DOCSLIB.ORG

Causal Factors of Radicalisation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Causal Factors of Radicalisation Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy 17 November 2008 Deliverable 7 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Part I 1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................4 1.1. Why do young men…........................................................................4 1.2. Overview ..........................................................................................6 2. CAUSAL FACTORS OF RADICALISATION ............................................8 3. RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT ............................................10 4. METHODOLOGY ...............................................................................14 5. CAUSES AND CATALYSTS.................................................................15 6. CAUSAL FACTORS AT THE EXTERNAL LEVEL ....................................18 6.1. Causes............................................................................................18 6.1.1. Political causes ......................................................................... 18 6.1.2. Economic causes....................................................................... 20 6.1.3. Cultural causes ......................................................................... 21 6.2. Catalysts ........................................................................................ 23 6.2.1. Recruitment ............................................................................. 23 6.2.2. Trigger Events .......................................................................... 24 7. CAUSAL FACTORS AT THE SOCIAL LEVEL.........................................25 7.1. Causes............................................................................................25 7.1.1. Social identification ................................................................... 25 7.1.2. Network dynamics .................................................................... 26 7.1.2.1. The role of the Internet.......................................................... 27 7.1.2.2. The role of prisons................................................................. 28 7.1.3. Relative deprivation .................................................................. 29 7.2. Catalysts ........................................................................................ 30 7.2.1. Recruitment ............................................................................. 30 7.2.2. Trigger events .......................................................................... 30 8. CAUSAL FACTORS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL.................................30 8.1. Causes............................................................................................31 8.1.1. Psychological characteristics....................................................... 31 8.1.2. Personal experiences................................................................. 31 8.1.3. Rationality ............................................................................... 33 8.2. Catalysts ........................................................................................ 34 8.2.1. Recruitment ............................................................................. 34 8.2.2. Trigger events .......................................................................... 34 9. VULNARABILITY..............................................................................35 10. CASE STUDIES.................................................................................38 10.1. Mohammed Bouyeri......................................................................40 10.2. Samir Azzouz................................................................................41 10.3. Mohammad Siddique Khan ...........................................................43 2 10.4. Shehzad Tanweer .........................................................................45 10.5. Richard Reid .................................................................................46 10.6. Patterns from case-studies...........................................................47 Part II 11. THE EU COUNTER-RADICALISATION STRATEGY ..............................50 11.1. Introduction .................................................................................50 12. EUROPEAN COUNTER-RADICALISATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES FROM THE 9-11 ATTACKS TO THE PRESENT...........................51 13. RADICALISATION AND EU POLICIES...............................................59 13.1. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy..............................................60 13.2. The European Union Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism .................................................................61 14. ASSESSING EU COUNTER-RADICALISATION POLICIES ...................63 14.1. Model for classification.................................................................63 14.2. Overlapping elements ..................................................................64 14.2.1. Political causes ....................................................................... 64 14.2.2. Cultural causes ....................................................................... 65 14.2.3. Network Dynamics .................................................................. 66 14.2.4. Recruitment as a catalyst......................................................... 66 14.3. Some overlapping elements .........................................................67 14.3.1. Economic causes..................................................................... 67 14.3.2. Social identification ................................................................. 67 14.3.3. Relative deprivation................................................................. 68 14.3.4. Trigger events as a catalyst...................................................... 69 14.4. Missing elements..........................................................................69 14.4.1. Psychological characteristics ..................................................... 70 14.4.2. Personal experiences ............................................................... 70 14.4.3. Rationality.............................................................................. 