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The Nexus Between provide insight on this community, it in 1986 (led since the mid-1990s by the is necessary to rely on reports by the Egyptian imam Mahmoud Shershaby), Salafism and Jihadism in ’ National Coordinator thereby laying the foundations of the the Netherlands for Counterterrorism (NCTb) and the Salafist infrastructure in the Netherlands AIVD, newspaper clippings and the as a whole.8 Three years later, another By Beatrice de Graaf extensive field work of anthropologists Saudi private missionary organization and social scientists who carried out with headquarters in Riyadh, al- immediately after the 9/11 attacks, CNN research projects among Salafist youths Waqf, initiated the establishment of displayed images from the Dutch city of in the Netherlands in recent years.6 the foundation al-Waqf al-Islami in Ede where groups of youth of Moroccan Based on this information, this article Eindhoven. The al-Fourqaan mosque in descent gleefully cheered and shouted will explain why Salafism7 gained Eindhoven, led by the Sudanese imam over the apparent blow dealt to the popularity in the Netherlands, and then Eisha Bersham, became the center of United States. Two years later, Shaykh examine the three stages through which this foundation’s activities. In 1990, Fawaz Jneid, a well-known imam from it has passed since the 9/11 attacks on also with Saudi support, the Foundation a Salafist mosque in the Netherlands, the United States. Sounna was created in The Hague (in cursed president George W. Bush, Ariel 1998 renamed as the Foundation As- Sharon, Dutch parliamentarian Hirsi 1986-2001: The Creation of a Salafist Soennah/Centrum Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Ali and filmmaker Theo van Gogh and Infrastructure in the Netherlands Taymia), led by the Syrian imam Fawaz begged Allah “to destroy the enemies of The Saudi non-governmental Jneid and preacher Jamal Ahajjaj (Abu Islam.”1 Another imam refused to shake missionary organization al-Haramain Ismail), who both play an important part hands with a Dutch female minister, was responsible for the creation of the in the dissemination of Salafism in the and a third advised his followers to El Tawheed Foundation in Netherlands.9 The Foundation ISOOK10 throw homosexuals from the roof.2 On in Tilburg (led by the Syrian imam November 2, 2004, two months after field study of the Salafist movement in the Netherlands Ahmed Salaam) was created in 2000, Fawaz had cursed Theo van Gogh, is soon to be published, however: Ineke Roex, Sjef van through indirect assistance from Saudi a young Dutch Muslim, Mohammed Stiphout and Jean Tillie, Salafisme in Nederland. Aard, Arabia. Salam is considered a highly Bouyeri, murdered and slaughtered omvang en dreiging (Amsterdam: IMES, 2010). Another educated cleric, who has published Van Gogh, quoting passages from the good overview is “Salafisme in Nederland: Een voorbi- many religious works; Fawaz Jneid and 3 medieval Salafist cleric Ibn Taymiyya. jgaand fenomeen of een blijvende factor van belang?” Mahmoud Shershaby are said to be his These incidents, and especially the Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Counterterrorism pupils. terrorist attack committed by Bouyeri, (NCTb), 2008. Also see Martijn de Koning, Zoeken naar brought the Salafist movement to een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van Other organizations came into existence the center of Dutch public outrage jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Amsterdam: Bert as well, such as the Foundation for and debate, and prompted the Dutch Bakker, 2008). Islamic Youths in Breda, founded Intelligence and Security Service 6 Most notably, Frank J. Buijs, Froukje Demant and in March 1990, or the al-Haramain (AIVD) to warn against the damaging Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem. Radicale en Humanitarian Aid Amsterdam (which influence of Salafist ideology on the democratische moslims in Nederland (Amsterdam: Amster- was dissolved in 2006). The Salafist 4 Dutch Muslim community. dam University Press, 2006) and De Koning, Zoeken naar movement, however, was still a minor een ‘zuivere’ islam. current within the Muslim community An authoritative or exhaustive history 7 Salafism is not a unified movement, as it displays in the Netherlands during this time of the emergence of Salafism in the various currents, historical trajectories and genealogies. period, according to an AIVD report 11 Netherlands does not exist, nor has Many Salafists are non-violent, and various strains are from 1998. the Salafist population in the country apolitical. Moreover, it is often used as a normative self- 5 been mapped out meticulously. To descriptor, used by religious factions to claim religious The above-mentioned foundations and and political legitimacy, than as an objectifying term. mosques in Amsterdam, Eindhoven, 1 “Imam beticht van opruiing tegen Van Gogh,” NRC Salafists claim adherence to the first three generations The Hague and Tilburg constitute the Handelsblad, October 31, 2006. of exemplary followers of the Prophet . As most prominent Salafist hubs in the 2 Jaco Alberts and Steven Derix, “Laveren tussen de wet Quintan Wiktorowicz has described in his seminal text Netherlands, drawing some 1,500 (As- en Allah,” NRC Handelsblad, September 19, 2005. from 2006, Salafists are united around the strict adher- Soennah) or even 2,000 visitors (al- 3 Ibid. ence to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God, or