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UNIVERSITY o r •-•T-IAND LIBRARIES JMAIN LIBRARY. ' 1 M L 0 E 2
"An obsession of coconut plant THE6227. 13/09/88 WAIN THE contemporary view of Kulon plantation, Gazelle Peninsula "An obsession of coconut planting": expropriated plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea 1914 - 1942
by
Peter Henry Cahill* MA
A thesis submitted to the University of Queensland
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of History, August 1987 'NiiVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND LIBRARIES J MAIN LIBRARY The work described in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material in whole or in part for a degree at this or any other university. ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of those coconut plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain which were expropriated from their German owners as a result of the Australian occupation of New Guinea in September 1914. The period covered is from that date until the Japanese occupation of New Guinea in January 1942. As an historical study the thesis is concerned with those plantations (although comparisons are made with plantations in other areas of New Guinea), rather than with an individual plantation or all the plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula or in New Guinea. Three distinct divisions fall within the period examined: those of the Military Administration (1914 - 1921), the Expropriation Board (1921 - 1927), and the Civil Administration (1927 - 1942). The Gazelle Peninsula was selected for examination as it was developed as the centre of the coconut plantation industry, and at the time of military occupation by Australia most of the important plantations had been laid out there. Others had been established on nearby island groups and parts of the mainland.
There are two main themes. The first is that because the economy of New Guinea depended almost entirely on the production and export of copra from coconuts, and the ancillary and auxiliary services this generated, the plantation industry was vital to it. Yet the Australian government allowed expropriated plantations to be seriously neglected whilst under the "care" of the Expropriation Board, and then permitted the Australian firms of Burns, Philp & Co. (hereafter "Burns, Philp"), and W.R. Carpenter Pty Ltd (hereafter "Carpenters"), to control most of the industry either through acquiring plantations or enjoying the monopolies of shipping services and commercial trading. The second theme is that after enthusiasm for the "new possessions" had faded, Australia realised that New Guinea was an encumbrance rather than an asset. On several occasions it was suggested that all or part of New Guinea might be given away, but the mandate was irreversible and Australia was compelled to carry on administering its "sacred trust". From the date of occupation the Australian government made it very clear that New Guinea had to be self-sufficient through the revenue it raised, but the world depression of the 1930s and the collapse of the copra market meant that Australia had to provide very considerable assistance to plantations to keep them from bankruptcy. As they were the main source of government revenue through taxes and initially the main source of employment for villagers to earn money to pay their annual head tax, the influence of plantations remained strong and the planters of the Gazelle Peninsula became the most vociferous group of Europeans in New Guinea.
Chapter One of this thesis is a background summary of German interest in the Pacific which resulted in the search for labour along the New Britain coasts and the recognition of trade possibilities there, the annexing of New Guinea as a Protectorate for the Neu Guinea Kompagnie to administer, the settling of traders and their acquisition of land to plant coconuts, and the withdrawal of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie in favour of the Imperial German government which saw certain areas of the Protectorate pacified, settled and laid out as coconut plantations. Chapter Two examines the occupation of New Guinea by an Australian military force, the administrative confusion following the lack of positive direction from the Australian government and the effects of this on the established plantations, and the gradual realisation that Australia intended to keep the colony at the end of the war. Chapter Three looks at the expropriation of German plantations, how appeals were handled, the position of Christian Mission plantations, the end of the Military Administration and the commencement of the civil Administration, and the early problems of the Expropriation Board. Chapter Four tells of mounting criticism of the deterioriation of valuable plantations under the "care" of the Expropriation Board, the preparation of inventories of expropriated properties for international tender, the way in which they were put up for tender and the first suspicions that Burns, Philp and Carpenters were moving behind the scenes to acquire as many plantations as possible, and also outlines the attempt of the German-sponsored Melanesia Company to regain German equity in the plantations. Chapter Five traces the way Australian civil Administration struggled to maintain New Guinea after the Expropriation Board was wound up, the problems of the world depression, the steadily increasing grip of Burns, Philp and Carpenters on New Guinea, and its vulnerable position dependent on a one-crop economy. Chapter Six sums up and offers conclusions based on the preceding chapters which, with the benefit of hindsight, appear self evident. But it is always easy to be wise after an event, and easier still to criticise actions of nearly seventy years ago from the vantage point of today. CONTENTS
Chapter One - The German background 1882-1914 THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEU GUINEA KOMPAGNIE . Introduction 1 . German colonialism 2 . Annexation 5 . Land 5 . The Neu Guinea Kompagnie 10 . The official move to the Gazelle Peninsula 13 . Labour 15 . Trade 18 . Missions 19 . The end of the Company period 22 THE IMPERIAL GERMAN ADMINISTRATION . Land 23 . European plantations 34 . Mission plantations 44 . Native plantations 46 . Labour 51 . Chinese labour 53 . Trade 54
Chapter Two - The Australian Military Administration 1914-1921 . Capitulation and occupation 61 . Plantations 7 3 . Labour 87 . Commerce 103 . Trading 109
Chapter Three - The early Board years 1920-1923 . The mechanics of expropriation 120 . The prize 123 . "Kicking out the Hun" 125 . Appeals against prescription 132 . The Military Administration ends 135 . The Board commences operations 137 . Land titles 140 . Labour 146 . Expropriation Board staff 156
Chapter Four - The later Board years 1923-1927 . Criticism of conditions 167 . Plantations 173 . Disposing of the plantations 181 . Selling the plantations 188 . Labour 202 . Economic development 213 . The end of the Board 233
Chapter Five - The Australian Civil Administration 1928-1942 . Developing the plantations 236 . Compensation for incorrect palm counts 240 . The economics of the industry 241 . Native plantations 251 . Labour 253 . Copra 266 . Economic development 277 . The industry in trouble 286 . Relief for planters 288 . The depression years 302 . The eruption 307 . Dummying revisited 310 . The destruction of titles records 313 . The end of an era 314
Conclusion 315 Appendix A purchasers of First Group properties 332 Appendix B purchasers of Second Group properties 333 Appendix C Third group properties 335 Appendix D extracts from "Sepik River Expedition" 336 Bibliography 338 PLATES
Contemporary view of Kulon plantation Gazelle Peninsula frontispiece
Staining the Australian flag 95
Natives undergoing N o.l Field Punishment in the gaol at Rabaul 98
Diagram of one type of Ceylon copra drier 270 MAPS
Sketch survey of the north-east portion of New Britain 1878-9 11
Approximate plantation locations on Duke of York islands 1900 20
Native reserves and plantation areas on the Gazelle Peninsula 1914 27
European plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula and Duke of York islands, ca. 1906 38
Approximate plantation locations on Duke of York islands 1940 267
Plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula as at January 1942 331 TABLES
Native lands acquired by the German government 28/30
Coconut plantation areas 1901/1913 Gazelle Peninsula 50
Gazelle Peninsula coconut plantations - 1920 155
New Guinea copra production 1913/1928 217
New Guinea copra exports 1928/1940 245
Government plantations in New Guinea 247
New Guinea - number of plantations 250
Labour employed on all plantations in New Guinea, 1929-1940 260
New Guinea copra exports 1913/1928 272
Dessicated coconut production in New Guinea 280
Comparative values of gold and copra production and percentage of total annual exports 1914-1940 284
Plantations alleged by T.L. McAlpine to have been acquired by dummies for W.R. Carpenter & Co. 311 INTRODUCTION
Early movements of European1 adventurers, trading vessels, naval o explorers and missionaries in New Guinea are well recorded, but the country remained of only casual interest to European settlers until the successes of German trading firms in Samoa demanded more labour for the coconut plantations being established there. In the search for labour, ships of the firm of Godeffroy <5c Son visited the coasts of New Britain, the Duke of York islands and the west coast of New Ireland. Their captains saw the trade possibilities with the natives and by about 1870 traders were settled along the coasts, usually close to Port Hunter in the Duke of Yorks (see map p. 11) which was then the hub of European activity in the New Britain Archipelago. Traders soon realised that buying land and planting coconuts on it (as was done in Samoa) would guarantee a regular and reliable source of copra, and this caused a demand for land which the Duke of Yorks could not meet. The more adventurous Europeans crossed to the Gazelle Peninsula where land was acquired and the first commercial coconut plantation laid out in 1882. New Guinea was annexed by Germany in 1884 and given to the Neu Guinea O Kompagnie to operate as a commercial venture. There were energetic, but generally unsuccessful, attempts to establish plantations of various crops (coconuts, tobacco, sisal) on Kaiser Wilhelmsland (mainland New Guinea) as well as on some of the island groups adjacent to the Gazelle Peninsula, but industry remained dormant there until the Company bought land for a labour depot at
1. "European" is a term used for all Caucasians in New Guinea. Although the Australian States did not federate into the Commonwealth of Australia until 1901, men from those States who went to New Guinea as traders, adventurers or missionaries were referred to either as "Europeans" or "Australians".
2. Documents and readings in New Guinea history: prehistory to 1889. edited by J.L. Whittaker et. al., Milton, Queensland, Jacaranda, 1975.
3. also known as the "Neu Guinea Compagnie", the "Neu Guinea Company" and the "New Guinea Kompagnie". In this thesis it will be referred to as the "New Guinea Company", usually shortened to "the Company". 11
Herbertshohe*. It was very , soon extended and planted with coconuts. The o transfer of the Bismarck Archipelago management area from Kerewara island in the Duke of Yorks group to Herbertshohe provided the impetus for extensive plantation development by the Company. The task of administering New Guinea proved too much for the Company which formally relinquished control to the German government in 1899. New Guinea remained a German Protectorate until occupied by Australian troops in September 1914, and was then administered by an Australian military occupation force. Great Britain was granted a 'C' class mandate by the League of Nations to administer New Guinea and delegated this to the Commonwealth of Australia which commenced civil administration of the re named Territory of New Guinea on 9 May 1921. The Japanese occupation of Rabaul on 23 January 1942 ended this.
This thesis attempts to trace the development of expropriated coconut plantations - chiefly on the Gazelle Peninsula, but with occasional reference to other areas in New Guinea - during three separate Australian "administrations": the Military Administration 1914 - 1921; the Expropriation Board 1921 - 1927; and the Civil Administration 1927 - 1942. Although Australian civil administration commenced on 9 May 1921, the Expropriation Board was so influential in New Guinea affairs that it was almost an administration in its own right and in this thesis is treated as such. The thesis concentrates on plantations and not administrations, although the cultivation of coconuts is so integral a part of New Guinea history that the story of one cannot be written without reference to the other. The thesis will also consider how, through Australian colonial inexperience, the commercial dominance of certain Australian firms enjoying extraordinarily close connections with the Australian government, and the vagaries of the world copra market, the flourishing colony declined from a prize considered essential to Australia’s defence and mercantile expansion (as well as her international image) to an expensive dependency. The thematic aims of the thesis are, therefore, to show how quickly the attractiveness of the colony faded with the Australian 12
1. "Herbert’s Heights" - named after the eldest son of the Kaiser.
2. the New Britain Archipelago was re-named the "Bismarck Archipelago" following annexation by Germany. Whittaker, Documents and readings in New Guinea history: prehistory to 1889. p. 473. Ill
government and how the wealthy plantations through initial neglect, subsequent planter inexperience, the gradual supplanting of coconut oil with other natural oils for food processing and the world depression, reached the point of financial desperation from which they were saved by the fortuitous discovery of gold on the New Guinea mainland in the 1920s, as well as by constant concessions and assistance from the government.
Sources - a general comment
White historians of events in black countries need to be careful what they decide is history, and how it should be gathered. In a society with no written or inscribed records an insistence on oral history in till research might be seen as a form of cultural paternalism, an apology for past actions. There are fine lines between myth, tradition and historical fact; the former becomes very smooth after rolling round the tongues of many tellers, particularly those with a real or imagined grievance which can distort or distract from the original happening. And how many native people in a colonial country cannot lay claim to a grievance of some sort? It is the stuff independence movements are made of. Gam mage pointed to the problem when he wrote how Time affects people’s memories, stories change as they pass from mouth to mouth, and people consciously or unconsciously alter the details of a story, or even the main story itself, according to their present needs or interests. Because of this an oral account is not only partly inaccurate to begin with, it also becomes less and less accurate as time goes on. Until Papua New Guinea produces sufficient historians willing to research its own history, the European version should not be spurned - if for no other reason than its creators are becoming fewer every year. Langdon asserts all history should be used 1
1. Bill Gammage, "Oral and written sources" in Oral tradition in Melanesia, edited by Donald Denoon and Roderic Lacey. Port Moresby, The University of Papua New Guinea and the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1981. p. 115 IV
If only because of the short time-span for which written records are available in the Pacific, Pacific historians should be prepared to use any kind of evidence they can get, if it suits their purpose.1 European-based history will provide some record for Papua New Guinea historians to use as a starting point. No matter how good the translator, a European version of oral history risks being flawed through misunderstanding, ignorance, score settling or the simple difficulty of arriving at accurate assumptions of what may, or may not, have happened at a certain time and at a certain place. European- based history should not be rejected, denigrated or pushed aside just because it is European-based history. It is vitally important to a black country because it is a record of a happening and therefore open to debate and criticism. An intention of this thesis is to put one aspect of European-based history firmly into its rightful place in the development of Papua New Guinea.
In an attack on what he views as 'mundane concentration on the raw O material' Professor Munz claims that academic historical research has been diverted by Ranke into the unprofitable grooves of archival research, instead of the study of history as it happened. Hegel, said Munz, used his splendid imagination in order to weave all the narratives of other historians into one broad O story. I have followed a similar approach and this thesis is an amalgam of the views of Gammage, Langdon and Munz with the aim of producing a record of the expropriated plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula through any source without undue emphasis on one. Available primary sources have been used - although I did not dwell in 'orgiastic bliss upon pieces of paper'^ - and where they became secondary sources through translation they were also used, although with caution as Sack has shown how two eminent scholars can use the same source material and 1
1. comment by Robert Langdon in Gavan Daws, ''On being a historian of the Pacific" in Historical disciplines and cultures in Australasia; an assessment. edited by John A. Moses. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1979. p. 129
2. Peter Munz, "Cast a cold eye" in Historical disciplines and cultures in Australia, p. 23
3. ibid.
4. ibid., p. 24 V
arrive at 'vastly different assessments'. 1
Sources - written
As this thesis is concerned with expropriated plantations in the first period of Australian control of the Gazelle Peninsula (1914 - 1942) there are sufficient translated German sources available to provide a broad synthesis of the etablishment of these plantations during the German period (1885 - 1914) for introductory purposes. That these are available is due to the skills of researchers such as Biskup, Firth, Hempenstall and Sack. As the records of the Neu Guinea O Kompagnie were destroyed in an air-raid on Berlin in September 1943 researchers of the German period in New Guinea have had to mine archives elsewhere for material for their books and articles. Peter Sack (sometimes with Dymphna Clark) is a copious contemporary translator; his works include the Annual Reports O of the Company and German administrations, the diaries, memoirs and pamphlets of Eduard Hernsheim, and the recollections of Governor Albert Hahl.* Sack's work is complementary to the extensive research of Stewart Firth, Peter Biskup and Peter Hempenstall. A variety of English adventurers/travellers wrote enthusiastically, and sometimes penetratingly, of German colonialism as practised in New Guinea. There are also several missionary based books which provide 1
1. Eduard Hernsheim, South Sea merchant, edited and translated by Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark. Boroko, Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1981. p. vii fn.
2. J. Leyser, "Title to land in the Trust Territory of New Guinea" in The Australian Yearbook of International Law, 1965. Butterworths, Sydney, 1966. p. 117
3. German New Guinea: The Annual Reports, edited and translated by Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark. Canberra, Australian National University, 1979. (to avoid confusion between Annual Reports issued during the German period, and those issued during the Australian period, the latter are cited as "Annual Report to the League of Nations".)
4. Albert Hahl, Governor in New Guinea, edited and translated by Peter G. Sack and Dymphna Clark. Canberra, Australian National University, 1980. VI
another viewpoint of the Protectorate, Eurocentric as it may be. The Tolai viewpoint is disappointingly slight and is probably best recorded in Sack's unpublished manuscript "Black through coloured glasses"1 although there are occasional publications of the Catholic and Methodist Missions (usually in the Kuanua dialect) which tend to stress Mission achievements. Material written by O or about traders* and planters of the German period is sparse. Sack noted that the traders and planters working in German New Guinea were less likely to write about their experience than government officials or missionaries. As a result, little was written during the German period on establishing and maintaining a plantation. Over ell'1 gives a good visitor's-eye-view of the functioning of a German plantation, while Lyng'* (writing during the Australian military Administration) gives views ranging from the idealistic to the absurd.
Clues can be gleaned from other sources: cases recorded in Commonwealth and Papua New Guinea Law Reports; papers of the Papua New C Guinea Land Titles Commission; and files of the post-1945 Papua New Guinea Departments of the Administrator, District Administration, and Lands, Surveys and Mines. Records of the German period obtained for, and during, hearings of the Land Titles Commission in Rabaul and Port Moresby are now difficult to locate. 1
1. Peter G. Sack, "Black through coloured glasses: a mosaic of traditional Tolai leaders", unpublished typescript. Canberra, 1976.
2. the exception is Hernsheim, South Sea merchant, but there is nothing to compare, for example, with Judith A. Bennett, "Oscar Svensen: a Solomons island trader among 'the few"' in The Journal of Pacific History, v. XVI no. 4 October 1981. pp. 170/189
3. German New Guinea, a bibliography edited by Peter Sack. Canberra, Australian National University, 1980. p. 4
4. Lillian Overell, A woman's impression of German New Guinea. London, John Lane, 1923. pp. 59/65
5. Jens Lyng, Our New Possessions. Melbourne, Melbourne Publishing Company, 1916; and Island Films. Melbourne, Cornstalk, 1925.
6. see, for example, S.S. Smith, Notes on Tolai land law and custom, stencil. Kokopo, Native Lands Commission, 1961 vn
A very real problem is the quality of statistics in German Annual 1 O Reports. Blum said they were often inaccurate; Hahl supported this. Therefore their comparison with Australian Administration figures (themselves often inaccurate or incomplete) is of doubtful value and tables in this thesis should be regarded accordingly. A curious difference in text occurs with the Annual Reports as translated by Sack & Clark, and those translated by H.A. Thomson during the Australian Military Administration. A set of the Thomson translations was available in the library of the Department of District Administration, Konedobu, Port Moresby, but it is difficult to locate a complete set in Australia. Some of the Thomson translations were held by the former Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) in Mosman, Sydney (currently the International Training Institute).
Holdings of New Guinea material in the Australian Archives, Canberra, are not extensive: some files contain only one or two sheets of paper. The office of the Custodian of Expropriated Property was originally a branch of the Prime Minister's Department in the Commonwealth Offices, Melbourne. On transfer to the Treasury in 1923 the office was moved to Jolimont (a suburb of Melbourne) from which in 1925 it was moved to Post Office Place, Melbourne. The offices of Public Trustee and Custodian of Expropriated Property were combined in 1928 and occupied space in Post Office Place. Accommodation was particularly limited in the building and it is thought that some destruction from books of account of German firms expropriated in New Guinea took place at this time. The office was transferred to Canberra in September 1931 and more records were destroyed before the transfer. At an unknown point after the transfer the majority of the Public Trustee's records were moved to a departmental record store at Kingston, near Canberra, together with the remains of the accounting records of German firms. In 1946 the Custodian was transferred from the Treasury to the1 2
1. Hans Blum, Neu Guinea und der Bismarckarchipel. Berlin, Schoenfeldt, 1900. pp. 58/59
2. Sack <5c Clark, Annual Report 1910/1911. p. 328 (note that the page number is that of the Sack <5c Clark volume, not the original Report) Vlll
Department of Territories but some important material was left behind in the Treasury.1 Many of the records held by the former Department of External Territories, Canberra, have been distributed among various Commonwealth departments and institutions and some have been returned to Papua New Guinea; bibliographic sources are unaware of their new locations. All records kept in Administration headquarters, Rabaul, were destroyed during the Japanese occupation - and subsequent Allied bombing - of Rabaul.
To supplement the remaining New Guinea records in the Australian Archives I have depended on the Administration’s Annual Report to the League of Nations although it is realised these were written for a specific audience, and the various reports of investigative Commissions in the periods 1914/1924 and 1937/1940. Volumes of the Australian House of Representatives, and Senate, Debates have also been used. There were consolations in the search for material. The discovery of an unpublished manuscript by Reginald Beazley1 2 (a drover from Queensland who went to New Guinea for the Expropriation Board as an overseer) telling of his experiences as an overseer, plantation manager and private recruiter, was very welcome. It was a great disappointment to learn that the diaries and private papers of Alan Richards (Expropriation Board overseer, manager, inspector; Australian government assessor of palm shortages on expropriated plantations) were dispersed or destroyed. His stepson advised me that from memory, shortly after his death, an Officer of the Department of Lands in Rabaul collected a quantity of Ritchie's papers to assist them in their work in the Gazelle Peninsula. I do know that he destroyed his voluminous personal diary prior to his death - apparently it was a very factual account of
1. extracted from the "Inventory of the records of the Public Trustee, the ControUer of the Clearing Office (Enemy debt) and the Custodian of Expropriated Property", photocopy of typescript from a Department of Lands, Surveys & Mines file, Rabaul, provided by T.R. Bredmeyer.
2. R.A. Beazley, "New Guinea adventure". Typewritten manuscript of experiences in the Territory of New Guinea from ca. 1920 to ca. 1935 (written ca. 1959/1960). Beazley Collection, Fryer Memorial Library of Australian Literature, University of Queensland Central Library. IX
events relating to War Damage Claims and as such may have been construed by misinformed people as defamatory. The disappointment was tempered by John J. Murphy’s locating the remaining Richards papers which contained his curriculum vitae, a full listing of the owners of plantations in New Guinea in the early 1960s, and various other papers. Another consolation was the chance discovery that most of the post-1945 papers of the late Fred Archer of Jame plantation, Buka Passage (and subsequently "Buka House", Rabaul) were in the care of his niece in Brisbane who kindly gave me access to them. Some had been erroneously destroyed in Rabaul immediately after his death and although the remainder cover the post-1945 period in extraordinary diversity, there were references to the 1920s/1930s which made them very useful in suggesting questions to oral informants. Of particular value was a series of letters written by H.R. Wahlen in the 1960s in which he spoke of his life and experiences in the Protectorate. Robin McKay, formerly of Aropa plantation, Bougainville, loaned me his set of the three Catalogues of Expropriated Properties on which had been written the upset and tender prices for all expropriated plantations, and also the names of the original purchasers. Cross checking with other sources provided some interesting details which appear in the text of this thesis. I was excited to hear rumours of a pre-war planter who had "written a book of his experiences" for his family. When I eventually traced Mr O Douglas Joycey I discovered that he had indeed written a book - of his recollections of France and Belgium in the 1914 - 1918 war, of the volcanic eruption at Rabaul in 1937, of the war in New Guinea 1942 - 1946 but not, unhappily, of coconut planting pre-1942. Mr Joycey was a medical assistant at Rabaul; his planting experience was gained postwar on Tobera plantation, from which Vimy plantation was excised. And, finally, I am grateful to Theo Bredmeyer and Pat Hopper for permission to quote from their theses, both of which suggested ideas to pursue in the writing of this thesis. Theo Bredmeyer also generously loaned me notes and documents to examine. 1
1. letter of 26 June 1986 from Tom Garrett, Sydney
2. Douglas Joycey, Recollections, the author, Brisbane, ?1986 X
Of outstanding value was the collection of documents, photographs and memorabilia which comprise the Burns, Philp Archives - surely one of the most complete collections of a merchant firm in Australia. It details happenings in Papua, New Guinea, most of the South Pacific islands where the firm had branches as well as certain aspects of the firm’s operations in Australian states. Two books1 have already been written from the archives; undoubtedly others will follow. At the time of my visit to Sydney the collection was being transferred from Burns, Philp’s head office to the University of Sydney Library where its archival order was being re-arranged. Once catalogued, the Burns, Philp archives will be essential to historians of the south Pacific.
Not a great deal was published about the Australian military Administration. Seaforth Mackenzie (Judge Advocate-General, sometime acting Administrator, plantation owner) was commissioned to write the official history of O the Australian occupation . Jens Lyng - who edited the Rabaul Record - was the main on-the-spot recorder; he subsequently published two books which deal with various aspects of the Administration. Charles Rowley’s The Australians in German New Guinea** is a scholarly masterpiece. There are a few "I-was-there" books written by members of the occupation force, and the letters of Marnie Bassett^ written in 1921, but not published until 1969, provide glimpses of garrison life from other angles. A thoughtful book on life in Rabaul and the Gazelle 1
1. K. Buckley & K. Klugman. The history of Burns Philp: the Australian Company in the South Pacific. Sydney, Burns, Philp & Co., 1981; and The Australian presence in the Pacific; Burns Philp 1914-1946. Sydney, Allen <5c Unwin, 1983
2. Official history of Australia in the war of 1914 - 1918. Vol. X: The Australians at Rabaul. S.S. Mackenzie. Sydney, Angus <5c Robertson Ltd., 1927
3. C.D. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1958
4. Marnie Bassett, Letters from New Guinea 1921. Melbourne, Hawthorn, 1969 XI
Peninsula in the 1930s was written by the American visitor, Margaret Matches1 O while books by Lamberts and Collins are also useful. It had been obvious to former Governor Hahl in 1916 that Australia had no intention of returning the colony to Germany, but in the period following the assumption by Australia of the mandate a number of books appeared pleading the German cause and urging the O return of the colony. There may have been some early interest in Germany for this but the rise of National Socialism, and internal problems, pushed the colonial lobby into the background.
