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UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: August 2010

Los Zetas: Baseline Assessment

2 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

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WARNING: LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION NOTICE: This product contains Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) information. No portion of the LES information should be released to the media, the general public, or over non-secure Internet servers. Release of this information could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities. This document is loaned to your agency for your official use and remains the property of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). This information can not be further released, disseminated, disclosed or transmitted without prior approval from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN DESIGNATED: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) The information contained herein remains under the control of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It is being disseminated for authorized law enforcement purposes only. This report may contain proprietary or other sensitive trade information subject to dissemination restrictions under the Trade Secrecy Act and Bank Secrecy Act and only those personnel with a need to know such information should be allowed access. Requests for use or further dissemination of any material contained herein should be made to: Director, Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20229 or by phone at (202) 344-3180.

3 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Scope (U) (U) The assessment will evaluate both threats and risks posed by Los Zetas drug trafficking organization (DTO). The focus of this assessment will be on the identification and evaluation of the following: organization structure, criminal enterprises, area of operation, communications, and modus operandi for cross-border movement of contraband.

(U) This assessment will provide CBP senior management and officers with a comprehensive baseline assessment of Los Zetas drug trafficking organization (DTO). This assessment will be a living document that will feed into the overall Common Intelligence Picture (CIP). OIOC will update this baseline assessment as required.

Executive Summary (U) (U//FOUO) The primary threat to the along the Southwest border continues to be Mexican DTOs.

(U//FOUO) Los Zetas criminal organization represents one of seven major DTOs that pose a grave threat to Mexican national security and to U.S. counternarcotics efforts. The combination of an elite military background, highly regimented structure, broad footprint, and ruthless nature make Los Zetas especially dangerous to the Mexican populace and security forces. Their ongoing conflict with rival DTOs, coupled with emerging DTO alliances, augments the danger and likelihood of violent acts conducted by Los Zetas.

4 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Report: Los Zetas

5 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Background (U) History of Organization (U) (U//FOUO) Los Zetas drug trafficking organization’s roots extend back to the late 1990s when the sought enforcement capabilities to control a portion of the burgeoning -trafficking market through . Originally comprised of 31 Mexican Airborne Special Forces Group (GAFES) deserters, Zetas were recruited by Gulf Cartel kingpin Osiel Cardenas Guillen as his personal security detail to protect his own cartel leadership position. Their specialized military background lent itself to enforcement operations, and Los Zetas emerged a coveted Gulf Cartel asset. In fact, the Gulf Cartel instructed Los Zetas to provide enforcement training to the (LFM), explaining how the LFM later earned the 1 “Los Zetas: reputation as one of Mexico’s most violent DTOs. As Los At the Service of the Gulf Cartel” Zetas membership grew and as it became more ensconced in the drug trade, the group’s strong ties to the Gulf Cartel Source: Open Source began to fade. It transformed into a semi-autonomous DTO. UNCLASSIFIED The arrest of Cardenas Guillen in 2003 and his in 2007 served as definitive catalysts in Los Zetas transformation process. By mid-2008 Los Zetas announced complete autonomy from the Gulf Cartel. Notwithstanding the separation, Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel shared areas of operation rather amicably.

(U//FOUO) However, hostility between the two separate organizations surfaced after January 18, 2010, when senior Gulf Cartel leader Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez, aka El Coss, ordered the of Victor Pena Mendoza, aka Concord 3, a Zeta captain operating in . Zeta commander Miguel Angel Trevino Morales, aka El 40, demanded the Gulf Cartel hand over the killer, which only reaffirmed that Los Zetas were no longer subservient to the Gulf Cartel. The Gulf Cartel ignored the demand, sparking numerous shootouts in and Nuevo Leon states for territorial control. As a result, homicide rates have risen significantly in a traditionally peaceful region.

1 (U) Cook, Collen W. Mexico’s Drug Cartels, Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2007, 8. Los Zetas and La Familia have transformed into bitter rivals.

6 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

(U//FOUO//LES) Although Los Zetas members are traditionally GAFES deserters, newer recruits do not necessarily possess the same military skills as original members. According to a National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) assessment, the inexperienced and undisciplined Zetas recruits pose a greater risk to U.S. and Mexican law enforcement as they are more likely to be compulsive in their use of violence to prove their worth and earn respect within the organization.2 The emergence of a cavaliering new breed of Zetas partially explains the fracture between Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel.

