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The Nexus Between Salafism and Jihadism in the Netherlands MARCH 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 3 The Nexus Between provide insight on this community, it in 1986 (led since the mid-1990s by the is necessary to rely on reports by the Egyptian imam Mahmoud Shershaby), Salafism and Jihadism in Netherlands’ National Coordinator thereby laying the foundations of the the Netherlands for Counterterrorism (NCTb) and the Salafist infrastructure in the Netherlands AIVD, newspaper clippings and the as a whole.8 Three years later, another By Beatrice de Graaf extensive field work of anthropologists Saudi private missionary organization and social scientists who carried out with headquarters in Riyadh, al- immediately after the 9/11 attacks, CNN research projects among Salafist youths Waqf, initiated the establishment of displayed images from the Dutch city of in the Netherlands in recent years.6 the foundation al-Waqf al-Islami in Ede where groups of youth of Moroccan Based on this information, this article Eindhoven. The al-Fourqaan mosque in descent gleefully cheered and shouted will explain why Salafism7 gained Eindhoven, led by the Sudanese imam over the apparent blow dealt to the popularity in the Netherlands, and then Eisha Bersham, became the center of United States. Two years later, Shaykh examine the three stages through which this foundation’s activities. In 1990, Fawaz Jneid, a well-known imam from it has passed since the 9/11 attacks on also with Saudi support, the Foundation a Salafist mosque in the Netherlands, the United States. Sounna was created in The Hague (in cursed president George W. Bush, Ariel 1998 renamed as the Foundation As- Sharon, Dutch parliamentarian Hirsi 1986-2001: The Creation of a Salafist Soennah/Centrum Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Ali and filmmaker Theo van Gogh and Infrastructure in the Netherlands Taymia), led by the Syrian imam Fawaz begged Allah “to destroy the enemies of The Saudi non-governmental Jneid and preacher Jamal Ahajjaj (Abu Islam.”1 Another imam refused to shake missionary organization al-Haramain Ismail), who both play an important part hands with a Dutch female minister, was responsible for the creation of the in the dissemination of Salafism in the and a third advised his followers to El Tawheed Foundation in Amsterdam Netherlands.9 The Foundation ISOOK10 throw homosexuals from the roof.2 On in Tilburg (led by the Syrian imam November 2, 2004, two months after field study of the Salafist movement in the Netherlands Ahmed Salaam) was created in 2000, Fawaz had cursed Theo van Gogh, is soon to be published, however: Ineke Roex, Sjef van through indirect assistance from Saudi a young Dutch Muslim, Mohammed Stiphout and Jean Tillie, Salafisme in Nederland. Aard, Arabia. Salam is considered a highly Bouyeri, murdered and slaughtered omvang en dreiging (Amsterdam: IMES, 2010). Another educated cleric, who has published Van Gogh, quoting passages from the good overview is “Salafisme in Nederland: Een voorbi- many religious works; Fawaz Jneid and 3 medieval Salafist cleric Ibn Taymiyya. jgaand fenomeen of een blijvende factor van belang?” Mahmoud Shershaby are said to be his These incidents, and especially the Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Counterterrorism pupils. terrorist attack committed by Bouyeri, (NCTb), 2008. Also see Martijn de Koning, Zoeken naar brought the Salafist movement to een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van Other organizations came into existence the center of Dutch public outrage jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Amsterdam: Bert as well, such as the Foundation for and debate, and prompted the Dutch Bakker, 2008). Islamic Youths in Breda, founded Intelligence and Security Service 6 Most notably, Frank J. Buijs, Froukje Demant and in March 1990, or the al-Haramain (AIVD) to warn against the damaging Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem. Radicale en Humanitarian Aid Amsterdam (which influence of Salafist ideology on the democratische moslims in Nederland (Amsterdam: Amster- was dissolved in 2006). The Salafist 4 Dutch Muslim community. dam University Press, 2006) and De Koning, Zoeken naar movement, however, was still a minor een ‘zuivere’ islam. current within the Muslim community An authoritative or exhaustive history 7 Salafism is not a unified movement, as it displays in the Netherlands during this time of the emergence of Salafism in the various currents, historical trajectories and genealogies. period, according to an AIVD report 11 Netherlands does not exist, nor has Many Salafists are non-violent, and various strains are from 1998. the Salafist population in the country apolitical. Moreover, it is often used as a normative self- 5 been mapped out meticulously. To descriptor, used by religious factions to claim religious The above-mentioned foundations and and political legitimacy, than