The only book based on personal experience of plantation life in New Guinea was published by Stuart^ in 1977 and tells o f his work on plantations in Bougainville (the former German Solomon Islands). There is a book,^ based on a post-1945 visitor's impressions of a plantation in the Warangoi area of the Gazelle Peninsula which is useful. At least two novels have been published about plantations in the Australian colonies: one by Egerton Jones telling of her fi 7 adventures in Papua, the other by Osborne is a very "British" account of a Q plantation manager's life in the middle part of New Britain. Huntley gives a rather idealistic version of the Methodist Mission's Vunakambi plantation, while 1234567
1. Margaret Matches, Savage Paradise. New York, Doubleday, 1930
2. Dale Collins, Sea tracks of the Speejacks. London, Heinemann, 1923
3. see, for example, Heinrich Schnee, The German colonies under the Mandates. Leipzig, Duelle 4. Robert Stuart, Nuts to you! Sydney, Wentworth, 1977 5. Ruth Hawker, Volcano cottage. Rigby, Adelaide, 1970 6. D. Egerton Jones, The coconut planter. London, Cassell, 1916 7. Ernest Osborne, The plantation manager. Sydney, NSW Bookstall Co. Ltd., 1923 8. W.R. Huntley, "Vunakambi Industrial Mission" in The Missionary Review. 6 August 1934. pp. 17/20 xii Groves* wrote more about the white man's lot and his concern for prestige than what he actually did. One of the most poignant stories of plantation life in the O post-1945 era (but applicable pre-war) is Shearston's "Leaving Molly" which is exquisite in its summing up of a period. The officers of the German and Australian administrations with the exceptions of Hahl, Lyng, Townsend^, McCarthy1* and Sinclair^ remain anonynmous. Heinrich Schnee (at one time a Judge at Herbertshohe) features in a novel about German East Africa at the outbreak of the first World War ® while Administrator Ramsay McNicoll is remembered in his son's editing of his private papers prepared for private circulation. The most well known settler identity, Q Q Queen Emma, has been the subject of two books, and a play . Like the planters and traders of the German period the Australians were little concerned with recording daily experiences in operating a coconut plantation. 12345678 1. William C. Groves, "Life on a coconut plantation" in Walkabout. 1 July 1935. pp. 33/36 2. Trevor Shearston, Something in the blood. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1979. pp. 1/6 3. G.W.L. Townsend, District Officer, from untamed New Guinea to Lake Success, 1921-1946. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1968 4. J.K. McCarthy, Patrol into yesterday: my New Guinea years. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963 5. James Sinclair, Kiap. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1981 6. William Stevenson, The ghosts of Africa. ?New York, Harcourt, 1980 7. R.R. McNicoll, Walter Ramsay McNicoll, 1877-1947. Melbourne, the author, 1973 8. R.W. Robson, Queen Emma; the Samoan-American girl who founded an empire in 19th century New Guinea. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1973, and Geoffrey Dutton, Queen Emma of the South Seas. Melbourne, Macmillan, 1976 9. Doreen Clarke, Missus Queen, a play in three acts. ?Adelaide, ?1976 xiii Only recently has re-awakened interest in New Guinea before 1942 resulted in publications by Biskup, Firth, Hempenstall, Sack, Griffin and those edited by Denoon and Nelson which provide part of the mosaic of New Guinea history. It is to be hoped that books by Papua New Guinean authors will round out their scholarship. Because of the lack of privately published material, the destruction of Administration records in Rabaul and Australia, and the paucity of material in the Australian Archives, Canberra, I have had to use whatever publications were available. The Pacific Islands Monthly, a journal which reflected planter ideas and attitudes often in opposition to Australian government policies, provided contemporary accounts of events in New Guinea. It was particularly useful in recording the actions of Burns, Philp and Carpenters and the extraordinary influence they wielded in New Guinea between the wars. It was suggested at one time that Burns, Philp was the force behind the Pacific Islands Monthly - a suggestion easily disproved by reading some of its issues. The PIM (as it was popularly known in the Pacific) presented events in more of an international context than did the extremely parochial Rabaul Times. Sources - Oral When only a minority of villagers in a colony is literate (and in the New Guinea of the period of this thesis the minority was very small indeed) the dependency on oral research can seem almost total. For example, land acquisition has been a problem to the Tolai of the Gazelle Peninsula who nurture feelings of resentment to what they now see as unbridled European land-grabbing (mainly during the German period) which, in many cases, it was. Because it is such a sensitive topic, and because there appear to be so many reed or imagined grievances to settle, the veracity and accuracy of Tolai informants on how they were affected by land acquisition and subsequent plantation development may not always be unbiased. Theo Bredmeyer advised me that ’accounts from former Tolai plantation labourers’ children or grand-children would be unreliable and lack XIV interesting detail’ *■; Pat Hopper noted it had not been possible to find any information on how Tolai felt about land transactions towards the end of the Neu 2 Guinea Kompagnie period. A search of villages in the Rabaul and Kokopo areas of the Gazelle Peninsula to locate old Tolai men and women who might remember, and be able to speak about, German times as well as the Australian period, was not very O successful as 'all the old ones have died'. A very few were found. Details gathered were sparse; whatever impact German colonialism had on Tolai villagers has faded with time and is now embraced in the nostalgic claim 'Ah, taim bilong Diaman e gutpela taim tumas' (literally, "The German time was very good") as Biskup discovered.^ One of the problems with elderly Tolai informants is that many do not have a clear understanding of time. Quite a number do not know when they were born (Bredmeyer5 also discovered this) which questions the reliability of some of their statements. Failing memories confused pre-1942 experiences with post-1945 experiences - as occurred with many European planters interviewed (discussed shortly). To avoid the possible distortion of Tok Pisin a young Tolai man, Robinson Matinur of Matupit village (educated at the Church of England Grammar School, Brisbane) translated. Perhaps the decline of interest in history as a contemporary discipline for tertiary study, or as a subject C in Papua New Guinea's educational system, means that few old villagers are being consulted about past events which are fading away. 123456 1. letter from T.R. Bredmeyer, Boroko, 18.3.86 2. Patricia Wiseman Hopper, "Kicking out the Hun": a history of the Expropriation Board of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, 1920 1929. MA thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1980. p. 11 3. personal communication from K.J. Bott, Rabaul. 25 March 1986 4. Peter Biskup, "Dr Albert Hahl - sketch of a German colonial official" in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. XXIV, no. 3, December 1968. p. 356 5. T.R. Bredmeyer, The registration of land in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1983. p. 157 6. Roderic Lacey, "Epilogue - oral sources and the unwritten history of Papua New Guinea" in Oral traditions in Melanesia, p. 265 XV There are now so few Tolai of the pre-1942 Australian Administration period alive who may have worked in some connection with, or had their lives specifically influenced by, plantation development that undue acceptance of such memories they can muster could skew available information. No Tolai former plantation labourers are alive in the 1980s - Tolai stopped working as plantation labourers in the 1890s. Trying to discover where former plantation labourers brought to the Gazelle Peninsula pre-1942 might now be in New Guinea would be a formidable task out of all proportion to the possible value of any information they might offer. The old Tolai mentioned above know of none now living in the Rabaul or Kokopo areas. All labour line records were destroyed on plantations and in Administration headquarters in Rabaul during the Japanese occupation and nothing can be located in the Australian Archives, Canberra. The Japanese shipped villagers and plantation labourers to various parts of New Guinea as a labour force; some Tolai were sent to Buna in north-eastern Papua1 and at the end of the war some melted into the jungle to avoid being press-ganged into ANGAU labour lines. Undoubtedly many labourers had earlier deserted from plantations and would have no desire to be identified in later years for fear of retribution. The problems of gathering oral evidence have been summed up by Nelson who wrote if we are looking for oral evidence in Papua New Guinea about a dramatic event occurring some fifty years ago witnessed by thirty people, then we will probably find rich material, but it may take a lot of time, work and luck to obtain it. Similar difficulties were experienced with former planters and their families. Time has taken its toll of the planter population of New Guinea and there are few left who lived on the Gazelle Peninsula. Many were lost as O prisoners of war in the sinking of the Montevideo Maru and in other actions with 123 1. interview B. Parer, Brisbane. 17 March 1986 2. comment by H. Nelson in Daws, "On being a historian of the Pacific" in Historical disciplines and cultures of Australasia: an assessment, p. 122 3. see A.H. Sweeting, "Civilian wartime experiences in the territories of Papua and New Guinea", an appendix to Paul Hasluck, The Government and the people 1942-1945. Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1970 XVI the Japanese, some of their widows remarried and some did not return to New Guinea after the war. Most of these have now died. A handful who had moved to Australia in recent years were willing to talk with me but the meeting with them - and/or their wives and children - by no means opened a treasure chest of memories. Without exception all had lost personal papers and photographs during the Japanese occupation of the Gazelle Peninsula. Many, through age, confused pre-1942 and post-1945 events as it is difficult to remember back fifty or so years with only the stimulus of other people’s comments to jog memories. Hannah (Jo) Broad put the problem into perspective when questioned: 'Goodness!' she exclaimed, 'that's nearly two generations ago'.* In common with most people the planters and their families easily remembered the good times and tended to forget the bad. Comparisons of conversations revealed a remarkable similarity of stories - not to be wondered at in such a tightly knit community. At the risk of over simplification, the establishment of one coconut plantation is much the same as another. Experiences, according to one planter, consisted of ''clearing the land, planting coconuts, living on the smell of an oily rag for ten years, dodging the bloody labour inspectors, and keeping the kanakas working". Some stories seemed to verge on the apochryphal, some were libellous, others became confused. During the course of conversation the gulf between planters and certain respected managers of company plantations, and general employees of the companies was summed up succinctly as "us ... and the BP push". Pre-war planters enjoyed the concept of the Australian Broadcasting Commission's Taim Bilong Masta series^ but remarked that it was not truly representative of their pre-war way of life. Even allowing for the bite of the depression years it is remembered as 'gloriously O abandoned' with tennis and bridge parties, horse-riding through the plantations, balls and dances at the clubs and hotels, servants and constant leisure time. Undoubtedly there was a certain bravado in keeping up appearances, but the planters continued to enjoy a lifestyle probably beyond their reach in Australia. I had intended to write a chapter on the lifestyles and idiosyncrasies of planters, 123 1. discussion with Mrs H. Broad, Brisbane. 7 April 1986 2. Taim bilong Masta. series of cassettes produced and presented by Tim Bowden, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1981 3. discussion with Mrs H. Broad, Brisbane. 7 April 1986 xvii but it is somewhat beyond the scope of this work and would make it unnecessarily long. There is a wealth of material which will, someday, be recorded. Methodology This thesis relies on a blend of oral and written Australian and Tolai sources, with occasional reference to translations of German material where available and relevant. Although the authors of books and articles are few, the works of some of them are many and present a problem in identifying them in footnotes. To avoid confusion, or constant reference to the Bibliography to identify a work, I have generally used key words in the title in footnotes subsequent to the original full citation of the work (except where the full title is given to avoid confusion with a work of similar title). For example; H.H. Romilly, Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland, 1878-1891. London, Nutt, 1893. p. ... would be subsequently cited as: Romilly, Letters from the Western Pacific ... p. ... Journal articles are treated in a slightly different way. For example; H.H. Romilly, "The Islands of the New Britain Group" in Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geographyi (new monthly series) v .IX 1887. pp. 1/18 would be subsequently cited as Romilly, "The Islands of the New Britain Group". p .... All works referred to in this Introduction are subsequently cited in full the first time they appear in the body of the thesis. A particularly confusing aspect of writings on German New Guinea is the lack of uniformity between weights, measures and currencies; Imperial and Metric units were used indiscriminately and sometimes in the same statistical table. Because units of weight and measurement remain constant it was decided XV111 to convert all Imperial units to Metric units rounded to the nearest whole unit. The currencies presented a more difficult problem as exchange rates and values varied widely.* It proved impossible to reach an acceptable 1980s equivalent for the various currencies used during the German period which, after 1899, were gradually replaced by the mark and pfennig. As the variety of currencies emphasised the cosmopolitan aspect of the colony it was decided to leave them unaltered. As a rough guide it may be assumed that 1 German mark = 1 English shilling = 10c Australian but these comparative values have no basis in present day values. The guide is a "visual” one for readers. As mentioned above, statistical presentation in Company and German administration reports varied so widely it is difficult to be precise with statistics for the Gazelle Peninsula alone. There was no consistency in categories being tabulated, and the problem is compounded by the way the areas for which o statistics were given varied between Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Old Protectorate , and the Bismarck Archipelago. As will be seen, this lack of consistency in statistical presentation also occurs in the Australian Annual Reports to the League of Nations. Acknowledgments Dr Chris Penders of the History Department of the University of Queensland was the original supervisor of this thesis. When illness forced him to withdraw, Associate Professor Ross Johnston kindly took over supervision. The guidance, suggestions and comments I have received show an awareness of the 1 1. some of the currencies used in the South Pacific, and the way their variety was turned to the advantage of commercial organisations, is shown in A.E. Bollard, "The financial adventures of J.C. Godeffroy and Son in the Pacific" in The Journal of Pacific History. v.XVI no.l January 1981. pp. 3/19 2. this comprised the Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon Islands and Kaiser Wilhelmsland. XIX importance of developments on the Gazelle Peninsula in the shaping of New Guinea. I am grateful for their help and interest. Staff of the Mitchell Library, the International Training Institute and Pacific Publications, all of Sydney; and the Australian Archives Office, Canberra, went to a great deal of trouble to locate material for me. Members of the map and photographic departments of the Australian National Library, Canberra, searched their (surprisingly sparse and occasionally wrongly identified) collections for items of interest. Staff of the Reference Department of the University of Queensland Library tracked down my more obscure inter-library loan requests; while Marianne Ehrhardt - war von ausser gewohnlicher Hilfe fur meine Arbeit - of the same Library corrected the bibliography, translated German texts and shared her recognised expertise generously. Various staff of the New Guinea Collection within the University of Papua New Guinea offered invaluable advice and assistance in locating material. Mrs Joan Humphreys, archivist with Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd, Sydney, searched the firm's records for me. Special thanks are due to Burns, Philp which gave me unrestricted access to anything I wished to see. It is unfortunate that because the pre-1942 records of W.R. Carpenter & Co. have been destroyed so much emphasis has been placed on Burns, Philp which probably gives an unbalanced view of the firm's activities in New Guinea in comparison with other firms. Feelings for Burns, Philp among planters interviewed were fairly evenly divided between those for the firm, and those against it. All, however, respected the firm's business acumen and appreciated the many - deliberately unrecorded - kindnesses it extended to planters in New Guinea during difficult times. Special thanks are due also to those who patiently answered interminable and occasionally irrelevant questions about life on plantations and the Gazelle Pensinsula pre-1942. They included Mrs Rube Allen and Mr and Mrs Lionel Mansfield of the Gold Coast; Mr and Mrs Charles Blake, Mrs Hannah (Jo) Broad, Mr Bernie Parer, Mr Douglas Joycey, Mr Max Orken, Mrs Julie Krause, Mrs Mary Roberts and Mr Colin Bayliss of Brisbane; Mrs Noelle Mason and Mr Eric Storm of Sydney; Mr and Mrs Robin McKay of Alstonville, Mr and Mrs Theo Thomas of Forster, and Mrs Marge Marr of Glenorie - all of New South Wales; Mr Dyson Hore-Lacey of Melbourne; Justice T.R. Bredmeyer of Boroko and Mr K.J. Bott of Rabaul, Papua New Guinea. All these former and present XX residents of Rabaul, Kokopo, the Gazelle Peninsula and other parts of the New Guinea islands were willing to talk of "gutpela taim bipo" and search their memories - and what papers they had - for me. Their interest in, and love for, Papua New Guinea goes beyond any accusations of Eurocentrism and clearly show they are a special group of people who are now, alas, slipping away. Special mention must be made of the late Fred Archer, whose eidetic memory and collection of photographs were generously shared with anyone who sought his advice. His papers, now in the care of his niece, provide a valuable insight into New Guinea history. John J. Murphy, pre-war patrol officer in New Guinea and post-war District Commissioner in Papua, also kindly located material among members of the Papua New Guinea communities living in retirement in and near Brisbane. Tolai informants included Priday Numi, Matinur Alwat, Towulia Penipas, Mano Waliah, John Vuia and Dr Geoffrey Tuvi - each of whom collated information from discussions among groups of villagers. Robinson Matinur and Joyce Gapi translated from Kuanua into English. Mr K.J. Bott, a resident of Rabaul since 1949 who is related by marriage to members of Matupit village, co ordinated the information. Sandra Leslie re-drew the map of native reserves from the tiny original, Jenny Fox loaned the photograph of Kulon plantation from which copies were taken to illustrate a typical Gazelle Peninsula plantation, and Paula Wright did an exemplary job of proof-reading while turning my draft into the impressive-looking product you are reading. To all these people and to Marian, Martin and Celia, I am grateful. The final responsibility for this thesis is, of course, mine. August 1987 CHAPTER ONE The German background 1882 - 1914 From about 1840 European merchants were drawn to the trade in coconut oil which was becoming increasingly important in the South Pacific. The demand for coconut oil in Europe for the manufacture of soap and candles guaranteed the success of the new industry, while its by-products (palm fibre, cattle fodder) broadened the market base. The Hamburg firm of Johann Caesar Godeffroy and Son* (hereafter called Godeffroys) established a trading agency at Apia in Samoa and, by a simple change in 1867 from trading in oil expressed from wet coconut meat to trading in copra (the meat of mature coconuts either sun or smoke dried), increased the O value of coconuts fivefold. Godeffroys was possibly the first firm to recognise the reluctance of natives to continue trading coconuts, a staple food item, which with their "laziness" in not wanting to work regularly for Europeans encouraged the firm to buy land on which to plant coconuts. It thus pioneered the coconut plantation industry, as well as formalising European commercial copra production in the South Pacific. In 1870 Godeffroys secured a virtual monopoly on Samoan copra, and from Apia its vessels spread through the South Pacific. Bismarck's early advocacy of a Samoan steamship company was partly intended to assist Godeffroys whose Apia establishment was then unmatched in the South Pacific. From 1867 the number of Micronesians entering Samoa to labour on plantations increased until it peaked at about 1,200 in 1879 and then dwindled rapidly. Weber (Godeffroy's manager at Apia) turned to the New Britain Archipelago as an alternative labour source. Recruiting vessels from the sugar plantations of 12 1. for an account of the firm, see Florence Mann Spoehr, White falcon: the house of Godeffroy and its commercial and scientific role in the Pacific. Palo Alto, Calif., Pacific Books, 1963 2. Western Samoa: land, life and agriculture in tropical Polynesia, edited by James W. Fox and Kenneth B. Cumberland. Christchurch, N.Z., Whitcomb & Tombs, 1962. p. 141 3. ibid., p. 143 2 Queensland and Fiji prowled the same coasts for labour.1 Hernsheim remarked on the dozens of ships from Fiji and Queensland which cruised around ... under the British flag, trying to recruit natives for the newly-established plantations in those colonies. ... this recruiting led to a great deal of trouble and shooting between the natives and the ships' crews in which it was difficult to decide which side had been the aggressor. Partly as a result of this competition Queensland annexed the eastern half of New Guinea to guarantee labour for its sugar plantations. The rejection of this by the Colonial Office in London caused a storm of protest among the Australian states and left a lingering feeling of resentment. It also sharpened German interest in the area. German colonialism In 1875 German commitments in the Pacific required two warships and O two cruisers to protect them. A unified Germany now saw colonies as a necessary symbol of national strength, and a haven against the social effects of industrialisation. Bismarck, although opposed to the idea of colonies,^ was drawn to a plan to use a chartered company to colonise New Guinea where Godeffroys was well established in the Nodup and Nonga areas of the north coast of the Gazelle Peninsula of New Britain, as well as at Mioko on the Duke of York islands 1234 1. Peter G. Sack, "Law, politics and native 'crimes' in German New Guinea" in Germany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870-1914. edited by John A. Moses and Paul M. Kennedy. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1977. p. 263 2. Eduard Hernsheim, South sea merchant, edited and translated by Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark. Boroko, Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1983. p. 83 3. Sylvia Masterman, The origins of international rivalry in Samoa, 1845 1884. London, Allen & Unwin, 1934. p. 79 4. William Churchill, "Germany's lost Pacific empire" in The Geographical Review, August 1920. p. 85 3 which was then the centre of tentative European settlement. Trading was good - ’This has been a great copra season', enthused a missionary, 'more copra has been obtained from here than any year previously'.1 But shortly afterwards, Godeffroys O went bankrupt 'over Russian paper and Westphalian iron'. Adolf von Hansemann, head of a large German bank - the Disconto Gesellschaft (Discount Company) - O formed the Deutsche-Handels-und-Plantagen-Gesellschaft in der SudseeJ (DHPG) in 1880 to take over the firm's South Pacific trading establishments. Conditions of trade were enhanced by the Pacific Islands Labourers Act 1880 which forbade British traders from trading in arms, ammunition and liquor; this effectively transferred trade in the South Pacific - and particularly in New Guinea - from British to German hands.^ Trading in New Guinea was not an easy life and European influence there was by no means absolute. For example, on the Gazelle Peninsula conditions of law and order were tenuous. In 1880 'The sky seems surcharged with war and rumours of war giving us much uneasiness of mind','* wrote Rev. Benjamin Danks. There were grave risks in going beyond the fringe of European contact and even in "settled" areas there was the ever present danger of attack.® Despite fluctuations in copra prices the potential for profit was high; so much so that in 1881 Rev. Danks noted 'I suppose there is no richer coconut- 1. Documents and readings in New Guinea history: prehistory to 1889. edited by J.L. Whittaker et al. Milton, Jacaranda, 1975. p. 390 (quoting Rev. B. Danks, 6 September 1880) 2. R.L. Stevenson, A footnote to history: eight years of trouble in Samoa. London, Dawson, 1967 (reprint), p. 28 3. 'This piece of literature is in practice shortened to the DH and PG, the Old Firm, the German Firm, the Firm, ... and the Long Handle Firm'. Stevenson, ibid., p. 29. (hereafter called "the DHPG") 4. William T. Wawn, The South Sea Islands and the labour trade, edited, with an introduction by Peter Corris. Canberra, Australian National University, 1973. p. 289 5. Whittaker, Documents and readings in New Guinea history: prehistory to 1889, p. 428 (quoting Rev. B. Danks, 8 January 1880) 6. H.H. Romilly, Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland. London, Nutt, 1893. p. 182 4 bearing country in the world' but warned that 'like all things, it is rushed, overcrowded'. Although 1881 was a depressed year for copra prices* Europeans continued to force their way along the coasts and into the interiors of New Britain and New Ireland. A year later the golden years of the copra trade were over and there was a shift in emphasis from individual traders to trading companies; by 1883 two to three thousand tons of copra were exported annually to Germany.® Not everyone was impressed with New Guinea. In June 1883 the out-going Consul- General in Apia, and the leader of an expedition to the Hermit islands, were reported by Hernsheim not to have much opinion 'of the potential or value of these regions for the German Reich'.^ Trader demand for coconuts in the coastal strip of the Gazelle Peninsula between Malaguna and Cape Livuan was such that villagers there commenced planting nuts specifically to meet it.® The promise of New Guinea attracted von Hansemann in Berlin and in April 1884 he tried unsuccessfully to persuade the firm of Robertson <5c Hernsheim, which was already operating in the Gazelle Peninsula area, to join the proposed Neu Guinea Kompagnie® (hereafter the Company) in opening New Guinea and promoting German trading interest there and elsewhere in the South Pacific. 12345 1. Whittaker, Documents and readings in New Guinea history: prehistory to 1889, p. 395 (quoting Rev. B. Danks, 4 February 1881) 2. More Pacific Islands portraits, edited by Deryck Scarr. Canberra, Australian National University, 1978. p. 521 3. Mary Evelyn Townsend, The rise and fall of Germany's colonial empire 1884-1918. New York, Fertig, 1966. p. 145 4. Hernsheim, South sea merchant, p. 79 5. Peter Biskup, "Dr Albert Hahl - sketch of a German colonial official" in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. XXIV, no. 3, December 1968. p. 351 6. also known as "The New Guinea Kompagnie", "the Neu Guinea Compagnie" and the "New Guinea Compagnie". 5 Annexation On 19 August 1884 Bismarck secretly ordered the creation of the German Protectorate in the New Britain Archipelago and north-eastern New Guinea comprising 'the northern shore of New Guinea from the Dutch mountains eastwards to Dampier Strait and the Territory back of it theoretically to the crest of the central range of mountains'.* On 17 December the German flag was hoisted at various points in the New Guinea islands and on the north-eastern coast of the mainland to protect established trading ventures and the 147 acres of land under European cultivation. Bismarck did not regard this as an Imperial act, but merely the placing of the land in the possession of the Company which almost immediately issued a series of regulations prohibiting the recruitment of labourers for work outside the Protectorate other than for German plantations in Samoa O where the labour shortage was 'critical. The German annexation, as well as the restriction placed on its inhabitants, increased resentment in the Australian states which, already angry at the rejection of the earlier Queensland annexation, felt that Germany had 'shouldered her way into the colonial world'.^ On 17 May 1885 the Company received an Imperial Charter authorising it to administer the Protectorate.^ Land In the 1870s the first traders and missionaries to come to Mioko on the Duke of York islands, Nonga and Nodup on the north coast and Kinigunan on the eastern tip of the Gazelle Peninsula, bought small trading and mission sites from 1234 1. Churchill, "Germany's lost Pacific empire", p. 87 2. John A. Moses, "The coolie labour question and German colonial policy in Samoa, 1900-14" in Germany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870-1914. p. 235 3. Hugh Clifford, German colonies; a plea for the native races. London, John Murray, 1918. p. 112 4. Peter G. Sack, Land between two laws: early European land acquisitions in New Guinea. Canberra, Australian National University, 1973. p. 120 6 native in these areas. There was very little difficulty in buying land, but because of language differences it was by no means certain that the natives fully understood what they were doing, or, indeed, if the people paid for the land were the rightful owners. It was not until Thomas Farrell and his de facto wife, Emma Eliza Coe (to be known throughout the South Pacific as "Queen Emma"), bought land at Ralum, near Kinigunan on the eastern tip of the Peninsula, after selling their land claims on the Duke of York islands for over 2,000 pounds (a profit of about 1,000%) that real interest in buying land arose. Between 1882 and 1885 there was a land rush in the Gazelle Peninsula and the Bismarck Archipelago as traders, settlers, missionaries and prospective planters secured land in anticipation of annexation and possible future restrictions. It was alleged that many of these land purchases 'used stealth and grease' while the natives 'played one against the other in dealing with Germans'.1 There was a certain amount of speculative buying in the hopes of profiting from re-sale, but some land was bought with the specific aim of establishing a plantation in the future when the O purchaser could afford it. The first land claims were registered in 1886 after von Oertzen, the Imperial German Commissioner, issued regulations from Matupit making it compulsory for all Europeans to present their land titles for examination O and positive registration. Although titles were marked "Pro Tempora" as no surveys had been made, this registration of land commenced the formal development of the Gazelle Peninsula into the most magnificent plantation area ever seen in the South Pacific. Sack dates the beginning of a colonial land law in New Guinea from 1 September 1886^ when an Ordinance regarding laws "in the colony of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie" came into effect. From then until 30 July 1887 a succession of ordinances and regulations was introduced to control the acquisition of land in the colony. Notable among these was a regulation in 1887 which defined Groundbook districts and required the setting up of Groundbooks to 123 1. Priday Numi, Matupit Village, 29.3.86 2. T.R. Bredmeyer, The registration of land in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983. p. 146 3. R.W. Robson. Queen Emma; the Samoan-American girl who founded an empire in 19th century New Guinea. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1973. p. 139 4. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 127 7 register land acquired in those districts. An official of the former Imperial Administration of New Guinea described how The Ground Book gave only a short description of the property, its situation, its size, and the person of the owner. The other details, especially the acquisition had to be shown from the applications that were scrutinized very carefully before the property was entered into the groundbook. The acquisition of property was effected either by occupation of uninhabited areas or by purchase from the indigenous occupiers. Both ways of acquisition were strictly reserved to the fiscul authority of the colony according to paragraph 3 of the regulations (enacted on 29 July 1887). An Imperial Ordinance for the Acquisition of Land in the Colony of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie, enacted on 29 July 1887, provided that anyone who had acquired land before 21 May 1885 in Kaiser Wiilhelmsland or the Bismarck Archipelago, or before 28 October 1886 in the German Solomon Islands (the date Germany annexed the Islands), could apply for registration of it in the Groundbook. On 10 August 1887 the Company issued Directions regarding land acquisition which, although intended as instructions to its agents, showed a surprisingly good knowledge of native customary tenure, even though this was not o always closely observed. In the early 1890s land available in the Gazelle Peninsula for Tolai use 'villages, gardens, hunting) and as a buffer against the spreading plantations decreased sharply. Fear of losing all their land (whether this could be regarded as a nascent form of Tolai unity is an interesting thought) probably contributed to the Tolai protests of 1893 during which they pulled up cotton plants and harassed plantation labourers in the Herbertshohe area. They were repelled, but two months later several hundred Tolai from Malaguna, Tingenavudu, Ulagunan, 12 1. letter of 5 August 1962 written at the Catholic Mission, Vunapope, to the Crown Solicitor, Rabaul, by Dr Josef Klug of Munich (Dr Klug was District Officer, Herbertshohe, from late 1907 until October 1909 when the office was moved to Rabaul). Richards Papers (various papers, including rough "diary" of occupations 1915/1961; notes on copra and coconut production; lists of former German properties in New Guinea and current owners ca. 1962/1963) 2. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 142 8 Bitarebarebe and Vairiki villages, as well as from villages on land owned by Queen Emma, tried to storm Herbertshohe and Kinigunan plantations.1 Tolai alarm at the encroachment of plantations was becoming widespread. The efforts of the Catholic Mission to mediate between Tolais and planters were to be the key to its O subsequent expansion from Vunapope to Takubur and inland to Tingenavudu in the mid-1890s. But natives could still be coerced reasonably easily into selling land as John Vuia remembers: If a German wanted land he'd give you pipes, knives, anything to get the land so we could not resist for long as we craved for spades - in fact tools and that sort of thing - but not money. The Germans quickly realised the attraction o f trade goods to Tolai: Generally land was bought by tools of trade presented out in front of us. We had little resistance to refuse the offers when confronted by this method as these things were highly valued. Of course a bit of grease was put on us too. Unfortunately, the Tolai system of land ownership was overlooked by German buyers and the Tolai claimed that They reckon it was renting it and after ttey go they get it back but this didn't seem to happen. German buyers were convinced they had bought land outright, but the Tolai considered they were merely renting it for a specific purpose. It was this mutual misunderstanding in land dealings that caused much of the immediate, and lasting, bitterness between the two groups. 1234 1. Peter Hempenstall, Pacific islanders under German rule: a study in the meaning of colonial resistance. Canberra, Australian National University, 1978. p. 49 2. Peter G. Sack, Black through coloured glasses: a mosaic of traditional Tolai leaders, typewritten manuscript. Canberra, 1976. p. 233 3. John Vuia, Rabaul. 14.4.86 4. ibid. 5. ibid. 9 In April 1893 Bishop Couppe bought several thousand acres of land along the north coast of the Gazelle Peninsula from trader Dupre. * The next year the problems being caused by large scale European land acquisition in the Gazelle Peninsula were officially discussed for the first time as a result of Richard Parkinson's gift to Bishop Couppe of the districts of Kalili and Vairiki which comprised about 15,000 acres inland from Herbertshohe. In 1896 Queen Emma, the Company and Octave Mouton (who had commenced laying out Kinigunan plantation) were ready to expand their plantations; Queen Emma intended to expel 478 Tolai from the hamlets of Kikirre, Freirapi, Ulalom, Mallemalle, Vunapappal, Bitarebarebe, Vunaba and Palvavuvur to plant about 500 ha of the land with coconuts. She was said to own almost the entire districts of Kabanga, Ravalien, Ulagunan, Tingenavudu, Bitarebarebe, Malagunan, and parts of Kabakaul O and Vunamami from where the earlier protesters had come. Albert Hahl arrived in the Gazelle Peninsula that year as Imperial Judge with the hope that the plantation economy being created would ultimately benefit O the native, as well as the European society. Protection of village lands was central to his thinking, although in investigating land claims he generally found that the planters had purchased land in accordance with German law. But he realized villagers did not always understand what they had done and would be unduly penalised if forced to quit their land, so while he confirmed freehold title for planters he also established "reserves" which villagers could occupy.^ Following Hahl's representations, Queen Emma and the Company agreed to defer their plans but within a year other planters commenced expanding the planted areas of land they held on the Gazelle Peninsula. Some relief for native land owners came in May 1896 after von Hansemann in Berlin authorised the inclusion in future contracts with villagers of a clause guaranteeing the original owners usufructuary rights to the land for a 123 1. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 90 2. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders under German rule, p. 137 3. Biskup, "Dr Albert Hahl", p. 347 4. a list, and map, of reserves excised up to 1914 is at pp. 27/30 1 0 specified period.1 By the end of the 1890s trouble between Tolai and planters eased as Tolais acknowledged they were now economically dependent on Europeans. Yet Count Pfeil, a former station manager at Herbertshohe, wrote of a plan in the 1890s to surround and protect the European plantation centre in the Gazelle Peninsula with semi-military settlements of Solomon Islanders to keep the people (who were to be pushed inland) in check. Dependency was obviously not to be confused with acceptance. The Neu Guinea Kompagnie ...... Company officials travelling to New Guinea envied the visible success of colonization in the Dutch Indies and determined to equal it in New Guinea. To do this the Company concentrated on Kaiser Wilhelmsland (mainland New Guinea), favouring tobacco and cotton as principal plantation crops, although it noted in 1886 that copra was the main export of traders in the Bismarck Archipelago. Firth suggests that the "plantations" (a rather grand name for the areas of partially cleared jungle) were commenced merely to prove the Protectorate's O agricultural potential to prospective settlers. Following the Company's plan to administer the Protectorate through a number of "management areas" Matupit island in inner Simpsonhafen was selected in February 1887 as the headquarters for the Bismarck Archipelago management area. But Weisser, who had been appointed area manager, could not buy land there or anywhere else around the harbour and suggested Utuan island in the Duke of Yorks (see map p. 11) as an alternative. 312 1. Biskup, "Dr Albert Hahl", p. 354 2. German New Guinea, a bibliography edited by Peter Sack. Canberra, Australian National University, 1980. p. 21 (the Solomon Islanders were mainly from the small island of Buka (hence the collective names of "Bukas") and were used from at least 1882 as police, and a labour force, by Queen Emma and Richard Parkinson. They were fearless, intensely loyal men treated with great respect by the Tolai). 3. S.G. Firth, "The New Guinea Company 1885-1899: a case of unprofitable imperialism" in Historical Studies,v. 15 no. 59 October 1972. p. 364 11 Wilfred Powell, Wanderings in a wild country, opposite p. 1 1 2 Nearby Kerewara island was selected instead, but the limitations of its harbour, surrounding reefs and lack of useable land caused the station to be moved to the Gazelle Peninsula close to Ralum. A labour station was established there1 and, almost as an afterthought, it was stated that the depot would be combined with a plantation. The Protectorate was opened to settlers on 18 September 18852 in the O hope that Germans in Australia would flock north to 'German soil' but only a few did. New Guinea was still regarded as an uncontrolled frontier rather than an established colony.4 It was a blessing', wrote Hernsheim, 'that only a dozen settlers were attracted by the New Guinea Company’s advertisements to C migrate to Kaiser Wilhelmsland'. In its haste to fill the Protectorate with settlers the Company acted in complete contradiction to the advice of the German Colonial Society that the German colonies are not suited to the reception of settlers with no means or even with very little. A large amount of capital and knowledge of tropical agriculture are both requisite ... A warning must be given against emigration to any of the German colonies without the necessary financial resources. 123456 1. German New Guinea: The Annual Reports, edited and translated by Peter Sack and Dymphna Clark. Canberra, Australian National University, 1979. Annual Report 1887/1888, p. 23. (note: page numbers are for the book, not individual Reports, hereafter "Sack & Clark, Annual Report..., p ....") 2. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 83 3. Firth, "The New Guinea Company", p. 364 ('During the governorship of Sir George Grey in South Australia 1841-1845 a considerable number of Germans were introduced as settlers by Godeffroy & Son, in consequence of the failure of the promoters to recruit sufficient colonists in England'. (Guy H. Scholefield. The Pacific, its past and future. London, Murray, 1919. p. 98) None of these was attracted to New Guinea. 4. Firth, "The New Guinea Company", p. 364 5. Stewart Firth. "Captain Hernsheim - Pacific venturer, merchant prince" in More Pacific Islands Portraits, p. 127 6. W.O. Henderson, Studies in German colonial history. London, Cass, 1962. p. 36 13 Plantation development on the Gazelle Peninsula did not proceed beyond Ralum and its sub-plantations (discussed shortly) until 1889. That year the Company engaged Richard Parkinson (Queen Emma's brother in law) to lay out a plantation of coconuts, interplanted with cotton, on land it had purchased near Ralum from Queen Emma, together with adjoining land near Kinigunan purchased from Octave Mouton's father. The Moutons had traded in the area for Thomas Farrell and had acquired land although Octave Mouton did not commence planting Kinigunan with coconuts until 1896. Despite the development of Herbertshohe, the Company continued to concentrate on Kaiser Wilhelmsland until the success of the cotton and coconut plantings on the Gazelle Peninsula could no longer be ignored. But further expansion near Herbertshohe was a problem as Queen Emma had bought most of the good coastal land between Kinigunan and Raluana Point to expand Ralum into the sub-plantations of Matanatar (which Parkinson used for experimental plantings of tropical plants), Ravalien and Malapao (which she gave to her sister, Phebe Parkinson), and the outstations Tokuka (later Tokua), and Gire Gire. This forced the Company, and individual planters, to push further inland and down the east and west coasts for land. The official move to the Gazelle Peninsula The focus of development in New Guinea changed from Kaiser Wilhelmsland to the Bismarck Archipelago in 1890 with the move of the administrative capital to the former labour depot at Herbertshohe, which was by then almost surrounded by the plantation of the same name. The following year Parkinson expanded the first hundred acres of Herbertshohe plantation for the Company and in 1892 the Company's Report stated 'this station is intended mainly for the cultivation of cotton and coconut palms and for animal industry'.1 The shape of a plantation economy had formed so quickly that within a year of the station's establishment labour recruiting had been relegated to second place. 1 . Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1891/1892, 1892/1893 (combined as one Report), p. 74 14 Herbertshohe plantation was soon expanded into the sub-stations of Kenabot, Raniolo and Gunanur. At the same time the station achieved a separate section in the Company's Annual Reports and although still responsible for recruiting labour it was becoming more important as a plantation centre. In April 1892 the area planted with cotton and coconuts was nearly 300 acres,1 of which 155 ha of cotton produced nearly 12,908 kgs of scoured (lint) cotton; the next year's crop increased production by 114%. The plantation surge was helped by the 'highly competent technical and scientific personnel' who were the German colonial service's strongest asset and 'the envy of any [ other] foreign colonial service'.1 2 34 Their experience in Samoa and their training in the Dutch East Indies provided trader/planters with more help and advice than their counterparts in British New Guinea received. Annual Reports of the Company - and later, the Imperial Administration - mention that officers were sent to the Indies to learn tobacco planting and gain plantation experience. It was a two-way process: Miller wrote 'My father was an expert in growing tobacco and was loaned by the Dutch government in Sumatra to the q German New Guinea Company to teach them to grow and cure tobacco'. Soils in controlled areas of the Protectorate were analysed, experimental crops introduced, overseas markets explored and catch crops planted for income while coconut palms grew to maturity. As a result the cultivated land in the Bismarck Archipelago management area increased by one-third in 1898/1899, mostly on the Gazelle Peninsula. There was nothing haphazard in the German approach to developing plantations and in its last Annual Report the Company noted that 'the European plantations are expanding in a gratifying manner'.'1 German national pride demanded that this be continued and improved. 1. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 88 2. Henderson, Studies in German colonial history, p. 135 3. Reminiscences of Mrs Lulu Miller, 1964. typescript, New Guinea Collection, University of Papua New Guinea Library, p. 2 4. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1899/1900. p. 188 15 Apart from the success of the Herbertshohe plantation complex, the Company's administration of the colony1 was a failure. Its Directors in Berlin had an impressive ignorance of local conditions, while their obsession with legislative detail, and refusal to hasten slowly in developing New Guinea, hindered Company officials and eroded Company finances. Labour Labourers recruited in the early 1880s were said to be 'temperamentally O and physically unfit for work'. Hernsheim agreed: 'These savages', he wrote 'were almost completely useless. They had neither manual skills nor any desire to work'.** UsuaUy a fair man in his assessments of New Guinea and its people, Hernsheim in this comment clearly overlooked the enormous changes native labourers had to cope with in these situations, doing work new to them, while trying to communicate with their employer (and very likely each other). Villagers on Kaiser Wilhelmsland and the Gazelle Peninsula occasionally worked as labourers in clearing land for plantations because they were attracted by the trade goods offered in payment, but working at a set task for a set time was not a Melanesian trait and so this "casual" labour was neither reliable nor constant. Despite their apparent "laziness" villagers were locked into a schedule of hunting, fishing, gardening, repairing houses and garden fences and - before the Europeans arrived - very busily engaged in warfare among themselves. The early European arrivals tended to see villagers as a collective labour force with no responsibilities, and in his eagerness to help planters in New Guinea and Samoa, Company Administrator von Bennigsen permitted the engagement of labourers for five years instead of the approved three years. Queen Emma and Otto Dempwolff 12 1. Townsend, The rise and fall of Germany's colonial empire, p. 150 2. Peter Corris. Passage, port and plantation: a history of the Solomon Islands labour migration 1870-1914. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1973. p. 72 3. Hernsheim, South Sea merchant, p. 30 16 (the Colonial Adviser in Berlin) opposed this,1 arguing that it would keep young men from their villages for too long. In February 1888 Hernsheim accompanied Consul Steubel from Apia around the Bismarck Archipelago on an enquiry into alleged abuses by Geman recruiters. Although personally concerned at certain aspects of recruiting and the treatment of some labourers, Hernsheim's headquarters at Matupit remained a source of supply for labourers for Samoa, as did the DHPG station at Mioko. Recruits came from the Gazelle Peninsula, New Ireland and the German Solomon Islands. Between 1887 and 1903 the death rate of labourers averaged 40% annually, and was probably the reason that depopulation was feared in certain areas. None of the Tolai men and women interviewed commented on the death rate of labourers, but two (John Vuia and Towalia Penipas) mentioned that some of their friends who went away to work on plantations did not return. Vuia suggested that those who went to New Ireland married there, but no comments were offered about labourers who went to other O parts of New Guinea or Samoa. Corns suggests that the average death rates of Melanesians (exactly from where in Melanesia is not clear) on Rewa plantation, Fiji, in 1883 was about 200 per thousand compared to 40 to 50 per thousand for Indian labourers. This seems to support his previous remark that labourers from New Guinea were unfit for plantation work, at least when they first arrived at the plantation. They were, at any rate, uninterested in it. Company officials on Kaiser Wilhelmsland claimed that the indolence of villagers there 'created a serious labour problem'^ which could only be countered by importing Asian coolie labour. A trial group of tobacco coolies in 1887 was judged successful and in November 1889 the first Chinese general coolies were brought from Singapore to work on Company tobacco plantations at Hatzfeldhafen on Kaiser Wilhelmsland. In January 1894 an Ordinance proclaimed in Friedrich Wilhelmshafen prohibited Chinese entering ports in British New Guinea or Australia. 123 1. Stewart Firth, "The transformation of the labour trade in German New Guinea, 1899-1914" in The Journal of Pacific History, volume XI, 1976. Part I. p. 51 2. Vuia, Rabaul. 14.4.86 3. Corris, Passage, port and plantation, p. 73 4. Townsend, The rise and fall of Germany's colonial empire, p. 148 17 A particularly astute German move was the Convention of 14 September 1899 (also known as the "Anglo-German Agreement of 1899") which modified the settlement of 1886 demarcating British and German spheres of agreement in the Solomon Islands ’by transferring to Great Britain the northern Solomons (except Bougainville and Buka which were retained by Germany) namely, Choiseul and Isabel and all other islands to the east and south-east of Bougainville, including the Lord Howe group'.* At the same time Germans were allowed to recruit in the British Solomon Islands, but the British were not allowed to recruit from the German Solomons or any other German possession in the Pacific. The effect of the German ban was quickly apparent. Of the 1,237 labourers recruited for Kaiser Wilhelmsland plantations in this period 1,044 were from New Ireland and 130 were from New Britain (i.e. from areas outside the Gazelle Peninsula) and the Duke of Yorks. In 1890 there were only 50 Tolai working as labourers on Gazelle Peninsula plantations and by the middle of the decade they stopped plantation labouring altogether. Their withdrawal from the work force, together with an increasing demand for labour as new plantations were laid out, saw the O influx of "foreign"* natives from other parts of New Guinea and, more significantly, the Chinese into the Gazelle Peninsula. The labourers from other parts of New Guinea brought their own problems to the Gazelle. Priday Numi of Matupit village said2 1 1. Former German Possessions in Oceania. Handbook 146 (prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office). London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920. p. 20 2. use of the word became common. Over sixty years later a United Nations Visiting Mission expressed 'astonishment that a foreign native is a New Guinean from outside the Gazelle Peninsula . . . . In other words, all persons from districts other than New Britain, and even many from it, are regarded as foreign natives when they come to work and live around Rabaul'. Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, 1962. New York, UNO, 1962. p. 11 18 The Sepik and Aitape did a lot of fighting and the Tolai did on occasion. Bougainvillians without a doubt. If a Sepik or Bougainvillian wanted a meri [ native woman ] he was chased away or killed.1 Yet John Vuia, who was born in Baia village on the north coast of the Gazelle Peninsula observed that the Buka, Manus and Kavieng labourers were peaceful. I saw that with my own eyes. ... on Matupit Farm plantation the Bukas had their wives (plenty). Foreign natives brought with them a certain stigma which Corris pinpointed as: The migrant labourer is without honour where he works, for his function is to do what the people there will not do. The demand for labour eased towards the end of the Company period as planters experimented with various schemes to reduce their constant need to recruit and train labourers. These included establishing a nucleus of workers willing to re-engage as their contracts expired, and replacing labourers with cattle to control grass and weeds under palms. Trade During the 1890s an increasing quantity of coconuts came from inland villages (within five to ten miles of the coast) for the Tolai to re-trade for European goods or tambu (native shell money). The supply of trade nuts was plentiful as the main traders' exports for 1894 show: Forsayth (Ralum) 100 tons Hernsheim (Matupit) 1,000 DHPG (Mioko) 1,000 4 312 1. Priday Numi, Matupit. 31.3.86 2. Vuia, Rabaul. 14.4.86 3. Corris, Passage, port and plantation, p. 2 4. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 27 19 These figures emphasise the dominance of trade copra as only part of Ralum plantation was mature enough to produce coconuts for copra. The average price received for trade and European produced copra was 18 pounds a ton1 which made the developing plantation industry very attractive. Towards the end of the Company period the dependence on trade coconuts and, occasionally, native sun dried copra, lessened as more land was acquired on the Gazelle Peninsula and Kaiser Wilhelmsland for plantations while plantings of the previous decade came into bearing. As had happened in Samoa, the emphasis changed from buying coconuts to buying land on which to plant coconuts. It seemed that everyone, including the Missions, wanted to own a plantation. . o Missions* Seven years before Catholic missionaries arrived in the Herbertshohe area via Nodup, a Methodist Mission station had been established at Mioko in the Duke of Yorks, and the Methodists felt a proprietary right to the Gazelle Peninsula. The Catholics were distressed to find the Methodists settled while the Methodists were annoyed by the threat of Catholic opposition, so to keep the O Missions apart and prevent them from poaching on each other's "territory" Bismarck introduced two spheres of Mission activity in the Archipelago. These proved unworkable and were abandoned in 1899. In July 1898 the Methodist Mission bought Ulu island in the Duke of Yorks (see map p. 20) for a District 12 1. Stewart Firth, "German firms in the Pacific Islands, 1857-1914" in Germany in the Pacific and far East, 1870-1914. p. 16 2. for a history of the Methodist Mission see H. Fellmann, A short history of the work of the Church in the Bismarck Archipel District. Rabaul, The Methodist Missionary Society of Australasia, 1918. (typescript of English translation by N. Threlfall, 1973, in United Church papers, Rabaul). A history of the Catholic Mission in the Gazelle Peninsula is given in [Sister] "Michael", 75 Glorious Years. Vunapope, Catholic Mission, ?1975. 3. "Michael", ibid., p. 15 20 SCALE E i K B YDS 0 1000 2000 3000 APPROXIMATE PLANTATION LOCATIONS DUKE OF YORK ISLANDS, 1900 21 Training Institution, but as Ulu was 'good land for planting'1 it was soon cleared and planted with coconuts and the Methodists joined the ranks of other new planters. The Catholic Mission experienced problems in obtaining land and O establishing plantations on Kaiser Wilhelmsland as well as on the Gazelle Peninsula. In 1890 Father (later Bishop) Couppe had been struck with the possibilities plantations revealed of 'open[ ing land developt ing] the country'^ and his imagination was further gripped by their prospects for Mission income and pastoral recruits. He developed a policy of buying land both for Mission sites and plantation development, but the Catholics were careful not to let commercial enthusiasm overshadow pastoral commitment despite their assertion that the pioneer priests and brothers were laying the foundation of the colony's economy.^ Couppe eagerly accepted land at Kinigunan offered by Richard Parkinson, using it to found Vunapope Mission and planting the balance with coconuts. Gradually, the Catholic Mission acquired more land and developed plantations at Malagunan on Blanche Bay, Mandres (Weberhafen) on the north coast, and Vunakambi^ and Bukumluk (known jointly as Vunkambi plantation), on land bought from trader Dupre also on the north coast of the Peninsula. In 1896 the Catholic Mission built1 2345 1. Fellmann, A short history of the work of the Church in the Bismarck Archipel District, p. 34 2. Ralph M. Wiltgen, "Catholic Mission plantations in mainland New Guinea: their origin and purpose" in Second Waigani Seminar: The History of Melanesia. Papers delivered at a seminar sponsored jointly by the University of Papua and New Guinea, the Administrative College of Papua and New Guinea, and the Council of New Guinea Affairs. Port Moresby, 1968. Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, Canberra, and the University of Papua and New Guinea. Port Moresby, 1969. pp. 333/341 3. Ronald G. Williams, The United Church in Papua, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Rabaul, Trinity, ?1972. p. 125 4. Wiltgen, "Catholic Mission plantations in mainland New Guinea", p. 332 5. not to be confused with Vunakamkambi plantation, subsequently owned by the Methodist Mission (and, like nearby Ratongor plantation, used as a civilian concentration camp during the Japanese occupation of Rabaul in 1942/1945). 2 2 the first "road" (a bridle path cut through the bush) on the Gazelle Peninsula between its main station at Vunapope and Takubur. The same year the newly arrived Judge Hahl used Methodist Mission influence to build a government road along the coast from Herbertshohe to Raluana.* Selling copra and attending markets was now an almost daily and time-consuming occupation for the Tolai, and roads made it much easier to bring trade produce (coconuts, copra, native food) to markets close to Herbertshohe and adjacent European plantations. They also drew more villagers into the periphery of official and Mission influence. The end of the Company period By 1899 the Tolai were changing from an independent people distrustful 9 ' ' ' ’ of Europeans to one becoming economically dependent on them. The agricultural potential of the colony, including that of the smaller islands (despite their later being dismissed as 'merely ringworms in the oeean'^), together with the scarcely tapped trading possibilities of the islands of the Bismarck Archipelago and Kaiser Wilhelmsland were now obvious. Assisted by its finance, former Company employees acquired land for plantations - mainly in the Gazelle Peninsula - in the 1890s. The Tolai now had to adjust to more Europeans invading their areas, while their own withdrawal from the plantation work force caused "foreign" natives and to a certain extent, Asian coolies, to be brought in as plantation labourers. With the spread of European settlement, European values and customs were imposed as a matter of course and the natives were expected to understand and observe the1 23 1. Peter J. Hempenstall, "The reception of European missions in the German Pacific Empire: the New Guinea experience" in The Journal of Pacific History, Volume Ten 1975. p. 50 2. the Methodist Mission lived in a state of 'armed watchfulness in 1894 (George C. Carter, Misikaram. Auckland, Wesley Historical Society, 1975. p.l 2); the Catholic Mission armed its labourers at Vunakamkambi plantation with private firearms. (Hempenstall, "The reception of European mission", p. 137) 3. Interstate Commission of Australia. Report: British and Australian trade in the South Pacific. Melbourne, Government Printer, 1924. Appendix G, evidence of W.H. Lucas, p. 30. (hereafter "Interstate Commission Report, p. ..."). 23 subtleties of European law - even where this was in conflict with their customary law, as usually happened in land dealings. The end of the Company period coincided with the realisation of the Tolai that European trade - "a terrible destroyer of their primaevalism"* - now bound them to introduced economic ideals. A feeling of security and purpose settled on the Europeans in the colony after the Imperial German government assumed full control of it. At the same time divisions hardened. The planters saw themselves as the real developers of the colony and were determined to enjoy the benefits of their hard work without being overly concerned with rules. The officials of the Imperial Administration (and, earlier, those of the Company) who by their very position were a transitory and ever-changing group, endeavoured to enforce the law and curb the land-hunger of the planters, guide settlers, and mediate between the Missions while expanding German influence in the colony. THE IMPERIAL GERMAN ADMINISTRATION Land The German Foreign Office warned Governor von Bennigsen in 1900 that he had no authority to make independent decisions in land matters, although O it admitted it would be desirable to transfer a limited authority to him. It soon became obvious to his successor, (acting) Governor Hahl, that land needed to provide Tolais with a living through hunting, fishing and gardening, had to be protected and on 17 November 1901 he sent a detailed report on existing native reserves on the Gazelle Peninsula to the Foreign Office. There were then twelve reserves: eight in the Blanche Bay area for over 2,000 villagers, and four around Talili Bay for a few hundred. AH were located on land owned by Europeans who had not always been compensated for the areas excised. The acquisition and control of land in all German colonies was under review in Berlin and was clarified on 21 November 1901 as the basis for a new set of land laws - the 'Imperial 12 1. Wilfred PoweU, Wanderings in a wild country. London, Sampson Low et al., 1883. p. 279 2. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 155 24 Ordinance regarding the Rights to Land in the German Colonies'1 - which gave colonial governors the right to attach special conditions to European ownership of O native land. On 30 November 1901 the Chancellor issued regulations relating to Groundbook procedure, and prescribed elaborate rules for the survey of land. The O Ordinance came into force on 1 April 1903 and required the following procedure to be followed in land purchases: Where an applicant sought a block of native owned land the steps in the process were as follows: application to the Governor, permit by the Governor to acquire from natives, acquisition from natives, permission from Governor to occupy, payment of purchase price or part thereof, confirmation (or disallowance) of the acquisition from natives after an on-the-spot inspection by a District Officer, survey, payment of survey fees and balance of purchase price (if any), formal cession from the government, application for entry in the Ground Book, and entry in the Ground Book. The formal cession of the land required the governor or his representative and the settler to appear personally before an Imperial Judge and sign an Auflassung (i.e. deed of cession) usually a two-page document setting out the conditions of the cession. The completion of this process took time, the big delays being in the on-the-spot check of the acquisition from the native owners by a District Officer, and survey. Apart from these requirements there were other safeguards to protect native lands. In 1902 the area required to be set aside for native use varied from 2ha. for every adult male native to lha for every man, woman and child^ while village sites, landing places and fishing rights had to be excluded from all purchases. The demand for land was mainly for plantations and restrictions had a double purpose: 12345 1. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 176 2. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders under German rule, p. 144 3. Judgment: "Custodian of Expropriated Property and Phoebe Kroening v. Commissioner of Native Affairs (Re Mortlock Islands)" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971-72. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. p. 641 4. Bredmeyer, The registration of land in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, p. 42 5. Sack, Land between two laws, pp. 170/171 25 introduced primarily to protect native land-holders against excessive purchases by Europeans, they also protected Europeans from buying land in areas then unsafe to settle in. For example, it was not until 1902 that the ’mountain tribes' around Varzin - then a two and a half hour inland journey from Herbertshohe - were pacified and Hahl could write that The Paparatawa tribe, which was mainly responsible for the disturbances was controlled. ... The establishment of a police station at Toma (Paparatawa) will ensure peaceful conditions both for the expanding plantations and also among the belligerent natives themselves. Concern for native land rights was also expressed by the Expropriation Ordinance of 1903 which stated that where land definitely passed from the possession of natives to non-natives in New Guinea, it might be expropriated if this appeared necessary to the government to ensure the natives an economic existence, and a home. But, susceptible to European protests about this, the Chancellor negated the Ordinance by a Decree which enabled a non-native to obtain an exemption from expropriation on a number of grounds. These included the bona fide acquisition of the land, or proof that he had lived on it or cultivated O it for three years without objection from the authorities. Two weeks after the Expropriation Ordinance came into effect the 'Imperial Ordinance regarding the Acquisition of Ownership and the Charging of Land in the Colony of the Neu Guinea Kompagnie', which had been enacted on 1 October 1887 and which had *1 largely determined land matters in the colony, was withdrawn. This formalising of land acquisition, together with the completion of the most important surveys and the fined definition of plemtation areas even, if need be, at the expense of established plantations, was said to have greatly improved relations with natives.^ But the Tolai were beginning to realise their early land sales were unwise and resented the lack of free access to it, German legislation notwithstanding: 123 1. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1902/1903. p. 236 2. Sack, Land between two laws, pp. 183/186 3. ibid., p. 128 4. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1903/1904. p. 244 26 Some of the land the Germans got for nothing. The land they paid for was not fair. We had to take the money, that was it. They wanted it and went to great lengths to get it. Many times Tolai said ground belong us we can walk about. We didn't like it all. Not our fashion. They were fortunate Governor Hahl was so sensitive to their needs. For example, three reserves totalling over 386 hectares comprising over forty per cent of the 9 Wangaramut plantation property in the Weberhafen area of the north coast were excised for native use. Two additional reserves of 385 ha were excised from Company land at Kabakada, also on the north coast of the Gazelle Peninsula, and in 1904 four reserves totalling 1,080 ha or 22% of the total area of the plantation were surveyed on Ralum. Although further plantation land was obtained during the German Administration over 6,000 ha of previously alienated land were now o excised on the Gazelle Peninsula for reserves. The map on page 27 and the list at pp. 28-30 show the extent of native reserves. On 22 July 1904 Governor Hahl prescribed conditions regarding the occupation of ownerless land by agreement with villagers, and ordered that areas necessary for the livelihood of villagers (particularly dwelling places, garden lands and palm groves) were precluded from acquisition. He also ordered that further conditions governing the acquisition by the Fiscus (i.e. the Treasury, or land holding section of the Administration) of native land, or its sale, would be laid down by the Governor either generally or for each case as he deemed fit. General conditions relating to the cession into private ownership of lands that had been acquired by the Fiscus were published in 1904 and subsequently in 1910, 1912 and 1914.^ The importance attached to formalising land holdings was quickly realised by all Europeans, and individuals, companies and missions whose holdings could be considered in any way indefinite moved to regularise them. 123 1. Vuia, Rabaul. 14.4.86 2. "Custodian of Expropriated Property v. Director of District Administration (Re Wangaramut)" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1969-70. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. p. 140 3. Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1969/70 ("Wangaramut"). p. 140 4. Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971/1972 ("Re Mortlock Islands"), p. 643 27 NATIVE RESERVES & PLANTATION AREAS - ____> Gazelle Peninsula 1914 Scale 28 NATIVE LANDS ACQUIRED BY THE GOVERNMENT LANDS ENTERED IN THE GROUND BOOK IN THE NAME OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT Date on which Description o f Land Area land was acquired, assigned, or entry From whom acquired Hec- in Ground Book Name District tares Ares Sq.M. applied for . Land entered in the Ground Book o f the Gazelle Peninsula for the German Goveihment Unambaur Keravia 0 35-89 0 3.10.1901 New Guinea Company The Pigeon Islands Between Neu 36 48 60 27.9.1900 The Australian Wesleyan -Nanuk and Lauenburg Methodist Mission Society Palanakaur and Blanche Bay Plakovo Keravia 1 89 97 (3.10.1901 The New Guinea Company Tom balk Keravia (7.3.1904 The Trader Karl Lausen Vulcan b land Blanche Bay Not stated 3.10.1901 The New Guinea Company Matakambang North Coast 103 72 0 15.11.1901 Mrs. E. Kolbe Tolublr North Coast 22 76 0 15.11.1901 Forsayth Company Limited Napurua Tavana 2 23 34 (11.10.1901 Natives Rumburua Tavana (29.11.1901 Native Reserve Vunapake 4 61 0 26.6.1903 New Guinea Company back o f Forsayth^ land Various Plots Simpsonhafen 333 22 17 20.6.1903 Natives, and by Agreement 4.8.1903 of Exchange with N.D. 13.10.1905 Lloyd Company 8.8.1911 3.5.1911 22.5.1911 22.7.1911 Palongor Kambeira 10 0 0 8.5.1903 Not stated Monaiu Kambeira 7 50 0 8.5.1903 Not stated Tanglene Kambeira 3 0 0 8.5.1903 Not stated Reserve Kabakanda 203 39 0 22.8.1903 New Guinea Company Reserve Kabakanda 182 24 0 22.8.1903 New Guinea Company Toma 4781 83 0 7.10.1903 This land was taken . * possession of Lungelunge Livuan 0 14 0 1.10.1902 Natives Plot o f Land Kabakaul 91 0 0 27.6.1904 Mrs. E. Kolbe by way o f exchange Plot o f Land 0 2 40 31.10.1904 Mrs. E. Kolbe Raging! Between Las- 27 50 0 20.7.1905 Vacant land acquired by sul Bigtit 22.7.1905 Imperial Government and Aid and Tonger Bight Plot o f Land Aul and 6 25 0 (20.7.1905 Vacant land acquired by Tanger Bight (22.7.1905 Imperial Government Plot o f Land Lassul Bight 5 0 0 20.7.1905 Vacant land acquired by Imperial Government Pilapila 1 0 0 24.2.1907 Mrs. E. Kolbe, Forsayth Company Public Road South side of 8 0 0 16.4.1907 Catholic Mission Sacred • Vunapope Mission Mission Topaiap Vlavolo 2 32 0 5.4.1907 Natives Rakaia Ram- Vlavolo 0 95 98 1.4.1907 Natives oramoro Matakambang North Coast 1 0 0 13.9.1907 Mrs. E. Kolbe, Forsayth and Company Wahlenhuegel 0 84 99 4.3.1914 H.R. Wahlen Ges. Limited Tomallli A Tomalili 25 0 0 16.12.1911 Kolichnuk or Togo or Sago, Bight a Solomon blander Rakaje, Mimlen, Kambair Bay 135 11 0 16.6.1908 Mrs. E. Kolbe, New Guinea Kambair Company 11.11.1909 Vacant land acquired by Madi 19 79 95 Lassul Bight the Imperial Government 16.10.1909 Natives Plot o f Land Korai 2 98 0 17.1.1910 29 NATIVE LANDS ACQUIRED BY THE GOVERNMENT LANDS ENTERED IN THE GROUND BOOK IN THE NAME OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT Date on which Description o f Land - s Area land was acquired, assigned, or entry From whom acquired Hec- in Ground Book Name District tares Ares Sq.M. applied for a Land entered in the Ground Book of the Gazelle Peninsula for the German Government - continued Ravuvutai Rarunakulul 0 7 34 9.4.1908 Natives • 13.7.1910 9.7.1910 Plot o f Land Rainau 35 19 0 12.4.1910 Natives 2.7.1910 18.7.1910 Tarawog, Dibdivir 5 10 0 31.5.1910 Vacant land acquired for Namalilli F 50 55 0 23.12.1910 the Landesfiskus by the * 42 57 0 Imperial Government Namalilli D 1 67 0 30.5.1910 Vacand land acquired for Namalilli E 23.12.1910 the Landesfiskus by the Imperial Government Vunagiau Paparatava 0 40 50 27.12.1910 Natives 31.1.1911 • 6.12.1911 Plot o f Land Map o f Rabaul 1 44 01 30.7.1913 Catholic Mission o f the . N o.l Sheet No.2- Sacred Heart, by agree ment of exchange Plot o f Land On Ratawul- 2 8 70 5.1.1911 Natives Native Cemetry Rabaul Road Keravia 1 36 48 12.4.1911 Natives Towatue 2 75 80 26.4.1911 Natives Keravat 4351 37 81 3.5.1912 Vacant land acquired for the Landesfiskus by the Imperial Government Ramadu (Native 486 14 58 7.5.1912 New Guinea Comany, by Reserve) exchange agreement Ragage (Native 676 46 68 Reserve) Mandres (Native 830 78 84 Reserve) Viaiapaladig 563 30 02 (Native Reserve) Bugbug (Native 1* 25 6 Reserve) (Trading Place) Public road. 26 41 91 7.5.1912 New Guinea Company, by Kambaira to Massava exchange agreement Public road, 0 90 0 19.10.1912 Transferred by R. Wolff, . Paparatava to Paparatava to the Land- Tbbera esfiskus Native Reserve 162 08 20 7.5.1912 New Guinea Company, by Towakundum exchange agreement Landing Place, Baining 0 84 27 12.12.1912 Vacant land acquired by Nangas the Imperial Government Viviren 0 97 86 9.B.1912 Natives 10.7.1913 Kapapau 0 64 61 21.12.1911 Natives 20.2.1913 Landing Place, Baining 6 16 06 12.12.1912 Vacant land acquired by Mamaar Bight 2.8.1913 the Imperial Government Various Plots Rabaul 15 91 27 22.8.1911 From natives and by exchange 18.9.1913 agreement with N.D. Lloyd Vunakano ' Baining 0 27 44 10.3.1914 Natives Gavit Baining 2 31 87 13.10.1914 Vacant land acquired by Imperial Government Amtsblatt 5 of 1.3.17 30 NATIVE LANDS ACQUIRED DY THE GOVERNMENT LANDS ENTERED IN THE GROUND DOOR IN THE NAME 01J THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT Date on which Description o f Land Area land was acquired, assigned, or entry From whom acquired Hec in Ground Book Name District tares (ires Sq.M. applied for Land entered in the Ground Hook o f the Gazelle Peninsula for the German Government - continued Rapalavat Baining 53 64 06 13.10.1914 Vacant land acquired by Imperial Government Dulip Rabaul 302 09 93 19.10.1914 Vacant land acquired by Imperial Government Vunavurvur Baining 9 56 42 14.11.1913 Vacant land acquired by Imperial Government Kokopo Rabaul 0 88 7 4.5.1900 By Purchase and assignment Plot o f Land Rabaul 0 08 0 24.9.1900 By Purchase and assignment Plot o f Land Rabaul 14 05 0 24.9.1900 By Purchase and assignment Plot o f Land Rabaul 2 93 0 24.9.1900 By Purchase and assignment Plot o f Land Rabaul 1 22 0 24.9.1900 By Purchase and assignment Plot o f Land Rabaul 1 72 0 24.9.1900 By Purchase and assignment Plot o f Land Rabaul 0 20 0 24.9.1900 By Purchase and assignment Plot o f Land Rabaul 2 15 0 24.9.1900 By Purchase and assignment Plot o f Land Rabaul 0 43 0 29.3.1906 By Contract of exchange, Dated 21.3.1906 Toma Rabaul 74 46 0 5.5.1908 Application . Source: Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/1922. Appendix F, pp. 1/2 31 In 1907 the colonial section of the German Foreign Office became an independent department. Colonial land policy was changed, and as a result the Administration of New Guinea tried to buy back land* and became very cautious about entering into any new land contracts, while rigidly enforcing ownership conditions. Waste land covered with bush could be bought only from the Administration at 5 marks a hectare and every purchaser was obliged to commence cultivation within a year and to bring three-quarters of his land under cultivation within fifteen years and keep it cultivated.^ In principle, land at a particular place was sold only when all preliminary enquiries concerning existing property rights held by villagers, landing facilities, public interest etc. were fully dealt with. Land on which there were extensive stands of coconut palms was O transferred only in special circumstances0 (e.g. to a Mission for "protection"). Despite Hahl's close watch over the acquisition of land, it seems that records in Groundbooks were not as complete as he would have wished. There do not appear to be firm figures for land acquired by Europeans and planted with coconuts, land acquired and planted with other crops (e.g. sisal on Kaiser Wilhelmsland, cotton on the Gazelle Peninsula), land acquired and not yet planted, and land held in reserve (possibly on a speculative basis). The figures that are available from various sources are conflicting. For example, in the Annual Report for 1911/1912 it was stated at January 1911 the total area of plantation land planted with coconuts was 25,840 ha. and that another 10,000ha. had been bought that year;-* it was subsequently stated in 1936 that there were 34,800ha. under 1. Henderson, Studies in German colonial history, p. 9 2. Marjorie Jacobs, "German New Guinea" in Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea (Volume A-K). Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1972. pp. 496/497 3. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1911/1912. p. 344 (’The Germans made it a rule that you could never buy a native's property that contained a certain number of coconut trees'. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence J.M.C. Forsayth, p. 89) 4. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1911/1912. p. 344 32 coconut cultivation in New Guinea in 1911.'*' As mentioned above, Hahl noted the inaccuracies associated with land acquisitions, and Bredmeyer has commented on the generally inaccurate method of German surveys (discussed in Chapter Three). The loss of almost all plantation files, and general German records, adds to the problem. It is, therefore, difficult to be exact in speaking of either total land acquisitions in the Gazelle Peninsula or New Guinea generally or areas of plantation land, cultivated or uncultivated. Where land acquisitions or areas of planted or unplanted land are mentioned in this thesis it must be remembered they are unsubstantiated figures. The demand for land was largely caused by Hahl's introduction in 1912 of generous land conditions for small settlers with little capital who wanted to start a plantation. Provided they were young and fit and had been in New Guinea - or another tropical colony - for two years they could buy blocks of up to 150ha. for 1 mark a hectare. The usual price of 5 marks a hectare, plus survey and O registration costs which brought the total price to 12 marks a hectare was waived. By 1914 about a hundred small settlers, including Germans from Queensland^ were living on parts of New Ireland, the Baining coast of the Gazelle Peninsula, and the mainland coast west of Hatzfeldhafen (Madang). The colony had obviously lost some of its "frontier" rawness. By 1914 the concentration of the plantation industry on the Gazelle Peninsula was weakening, although it remained the financial core. Jolley wrote of the extensive land acquisitions on the north coast of the Gazelle Peninsula, stretching well into the Baining area: Between Tombaule and Wundal [ i.e. Vudal] is land formerly the property of E.E. Forsayth, now that of the Forsayth Gesellschaft. Thence to Massawa Bay is all New Guinea Company including the Bush as 12 1. Gordon Thomas, "Land settlement in New Guinea" in The Australian Quarterly, no. 32 December 1936. p. 51 2. Albert Hahl, Governor in New Guinea, edited and translated by Peter G. Sack and Dymphna Clark. Canberra, Australian National University, 1980. p. 143 3. Jacobs, "German New Guinea", p. 497 33 well as the shore. From Massawa to Lassul is all taken up and there is nothing to be had in areas of over 250 acres until one rounds Cape Lambert. To the east of Tombaule (Raulawat) is first a native reservation, then comes 1250 acres of Guyot's and thereafter all planted land, or native reservations to Rabaul. Sack confirms that a great deal of native land was acquired throughout New Guinea - but principally in the Gazelle Peninsula area - before 1914. The O Company acquired 50,000ha. under its agreement with the Reich and in the latter years of German administration strong planter demand for land saw another 20,000ha. acquired between 1912 and 1914. In 1899 a total of 950,000 acres had been claimed: the Company claimed about 500,000 acres, Queen Emma about 330,000 acres, and Hernsheim about 80,000 acres. In 1914 this had been reduced to just over 700,000 acres which was a substantial amount for the Administration O to survey and register and for the planters to develop. In 1914 Hahl called for an immediate delineation of plantation and native lands in the Gazelle Peninsula and the Duke of York islands.4 He considered it necessary to regularise all holdings as earlier surveys in the area had sometimes been inaccurate. The Australian Civil Administration of New Guinea was to find many of the early German surveys inaccurate, in some cases ’wildly'^ so. One problem was the tendency of topographical boundaries to change: e.g. rivers quite frequently altered course during, and after, heavy rains. A formal survey of properties would, as Hahl obviously hoped, anticipate possible future boundary disputes as well as returning to its rightful owners native land which had "crept into" holdings. These surveys could be voluntary, or where an amicable arrangement could not be reached, through expropriation without compensation 1 1. letter of 9 March 1912 from F.R. Jolley, Rabaul, to Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd., Sydney. Burns, Philp Archives, University of Sydney. 2. Sack, Land between two laws, pp. 169/171, 175 3. ibid., p. 175 4. Biskup, "Dr Albert Hahl". p. 354 5. Bredmeyer, The registration of land in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, p. 297 34 (but not necessarily for additional native reserves unless this had been specifically stated). Draft legislation, finalised by late 1913, was issued as the Land Regulations of 1 January 1914.^ There was little time for them to have much effect before the threat of war was followed by the Australian occupation of New Guinea. European plantations At the time the Imperial German Administration assumed responsibility for New Guinea, the plantations of Queen Emma and the Company were thriving on the Gazelle Peninsula, Hernsheim's Matupit plantation (which John Vuia saw being planted1 2 3) had 50 acres almost wholly planted and he was laying out another at Kurakakaul on the north coast. Smaller individual planters (e.g. Octave Mouton at Kinigunan) were also well established (see map p. 35). Land was cheap and labour theoretically plentiful, the climate and conditions were ideal for palms which were easy to grow and maintain. In 1902 Dr Albert Hahl was appointed Governor of German New Guinea and that year copra prices soared to 300 marks a ton. There was increased demand for plantation land, caused by 'a new spirit of O enterprise’ in the colony. The opportunities were there for the taking; two case studies show how they were seized, one on a modest scale which was the norm, the other by the man destined to become the most powerful force in the colony. In 1899 an early settler 1. Rabaul Record, 1 August 1916. v.l no. 6. p. 1 2. Vuia, Rabaul 14.4.86 3. Hahl, Governor in New Guinea, p. 90 35 APPROXIMATE PLANTATION LOCATIONS GAZELLE PENINSULA, 1900 36 came to New Britain where I was manager o f a trading station at Kabanga. ... I later settled in Bougainville ... the first white man to make a home on this island, ... I abandoned the enterprise and took over the management of the newly established plantation at Pondo, the first settlement on the west coast of New Britain. ... about two years later I took over the management at the Kinigunan Estates. In 1906 1 started, on behalf of the New Guinea Company, the coconut plantation Warangoi, and in 1909 the coconut and cocoa plantation Putput, both on New Britain.... I acquired about 400 acres of land at Birara (New Britain) ... my plantation proved a success and in 1914 I was able to stand financially on my own legs. In the late 1890s Heinrich Wahlen arrived in the Gazelle Peninsula as a clerk for the firm of Hernsheim S c Co. but did not stay with the firm for long: When I was with Hernsheim S c Co. the firm sold their land to several Germans against my ideas. I told Mr Thiel the partner of the firm not to sell but to open plantations with Coconuts like Queen Emma had done, but he answered "We are merchants <5c traders, we dont want to invest money but we wish to make money S c take it with us. One day a war may happen S c then we lose everything what we have invested". The last sentence was indeed quite right, we lost everything. After this conversation both of us made a trip to the western Islands in an Australian steamer loading copra. We had a look at this part of the Colony <5c I proposed to take over the trading stations of H <5c Co. telling Mr Thiel that in my opinion the production of copra ought to be higher which he did not believe. H S c Co. owned a couple of little islands where their trading stations were established. But before I decided to take over the trading stations I asked the German Government to sell me all Islands. The trading stations alone did not interest me. The Government agreed and I took over the Islands and I was right about the production of Copra, nearly twice much as before I delivered. The buyers of the land Mr Kaumann, Guyot <5c Capt Macco & I we all had made an agreement with H <5c Co. to buy all goods from the firm at a certain price S c sell all produce to the firm. Copra f.i. to a fixed 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series A458, item G118/7 File 1. "Summary of statement made by unidentified person to Mr Brown, Special Magistrate, Rabaul". 37 price whilst the other produce were sold through the firm on a commission basis. After about 2 years Copra started to raise and the firm paid higher prices to the other gentlemen but not to me saying that as I had a monopoly I did not pay higher prices to the natives & the more profits H & Co. would gain alone. I told Thiel I considered it not fair to treat me not in the same way as his other customers. Under these circumstances I wished to loosen our agreement running still for 7 years & I was asking him whether he was satisfied with a payment of DM100,000. He agreed, I went to Germany, raised the sum <5c paid it in the Court of Kokopo the sum of DM100,000 and as old friends we left the Court. But soon after this the Copra was reusing again and the whole sum I was gaining again in one years time. Surely H & Co. made a sour face and I smiled. Further on I made great profits by the sale of Trocas shells. When I started trocas were valueless. All other shells and B [eche] d e M[er] the traders had fished off, only trocas were left. When I started the button industry had use for Trocas shells. Great quantities were laying on the reefs of the western Islands and I made huge profits investing all money in the opening of new plantations. As well as these individual successes, the 'great palm plantations'^ - mainly in the Herbertshohe area - of the firms and the Catholic Mission grew substantially in size and production. In 1903 there were 16,612 acres of coconuts O fully planted by Europeans on the Gazelle Peninsula. After 1903 the spread of peaceful conditions encouraged more individuals of 'limited means'^ to take up land and lay out plantations. Expansion was southwards from Herbertshohe to the Warangoi River, along the north coast in the Nodup/Nonga locality, and into the Baining area around Weberhafen (see map p. 38). 123 1. letter from H.R. Wahlen, Hamburg, to F.P. Archer, Rabaul, of 10 May 1963. Archer Papers. 2. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1901/1902. p. 217 3. A.L. Epstein, Matupit: land, politics and change among the Tolai of New Britain. Canberra, Australian National University, 1969. p. 40 (quoting Schnee, 1904, p. 352) 4. Hahl, Governor in New Guinea, p. 113 tjj*E - g ------*■>' EUROPEANPLANTATIONSPENINSULAGAZELLE THE ON ore ah&Witkr itra itr fNwGie,p 37 p.Guinea, New of history pictorial A GashWhittaker,& source N UEO YR SAD, a 1906 ISLANDS, ca. YORK DUKE ANDOF 38 39 As plantations expanded and more new ones were planted, the frontier of settlement moved further from Herbertshohe into the Baining area of the Gazelle Peninsula, and the east and west coasts of New Ireland. As will be seen from the main map at p.331 this was mainly coastal fringe development with few plantations (apart from those in the immediate Herbertshohe area) extending inland more than two kilometres. It proved impossible to supervise all areas of a plantation regularly, and planters suffered theft of coconuts by adjacent villagers and, frequently, by their own labourers. Preuss wrote how The planter therefore often sees the harvest melt away through continuous theft, and in heavily populated districts, near towns or villages, it often goes so far, that in spite of the greatest vigilance, the greater part of the nuts is stolen, and the plantation must be given up as unprofitable. ... The white man encircles his plantation with barbed wire and sets a continuous watch, but he will only enjoy his palm trees if he can take the law into his own hands ... Theft was also a worry to those natives who may [ themselves] own some coconut palms, attempt to ward off thieves by magic, or tie dead palm leaves up the length of the stem sa that their rustling will . betray the thief climbing up. The theft of coconuts may have been a problem in the Baining area but not elsewhere for Vuia is quite adamant that Tolai did not steal coconuts from O plantations in the Herbertshohe and Nodup/Nonga areas. Conscious of the expanding plantations, and the problem beginning to be experienced by Europeans and natives, Hahl called a meeting of traders, planters and missionaries to discuss developments in the colony with emphasis on their effects on the Gazelle Peninsula.1 2 1. Paul Preuss. Die Kokospalme und ihre kultur. Berlin, Reimer, 1911. pp. 77/78 2. ibid., p. 77 3. Vuia, Rabaul. 14.4.86 40 The formation of an Advisory Council which followed this meeting in 1904 showed that the pattern of "get-rich-quick" trading schemes dependent on village coconuts and sun-dried copra was being replaced by the careful maintenance of properly laid out plantations. Actual and potential crops were so promising that a Business Tax of 40M - 400M a year, depending on the size of the business, was introduced on 26 January 1905. Planters were excluded as copra was already subject to an export levy, initially of 4M a ton since 1888 and increased to 10M a ton in 1905. In 1906 the Imperial grant to New Guinea was almost halved and Hahl was forced to introduce an unpopular duty on copra to obtain alternative revenue. Two years later a new tariff which drastically increased import duties generally caused planters on the Advisory Council to resign in protest. It also caused a loss of confidence in Hahl at a time when the Protectorate was looking particularly promising to businessmen in Germany and elsewhere. After 1907 more companies moved into the plantation industry, displacing and buying out some of the smaller planters. The Bismarck Archipel GmbH1 was founded in 1907 to acquire the plantations, trading business and land o holdings of the firm of E.E. Forsayth & Co. , but the established Bismarck Archipelago firms of Hernsheim, Wahlen and the DHPG, with the backing of the Warburg Bank in Germany and other firms, made a successful bid for Queen Emma's empire. It was sold in 1910 for 2,750,000M and linked to H.R. Wahlen GmbH of Hamburg. A Forsayth Company with limited liability and capital of 2,000,000M was formed and shortly after transformed into a share company - the Hamburg South Seas Aktiengesellschaft (HSAG) - with Wahlen as managing O director. Several companies were formed in Germany at this time to establish plantations to meet the European and Australian demand for coconut oil; these included the Bremen South Seas Company, a Hamburg South Seas Plantation 12 1. Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung ("Limited liability company") 2. Firth, "German firms in the Pacific Islands", p. 15 (Sack, Land between two laws, p. 103 states the date of formation was 1908) 3. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 103 41 Company, and a German Farm and Plantation Company.1 Another new company, the Londip Pflanzung GmbH was formed in the Protectorate early in 1914.^ The plantation explosion caught the Administration unprepared for in 1909 there was scarcely enough land available at Herbertshohe for essential buildings. Before the end of the first decade of Hahl's governorship the number of commercial coconut plantations in New Guinea increased from thirty-eight to fifty-five.^ In 1911 Hahl noted the lack of interest in crops other than coconuts, for although there had been many experiments with alternate crops - including cocoa, coffee, nutmeg, rubber, kapok and tobacco - all these had achieved was proof that they would grow in New Guinea. With the exception of cotton exported in the late 1890s, no crop other than coconuts was produced constantly in sufficient quantities to export and test the overseas market. Planters preferred coconuts as their main crop. It was easy to see why: by 1912 a ton of properly dried copra from a European plantation brought three times the price of a ton of often imperfectly dried copra obtained by trading. Yet the trade copra could stiU be sold at a price attractive enough to make a good profit. Once planted, a coconut plantation did not require the capital intensive maintenance some of the alternate crops would need if they were to be competitive with products from established British and Dutch colonies. The value of carefuUy managed and maintained coconut plantations providing a regular supply of properly dried and marketable copra far outweighed the seasonal variations of exotic tropical crops, and the occasional difficulty in moving them to market quickly to meet a sudden demand. There was a steady demand for coconut oil - in Australia alone the manufacture of soap and candles required 457,693 gallons of coconut oil a year. The Pacific Islands collectively were fourth in annual copra exports,^ and a significant part of this came from the Gazelle Peninsula. Prospects in the final 123 1. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 104 2. "Mainka v. the Custodian of Expropriated Property" in Commonwealth Law Reports, v.34 1923/24. Melbourne, The Law Book Company of Australia, 1924. p. 298 3. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1909/1910. p. 313 4. Interstate Commission Report, p. 32 42 year of German Administration attracted strong investor interest in coconut plantations as technology was geared towards using coconut oil in preference to other fatty-based natural oils. Hahl became seriously concerned at the speed with which Australian and British capital* was flowing into German New Guinea and the threat this posed of reducing opportunities for German planters and businessmen, as well as strengthening a significant non-German commercial influence. Even the English manager of the Forsayth Gesellschaft - who had bought Raulawat plantation in 1912 ("and had received permission from the Governor to select a further 1250 acres of bush land at the back ... so that I will have a block o f about 2000 acres") - O stated quite openly 'it is my wish to enlarge British interests in this Colony'. Hahl's alarm was heightened by fears that Australian interests would buy Queen Emma's plantations and properties, then up for sale. But Burns, Philp - to whom they were offered - baulked at her price and so let slip the best possible opportunity to become immediately a force in the colony, and ultimately to enjoy virtually unchallenged commercial dominance in New Guinea. Some, but not all, of the Australian capital flowing into the colony was invested in coconut plantations, particularly in the German Solomons (Buka and Bougainville islands) which were a fair distance from the administrative centre at Rabaul and therefore difficult to keep a close watch on. Between 1900 and 1907 there was quite significant Australian plantation development in Bougainville. The New Britain O Corporation was established in Sydney in 1907 with Toimonapu plantation as its 123 1. 'in the [Kieta ] district are many important planting enterprises started by English Capital which renders a local authority necessary'. Grundler Memorial: translation of a Memorial referring to the German New Guinea Budget for 1915, 1916 and 1917. Dated 28th February 1915 and signed by Grundler (as Assistant Secretary of the German Administration). 2. Jolley to Burns, Philp 12 March 1912 3. 'I think I was the first man in Australia to introduce capital to take up land in these islands for plantations; it was the New Britain Corporation and the Buka Plantation and Trading Company'. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence J. Strasberg), p. 65 43 first venture* Burns, Philp's influence was already apparent there through its O management of Choiseul Plantations Ltd., the Vella Lavella Plantation and Trading Company had extended from the British to the German Solomons; a Buka Plantation and Trading Company was formed; Lever Pacific Plantations Pty Ltd (an English firm) was very active in the British Solomons and was looking speculatively at the German Solomons; and Burns, Philp's Walter Lucas had acquired about 8,000 acres on Bougainville which the firm subsequently developed q into Soraken, Baniu, Teopasino and Angua plantations. Other Australian and British ventures in New Guinea generally included timber-milling, sugar cane planting and crushing, share-farming and bird of paradise hunting. Well received by the German Administration initially, few of the ventures came to anything but they did indicate continuing non-German interest in pioneering business schemes other than plantations. Nor were some German schemes much more successful. In 1910 Hahl reserved 9,000 acres of land on the North Coast between Tombaule and Kerevat for "one Kleinschmidt" who was to bring 50 German adults from Queensland before December 1912 to cultivate it.^ The plan was to cut the land into small blocks for growing coconuts, arrowroot and sugar cane, but it was very slow getting under way. When it did commence, planting concentrated on coconuts. One perhaps surprising non-participant in speculative ventures was Burns, Philp which, as in Papua, showed little interest then in anything other than plantations. Perhaps it was wary of investing heavily in a foreign colony, although it had been tempted to do this with the Forsayth properties. The firm's customary caution in committing itself to any new venture until it had been carefully assessed lost it the custom of F.R. Jolley who had bought Raulawat plantation on the north coast in early 1912. Jolley was then manager of Forsayth Gesellschaft 1 1. Octave Mouton, The New Guinea memoirs of Jean Baptiste Mouton. edited, with an introduction by Peter Biskup. Canberra, Australian National University, 1974. p. 123 fn. 97 2. K. Buckley 3. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 104 4. Jolley to Burns, Philp. 12 March 1912. (Kleinschmidt was an Australian of German descent). 44 and sought credit concessions in return for dealing exclusively with Burns, Philp. Some four months after making the initial inquiry Jolley had heard ’nothing to the effect that you are in a position to supply me with goods upon credit'; he then informed Burns, Philp he had taken over the trading of the Forsayth Gesellschaft upon the north coast of New Britain (roughly from Nodup to Cape Lambert) and would deal exclusively with that firm.* It was another expensive mistake for Burns, Philp which would have done well out of a business association with Jolley (who later became Deputy Chairman of the Expropriation Board in Rabaul - see Chapter Two). The German Administration was very much aware of outside interest in New Guinea, and an official Memorial in 1914 claimed that local administrative centres and branches needed to be established throughout the colony to benefit from this interest through commercial and agricultural schemes. 'The Government', continued the Memorial, 'cannot limit itself to the periphery Of this huge Territory that offers possibilities as regards plantations and mining that do O not permit of a long delay'. Six weeks later Hahl left Rabaul for furlough, the war intervened and Australia occupied the colony. Mission plantations In June 1902 the Sydney head office of the Wesleyan Mission decided that a larger area of Ulu island in the Duke of Yorks should be planted with coconuts; this matched Rev. Crump's determination that Ulu should not only be the Mission's District Training Institution (his apologia for the plantation) but also 1 1. Jolley to Burns, Philp. 12 March 1912 2. Grundler Memorial 45 be the industrial department of the Church in New Guinea.1 But the plantation expansion was so swift that five years later the Training Institute was moved further north on Ulu to Watnabara because 'the work of the plantation was O crowding it out'. Ulu achieved its commercial objective quite successfully, but O the meagre0 human resources of the Methodist Mission did not then allow it to become further involved in planting activities elsewhere. By comparison, the Catholic Mission expanded at an enviable rate and in 1908 had five large plantations which ranked it behind the Company and Queen Emma in the size and importance of its holdings. The Catholics claimed that plantations were necessary for their safety Because they formed a natural, sure protection against sudden attacks by the suspicious war-like people. Seeing the missionaries surrounded by many labourers and not being without protection, they did not dare attack. Neither Mission was welcomed unreservedly by the natives, but each was determined to further develop plantation holdings and to justify this by claiming the income was useful to finance its work in New Guinea, even though this was mainly beneficial to their followers. 1. Both the London Missionary Society in Papua, and the Methodist Mission at Ulu, operated industrial departments within their Church. Their thinking was remarkably similar: see J. King, London Missionary Society New Guinea Mission Report March/April 1905. quoted in Nancy F. Lutton, The Kwato community: Mission industrial education and plantations. University of Papua New Guinea and Department of Primary Industry "History of Agriculture" Discussion Paper no. 28. Waigani, University of Papua New Guinea, 1970. p. 9; and Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence of J.W. Burton, Wesleyan Mission), p. 128 2. Fellmann, A short history of the work of the Church in the Bismarck Archipel District, p. 29 3. they had not improved since 1898 - 'At the present time there are about fifty white missionaries in the Bismarck Archipelago - about one quarter of the total white population (including women and children). Of these no less than forty-five belong to the Catholic Mission of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which has so far operated only on the Gazelle Peninsula'. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1898/1899. p. 171 4. Wiltgen, "Catholic Mission plantations in Mainland New Guinea", p. 358 46 Native plantations The first native plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula were laid out under Hahl's guidance on native land not sold to Europeans. Villagers worked them on a voluntary basis, and profits from the sale of produce - usually coconuts, but occasionally native foods (taro, bananas, yams) as the term ^plantation" was all embracing - remained theirs and were used to pay head tax. Government plantations (also known as fiscal plantations) were located on government owned land - hence the name - and were cultivated by villagers in accordance with the provisions of the statutory forced labour Ordinance (Anweisung)1 of 1 November 1903. The Anweisung authorised officials to co-opt all able-bodied young men in 9 the area of control for up to four weeks a year to assist in the construction and maintenance of roads, or to work on government plantations. There is no doubt that the Administration benefitted directly through the concept of government plantations from head tax, but villagers kept the balance. On the Gazelle Peninsula this was substantial for as early as 1890 Queen Emma alone was buying 9 160 tonnes of native food a week to feed her labourers. Because plantation development was not as extensive elsewhere in the colony with subsequent pressures on land necessary to sustain normal village life, Hahl's insistence on native reserves applied mainly to the Gazelle Peninsula. It therefore seems unlikely that he would have required villagers to use their land for plantations which would solely benefit the government. It was also obvious that the natives needed guidance in planting coconuts. Dr Paul Preuss, an agricultural expert who visited the colony regularly, noted how 1. 'Anweisung betreffend die Anforderung offentlicher und unentgeltlicher Leistungen von den Eingeborenen'. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. Appendix B, p. "40l (note: only one Report was printed for this period) 2. as the areas of control in the later 1890s/early 1900s were limited to a very small part of the New Guinea coastline (and that mainly in the Bismarck Archipelago) the Anweisung affected a minor proportion of adult males in the Protectorate. 3 3. the ration scale at the time was 500 grams of rice, 1,500 grams of yams daily, plus a weekly issue of 750 grams of meat, 60 grams of tobacco and 1 pipe. Biskup, "Dr Albert Hahl". p. 355 47 the natives think they have done enough if they pick up the fallen nuts under the trees and, without any sorting, leave them to germinate on the ground under palms, and as soon as the young plants show the first leaves, plant them out in their final places where, on the principle of the more trees the more fruit, they are put much too close together, and the holes, just big enough to take the nut, are hurriedly hacked out with a few strokes of the pick. The value to the villagers of ’'compulsory" native plantations has been shown by Latukefu who records how in Bougainville The people of Teop island told of how a Fijian, the first Methodist missionary, forced his converts, under threat of physical punishment, to plant coconut trees on their land. Today they are reaping the benefits and remember his work with deep gratitude and affection. It is worth emphasising that the compulsion to plant came from a Fijian missionary, not a European official. Although native labourers were closely involved in most aspects of developing and maintaining a plantation - by observation, if not always by action - few were sufficiently motivated at this time to introduce any new techniques learned into village coconut cultivation. A Catholic priest wrote, somewhat despairingly, that As long as a Kanak is in the service of a European or under direct European influence he can accommodate himself to any circumstances. As soon as he has left his service and returns to his savage tribesmen in the bush, he throws everything overboard that he learned during his years in a White residence. From the very first day he returns to his old habits and way of life. He has not put away a single old habit or learned a single new one. Many of our natives have spent time as labourers in the (commercial) coconut plantations. There they learned to plant the palms for the maximum harvests and the highest income. When he returns home, no labourer thinks of applying these principles and planting the palms rationally. If he wants1 2 1. Preuss, Die Kokospalme und ihre kulture. p. 28 2. Sione Latukefu, "Oral history and Pacific Islands missionaries: the case of the Methodist Mission in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands" in Oral traditions in Melanesia, edited by Donald Denoon and Roderic Lacey. Port Moresby, The University of Papua New Guinea and the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1981. p. 186 48 coconut palms he does it in the old way, just putting some nuts in the ground at close, irregular intervals and leaving the rest to Nature. A Kanak returned from a plantation is no more eager to work, no more ambitious, than any other "boy" from the bush who has never come under European influence. There were, of course, two sides to this. The natives themselves considered European methods of planting coconuts "wasteful", and preferred their way by which they put down the nuts horizontally on the ground to germinate. When the seedling has developed its first leaves and the roots have grown through the fibrous husk, the upper half of the nut, including the shell, is carefully cut off horizontally and special attention is given to leaving the stem of the young plant undamaged. The connection between the seedling in the husk and its "foot" inside the shell is severed by a sharp knife just inside the eye of the nut. Then the contents of the nut are extracted, the upper half shell is thrown away and the lower half shell, with the seedling attached, is planted out. 12 The European practice was to plant the entire coconut, husk and all, after germination in a nursery had produced a shoot about one metre high. Either method was successful in producing coconuts, but the European one - as it was meant to - produced bigger and better crops on fewer and healthier trees. In the first ten years of Hahl's governorship the European plantations developed at an astonishing rate while those planted and maintained by villagers lagged in comparison. Because of the way in which statistics were presented in Annual Reports of the period it is difficult to be precise about plantation expansion. For example, the table on p. 50 shows the growth of coconut plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula between 1901 and 1913, but the statistics from which it is drawn do not indicate whether the plantations were all European ones, or a mix of European, native and government plantations. The Annual Report for 1911/1912 noted that plantation land statistics were 'taken from 1. P.A. Kleintitschen, Die Kustenbewohner de Gazellehalbinsel. Hiltrup, Herz-Jesu-Missionhaus, 1906. p. 118 2. Preuss, Die Kokospalme und ihre kulture. p. 48 49 information supplied by planters, plantation companies and their representatives’* and as such were ’probably not entirely accurate ... although they are likely to be A reliable as regards the area under cultivation'. Another confusing practice was to include Old Protectorate (i.e. the Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon Islands and Kaiser Wilhelmsland) totals in those for the Gazelle Peninsula as happened in the 1910/1911 Report where there were supposedly 21,273 coconut palms planted; this O figure was changed in the 1912/1913 Report to 28,100. As mentioned on p.vii of the Introduction of this thesis, the dubious quality of statistics presented in German - and Australian - Annual Reports for New Guinea; and the lack of consistency in their presentation, makes it impossible to be precise in tables. Where tables are given they should be considered as accurate as the available raw data allow. In the final Annual Report of the German Administration there was a plea for 'the appointment of suitable persons, familiar with the land and the people, to train and supervise the natives [ and so ] ensure the successful expansion of their plantations.1* Although native plantations may not have achieved the importance Hahl wished, they were valuable in diverting native energies into an occupation more acceptable to Europeans, they undoubtedly complemented Tolai entry into a cash economy, they provided the Administration with a modest revenue through head tax; and, most importantly, they kept remaining land out of the grasp of Europeans. 123 1. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1911/1912. p. 343 2. ibid., p. 344 3. Sack <5c Clark, Annual Report 1912/1913. p. 364 4. ibid., p. 365 50 COCONUT PLANTATION AREAS - 1901/19131 Gazelle Peninsula year total planted bearing palms palms area area area planted bearing ha. ha. ha. 1901/1902 2,584 676 1902/1903 6,655 776 1903/1904 8,198 1,869 1904/1905 67,672 8,522 2,065 1905/1906 88,915 13,529 2,878 1906/1907 70,082 11,102 1,981 10,558 1,845 1907/1908 79,950 11,987 14,770 1,9432 1908/1909 80,241 18,325 4,0292 16,023 1909/1910 20,520 5,1932 17,773 1910/1911 162,5003 25,4202 21,2734 1911/1912 171,0003 25,840 1912/1913 185,000 32,300 10,7002 29,2002 source; Annual Reports 1. no indication whether these are European only, or European and native. 2. "best guess" figures 3. "The reed growth is not quite so great as part of the increase recorded is due to more accurate system of plantation statistics". Annual Report 1910/1911. p. 328 4. "These figures actually refer to ... the Old Protectorate (i.e. the Bismarck Archipelago, Solomon Islands and Kaiser Wilhelmsland)". Annual Report 1911/1912. p. 344 51 Labour In 1901 it was clear that the labour ordinance introduced by the Company in 1888, which still operated in the Colony, was inadequate. Hahl planned to replace it gradually with a series of ordinances designed to push villagers into the European cash economy by making them work to European standards. The spur for this was the head tax. Between 1908 and 1913 the pace of recruiting more than doubled as more plantations were laid out, and earlier plantings matured and required harvesting and maintenance. From 8,713 recruits signed on in 1908 the figure rose yearly to reach 19,093 for the year 1912/1913, with a suggested total for the period of 41,938.* Because recruiting was permitted only in areas which had been "pacified” - or which tolerated the German presence - labourers came from 'a O relatively small population compared to that of the colony as a whole'. There was no firm idea how many people lived in areas open to recruiting and their numbers would remain uncertain until a census for each area could be held. As the first census for the Tolai of the Gazelle Peninsula was not taken until 1910, the chance of a census being held elsewhere in the colony was remote. Hahl was constantly pressed to open more areas (presumably in east and west New Britain, east and southern New Ireland, and the Markham Valley of Kaiser Wilhelmsland) but there were dangers in expanding the recruiting frontier too quickly. For example, Hernsheim & Co. established a coconut plantation on Wuvulu island (off the mainland coast, roughly opposite Aitape) in 1902 and through the introduction of diseases not previously experienced on the island, and presumably by the firm acquiring the best land for the plantation, it was alleged that ninety per cent of O the Wuvulu people died before 1914 from malnutrition and malaria. The malaria was said to have originated from indentured labourers brought to the island from other parts of the colony. A problem which Hahl had earlier foreseen hampered1 23 1. Firth, "The transformation of the labour trade", p. 59 2. ibid. 3. What do we do about plantations? edited by M. Walter. Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research Monograph no. 15. Boroko, The Institute, 1981. p. 107 52 recruitment in areas closest to intensive plantation development, particularly on the Gazelle Peninsula. Young native men there preferred to cultivate their own plantations to get coconuts for trading rather than work away from their villages.* The reason was the proliferation of European traders and the competition they provided for coconuts. As natural traders themselves, the coastal Tolai recognized a market and withdrew from the labour force to cater for it. The European response to this was indignation tempered, one feels, with a little envy: in the past, when there were fewer traders, the natives were more willing to work for us, for a daily wage. The price for coconuts and other products keeps rising. The natives are becoming better off; all their needs are easily satisfied, so why would they work a full day! You can get them to work a few hours at most and then they want to be paid and laze the rest of the time away. That is why it becomes ever more difficult to recruit workers for the commercial plantations here. Still another reason - and one that Hahl would have appreciated - was that Tolai q preferred to sell at markets which acted as meeting places and social centres. The only limitation to European commercial expansion in the colony was said to be the availability of labour, yet capital continued to flow in at a rate beyond the labour capacity of the colony to service it.^ Towards the end of his governorship planters called regularly for the introduction of universal forced labour but, as Hahl argued, so many labourers from controlled areas were already on plantations C this would hardly have increased their numbers.1 234 1. Sack <5c Clark, Annual Report 1912/1913. p. 365 2. Kleintitschen, Die Kustenbewohner de Gazellehalbinsel. p. 56 3. John Vuia, Rabaul. 14 April 1986 4. Sack <5c Clark, Annual Report 1912/1913. p. 353 5. Firth, "The transformation of the labour trade", p. 64 53 Chinese labour1 In early 1901 Hahl tried to step up the flow of Asians to New Guinea. In April that year 270 Chinese arrived in Rabaul for the tobacco fields of Jomba^ on Kaiser Wilhelmsland, but the cost of recruiting and bringing them to New Guinea was so high there was no profit left in cultivating tobacco and the crop was abandoned. However, skilled Chinese were considered desirable for the colony, particularly since there was a sharp increase in the demand for labour from about 1904 which reflected both plantation, and general commercial, expansion. It was anticipated that 'four to five thousand men would be required in the next few . . O ...... • ■ ■ • ■ • ...... years'0 as plantation labourers and it was thought these could be Chinese. However, in 1909 Hahl reported that coloured immigrants preferred more independent occupations in the Protectorate^ (trading, shop-keeping) to which villagers were not suited, and he further remarked that neither Chinese nor Malays were now employed anywhere in the Protectorate as plantation labourers.® The Chinese had become the most important section of the non indigenous coloured population both in numbers and economic influence, and 'play[ed ] the role of cultural pioneers and often prepare [d ] the soil for large European enterprise, by slowly acquainting the natives with the way of life of foreign immigrants, and by accustoming them to trade and new needs'.® This fell in nicely with Hahl's policy of drawing villagers more closely into the economy. 12345 1. see Peter Biskup, ''Foreign coloured labour in New Guinea" in The Journal of Pacific History, Volume Five 1970. pp. 85/107; J.A. Decker, Labor problems in the Pacific Mandates. New York, The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940; and P.H. Cahill, The Chinese in Rabaul, 1914 1960. MA thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1973. 2. New Guinea Annual Report 1901/1902. p. 22 (H.A. Thomson translation) 3. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1907/1908. pp. 280/281 4. ibid., Annual Report 1908/1909. p.296 5. ibid., Annual Report 1909/1910. p. 310 6. Biskup, "Foreign coloured labour", p. 106 54 By 1914 the German Administration was becoming concerned about the economic strength of the "coloured non-natives" (mainly the Chinese) in the Protectorate and started training natives as tradesmen and clerical workers to lessen dependence on Asian migrants and to replace them completely by 1920.* But the Chinese grip on the economic life of the Protectorate was tight. Trade The British firm of Lever Brothers had established a coconut oil mill at Balmain (Sydney) in 1895, and when it also began developing coconut plantations in the Solomon Islands Burns, Philp recognised a powerful competitor in the Pacific copra trade. Burns, Philp moved into the newly acquired Solomon Islands to secure the trade of British settlers there who had been dealing with Hernsheim & Co. of Rabaul which had earlier established a depot on the island of Guadalcanar A (sic) for its trade in copra, ivory nuts and pearlshell. Inaugurating a system it was to use in German (and later, Australian) New Guinea Burns, Philp helped settlers pay off their debts by lending money at 7% interest on the security of plantations. Loans were conditional on planters dealing entirely with the firm. The growing soap and oil industry in New South Wales bought copra from the Herbertshohe area and so reduced exports to Singapore and Marseilles. Copra looked so promising that even Hernsheim & Co., which had earlier concentrated on trade, established coconut plantations on the northern Duke of q York Island, and on Manus Island in the Admiralties Group. In 1903 Nord- Deutsche Lloyd experts arrived at Simpsonhafen to sound the harbour and survey1 23 1. Plans for the development of a school system in German New Guinea, 1914. (typescript sheet distributed at a history seminar University of Papua New Guinea, 1973. source unknown). 2. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence W.H. Lucas), p. 49 3. Hahl, Governor in New Guinea, p. 113 55 the site for a huge wharf* which was built with warehouses and oil storage tanks; the foreshore was cleared and houses and office buildings erected. By the end of o 1904 the installations were ready for shipping and plans were underway to move 9 the capital from Herbertshohe to the new site of Rabaul on the harbour shore. The move was prompted both by the increase in exports and shipping, and the need for proper harbour facilities to replace those at Herbertshohe. Simpsonhafen offered about 3.5 square miles of anchorage and was obviously superior to the open roadstead at Herbertshohe.^ The town of Rabaul was planned as Germany's administrative and commercial centre in the Pacific and became a major coaling station^ for German ships. After the German Administration assumed responsibility for New Guinea the strong Australian influence that had been developing was consolidated through business and shipping contacts, and the appointment of business agents in Sydney and Rabaul. Although it had earlier been unable to divert much of the copra owned by the principal German firms Burns, Philp had graduaUy secured that of most of the non-German business 1. The wharf was '300 yards long, 143 yards of which are available for berthing ships, the depth of water varying from 39 to 24 feet - sufficient... for the largest vessels'. Former German Possessions, p. 33 2. Hahl, Governor in New Guinea, p. 114 3. the area 'was an uninhabited area known as "ra-baul", the mangrove. No village existed here ... in 1905 ...'. A.E. Polansky, ''Rabaul" in South Pacific BuUetin, v.16 1966. p. 42. For a description of the Rabaul township area see Theo Varpiam and R.T. Jackson, "Rabaul", in An introduction to the urban geography of Papua and New Guinea, edited by Richard Jackson. University of Papua New Guinea Department of Geography Occasional Paper no. 13, March 1976. pp. 415/416. 4. Former German Possessions, p. 33 5. Stewarts Handbook of the Pacific Islands 1908. Sydney, McCarron, Stewart, 1912. p. 263 6. in 1905 the Australian firm of Nelson <3c Robertson was formed with 50 pounds capital and started island trading. Its first clients were O.J. Mouton and J.M. Rondahl. Pacific Islands Monthly, August 1955. The German sponsored firm of Justus Scharff had a large wholesale store in Sydney and handled some copra shipments. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence H.B. Allard), p. 92 56 (Forsayth & Co., O. Mouton <5c Co., J.M. Rondahl, and the Catholic and Methodist Missions).* The Australian market was favoured by smaller non-German O businesses which were able to obtain goods quickly and on credit from Australia and so had little, if any, contact with German agents or business houses. But a subtle swing to German-only organisations came with the new monthly shipping service commenced by the NDL between Japan and Australia, via China. In 1905 the NDL forced Burns, Philp to abandon its run to New Britain (started in 1878 with the Myrtle) by offering all traders and planters in New Guinea a through rate to European ports for copra at a low 55M a ton. This included transhipping of cargo at Sydney if NDL ships took that route. The NDL offer was conditional on planters agreeing to enter into a contract for five years from October 1905. The terms were so good that practically all German planters accepted"* and in 1905 the first NDL ship to operate under the new scheme steamed into Simpsonhafen. The sale of E.E. Forsayth & Co. to a German company aroused fears in Australia that this would mean a decline in the amount of copra sent there for onward shipment to Europe. In anticipation of this Burns, Philp appointed an agent for New Guinea copra in Amsterdam as the bulk of European coconut oil processing was in Dutch and German hands.4 In 1912 a factory in Bremen manufactured almost 1,000 tons of margarine a week from coconut oil, and by 1913 about 580,000 tons a year were being consumed on the Continent and in the 1. Commonwealth of Australia. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1920-21. vJII "Interim and final reports of Royal Commission into late German New Guinea". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1920. pp. 5/83 at p. 46. (Note: the Commission consisted of Attlee Hunt (Chairman), W.H. Lucas (Member) and Sir Hubert Murray (Member). The Reports consisted of the Interim Report, pp.5/8; the Agreement Report, pp. 13/22; the Majority Report, pp.23/49 and the Minority Report, pp.52/71 with Appendices at pp.75/83. Murray disagreed with most of the Hunt/Lucas findings. In this thesis the Reports will hereafter be cited as "Interim & Final Reports (Agree), (Major), (Minor), p. ...") as applicable. The page numbers refer to the pagination of the combined Reports not that of the volume of Session Papers). 2. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1907/1908. p. 286 3. Buckley & Klugman, The history of Burns, Philp: the Australian company in the South Pacific, p. 153 4. ibid., p. 260 57 1 9 United Kingdom. There was an 'extraordinary' increase m copra exported to Australia during this period: starting from 1,892 tonnes in 1909 it rose to 3,636 tonnes in 1914. Despite the maturing of many plantations in the Gazelle Peninsula, the bigger proportion of exported copra was processed from trade coconuts. As stated above, the Tolai were taking advantage of the demand for coconuts or native dried copra to obtain trade goods for themselves. Kleintitschen observed that As time passed the natives' wants have increased; they now need clothes, which must occasionally be washed or replaced. For Sundays and dancing days everyone wants to wear a better loincloth. Smoking tobacco, with the necessary pipes, does not grow on trees. Many would like a hat, trousers, an umbrella, a blanket. They want to provide locks for their houses and lockable chests for their clothes and valuables. These are all needs they did not have in the past, and to satisfy them they must do more work and barter. Their fruits: bananas, taro, yam etc. are sold to the Whites for a variety of things: tobacco, pipes, knives and lavalavas. Hundreds come to the periodical market days to exchange goods with White merchants and themselves. For bigger undertakings they also have new needs for knives, axes and spades while the Baining people sell the product of their gardens almost exclusively, our Kanaks mainly sell their coconuts. That requires slight labour and brings a great return: the nuts are merely cut up and dried in the sun. On the Gazelle Peninsula Tolai copra producers became so wealthy that the value of clothes and textiles they bought in 1913 was nearly a quarter of a million marks, and they had little difficulty in 'paying for the European cigarettes, tinned goods, even houses which had become status symbols'.^ Although they bought most of this from Chinese traders, storekeepers or tradesmen, Jolley - attracted by the money changing hands - obviously felt confident of winning their custom for he wrote 123 1. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence J. Meek), p. 75 2. Sack & Clark, Annual Report 1910/1911. p. 332 3. Kleintitschen, Die Kustenbewohner de Gazellehalbinsel. p. 56 4. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders under German rule, p. 143 58 I ... aim mostly at the Chinese and Native trade which is by far the largest, and certainly safest. Being an Englishman I would in the ordinary get the preference, as other nationalities are not particularly liked. Jolley's confidence was misplaced as the Tolai traded almost solely with Chinese. John Vuia remembered how We sold drais [mature coconuts] to Chinese, not Germans. Chinese always re-dried copra they bought from Tolais. Tolai knew when the price of copra went down but they didn't understand world markets. No matter what the price [ was ] we made copra as we needed money. Business generally was so good that Hahl created a Business Tax Board, O consisting of a German official, businessmen and planters. It first sat in 1912 to consider which taxes could be levied to increase the colony's revenue. In 1909 Hernsheim <5c Co. became an Aktiengesellschaft (limited company) and in the five years to 1914 made profits exceeding 1,000,000M on an original nominal capital of 1,200,000M (increased to 1,800,000M in 1911), paying dividends which averaged 10.6% a year.4 Early in 1911 the Londip Pflanzung GmbH was formed with a capital of 90,000M^ to share in the profits being won from coconut plantations. A good deal of the interest in coconut plantations was generated by enthusiastic publications such as The Cult of the Coconut which, published in 1911, painted a glowing picture of almost instant wealth through copra (’the planter with 25,000 coco palms may be certain of a handsome income 12345 1. Jolley to Burns, Philp. 9 March 1912 2. Vuia, Rabaul. 14 April 1986 3. Patricia Wiseman Hopper. Kicking out the Hun: a history of the Expropriation Board of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, 1920 1927. MA thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1980. p. 58 4. Firth, "German firms”, p. 23 5. Commonwealth Law Reports v.34 1923-24 ("Mainka v. the Custodian"), p. 298 59 for one hundred years or longer'1), or trading (’There is another source of revenue open, which is remunerative beyond belief, to the man of small capital. While waiting the returns from his plantation he may trade with the natives ...'^). The DHPG supported the concept of ready wealth through paying a dividend of 36% just before the war, nearly five times that which it had paid in 1900.^ In 1914 the Forsayth GmbH was profitable enough to merge into the Hamburgische Sudsee AG (HSAG).4 The influence of the big firms was felt in almost every aspect of New Guinea from providing loans for laying out plantations to providing facilities for C Chinese traders "back from the bush" to draw their cheques. The Chinese were by now well-established in the colony. In 1908 there were fifty Chinese traders in the Bismarck Archipelago; three years later there were 143 trading stations in the Protectorate mostly operated by Chinese. The only European owned trading enterprises were those linked to a plantation.^ In 1911 the most prominent Chinese, Ah Tam (Lee Tam Tuk), had a Rabaul store turnover of 85,000M and in 1912 was the only Chinese mentioned in the Addressbuch fur Deutsche-Neu-Guinea, Samoa and Kiatschou. In 1914 other Chinese businessmen in New Guinea had annual incomes of between 1,500 - 3,000M. 7123456 1. The cult of the coconut: great development L in ] (copra) & oil palm industries. London, Curtis Gardiner, ?1911. p. 80 2. ibid. 3. Interstate Commission Report Appendix G (evidence J. Meek), p. 17. Meek claimed that on a capital of 137,500 pounds the gross profit was 90,000 pounds and the net profit 68,275 pounds. 4. Firth, "German firms", p. 23 5. C.D. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1958. p. 79 6. ibid., p. 75 7. ’they have simply run the white man out of every trade'. Germany in the Pacific, and an account of British New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Reprint from the "Sydney Daily Telegraph" of articles contributed by Senator Staniforth Smith. Sydney, Cunninghams, 1905. p. 6 60 On the eve of the First World War German New Guinea was flourishing. Its European population had doubled since 1909 (most of these were connected in some way with plantation ventures), whilst it had over twice as much land under cultivation as its neighbouring Australian colony of Papua. Capital flowed in and even the Company paid a first dividend of 5% after twenty-seven years of operation and was encouraged to increase its capital to 11,000,000m .1 Its income in 1914 from copra production and trading activities was 147,000 o pounds. Of the 80,000 tons of copra exported annually from the Pacific Islands, 17,000 tons came from the Protectorate (including the Marshall and Caroline Islands).** Although the economy depended on coconuts, other crops were being actively considered. On the Gazelle Peninsula cocoa and rubber plantings were proving successful (stands of ficus rubber can still be seen at Matanatar plantation) but - surprisingly - there had been no attempt to re-plant cotton commercially. On Kaiser Wilhelmsland exploration parties had found oil near Aitape in the Sepik area in 1913, and a new syndicate was about to begin dredging for gold in the Waria River.^ It was these developments, together with the otherwise untapped potential of the Protectorate, that retained Australian interest in New Guinea which climaxed in military occupation in September 1914 and led to the eventual expropriation of German properties and businesses. 1. Jacobs, "German New Guinea", p. 496 2. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 52 3. Buckley <5c Klugman, The history of Burns Philp: the Australian company in the South Pacific, p. 258 4. Sack, Land between two laws, p. 100 CHAPTER TWO The Australian Military Administration 1914-1921 61 Capitulation and Occupation1 Australians remained indignant at Germany's annexation of New Guinea seeing at their doors ... German soldiers, German fleets, German competition with their trade; a great rival German influence menacing their wealth, their institutions, their independence. Australia regarded itself as the rightful "Protector of the Pacific" and used suspicion of military activity in German New Guinea to keep its resentment smouldering. To James (later Sir James) Burns of Burns, Philp it was 'natural and O necessary for Australasia to control the South Pacific'0 and his attitude reflected popular thinking. Staniforth Smith summed this up when he wrote as the territory Germany possesses in the Pacific affords excellent harbours, they may be used for coaling stations and strategic bases from which her cruisers could issue in times of war and pray (sic) upon our intercolonial commerce or shell our coastal towns. 