(U//FOUO//LES) The evolution of Los Zetas continues as they have essentially branded intimidation tactics through narco-banners, , and beheadings. Consequently, common criminals often employ DTO identifiers to instill fear in victims. However, not every so-called Zetas member is truly affiliated with the drug trafficking organization.

Zetas Recruitment Poster

Organizational Structure (U) Source: Open Source (U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas DTO consists of three UNCLASSIFIED clearly defined organizational tiers.3 The top tier includes the original GAFES deserters known as the “Old Zetas”; the majority of the original Zetas have been captured or killed, while few remain at large. The capo, lieutenants, plaza chiefs, and gatekeepers represent the remainder of the first tier. Los Zeta plaza chiefs are also collectively referred to as “La Compania.”4 Appendix 1 graphically displays the organizational structure of Los Zetas top tier. The DTO is co-led by Heriberto Lazcano Lazcano (aka Lazca, Zeta 1, Zeta 3, and El Verdugo) and Miguel Angel Trevino Morales (aka Zeta 40). It is unclear how Lazcano and Trevino share power and which lieutenants report to which of the two leaders.

2 (U) National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), 2010-Q0317-002 3 (U) Cook, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, 8; (U) Gomez, Francisco, “Los Zetas por dentro,” El Universal, December 31, 2008; Brands, Hal, Los Zetas: Inside Mexico’s Most Dangerous Drug , Air & Space Power Journal, October 2009. 4 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-LRT-10-715041

7 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

(U//FOUO//LES) The organization’s second tier consists of “New Zetas,” who include administrative, enforcement, Lossecurity, Zetas facilitation, Kingpins intelligence, and communication experts. 5 Specific members of the second tier include Guatemalan Special Forces known as Kaibiles, more recent GAFES deserters, accountants, and so-called “Old Cobras.” The Cobras assist with Zetas security and enforcement.6 Only trusted and experienced Cobras may advance from the third to the second tier.

(U//FOUO//LES) In addition to the “New Cobras”, the third tier consists of mostly common criminals that support Zetas operations. “Los Halcones” watch over distribution zones and guard safe houses. “La Direccion” includes communications experts who collect signals intelligence used to orchestrate executions and . “Las Manosos” are responsible for procuring weapons. “Las Leopardos” are information-gathering prostitutes. “Las Ventanas” are 7 unemployed or teenage lookouts. Los Zetas operate training camps to preserve the organization’sHeriberto operational Lazcano aptitude Lazcano among new recruits.Miguel Angel Trevino Morales Lazca, Zeta 40 (U//FOUO//LES)Zeta According 1, Zeta 3, El Verdugoto PGR documents, Los Zetas Formeroperate GAFES in formationssoldier resembling 8 Original Zeta Trained by U.S. DOD military squadrons.Military Four Service: or five Zetas from different tiers are mobilized to form a “stake,” which independently06/05/1991–03/27/1998 reports to senior leadership. The cellular nature of “stakes” insulates leadership and members of other “stakes.” UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) Los Zetas focused recruitment on young men, primarily current or former Mexican military. Many of the recruits come from poor families in the Mexican states of , , and .9 Los Zetas use third parties and informal connections to recruit drug “mules” and presumably other low-level, expendable personnel. They also are known to hang banners from overpasses to recruit operatives; the banners promise food and competitive salaries, exploiting the dire economic condition of many Mexican towns.10

5 (U) Kaibiles possess specialized military training in jungle guerrilla tactics. 6 (U) Gomez, “Los Zetas por dentro,” December 2008. 7 (U) Brands, Los Zetas, October 2009. 8 (U) Gomez, “Los Zetas por dentro,” December 2008. 9 (U) Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Los Zetas Threat Assessment/Operation Noble Hero (GFM3-05- 8006) 10 (U) Womer, Sarah and Robert Bunker, “Surenos and Mexican Cartel Use of Social Networking Sites,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, March 2010.