Fourqaan) each Friday (of a population 4 “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical- monotheism), the rejection of innovations (bid`a) of the of about 850,000 Muslims in the 12 isme in Nederland,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Ser- Islamic creed and practice, the condemnation of polythe- Netherlands). In comparison with other vice, 2007; “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele trends en ism (shirk) and all other forms of venerating humans or ontwikkelingen van het salafisme in Nederland,” Dutch objects. Salafists maintain that theirs is the only- legiti 8 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; De Koning, Zoeken Intelligence and Security Service, December 2009. mate interpretation of the Qur’an and sunna. To them, naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, pp. 373-377. 5 Salafism is a relatively new phenomenon in the Neth- Islamic pluralism, let alone subjective individual inter- 9 Ibid. erlands. As a movement, it is very closed to the outside pretation without being an accepted authority, does not 10 ISOOK stands for the Islamitische Stichting voor Op- world. Therefore, the author does not pretend to give exist. For an overview of Salafism, see Roel Meijer ed., voeding en Overdracht van Kennis (Islamic Foundation an in-depth analysis, but presents this article as a well- Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: for Education and Dissemination of Knowledge). informed snapshot of the present situation, taken in- Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 1-32; Quintan Wiktorow- 11 “De politieke islam in Nederland,” Dutch Intelligence stead from a security studies’ point of view, rather than icz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,”Studies in Conflict and Security Service, 1998. a theological or anthropological one. The first in-depth and 29:3 (2006): pp. 207-239. 12 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.”

17 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 countries such as the United Kingdom, and the jihadi/takfiri Salafists (or Salafi- Dutch defenders of national security, Germany or France, these Salafist jihadists).16 Western liberalism and secularization. groups became more popular and rooted within the Muslim communities than Selefies, as they label themselves, are the Therefore, after years of benign neglect, other related radical Islamist currents most apolitical, pious group, and claim Moroccans, Turks and other immigrants such as Hizb al-Tahrir (Hizb ut-Tahrir) to be non-violent. Their main preacher were now framed as “Muslims” and or Takfir wal-Hijra.13 is Abdillah Bouchta, a Salafist teacher were held responsible for jihadist from Tilburg. The second group includes attacks elsewhere. The consequence of The Salafist mosques also mobilize more politically-oriented Salafists who this application of religious frames of a multinational crowd of visitors. are non-violent as well, but engage more identity in mainstream Dutch discourse Muslims from the Maghreb, the Horn in local and international politics. This was that youth with Moroccan parents, of Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, strand develops its mobilizing power but born and raised in the Netherlands, Turkey, the Middle East and Dutch through central nodes within the Muslim embraced this stigmatization and fell converts are among the attendants.14 community, most of them financed back on this new collective, post-ethnic Although the Salafist movement in or inspired by Saudi organizations.17 Muslim identity. They adopted the general consists of Saudi, Egyptian A third, very marginal strand can be same set of mechanisms that can be or Syrian members, Dutch Moroccans described as the jihadi/takfiri branch of found within other youth cultures: they constitute the predominant group, Salafism, according to De Koning, and appropriated a negative identity that in particular Muslim youth of comprises a small number of Muslims, frightened and provoked the mainstream Moroccan descent (40% of the Dutch especially those connected to the former population by incorporating violent Moroccan population is under 30).15 Hofstad Group.18 and dangerous symbols and discourses The Moroccan community was also in their group identity.20 They adopted responsible for the establishment These groups differ, for example, symbols and discourses from the Salafi- of the As-Soennah and al-Fourqaan regarding the status of Islamic clerics, jihadi movement since this provided mosques. attitudes toward parliamentary them with the tools to transform democracy and the desirability of the themselves into superior and militant 2001-2002: Salafism as Empowerment resurrection of a caliphate.19 Although human beings with direct access to the In the Netherlands, Salafi-jihadism is a the first two branches of Salafism “Truth.”21 latecomer compared to the other Salafist are non-violent, they nevertheless communities in Europe, where political imported theological doctrines on From 2002-2003 onward, a small refugees from the Middle East and the war against infidels, the search number of these alienated second- veterans from the wars in Afghanistan, for a pure Islam and the tools for a generation immigrants of Moroccan Bosnia and Chechnya imported militant radical form of Muslim empowerment descent entered the path of violent experiences to the West as early as to the Netherlands. These radical radicalization. Among them were the the late 1980s, such as in France and ideas grew in popularity within the members of the so-called “Hofstad in the United Kingdom. From the late Muslim community after 2001, when Group.” 