1. see Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18. v. 10: "The Australians at Rabaul: the capture and administration of the German possessions in the southern Pacific" by S.S. Mackenzie. Sydney, Angus 2. J.A. Froude, Oceania or England and her colonies. London, Longmans, 1886. pp. 84/85 3. K. Buckley & K. Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific:" Burns, Philp 1914-1946. Sydney, Allen <5c Unwin, 1983. p. 1 4. Germany in the Pacific, p. 4 62 Yet a secret .memorandum to the Australian Cabinet in 1916 played down the value of these harbours, saying they would be ’difficult and costly to make, and still more to operate'1 although it reiterated that it is decidedly desirable that the territory south of the line should remain in British hands so as to round o ff the British Possessions of Papua, and the Solomons. From the time war broke out between Britain and Germany Australia realised its opportunity to gain New Guinea, and also realised there would be little to prevent it doing this. ’The imperatives of the European situation were such that Germany O could afford scant protection for its Pacific possessions’0 as its fleet was scattered over the world's oceans when war was declared. The German Administration in New Guinea was not equipped to deal with hostilities even though European plantation personnel and Administration officials joined local reserve units several months before war was declared. In doing so they left labour lines with little or no supervision or control, and as a result 'A wave of unrest'^ and uncertainty swept through labourers on the Gazelle Peninsula as the distribution of rice and tinned food either ceased, or was severely limited. It was rumoured among them that the Administration had lost authority and that it was unnecessary to work for, or obey, employers. Long term war planning in the Protectorate would have anticipated this challenge to authority and the threat to copra production. The Australian occupation probably came as something of a relief to the German Administration which was besieged with local problems caused by the worst drought in the Bismarck Archipelago for seventeen years, and the uncertainty resulting from the knowledge there was nothing positive Germany could do to protect any of its South Pacific possessions. 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A3934 Item SC 12(19). Secret memorandum of 23 May 1917 from Brigadier-General Hubert Foster to Secretary, Department of Defence, p. 2. (hereafter "Foster memorandum, 1917. p. ...") 2. Foster memorandum, 1917, p. 3 3. Robin Bromby. German raiders in the Pacific. Sydney, Doubleday, 1985. p. 11 4. . Stephen Winsor Reed. The making of modern New Guinea. Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1943. p. 156 63 On 1 August 1914 the acting Governor issued a Proclamation notifying the population of its liability to serve the state in the case of war. Some attempt was made to form plantation labourers into a defence force with the native police, but many of the labourers deserted and there were insufficient arms for those who remained. Although the seat of government was transferred from Rabaul to Toma on the plateau overlooking Simpsonhafen, the Administration did not hide its records. These - and particularly the ones deeding with land and labour matters - were to prove invaluable (once translated) to following Australian Administrations. With the declaration of war on 4 August German possessions in the western Pacific became of great strategic importance.1 It was expected Japan would try to seize New Guinea and Samoa as 'Their commercial value is already O considerable and will be largely increased’, according to the Australian Minister for Defence. On 6 August the Secretary of State for Colonies sent a telegram from London to the Governor-General of Australia inquiring if your Ministers desire and feel themselves able to seize German wireless stations at New Guinea, Yap and the Marshall Islands, and Nauru on Pleasant . Island, we should feel this a great and urgent Imperial service. Here was 'a stirring summons for action'^ (and a second - this time legitimate - chance to gain New Guinea) and the Australian Government hastened to raise and equip the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (ANMEF) which, twelve days later, embarked on the Berrima to sail the following day. Shortly after daybreak on 11 September the Berrima, escorted by the Australia, rounded 1. Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1922. v. II. "Report by the Minister of State for Defence on the Military Occupation of the German New Guinea Possessions". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1922. p. 3 (hereafter "Military Occupation Report, p. ..."). 23 2. Wm Roger Louis, "Australia and the German colonies in the Pacific 1914-1919" in The Journal of Modern History, v.38 1966. p. 407 3. Military Occupation Report, p. 3 4. ibid. 64 Cape Gazelle and steamed into Blanche Bay. The first impression of the ANMEF members lining the ships’ rails was that ’the island must consist entirely of coconut palms, with a certain amount of earth sticking to the roots’.1 Two days later naval detachments, residents and native police drew up on a vacant piece of land (’’Proclamation Square") where at 3 p.m. the military occupation of New Guinea was formally proclaimed, the national anthem sung and 'three rousing British cheers' given. Sections 3 and 6 of the Proclamation were to prove particularly significant. They were: 3. the lives and private property of peaceful inhabitants will be protected, and the laws and customs of the colony will remain in force so far as is consistent with the military situation. and 6. in return for such protection it is the duty of all inhabitants to behave in an absolutely peaceful manner, to carry on their ordinary pursuits so far as is possible, to take no part directly or indirectly in any hostilities, to abstain from communication with His Majesty's enemies, and to render obedience to such orders as may be promulgated. Their effects will be discussed shortly. On 14 September the Encounter shelled ridges near Toma to encourage German capitulation. On 17 September the conditional capitulation agreement, to take effect from 21 September, was signed. Under the terms of the capitulation all German officials of the Administration, and their families, were guaranteed safe conduct to Germany.^ With the exception of certain key officials considered 1. F.S. Burnell. Australia versus Germany: the story of the taking of German New Guinea. London, Allen & Unwin, n.d. p. 243 2. L.C. Reeves, Australians in action in New Guinea. Sydney, Penfold, 1915. p. 42 3. British Administration of (Late) German New Guinea Gazette, v. 1 no. 1, 15 October 1914 4. Commonwealth of Australia. Parliamentary Debates. 2d Session of the 9th Parliament (1st Period). Volume 114 1923. Senate and House of Representatives, p. 922 (note: subsequent citings of all Parliamentary Debates will be "Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. ... date, p. ••• "19 65 essential for the continuing operation of the colony all left New Guinea as soon as their passage could be arranged to Sydney. About 150 "prisoners" arrived there from New Britain. Some were sent to the concentration camp at Liverpool (NSW), while the higher officials were kept in Sydney. The acting Governor, Dr Haber, was accommodated in a boarding house at Potts Point; others stayed briefly at the Hotel Australia. They had been guaranteed three months salary under the capitulation agreement, and this was paid weekly. Those who remained in Sydney awaiting passage to Germany were usually released on taking an oath of neutrality, but had to report to the police regularly and were forbidden to go to places of public entertainment.* Following the signing of the capitulation agreement, and the administering of an oath of neutrality to all German nationals remaining in New Guinea, a most curious state of affairs evolved. Holmes, as commander of the ANMEF, assumed control of New Guinea. It was almost immediately apparent that little official thought had been given in Australia on what was to be done with the former Protectorate after German capitulation, other than to follow the protocols of international and military law. Holmes repeatedly asked for advice and instructions as he was aware that 'a military occupant, though vested with almost absolute power, is not the sovereign of a territory, and therefore lacks the right to make legal administrative changes, except to maintain and safeguard his O army and to realise the purpose of war'; but he was left very much to run the colony himself within the constraints of the three legal systems effective in it. These were international law governing the relations between the occupying force 1 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, v. 103 1914. pp. 1245/1246 2. see Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 4 66 and the inhabitants of the colony; territorial (i.e. German)* law governing the regulation of the people among themselves; and military laws and regulations (either British or Australian) which governed the conduct and discipline of O Australian troops. Holmes, and successive Australian Military Administrators, was bound by the capitulation agreement - particularly Article 9 which stated that during the said military occupation the local laws and customs will remain in force so far as is consistent with the military situation. This complemented the Manual of Military Law 1914 which prescribed that 'important changes can seldom be necessary and should be avoided as far as possible’.^ Despite criticism for following German law and custom in his administration of the colony, it was Holmes's duty, subject to war requirements, to carry on existing laws and principles of government. His, and his successors', legislation rarely exceeded what was strictly necessary for carrying on government during the military occupation; German law remained substantially unaffected.® The constraints placed on Military Administrators and the legal maze in which they worked were to have significant effects on the maintenance and development of the copra industry. 12345 1. The law in force in the Territory before 9th May, 1921, is sometimes described as "German Law", but that description, though conveniently short, is dangerous unless it is clearly understood that it stands for the longer and correct one given in S.4 of the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance (note; promulgated in 1921, but the reasons are relevant here): "all ... legislative measures enacted issued or made in the name of the German Emperor or the German Government by the competent authority for the time being, and expressed to intend to, or applied to or in force in, the Territory" before that date. In short, the laws in force in New Guinea before 9th May 1921, were the laws of New Guinea, and they were none the less the laws of New Guinea because most of them had their origin in Germany'. Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971-72, ("Re Mortlocks"). p. 630 2. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. pp. 253/254 3. Interim and Final Reports (Major), p. 29 4. ibid., quoting Manual of Military Law 1914. p. 290 5. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 7 (note; only one Report was published for the period of the Australian military occupation). 67 Holmes retained certain German officials and most of the plantation managers to keep the colony functioning, but within three months all officials resigned in protest at the public flogging of several Germans for assaulting an Australian missionary.1 Holmes drew on ANMEF officers to replace them but their disparate backgrounds as volunteers, and the unfortunate reputation the ANMEF gained, tended to limit their value in administering the colony in the immediate post-occupation months. The ANMEF did, however, bring to New Guinea the military concept of divisional responsibility to a commander and adapted this to a system of administering departments responsible to an Administrator which was continued by all Administrations of occupied, and later Mandated, New Guinea. There were problems apart from those of administering the colony. Because of the drought, springs and wells had dried up and drinking water had to be obtained by sinking zinc-lined casks just below high-water mark on the shore and dipping water out at low tide. There were practically no fresh fruit and vegetables available other than green pawpaws; and copra production declined as the drought stunted flowering spathes and reduced the quantity of meat that formed inside each nut. The early days of occupation saw relations between Australian soldiers and German civilians change from the urge 'To wield the bayonet and drive it home with all my might into the murderers of a non- O combatant' to soldiers shaking hands with German planters and traders who had O taken the oath of neutrality and saying 'Good luck to you'. Possibly because 'the clash of arms in New Britain was so short and comparatively painless'^ war hatreds quickly calmed; yet once it was rumoured that 'Most of the Germans were share-holders in the New Guinea Store' (presumably the Company's), notices 123 1. see Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. pp. 124/126 2. Reeves, Australians in action in New Guinea, p. 39 3. J. Lyng. Island Films. Sydney, Cornstalk, 1925. p. 23 4. ibid., p. 21 68 appeared in the barracks (ironically, the main Company building) stating that any person found purchasing goods would be ’publicly blanketed’.* Naturally, not all Germans remained neutral; in October 1914 some encouraged natives to burn the O timber supports of the tunnel linking Rabaul to Talili Bay* as an irritant to the Military Administration. There were other acts of defiance, but little damage could be, or was, done to the occupying force. After the anti-climax of occupation ANMEF members soon became bored with garrison duties. In November 1914 Holmes was obliged to convene several courts-martial to try non-commissioned officers and men for stealing from plantation and town residences, and others for receiving stolen goods. 'Looting was rampant', according to Burns, Philp's Walter Lucas who found it necessary to have 'a guard of four naval cadets over the wharf shed day & night' for 'a military guard is worse than useless as they connive at robbery'. In January 1915 the ANMEF was replaced by members of the North-West Expedition and returned to Australia with an 'unenviable reputation as champion looters'.^ A Court of Inquiry in Sydney in April found, among other things, that discipline in Rabaul had been very lax.^ In a quite remarkable statement the Court considered 1. Reeves, Australians in action in New Guinea, p. 70 2. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 57 3. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1916. pp. 11/12 4. Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1915-16-17. Vol. 2 "Rabaul - alleged misuse of Red Cross gifts, and looting by military officers and privates - report on, by Hon. W.M. Hughes, Attorney-General". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1915. pp. 375/376 (hereafter "Red Cross Report 1915, p. ...") 5 5. Australian soldiers in Port Moresby in early January 1942 repeated the pattern. A report spoke of the 'disorderly and undisciplined conduct ... prevalent for some weeks after their arrival' (Commission of Inquiry under the National Security (Inquiries) Regulations and National Security (General) Regulations into the circumstances relating to the suspension of the Civil Administration of the Territory of Papua in February, 1942. Report by J.V. Barry, K.C., (Commissioner), 1944 1945. (stencilled copy) para. 18 p. 4. Barry reported that after the second Japanese air raid on Port Moresby 'the theft and destruction of civilian property was general and extensive, ibid., para 68. p. 25. 69 that a misapprehension existed on the part of portion of the Australian Military Forces as to the right of expropriating enemy property - an impression which they thought was due to the fact that most of the officers and soldiers had recently been civilians, and were ignorant of the laws and usages of war - and they suggested that steps might be taken to make known throughout the Forces that the unauthorised appropriation of enemy property was theft. What action, if any, was taken to return or pay compensation for property stolen by ANMEF members is not known. The Military Administration itself appeared unclear of the difference between "expropriating enemy property" and "theft"; the question now arose, as it was uncertain German New Guinea would be retained at the end of the war, if it would be advisable to transport the valuable machinery and gear from Bitapaka to Roebourne, in West Australia, where the erection of a high-power station for purposes of defence was then contemplated. Caution prevailed, and the machinery remained in the colony but it was obvious that German property in the colony was being eyed acquisitively. Officers of the North-West Expedition settled into posts vacated by ANMEF officers and, under the command of General Pethebridge, commenced administering the colony within the framework of (mainly) German legislation. It was subsequently admitted in the Australian Senate that in the early months of the occupation there had been 'nothing but trouble' until Pethebridge (the former Secretary of the Department of Defence) was appointed Administrator.** A wireless station built in Government House grounds from parts salvaged from the Bitapaka tower put the Military Administration in communication with the Defence Department in Melbourne, via Port Moresby in Papua, German interests had offered to lay a cable between Cooktown in Queensland and Samarai in Papua in the early 1900s if the Australian government granted permission to extend it to 123 1. Red Cross Report 1915. p. 376 2. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 204 3. Peter Heydon, Quiet decision: a study of George Pearce. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1965. p. 137 70 Herbertshohe1, but the Prime Minister declined the proposal and the Military Administration had to be satisfied with the relay communication mentioned above. This allowed Pethebridge to maintain contact with his old Department as well as the Australian government and so he probably enjoyed the closest liaison with them than had any of the Military Administrators. He set about his duties in New Guinea with deliberation; no attempt was made to interfere with, or influence, the running of plantations which continued to function under the control of their (mainly German) owners. As the NDL shipping service had ceased, an alternate one was needed and Burns, Philp - whose fleet had not been requisitioned in Australia for wartime service - was quick to supply vessels under an agreement with the Australian government. Two of its steamers commenced a service between Papua and Rabaul; freight charges initially of 35s a ton were soon increased to 50s. The NDL O charge had been 20s a ton. Burns, Philp claimed that the increased freight rates were partly the result of high mercantile marine war risk insurance charges at a O time when German destroyers were threatening shipping, but although 'conditions in the Pacific region were much easier by the end of 1914'1 234 after the sinking of the German warship Emden, there does not seem to have been a proportionate reduction in freight charges. In October 1914 Burns, Philp sent a steamer from Sydney to Rabaul with a cargo of rice and general provisions which, at Holmes's direction, was shared between the Administration and the German firms. The cargo carried a general surcharge of 10% on costs, and the venture proved very satisfactory to the firm although Holmes complained that its landed cost of VI 4.10.8 for rice was excessive compared to that landed by the (short-lived) competing firm of Aitken Brothers 1. Staniforth Smith, Germany in the Pacific, pp. 6/7 2. Interim & Final Reports (Major), p. 47 3. Bromby, German raiders in the Pacific, pp. 148/149 4. Buckley <5c Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 16 71 for 712.12.7 a ton.1 Other Burns, Philp ships followed in November and December 1914, and in January 1915 commenced a regular service. These included the German ship Germania, seized in Sydney harbour as a prize of war by the Australian government, which chartered it to Burns, Philp in 1916. The firm renamed it the Mawatta. Recognising the opportunity offered by the confusion in post-occupation New Guinea the firm sought a year's contract from the Australian government to supply the rice requirements of the colony but Administrator Pethebridge did not consider a monopoly desirable and the contract was not awarded. Although the firm's prompt appearance on the scene looked like a monopoly in the making, it was the only Australian firm then capable of providing o a regular shipping link between Rabaul, via Sydney. German wholesale firms in Rabaul complained of the high freight rates saying that Burns, Philp's business methods were "unfair" in deeding with small traders, but as they had no option but to use the firm's ships their complaints had little effect. The NDL coup of 1905 had not been forgotten by Burns, Philp. Smaller German firms used the firm's ships without argument. In May 1915 Hernsheim's was importing opium from Manila for Ah Tam, and in 1918 opium was still arriving in Rabaul in Burns, Philp's •» ships. In January 1916 Lucas went to Rabaul and secured the agencies of HSAG, Hernsheim and the H.R. Wahlen company for Burns, Philp on terms of a 2.5% buying commission for goods shipped from Australia as well as from Rabaul. The firm also provided credit of up to - f t ,000 for Wahlen, and 72,000 for each of the other companies, at 6% interest. When the credit limits were doubled a year later, the interest rate increased to 8%. It was, as Buckley & Klugman comment, a highly profitable business. ^ There is no doubt that Burns, Philp's 123 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 8 2. ibid., p. 51 3. ibid., p. 79 4. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1916. p. 32 72 fortunes were enormously enhanced by its New Guinea opportunities. Had there been another Australian firm able to challenge the Burns, Philp monopoly in the early months of occupation it might have been a very different story. But W.R. Carpenter and Co. was not established until 1914 and did not give any significant opposition until well into the 1920s by which time Burns, Philp was established as the force majeure in New Guinea. In the absence of precise instructions from the Australian government the Military Administrators of German New Guinea made decisions which largely determined the pattern of economic arrangements during the occupation. A report by the occupation Treasurer at the end of 1915 said that there was a need for an Australian government decision on the means of negotiating drafts between Rabaul and Sydney, and the extent to which the Administration was already committed by interim arrangements. It stated that with 'Copra being the principal means of exchange, arrangements have been made with the firms ... to give a lien over their copra shipments; and endorsed bills were handed into the bank [ i.e. the Treasury ] for transmission to Sydney',1 Burns, Philp was appointed Rabaul agent to handle this. In December 1915 the Sydney agency of Justus Scharff complained to HSAG that when it attempted to pay the lien on copra shipped on the Matunga the firm refused to take the money and deliver the o copra. A potentially awkward situation was avoided by the Australian government closing the German owned agency and approving its re-opening as an Australian one. The first eighteen months of the Australian occupation revealed problems outside the military's experience. Although unable to make significant changes in existing legislation, Pethebridge and his officers laid the ground-work for subsequent Australian Military Administrations while they struggled to maintain a stable governing presence and keep the colony solvent and productive. 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 9 2. ibid., p. 8 73 Plantations The situation from September 1914 to January 1915 was confused as the Military Administration settled in. It appears no record was made of the number of coconut plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula (or in New Guinea generally) at the time of occupation, nor of their value.1 Trade faltered with the cessation of regular shipping services and began to have such a noticeable effect on plantations that the Australian government was obliged to approve the export of trade goods a from Australia to "enemy aliens" in New Guinea. While this revitalised trade, the export of copra (of which 14,000 tons valued at 7309,000 had been exported in 1913^) was another matter. Before 1914 hot air and sun dried copra from New Guinea had been regarded as a quality product but in the settling in period after the occupation the quality, and quantity, of copra produced dropped significantly. Despite an increase in bearing areas as earlier plantings matured, the low world price and the difficulty of reaching European markets kept production down until about 1915 when Australian crushing mills increased their production to meet the demand in Australia and Great Britain for glycerine and oil. Copra from the rich plantations of the Gazelle Peninsula had been a prime factor in Australian interest in the colony, particularly when compared to the modest quantities produced by its impoverished colony of Papua. In 1914 there were said to be 34,800 ha.^ under coconut cultivation in New Guinea compared to C 16,200 ha. in Papua0; exports were nearly four times that of Papua while copra production was nearly fifteen times greater. 1. in 1918 all plantations in New Guinea were valued at eleven million marks. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 110 2. Government Gazette no. 3 of 12 January 1915 3. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 18 4. A. McLennan, "The population problem of New Guinea" in The Australian Quarterly. v.X no. 1, March 1938. p. 51 5. Francis West. Hubert Murray: the Australian pro-consul. Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1968. p. 27 74 A coconut plantation seemed synonomous with a life of wealth and ease despite warnings such as that in the Sydney Mail of 23 September 1914 that a recent German publication points out, with reference to New Guinea and the neighbouring islands, that coconut planting offers a wide and profitable field for capital but cannot be recommended to those who must look for a quick return on their money unless carried out in conjunction with other pursuits such as trading and growing minor products for the Australian market. The cost of planting an area of 500 hektars (sic) (1,236 acres) with coconuts and its upkeep for 6 years is given as from V3,500 to y4,500. A hundred trees are planted to the acre and each tree carries on an average 80 nuts with normal rainfall. After 14 years at the latest the plantation is in full bearing. From 7,000 to 8,000 nuts make a marketable ton of copra. There was an almost wilful inability to grasp that laying out a plantation was hard work, and that during the seven years or so it took for palms to grow to maturity, planters lived very frugal lives. ANMEF troops returning to Australia told of the "lazy" life of planters, while articles such as the following in the Rabaul Record in August 1916 verged, in retrospect, on gross misrepresentation: The process adopted to make a plantation was this: a trader would acquire from the chiefs suitable land, ranging in size from a thousand acres upwards. Next he would hire a couple of hundred natives to clear the land and plant coconuts. At the same time he would carry on trading with local natives, thus earning sufficient to pay for all improvements. From the time he had organised the work and trained some of the more inelligent boys as overseers he could practically spend his day in the lounge chair on the veranda contemplating. In other words, through his superior intellect, he would make one lot of natives pay another lot of natives to present him with a plantation. In the course of ten to fifteen years he would be a wealthy man, if, in 1. Noel Gash <5c June Whittaker. A pictorial history of New Guinea. Milton, Queensland, Jacaranda, 1975. plate 450 p. 208 (the photograph was of HSAG's experimental plantation of Matanatar) 75 the meantime, he had not either been speared or drunk himself to death. Simplistic comments like this, even with the sting at the end of the paragraph, astounded German planters who knew the hardships and dangers associated with carving a plantation from the jungle. Later issues of the Rabaul Record carried articles^ telling exactly what establishing and running a plantation demanded, but the damage had been done. Some of the officers of the Military Administration were attracted to the idea of becoming planters after the war and used the opportunity provided by their positions to select the plantations for which they would tender. For example, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Seaforth Mackenzie, Judge of the Central Court, Rabaul, was to tender for the long established and productive plantations of Matanatar and Ravalien near Herbertshohe (subsequently Kokopo), and Ablingi in the Baining.^ Mackenzie was not the only one to pre select plantations. A senior employee of Burns, Philp quietly inspected plantation areas with a view to future acquisitions as he wrote in 1932: All the country on the mainland is second rate to valueless and at least four fifths of Bagail [ in the new Ireland area ] should be abandoned..... This country I inspected in 1920, it was worthless then and still looks the same after eleven years. The economy of the colony still depended heavily on trade copra or coconuts obtained from villagers, although there was an increasing amount of copra being produced on European plantations. But just at the time when plantations could be expected to come into greater bearing as palms matured, the restriction on shipping from Rabaul to overseas markets became very 1. J. Lyng, "How to be a coconut planter" in Rabaul Record, 1 August 1916 2. see, for example, article by Llew Mullin in Rabaul Record for February, 1916, and by "Sudoxe" in issue for April 1917. 3. see List of New Guinea Properties sold by the Custodian of Expropriated Property as at 1st January 1928, Melbourne, Government Printer, 1928. pp. 3, 4, 6 4 4. letter of 12 November 1931 from A.M. Turnbull (Manager, Island Agencies Dept. Sydney) to General Manager, Burns, Philp, Sydney. Burns, Philp Archives, Sydney. 76 pronounced. Freight rates between Sydney and London rose 'enormously'1 and thousands of tons of copra were stored awaiting transport. Storage, in turn, led to increased costs as well as the risk of fire through spontaneous combustion - a risk constant with stockpiled copra. Because of these shipping difficulties caused by the war, Sydney's position as the extrepot for South Pacific copra became very strong as the market was now almost exclusively Australian, although a few shipments of copra were sent to Japan. Profits earned by German planters and traders in New Guinea could not be sent to Germany, and individuals and companies used these to expand and further develop their plantations by increasing the area of land under coconuts, replacing poor quality palms, digging drainage ditches where needed, and improving plantation residences and other buildings. Confident that their private property would be respected under Section 3 of the Proclamation (discussed above), and encouraged by the Military Administration to develop their plantations, the German owners or managers put into them the profits they were forbidden to send to Germany. The planted area O increased from 84,000 acres in 1914 to 134,000 acres in 1918 as planters felt that regardless of which country won the war they could only benefit from their expanded and improved plantations. The amount of money put back into plantations cannot now be estimated but it was considerable. Buckley <5c Klugman suggest that the stories of Germans making heavy investments in their plantations are exaggerated, and cite W. Dupain, Burns, Philp's shipping office manager at Rabaul who estimated that in New Guinea plantations there were 90,000 acres of land under coconut trees, of which 35,000 acres were currently bearing fruit. Five years earlier the planted area was 77,000 acres, 24,000 of which were then bearing fruit. ... about 4,800 acres of the total planted increase in planted land was attributable to Choiseul Plantations Ltd in the four years of the war. 12 1. Buckley Sc Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 41 2. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, pp. 188/189 3. Buckley Sc Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1916. p. 83 77 Dupain was said to have obtained these figures from German sources. I have shown above (and later in this Chapter) that there were wide variations in assessments of planted land and bearing areas and that any such figures should be viewed cautiously. I disagree with Buckley <5c Klug man's suggestion of exaggeration. The remission of money to Germany was forbidden, and with the Commonwealth Bank branch (established in Rabaul in 1916) largely monitoring financial dealings in the colony, surely it would have been impossible to transfer funds elsewhere? Germans deported to Australia in the first few months of occupation - as well as those deported once the expropriation of German property was in full swing - were subjected to a body search before boarding their ships so that the smuggling of money or portable property (coins, jewellery) out of the colony was unlikely. Lack of any official action to "freeze" these profits saw considerable capital improvement of plantations that were ultimately expropriated by the Australian government. It is worth noting that the capital of the Londip Pflanzung GmbH was increased from 90,000M to 115,000M in 19161, an indication that copra prices were good and prospects, generally, even better. By about mid-1916 an air of purpose had replaced the initial indecision of the early occupation period. Copra was in demand in Europe for the manufacture of margarine and soap, glycerine and explosives. The demand revitalised the coconut oil crushing plant at Balmain in Sydney whose manager claimed that About a fortnight or so after war broke out, I hardly knew where I was; our mills were running single shifts; knowing then that the German mills would be closed up I started three shifts which we had not been running for two or three years. I shipped all the oil we could possibly make for about a year, and made more money in the mill than we made in about ten years. ... It was impossible for exporters to compete with Germany prior to the war in crushing oil in Sydney; but as soon as the Germans were closed up it became all right. 1. Commonwealth Law Reports v.34 1923-24 ("Mainka v. the Custodian of Expropriated Property"), p. 298 2. Interstate Commission Report Appendix G (evidence J. Meek), p. 10 78 This was not lost on the Sydney commercial world in which Burns, Philp was prominent. In Melbourne the Munitions Committee 'implored Kitchen <5c Sons (soap and candle manufacturers) to make all the glycerine we could to sell to England'1 The price there was V65 a ton until 1916 when the English market virtually closed down because of shipping difficulties. The price reached 7300 a ton in San Francisco which took over milling copra and manufacturing margarine from London. It was to be claimed in 1920 that Since 1914 ... Kaiser Wilhemsland, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Samoa are sending increasing quantities of copra to America and Japan ... by sailing vessels. ... San Francisco has set up many crushing mills and bids fair to become the centre of the western copra trade. Even coconut shells could be utilised as their high charcoal content O made them valuable as filters for gas masks, but there were no exports of unshelled coconuts from New Guinea specifically for this purpose. As plantations matured, exports increased: year copra exports value September 1914 14,266 tons -/309,000 1918 21,000 tons -/373,000 1919 ? 7441,613 1920 23,735 7807,000 sources: Military Occupation Report, p. 21 Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. pp. 72/73 At the same time the results of putting wartime profits back into plantations showed up in the way the total planted area increased: 12 1. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence J.H. Kitchen), p. 25 2. Former German Possessions, p. 78 3. Military Occupation Report, p. 21 79 year planted bearing 1909 39,595 acres (16,024 ha.) 1914 76,847 acres 23,572 acres (31,099 ha.) (9,359 ha.) 1918 133,960 acres 44,169 acres (54,213 ha.) (17,875 ha.) source: New Guinea Agricultural Gazette. v.2 no. 2 October 1936. p. 11 Anxious that valuable plantations should not be put at risk through lack of experienced managers, the Administration encouraged German planters and overseers to continue working them. It was also anxious about diseases and insect pests (which Cobcroft later showed to be significant)*, realising that the greatest danger lay 'not so much in the extensive plantations under European management O as in the little cultivated and poorly tended areas owned by natives'. District Officers on the New Guinea mainland (formerly Kaiser Wilhelmsland) did not O continue the German practice of "Kiap" plantations - that is, encouraging native plantations - and existing native plantations there were neglected, although District Officers in the Gazelle Peninsula and New Ireland areas were, apparently, promoting and overseeing native plantation expansion. This may have been because of the nearness of these areas to the administrative centre of Rabaul. Between 1910 and 1922 there was little increase in native plantation copra 123 1. Cobcroft Report, p. 93. A.R. Cobcroft, manager of Mulifanua plantation, Samoa, was brought to New Guinea to conduct an expert examination of the plantations in the care of the Expropriation Board. His report appears as an addendum to the Yarwood, Vane Report (the full citation of this is at fn. 3, p.103), and is cited hereafter as "Cobcroft Report, p. ..."). 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. pp. 37/38 3. Melanesian pidgin for "Captain", i.e. a government official (usually a District, or Patrol, Officer). F. Mihalic, Grammar and dictionary of neo-Melanesian. Techny, 111., Mission Press, 1957. p. 58 80 production which was said to be about 6,000 tons^ in 1922. This was because it was more profitable, and certainly much easier, to sell unhusked coconuts to European or Chinese traders. In 1921 the area of native-owned plantations in New O Guinea was 20,000 acres. Some native owners did very well from their plantations: Old Tom [ a former Queensland "Kanaka" ] owned some thirty acres of coconut plantations, a two- roomed house built after the European model; a whaleboat with canvas sail, a pair of field-glasses, and of course, pigs and shell money. Native copra was often imperfectly dried and generally brought a lower price than copra made on European plantations^ but it was still bought by local traders - usually Chinese - who paid badly, often in inferior trade goods. The Chinese had been quick to accept the credit arrangements offered by Australian companies establishing themselves in occupied New Guinea and so shake off the financial control of German companies. They competed directly with German traders and planters for native copra or trade coconuts. But they were not the only threat to established trader/planters. From the time of occupation - indeed, even while the Berrima was proceeding up the Australian coast - Australia had determined to keep New Guinea after the war. James Burns of Burns, Philp busied himself apportioning the South Pacific shortly after the war began. He sent a memorandum "Australia in the South Pacific"^ to the Australian Department of External Affairs for consideration, and although no action was taken on it, the firm's keen interest in the South Pacific - and particularly German New Guinea - was noted. In mid-November 1918 the Australian Parliament resolved that the German colonies in the Pacific 'should not 1234 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/1922. p. 94 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 14 3. Lyng, Island Films, p. 28 4. Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 17 5. Buckley <5c Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 6 81 in any circumstances' be restored to Germany1. The defence of Australia was proffered as a reason for if the islands are in enemy hands, they would form a perpetual and very serious menace to Australia. The return of them to Germany would make it possible to concentrate stores, ships and transports within 750 miles of the Queensland coast. With the development of aeroplanes it would be possible to raid Australian towns from these islands. Accordingly it is most important to Australia that these Islands should not be returned to Germany. Burns, Philp considered that the property of German planters and traders in New Guinea should be expropriated, and proposed the formation of an Anglo-Australian company to buy the assets from the Australian government. Burns suggested that the value of German assets 'could be allowed for in the indemnity which Germany will have to pay Great Britain, leaving it to the German proprietors to recover the O value from their own German government'. This form of expropriation without compensation by the Australian government was what occurred after the war. The Prime Minister of Australia, W.M. Hughes, was in basic agreement with Burns's suggestions but nothing could be done until after the signing of the Peace Treaty. The idea was then dropped as Hughes decided instead to settle returned Australian servicemen on expropriated properties in New Guinea. A firm decision was delayed, even though Members of both Houses of the Australian Parliament agreed that as It was our soldier boys who wrested these islands from the enemy ... who fought for them and captured them ... if there's anything in those islands, of which our returned soldiers would like to take advantage in the way of settlement, the way ought to be made smooth for them. The final solution was obvious. 123 1. Louis, "Australia and the German colonies in the Pacific 1914-1919". p. 418 2. Latham Papers. National Library of Australia. MS1009/207454. Secret memorandum on the Pacific. 23 July 1918. p. 3 3. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 7 4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. LXXXIX 1917/1919. p. 12259 82 Supporting the attitude that "the islands" were rightfully Australia's as a prize of war, if not as a natural extension of Australian influence in the South Pacific, a Report of about the same time recommended that as soon as possible after resumption the plantations be offered for sale to individuals or companies making special provision for settlement on suitable blocks of such ex-soldiers as may desire to embark on the enterprise of coconut growing in the Territory. Expropriation of German businesses for Australian ex-servicemen was now an accepted policy, perhaps agreed to in an effort to reduce the ill-feeling caused in Australia by conscription in 1916. Nationalising the plantations was rejected on the grounds that there was insufficient demand for copra in Australia as the European demand lapsed with the end of the war. The Australian Government continued to deliberate how to dispose of the plantations after it received the expected Mandate, while their German owners waited and hoped for a fair settlement. There was an upsurge in land buying in the calendar year preceding the occupation but, because of widely varying and conflicting records, it is impossible to arrive at firm figures for the total amounts of land alienated, planted with crops and actually bearing. Giving evidence to the hearing of the Interstate Commission Lucas said that the total amount of cultivated land in New Guinea in 1913 was 27,715 acres of which 9,210 acres bore crops (which differed markedly from the 1914 totals of 76,847 acres and 9,359 acres given in the New Guinea Agricultural Gazette as shown on p. 79 of this thesis). Lucas continued these are the latest figures available ... I do not think they have been compiled since the British occupation ... any figures printed by the British Administration are collated from the figures left behind by the Germans.1 2 1. Interim & Final Reports (Major), p. 45 2. Interstate Commission Report Appendix G (evidence W.H. Lucas).-p. 33 83 Dubious statistics for land in New Guinea are constant because of inaccuracies admitted by both German and Australian Administrations in recording them. In many cases, records of land held were supplied by plantation owners and were undoubtedly estimates. Lucas's figures above may have been for the actual amount of land bearing a crop at the time (they are close to those in this category on p. 79), but in the transcript the area in acres and hectares has been confused as two separate totals for land planted, and land bearing. They allegedly include 42 plantations of approximately 17,305 acres "in various parts of the Protectorate". Contracts of sale in process before the occupation were permitted to proceed if there were no administrative objections, but no further land was to be sold although it could be leased from natives if they approved, subject to an annual rental. Only a few residents took up new land - mainly because a considerable amount of plantation land was unplanted - and the Military Administration refused to allow new land-buyers to enter New Guinea.