70 15. CASE STUDIES: UK AND AMSTERDAM..............................................71 15.1. The UK approach .......................................................................71 15.2. The Amsterdam approach .........................................................75 16. CONCLUSION...................................................................................80 REFERENCES..........................................................................................87 EU Policy papers....................................................................................96 Other sources........................................................................................96 3 Part I 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. Why do young men… “Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier ”. 1 The post-mortem video-statement from the alleged “ring-leader” of the London 7/7 bombers, Mohammad Siddique Khan, which was shown on Al Jazeera on 1 September 2005, leaves no doubt that he believed that he was “a soldier” at “war” with the West. A West, which in his mind was threatening his so-called Muslim brothers and sisters, that is the Ummah – the community of Muslim believers all over the world – and that this threat was so severe, that he had to act in defence of it by killing what he saw as supporters of a democratically elected government, which was responsible for the so-called war against his fellow Muslims. And there can be little doubt that he thought that being at war made it legitimate to kill and wound people, who accidentally happened to take the wrong car in the London Underground that July morning in 2005. But why did Khan, who is remembered as a “quiet, studious” boy at school who was “never in trouble”, commit such a horrible act? A man, who as an adult was employed as a learning mentor at a local primary school and was respected for his commitment to the children of his youth club. (Whitlock, 2005) Why did he and his fellow bombers, Tanweer, Hussain and Lindsay, all second generation British nationals, seemingly well integrated and normal British youths, decide to become, what Khan describes as “soldiers” and give up their own lives and altogether kill 56 and wound over 700 people on that morning in July? 1 Muhammad Siddique Khan’s post-mortem video-statement, referred from Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, House of Commons, HC 1087, p 19. 4 Indeed, why do some young European men of Muslim faith, who have lived all of their life in democratic societies, choose to give up their seemingly well- integrated, normal lives in order to follow the call for Jihad? And what happens in that process – or those processes – where a person develops more and more radical views, some times ending in violent radicalisation and extremism. And just as intriguing: what can Europe do in order to prevent or manage the problem? Questions such as these
Load more

Recommended publications
  • In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as CHILD POLICY a public service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION Jump down to document ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and PUBLIC SAFETY effective solutions that address the challenges facing SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY the public and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Support RAND TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Learn more about the RAND Corporation View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. in their own words Voices of Jihad compilation and commentary David Aaron Approved for public release; distribution unlimited C O R P O R A T I O N This book results from the RAND Corporation's continuing program of self-initiated research.
    [Show full text]
  • Al-QAEDA and the ARYAN NATIONS
    Al-QAEDA AND THE ARYAN NATIONS A FOUCAULDIAN PERSPECTIVE by HUNTER ROSS DELL Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON DECEMBER 2006 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For my parents, Charles and Virginia Dell, without whose patience and loving support, I would not be who or where I am today. November 10, 2006 ii ABSTRACT AL-QAEDA AND THE ARYAN NATIONS A FOUCALTIAN PERSPECTIVE Publication No. ______ Hunter Ross Dell, M.A. The University of Texas at Arlington, 2006 Supervising Professor: Alejandro del Carmen Using Foucauldian qualitative research methods, this study will compare al- Qaeda and the Aryan Nations for similarities while attempting to uncover new insights from preexisting information. Little or no research had been conducted comparing these two organizations. The underlying theory is that these two organizations share similar rhetoric, enemies and goals and that these similarities will have implications in the fields of politics, law enforcement, education, research and United States national security. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................... ii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iii Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Al Qaeda Network a New Framework for Defining the Enemy
    THE AL QAEDA NETWORK A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE ENEMY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2013 THE AL QAEDA NETWORK A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING THE ENEMY KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2013 A REPORT BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ABOUT US About the Author Katherine Zimmerman is a senior analyst and the al Qaeda and Associated Movements Team Lead for the Ameri- can Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. Her work has focused on al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Aden region and associated movements in western and northern Africa. She specializes in the Yemen-based group, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab. Zimmerman has testified in front of Congress and briefed Members and congressional staff, as well as members of the defense community. She has written analyses of U.S. national security interests related to the threat from the al Qaeda network for the Weekly Standard, National Review Online, and the Huffington Post, among others. Acknowledgments The ideas presented in this paper have been developed and refined over the course of many conversations with the research teams at the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. The valuable insights and understandings of regional groups provided by these teams directly contributed to the final product, and I am very grateful to them for sharing their expertise with me. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Jessica Lewis for dedicating their time to helping refine my intellectual under- standing of networks and to Danielle Pletka, whose full support and effort helped shape the final product.