8 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Old Zetas

New Zetas

Cobras, Halcones, Dirección, Mañosos, Leopardos, Ventanas

Zetas Hierarchical Structure (U) Source: CBP UNCLASSIFIED

Criminal Enterprise (U) (U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas continue to expand their criminal enterprises, going beyond the traditional activities of a poly-drug trafficking organization. Los Zetas traffic multi-ton drug quantities, smuggle bulk cash shipments from southern into Mexico, launder illicit revenue, traffic firearms, engage in public and private corruption, and use violence to carve their share of the drug market. Los Zetas, or common criminals operating under Los Zetas brand, now engage in a bevy of other criminal enterprises, to include human smuggling, gasoline and oil theft, and pirating audio and video merchandise.11

(U//FOUO//LES) They fuel their impunity by relying on a no-nonsense “plata o plomo” (silver or lead) approach, which has lead to their ability to effectively corrupt public officials, specifically at the state and local levels. Recently, Los Zetas have been connected to near Zapata, Texas. They claim to be Mexican police but are marked with the

11 (U//FOUO//LES) HIR/ICE-0040-10; FIR-EGT-06-03358; HSIR-LRT-10-754062.

9 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

famous Zeta markings of the letter Z on their necks and arms. These Zetas operatives dress in black and carry automatic weapons along with radio cell phones. They board bass angler boats mainly on the Mexican side and demand any weapons, drugs, electronics, or money onboard. No reports claim that these pirates have actually physically harmed the victims.12 It remains unclear whether the perpetrators are truly linked to Los Zetas DTO or if they are independent criminals operating under Los Zetas brand.

Strategic Alliances (U) (U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas, like other Mexican DTOs, forge loose alliances when strategically beneficial for their own survival or to expand operational capacity in illicit activities. Los Zetas are linked to a number of other criminal organizations in pursuit of both aforementioned objectives. Los Zetas reportedly aligned with the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO) in order to contend against a common foe in the Sinaloa Federation.13 The alliance operated in two locations where Sinaloa is seeking to expand its influence: Sonora state and in Mexico’s eastern states. The Sinaloa Federation allegedly aligned with the Gulf Cartel in the wake of the Gulf-Zeta conflict sparked in January 2010. That conflict has limited Los Zetas ability to assist their BLO partners in fighting off the Sinaloa Federation in Sonora. Likewise, the death of Arturo Beltran Leyva in December 2009 created a power vacuum which ignited an internal rift within the BLO. Consequently, BLO’s capacity to assist Los Zetas in the Gulf region, in addition to fighting for its own territory, has been greatly diminished.14 Therefore, the alliance has fizzled into nothing more than a vocal show of support.

(U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas pursue international contacts, as noted in their partnership with the Guatemalan Kaibiles. They also maintain contact with Colombian DTOs, including the Envigado Office led by fugitive Maximiliano Bonilla, aka Valenciano.15 Los Zetas reportedly purchase cocaine from and Cuba.16 As with the Sinaloa and Gulf DTOs, Los Zetas have expanded their operations in Central and South America and Europe.17 (U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas also build alliances with smaller Mexican DTOs that are typically family-run and situated in specific Mexican towns along the border. For example, Los Zetas

12 (U) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2010/05/29/AR2010052903707.html?wprss=rss_print 13 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR-LRT-10-754443 14 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR-LRT-10-754443 15 (U) OSC, LAP20100509053007 16 (U) OSC, LAP20100607470001 17 (U) OSC, LAP20100408357003

10 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010 facilitate narcotics trafficking through Ciudad Acuna, state, using the Calderia, Andrade, and Rangel DTOs.18

(U//FOUO//LES) Lastly, Mexico’s Deputy Attorney's Office for Special Investigation into (SIEDO) reported in February 2010 that the country’s main DTOs employ over 5,000 gangs and over 20,000 gang members to carry out narco-related activities.19 Los Zetas are affiliated with the MS-13 and Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos street gangs and with the and the gangs. The gangs are used to carry out contract killings and to smuggle drugs, firearms, and people.20

Area of Operation (U) (U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas expanded their range of influence considerably as the Gulf Cartel’s enforcement apparatus and as an independent drug trafficking organization. Los Zetas maintain a presence in Mexico, ,21 and , with the former being the main area of Zeta operations. Los Zetas mainly reside within Mexico’s eastern and southern states, but there are documented cases of Zeta presence and influence in other regions as well. Los Zetas Zetas Mexican Area of Operations (U) operate in the following Mexican states: Source: Mexican Public Security Secretariat (SSP) UNCLASSIFIED