* In doing this the Administration was observing its obligation to maintain the status quo until the colony's future was decided. But this restriction on buying new land, together with windfall profits earned from high wartime copra prices, encouraged existing German land-holders to increase their cultivated areas. By 10 October 1916 the area of planted land held by the Company, HSAG and Hernsheim 6c Co. was said to be about 16,600 ha. (about 38,500 acres) valued by its owners at VI,275,000. Other smaller companies were said to have a total planted area of over 5,500 ha. (about 12,000 acres); more than half of this (3,500 ha. or 8,750 acres valued at y239,350) was held by Wahlen GmbH. The following table shows the value of these smaller companies: Company area held area planted value ha. ha. ± * Wahlen 6c Company 5,718 3,500 239,350 * Kalili Plantation Company 1,580 965 53,890 * Kleinschmidt Company 1,115 100 12,500 * Bremer Sudsee Company 1,000 569 1,333 * Mioko (DHPG) 337 65 2,500 Bismarck Archipelago Company 1,977 423 32,500 Bopire Syndicate 1,411 416 35,000 Schluter 100 40 1,750 * situated on or near the Gazelle Peninsula source: Interim 6c Final Reports (Murray), p. 68 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 16 84 A scheme put forward to stimulate "British” settlement by commencing land sales was rejected by the Administration, but in 1918 when it was fairly clear what Australia intended for the colony applications for land from Germans and non- Germans became more frequent. The German applications were somewhat paradoxical. In November 1918 the acting Administrator (S.S. Mackenzie) had advised the manager of the Company at Madang that the Administration and the Australian government were examining the possibility of carrying on the land policy of the German government by which purchased land was transferred to settlers as freehold. If this was considered unsuitable after examination, the acting Administrator thought that leases would be granted on easy terms for 99 years as occurred in most British colonies. He wrote: To quieten your people, tell them all applications have been registered and their rights secured in any case, whether the colony goes back to the Germans or will be taken over by another power. If the colony becomes German again the German Government of course will acknowledge all rights granted by the British Administration and will carry on a land policy that seems the best in its opinion. If the colony becomes British, the land policy will be settled as mentioned above, viz. freehold or leases for 99 years at easy terms. As a result of Mackenzie's advice German planters continued to plant their land up to and after 1918 in anticipation that compensation paid by an Australian government would be assessed on the value of existing developed property. But they were sadly mistaken for all they were doing was developing their properties to the ultimate benefit of the Australian government. To stop land being bought by, or passing to, the "wrong" sort of person, a Lands Ordinance was introduced in December 1919 to prevent any further transfer, sale or lease of land (either as an estate or an interest in undeveloped1 1. Hopper, Kicking out the Hun, p. 58. (S.S. Mackenzie to the Manager, New Guinea Company, Madang, 18 November 1918. extracted from German New Guinea newspaper cuttings, Mitchell Library, Sydney). 85 land) without the written consent of the Australian Minister for Defence.This was done to prevent German owners avoiding expropriation by converting their properties to cash and sending the money overseas in cash or movable property (gold, jewellery, native artifacts). Bank transfers of funds were formally prevented by the Enemy Property Ordinance 1920 which prohibited the remittance of property or money overseas to any former enemy subject, or office of a company incorporated in New Guinea. In 1922 the total area of land alienated in New Guinea was said to be 697,179 acres, of which only about one-fifth or 144,979 acres - despite the extensive planting during the occupation period - was planted. Land was held by the following companies and missions: Company total holding planted New Guinea Company 368,118 acres 21,962 HSAG 62,271 9,985 H.R. Wahlen 14,129 9 Hernsheim & Co. 8,549 6,698 Catholic Mission 61,895 ) (various) ) 15,831 Methodist Mission 5,387 ) source: Military Occupation Report, pp. 20/21 It is significant that the largest commercial organisation in the Protectorate had planted less than 6% of its holdings, while the smallest had planted 78%. The Company was quite obviously "hoarding" land as an asset for its returns to shareholders had not been spectacular considering the time it had been in New Guinea and the advantages it had enjoyed. By comparison, smellier companies like Hernsheim's were using their unexpected wartime profits to develop their holdings.1 1. there appears to be a correlation between this, and a 1950s decision by the Australian government not to permit New Guinea Chinese to purchase plantations on which war time airstrips had been built, see Cahill, "The Chinese in Rabaul 1914-1960". p. 257 86 At the same time as German planters were expanding their plantations, earlier plantings were maturing to the extent that storage space for copra at major centres in New Guinea was severely taxed. The Administrator urged the Australian government in June 1918 that overseas steamers in future should be despatched with greater speed and regularity than heretofore. This was carefully qualified by the Secretary of the Commonwealth Shipping Board, Melbourne, that no tonnage can be allotted to German owned copra until all produce of the British planter is satisfactorily provided for. The qualification was petty as the quantity o f "British” produced copra awaiting movement from New Guinea ports was minimal compared to that produced by German plantations. Although some German residents of New Guinea remained hopeful that they would either retain their properties or be satisfactorily compensated for them by the Australian government after the war, officials in the Military Administration knew this was very unlikely. The colony appeared too prosperous, was too close to Australia, and too good a potential source of trade for Sydney business houses for it to be returned to Germany. In retrospect, it was obvious that restrictions on land dealings in New Guinea were the overt signs of Australian determination to retain the colony. In April 1920 a branch of the Returned Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmens' Imperial League of Australia (RSSAILA) was formed in Rabaul. By January 1921 it had 106 members, comprising most of the "British" population who planned to take their discharge in Rabaul and remain in New Guinea. They were aware of the view current in Australia 'that the way to reward the returned soldier, who may 12 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A2 item 18/39. Prime Minister's Dept. - File of papers (annual single number series). "Copra", 1917-1918. Administrator's comment of 11.6.18 contained in letter 22 July 1918 from Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, Melbourne. 2. ibid., letter of 26 July 1918 from Secretary, Commonwealth Shipping Board, Melbourne, to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, Melbourne. 87 have found life in Australia uninteresting after the adventure of the Great War, was to give him a block of land'1 and were determined to share this in New Guinea. But first, the pivot on which the colony’s prosperity balanced had to be consolidated. O Labour* There was an important additional reason for Australian interest in New Guinea: expanding Australian investment in the British Solomon Islands required more labour. W.H. Lucas of Burns, Philp was 'acutely' aware that labour costs on nearby Bougainville (i.e. the German Solomons) were much lower than in the o British Solomons and urged that New Guinea be kept by Australia. Labour was New Guinea's most valuable natural asset, essential for the operation of its plantations. There was thought to be 'sufficient to meet all reasonable demands made upon it ... for many years to come' even though it was 'not possible to predict whether the numbers would be adequate to meet a vigorous policy of close settlement or for opening up the country on an extensive scale'.^ The Military Administration, influenced by German principles (which could hardly have been avoided), saw villagers as the natural source of 'the necessary labour [ for ] the plantations'.® Indeed, there was a firm belief that work and discipline were essential for villagers: 32451 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 317 (a similar principle was followed in the 1960s with the European Soldier Settlement Scheme at Popondetta in the (then) Northern District of Papua. Its achievements were unremarkable). v 2. see Decker, Labor problems in the Pacific Mandates (Chapter VI: "The native indentured labour system in New Guinea"); Reed, The making of modern New Guinea pp. 178/184; and Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea pp. 99/163. 3. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns Philp 1914-1946. p. 1 4. Military Occupation Report, p. 16 5. J. Lyng, Our New Possessions. Melbourne, Melbourne Publishing Company, 1916. p. 60 88 Look at them [ the doctor exclaimed ] - did you ever see a more dismal looking bunch of humanity - filthy and half-starved - all stomach, and no chest and muscles. These people either gorge or starve. Regular food on a plantation, ... will make human beings of them. Compare the miserable creatures brought in from the bush with those met on the plantations, and you can't believe it is the same race of people. It was claimed that Wahlen did his best to 'revitalise the race and bump up the birth rate'^ by importing "husky" Solomon Islands men and paying baby-bonuses to the women, but in this, at least, he failed. The Military Administration inherited a draft set of revised Native Labour Regulations (the last codification of 1 January 1910 had been little changed) which, with few amendments, it used as the basis for the Native Labour Regulations it introduced on 16 July 1915. Three months later, Burns, Philp sought permission to recruit in the colony (i.e. in the German Solomons) for its plantations in the British Solomons. The firm claimed 'there are plenty of natives on those islands anxious for plantation work under British masters, but who will not work for the Germans'.’* Lucas further claimed that it was 'vital' for the British and German Solomons to have access to 'the plentiful labour supply of the Bismarck Archipelago and mainland German New Guinea'^ and was, no doubt, outraged when the Military Administrator refused his request on the basis of the 1899 Convention between Germany and Britain. The Administrator argued that1 234 1. Lyng, Our New Possessions, p. 184 (Stevenson expressed the same opinion about imported labourers in Samoa: 'After six months of plantation life, they do not resemble the same beings'. Stevenson, .A footnote to history, p. 75) 2. K.A. Saxby, "The baron of Maron" in The Bulletin. December 5, 1956. p. 25 (I have found no corroboration of this in the Archer papers in correspondence between Wahlen and Archer, but the planning for a healthy labour force - if true - does seem in character with Wahlen). 3. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 118 (Buckley 6c Klugman, The history of Burns Philp: the Australian company in the South Pacific, pp. 254/255 seems at variance with Lucas). 4. Buckley 6c Klugman, The history of Burns Philp: the Australian company in the South Pacific, p. 27 89 German law forbade the request, particularly as 'considerable difficulty is being experienced by local planters in these Possessions in obtaining readily the labour they require'^; this called into doubt Lucas's claim of a "plentiful" labour supply in other parts of German New Guinea. The restrictions of the 1899 Convention were carefully observed by British administrations in the South Pacific. In 1910 the High Commission for the Western Pacific had prohibited recruiting of Solomon Islands labour 'for places outside those islands for fear it might infringe German O recruiting rights under the Convention'. Possibly because the Military Administration in New Guinea was bound to observe German law in the colony, recruiting procedures were more strictly interpreted and evasions or breaches of the Native Labour Regulations were more severely punished than during the O German period. The systems of indentured and free (i.e. temporary or casual) labour were continued, planters preferring the first which gave them a good deal of control over labourers. Free labour was valuable to a plantation situated in a well populated district, even though the New Guinea villager was considered 'too casual and inconsistent in temperament to set his hand to steady and continuous work unless he becomes accustomed to the routine of a system which at the same time binds him by definite legal sanctions'.^ The new labour regulations were said to look on villagers 'merely as a means to an end'5 which was perfectly correct. The Germans, according to Sir Hubert Murray of Papua, regarded them as an asset to be used in exploiting the country 'whereas in British colonies, the welfare of the native is regarded as being in itself of the first importance'. 1 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, pp. 118/119 2. M.D. Green, The problems of a labour supply for plantation agriculture in the Solomon Islands, 1908-1912. Long essay in partial fulfillment of a Master of Arts degree, University of Auckland, 1974. p. 37 3. Military Occupation Report, p. 15 4. ibid., p. 16 5. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), p. 55 6. ibid. 90 Indentured labourers were issued with a length of cloth to wear, a blanket and occasionally a mosquito net. Wages were fixed at a minimum of five shillings a month for a man and four shillings for a woman or boy under sixteen; maximum wages (except in special cases) were ten shillings a month. Married women could be indentured for plantation work only if accompanied by their husbands, and male children of twelve and female children of nine could be signed on as domestic servants with the consent of the Military Administrator.* Labourers were accommodated in large, barrack-like dormitories which became a O feature of New Guinea plantations, and worked ten hours a day six days a week with a mid-day rest of one and a half hours. Wages were paid in cash, later amended to include a trade goods component. Half the cash wage was paid at the end of each month; the balance was deferred until conclusion* of the contract of service. This "deferred wage" gave a plantation manager/owner extra cash to use during the contract time of each group of labourers, but meant he had to find a considerable sum at the end of the period. One way of doing this was to open a trade store on his plantation and recoup labourers' deferred wages from money they spent in the store. The Administration realised that areas close to Rabaul and in New Ireland had been heavily recruited, creating social problems with young adult^ males away from their villages for years. Areas were opened or closed to recruiting depending on the number of young men remaining and, as recruiters moved between them, a certain air of open or closed "season" developed. Recruiting was difficult and dangerous but very profitable; those engaged in it were said to have 'one foot in the grave and another in gaol'.'* The recruiter tried by legitimate means to persuade natives to sign on; he could not (although he frequently did) trick or command them to do so. Recruiting of native officials (luluais and tultuls) was forbidden and recruiting laws were strictly enforced 1234 1. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), p. 55 2. similar to men's long-houses in some recruiting areas. Was this calculated German psychology, or just cheap housing? 3. the minimum age for male labourers was twelve years. 4. Lyng, Our New Possessions, p. 91 91 which, in theory, made recruiting less easy as the Administration 'afforded more protection to the native against the evils of illegal recruiting'.1 In practice, the lack of Administration personnel meant that the recruiter went almost unchallenged provided he was moderately careful. Even though Administrator Johnston had stated in June 1918 that three or four schooners were "absolutely O essential" for patrolling work coastal patrolling by Administration officials generally depended on "lifts" on recruiting vessels so a reasonable amount of mutual tolerance developed. Agents - in many cases planters seeking income while their newly planted coconut palms grew to maturity - were employed by the large firms as recruiters for their plantations. In the Madang (formerly Kaiser Wilhelmshafen) District these agents received V6 head 'on delivery at Madang'.** Chinese sub-recruiters were paid Y3 a head, and native assistants five shillings. It was a profitable business; agents did well and a number of plantations were supported in their developmental stage through recruiting payments earned by their owners. All recruits were sent to a central point where they were medically inspected to see that they were able-bodied and not under age (the latter point was sometimes overlooked), and then signed on by the District Officer. At Madang they were confined to a little island in the harbour awaiting the pleasure and convenience of the Company to be despatched to their final destination. As the harbour was infested with crocodiles ... and with ' sharks .. no one ever attempted to escape. Lyng's use of the words "confined" and "escape" begs the question of how voluntary their signing on actually was. One of the constant problems of recruiters and plantation managers was the desertion rate as new arrivals on plantations came to realise that labouring was hard, and often lonely, work. Therefore, a system evolved whereby labourers were never sent to plantations in their home areas but despatched to plantations as far away as possible. They were 123 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 14 2. C.D. Rowley, "The area taken over from the Germans and controlled by the A.N.M.E.F." in South Pacific, vol. 7 no. 9, April 1954. p. 836 3. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, pp. 128/129 4. Lyng, Island Films, pp. 186/187 92 less likely to desert from a plantation located in the middle of an unknown, and possibly unfriendly, group o f villages. Once on a plantation they were under the control of the manager. The approach to disciplining labourers did not change markedly under the Australians; no other aspect of post-occupation administration absorbed as much attention as this did. In May 1915 Administrator Pethebridge cautioned a plantation manager at Talasea for flogging deserters with a rope instead of the regulation leather strap, and for exceeding ten strokes. He explained to the labourers that they had been punished as they deserved for breaking their contracts. Even though the Native Labour Regulations, introduced in July 1915 prescribed limitations on flogging, licences to flog continued to be issued to Europeans until 15 August when this form of discipline was withdrawn by regulation. A month later an amendment stated that flogging a native was permitted only by order or direction of the Central Court Judge, the officer in charge of Native Affairs, Rabaul, or the local District Officer, and then only after conviction following a proper trial.1 This O was seen as "straining" the Administration's legal authority but the Australian government risked this to avoid any criticism which might weaken its claim to New Guinea after the war. Various other amendments made to the Regulations were consolidated on 15 March 1917 and re-enacted as the Native Labour Ordinance 1917. Although the ability of Europeans to flog natives had been curtailed, the Administration had overlooked the activities of village officials. As late as July 1917 the District Officer at Morobe (on the mainland) reported that 'One matter that has been allowed to go on ... is the flogging of boys and maries O (sic) by the native luluais and tultuls'. It appears to have been left to the District Officers to discourage this until by direction of the Australian Cabinet of 10 March 1919 flogging (other than by an approved government official) was 'strictly 12 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 13 2. Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 29 3. C.D. Rowley, "Native officials and magistrates in German New Guinea" in South Pacific, vol. 7 no. 8, January-February 1954. p. 780 93 and absolutely' prohibited; 1 any infringement was liable to a fine of 2,000 marks. Representatives of the principal German companies in Rabaul protested to the Military Administrator that withdrawal of the employer's right to flog caused 'great anxiety among the settlers of this colony' for As soon as the natives get aware of this change it will be impossible to keep up the necessary discipline among the labourers, and the boys will neglect their work to such an extent that Hie lucrativeness of all plantations will be questioned. They argued that ...... The natives around Rabaul, though being in continuous touch with white people for over thirty years, are not yet more than children, and they have to get a licking just as well as every naughty boy in civilised countries gets from his parents or school masters. Finally, the representatives claimed that the former German Administration, as well as the Catholic Mission, had agreed to the proposal to extend corporal punishment to women. Missionaries, wrote the pioneer Lutheran missionary Johannes Flierl, know by experience of a long lifetime that even children of our own cannot be well educated without any chastisement ... . The natives are mere children and some of them are very naughty children. German alarm was shared by the 'soft-hearted Australians'® who, after a closer acquaintance with labourers, realised the need for punishment if for no other reason than to assert their place in the new colonial hierarchy. Few of the Military Administration officials would have gained first hand experience in working a labour line. 3124 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p.13 (It is curious the fine was in marks. The use of German paper money had been forbidden by the Currency and Coinage Proclamation of 1916 (Annual Report 1914/1921, p. 32). The Administration seemed to be suggesting the offenders were German, not Australian). 2. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 140 3. ibid. 4. ibid., p. 141 5. Lyng, Island Films, p. 193 94 Much has been made of German "brutality” in flogging their native labourers, but it should be remembered that, as in Samoa, 'the lash used was a "cat", similar to that employed aboard German naval vessels'* of the period. It was a harsh age for subordinates, German nationals included. In 1900 the administrators of the Company, proprietors of business firms, and lay-brothers of the Catholic Mission had 'received authority to administer disciplinary punishments for small offences'. By paying an annual fee of 20M employers were O able to administer corporal punishment to their employees and were issued with licences called Disziplinarerlaubnis. Although unable to find any reference to these in German records Reed saw some, kept as souvenirs by Australian residents in the Territory, and was convinced of their authenticity.^ The Germans were so open about their treatment of natives that when Australians looked for incidents to criticise, they found them easily in published official German reports.^ A cartoon by Norman Lindsay (see p. 95) published in The Bulletin was an emotional, if inaccurate, portrayal of this. Nearly twenty years after New Guinea passed to Australia, allegations of German harshness were still so common that the editor of the Rabaul Times wrote to the Pacific Islands Monthly his view of the wisdom of licensing employers to flog their plantation labour. He concluded; it would be contrary to my sense of justice ... to allow the impression to be circulated that the treatment of the natives by the Germans was as brutal and ferocious as some people would have us believe. 1 1. Corris, Passage, port and plantation, p. 69 2. Rowley, "Native officals and magistrates", p. 780 3. Stewart's Handbook of the Pacific Islands 1920. Sydney, McCarron Stewart, 1920. p. 366 4. Reed, The making of modern New Guinea, p. 143 5. Biskup, "Dr Albert Hahl". p.348 6. Gordon Thomas, Pacific Islands Monthly, 15 February 1939 (Thomas came to Ulu in 1908 as a printer with the Methodist Mission; he became editor of the Rabaul Times in 1932). 95 STAINING THE AUSTRALIAN FLAG "The natives of ex-German New Guinea are still flogged by the Hun, the law of the former German possessions remaining paramount until peace terms have been decided". The Bulletin. 27 February 1919. p.10 96 "Flogging", according to Administrator Johnston, was a misnomer. It was less severe, he said, than that experienced by boys in British public schools and was therefore in the British tradition.1 Johnston saw the abolition of an employer's right to flog as an encouragement for illegal flogging. What plantation manager, he reasoned, would waste time and disrupt his plantation routine bringing an offender to a court hearing? Particularly when that offender had cost between - £ J and V9 to recruit and train and, if convicted, his services would be lost to the manager who would then have to make do with a new recruit 'freshly caught o from the bush' The solution was punishment on the spot. Australians in New Guinea were surprised by the concern felt in Australia about flogging, wondering delicately why things that in Australia would be considered all in the game of the day (for instance, the slapping o f a cheeky native on the thick part of the body) stir the imagination of people in Australia. Perhaps in an attempt to reduce criticism of the practice of flogging in New Guinea Lyng pointed out that flogging was still permitted on white men in Australia.^3 412 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 147 2. ibid. 3. Lyng, Island Films, p. 242 (it has always been an argument that people not on the spot in New Guinea could not understand the actions and attitudes of Europeans (mainly Australians) who lived there). 4. ibid., p. 192 (flogging is legal in Queensland where it is called "whipping", together with solitary confinement for offenders sentenced to periods of less than two years; and for indictable offences committed by male children under twelve years of age. See R.F. Carter, Criminal law of Queensland. 6th ed. Butterworths, Brisbane, 1982. pp. 73, 666). 97 Alternatives to flogging considered by Johnston included hard labour on roads, breaking stones, deportation to outstations and the cutting of hair for minor off fences.1 He even had samples of stocks and pillories made, and asked the c\ Department of Defence in Melbourne for permission 'to experiment' with them. When this was refused, Johnston sought to continue tradition by requesting 300 pairs of handcuffs and 100 sets of leg irons. He even invoked Field Punishment No. 1, a punishment for military offenders by which a labourer was tied by his hands and feet to long rods and allowed to hang for two hours a day for twenty one days with breaks in between (see photograph p. 98). By an amendment of 1 January 1919 to the Native Labour Regulations this was imposed on natives for O 'serious offences”' until 1922. Murray was concerned to see that although flogging had been abolished in New Guinea, disciplinary punishments (detention or confinement without chains, and fines) were retained in the Native Labour Ordinance of 1919. Detention was not to exceed three days, and only in very exceptional circumstances or serious cases was it lawful to put a labourer in chains; in no case was it lawful to deprive him of daylight. This latter point was an improvement on the Ordinance of 1917 which permitted a labourer to be deprived of light, though only in exceptional 'serious' cases.^ 123 1. this would have upset the Methodists. The declaration "I am going to get my hair cut" in the 1890s meant a Tolai had decided to join the Methodist Church. "Combed hair was undeniably the badge of the lotu (church) ..." Australasian Methodist Missionary Review, May 1891. pp.4/5 quoted in Sack, Black through coloured glasses, p. 131 2. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, pp. 147/148 3. Gash, A pictorial history of New Guinea, plate 395, p. 190 4. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), pp. 54/55 98 NATIVES UNDERGOING NO. I FIELD PUNISHMENT IN THE GAOL AT RABAUL source: Overell, A woman’s impression of German New Guinea, facing p. 10 99 It must be remembered that officers of the Military Administration came to New Guinea as members of an occupying force, not as colonial administrators. They had no experience in native labour management and no clear idea what it entailed. Settled in their neat bungalows with well-trained houseboys to look after their white drill uniforms (carefully tailored in Chinatown) the 'Coconut Lancers'* administered the colony as best they knew. Conscious of the need to maintain the colony as a going concern while its future was decided, they recognised its almost total dependence on native labour. Inevitably they followed German practice, adopted German labour laws and even German attitudes in seeing villagers as 'human beings of the very lowest standard of life in the whole O world' who, according to Administrator Johnston, lacked the "mental capacity" to formulate ideas about self-government although they had an introduced form of O this in the luluai system, but 'only within village boundaries'. This alleged lack of mental capacity was not corrected by any form of education, formal or industrial. There was no plan to re-open the Namanula Native School to train native artisans and clerical workers despite agreement that 'an important duty devolving on the government will be to initiate a system of vocational training for natives'^ whose continuing development should have been one of the main aims of the Military Administration. It was admitted that a considerable number of villagers had sufficient intelligence to allow them to learn most ordinary trades and to acquire the skills to do most of the work required, but first it would be necessary 'to secure a limited number of white tradesmen as teachers and if these men are tactful and patient the results of their work will be evident within a very few years'.^ Few tradesmen were engaged for this purpose although it was an obvious area in which returned Australian servicemen could have been employed using their skills instead of trying to become planters, or plantation overseers, virtually overnight. Recommendations for the educational training of natives put1234 1. G.W.L. Townsend. District Officer: from untamed New Guinea to Lake Success, 1921-1946. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1968. p. 25 2. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 140 3. Rowley, "Native Officials and Magistrates", p. 775 4. Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 31 5. ibid. 1 0 0 forward in the only Annual Report published by the Military Administration had not been tested during the occupation and little was done to raise villagers above the level of labourers. It seems that while the semi-skilled or tradesmen positions of the Administration were earmarked for Australian returned servicemen, natives were to be employed as plantation, and general, labourers. Quite obviously the creation of an education system, together with the requisite schools and qualified teaching staff would have been beyond the financial competence of the Military Administration (as well as possibly infringing the capitulation conditions for the colony) but the introduction of some form of agricultural extension training should have been possible. This would have combined farming and possibly plantation techniques and may have raised the interest of villagers, if not their aspirations. During the military occupation it was acknowledged by planters that the profitability of their plantations depended almost entirely on a reliable and sufficient labour force. Hahl's earlier advice to German planters to look after their labourers had been followed and conditions were improved (shorter working hours, provision of land for food gardens, some form of organised sport) in an attempt to make plantation life more attractive to employees, and to those in villages who might follow. 'It is now generally realised by the German employers' wrote a report of the period, 'that it is to their interest to treat their labour well, otherwise the ill fame of their estate would be widely circulated and they would find it difficult, if not impossible, to secure further supplies of labour'.1 Australian firms were quick to appreciate this. A director of W.R. Carpenter & Co. advised all employers after a visit to New Guinea that the black man only respects and obeys the master he fears. No sane planter or overseer would ... flog his boys; he would be injuring himself; he wants their help and aims at keeping them straight and in good health, just as he does with a useful horse.1 2 1. Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 16 2. Thomas Henley. New Guinea and Australia's Pacific Islands Mandate. Sydney, John Sands, 1927. p. 67 101 While Australians were inclined to suggest that Germans had been brutal with their native employees, they were themselves extraordinarily harsh in the official handling of native problems. A "punitive expedition" sent to Lindenhafen plantation to investigate a fatal labour line brawl followed the classic German pattern. During the "investigation" thirteen villagers "and possibly more" including a luluai were shot, two villages burned and the body of a villager hung on the site of one of them. The heads of others presumed guilty of murder were cut o ff and displayed where the crimes were committed.1 It is interesting to contrast these actions with a report of the same period which claimed that the change from German to Australian control has meant for the native of New Guinea a fuller protection of personal liberty and of tribal and communal property, and a keener solicitude and higher regard on the part of the government for the sanctity of human life. Towards the end of the Military Administration there was a great deal of controversy over the way Australia had looked after the villagers of New Guinea. With one eye on the League of Nations and its final decision which, it was anticipated, would allow Australia to administer New Guinea, the Australian government did try to improve its image regarding the control and care of native labour. Australia’s "Pacific destiny", emphasised by the Brisbane Courier was to teach the native, who is too lazy to work unless he has to, that his physical and moral salvation lies in having an occupation which imposes on him a physical tax. The islander has too long been coddled and made a subject merely of sentimental concern. The island population is diminishing chiefly because of the enervating effects of idleness. Despite warnings and predictions there was never a recorded shortage, or total absence, of labour for plantations. People depending on a subsistence economy are not forced by economic necessity to become labourers, and some artificial means are usually necessary to stimulate interest in labouring for a 123 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 198 2. Military Occupation Report, p. 18 3. Brisbane Courier, 30 January 1919 102 wage. Initially, trade goods and the technological marvels of the period (steel knives and axes) provided this but the need for these was soon satisfied. Similarly, the need to obtain money for head tax payments in eligible areas was easily enough met from trading in copra, coconuts, marine products, native artifacts or food. The overwhelming reason for signing on as labourers seems to have been for an adventure to replace the warfare and cannibalism now forbidden by the colonial administrations. Much the same situation occurred in the British Solomons where it was noted that the absence of ’murderous inter-tribal wars, which however fatal they may have been to the individual, yet kept the minds of the community alert and their bodies active', had caused a listlessness among the islanders. There was also a curiosity to view Europeans at closer quarters. There was some coercion to recruit - a system of bonuses to luluais, tultuls and influential villagers to "encourage" young men to sign on was common during the military occupation - and there was trickery as well. Recruiters working through a new area for the first time sometimes followed the German practice of sending men back to their home villages after a few months, well paid and with a "box" of trade goods to impress those who had stayed behind and encourage them to sign on. There was frequently some form of compulsion also - Townsend noted that o some luluais in the Sepik District were given shotguns as a reward for meeting labour quotas - but it was easy enough for villagers to fade into the jungle if they wanted to avoid a recruiter or (white) Administration official. It was not so much a matter of not wanting to work, as of not wanting to miss the opportunity of working, that turned villagers into labourers. Had this been more clearly appreciated by the Australian Administrations a lot of unnecessary problems may have been avoided. 12 1. Green, The problems of a labour supply for plantation agriculture, p. 62 2. Townsend, District Officer, p. 57 103 Commerce The prize the Australians sought was bigger than they had imagined. The operations of the Company alone almost equalled all major German plantation and trading companies in the Pacific combined. Its share capital was reported to beV375,000 with reserve funds of ^.32,500; receipts from its products and trading business for the year ending 31 March 1913 were VI47,000.1 Together with the firms of Wahlen, Mouton and the DHPG it formed the commercial backbone of New Guinea operating within a system of plantations, wholesale and retail stores in Rabaul and elsewhere in the colony, and a fleet of coastal vessels engaged in recruiting and trading through small stations, mostly manned by Chinese. Their enterprises were so closely interwoven that one supported the other which was the secret of their strength. Australians seeking to compete with German firms in O New Guinea were said to face ’an impossible task’. One of the stranger acts of the Military Administration was to close the stores of the Company, HSAG, Hernsheim & Co. and Wahlen GmbH, merge them, and re-open them as two stores in the name of the Company and HSAG. The Company store became a wholesale depot for plantation supplies, while the HSAG stores transacted business in two principal areas: supplying plantation O requirements, and supplying general articles for ’whites and blacks'. It would have been difficult to distinguish between the two areas of demand but the advantages to Sydney business houses, shipping companies and agents were immediately apparent. The Australian occupation of New Guinea had brought a halt to labour recruiting for German plantations in Samoa, and the DHPG - which1 23 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 52 2. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence W.H. Lucas), p. 43 3. Australia. Commonwealth. Parliamentary Papers. General. Session 1923-1924. v. 4 pp. 1235/1328. "Report of expropriated properties and businesses by Yarwood, Vane and Co., with G. Mason Allard; together with comments thereon by Walter H. Lucas, Chairman of the Expropriation Board, accompanied by a copy of a report by H.W. Simmonds, acting Government Entomologist for Fiji". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1924. pp. 1244/1245 (hereafter "Yarwood, Vane Report, p. ...") 104 operated a recruiting business and labour depot on the Duke of Yorks - declined so rapidly that a receiver was appointed for it thirteen months after the occupation. In April 1916 a branch of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia was established in Rabaul 'as a war measure, pure and simple'1 for 'the convenience of O . the naval and military forces'. It was an event unique in history - 'a bank initiated by a military force in a captured territory, with its transactions and accounts carried out in the enemy currency and monetary system'.^ The latter claim is not quite correct. As will be seen below, legislation banning the use of German currency (admittedly only notes at first) had been introduced a month earlier, but obviously would have taken time to become effective throughout New Guinea. The main purpose of the Bank was to give the Military Administration control of the financial activities of German residents in the colony. Pre-war, three firms - the Company, HSAG and Hernsheim's - at locations in various parts of the Protectorate, had acted as bankers for planters and small traders.^ They received deposits from, and made advances to, customers whom they charged 8% to 10% commission for shipping their produce and making payments on their behalf through agents in Australia and Germany. Using Hamburg as their European base, the companies' business included credit and debit arrangements between the colony and Germany, and the general business of exchange between New Guinea and other countries. Debtors were compelled to purchase goods and seU produce through them at high rates of commission; this was a favourite Burns, Philp practice. They also accepted money on deposit ("at call") giving up to 7% 1234 1. C.C. Faulkner, The Commonwealth Bank of Australia. Sydney, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 1923. p. 221 2. Stewarts handbook of the Pacific Islands 1920. A reliable guide to all the inhabited islands of the Pacific Ocean for traders, tourists and settlers, with a bibliography of island works (by Percy S. Allen). Sydney, McCarron, Stewart, 1920. p. 135 3. Richards papers, p. 2 of an unidentified document (possibly copied from an issue of the Rabaul Record?) 4. see, for example, the description of Hernsheim's banking activities in Commonwealth Law Reports v.34 1923-24. p. 303. Also see the comment about Forsayth's "Trade and Savings Bank" in Former German Possessions, p. 88 105 interest to depositors.* These transactions were very profitable, and after the occupation the only change made to them was to divert business from Germany to Australia where Australian agents replaced German ones. The change was justified on the grounds that to permit trade with Germany would displease the Australian people for although Australia did not undertake naval and military operations against German New Guinea for the sake of gain ... it would be intolerable if after all that had been done and suffered by Australia its citizens were to be asked to stand by, to accept all the troubles and difficulties attendant on the international obligations regarding the government of the country, to incur heavy financial responsibilities, to risk possible losses, qnd to see the profits of trade going into alien hands. It came as a shock to German companies in New Guinea when the Administrator decreed that after 1 May 1916 all banking business had to be done through the Commonwealth Bank. They immediately pointed out to him that most trade was carried out through them, and most small traders were bound to them financially. They pleaded that existing arrangements should not be disturbed too suddenly. As a compromise the companies were allowed to open accounts with the Commonwealth Bank and maintain existing financial arrangements with their customers, but were obliged to supply the Bank with copies of correspondence and invoices connected with the despatch of produce and receipt of goods in exchange. The Australians in New Guinea were pleased with the impact of the Bank for ’So rapidly did it identify itself with the country that it was difficult afterwards to imagine how the business of the Territory had been carried on O without its assistance’. The control of currency was a constant worry to the Military Administration until eased by the Currency and Coinage Proclamation of 11 March 1916 which forbade the use of German paper money. Of initial alarm to planters who anticipated problems in paying deferred wages to labourers, the Proclamation12 1. Faulkner, The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, p. 222 2. Interim & Final Reports (Major), p. 47 3. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 245 106 was clarified a month later to stress that the use of German silver coins was still permissible.1 German currency then in circulation in the colony included that introduced by the Company (50,000 gold marks, 200,035 silver marks, 20,000 bronze or copper coins^) and German Reich notes of 5, 10, 20, 100, 500 and 1,000 marks, with bronze and nickel coins of 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10 pfennigs, £, 1, 2, 3 and 5 silver marks, and 10 and 20 gold marks. "Circulation" is probably not quite accurate as natives were inclined to hoard coins and supplies occasionally ran short. All German currency - Company and Reich - was legal tender in the colony before the Proclamation although gold coins and high denomination notes were rarely seen after it giving rise to the suspicion that planters and other German nationals had caches of these. This eased three days after the first pay of ^5,000 in Australian gold sovereigns to ANMEF troops when it became known that Rabaul Chinese had bought these at a premium of 4 marks to the pound. Another problem then surfaced: it was realised no arrangements had been made for regular supplies of money to pay troops and to prevent dissatisfaction in the ranks the Commonwealth Treasury gave the Military Administrator permission to print 5, 10 and 20M notes payable in coin at the Rabaul Treasury. There was a "decrepit hand press" and type in Rabaul to do this, but no paper. Notes were therefore printed on available blank newsprint, canned food wrappers, envelopes and paper bags using a printing fluid made of boot polish and scarlet ink. Known as "Ben Price" notes after the sergeant detailed to print them, they had a brief life.'