    [Show full text]
  • Lashkar-E-Taiba
    Lashkar-e-Taiba Name: Lashkar-e-Taiba Type of Organization: Insurgent non-state actor religious terrorist transnational violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Islamist jihadist Salafist Sunni takfiri Place of Origin: Pakistan Year of Origin: 1990 Founder(s): Hafiz Muhammad Saeed Places of Operation: Pakistan, India, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh Overview Also Known As: • Al Mansooreen1 2 • Lashkar e-Tayyiba18 19 • Al Mansoorian3 4 • Lashkar-e-Toiba20 21 • Army of Madinah5 • Lashkar-i-Taiba22 23 • Army of the Pure6 7 • LT24 • Army of the Pure and Righteous8 9 • Movement for the Safeguarding of the First Center of • Army of the Righteous10 11 Prayer25 • Deccan Mujahideen12 • Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis26 27 • Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF)13 • Paasban-e-Kashmir28 29 • Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq14 • Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith30 31 • Islamic Jammat ud Dawa15 • Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith32 33 • Jamaat ud-Dawa16 17 • Pasban-e-Kashmir34 35 • Tehreek-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awal36 Executive Summary: Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), meaning “Army of the Pure,” is a violent Islamist group based in Pakistan [1].37 Since its formation in the 1990s, LeT has carried out numerous attacks against military and civilian targets in India [2], particularly within the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir.38 The group received significant international attention for its alleged involvement in 1 Lashkar-e-Taiba the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which claimed the lives of 166 individuals and injured more than 300 others.39 LeT finds its roots in the Pakistani Islamist group Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI),
    [Show full text]
  • The New Insurgents: a Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency
    The New Insurgents: A Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency George Michael US Air Force Counterproliferation Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama THE NEW INSURGENTS: A Select Review of Recent Literature on Terrorism and Insurgency by George Michael USAF Counterproliferation Center 325 Chennault Circle Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 March 2014 Disclaimer The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air University, Air Force, or Department of Defense. ii Contents Chapter Page Disclaimer .............................................................................................. ii About the Author..................................................................................... v Introduction ........................................................................................... vii 1 Domestic Extremism and Terrorism in the United States ....................... 1 J.M. Berger, Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam ................................................................................................ 3 Catherine Herridge, The Next Wave: On the Hunt for Al Qaeda’s American Recruits ........................................................................... 8 Martin Durham, White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics ........................................................................................... 11 2 Jihadist Insurgent Strategy ....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum
    COUNTER-TERRORISM REFERENCE CURRICULUM CTRC Academic Project Leads & Editors Dr. Sajjan M. Gohel, International Security Director Asia Pacific Foundation Visiting Teacher, London School of Economics & Political Science [email protected] & [email protected] Dr. Peter Forster, Associate Professor Penn State University [email protected] PfPC Reference Curriculum Lead Editors: Dr. David C. Emelifeonwu Senior Staff Officer, Educational Engagements Canadian Defence Academy Associate Professor Royal Military College of Canada Department of National Defence [email protected] Dr. Gary Rauchfuss Director, Records Management Training Program National Archives and Records Administration [email protected] Layout Coordinator / Distribution: Gabriella Lurwig-Gendarme NATO International Staff [email protected] Graphics & Printing — ISBN XXXX 2010-19 NATO COUNTER-TERRORISM REFERENCE CURRICULUM Published May 2020 2 FOREWORD “With guns you can kill terrorists, with education you can kill terrorism.” — Malala Yousafzai, Pakistani activist for female education and Nobel Prize laureate NATO’s counter-terrorism efforts have been at the forefront of three consecutive NATO Summits, including the recent 2019 Leaders’ Meeting in London, with the clear political imperative for the Alliance to address a persistent global threat that knows no border, nationality or religion. NATO’s determination and solidarity in fighting the evolving challenge posed by terrorism has constantly increased since the Alliance invoked its collective defence clause for the first time in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States of America. NATO has gained much experience in countering terrorism from its missions and operations. However, NATO cannot defeat terrorism on its own. Fortunately, we do not stand alone.