18 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR-DRT-08-00836 19 (U) OSC, LAP20100210470001. 20 (U//FOUO) HIR/ICE-0040-10; (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-DRT-08-17078; (U//FOUO//LES) HIR/ICE-0118-09; (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR-LRT-10-754443 21 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-MUR-09-02458

11 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Zetas Presence in Mexican States (U) Tamaulipas22 Nuevo Leon23 Campeche24 Coahuila25 Veracruz26 Sonora27 San Luis Potosi,28 Hidalgo29 Zacatecas30 Tabasco31 Quintana Roo32 Yucatán Oaxaca33 Puebla34 Aguascalientes35 Guanajuato36 Guerrero37 Michoacan38 Chiapas39 Federal District40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas influence has breached the border and extended into the United States. Their drug distribution network contains key hubs within the state of Texas. Meanwhile, their interests and influence reach many non-border U.S. cities as well. Reportedly, Los Zetas operatives have homesteaded in the United States to recruit teenagers and young adults.

(U//FOUO//LES) In the wake of their dispute for territorial control with the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas have incurred several significant losses along the Texas-Mexico border. However, they continue to dominate large swaths of Tamaulipas state and are poised to capture other key drug- trafficking corridor cities, including Matamoros.41 According to seizure figures from Laredo, Del Rio, and Eagle Pass, Los Zetas appear to be re-routing drug loads through the more permissive

22 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR: ICE-IH-04998-10 23 (U//FOUO//LES) HIR/ICE-0408-10 24 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR-LRT-10-754433 25 (U//FOUO//LES) HIR/ICE-0410-10 26 (U//FOUO//LES) DROLEAD-0000313-10. Los Zetas allegedly operate training camps in Veracruz state. 27 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR-ITTU-09-669123 28 (U) OSC, LAP20100504049005 29 (U) OSC, LAP20100511470001 30 (U) OSC, LAP20100504049006 31 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR: ICE-QC-03256-10 32 (U) OSC, LAP20100527470003. According to SIEDO, Los Zetas and the BLO hold absolute control over drug trafficking and sales in state. 33 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR: ICE-QC-03047-10 34 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-TCA-08-16085 35 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-TCA-08-16085 36 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-TCA-08-16085 37 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-TCA-08-16085 38 (U) Cook, Mexico’s Drug Cartels, October 2007. 39 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-TCA-08-16085 40 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-TCA-08-16085 41 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-FTB-10-774896

12 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010 western routes, specifically through Ciudad Acuna and Piedras Negras, Coahuila state.42 The shift in trafficking routes likely stems from the inter-cartel violence and from the military’s strong presence in . This smuggling trend will likely continue as long as the security situation in Nuevo Laredo remains volatile.43

Zetas Presence in U.S. Cities 44 (U) Gainesville, FL Miami, FL West Palm Beach, FL Atlanta, GA Dubuque, IA Chicago, IL New Orleans, LA Shreveport, LA Boston, MA Lawrence, MA Detroit, MI St. Louis, MO Raleigh, NC Wilson, NC Manchester, NH Buffalo, NY New York City, NY Cleveland, OH Memphis, TN Nashville, TN Austin, TX Beaumont, TX Brownsville, TX Dallas, TX Eagle Pass, TX Edinburg, TX Forth Worth, TX , TX , TX Laredo, TX McAllen, TX Mission, TX Port Arthur, TX Prosper, TX City, TX Roma, TX Victoria, TX FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

42 (U//FOUO//LES) BVIC 4/23/10-4/29/10 43 (U//FOUO//LES) BVIC 4/23/10-4/29/10 44 (U//FOUO//LES) NDIC 2010-S0787-004

13 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Zetas U.S. Area of Operations (U)

Source: Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, August 2008 thru December 2009. FOR OFFCIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECEMENT SENSITIVE Communications (U)

(U//FOUO//LES) As former Mexican GAFES soldiers, Los Zetas possess expertise in sophisticated communication. In fact, the name of the criminal organization stems from the radio call signs assumed by its members. Each original member of the criminal organization assumed radio call signs starting with the letter Z followed by a number. Los Zetas use other means of communication as well. Los Zetas also operate an effective media campaign using popular Internet sites like YouTube to build a reputation that they will make good on their threats, to rally operatives and supporters, and as propaganda to intimidate rivals. The effective campaign explains why street-level criminals would choose to use Los Zetas brand to intimidate victims and rivals. Los Zetas use non-verbal communication through narco-banners and identifying symbols (the letter Z 45 and the following logos: Ferrari, MGM, and John Deere46 47) to

45 Zeta stands for the letter Z in Spanish.

14 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010 intimidate the public, summon rivals, and provide red-on-red de-confliction for “stakes” operating in the same area.

