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National Security Implications of Al-Takfir Wal-Hijra The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2005, Article 3 National Security Implications of Al‐Takfir Wal‐Hijra Joshua L. Gleis as the site points out, “[a]s a descriptive name, Background Takfir Wal‐Hijra has far more utility than Jamaʹat The radical Islamist movement Al‐Takfir Wal‐ al‐Muslimeen. Takfir is a verb which means to Hijra originated in Egypt in the 1960s as a radical declare kufr (infidel), that is, to excommunicate. offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Believing The hijra is the flight, or migration, of that much of the world is heretical, members of Muhammad and his jamaʹat from Mecca to the movement adhere to a strict Salafi Yathrib (Medina) in 622 AD.”5 interpretation of Islam, and aim ultimately to The Takfiri name re‐emerged in the late return to what they consider to be a true Islamic 1990s and early 2000s. A group calling itself society—the Islamic caliphate. This interpretation Takfir Wal‐Hijra that opposed the Syrian thus requires that its followers purify the world of government and non‐observant Muslim 6 infidels. The group is known for perpetrating Lebanese also took credit for the killings of violence against those it considers kufar (heretics), Christian civilians in the Dinnieh area of 7 including those Arabs and Muslims whom Takfiris Lebanon. In the 1990s the name resurfaced yet do not consider to be living in accordance with again with attacks on mosques in the Sudan as 1 true Islam. According to the U.S. Department of well as against Sudanese government interests. Justice, Takfiris are guided by fatwas issued by These attacks were carried out under the influential radicals, such as the “blind sheikh,” leadership of Abbas Al‐Bakr Abbas and with 2 Omar Abdel Rahman. members who had been formerly of Ansar Al‐ 8 The movement was founded by an Sunna Al‐Mohamadiya. agricultural engineer named Shukri Mustafa in Takfir Wal‐Hijra is not simply a terrorist Egypt in the 1960s. During his stay in prison, organization. Instead, it is better described as a Mustafa had been part of a Muslim Brotherhood radical ideology than an organization per se—a splinter group, Jamaʹat al‐Muslimeen (Society of web of Islamic militants around the world 9 Muslims) that believed in a radical interpretation connected only by their beliefs. As a result, it has of Egyptian writer Sayyed Qutbʹs text Maʹalim fiʹl‐ been depicted by some as an “Islamic fascism” of 10 Tariq (Milestones on the Road).3 As is explained sorts. Indeed, Takfiris are seen as so extreme on the website Perspectives on World History and that even many radical Islamists such as Abu Current Events, “the name al‐Takfir wʹal‐Hijra Hamza, the claw‐handed imam of London’s was applied to Jamaʹat al‐Muslimeen by Finsbury Park Mosque who has endorsed and journalists after the group became publicly defended the 9/11 attacks, described Takfiris as known.”4 True Takfiris still prefer the “nothing but a bunch of extremists… [they] create denomination of Jama’at al‐Muslimeen. However, nothing and destroy everything. It is not right to © The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah be as harsh as they are. These people want to be have labeled their Islamist opponents as members 11 judges and executioners.” As an ideology, Takfir of Takfir Wal‐Hijra in order to discredit them Wal‐Hijra today operates with no overall central politically, adding to the confusion over who is in 20 structure; it is impossible to attribute one leader to fact truly Takfiri. While the size of the 12 the movement. There are, however, some movement is unknown, considering its presence figures within the movement who are worth in dozens of nations and involvement in terrorist noting: acts around the world, the number is likely in the Shukri Ahmed Mustafa (1944‐1978). As thousands. previously described, Mustafa was Takfir’s founder and spiritual leader, and a disciple of Links with Al Qaeda Sayyid Qutb. Mustafa was also thought by some Takfir Wal Hijra is now also associated with to be the Mahdi who, according to Islamic Al Qaeda, although the depth of their relationship tradition, would be the deliverer of the end of is unclear and debated among experts. While time.13 In the Egyptian crackdown on Islamic many Al Qaeda members are Takfiri, Takfir Wal‐ extremism in the 1970s, Mustafa was captured Hijra is not an affiliate of Al Qaeda and operates and executed. independently. Takfiri have been implicated in Youssef Fikri (aka: the “Emir of Blood”) was several terrorist plots attributed to Al Qaeda the spiritual leader of a Takfir Wal‐Hijra group in elements. They are believed to have provided Morocco. He was captured support for the March 11, 2004, train bombings in Future attacks in in 2002 in Casablanca and Madrid. There is a growing fear that Takfiri are sentenced to death. It is mobilizing to carry out additional operations in Europe will likely be a 21 result of the merging of said that he killed his own Europe. Takfiri were also known to have fought uncle because Fikri the Soviets alongside Osama bin Ladenʹs 22 the expertise of Al believed he was living with mujahideen in Afghanistan, and it is believed 23 Qaeda elements with a prostitute and had ties to that bin Laden has been a Takfiri financier. 