    [Show full text]
  • FIRST SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT ) 13 V
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 October 2005 Grand Jury 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) SA CR 05-254(A) ) 12 Plaintiff, ) FIRST SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT ) 13 v. ) [18 U.S.C. § 2381: Treason; ) 18 U.S.C. § 2339B: Providing 14 ADAM GADAHN, ) Material Support to a a.k.a. Azzam al-Amriki, ) Designated Foreign Terrorist 15 ) Organization; 18 U.S.C. Defendant. ) § 2(a): Aiding and Abetting] 16 ) ) 17 ) ______________________________) 18 19 The Grand Jury charges: 20 COUNT ONE 21 [18 U.S.C. § 2381] 22 A. INTRODUCTION 23 1. Al-Qaeda is, and at all times relevant hereto was, a 24 foreign terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of 25 State, pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 26 Act. 27 2. Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have proclaimed 28 publicly that they are leaders of al-Qaeda. Prior to his death, 1 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi proclaimed in public that he was the leader 2 of al-Qaeda in Iraq. 3 3. On or about September 11, 2001, the United States was 4 attacked through the hijacking of commercial airliners. These 5 commercial airliners were flown into the World Trade Center in 6 New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. Another hijacked 7 commercial airliner was flown into the ground in Pennsylvania. 8 These attacks resulted in the loss of approximately 3,000 lives. 9 4. Usama bin Laden has acknowledged publicly that the 10 September 11, 2001 attack on the United States was an al-Qaeda 11 operation.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom of the Press 2007
    FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2007 needs updating FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2007 A Global Survey of Media Independence EDITED BY KARIN DEUTSCH KARLEKAR AND ELEANOR MARCHANT FREEDOM HOUSE NEW YORK WASHINGTON, D.C. ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. LANHAM BOULDER NEW YORK TORONTO PLYMOUTH, UK ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Published in the United States of America by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, MD 20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2007 by Freedom House All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. ISSN 1551-9163 ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-5435-1 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7425-5435-X (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-7425-5436-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7425-5436-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Table of Contents Acknowledgments, vii The Survey Team, ix Survey Methodology, xix Press Freedom in 2006, 1 Karin Deutsch Karlekar Global and Regional Tables, 17 Muzzling the Media: The Return of Censorship in the Common- wealth of Independent States, 27 Christopher Walker Country Reports and Ratings, 45 Freedom House Board of Trustees, 334 About Freedom House, 335 Acknowledgments Freedom of the Press 2007 could not have been completed without the contributions of numerous Freedom House staff and consultants.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kurdistan Workers Party
    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT Issued by the authority of the Minister for Home Affairs Criminal Code Act 1995 Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation—Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Regulations 2018 The purpose of the Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation—Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Regulations 2018 (the Regulations) is to specify Lashkar-e-Tayyiba for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ in subsection 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code.1 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is currently specified for this purpose by the Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation—Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Regulation 2015, which is repealed by the Regulations. Details of the Regulations are set out in Attachment A. Section 5 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Act) provides that the Governor-General may make regulations prescribing matters required or permitted by the Act to be prescribed, or necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to the Act. The Schedule to the Act sets out the Criminal Code. Paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ in subsection 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code provides that regulations can specify organisations for the purposes of the definition of ‘terrorist organisation’. Subsection 102.1(2) of the Criminal Code provides that before the Governor-General makes regulations specifying an organisation for the purposes of paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ in subsection 102.1(1), the Minister must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act or advocates the doing of a terrorist act.