1990s, but especially after 9/11, these the so-called “Fortuyn-revolt” in the Salafist groups extended their religious Netherlands gained momentum and 2002-2004: Salafism as a Hotbed for infrastructure in the Netherlands: started to attack “Muslim immigration.” Homegrown Jihadism22 they built new mosques, websites and The charismatic right-wing politician In late 2001 to early 2002, the AIVD informal networks. Martijn de Koning and his effervescent began monitoring Salafist centers, such discerns three groups among them: populist party entered the political as the al-Fourqaan mosque in Eindhoven “Selefies,” politically involved Salafists stage in August 2001 and linked Islam, that was suspected of recruiting young immigration, integration and terrorism Muslims for the international jihad.23 In 13 Hizb al-Tahrir is a very hierarchical organization, but together, discursively framing them into 2002, two Dutch Moroccans were killed lacks infrastructure and cadre in the Netherlands. This a security issue, which of course made in Kashmir, Khalid el-Hasnoui and can be explained by the absence of a large immigrant an impression immediately after 9/11. Ahmed el-Bakiouli, both supposedly community from Pakistan or India in the Netherlands. The Salafist movement in particular The first activities of radical Salafist and jihadist groups became the focus of political and 20 Martijn de Koning, “Een wekelijks portie burger- in the Netherlands were initiated by immigrants from public attention, since the Salafists— schap 8 – Wat meer radicalisering graag,” February Algeria, Morocco or Syria, all countries where Hizb with their emphasis on purity, hatred 22, 2010, available at www.religionresearch.org/mar- al-Tahrir is less active. Immigration history and coinci- against “infidels” and revulsion against tijn/2010/02/22/een-wekelijks-portie-burgerschap-8- dence played a part in this. supposedly low moral standards in the wat-meer-radicalisering-graag. 14 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” West—posed the mirror image to the 21 De Koning, “Changing Worldviews,” pp. 404-423. 15 Ten percent of the immigrant population is Moroccan 22 This paragraph is partly based on the chapter “The (approximately 345,000 in 2009), whereas the Turkish 16 Martijn de Koning, “Changing Worldviews and Van Gogh : A New Threat from Homegrown minority stands at 11%. See the Centraal Bureau voor Friendship: An Exploration of the Life Stories of Two Terrorism in The Netherlands,” to be published in the de Statistiek located at http://statline.cbs.nl; V. van den Female Salafis in the Netherlands,” in Meijer, Global forthcoming book, Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Rein- Maagdenberg, “Jaarrapport Integratie,” in Onderzoek ver- Salafism, pp. 408-410. ares, Leader-led Jihad (New York: Columbia University richt in opdracht van het Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 17 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” Press, 2010). (SCP) (Rotterdam: Instituut voor Sociologisch-Econo- 18 De Koning, “Changing Worldviews,” p. 410. 23 “OM: moskee Eindhoven werft strijders,” NRC Han- misch Onderzoek, 2004), pp. 13-14. 19 Buijs et al. delsblad, May 3, 2003.

18 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 recruited in the al-Fourqaan mosque.24 to the notice of the AIVD in January Akhnikh even bragged about contacts Months later, 13 individuals were 2003, when he took the train to Berlin, with Maulana Masood Azhar, the arrested for terrorist activities, some bound for Chechnya, to join local founder of Jaysh-i-Muhammad, which of whom were regular visitors of al- jihadists in their fight against Russian they later downplayed in court—but no Fourqaan.25 forces together with his friend Khalid evidence of concrete preparations was (or Hussam, who was 17-years-old), found.38 Beginning in December 2001, the but they were arrested and put back on AIVD also monitored the radical a train to the Netherlands.31 After his Then, on the early morning of November Salafist El Tawheed mosque in the return, Azzouz’s status rose; he started 2, 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a 26-year- north of Amsterdam for suspicion of his own Islamic book company and old Dutch Moroccan, born and raised in Egyptian and Saudi influences, since began only associating with Moroccan Amsterdam, awaited publicist Theo van the mosque had financial relations to a youth.32 Gogh in an Amsterdam street, shot him Saudi non-governmental organization, off his bicycle and slaughtered him with al-Haramain International.26 In the Ismail Akhnikh was another Hofstad a ritual knife in the street in front of summer of 2002, the service identified Group member with international many witnesses.39 Under the new Dutch a group of Muslim youth, who met in aspirations. Akhnikh, born in anti-terrorism laws passed in August and around the mosque and gathered Amsterdam in 1982 from Moroccan 2004, Bouyeri was arrested and tried around Redouan al-Issar (also named immigrants, regularly attended the El for murder with “terrorist intent.”40 “Abu Khaled” or “the Shaykh”) who Tawheed mosque in Amsterdam where On July 26, 2005, he received a life had ties to radical Muslims in Spain and he became acquainted with Azzouz and sentence, without parole—unusually