* Between 1916 and 1920 proclamations and ordinances forbade the use of German (Company or Reich) paper money, tokens or counters, but permitted the use of silver coins; allowed missions to use tokens or counters; forbade the use of German silver coins; allowed natives to use German silver coins for an additional year; and prohibited persons not having the status of Europeans using earthenware saucepans as the basis of currency or barter in the Siassi Islands (off the coast of mainland 12 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 32 2. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 109 3. C.H. Bertie. For pleasure. Sydney, Angus <5c Robertson, 1937. pp.55/56 107 New Guinea);^- until finally the Currency and Coinage Ordinance of December 1920 repealed previous ordinances and forbade the use of German money after 1 January 1921, other than by natives. What happened to the Mexican and Bolivian silver dollars, and other currencies used by trader/recruiters in the first days of settlement, is not known. Nor is it clear how payment of copra sold on Australian, British or American (i.e. San Francisco) markets was assessed in German marks payable in Rabaul. What is clear, however, is that the Administration's interfering with the most visible sign of a stable government was confusing and unsettling to everyone. Before the occupation, German companies had Australian agents - mainly in Sydney - to purchase and ship goods for them; engage overseers, storemen and clerical staff; and attend to other matters. At the outbreak of war their functions were transferred to various "British" firms which received commissions on purchases for, and sales to, firms in New Guinea; some even made O advances against produce in transit for which interest was charged. This was another profitable arrangement which attracted the attention of Sydney merchants. In January 1916 Administrator Pethebridge was told by Lucas that the Commonwealth Bank had "approved" Burns, Philp as the sole agent in Sydney for handling copra, and any other produce, from New Guinea. Pethebridge sought clarification from the Department of Defence in Melbourne and was advised that the Bank itself had suggested various ways of controlling copra sent to Sydney from New Guinea. These required it to handle accounts in Sydney for the proceeds of copra sales, and to be informed of all copra shipments and the agents to whom they were consigned. Planters or firms sending copra to Sydney should operate on those accounts only, or on orders signed by the representative of the Administrator. Any cash surpluses accruing after the sale of copra and deduction of charges (commission, freight) were to be transferred to the Administration account with the Commonwealth Bank for the Administration to pay the firms in 1 1. it is not clear at whom this was directed. Chinese had achieved equality with Europeans under the Ordinance defining the status of persons of the Chinese, Malay and other races of 26 November 1915. See Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 32 2. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 12 108 Rabaul. The Bank further suggested that 'a firm such as Burns, Philp & Co. be appointed to act as agents for principals in Rabaul' because Lucas was on the spot, and therefore no uneasiness could be felt as to proper conduct or transactions whereas in other circumstances, quite conceivably, every transaction would have to be closely watched, additional responsibility therefore thrown on the Bank1 This masterly piece of obfuscation had to satisfy Pethebridge. One wonders why additional Commonwealth Bank staff - particularly returned exservicemen - were not transferred to Rabaul to assume the "additional responsibility" instead of Burns, Philp being favoured yet again. The speed with which Burns, Philp moved to re-establish itself - first in shipping, and then as the major commercial force - in New Guinea has been O discussed by Hopper who traces the rise of W.H. Lucas from his position as the firm's Pacific Islands shipping manager to his appointment as Chairman of the Expropriation Board and Technical Adviser to the Australian government. Hopper suggests that there was an unusually close association between Lucas and the Australian government; even Murray had commented on his 'weird sort of puli'.^ James Burns was friendly with the Australian Governor-General and the firm was in frequent and close contact with Ministers and officials of the Australian government as correspondence in the firm's Sydney archives shows. Whether this resulted in any form of special treatment is beyond the scope of this thesis, but there is no doubt Burns, Philp enjoyed advantages in New Guinea that other firms did not. For example, it was not until 1916 that the much smaller Sydney firm of Nelson & Robertson was able to establish an office in the premises of the Rabaul Hotel.^ It was no threat to Burns, Philp which had already obtained the agencies 123 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 63 2. Hopper, Kicking out the Hun, pp. 48/52 3. Francis West. Selected letters of Hubert Murray. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1970. p. 99 4. Pacific Islands Monthly, February 1955 109 of HSAG and Hernsheim & Co.1 as mentioned earlier. Trading prospects with New Guinea for other Sydney firms were excellent due in part to the Military Administration's ineffectiveness and hesitancy in following up some of its own legislation. For example, Administrator Pethebridge issued a regulation in February 1917 detailing a sliding scale of payments for copra traders on the GazeUe Peninsula which provided that where the Sydney price for copra was less than 723 a ton traders would be paid 79 a ton; where it was between 723 and 726 a ton the payment would be 710 a ton in the proportion of 7L to 73 a ton and so on. The prices were for copra bought by exporters from small traders who were required to pay their native suppliers initially 79.4.0 a ton, soon reduced to 78.12.0 a ton. The regulation was virtually ignored and was repealed in 1918. In April 1921 - the month before civil administration of New Guinea commenced - the Australian government established the position of New Guinea Trade Agent in Sydney and so reduced the business of private agents there, and of Australian firms in New Guinea, to a certain degree. All requirements of the Administration, and the sale of copra and other produce on its behalf (and subsequently that of the Expropriation Board), was to be handled by the agent. Trading The imagined glamour of plantations was equalled by the aura surrounding trading. A Burns, Philp travel brochure lyricised that To anyone with imagination the business of a trading company will be found to be as romantic as anything connected with the moated granges and ruined castles of the past. Reality was much different, as the Military Administration found in trying to maintain the infrastructure of trade in Rabaul. It was at this point that the first doubts about the value of the colony to Australia should have occurred. Superficially in fine shape with its visible wealth of coconut plantations, it was dependent on essential facilities - and expensive ones at that - which simply did 1. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 292 2. Picturesque Travels no. 4. Burns, Philp, Sydney, 1914. p. 76 110 not stand up to close examination. For example, the coal wharf at Matupit - at any time a flimsy structure built of unsheathed piles of inferior timber - had deteroriated to a dangerous stage; Hernsheim's and the Company's wharves were considered frail and small with shallow water; and the HSAG wharf was small, old and with a limited life although it had an excellent depth of water. The wharf built by the NDL in 1905 needed urgent maintenance as a section of the goods shed floor at the deep water end was sinking. Temporary repairs to it, estimated at 73,000, required pile-driving machinery borrowed from the Papuan government. Full repairs were calculated at between 78,000 - 712,000, with an estimated annual maintenance cost of 74,000.* Coastal shipping was in a parlous state: the most serviceable vessel was the iron-hulled Meklong which had been designed for and built to operate on the Meklong River in Burma. She was capable of steaming seven knots in smooth water; if any sea was running her speed became O 'uncertain'. As a result of this lack of reliable coastal shipping copra accumulated at outstations and isolated plantations with a corresponding effect on trade. In the main centres the chief competitors for trade copra and coconuts were the Chinese. Part of a trader's margin of profit came from bartering goods for copra; Lyng told how Chinese traders from Rabaul exchanged 'cheap prints, O knives, mirrors etc. for copra'. Vuia told why Chinese were popular with Tolais: Chinese were in a way one of us and they sold us the goods we wanted and were oriented to our way of life. Moreover Chinese employed Tolai to work for them and we felt we were equal to them in our way of life.4 The goods were supplied to Chinese traders by German importers who were able to control traders' profits by their pricing policy until shortly after the occupation1 23 1. Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 6 2. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 200 3. Lyng, Our New Possessions, p. 200 4. Vuia, Rabaul. 14 April 1986 Ill when legislation raised Chinese to a status equivalent to that of Europeans.1 This gave them opportunities for business contacts with firms in Australia willing to extend credit to them (which German firms would not) and so bypass German importers. To prevent a price war developing between Chinese traders and German planters, new legislation introduced on 3 March 1917 set rates for trading on the Gazelle Peninsula at one shilling for thirty-six coconuts or twenty-four pounds of green copra or twelve pounds of dry copra. It not only regulated the rate of exchange of copra and coconuts but also the price of articles traded to natives. Any immediate benefit to villagers was incidental although it did lead to a more careful licensing of sub-traders and limited the chances of price competition. A year later the Administration advised that trading in copra was to be in accordance with the Regulation of the Governor of German New Guinea of 14 March 1903,^ yet the Sale and Disposition of Copra Ordinance 1920 prescribed that the sale and barter of copra was to take place only at leased trading stations, or on freehold or leasehold estate owned or leased by one of the parties to the sale, or his principal. This was to control the influence of Chinese on the copra trade and prevent their continued leasing of German owned trading stations which were to be expropriated, put up for tender and - it was hoped - won by Australian returned servicemen. On 25 February 1920 the Trading Stations Leases Ordinance 1920 strengthened existing legislation by prohibiting the granting of leases for trading stations.^ Although temporarily checked by this legislation the Chinese found ways around it so successfully that the Administrator soon found it necessary to place a "Public Warning" in the Government Gazette of 16 August 1920 setting out penalties for 'the practice prevalent among Chinese of attempting to give bribes1 23 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 25, says that the real reason was to bring them within the jurisdiction of the Central Court and the administration of the Department of the Judge, apparently to deal with bribes. 2. Government Gazette v.IV no. 3, March 1917. p. 33 3. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 37 4. ibid., p. 39 112 to officials in return for services in matters connected with the performance of their duty'.1 This supplemented the Gratuities Ordinance 1916 which had been issued to warn members of the occupation force of the consequences of accepting a bribe. Between 1917 and 1920 legislation, specifically aimed at the Chinese, was passed to control trading in copra. It comprised: 14 April 1917 - trading in Copra Ordinance 1917 (repealing Order of 20 February 1917 and substituting additional provisions); 20 March 1917 - Closing of Stores Order 1917 (regulating hours of trade for storekeepers in Rabaul); 31 March 1917 - Control of Chinese Trade Order 1917 (Officer in Charge of the Department of Customs to have control of all wholesale importing, exporting and dealings by Chinese; a specified share of the profits of importing to be forwarded to the Administrator); 29 January 1920 - Sale and Disposition of Copra Ordinance 1920 (Sales, bartering, etc. of copra to take place only at leased trading stations or on freehold or leasehold estate owned or leased by one of the parties to the sale or his principals); and 25 February 1920 - Trading Stations Leases Ordinance 1920 (prohibiting the granting of leases for trading stations). In spite of the occasional hindrance imposed by these Ordinances the takeover of the village copra and coconut trade by the Chinese grew more O pronounced. 'One needs only go for a drive from Rabaul to Kokopo or along the North Coast', wrote Lyng, 'and he will in less than an hour pass a dozen Chinese traders living mostly in miserable huts ... but always with some trays of copra 12 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 25 2. ibid., pp. 32, 37, 39 3. Herbertshohe was renamed Kokopo ("the landslide" in Kuanua) in 1916. 113 drying in the sun’.* Although some Europeans scorned the influence of Chinese on trading, the firms found them useful in discouraging opposition to themselves. Lyng tells how a planter who refused to buy from one of the major firms was brought into line: One planter ... started to make a plantation on the old lines some years ago. Of course he could not buy his kanaka merchandise from, or sell his copra to, more than one of the rivalling wholesale firms, the consequence being that one of them put a Chinese tradqr on one side of him, and one on the other side. In July 1917 the Australian government introduced the "substitute" system which so limited the number of Chinese, Malays and Japanese entering O New Guinea that it almost ceased. This was partly due to the extension of the White Australia policy to New Guinea, but was mainly a move to curb Chinese business competition. Contract-expired Chinese tradesmen, engaged to build the new capital of Rabaul and who had been unable to return to China because of the war, formed business alliances with other Chinese who had acted as traders for German companies. Through hard work, skill and an unfailing ability to sense which European hand - military or civilian - was receptive to bribes they became a potent trading group. In alarm, the Administration introduced the Non-Indigenous Persons (Amendment) Ordinance 1920 to prevent Chinese immigrants establishing themselves in trade, but it was too late; the Chinese were well organised and their trading monopoly was almost complete. The Chinese monopoly balanced that which Burns, Philp enjoyed over shipping. Had that firm managed to gain control of the native copra trade, acquire many of the larger and potentially more profitable plantations (as eventually happened), as well as controlling coastal and overseas shipping, New Guinea would have been little better them its fiefdom. Administrator Pethebridge 123 1. Lyng, Our New Possessions, p. 57 2. Rabaul Record v.l no. 6, 1 August 1916. p. 8 3. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 85 (also see Cahill, The Chinese in Rabaul 1914-1960. pp. 25/27) 114 had earlier objected to 'having all shipping business and commercial agencies in hand (sic) of one firm'* and had won his point.' Pethebridge's successor, Johnston, wrote strongly of the way produce was carried to Australia only in "British" ships: o "We are compelled", he said, "to purchase all our requirements from Australia" and urged the re-establishment of shipping links between New Guinea and the East to break the monopoly of "British" shipping, and reduce excessive freight profiteering. Johnston outlined to the Australian government how rice from Singapore or Hong Kong was carried 2,000 miles past Rabaul to Sydney, unloaded, bought from a merchant, loaded onto a Burns, Philp ship and carried 2,000 miles back to Rabaul - all at 50 shillings a ton. Produce from Rabaul destined for European markets was transshipped to Sydney and sent on 'by the most expensive Q or longest route'. Johnston urged that conditions which might have been necessary during the war should be lifted and sufficient freedom given to the colony to take advantage of the quickest and best means to markets rather than keep it restricted 'in order to find profits for Sydney merchants'.^ However, the Sydney merchants triumphed, and "British" shipping continued to move cargoes between New Guinea and Australia. It was thought that after the war there would be several shipping lines operating a New Guinea service, including a Russian line as Russia was 'one of the C greatest consumers of copra'. But foreign shipping lines were not encouraged although in 1920 some competition to Burns, Philp was provided by the Osaka Mercantile Steamship Company Limited with a cargo service Japan-Rabaul- Sydney and other Australian ports. Burns, Philp then operated a five-weekly Sydney-Rabaul-Sydney service with the s.s. Melusia; a similar five-weekly service 12345 1. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 64 2. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), p. 70 3. ibid. 4. ibid. 5. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence M.A. O'Callaghan), p. 85 6. Stewart's Handbook of the Pacific Islands 1920. p. 129 115 with the s.s. Morinda and Marsina included Brisbane, Cairns and Papuan ports (Port Moresby and Samarai). All Burns, Philp services were supported by a mail subsidy from the Australian government.1 Murray had recommended in 1916 that the Australian Government Shipping Line should take over the carriage of cargo between Australia and New Guinea without delay. This was not done, and he was forced to admit that no other Australian firm could then provide the shipping necessary to keep the colony supplied and move its copra. Having assumed control of New Guinea, banned the transmission of legitimate profits to Germany, and acknowledged an Australian monopoly on o shipping servicing it, the Military Administration turned its attention to the taxation system of the colony with the aim of financing its administration by locally generated revenue. German Business Tax (Gewerbesteuer) had been assessed by a Taxation Board (Einschatzungs Korn mission) and was payable annually by all persons carrying on business at the rate of 1.5% of gross proceeds. Planters producing 150 tons of copra a year (which then sold for 73,000) were assessed to pay 745 tax, while those operating a plantation trade store which sold 7500 worth of trade O goods a year attracted an additional tax of 77.10.0. The disturbance to trade caused by the break in regular shipping services necessitated an increase in the rate of business tax within a few weeks of the occupation to generate money for circulation. It was levied as a percentage of individual gross turnover, ranging from 1% on a turnover up to 4,000M to 3% where turnover exceeded 1,000,000M. In February 1915 the Military Administrator introduced an Order under which tax was to be paid by everyone at a prescribed flat rate depending on annual turnover. The new rate varied from 50M on a turnover up to 4,000M, to 5,000M on 12 1. the subsidy for the German postal service between the Far East, Australia and the German possessions in the South Pacific for the fifteen years from October 1914 had been set at 1,300,000M. (Interstate Commission Report, p. 49) Note that the subsidy received by Burns, Philp was paid annually. 2. which Burns, Philp held with little passenger competition until the commencement of the China Navigation Line service in 1952. 3. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 20 116 a turnover exceeding 200,000M. In January 1916 the rate of tax was changed again, this time to 1.5% on gross turnover with an additional 1% tax on turnover in excess of ^20,000;* and was declared payable upon all trading other than in copra. Business in the colony was strong enough for a Business Tax Board to be appointed that December to regulate the incidence and assessment of the tax.^ While the Administration concentrated on the Business Tax the customs tariff remained unaltered until May 1916 when a new tariff - expressed in "British" money and units, but otherwise differing little from the German tariff - was imposed. Copra was taxed at 10 shillings a ton, doubled in February 1917 and q increased in October that year to 25 shillings a ton° reflecting the rising price for copra caused by increasing demand as the war in Europe ground on. The tax of 25 shillings a ton remained constant, although Murray thought it should have been reduced to 20 shillings,^ and a temporary supertax - designed to meet costs incurred during the transition from Military to Civil Administration - was suggested. Based on the price realised at Rabaul the supertax was to be imposed only while prices were high, for it was generally admitted that a price of V25 a ton for copra at Rabaul would give planters and traders a very fair margin of profit. The supertax therefore was to be assessed on average annual prices for copra5 increasing in accordance with the prices paid per ton for copra at Rabaul; if the price was V25 -730 a ton the supertax would be assessed at 5 shillings a ton, if V30 - Y35 a ton it would be 10 shillings, and so on. The introduction of the Business Tax Board, as well as the supertax, excited no protest from planters and both moves were clear indications of the prosperity of the colony during the military occupation. 1234 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 11 2. ibid. 3. ibid. 4. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), p. 64 5. Interim & Final Reports (Major), p. 40 117 Additional revenue was brought in by the native head tax (Jahreskopfsteuer) of 5M annually paid by all adult male natives capable of work, living in districts proclaimed taxable. Exceptions were granted to those under indenture, sick or otherwise incapacitated for work, police and village officials (luluai, tultul, dokta boi), teachers, students at mission schools (there were no government schools), and those who had four children by one wife.^ The tax was collected by the head men of villages who received a commission of 10% of the total collected and therefore had an obvious interest in encouraging villagers to engage in an income producing occupation. Natives employed for at least ten months of a year by non-natives, or by a native who paid business tax, were exempt from forced labour (Frohnarbeit). Those who could not, or would not, pay the head tax were compelled to work for the Administration (i.e. "forced" labour)^ which freely commuted payment of head tax into full employment during the first fifteen months of the occupation because of a noticeable drop in native copra production.^ No change was made to the rate of head tax during the occupation; the Administration's policy was that 'the natives were to be treated with patience, tact and fairness, and were to be made to understand that in return for the payment of the tax they had the right to receive at the hands of the administration protection, medical attention, medicine and facilities for trading, and that, generally, they were to look to the government to settle their grievances in a fair and impartial manner'.^ In newly opened Districts the head tax was introduced gradually 'so that the natives may become accustomed by easy stages to their new obligations'J and in more settled areas it was officially regarded as a stimulus to the development of cash cropping. In the tax years from 31 August 1915 to 30 June 1921 the head tax (in round figures) rose from ^2,838 to^L5,520® which indicates strong commercial growth during this period. The average annual 12345 1. Reed, The making of modern New Guinea, p. 179 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 10 3. Lyng, Our New Possessions, p. 237 4. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 304 5. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 175 6. see Annual Reports for the period. 118 return for the tax of just under 713,000 was almost 9% of the average annual revenue for the period of 7145,000. After January 1916 exemptions from head tax were granted sparingly, and then mainly to mission trainees and students. Despite the amount of revenue reused within New Guinea it was realised that a subsidy would be required from Australia for some years for public works and general development within New Guinea.1 During the seven years of the Military Administration the total revenue of 7883,604 was used in maintaining the colony.^ The total occupation costs were over 7912,000 but by using the defence budget to pay military salaries and associated expenses of the Military Administration, the principle that a dependency must, as far as possible, pay for itself was deferred. Together with the high copra prices received during most of the occupation, this concealed the fact that in reality New Guinea was a poor country and created a false impression of its worth. This was particularly unfortunate for it occurred during a boom in world trade in 1919/1920 when there was a rush to stock up on goods that had been in short supply during the war. Prices were uncharacteristically high and produced easy profits instead of these being earned through normal expansion. New Guinea’s dependency on a single crop O had caused concern early in the Military Administration, and the need for a Director of Agriculture 'to encourage the cultivation of many products besides coconuts, such as cocoa, rubber, fibres, coffee, tobacco, arrowroot, kapok, sugar, cinchona, spices, oils, cotton and bananas'^ was considered urgent. There were many experimental plots of these crops - all of which had been planted during the German Administration - still flourishing on Matanatar plantation and the Kerevat Agricultural Farm on the Gazelle Peninsula, as well as in various parts of the New Guinea mainland. Murray had noted that 'The trade of the German colonies has never represented more than a very small fraction of Germany's total trade: in 123 1. Military Occupation Report, p. 19 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 11 3. Interim & Final Reports (Major), p. 32 4. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 21 119 1913 one-half of one per cent of her imports and one-half of one per cent of her exports1,'*' yet of the 102,000,000M Germany poured into her South Seas o Possessions most would have gone to New Guinea, so obviously the potential for return was seen to be there. Frustrated by its commitment to the conditions of capitulation, and by a lack of interest from Australia once the colony had been occupied, the Military Administration was unable to change matters radically. Two weeks after the Armistice, the Australian government considered a proposal put forward by Burns, Philp to form a company to buy all the New Guinea properties for about V2,500,000. A provisional prospectus prepared for the company - to be called British Australian Pacific Estates Ltd - stated it was essential that the 'German O element' in New Guinea be 'entirely deported'0 so it was clear the main attraction of the colony was the opportunity for competition free trading. But the Australian government maintained the status quo until advice of the Mandate was received and then, with a rush, it decided to expropriate German properties.123 1. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), p. 81 2. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix F. p. 1 (in 1917 an un-named German authority had estimated that by 1926 the German Pacific Islands colonies should be able to supply 90,000 tons of copra a year - one-third of Germany's requirements. Former German Possessions, p. 47) " 3. Buckley <5c Klugman, "The Australian presence in the pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 85 CHAPTER THREE The early Board years 1920 - 1923 120 The mechanics of expropriation1 The acceptance of the mandate for New Guinea by the King of England for and on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia was authorised by the Imperial Act 9 & 10 Geo.V.c.33 (31st July 1919) called the Treaty of Peace Act 1919. Under Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace which came into force on 10 January 1920, Germany renounced in favour of the principal allied and associated powers all rights and titles over her overseas possessions. Following announcement of the Treaty of Peace conditions, an Order of the Military Administrator in Rabaul made it necessary for any German in New Guinea who owned a vessel of five tons or more to enter into a bond of yiOO as a guarantee that the vessel would remain within the territorial limits of the colony.^ This was to prevent Germans fleeing New Guinea with their portable valuables and was an indication of what was in store for them. The Australian government prepared legislation in anticipation of the mandate, and in September 1920 passed the New Guinea Act 1920 authorising the Governor-General of Australia to accept the mandate for New Guinea when issued under the covenant of the League of Nations. In the Act it was declared, among other things, that ’the Territories and islands constituting New Guinea are a Territory under the O authority of the Commonwealth by the name of the Territory of New Guinea' and the colony became known to Australians as "the Territory". One would have thought that with the formalities over, Australia would hasten to inspect the prize. In mid-1920 a visit of parliamentarians to Rabaul was 'in contemplation ... to see something of the islands over which the mandates (sic) have been granted' but the Prime Minister advised that the visit was postponed. The government then proceeded with more important business: 'two Bills relating to industrial . 4 matters'. 2341 1. based on Yarwood, Vane Report, pp. 3/6 2. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, p. 318 3. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 6 4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, v.93 1920. p. 3791 121 In order to give effect in New Guinea to any decision of the Australian government to retain or liquidate the property of German nationals, the Expropriation Ordinance 1920 was introduced in Rabaul by the Military Administrator on 1 September 1920. It provided for the liquidation of the properties of German firms, companies and persons, and of estates of deceased i German nationals. Section 4 of the Ordinance provided that upon publication of £ declaration in the New Guinea Gazette, all property of the declared companies, firms, persons or estates would forthwith vest in the Public Trustee. The Treaty of Peace Regulations 1920-1922 contained provisions for vesting as at 10 January 1920 in the Public Trustee (and, by subsequent amendment to the Expropriation Ordinance in July 1921, the Custodian of Expropriated Property) all property rights and interests (i.e. personal, as well as business) in New Guinea of German nationals, and charged the net proceeds of their sale, liquidation or other dealings to the compensation payments provided by the Peace Treaty. It was subsequently advised by the Australian Solicitor-General that net profits earned by a plantation from the sale of copra between the date of expropriation and the sale of the plantation were not required to be credited to Germany; similarly any losses incurred in the production and sale of copra from an expropriated plantation could not affect the amount to be credited to Germany through its subsequent sale.1 Under s.4 of the Expropriation Ordinance the vesting of property in the Custodian took effect from 10 January 1920 - the date the Treaty of Peace came into force. Germans in New Guinea protested that this was a retrospective grasping of profits, but it was legally correct and entitled the Australian government to all income, profits and increments in value earned by, or arising out of, or accruing O since that date. Power was given to the Custodian to sell any property retained by or vested in him and provisions were made for the methods and terms of sale. The first Custodian appointed was Mr Percy Deane, Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department, who held the office until March 1923 when it was 9 transferred to Mr J.R. Collins, Secretary to the Treasury. Control of expropriated properties thus shifted from the Prime Minister's Department to the12 1. Auditor-General's Report 1927/1928. p. 85 2. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 5 3. Faulkner, The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, pp. 230/231 122 Treasury at a time when there was severe overseas criticism of Australia's handling of its Mandate - this is discussed in Chapter Four. The Expropriation Ordinance authorised the Military Administrator to appoint a Board of three or more persons to manage and otherwise deal in whole or part with the property vested in the Custodian, though without power to dispose of any land, or any interest arising under a mortgage until it had been satisfactorily established that there was no British involvement. A Board, known as the Expropriation Board (hereafter "the Board"), was appointed with W.H. Lucas as chairman and executive manager, C.I.H. Campbell,1 manager of the Commonwealth Bank branch in Rabaul, and C.J.W. Gillan, Treasurer of the O Administration, as its first members. Campbell's appointment 'identified the 9 Commonwealth Bank more closely with the control of affairs in the Territory', for the Bank was subject to direction by the Australian government, while Gillan's appointment strengthened its local control. Gillan resigned on 4 August 1921, and Campbell on 1 April 1922, both to return to Australia. F.R. Jolley (former accountant/manager for Forsayth Gesellschaft, owner of Raulawat plantation until 1915, former British Consul in Rabaul and unsuccessful applicant for the position of Administration Treasurer) was appointed business manager of the Board on its inception, and subsequently deputy chairman and deputy executive manager on 18 October 1920; from 12 February 1923 he continued as deputy chairman. Others who held positions on the Board at various times included W.C. Harvey (later New Guinea Trade Agent in Sydney), and J.T. Pinner who was appointed chief accountant and member on 1 March 1921. By 1924 membership had firmed into that of Lucas, Jolley and Pinner. Lucas was also appointed Technical Adviser to the Australian government on New Guinea affairs and spent most of his time in Melbourne, close to the Custodian and the government. The responsibility for day to day affairs of the Board was left to Jolley who, consequently, occupied a very important position in the colony.12 1. who subsequently purchased Raua plantation, Bougainville. 2. Yarwood, Vane Report, pp. 5/6 3. Faulkner, The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, pp. 230/231. 123 The prize It had been clear to former Governor Hahl that Given the close fusion of business and politics in Australia we would not be wrong to expect ... that Mr Hughes and Mr Lucas will retire from the scene of their disastrous activity only when the booty is firmly in their pockets. We must therefore prepare to receive in the homeland the 680 German colonists of New Guinea as poor refugees during the summer, probably the last who had to endure persecution and banishment for the sake of their German name. The booty was substantial. At the end of the war the values placed by their owners on major German companies in New Guinea were; Neu Guinea Kompagnie f l , 280,000 HSAG 500,000 )cn nan2 Hernsheim & Co. 260,000" The companies were mainly involved in plantations, or ancillary enterprises involving plantations (shipping, recruiting, supplies and equipment). Wahlen advised that the following claims were made against the German government; Neu Guinea Kompagnie DM42,200,000 Wahlen Gesellschaft 45,000,000 Hernsheim & Co. 13,000,000^ There is no accurate way of assessing a present day value of these claims which were, obviously, significant. How the claims were received is discussed below. 12 1. Stewart Firth, "Albert Hahl: Governor of German New Guinea" in Papua New Guinea portraits - the expatriate experience. James Griffin, editor. Canberra, Australian National University, 1978. p. 46 (in June 1917 the German South Sea Association petitioned the Bundesrat to recover Germany’s Pacific colonies without any hope of success. Former German Possessions, p. 71) 2. Firth, "Captain Hernsheim". p. 115 3. H.R. Wahlen, Hamburg, to K. Saxby, President of the Rabaul Historical Society, July 1962. 124 The general policy of the Board was to dispose of any surplus plant, furniture, or other movable assets not required in the conduct of its business. This was an enthusiastic grabbing of the spoils, seen to be permitted by clause (i) of Article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles which asserted that Germany undertakes to compensate her nationals in respect of the sale or retention of their property, rights or interests in allied or associated states. O The total area of "enemy" property in German New Guinea at the time of expropriation is difficult to state with certainty. A New Guinea wide assessment of property, including that of the various missions, published in the Report of the Australian government’s Royal Commission on New Guinea in 1919, gives conflicting figures within the sub-Reports. It would seem that there was no clear idea what property consisted of, or its value, for each sub-Report used a different method for recording property types (e.g. plantation or business/commercial), O areas and value. A figure given for the total area of "enemy" property in private ownership at the time of expropriation (January 1920) of 294,979 acres^ is more than double that given for the planted area of 144,979 acres'^ reported by the Royal Commission which gives no figure for the area held (but not planted) with which to compare. The following table from the Royal Commission’s Report is therefore merely an indication of the companies, missions and individuals holding land in New Guinea at the time of expropriation: 1 1. Interim & Final Reports (Murray). Appendix B, p. 79 2. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), p. 75; (Agree) pp. 24, 26 3. Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 19 4. Cobcroft Report, p. 31 5. Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 19 125 owner area planted (acres) (acres) New Guinea Company 368,118 21,962 HSAG 62,271 9,985 Hernsheim <5c Co. 8,549 6,698 Rheinische Mission 2,897 740 Neuendettelsau Mission 10,411 1,727 Liebenzell Mission 25 25 Methodist Mission 5,387 741 Marist Mission 4,087 1,099 Capuchin Mission 1,159 618 Sacred Heart Mission 39,536 5,930 Catholic Mission of Holy Ghost 17,203 5,691 150 smaller planters & companies \ (mainly German) 174,281 86,831 21 Chinese planters on New Ireland 3,255 2,932 697,179 144,979 source: Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 19 The sites of established plantations had generally been well chosen, but some of the post-1914 plantings (particularly in the Baining area) were 'so obviously unsuited to coconut cultivation, or for that matter cultivation of any description, that it is most difficult to understand how any one with any experience could have planted them'.-*- Perhaps it was done in the expectation that compensation following expropriation would be assessed at a rate of so much a palm, or so much a planted acre. But, as the Germans were to find out, this was a futile hope. "Kicking out the Hun"^ The speed with which the Board moved to take over German property indicates that selections had been made, and lists prepared, well in advance of legislation allowing expropriation. Eight principal German companies were prescribed the day the Expropriation Ordinance came into effect and two weeks later other companies and firms, a number of Germans absent (or who had been deported) from New Guinea, and the estates of a number who were deceased were 1 1. Cobcroft Report, p. 32 2. borrowed from the title of Hopper's thesis. 126 also prescribed. To prevent Germans walking off their jobs once they or the companies employing them were prescribed, s.14 of the Expropriation Ordinance required them, under threat of heavy punishment, to continue working for twelve months to prevent interruption to business, and to allow 'the necessary stocktaking and preparation of accounts, etc.''*’ because 'Australia had no population to draw o upon with any knowledge of plantation work'. There was a naive charm about the way plantations were taken over by the Board. Planters said they were served with the following notice; The bearer, Mr...... is taking charge of your plahtation on behalf of the Expropriation Board. Please check and hand over all/ stocks on your plantation, count coconut trees, usw., usw. Trusting you will give every assistance in your power to Mr...... ? Not surprisingly, Germans resented their compulsory retention on plantations, and, not unnaturally, they resented the loss of their plantations and property. It was alleged by their Australian replacements that many Germans created difficulties, refusing to assist or instruct them and making serious trouble between native labourers and the new Australian overseers. Their actions considerably hampered the Board, particularly during its first twelve months in existence. The Board later claimed that they also let their plantations run down after expropriation and while waiting to be replaced, and used this as an excuse for its own initial poor performance.^ To reinforce the powers of the Expropriation Ordinance, a Deportation Ordinance was issued by the Military Administration in April 1921. Once a planter's property had been expropriated and he had been relieved by a Board employee he was deported, unless he had appealed against prescription. There was no other appeal against deportation. Lyng raised an interesting point in saying that some Germans would have taken Australian citizenship to retain their 1 1. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 9 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.103 1923. p. 452 3. ibid., p. 456 4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 4977 127 properties and remain in New Guinea'*' but this was not considered by the Australian government. Those who appealed were permitted to remain for the time being in possession of their property where the Administrator considered this would not prejudice the outcome of their appeal. Those unlikely to challenge prescription (e.g. employees of German firms) were repatriated to Germany at the expense of the Australian government; most had left by early 1922. The determination of the Australian government to get rid of German planters as quickly as possible meant that private planters were, financially, worse off than the employees of the big companies. The latter were allowed to take with them any savings they had accumulated after 10 January 1920 (i.e. the date to which the seizure of German property was backdated under the Expropriation Ordinance 1920). But private planters were not paid anything after that date for wages, or for the enhanced value of their plantations brought about through improvements they made with profits they were unable to remit to Germany. In some cases O planters received no wages for nearly two years. However, German nationals in New Guinea awaiting repatriation were paid a living allowance of 20s a day for O each adult, and 15s a day for each child; subsequently reduced to 15s and 7s6d at a time when the daily living allowance for the chairman of the Board was 3Os.'* Payment of the daily allowance to Germans ceased completely on 30 November 1921. The adequacy of the German's living allowance was queried in the Australian Parliament where the Prime Minister (S.M. Bruce) assured the House that it was 'ample for a man to live in reasonable and decent comfort in Rabaul'.5 Conditions in the hotels in Rabaul and Kokopo quickly became uncomfortably crowded with plantation owners, and their families, accustomed to spacious residences and an abundance of servants. The loss of face planters and their families suffered in their drop from the apex of the colony's society embittered many Germans, and embarrassed many Australians.1 1. Lyng, Island Films, p. 221 2. Series A1781 item A217. Policy File Part IV (1924-1925). letter from expropriated planters to Prime Minister. 20.11.22. 3. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 6 4. ibid., p. 9 5. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.103 1923. p. 927 128 It was planned that each expropriated planter would be given a certificate by the Board detailing portable assets (i.e. personal items) expropriated, a description of buildings and plants, the area/s of his plantation/s which were planted or unplanted, and the number and ages of palms. Representatives of the German companies claimed each mature palm was worth £1.17.6* but a valuation formula based on the number of coconut palms, production figures and the area in which the plantation was located, was used to assess the reserve price for each plantation. The valuation formula was based on the Merton scale by which The value of an ordinary plantation with 50 trees to the acre, in the eighth year, is set down at 11/- per tree or £27 per acre. The value of a good plantation of the same age is put at 13/6 per tree or £33.15.0 per acre. These Are ... German valuations of German plantations. Because Lucas and representatives of the companies could not agree 'upon a basis O of valuation' values were not included in the certificates of assets given to each planter to present to the German government for compensation. One reason suggested for this was the price of copra which, just before the plantations were taken over by the Board in 1920 was £40 a ton, had dropped to £18.10.0 by 1921.