(U//FOUO//LES) In addition, Los Zetas have watchtowers in tactical spots along the Mexican border. Falcon Lake, located near Zapata, Texas, sits astride the U.S. Mexico border. Falcon Lake is becoming a well known Zetas territory as well as a strategic drug-trafficking hotspot. A three story watchtower on the Mexican side of the lake is used to observe all actions by Border Patrol agents. Los Zetas know where all boats are at all times and know exactly when a shift change is going to occur. This tactical knowledge helps them transport drugs to U.S. stash houses in the form of rented cabins located in Texas’s Falcon State Park.48

(U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas smuggling organization has a radio communication system. Los Zetas carry cell phones with cameras. There are claims that they utilize some sort of equipment where they can triangulate certain radio signals. In addition, Los Zetas have listening equipment, where they may overhear conversations with possible recording capabilities.49

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

(U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas employ computer and technological experts. Many of these hired experts can track cell phone signatures of their rivals and penetrate police and military communication channels. Reports assert that Los Zetas have a computer device that allows them to download telephone numbers from cell phone SIM cards. In addition, they have the capability to dial a phone number from the database and observe which cellular tower the phone signal is routed through, exposing their target’s approximate location. Los Zetas have proven their advanced capabilities in the use of commercially available technology to coordinate strategy and operations.50

46 (U//LES) Tucson Urban Area Security Initiative, Situational Awareness Bulletin, 6/18/2010. 47 (U//FOUO//LES) FIR-FBN-09-687767 48 (U) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-yn/content/article/2010/05/29/AR2010052903707.html?wprss=rss_print 49 (U//FOUO//LES) HIR/CBP-2186-07 50 (U//FOUO//LES) HIR/CBP-2186-07

15 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Methods of Cross-Border Movement of Contraband (U)

(U//FOUO//LES) Although the situation between the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas remains volatile, they both continue to control the major smuggling routes and entry points into the United States through .51 If CBP seizures in the Laredo Field Office and Laredo Sector are indicative of drug smuggling activity, drug flow into South Texas increased significantly between September 2009 and March 2010. Drug flow then nearly halved in April 2010 and has remained fairly constant to date. The sudden decline in drug flow suggests that the violence between Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel has had a significant impact on the groups’ ability to smuggle narcotics. As violence dissipates and as the warring factions settle into their new respective areas of influence, drug flow into South Texas will likely increase dramatically as they offload stored loads.

(U//FOUO//LES) Like all DTOs, Los Zetas rely on major highways to transport drug loads to distribution hubs throughout Mexico, Texas, and the rest of the United States. Interstate Highway 35 serves as an ideal corridor for Zeta drug loads as it directly connects Laredo to San Antonio, Austin, Waco, and Dallas; it also leads to Interstate Highway 10, which reaches Houston, a major node in Los Zetas’ U.S. distribution network.

(U//FOUO//LES) However, according to seizure figures from Laredo, Del Rio, and Eagle Pass, Los Zetas appear to be re-routing drug loads through the more permissive western routes, specifically through Ciudad Acuna and Piedras Negras, Coahuila state.52 State Highway 90 from Del Rio and State Highway 57 from Eagle Pass feed into Interstate Highways 35 and 10, making those border towns nearly as valuable as Laredo.