    [Show full text]
  • Evaluating the Effects of Counterterrorism Strategies on Insurgency in Nigeria Bowie Sonnie Bowei Walden University
    Walden University ScholarWorks Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection 2019 Evaluating the Effects of Counterterrorism Strategies on Insurgency in Nigeria Bowie Sonnie Bowei Walden University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations Part of the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons, Personality and Social Contexts Commons, and the Social Psychology Commons This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Walden University College of Social and Behavioral Sciences This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by Bowie Bowei has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects, and that any and all revisions required by the review committee have been made. Review Committee Dr. Marcel Kitissou, Committee Chairperson, Public Policy and Administration Faculty Dr. Kristin Dailey, Committee Member, Public Policy and Administration Faculty Dr. George Kieh, University Reviewer, Public Policy and Administration Faculty Chief Academic Officer Eric Riedel, Ph.D. Walden University 2019 Abstract Evaluating the Effects of Counterterrorism Strategies on Insurgency in Nigeria by Bowie Bowei M.Sc., Lagos State University, 2013 MPA, Lagos State University, 2008 B.Sc., Ambrose Ali University, 2005 Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Public Policy and Administration Walden University August 2019 Abstract With the evolving problems of terrorism in Nigeria and the formation of numerous new terrorist groups, insurgency in Nigeria has escalated, making it one of the most terrorized countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7Th July 2005
    Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 HC 1087 Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 11th May 2006 for the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 11th May 2006 HC 1087 London: The Stationery Office £8.50 Contents Preface Page 1 The morning of 7 July Page 2 The immediate aftermath Page 7 Why did they do it? Page 13 Were they directed from abroad? Page 20 How did they do it? Page 22 Conclusion Page 26 Annex A Page 28 The evolution of the modern international terrorist threat Annex B Page 31 Radicalisation in context Annex C Page 33 Timeline of the evolution of the modern international terrorist threat Annex D Page 36 Timeline of the four individuals PREFACE The 7 July bombings were an act of indiscriminate terror. They killed and maimed the old and the young; Britons and non-Britons; Christians, Muslims, Jews, those of other religions and none. The authors of this account extend their deepest condolences to the bereaved, sympathy to the injured and admiration to them and others involved in the rescue efforts and wider response. Ten months on, Londoners and those who visit London have shown their resilience by calmly continuing with their lives as before. This narrative summarises what the police, intelligence and security agencies have so far discovered about the bombers and how and why they came to do what they did.
    [Show full text]
  • Muslims in Europe: a Short Introduction Justin Vaisse
    US – EUROPE ANALYSIS SERIES September 2008 Muslims in Europe: A short introduction Justin Vaisse This paper aims to briefly present the basic Eastern Europeans moving west", even though facts and issues concerning Muslims in Europe, a) not all of the migrants from this region are from a political and sociological perspective, Muslims, b) "Eastern Europeans" would never be and to offer elements of comparison with the labeled "Orthodox" or "Catholics", and c) that is US.1 There will be a slight emphasis on France, not the issue anyway, since the article is about due to author's area of specialty – and to the immigration. For a couple of weeks in fact that France is home to the largest Muslim November 2005, the media used the term population in Europe. "Muslims riots in France" to describe the wave of urban violence that resulted in burnt cars and property damage. But these riots had nothing ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Justin Vaisse is a to do with Islam, and everything to do with the Senior Fellow in the Center on the social and economic conditions of largely United States and Europe at the immigrant communities. Muslim groups, who Brookings Institution. tried to play a mediating role, discovered themselves to be irrelevant and powerless. A few popular myths about Islam in Europe Myth #2: Muslims in Europe are, in one way or should first be dispelled, in order to grasp the the other, inherently foreign, the equivalent of real issues and challenges: visiting Middle-Easterners who are alien to the "native" culture. Myth #1: Being Muslim constitutes a fixed identity, sufficient to fully characterize a person.
    [Show full text]