his existing resources to satisfy a colonial agenda. He recognized the opportunity for

Atlantic intelligence gathering in Spain following the Treaty of London (1604). There, his ambassadors, notably the exceptional intelligence master, Sir John Digby, collected intelligence to protect England’s fledgling colonies and defend England’s Atlantic interests from Philip III. James also used printed propaganda and the reach of the Church of England to protect and shape the reputation of English colonies at home. For James’s imperial project to work (without requiring him to spend his own money), he needed English subjects to invest and immigrate. James and his Privy Council framed colonial ventures as national, Christian projects to inspire this type of engagement.

James’s expansion of the State Paper Office further aligned with his approach to imperial and information management. While the office served a range of state interests, it also significantly aided empire building. James was well aware that negotiating European jurisdiction over far-flung lands and seas required possessing and harnessing the legal,

315 historical, and archival materials to establish possession. Thus, his interests in more firmly establishing domestic and foreign sovereignty paired well with an improved archive.

James devoted additional resources to empire building only when his strategy of sub-contracting imperial management failed. This was precisely the case with the Virginia

Company of London. To support Virginia in times of crisis, James and his government approved the lottery, printed propaganda, enlisted the church, and provided much-needed intelligence. But these efforts proved insufficient when the Virginia Company imploded after the 1622 massacre. The Company’s mismanagement laid bare during factional infighting, threatened to ruin the entire enterprise. James’s investigation into the Company and the conditions in the colony confirmed that the Company could no longer effectively manage the colony. To ensure the success of his fledging empire, James made Virginia a royal colony.

By demonstrating the many ways King James engaged in empire building, this study challenges the dominant narrative of the early English Atlantic empire.95 Simply because he did not approach empire building in the same way as Spain, does not imply that

James was disinterested in, or disengaged from empire building. Instead, he adopted a different approach to imperial management. This strategy may have been deliberate:

James’s ambassadors and consuls in Spain noted the state’s declining wealth despite the frequent arrival of the treasure fleets. Or perhaps James chose this method of empire building because it was cheaper; his uneven spending is well known to historians. Either way, James’s approach to empire had both advantages and weaknesses. As historians of colonial North America have shown, despite the Crown’s directives, governing these

95 Bliss, Revolution and Empire, 17; Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 13-16; Roper, English Empire in America, 131-2; Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, 410-11.

316 colonies fell to overburdened and under-supplied colonial authorities.96 Crown and Council only stepped in during times of crisis or after the persistent petitions by subjects.

Charles I’s approach to imperial management suggests both continuity and change in imperial policy. He relied on colonial governments to self-police during times of crisis, issuing numerous orders which he trusted them to enforce. He did however, also devote additional government resources to colonial oversight. The Committee for Foreign

Plantations created in the 1630s closely observed the movement of people and goods between England and the colonies. While not an exhaustive program of imperial management, this arm of Caroline governance, often overlooked, is by no means unimportant. The Committee’s rigorous examination of the documentation of New

England immigrants proves that the colony was not a crown-sanctioned safe harbor for religious dissidents. The Committee’s instructions and work also demands that historians reconsider the novelty associated with its Restoration successor, the Board of Trade.

By bringing into view this work of James, Charles, and their governments, this dissertation offers a serious revision of the character of, and periodization for, England’s

Atlantic empire. From London, the state engaged in many aspects of empire building including trade, migration, colonial governance, and fortification. As noted above, there were significant limits to exercise of state power on the ground. But my main contention, that James and Charles were neither disinterested in, nor disengaged from, empire building, is well served by this study.

By attending to information management, this dissertation makes additional significant historiographical interventions. First, I have demonstrated how information

96 Steele, Warpaths; Gleach, Powhatan's World and Colonial Virginia; Kupperman, Settling with the Indians; Fausz, “Middlemen in Peace and War.”

317 management is a useful subject of analysis for the study of early modern England and its

Atlantic colonies. At the most basic level, information management allows us to see connections between formerly disparate areas of study, including diplomacy, print culture, archive building, etc. This approach also connects often overlooked sources—ephemera, trans-Atlantic documentation, and paperwork—to a dynamic imperial project.