as an objectifying term. mosques in Amsterdam, Eindhoven, 1 “Imam beticht van opruiing tegen Van Gogh,” NRC Salafists claim adherence to the first three generations The Hague and Tilburg constitute the Handelsblad, October 31, 2006. of exemplary followers of the Prophet Muhammad. As most prominent Salafist hubs in the 2 Jaco Alberts and Steven Derix, “Laveren tussen de wet Quintan Wiktorowicz has described in his seminal text Netherlands, drawing some 1,500 (As- en Allah,” NRC Handelsblad, September 19, 2005. from 2006, Salafists are united around the strict adher- Soennah) or even 2,000 visitors (al- 3 Ibid. ence to the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God, or Fourqaan) each Friday (of a population 4 “De radicale da’wa: De opkomst van het neo-radical- monotheism), the rejection of innovations (bid`a) of the of about 850,000 Muslims in the 12 isme in Nederland,” Dutch Intelligence and Security Ser- Islamic creed and practice, the condemnation of polythe- Netherlands). In comparison with other vice, 2007; “Weerstand en tegenkracht: Actuele trends en ism (shirk) and all other forms of venerating humans or ontwikkelingen van het salafisme in Nederland,” Dutch objects. Salafists maintain that theirs is the only legiti- 8 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland”; De Koning, Zoeken Intelligence and Security Service, December 2009. mate interpretation of the Qur’an and sunna. To them, naar een ‘zuivere’ islam, pp. 373-377. 5 Salafism is a relatively new phenomenon in the Neth- Islamic pluralism, let alone subjective individual inter- 9 Ibid. erlands. As a movement, it is very closed to the outside pretation without being an accepted authority, does not 10 ISOOK stands for the Islamitische Stichting voor Op- world. Therefore, the author does not pretend to give exist. For an overview of Salafism, see Roel Meijer ed., voeding en Overdracht van Kennis (Islamic Foundation an in-depth analysis, but presents this article as a well- Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: for Education and Dissemination of Knowledge). informed snapshot of the present situation, taken in- Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 1-32; Quintan Wiktorow- 11 “De politieke islam in Nederland,” Dutch Intelligence stead from a security studies’ point of view, rather than icz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,”Studies in Conflict and Security Service, 1998. a theological or anthropological one. The first in-depth and Terrorism 29:3 (2006): pp. 207-239. 12 NCTb, “Salafisme in Nederland.” 17 MARCH 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 3 countries such as the United Kingdom, and the jihadi/takfiri Salafists (or Salafi- Dutch defenders of national security, Germany or France, these Salafist jihadists).16 Western liberalism and secularization. groups became more popular and rooted within the Muslim communities than Selefies, as they label themselves, are the Therefore, after years of benign neglect, other related radical Islamist currents most apolitical, pious group, and claim Moroccans, Turks and other immigrants such as Hizb al-Tahrir (Hizb ut-Tahrir) to be non-violent. Their main preacher were now framed as “Muslims” and or Takfir wal-Hijra.13 is Abdillah Bouchta, a Salafist teacher were held responsible for jihadist from Tilburg. The second group includes attacks elsewhere. The consequence of The Salafist mosques also mobilize more politically-oriented Salafists who this application of religious frames of a multinational crowd of visitors. are non-violent as well, but engage more identity in mainstream Dutch discourse Muslims from the Maghreb, the Horn in local and international politics. This was that youth with Moroccan parents, of Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, strand develops its mobilizing power but born and raised in the Netherlands, Turkey, the Middle East and Dutch through central nodes within the Muslim embraced this stigmatization and fell converts are among the attendants.14 community, most of them financed back on this new collective, post-ethnic Although the Salafist movement in or inspired by Saudi organizations.17 Muslim identity. They adopted the general consists of Saudi, Egyptian A third, very marginal strand can be same set of mechanisms that can be or Syrian members, Dutch Moroccans described as the jihadi/takfiri branch of found within other youth cultures: they constitute the predominant group, Salafism, according to De Koning, and appropriated a negative identity that in particular Muslim youth of comprises a small number of Muslims, frightened and provoked the mainstream Moroccan descent (40% of the Dutch especially those connected to the former population by incorporating violent Moroccan population is under 30).15 Hofstad Group.18 and dangerous symbols and discourses The Moroccan community was also in their group identity.20 They adopted responsible
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