(U//FOUO//LES) Los Zetas employ family-run DTOs situated in Mexican border towns to carry out cross-border drug movements.53

(U//FOUO//LES) The profit-driven business of trafficking drugs has led Los Zetas to arm and train their transporters to defend drug shipments and to violently engage U.S. law enforcement if challenged.54 Los Zetas have a reputation for mounting armed incursions into the United States to protect drug shipments and other interests.55

51 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR: ICE-QC-03805-10 52 (U//FOUO//LES) BVIC 4/23/10-4/29/10. 53 (U//FOUO//LES) HSIR-DRT-08-00836; Los Zetas facilitates narcotics trafficking through Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila state, using the Calderia, Andrade, and Rangel DTOs. 54 (U) NDIC, 2010-Q0317-002 55 (U) Brands, Los Zetas, October 2009.

16 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Intelligence Gaps (U) • (U) The full extent of Los Zetas associations with legitimate U.S. and foreign businesses • (U) Possible locations of stash houses, labs, and grow operations • (U) The terminology and code words used within the Los Zetas organization • (U) The exact information Los Zetas are collecting on U.S. law enforcement activities • (U) Zeta-linked corruption among U.S. law enforcement personnel and among the upper echelons of Mexican law enforcement and politics • (U) Standard recruiting process for prospective DTO members at each functional level • (U) Favored modes of drug transportation

Actions/Follow Ups (U) • (U) OIOC will continue to work with DHS and Intelligence Community partners in the exchange of information pertaining to Mexican drug trafficking organizations. • (U) OIOC will continue to monitor Los Zetas and provide updated information as needed.

Tracked By (U) • (U) DHS SINs HSEC-05-00000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-01001-ST-2009, HSEC-05-02000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-03000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-04000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-05000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-06000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-07000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-08000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-09000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-10000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-11000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-12000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-13000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-14000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-15000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-16000-ST-2009, HSEC-05-17000-ST-2009, HSEC-07-01000-ST-2009, HSEC-08-01000-ST-2009, HSEC-08-02000-ST-2009, HSEC-16-00000-ST-2009

17 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

• (U) CBP PIRs OBP-SWB-3.1.2, OBP-SWB-4.1.1.1, OBP-SWB-4.1.2.1, OBP-SWB-4.1.2.2, OBP-SWB-4.1.2.3, OBP-SWB-4.1.2.4, OBP-SWB-4.1.2.5, OBP-SWB-4.1.3.2, OBP-SWB-4.1.4.1, OBP-SWB-4.2.1.1, OBP-SWB-4.2.1.3, OBP-SWB-4.2.1.6, OBP-SWB-4.2.2, OBP-SWB-4.2.3, OBP-SWB-4.2.3.3, OBP-SWB-4.2.5.3, OBP-SWB-4.2.6.1, OBP-SWB-4.2.7.3

18 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

Appendix (U)

• (U) DTO: a drug trafficking organization can be considered the single unit that when combined with other drug trafficking organizations form a . Not every Mexican drug trafficking organization is part of a cartel.

• (U) Cartel: a criminal organization formed to promote and control the production and distribution of narcotic drugs. They range from loosely-managed agreements among various drug traffickers to formalized commercial enterprises. They are structured groups, which exists for an extended period of time. A drug cartel is large in number of members, covers a large amount of territory, and has extensive connections with foreign and native criminal groups. The group uses violence and corruption to continue its criminal activity. A drug cartel differs from a drug trafficking organization, because it is an amalgamation of independent organizations that agree to work together under the direction of specific leaders and a main boss.

• (U) Lieutenant: a commissioned officer ranking above a second lieutenant and below a captain. It often designates someone who is "second-in-command," and as such, may precede the name of the rank directly above it.

• (U) Cell: a functional basic unit or a group of a DTO or a Cartel.

• (U) Recruiting/Recruitment: a process of adding new individuals; attracting, screening, and selecting qualified people for a job at a DTO or Cartel.

• (U) Stash House: a place in which something is stored secretly; hiding place; cache. A warehouse, a commercial building used by DTOs to store drugs, etc. They are usually large plain buildings in industrial areas of cities and towns. They usually have loading docks to load and unload “goods” from trucks.

• (U) Sicario: an assassin.

• (U) Plaza: a geographic area within a country controlled by a specific DTO or a Cartel, a cartel stronghold.

19 01BA-10-TSTA U.S. Customs and Border Protection (202) 344-1150 Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination www.cbp.gov 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW [email protected] Washington, DC 20229 UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED // FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORECMENT SENSITIVE

Baseline Assessment: Los Zetas August 2010

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