Information management is a particularly useful way to re-examine narratives of state building. As C.A. Bayly has aptly shown in a later imperial context, the study of information management allows states to make their limited resources of imperial control work harder. This result is certainly visible in early modern England—James, in particular, allocated few resources to imperial defense, infrastructure, and oversight. But he did employ and expand his resources for information management to suit an imperial context and agenda.

Information management was not only a way to improve the capabilities of a weak

English state, but it also enabled state building. Expanding the breadth of semi-state agents and bureaucrats, as well as government institutions, through projects of information management, improved the state’s capabilities. In this way, empire building facilitated state building, and through these processes, both were mutually constituted. Over time, as information management alone failed to meet the growing demands of an expanding empire, James and Charles turned to centralized and sustained colonial oversight. This innovation led to the foundation for the later Board of Trade, the Committee for Foreign

Plantations, which was supported by a growing professional bureaucracy.

Instead of merely departing from previous narratives of state formation, this dissertation also builds on studies of early modern English state building. In an article that

318 anticipated the arguments in his influential study of English state formation, Michael

Braddick notes a series of problems that continue to characterize the study of early modern state building. He suggests that the “tendency to reify the state or to consider it as a purely institutional phenomenon….obscures the function of the state as one of a range of social institutions through which people try to pursue their interests.”97 Noting the cooperation between local officials and brokers acting as “mediators between the central government and the locality,” Braddick argues that the growth of the local government increased the authority of the center without central initiative.98 This is a useful way to consider the center-periphery relationship between the government in London and the colonies in the

Americas. For the purposes of my study, I would modify Braddick’s assessment: the growing needs of the empire increased the authority of the center, but in turn, also required more of colonial governments. The state’s dependency on “co-operation and support” is evident in this study. We see this relationship between power and co-operation play out in a few ways. First, in Spain and in the Atlantic, a range of informants and correspondents enhanced the state’s ability to gather Atlantic intelligence. Secondly, on the ground in the colonies, cooperation between colonial authorities, individual colonists, and Amerindian go-betweens to provide information and self-police helped to establish a more successful colony.

Information management is also a particularly useful twenty-first century mode of analysis; it is informed by contemporary politics and experiences and offers a useful lens through which to interpret the past. The influence on our lives of expanded digital

97 Michael Braddick, “State Formation and Social Change in Early Modern England: A Problem Stated and Approaches Suggested,” Social History 16.1 (1991):1; See also Braddick, State Formation. 98 Ibid., 2.

319 capacities and technologies created to manage an information overload is inescapable. All of this information is presented to us as neutral, separate from the politics that underpin its creation and control. These politics of information management have become increasingly apparent over the past decade—evident in innovations like WikiLeaks, the telephone hacks of the Associated Press, and Edward Snowden’s NSA leaks. As states have made information management increasingly their business; perhaps, so too should historians.

Recent polls by the Pew Research Center and YouGov show that Americans are perhaps more accepting of government surveillance than citizens of most other countries.

While we generally disapprove of domestic surveillance (37% of those polled believe that monitoring American citizens is acceptable), we are less concerned about our government’s foreign surveillance activities. Indeed, 49% approved of the U.S. government monitoring foreign citizens, and 52% approved of monitoring other countries’ leaders.99 This suggests that Americans in particular consider acquiring information to be an intimate part of statecraft.

These recent leaks in government surveillance, particularly in the United States, reveal how states have harnessed comprehensive and efficient information systems in order

99 Chris Chambers, “The psychology of mass government surveillance: How do the public respond and is it changing our behaviour?” The Guardian, 18 March 2015, accessed 10 November 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2015/mar/18/the- psychology-of-mass-government-surveillance-how-do-the-public-respond-and-is-it-changing- our-behaviour; What Americans think about NSA surveillance, national security and privacy, George Gao. May 29, 2015. Pew Research Center. Washington, D.C. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/29/what-americans-think-about-nsa-surveillance- national-security-and-privacy/; Global Opinions of U.S. Surveillance: United States. 2014. Pew Research Center. Washington, D.C. http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/nsaopinion/country/united-states/. According to the YouGov poll, France, Britain, the Philippines were the three countries where people were most accepting of all three types of government surveillance: surveillance of its own citizens, foreign nationals, and foreign countries. By contrast, people in the United States are less accepting of domestic surveillance and more accepting of surveillance of foreign nationals and foreign countries, suggesting a greater social ingroup bias than other countries polled.