Belgium.27 Abu Khaled was an illegal helped to form the Hofstad Group in the harsh in Dutch judicial history.41 immigrant from Syria, a former member fall of 2002.33 In the summer of 2003, of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and he traveled with Azzouz to Barcelona Bouyeri’s action took the security a Takfir wal-Hijra adherent who came to meet with Abdeladim Akoudad for services by surprise. From 2002, to the Netherlands in 1995.28 For a guidance and instructions.34 Abdeladim the AIVD had monitored a group of number of radical Muslims, he became Akoudad (or “Naoufel”), a Moroccan jihadist radicals with whom Bouyeri a mentor.29 living in Spain, was suspected by was acquainted, a network the service the Moroccan security services of internally dubbed as the “Hofstad He inspired, among others, 17-year-old involvement in the Casablanca attacks Group” since it operated in the nation’s high school student Samir Azzouz, of of May 16, 2003.35 capital, Amsterdam (Hofstad translates Moroccan origin but born and raised in as “capital city”).42 Its core members the Netherlands.30 Samir Azzouz came After temporary arrests in October were under surveillance, but Bouyeri 2003, Akhnikh, Azzouz and Jason did not belong to them. He did not take 24 Siem Eikelenboom, Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam Walters further developed their skills as part in the foreign trips some of the in Nederland (Amsterdam: Veen, 2004), p. 63. jihadists and urged other Muslims to go members made and was not considered a 36 25 Eikelenboom, Jihad in de polder; “Annual Report abroad to wage jihad. Akhnikh went to 2002,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 2003; Pakistan that year, as did “Zakaria T.” “Saoedische invloeden in Nederland. Verbanden tussen and Walters (who even went twice, in 2004, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, 2004–2005. 37 salafistische missie. Radicaliseringsprocessen en isla- July and December 2003). Walters and 38 Ibid. mistisch terrorisme,” Dutch Intelligence and Security 39 A highly informative account of the assassination of Service, June 2004. dam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2007). Van Gogh and the development of the Hofstad Group can 26 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; “De omstreden El 31 Ibid. be found in: Albert Benschop, “Jihad in the Netherlands. Tawheed-Moskee,” NOVA broadcast, November 9, 32 Ibid. Chronicle of a Political Murder Foretold,” available at 2004. According to NOVA, Saudi businessman Aqeel 33 “Verdict in the Hofstad-case,” Court of Rotterdam, www.sociosite.org/jihad_nl_en.php. Alaqeel financed the El Tawheed mosque with 1.3- mil The Hague, March 10, 2006. Also see Emerson Ver- 40 See the verdict against Bouyeri, Court of Amsterdam, lion euros. Al-Haramain was blacklisted as an al-Qa`ida maat, De Hofstadgroep. Portret van een radicaal-islamitisch July 26, 2005. charity, but the accusations were not substantiated and netwerk (Soesterberg: Aspekt, 2005), pp. 55-77. 41 In the Netherlands, life sentences are rare. Bouyeri the mosque continued to operate. Thanks to Dennis de 34 Ibid. was the 28th person to receive such a sentence since 1945, Widt for these references. 35 Petter Nesser, The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker: Reli- war criminals included. Capital felonies, such as murder, 27 “Letter to Parliament,” Netherlands’ ministers of the giously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name usually result in sentences of 10-15 years. The new terror- interior and justice, Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, of Global Jihad? (Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research ism law, however, states that if there is a terrorist motive No. 5319045, November 10, 2004, pp. 20-24. Establishment, 2005), pp. 17-19. for a crime, the sentence can be increased by half. Impris- 28 Ibid. 36 “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken onments ordinarily in excess of 15 years can be upgraded 29 “Feitenrelaas,” attachment to the “Letter to Parlia- tegen Nadir A. etc.,” National Prosecutor’s Office (Lan- to , as was the case with Bouyeri. ment,” Netherlands’ ministers of the interior and justice, delijk Parket), Amsterdam, February 6, 2005, pp. 7, 13. 42 Description of this case is based, among others, on the Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, No. 29854, Novem- 37 “Dutch Radical Islamic Group Planned Euro 2004 requisitory of the National Prosecution in the Hofstad ber 10, 2004. Attack in Portugal,” Agence France-Presse, November Group case. See “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie,” 30 For an account of this story, see “Samir A. First En- 15, 2004; “Dutch Islamists Planned Barroso Attack,” Re- part I, National Prosecutor’s Office, January 23, 2006 emy of the State,” KRO Reporter, October 1, 2006. The uters, November 15, 2004; “Letter to Parliament,” Neth- and part II, January 25, 2006; District Court of Rotter- documentary includes interviews with Azzouz and his erlands’ minister of justice, November 10, 2004, Han- dam, verdict in the Hofstad Group case, March 10, 2006; wife. Also see Eric Vrijsen, “Van Samir A tot Marad J,” delingen van de Tweede Kamer, 2004–2005. Also see “The ‘Hofstadgroep,’” working paper, Transnational Elsevier, December 1, 2005; Arjan Erkel, Samir (Amster- the parliamentary debate on this report on November 11, Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, April 2008.