14 the ideology of the communism. Ayman Al‐Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s presumed Salafi Takfir Wal-Hijra Bassam Ahmed Kanj second‐in‐command, and Mohammed Atta, lead (alias: Abu Aisha, aka the suicide hijacker in the 9/11 attacks, are two among movement. ‘Afghan Arab’) was the several international terror masterminds also 24 leader of a terrorist group linked to Takfir Wal‐Hijra. Some believe that of 200‐300 Lebanese fighters that Lebanese Abu Musab al‐Zarqawi, Ramzi Yousef, Khalid 15 authorities called Takfir Wal‐Hijra. It is reported Shaikh Mohammed, Ali Mohammed (of the U.S. that while working as a taxi driver in Boston, Kanj Special Forces) and Mahmoud Abouhalima befriended Riad Hijazi, who later plotted to bomb are/were Takfiri as well. This is supported by the tourist targets in Jordan over the millennium fact that as part of their cover they acted as non‐ 16 celebrations. He was killed by Lebanese forces observant Muslims, a practice associated with 17 in Lebanon in 2000. Takfiris who justify such behavior for jihadist Due to the loose structure of the Takfir Wal‐ purposes of waging Jihad. However, Takfiri Hijra movement, it is very difficult to estimate the elements are also believed to have attempted the number of adherents. The movement has a known assassination of Osama bin Laden when he was 25 presence in North Africa, as well as in Western living in Sudan in 1996. European countries such as France (in at least 16 Due to the similarities and connections between mosques), Germany, Italy and the United Al Qaeda and Takfir Wal-Hijra, future attacks in Kingdom—the latter believed to be a major hub Europe will likely be a result of the merging of the 18 expertise of Al Qaeda elements with the ideology of for recruitment. Takfir Wal‐Hijra also has a the Salafi Takfir Wal-Hijra movement.26 As presence in various countries in the Middle East, Dr. 19 East Africa, and in North America. Many Mamoun Fandy, an Egyptian‐born professor of politics and senior fellow at the James A. Baker III governments, particularly those in North Africa, © The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University Spring 2005, Article 3 3 Institute of Public Policy, has stated: “[Takfir] is is legitimate, more attention should be paid to the 27 very central to the Al Qaeda movement.” radical Salafi elements such as the Takfiris. They Since the 9/11 attacks there have been several are not only widely present in Middle Eastern events that may be associated with members of states today, but have also proven less interested the Takfiri movement. In 2002, a Takfiri terrorist in compromising and cooperating with Arab sleeper cell that was planning attacks on airliners, governments, such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan. the U.S. embassy in Jordan, Disneyland, and a Las Furthermore, they have shown their continued 28 Vegas casino, was captured in Michigan. In ability and willingness to target non‐Muslims and Morocco, more than 400 persons belonging to a Muslims alike in a number of Middle Eastern group known as Al‐Salafiyah al‐Jihadiyah and Al‐ countries. In Lebanon, for example, Takfiris did Takfir Wal‐Hijra were arrested for the murder of not only target Christian pilgrims but also fought over ten Moroccan citizens who had “deviated for the overthrow of the Syrian and Lebanese 29 from Islamic Sharia.” Dutch authorities have governments. added that the murderer of Dutch filmmaker At first glance, Takfiri aims of overthrowing Theo Van Gogh, Mohammed Bouyeri, was also the Syrian or Lebanese governments may not 30 Takfiri. appear to be in conflict with United States Some believe that it is now in Europe where interests in promoting democracy throughout the Takfir Wal‐Hijra should be of most concern to top world. Takfiris, however, are not interested in anti‐terrorism authorities. Janeʹs Intelligence establishing a democracy or even a moderate Review has predicted that “Al Takfir Wal‐Hijra Islamic regime. Rather, they are concerned with now presents perhaps the most pressing security creating an extremist Islamic government that concern [in Europe].” This has been supported by would make highly conservative Muslim states 31 the French terrorism expert Roland Jacquard such as the Islamic Republic of Iran look free and and by leading European scholar on radical Islam, open.
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