320 to further their global influence. Thus, by observing how information management is deployed as a weapon in a twentieth-century context that is largely post-imperial, projects of information in earlier imperial contexts become recognizable. This dissertation locates new spaces of power harnessed by states in pursuit of, and service to, empire building.

James I, Charles I, and their governments, built an information state: through intelligence programs built on expansive networks of informants who provided current conditions in the colonies, and information databases (such as well-organized archives) based on collections of historical materials. This information state also policed the movement of people, especially those whose ideas threatened to undermine state sovereignty and power, by requiring thorough documentation of individuals’ occupations, finances, religious reputations, and civic lives, scrutinized by the Committee for Foreign Plantation.

A final way in which information management improves our understanding of

Atlantic empire building is with regards to Atlantic connectivity. Through diverse practices of information management, the state created networks that tied together an Atlantic community. This structure was both real, evidenced in trans-Atlantic intelligence networks and paper trails, and imagined. Printed and church-propagated promotional materials endeavored to create an “imagined community” of well-intentioned English women and men desirous to spread English religion and influence to colonial spaces.100

Bacon offers us seventeenth-century insight into these processes. Indeed, his famous maxim, that knowledge is power, is reflected in this study. In Europe’s Atlantic contest, gathering and protecting imperial knowledge was critical to achieving success. But the relationship between state building, empire building, and information management is

100 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991).

321 perhaps a bit more Foucauldian: knowledge and power produced one another.101 When information management alone could no longer serve the growing needs of England’s colonies, James and Charles met the needs of empire with reforms that included modern state building. This mutually constitutive relationship between empire and state building is made visible from the wider project of imperial information management. Freed from the formal constraints of the fiscal-military state, we can see a creative and comprehensive imperial project, conceived in England but reshaped in America, tethered to the state, and connected by the Atlantic.

101 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980). Archer clarifies this relationship in this context: “power and knowledge were not identical in early modern England; they were separate domains joined through the mutually productive relationship between sovereignty and intelligence within a culture of surveillance.” Archer is principally concerned with the productive power of state intelligence, but his point well-serves the broader Jacobean project of information management, 2.

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Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (ODNB)

Adams, Simon. “Dudley, Sir Robert (1574–1649).” ODNB. Anders, Ingram. “Bishop, George (b. in or before 1538, d. 1610/11).” ODNB. Appleby, John C. Appleby. “Claiborne, William (bap. 1600, d. 1677).” ODNB. Baron, S. A. “Bourne, Nicholas (b. in or before 1584, d. 1660).” ODNB. English, Christopher. “Whitbourne, Sir Richard (1561–1635).” ODNB. Fortescue, G.K. “Fortescue, Sir Nicholas (1575?–1633).” Revised by Stephen Wright. ODNB. Handley, Stuart. “Cotton, Sir Robert Bruce, first baronet (1571–1631).” ODNB. Kelliher, W. H. “Crashawe, William (bap. 1572, d. 1625/6).” ODNB. Knafla, Louis. “Starkey, Ralph (d. 1628).” ODNB. Loomie, A. J. “Aston, Walter, Baron Aston of Forfar (1584–1639).” ODNB. Lorimer, Joyce. “Leigh, Charles (bap. 1572, d. 1605).” ODNB. McCavitt, John. “Chichester, Arthur, Baron Chichester (1563–1625).” ODNB.

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McDermott, James.“Howard, Charles, second Baron Howard of Effingham and first earl of Nottingham (1536–1624).” ODNB. Morgan, Basil. “Dale, Sir Thomas (d. 1619).” ODNB. Nicholls, Mark and Penry Williams. “Ralegh, Sir Walter (1554–1618).” ODNB. Pogson, Fiona. “Cottington, Francis, first Baron Cottington (1579?–1652).” ODNB. Pollard, A. F. “Wilson, Sir Thomas (d. 1629).” Revised by Sean Kelsey. ODNB. Rabb, Theodore K. “Sandys, Sir Edwin (1561–1629).” ODNB. Stater, Victor. “Bourchier, Henry, fifth earl of Bath (c.1587–1654).” ODNB. Thrush, Andrew. “Butler, Nathaniel (b. 1577, d. in or after 1643).” ODNB. Wright, Stephen. “Symonds, William (b. 1556, d. in or after 1616).” ODNB.

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