19 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 main actor in the Dutch jihadist scene.43 O Hirshi Ali.” “I deem thee lost, O Finally, it is argued that Bouyeri acted Bouyeri’s radical texts calling for unbelieving fundamentalist.”46 in line with Fawaz Jneid’s malediction violent jihad, disseminated under the of Theo van Gogh and Hirsi Ali.53 name “Abu Zubair,” were only noticed These two texts showed that Bouyeri’s after the police and the AIVD stepped attack was the outcome of an ideological After these connections became public, up their investigation into the Hofstad turn to violent jihad that evolved from the whole Salafist movement was put on Group after the murder of Van Gogh on the Hofstad Group, since Bouyeri wrote trial in the eyes of the Dutch population. November 2, 2004.44 these texts in spiritual support for The members of the Hofstad Group had this network.47 In one of Bouyeri’s last been visitors of the As-Soennah and El After the attack, it became clear that writings, an “Open Letter to the Dutch Tawheed mosques in The Hague and Bouyeri sought legitimacy for his Population” dated August 12, 2004 Amsterdam.54 The al-Fourqaan mosque atrocity in religious arguments. With (which he left on a USB-stick for other in Eindhoven was accused of recruitment him, he had a farewell letter titled Hofstad Group members to disseminate activities and radical Salafist imams had “Drenched in Blood.” This versed text within “the umma”),48 he announced on many occasions lashed out against the read as an incitement to holy war and attacks against Dutch public places, Netherlands, homosexuals and liberal was signed Saifu Deen al-Muwahhied. justifying them due to the support of intellectuals such as Hirsi Ali or Theo van According to Ruud Peters, a Dutch Islam the Dutch government for the United Gogh.55 In the perception of large parts expert and witness for the prosecution, States and Israel. His argument echoed of the Dutch population, the November this alias was a combination of two a fatwa announced by dissident Saudi attack showed that every orthodox Arabic terms—“sword of religion” Shaykh Hamud Ibn `Uqla al-Shu’aybi, Muslim could be a potential terrorist,56 (Saif al-Din) and “confessor of Tawhid” legitimizing the September 11 attacks.49 and opinion polls said that 80% of the (al-Muwahhid).45 In the “open letter,” A translation of this fatwa was found population wanted “tougher policies Bouyeri directly threatened Dutch- on computers of other Hofstad Group against immigrants.”57 Jihadist terrorism Somali liberal politician Hirsi Ali, and members.50 became a public nightmare. In 2005, the blamed politicians for allowing Jewish Dutch population listed it as the most influences in politics. According to Bouyeri and the Hofstad Group drew important issue facing the country.58 Norwegian researcher Petter Nesser, inspiration from several Salafist the conclusion of the letter shows “the sources. They took the principle of al- 2004-2010: Salafist Resilience Against essence of ‘al-Qaidaism,’” by foreseeing wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) Jihadists the defeat of the enemy on the individual, from the Salafist cleric Abu Muhammad After the murder of Van Gogh and local, regional and global levels in order al-Maqdisi, which dictates that true the public outrage that followed suit, of priority: jihadists should isolate themselves from a process of reorientation seemed to the non-Muslim world and hate those set in within the Salafist movement And like a great prophet once said: who threaten Islam.51 From the London- in the Netherlands, partly due to the “I deem thee lost, O Pharaoh.” based Salafist imam Abu Hamza al- increased monitoring and control (17:102) And so we want to use Masri, they took the principle of takfir activities conducted against them similar words and send these (declaring fellow Muslims infidels).52

before us, so that the heavens and keling van Mohammed Bouyeri. Deskundigenrapport the stars will gather this news and 46 Nesser, p. 25. opgesteld op verzoek van het Openbaar Ministerie voor spread it over the corners of the 47 “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie.” de Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam,” May 2005; universe like a tidal wave. “I deem 48 “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken R. Peters, “Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald thee lost, O America.” “I deem tegen Nadir A. etc.,” pp. 31-32. door Mohammed B,” attachment to the report mentioned thee lost, O Europe.” “I deem thee 49 A biography of this shaykh is available on a web- above. lost, O Holland.” “I deem thee lost, site called “Marokko Community,” in which references 53 “Imam beticht van opruiing tegen Van Gogh.” to the September 11 fatwa are found. For the biography, 54 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” 43 The Review Committee on the Intelligence and Secu- see “Sheikh Hamoud bin Uqla as-Shu’aybi: De leven- 55 Ibid. rity Services officially established in March 2008 that sloop van een groot geleerde,” July 24, 2008, available at 56 Ron Eyerman, The Assassination of Theo van Gogh. this had been a serious intelligence failure, as evidence www.forums.marokko.nl/showthread.php?t=2092457. From Social Drama to Cultural Trauma (Durham/London: surfaced prior to the attack that Bouyeri was at least affil- Al-Shu’aybi’s fatwa in English can be found at www. Duke University Press, 2008), p. 11. In reality, research iated with Dutch jihadist groups. See “Toezichtsrapport tawhed.net/a.php?a=hmodUkla. revealed that probably less than 2 % of the Dutch Muslim inzake de afwegingsprocessen van de AIVD met betrek- 50 “Requisitoir van de officier van Justitie.” population of Amsterdam was susceptible for “radical- king tot Mohammed B.,” Commissie van Toezicht betref- 51 Al-Maqdisi has revolutionized this theme in Salafi- ization.” See Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie, Processen fende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD), jihadism. For details, see Joas Wagemakers, “A Purist van radicalisering: Waarom sommige Amsterdamse moslims March 2008. Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maq- radicaal worden (Amsterdam: IMES, 2006). 44 Siem Eikelenboom, Niet bang om te sterven: Dertig jaar disi,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36:2 (2009): 57 Justin Sparks, “Muslim Mole Panics Dutch Secret terrorisme in Nederland (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, pp. 287-297; Joas Wagemakers, “Framing the ‘Threat Service,” Times, November 14, 2004. 2007), pp. 23-27; “Repliek van de officier van justitie in to Islam’: al-wala’ wa al-bara’ in Salafi Discourse,” Arab 58 “Kwantitatief onderzoek risicobeleving terrorisme de strafzaken tegen Nadir A. etc.,” National Prosecutor’s Studies Quarterly 30:4 (2008): pp. 1-22; Joas Wagemak- 2008,” Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Counter- Office (Landelijk Parket), Amsterdam, February 6, 2005, ers, “Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: A Counter-Terrorism terrorism & Netherlands’ Government Information Ser- pp. 4-5, 9-10, 17-23. Asset?” CTC Sentinel 1:6 (2008): pp. 7-9. vice, September 2008, p. 5. Fear of terrorism was men- 45 “Repliek van de officier van justitie in de strafzaken 52 De Koning, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, p. 374; See tioned spontaneously by 40% of the respondents. The tegen Nadir A. etc.,” pp. 4-5. also R. Peters, “De religieuze en ideologische ontwik- economy ranked second with 25%.

20 march 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 3 by the security services and local real danger and an aberration from Islam Muslims meet on the internet or during authorities. In February 2005, Minister since they ignite fitna (chaos and sedition) sermons of traveling youth preachers, for Immigration and Integration Rita within the Muslim community itself.65 and they translate and exchange jihadist Verdonk, for example, declared three texts.72 Radicalization has remained imams from the al-Fourqaan mosque In 2007, the AIVD signaled that more marginal, however, and should be viewed in Eindhoven as unwanted aliens, and unity had been achieved among the more as part of a radical Islamist youth started procedures to expel them from different Salafist branches, among counterculture and a way of expressing the country.59 These more repressive which the strand of political, non-violent identity within the Dutch context. measures were flanked by other central Salafism was gaining the upper hand.66 Moreover, the service noticed that Dutch and local deradicalization programs, The NCTb underlined this estimate and Moroccan Muslims increasingly found directed against so-called “hotbeds of identified trends of moderation and ways of articulating their grievances radicalization.”60 adaptation to the outside world. The and frustrations through democratic and increasing resilience against jihadist- activist channels. The anti-Islam movies of Consequently, due to these forms of thinking within the Salafist movement right-wing parliamentarian external pressure, Muslim resilience was supported by a decreasing fear (Fitna, 2008) and the politician/publicist against jihadism increased.61 of homegrown terrorism within the Ehsan Jami (An Interview with Mohammed, Immediately after the murder of Van broader Dutch society that felt more 2008) attracted a weaker response from Gogh, various Salafist leaders warned at ease since there had been no further the Muslim community than anticipated. their followers against interpreting jihadist attacks since November 2004 Additionally, the Israeli bombing of Gaza radical texts without consulting and no other substantial homegrown in December 2008 to January 2009 led clerics.62 In 2005, it was revealed that networks uncovered.67 to a number of