Future Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation In
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FFUUTTUURREE RREEGGIIOONNAALL NUUCCLLEEAARR FUUEELL CCYYCCLLEE COOOOPPEERRAATTIIOONN INN EAASSTT ASSIIAA:: EENNEERRGGYY SEECCUURRIITTYY COOSSTTSS AANNDD BBEENNEEFFIITTSS Report of the EAST ASIA SCIENCE AND SECURITY PROJECT Prepared for The John T. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Prepared by David von Hippel, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Tadahiro Katsuta, Jungmin Kang, Alexander Dmitriev, Jim Falk, and Peter Hayes Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability at the University of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim 2130 Fulton Street LM 200, San Francisco, CA 94117 Phone: (415) 422 5523 Fax: (415) 422-5933; e-mail: [email protected] David von Hippel e-mail: [email protected] [June 6, 2010] i Nautilus Institute Executive Summary Over the past two decades, economic growth in East Asia—and particularly in China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Vietnam, Taiwan, and Indonesia—has rapidly increased regional energy, and especially, electricity needs. As a recent, eye-opening example of these increased needs, China added more than 100 GW of generating capacity—equivalent to 150 percent of the total generation capacity in the ROK as of 2007—in the year 2006 alone, with the vast bulk of that added capacity being coal-fired, with attendant concerns regarding the global climate impacts of steadily increasing coal consumption. Even more striking than growth in primary energy use—and indeed one of its main drivers—has been the increase in electricity generation (and consumption) in the region. With the lessons of the “energy crises” of the 1970s in mind, several of the countries of East Asia—starting with Japan, and continuing with the ROK, Taiwan, and China—have sought to diversify their energy sources and bolster their energy supply security by developing nuclear power. Several other East Asian nations are currently discussing adopting nuclear power as well. At the same time, global security concerns related to terrorism and to the nuclear weapons activities of North Korea, Pakistan, and India, as well as the (nominally peaceful) uranium enrichment program pursued by Iran, have focused international concern on the potential for nuclear proliferation associated with nuclear power. In addition, old concerns regarding the management of nuclear spent fuel and other wastes remain, at best, only partially addressed. One means of addressing proliferation concerns, reducing environmental and safety risks of nuclear power, and possibly of reducing the costs of nuclear energy to the countries of the region, is regional cooperation on nuclear fuel activities. A number of proposals for regional cooperation on safety, enrichment, spent-fuel and waste management, and other issues have been offered over the years, some from within the region, and some from outside the region. The net impact, however, of regional nuclear cooperation on the energy security—expressed broadly to include supply security, economic impacts, environmental security, and security related to social and military risks—requires a more detailed look at how cooperation on nuclear power might be organized and operated. In the East Asia Science and Security (EASS) Project, Nautilus Institute and its collaborating teams in nine countries of the region have been working together to define several different scenarios for nuclear fuel cycle cooperation in East Asia, and to evaluate those scenarios under different sets of assumptions regarding the development of nuclear power in the region. This Draft Report to the MacArthur Foundation provides a discussion of the background of the project, as well as results of the EASS analyses undertaken to date. In the coming years, we expect to further elaborate and refine these analyses, and also to broaden our review of the impacts of nuclear power in East Asia to look at the interactions between climate change issues and nuclear power. Given the constraints on nuclear fuel activities in East Asian countries that are (or could potentially be) major users of nuclear power, regional fuel cycle activities have been attractive to policymakers. Domestic and international political constraints on construction and operation of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and, especially, domestic constraints on the siting and operation of spent fuel management facilities, have spurred international discussions on nuclear collaborations. Over the last two decades, a number of regional nuclear fuel cycle proposals have been discussed, including the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) proposed by the ii Nautilus Institute United States during the George W. Bush administration (and recently discontinued by the Obama administration), but also including less ambitious proposals for shared enrichment and/or spent fuel management and/or nuclear safety and fuel management safeguards. Specific proposals have included “ASIATOM”, an “Asian Nuclear Safety Centre”, and an “East Asian Collaboration for Intermediate Storage”, among others. These and other options are summarized briefly in Chapter 4 of this Report. The goals of the EASS activities described in this Report are as follows: • Develop, in consultation with national expert teams, a set of detailed, internally-consistent nuclear energy/nuclear fuel-cycle paths for each of the countries of East Asia that have (or may have within the next few decades) nuclear power plants (Japan, the Republic of Korea, the DPRK, the Far Eastern region of Russia, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia). • Develop regional nuclear energy/fuel-cycle paths/scenarios that explore advanced technical and organizational concepts of improved regional spent fuel security based on regional cooperation. These scenarios include the evaluation of various schemes to produce enriched uranium within the region on a “non-proliferation preferential” basis, and spent fuel management/reprocessing options for regional cooperation in East Asia within “reference” and “maximum” nuclear power capacity development paths. Paths development includes elaboration of alternative maximum nuclear energy paths reflecting regional cooperation to address nuclear fuel-cycle policy imperatives. Paths variants include different nuclear materials recycling regimes. • Evaluate the generation of different types of nuclear wastes, and the national and regional costs for waste management, through the application of tools and information produced during the EASS project and by other researchers in the field The EASS project builds on the extensive quantitative, qualitative research and analysis undertaken under Nautilus’ Asian Energy Security (AES) project (and its predecessor efforts such as the East Asia Energy Futures project) to investigate alternative future nuclear power and fuel-cycle development paths, and to develop realistic policy options for developing implementable projects to reduce the proliferation potential of nuclear power systems in the region (and, by extension, globally). Analytically, the overall approach taken in the study to date has been to estimate future electricity demand by country, then use EASS energy paths (“BAU”, “Minimum Nuclear” and “Maximum Nuclear”) to develop different requirements for/implied SF production from nuclear energy use by country. In parallel, we have developed several different initial “generic scenarios” of regional enrichment/spent-fuel management, and are using them to examine the cost, technical/physical outputs, and other energy security (see text box below) implications of those scenarios. This Interim Report focuses on early results of the EASS project’s analysis of four cooperation “scenarios” for nuclear fuel enrichment and for spent fuel management. The scenarios, and some (but hardly all) of the key policy issues they suggest, are as follows: 1. “National Enrichment, National Reprocessing”: In this scenario the major current nuclear energy users in East Asia (Japan, China, and the ROK), and perhaps others as well, each pursue their own enrichment and reprocessing programs. Disposal of high-level nuclear wastes from reprocessing would be up to each individual country, with attendant political and iii Nautilus Institute social issues in each nation. Security would be up to the individual country, and as a result, transparency in the actions of each country is not a given. 2. “Regional Center(s)”: This scenario features the use of one or more regional centers for enrichment and reprocessing/waste management, drawn upon and shared by all of the nuclear energy users of the region. We avoid identifying particular country hosts for the facilities, but China and Russia are obvious candidates. 3. “Fuel Stockpile/Market Reprocessing”: Here, the countries of the region purchase natural and enriched uranium internationally, but cooperate to create a fuel stockpile that the nations of the region can draw upon under specified market conditions. Reprocessing services are purchased from international sources, such as France’s AREVA or from Russia, while some spent fuel continues to be stored in nations where nuclear generation is used. 4. “Market Enrichment/Dry Cask Storage”: In this, likely the cheapest of the four scenarios for participants, countries in the region (with the possible exception of China) would continue to purchase enrichment services from international suppliers such as URENCO in Europe, the USEC in North America, and Russia. All spent fuel, after cooling in ponds at reactor sites, would be put into dry cask storage either at reactor sites or at intermediate storage facilities. Below we present