non-violent initiatives. the Amsterdam imam Fawaz had urged Within the Dutch Salafist milieu, the some young Muslim women that were In its 2008 annual report (published AIVD therefore noted a “self-cleansing under the influence of the Hofstad Group in April 2009), the AIVD concluded power” and an increased resilience against to report to the police.63 As a result of that “the terrorist threat increasingly (violent) radical tendencies within the their statements, the case against the emanates from transnational and Muslim community.73 Hofstad Group in 2005-2006 became local networks with an international stronger. Moreover, in 2006 the Islamic orientation, but less from local- Conclusion Foundation for Culture and Welfare in autonomous networks.”68 Activities After 2001, the orthodox Salafist creed Tilburg, headed by the apolitical Selefie of “homegrown” radicals and their gained popularity because it offered imam Bouchta, published a booklet in networks had been effectively alienated Dutch youth of Moroccan which it condemned suicide attacks, disrupted.69 In December 2009, the descent a critical perspective of warned against preachers of hate and level of security alertness regarding their own society. It enabled them to accused Salafists who turned to violence terrorism was therefore lowered from identify with the umma and suffering of of sinful aberrations.64 “substantial” to “restricted” since Muslims elsewhere (in Iraq, Chechnya terrorist attacks against the Netherlands or Palestine), whose plight, in their Indeed, Salafist leaders such as Fawaz no longer seemed imminent.70 view, mirrored their own discriminated realized that jihadist activities such position in the Netherlands. Salafism as the murder of Van Gogh could Radicalization of Moroccan youth is provided youths who felt caught only backfire against Muslims in the still taking place, according to the between their traditionalist parents Netherlands. His warnings against AIVD, certainly if compared to the and the modern, secularized Dutch the takfiri-ideology of Bouyeri and the Turkish community.71 These young society a clear set of beliefs and a means other members of the Hofstad Group of (re)gaining pride and self-esteem.74 were, however, not only inspired by 65 To these clerics, takfir can only be pronounced by strategic musings; to some Salafist qualified religious authorities under special and restrict- as Diyanet and Milli Görüs and the impact of Turkish clerics, individual takfiri-activities are a ed circumstances. See Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi nationalism. In its annual report in 2007, the AIVD did, Salafis or Revolutionaries: On Religion and Politics in the however, signal that some youths were trying to shirk 59 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; “Ook tweede Eind- Study of Islamist Militancy,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, away from their tight community and were radicalizing hovense imam terecht uitgezet,” Algemeen Nederlands pp. 244-266. on their own account, through the internet. No news Persbureau, October 10, 2007. 66 “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical- of violent activism perpetrated by radical Islamist or 60 “Lokale en justitiële aanpak van radicalisme en isme in Nederland.” Salafist Turkish youths has yet come to light. See “An- radicalisering,” Kamerstukken 2004–2006 29754 No. 67 “The ‘Hofstadgroep,’” p. 16; “Annual Report 2006,” nual Report 2007,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Ser- 5; “Actieplan polarisatie en radicalisering 2007-2011,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, 2007, p. 33. vice, 2008. Netherlands’ Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Rela- 68 “Annual Report 2008,” Dutch Intelligence and Secu- 72 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” tions, August 2007. rity Service, 2009, pp. 20-22. 73 “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele trends en ontwik- 61 “Saoedische invloeden in Nederland. Verbanden tus- 69 Ibid. kelingen van het salafisme in Nederland.” Also see A. sen salafistische missie. Radicaliseringsprocessen en is- 70 “Letter to Parliament with the Eleventh Counterter- Olgun, “Nuance keert terug in Nederland,” NRC Handels- lamistisch terrorisme.” rorism Progress Report,” Netherlands’ National Coordi- blad, February 13, 2008; “Bijna 3000 digitale knuffels 62 De Koning, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, p. 372. nator for Counterterrorism, December 15, 2009. voor PVV-voorman Wilders,” Metro, January 30, 2008; 63 Alberts et al. 71 Regarding the Turkish community, social resilience Bas Heijne, “Waarom ik Geert Wilders dankbaar ben,” 64 “Folderen in strijd tegen aanslagen,” Brabants Dag- against radicalization is traditionally higher because of NRC Handelsblad, January 26, 2008. blad, June 10, 2006. the moderating influence of Islamist organizations such 74 Buijs et al., pp. 228-231.

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Only a tiny group among them went a In sum, the Salafist movement in the step further, embracing the lifestyle Netherlands is still controversial. Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism and symbols of jihadists abroad as the The strand of political Salafism Courts only answer to their perceived sense of remains responsible for anti-Western, injustice and insecurity, and even put isolationist and radical opinions; By Huma Yusuf them into practice in the Netherlands.75 however, as stated by De Koning, The members of the Hofstad Group political Salafists and apolitical Selefies in the wake of the November 2008 legitimized their terrorist intentions with hold a different view on violence and terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Pakistani thoughts they took from notable Salafi- attitudes toward “infidels” compared President Asif Ali Zardari stated, jihadi clerics such as Abu Hamza al-Masri to the jihadists. Salafist criticism of the “Pakistan is committed to the pursuit, or Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. war in Afghanistan or the exploitation arrest, trial and punishment of anyone of women in Western media and society involved in these heinous attacks.”1 This still does not solidify a causal should not be equated to terrorism, Zardari’s emphasis on prosecuting relationship. Salafist mosques did but could be viewed as the voice of a accused terrorists in legal courts indeed function as an ideological hotbed group of highly critical and religious renewed interest in Pakistan’s anti- for potential radicals. The al-Fourqaan citizens that are searching for a self- terrorism court (ATC) infrastructure, mosque in Eindhoven was identified conscious position within Dutch a parallel legal system established in as a playground for jihadist recruiters. society.78 Moreover, both the NCTb and 1997 under the Anti-Terrorism Act to The members of the Hofstad Group, the AIVD signal a trend of adaptation dispense quick justice for those charged however, were not passive victims of and moderation (inspired by external with terrorist activities. Almost a year Salafist “hatemongers” from abroad. pressure from Dutch security services later, an ATC in Rawalpindi indicted On the contrary, militant Muslims such and local authorities as well as from seven men for providing weapons and as Samir Azzouz, Jason Walters or the Saudi regime) of Salafist excesses training to the Mumbai terrorists.2 The Mohammed Bouyeri were actively seeking and a growing resilience and resistance trial is still in process, and in January jihadist guidance once they had embarked against the seeds of violent jihadism.79 2010 an ATC judge in Rawalpindi on their course of radicalization. At some rejected petitions seeking the acquittal point, they even stopped visiting their Dr. Beatrice de Graaf is an associate of six of the seven who stand accused.3 Salafist mosques because it did not offer professor at the Centre for Terrorism them instructions to wage jihad in the and Counterterrorism at the Campus The Although the involvement of Pakistani Netherlands. They therefore constructed Hague (Leiden University). She is currently militants in the Mumbai attacks placed their own brand of umma-oriented carrying out a research project on the making the spotlight on ATCs, the government’s jihadism through texts and principles of National Security measures in Western decision to conduct military operations they found on the internet. countries. Her monograph Theater van de against Pakistani Taliban fighters angst was published in January 2010 and will in Swat in May 2009 and in South Indeed, the AIVD defined Salafism appear in English later this year under the Waziristan Agency in October 2009 as “anti-integrative, anti-democratic title, Counterterrorism as Performance: forced the government to revisit the and isolationist” in 2007 and again in The Battle Against Terrorism in the ATC infrastructure.4 As hundreds 2009.76 This definition, however, cannot Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the of militants either surrendered or be equated with terrorism. Salafism United States Compared. She supervises were arrested during the operations, is not a sliding scale from passive a database on terrorism research located at questions have risen about how they orthodoxy into violent orthopraxy. www.terrorismdata.leiden.edu. The author should be dealt with according to the On the contrary, from 2005 onward, wishes to thank Daniël Meijer and Ineke Roex law. Salafist imams, including Fawaz Jneid, for their assistance in writing this article. have tried to put a brake on overly This article will explain why the ATCs enthusiastic jihadist emotions among have become especially relevant due to Muslim youth by steering them into Pakistan’s recent military operations in more apolitical and especially non- its northwest, provide the history of the violent action modes and sometimes country’s anti-terrorism legal policies even reported them to the police.77 and finally express significant concerns about the ATCs and the country’s overall 75 Kees van den Bos, Annermarie Loseman and Bertjan anti-terrorism judicial infrastructure. Doosje, Waarom jongeren radicaliseren en sympathie krijgen voor terrorisme: Onrechtvaardigheid, onzekerheid en be- 1 Asif Ali Zardari, “The Terrorists Want to Destroy Paki- dreigde groepen (The Hague: WODC, 2009). stan, Too,” New York Times, December 8, 2008. 76 “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical- 2 “Seven Indicted for Planning, Aiding Mumbai Attack,” isme in Nederland”; “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele Dawn, November 25, 2009. trends en ontwikkelingen van het salafisme in Neder- 3 “Pakistan Court Refuses to Acquit Mumbai Suspects,” land.” Also see Hans Moors and Menno Jacobs, Aan de Agence France-Presse, January 6, 2010. hand van de imam. Integratie en participatie van orthodoxe 78 De Koning, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, p. 378. 4 “Pakistan: The Swat Offensive Update,” Stratfor, May moslims in Tilburg-Noord (Tilburg: IVA beleidsonderzoek 79 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; “Weerstand en 22, 2009; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Assessing the Progress en advies, 2009). tegenkracht: Actuele trends en ontwikkelingen van het of Pakistan’s South Waziristan Offensive,” CTC Sentinel 77 Buijs et al.; Alberts et al. salafisme in Nederland.” 2:12 (2009).

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