^ Lucas was said officially to value a palm according to its age** but privately thought the value depended on the current price of copra. The Germans felt the rate should depend on the productive potential of the palm, which came part of the way to meeting Lucas's official valuation rate. Only a few private planters had adequate and up to date book records of their assets - the number of palms planted and their ages shown on an estate planting map, household furniture, 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/1922. p. 125 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1 item 23/6377 "Valuation of coconut plantations". Letter of 10 March 1923 from Staniforth Smith (Administrator and Director of Agriculture, Papua) to the Prime Minister. 3. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 7 4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.103 1923. p. 928 ‘ 5. ibid., p. 455 129 boats, plant, livestock - and received proper certificates for these. A "memo entry" was made for the others in the Board's books to record their assets at a nominal figure of 71 in each case. The manager, or the remaining representative of each company, was given a certified statement prior to departure showing the book value of his company's assets and liabilities at Treaty date. The firm's books remained in the possession of the Custodian, and the records of all the companies were incorporated into the "more modern system" of the Expropriation Board's accounts as from 1 July 1921.* There was little point in placing values on anything as inflation in postwar Germany made each certificate 'a valueless cheque drawn on a bankrupt O government'. Many planters who had been wealthy men in New Guinea were 'not O worth a fiver' in Berlin. Townsend cites the ease of one German family which received the equivalent in Berlin of 721 Australian for a plantation valued at 717,000 Australian.^ Wahlen claimed that German planters from New Guinea received only 7% of the market value of their plantations from the German government-while full compensation was paid to industrialists in the Ruhr Valley whose businesses were vital to the rehabilitation of postwar Germany.^ H. Andeker, the owner of Singaua plantation (near Finschhafen on the New Guinea mainland), was given a certificate by the Board that his plantation was worth 740,000; the German government gave him 7100. Even those living in Germany suffered; the German father of a British born son (who resided in England with his 1. Auditor-General's Report 1927/1928. p. 29 2. J.R. Burton, "The Australian mandate in New Guinea" in Studies in Australian Affairs, edited by Persia Campbell, et. al. Melbourne. Macmillan, 1928. p. 221 3. Lyng, Island Films, p. 224 4. Townsend, District Officer, p. 28 5. H.R. Wahlen, Hamburg, to F.P. Archer, Rabaul. 19.6.64. Archer papers. 6. Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra. Series A1781 item 217. Policy file Part IV 1924-25. 130 mother) was scarcely able 'to eke out a bare subsistence'* in Germany where he had over ^80,000 in bank deposits. It was not until 1926 that the Weimar government of Germany redressed some of the wrongs its colonisers had suffered. That year, Hernsheim & Co., like other former German Pacific firms, invested in Dutch Indonesia using a war compensation loan of 912,000 O Reichsmarks. Quite apart from the financial ability of the German government to meet the compensation claims of its colonial nationals there was, allegedly, little sympathy in Germany for them. The interim report of a British committee into ex-enemy persons "in necessitous circumstances" claimed that Many cases have been reported to the Committee of refusal by the German Government to recognise claims for compensation from German nationals resident out of Germany or not of German birth, while the extent to which any claims brought to the notice of the Committee have been recognised in Germany has been a mere fraction of the total amount. In January 1921 an auction was held in Rabaul to dispose of movable assets "left behind" by deported or absent Germans, and the proceeds of yi,479.3.6 were credited to their accounts. In November and December further auctions of the effects of Germans either in New Guinea or represented by their lawyers were held, and the proceeds - this time only y_677.3.0 - were similarly credited. It was a buyer's market. Some Australian planters speak today of the "fine silver" and "beautiful table linen" they acquired. As the accounts of planters with the major German firms had been frozen by the Military Administration, few were able to bid at auctions of their personal possessions. There was considerable diversity in the financial status of expropriated Germans awaiting deportation - some were barely able to buy back wedding presents, yet others allegedly gambled in gold, 1 1. Interim Report of the Committee appointed by the Board of Trade to advise upon applications for the release of property of ex-enemy aliens in necessitous circumstances. (Command Paper 1687). London, HMSQ, 1922. p. 8 (hereafter "Interim Board of Trade Report, p. ...") 2. Firth, "Captain Hernsheim". p. 115 3. Interim Board of Trade Report, p. 9 131 diamonds and 'Bavarian 100 mark notes'* in Chinatown. In its issue of 22 July O 1921 Stead's Review described as 'refined cruelty' the way Germans were robbed of their property, both personal and corporate, and driven out of New Guinea. Some embarrassment was later felt about the zeal of the Board for 'To put the boot into people when they are down to it as the Expropriation Board is doing is O not British', Burton remarked how 'Many of us as we faced some of the individual cases felt ashamed of such action'^ but Lucas considered that 'the Huns ... have been remarkably well treated'. On 23 March 1921 (i.e. about six weeks before civilian administration commenced in New Guinea) the first list of prescribed residents in New Guinea was published in the New Guinea Gazette. Further lists of prescribed companies, firms, estates and persons were published almost monthly until December 1921, and then in July, August and September 1922. The following summary shows the total up to September 1922; 1 Companies and firms 48 Individuals In Territory at date of prescription 275 Residing outside the Territory and deported 256 Estates of deceased persons 46 577 Total 625 source; Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 6 1. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 250 fn.3 2. Stead's Review, 22 July 1921 3. Lyng, Island Films, p. 216 4. Burton, "The Australian mandate in New Guinea", p. 221 5. Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra, file CRS A457 item 650/4. Territory of New Guinea. Administration - Central. Employees wives and families admission to the Territory. W.H. Lucas to ... Strachan, 4.6.21. 132 Appeals against prescription A number of Germans appealed against prescription on various grounds. These included that the re-drawing of some European national boundaries under the Treaty of Versailles had made them homeless persons, that their plantations had been started with the full knowledge and approval of the Military Administration,^ that their Samoan (or "island”) wives would be unable to adjust to living in Germany, and that some of the German planters were married to wives of Australian or British birth. As a result of these appeals the Australian government appointed E.T. Brown as Special Magistrate under the Treaty of Peace O regulations 'to enquire into questions of nationality and other matters' and 'to 9 prevent any injustice or hardship'. What other effects the expropriation of personal property would have is hard to imagine. The most emotive appeal was the last one and Brown was to report to the Governor-General on 25 November 1921 that All these cases are governed in varying degrees by a common principle, that one of the partners has lost her rights as an English woman, not by any voluntary act of her own directed to that purpose, but by mere operation of the law, as a result of her marriage with an alien. The point was closely examined in Britain in 1922 and the international law acknowledged.^ It was subsequently reaffirmed in the Australian Parliament that an Australian or British woman automatically becomes a German citizen under international law when she marries a German national. Later "acts of grace" by which expropriated properties were returned to their German owners because of the nationality of their wives were to cause the Australian government considerable trouble. By 1924 Brown had received 135 appeals, dealing with them 12345 1. see Appendices G and H, Auditor-General's Report 1928/1929. p. 78 2. New Guinea Gazette no.l, 9 May 1921. p. 7 3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.103 1923. p. 927 4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.114 1926. p. 4966 5. Interim Report of the Board of Trade, p. 5 6. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.103 1923. p. 458 133 as follows: those allowed 39 those dismissed 63 those withdrawn/not proceeded with 27 remaining undecided 6 Total 135 source: Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 6 There is some confusion in the early figures for those released from expropriation. In the period between 1920 and 31 January 1925 it was stated that 34 had been so released1, yet it was stated in Parliament in 1925 that 31 had been O released. I estimate that 17 of these owned plantations in the Gazelle Peninsula area (mainly in the Baining); most of the remainder were wives of planters which, considering that the total number of plantations available for expropriation was 46, represents about 37% of Gazelle Peninsula plantations - a not insignificant figure. Owners released from expropriation probably caused feelings similar to those expressed in New Ireland where local feeling on this matter is bitter, especially as these Huns get their places back as an "act of grace", while dinkum ex-soldiers and British subjects cannot purchase a place, on easy terms. As a result of Brown's report, the Prime Minister (W.M. Hughes) agreed to exemptions on the following grounds: 1. that the applicant was married to a woman who was, until her marriage, a British subject; 2. that the applicant was married to a woman who was a Pacific Islander, or who was partly of Pacific Islands blood and who could not easily live anywhere but in the Islands; 3. that the applicant was married to a woman who owned separate property and who but for her marriage would be a British subject or the subject of 12 1. Commonwealth Archives Office. Series CRS A1781, item A136. Custodian of Expropriation Property. Accounts for New Guinea Gazette Notices, 1925-1930 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.114 1926. p. 638 3. ibid., p. 4967 134 an allied or associated power or of a neutral country; and 4. that the property of the applicant was very small, consisting largely of savings from wages and it would be a special hardship to deprive him of such a small sum. These exceptions emphasise the concern in Australia that British women might be caught in the expropriation net. It was not desired’ said the Australian Treasurer 'that women of British blood should suffer hardship through the operation of the O expropriation provisions of the Treaty of Versailles'. In sixteen cases property O was released on humanitarian grounds0; some of these involved Samoan wives of German planters. These conditions of exemption were surprisingly generous, showing the influence Great Britain had over its former colony although there is no suggestion that pressure was brought to bear on Australia to introduce them. The exemptions were, in some cases, made at the expense of Australian returned servicemen in New Guinea. Questions were asked in the Australian Parliament about the validity of some of the exemptees (other than "British" women) in response to angry protests from the RSSAILA in New Guinea^ but Hughes's uncharacteristic generosity was more than balanced by the eagerness of the Board to "kick the Hun out of New Guinea". There had been some alarm that the blanket expropriation of German properties would include those owned by Christian Missions established in New Guinea. The Catholic Mission - the largest and wealthiest, with the greatest number of German clergy - protested that its properties 'came from the alms of Catholics of the whole world, especially from annual subsidies of societies known 123 1. Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra. CRS A571 item 29/4348. Treasury Correspondence file, annual single number series: 'New Guinea Plantations', 1919-1930. 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.114 1926. pp. 4966/4970 3. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/1922. pp. 126/127 4. see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.114 1926. pp. 4966/4970 135 as "The Holy Childhood” and "The Propagation of the Faith"' and pleaded for their exemption. Australia was unsympathetic, claiming that so long as German missionaries are in a position to form a strong German outpost, ready to consolidate old and establish new interests with full knowledge of all local conditions, and their activities are cloaked by their missionary garb, Australia will be unable to transform the Mandated Territory into a peaceful, harmonious and prosperous colony of the Commonwealth. But Australia was obliged to acknowledge Article 43B of the Treaty of Versailles which provided that the property of Missions whose profits were devoted to supporting their Mission activities should continue to be so used after being transferred to trustees (undoubtedly "British") of the same faith. The German Missions Ordinance 1926 subsequently vested all property held by German Christian Missions in New Guinea at 10 January 1920 in the Administrator, and allowed him to revest it in trustees appointed or approved by the Australian Governor-General. The Missions avoided prescription and expropriation, but the missionaries continued to be closely watched for signs of subversive behaviour. The Military Administration ends On 9 May 1921 seven years of military occupation ended in New Guinea, and civil Administration commenced. Coming three years after the Armistice, the changeover caused little interest in Australia. No representative of the Australian government was sent to Rabaul to attend any ceremony to mark the o occasion. Even though the 'very brilliant efforts' of W.M. Hughes had gained the 9 mandate for Australia, he had accepted it 'with the worst possible grace' because he had sought to annex New Guinea. Hughes apparently did not care for the League of Nations' supervision of the mandate, minimal as this was to be. Not 12 1. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), p. 75 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.103 1923. p. 921 3. W.J. Hudson, "New Guinea mandate: the view from Geneva" in Second Waigani Seminar: the history of Melanesia, p. 141. 136 everyone in Australia had been anxious to gain New Guinea. In January 1922 (i.e. seven months after civil Administration commenced) C.I.H. Campbell, the manager of the Commonwealth Bank branch in Rabaul (and member of the Expropriation Board) wrote to the Governor of the Commonwealth Bank in Sydney that the Australian government was claiming that no definite arrangements had been made with the League of Nations under which compensation was guaranteed should the mandate be transferred to another country. For this reason, Campbell wrote, Australia was disinclined to spend large sums of money in developing the country.1 Because of Campbell’s membership of the Board it is possible he was repeating something he had been told by Lucas - the Board's chairman - who had a very close association with the Australian government. After the commencement of civil Administration Australia lost interest in her "new possessions", and a change of government saw New Guinea drift further into the background of federal politics. Commercial interest, however, remained sharp. This alarmed the chairman of the Australasian Methodist Missionary Society who, at a public meeting in Melbourne, exhorted his audience What patient help and gracious chivalry then ought we not to extend to these inferior races who are asked to make adjustments far more profound them those we have attempted in our superior life! We must end forever the old systems of commercial exploitation. The cry for cheap labour must be thrust back down the throats of those few unworthy members of our race who utter it. We, as an Australian nation, have embarked upon a venture of race idealism. If we are unprepared for so heroic a voyage, we must put back to port, and resign our captaincy. Despite Burton's plea, the commercial exploitation of New Guinea through its coconut plantations was exactly what occurred. With the colony handed to Australia to administer, and most of the German residents deported, the 12 1. Hopper, "Kicking out the Hun", p. 157 (quoting C.I.H. Campbell to the Governor, Commonwealth Bank, 17.1.22) 2. J.W. Burton, The Australian Mandate in relation to our duty to native races. Melbourne, Australian Students Christian Movement Corporation, 1921. pp. 5/6 137 Expropriation Board took over control of the plantations. But although the Board was the de facto authority in New Guinea, titular responsibility for the colony rested with the civil Administration which was to be severely criticised for the malpractice and incompetence of the Board. Macaulay gives a picture, drawn from a report by Samuel Pepys of the British Navy in 1684, which stated: The new administration was a prodigy of waste fulness, corruption, ignorance and indolence ... no estimate could be trusted ... no contract was performed ... . Some of the new men of war were so rotten that, unless speedily repaired, they would go down at their moorings. ... Most of the ships which were afloat were commanded by men who had not been bred to the sea. The analogy seems applicable to the Expropriation Board; it is useful, therefore, to consider how the Board carried out its duties in New Guinea and what results it achieved. The Board commences operations The functions of the Board, outlined in the Expropriation Ordinance 1920, were stated by the Prime Minister to be to maintain the plantations, to attend the matured trees, and rear the immature trees to the bearing stage. It was not their (sic) duty to administer the plantations indefinitely, but to maintain their physical condition and to dispose of them. The Board assumed responsibility for 268 plantations (actually there were over q 300, but they were grouped into 268 for administrative purposes)0 comprising: 123 1. paralleled in Arthur Bryant, Samuel Pepys, the Saviour of the Navy. Cambridge, University Presss, 1947. p. 95 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 927 3. Cobcroft Report, p. 83 138 153 freehold, entered in Groundbook 54 freehold, surveyed but not entered in Groundbook 30 freehold, not surveyed, and not entered in Groundbook 7 properties surveyed by German government surveyors - surveys not acknowledged by lands department of present Administration 8 properties leasehold 16 properties held under permissive occupancy or occupied without permission source: Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 20 These plantations covered 294,530 acres, of which 117,858 acres* were planted with 5,368,459 economic trees; more than 5,000,000 of these were coconut palms. Apart from the cleared and uncleared plantation land, 198,059 acres of virgin land had been granted to various companies and individuals; 15,000 acres of this had been granted to individuals subject to improvement within fifteen years from the date of grant. The balance had been granted to the New Guinea Company free of any similar conditions. The size of plantations on the Gazelle Pensinula varied widely: for example, 31 plantations (which included most of the long established and producing properties) were under 500ha., 11 were over 500ha., and 5 were over l,000ha. (see table p. 155). Less than half of the planted area was in full bearing and self-sufficient, while the balance had plantings up to seven years old which would require attention until they matured. Included in these new areas were plantations which had been established during the military occupation with the approval of the Administrator. The Board stopped all expenditure on new plantings and this, together with the world slump in copra prices in 1921, depressed business and reminded German planters how tenuous their position really was. 1. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 17 139 The commencement of Civil Administration on 9 May 1921 brought the functions of the Board and the new Administration into sharp focus. Because of its status under the Expropriation Ordinance, the Board soon overshadowed the Administration in power and influence in New Guinea. Under the Ordinance the Administrator became subordinate to the Board whose chairman, Lucas, emphasised this by having directions which he had recommended in his dual role as Technical Adviser on New Guinea affairs to the Australian government relayed to the Administrator. Until the last of the expropriated plantations had been sold and the Board was wound up in 1927, it was the Administration in New Guinea in everything but name. It employed more staff at its peak (300 compared to the Administration's 221)*, it enjoyed an almost unlimited operating budget, and it had instant entry to the Australian government through its chairman instead of having to work through a junior ministry as the Administration did. Despite these advantages, the problems the Board faced on taking over the plantations were staggering. They included records which were incomplete and in German (which few Australians in New Guinea understood), a variable copra market on the other side of the world, the financial policy of the Australian government that New Guinea was to operate within the limits of its revenue as quickly as possible, insufficient housing for Board staff, malaria, the isolation of many plantations, the inaccessability of almost all "pacified" areas from which to draw labour, and the constant action of many dispossessed Germans which hindered both it and the Administration in their work. It was almost immediately obvious that no one in Australia had given much thought to the organisation and administration of the colony as a "British" asset, nor of the problems inherent in superimposing one set of introduced laws on another. The first shocks came when the Board looked at the registration of plantation lands in the German Groundbooks, and commenced preparing an „ inventory of plantations to sell. 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 925 140 Land titles ■*■ German land law in New Guinea was repealed in May 1921 when the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 came into force. German law was not immediately replaced because the Australian government had not decided its land policy for New Guinea: whether land was to be alienated in freehold or leasehold. The repeal of the German land law left some gaps in the law, e.g. the government had no statutory power to purchase or resume land or to seize ownerless land. As a result, no land was acquired between 9 May 1921 and the coming into force of the Land Ordinance in late 1922. Applications for new leases had to wait the enactment of the Ordinance allowing Administration land to be leased. Five days after civil administration commenced in New Guinea the Administrator requested the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department in Melbourne to prepare a draft Land Ordinance based on the Land Ordinance 1911 of Papua with the sole difference being the power to grant freehold estates. The need for such an Ordinance became obvious following the failure to sell the first batch of expropriated properties in 1922 (discussed below), and so the Attorney- General's Department in Melbourne drafted a Torrens Ordinance for New Guinea. However, to draft provisions to bring German titles onto the register required a knowledge of German law as well as the land law contained in the Torrens system and of differences between the two. The registering of titles was delayed by the lack of sufficient staff of all kinds to do the work required. There was a shortage of German translators, of surveyors and draftsmen, and even of District Officers to carry out field investigations. Finally, there was a need for a judge to hear land cases. A draft of the Ordinance was prepared and after minor amendment came into force on 21 December 1922. It followed the Torrens system of land registration familiar in Australia in the 1920s and aimed to register land and interests in land, to confer indefeasibility (i.e. the title of the registered proprietor was not capable of being defeated), and to provide for the registration of dealings in registered land. Under the Torrens system persons dealing with the 1. This section draws from Bredmeyer, The registration of land in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. (Chapter 3, pp. 57/91) 141 registered proprietor of land could rely on the register as proof of his ownership. It was realised that the registering of all land titles onto the Torrens register would take some time, but it was not appreciated at first just how long this would be. The government appointed E.T. Brown - who had previously been the special Magistrate appointed to hear the appeals of German nationals in New Guinea against prescription - to draft provisions to bring German titles onto the register. Brown approached the task with the clear view that a title registered by the German Administration in a Groundbook was a presumptive one: the person so registered was presumed to be the owner. By contrast, a Torrens title was conclusive, subject to fraud and minor exceptions. Brown stressed that before a Groundbook title was transposed to a Torrens register an opportunity would be given for other persons, including natives or their representatives, to lodge adverse claims and have them determined by the court. Any summary transposition of German titles onto the Torrens register without investigating and determining adverse claims would involve the danger of causing serious injustice. Under German law, each title to a property was registered in a Groundbook, but a record was not always made of any native rights that might exist on land so registered. Brown recommended in all cases an actual inspection of the land to see whether any natives were in occupation, supported by enquiries at neighbouring villages to disclose any claims not founded on actual residence. Bredmeyer emphasises the pain-staking care with which all claims to land were examined during the Australian Administration, even at very significant cost in time and money. Yet little effort was made to balance this with an understanding of Melanesian agricultural techniques. Denoon suggests many of these had evolved to reduce the risk of environmental degradation* and to counter the effects of strong sunlight and torrential rain on the biomass from which the vegetation cover had been removed. Village agricultural practice was to till soil shallowly and to disturb the land as little as possible. Crops - e.g. bananas and sweet potato - were combined to imitate natural ground cover and rarely 1 1. A history of agriculture in Papua New Guinea: a time to plant and a time to uproot, edited by Donald Denoon and Catherine Snowden for the Department of Primary Industry. ?Boroko, Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, n.d. Introduction, p. 2 142 cultivated for more than two years after which the garden plot stayed fallow for a generation or more. But the capitalist style of agriculture introduced by plantations not only required the clearing of vast tracts of thickly forested land, with subsequent loss of village hunting and foraging areas, it required these areas to remain under the one crop indefinitely. Few Europeans made serious attempts to understand village production systems-*- and this, together with mutual misunderstandings between villagers and Europeans on the acquisition of land, made the hearing of land claims complicated and time-consuming. The Administration was to discover enormous numbers of registered titles which appeared straight forward as far as ordinary transfers were concerned, but which had a large number of questions concerning native rights that needed settlement before the titles could be considered clear. As Prime O Minister Bruce said 'We had to get the position clarified before we could act'. At the same time as the Administration was cautiously examining Groundbooks and the realisation of what was going to be involved in sorting out land titles was growing, the Expropriation Board pressed ahead with preparing expropriated property for sale. The Board was aware of the potential problems with titles but decided not to wait while these were examined. Between June and November 1922 two batches of properties, consisting of 30 plantations, 3 Rabaul stores and 9 Rabaul residential blocks were offered for sale. Advertisements in New Guinea, Papua, Australia and England attracted only one tender - for the Toma plantation and hotel site. There should have been others according to Charles Blake who in 1922 took tender money to Sydney for various plantations and entrusted it to a Sydney lawyer. The lawyer 'took this to 9 the Bourke Cup, lost the lot and then disappeared'. The Board realised that although there was a good deal of interest in expropriated properties, buyers were hesitant to commit themselves until the position of titles had been resolved, and 1 1. Denoon and Snowden, A history of agriculture in Papua New Guinea, p. 3 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 923 3. Charles Blake, Brisbane, March 1986 143 banks (or companies) would not finance purchasers without a clear title to the property. The following four examples from the Catalogue for- First Group properties show actual and potential encumbrances that were quite common: 1. Ulaveo plantation This property adjoins Tokua plantation. ... Both properties are entered in the Groundbook under one title. ... Should the properties be sold separately a fresh survey will be necessary at the expense of the purchasers. 2. Kuradui plantation The natives of Tolom have certain beach and fishing rights on the foreshore of the plantation. ... The plantation has an unsurveyed road running through it. 3. Gire Gire plantation As the whole of the unplanted land may be excised to satisfy native rights, tenderers should submit two tenders for the property, one for the planted area only, and another for both planted and unplanted areas. The records show the existence of native rights over these properties. 4. Tovanakus plantation The property would appear to be ready for registration under the Lands Registration Ordinance, but in addition to the tender price and usual survey and registration fees, the purchaser will be required to pay to the natives an amount equal to 5s. per hectare. The titles of some of the properties offered for sale in 1922 were in an incomplete state, and a prospective purchaser on enquiry either of the Board or the Administration could only be shown some documents in German which authorized the taking up of certain land under certain conditions. No guarantee was given or offered as to the nature of the title that would eventually issue to a purchaser in O exchange for these documents. This uncertainty of titles did not encourage1 1. Catalogue of Expropriated Properties (First Group) in the Territories of Papua and New Guinea. Published by the Custodian of Expropriated Property, under the authority of the Commonwealth Government. Melbourne, Government Printer, 1925. pp. 37, 50, 81, 113 2. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 20 144 tenders and the Australian government realised it had to solve the problem quickly. In a lengthy address to Parliament in 1923 refuting allegations of mismanagement and neglect in the administration of New Guinea, Prime Minister Bruce acknowledged that although 'a whole system of government ha [d] been established' there 'two important matters remained outstanding. One of these relates to land transfers and presents extraordinary difficulties'.* Because of the need to sell off expropriated property as quickly as possible, work continued in taking stock of property assets, and preparing details for publication in the Catalogues of Expropriated Property. Archer noted that 'The Expro Board [ on behalf of ] Cust. of ex-enemy property took everything possible that could be classed as an ex-enemy asset into account while compiling o their Catalogues' of the plantations. It was anticipated that there would be a strong demand for them: by 1919/1920 copra exports had risen to 24,000 tons as coconut oil was still needed for soap and glycerine, while the increased demand for margarine 'created an enormous and apparently insatiable demand for ''copra- O oil'". Modern technological processes and changing social attitudes combined to increase demands for natural oils of which the cheapest, and most easily processed, was coconut oil. Even allowing for the short-lived drop in copra prices in 1921 the future for plantations looked bright and generated a great deal of interest in the further development of the industry in New Guinea. So much so that it was decided to sell the properties in three Groups to avoid flooding the market and depressing prices (in fact, the opposite happened: prices rose with each Group offered). The Board knew that the attempt to sell plantations in 1922 had failed partly because of the unclear nature of titles and the lack of title information given to prospective purchasers; so the Custodian was anxious to give as much title information in general terms, and in detail, on each property that he could. A major block to this came when the Chief Surveyor in New Guinea advised the Administrator that he would not accept any of the German surveys as 123 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.103 1923. p.923 2. extracted from a document in the Archer papers (untitled, undated). 3. Military Occupation Report, p. 21 145 correct. In many cases the distances given on German surveys were only approximate, and sometimes the survey plan had been compiled in an office from information given in the purchase document and was not supported by pegs laid in the ground. Under the standard of accuracy applying in Torrens practice, survey lines had to close with a margin of error of not more than 1 in 4,000. The majority of German surveys did not meet this standard because German surveyors had used prismatic compasses instead of the more accurate theodolite. To quicken the registration of properties the Administrator decided to accept German surveys and, acting on this decision, the Custodian stated in his Catalogues for properties surveyed during the German administration and entered in the relevant Groundbook "that the survey was acceptable to the Administration", e.g. Kuraiba plantation The property is entered in the Groundbook, and had been surveyed. The survey is acceptable to the Administration.1 The Australian Attorney-General criticised the Administrator's decision to accept German surveys without verification. He said it was objectionable for both vendor and purchaser, warning that because the German surveys were unreliable - as the Chief Surveyor in New Guinea had already said - if and when the properties were later surveyed, the surveyed areas would differ from the areas sold and the government would be subject to continual complaints from purchasers for rectification and compensation. Following discussions between the Attorney- General, the Chief Surveyor and the Administrator, it was decided that German surveys would be considered acceptable provided they were sufficiently accurate for Torrens registration. It was found that the majority was not sufficiently accurate and therefore not acceptable. The Custodian was not unduly worried by this, anticipating that most of the properties would be sold to returned servicemen who had twenty years to pay for them. It was felt that any surveys needed to satisfy the requirements of Torrens registration would be finalised long before 1. Catalogue of Expropriated Property (First Group) in the Territories of Papua and New Guinea, p. 76 146 then. But the slow, tedious process of checking titles for survey accuracy and outstanding native claims was to continue through the administration of the Board and was still in train when the Japanese occupied New Britain in 1942. The intricacies of land registration and the settlement of outstanding native rights were one part of the web of administrative problems the Board became entangled in with the running of the expropriated plantations. Another was the retention of present, and the recruitment of additional, labour to keep the plantations operating. Labour The Board found an ’absolutely chaotic state of affairs'1 relating to labour when it took over control of the plantations. No organisation existed, and no one knew what labour was actually at work; it took a year to sort out matters. Few accurate records appear to have been kept during the Military Administration on plantations whose owners had already been deported, while records for those still run by their German owners were deliberately neglected. Some Board employees were quick to take advantage of the confusion. Blake recalled how he had inspected one Board plantation and discovered "ghost” labour lines whose wages were being pocketed by the manager. This practice must have been fairly common as the Ralum depot office of the Board was broken into shortly after and O all plantation labour records stolen. During the German administration plantations with a labour surplus had been permitted to "sell" (i.e. transfer) the unworked period of indentures of surplus labourers to smother plsmter for a csish refund. This was disliked by the labourers who were not consulted before being "sold". It apparently continued during the Military Administration and, indeed, is referred to as an established 1. Cobcroft Report, p. 37 2. Charles Blake, Brisbane, March 1986 147 practice in the Commonwealth Auditor-General's Report for 1927/1928* even though it was supposedly stopped in late 1920 when the plantations were vested in the Public Trustee. Germans on plantations awaiting replacement by Australians told labourers that they had been "sold" and would be sent to other plantations once the Australians took over. This caused tremendous problems; many labourers deserted and fled into the bush (still not the safest of places), and the Administration met fear of it years after all plantations had been sold. Labourers' contracts were expiring at the rate of 5,000 a year, and in March 1921 the Board moved to correct this by offering bonuses of 5s, 10s, and 20s to any of its employees who recruited one, two or three year labourers. To encourage continuity of service (i.e. "re-signs") these bonuses were altered O slightly on 1 February 1923 to 5s, 7s6d and 25s for new recruits. Those signing on for three years were preferred, but as fewer recruits were offering for work numbers gradually declined. The total number of plantation labourers said to be employed by the Board for the period 1921-1923 was; December 1921 11,300 December 1922 12,815 June 1923 12,647 source; Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 19 In 1919 there had been 16,700 labourers employed on all plantations in New Guinea. One of the reasons for the drop in recruits was the difference of approach between German and Australian employers. The Germans established a rapport with labourers based on a strict, clearly defined understanding of their position. At the same time there was an empathy as Wahlen demonstrated on the death of his bossboi's mother:1 2 1. Attorney-General's Report 1927/1928. p. 31 2. Beazley claims the rate was higher, but does not say what it was. R.A. Beazley, New Guinea adventure. Typewritten manuscript of adventures in the Territory of New Guinea from ca.1920 to ca.1935. Beazley Collection, Fryer Memorial Library, University of Queensland Library, p. 14 148 I called for Bullakau and told him that his mother died and handed over to him the scull of his mother. He took the scull and cried bitterly. I kept the scull and put it in my office on a shelf and when Bullakau who often came to the office, entered the room he looked at his mother and was so glad that the scull was high and dry on the shelve. Bizarre as this might seem to Australians, Wahlen's action was appreciated by his native employees. In 1921 a visitor to New Guinea - who was a guest at Government House and a keen observer of the colony - wrote to her parents 1 wouldn’t be a native under some of the whites one sees here ... all the planters ... whom we have met O still rely on a good hard bang to cure an unwilling boy’. This was self-defeating as once a plantation gained a name for ill treatment of labourers, or poor working conditions, it was very difficult to recruit for it. At Kalili plantation, for example, the labourer death rate of about three or four a year increased to about one a week in the early 1920s under the Board’s control. This was largely O attributed to the actions of overseers and bad sanitary conditions but even though efforts were made to restrain the overseers and clean up the labour quarters, Kalili continued to have problems recruiting and retaining reliable labour. A problem facing the Board which needed immediate attention was the repatriation of labourers recruited during the German Administration for other German colonies in the South Pacific. In 1922 an attempt was made to return labourers sent to Nauru as mine workers by the DHPG depot at Mioko. There was some hope that they might swell the plantation labour force, but their return was considered ’’too close to repatriation" and "blackbirding" and was brought before 123 1. H.R. Wahlen, Hamburg, to F.P. Archer, Rabaul. 30.10.62. Archer papers. 2. Marnie Bassett, Letters from New Guinea 1921. Melbourne, Hawthorn, 1969. p. 12 3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 457 149 the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in August 19241 and the labourers, presumably, stayed where they were. In 1923 a hundred labourers were repatriated from Samoa to Rabaul where they went about allegedly ’to popularise in New Guinea recruiting for Samoa'.2 They told of receiving wages of 30s a month (which startled the Board and private planters) and ’came home wearing European hats and clothes, ... their Q women with European ladies dresses'. The recruiting of New Guinea labourers for work in other Sputh Pacific areas had ceased with the military occupation, but the plantation industry was alarmed at the possibility of competition for what it claimed was an insufficiency of village labour, and raised the question of importing Asian labour. The Permanent Mandates Commission was doubtful of the idea which was rejected by the Administrator on the grounds that Asians were banned through the extension of the White Australia policy to New Guinea. Dependent on an agricultural economy, New Guinea was unique as a major tropical colony without imported Asian agricultural workers. Comparisons with the 'easily obtained, competent, highly trained, intelligent and virile Chinese labour' in Samoa with New Guinea native labourers of 'relatively low quality, poor in physique and difficult to obtain'^ were constantly made. These were sometimes unfair for although they may not have excelled as manual workers, villagers were adept at other skills. For example, one replaced the Chinese captain of the 123 1. Institute of Pacific Relations. Fifth Biennial Conference. Data paper: Labour condition in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, by Margot Hentze and S.H. Roberts. Documents, v. VIII, Banff, 1933. (hereafter "Hentze/Roberts paper, p. ..."). The words in inverted commas appear - in the paper. 2. Stewart's Handbook of the Pacific Islands 1920. Sydney, McCarron Stewart, 1923. p. 389 (the concept of the Australian Administration permitting recruitment for Samoa is extraordinary. This is the only reference discovered to it). 3. ibid. 4. Cobcroft Report, p. 83 150 coastal cargo boat, the Palpal, and subsequently worked for the Board as captain of the Hindi. * Plantation labourers were recruited by (a) Board overseers or other staff who received a bonus for every native signed on (in 1922 Richards, for example, went recruiting inland from Arawa and Mabiri plantations on n Bougainville and secured 180 recruits for Manus plantations ), (b) by the 27 private recruiters who received ^7.10.0 a head which covered all expenses for three year recruits delivered to a Board plantation (it is worth noting that private recruiters were forbidden by the German administration), and (c) special expeditions^ organised by the Board into the 'relatively virgin' (sic)^ fields of the Upper Sepik and Markham Rivers on the mainland which were a rich source of young men eager to see what the white man was doing. One such expedition in 1923 obtained over 900 recruits from the Sepik area. As with labourers in the British Solomons, the men of the Sepik were attracted by four recruiting stimuli: 1. the desirability of European goods; 2. the novelty of travel outside the circumscribed village area; 3. the example set by those who had gone before and returned safely; and 4. pressures within their own society to brmg back trade goods, and money to pay the head tax. 1 1. Bill Gammage, "The Rabaul Strike 1929" in The Journal of Pacific History. Volume Ten 1975. p. 4 2. extracted from curriculum vitae in Richards papers. 3. see extracts from "The Sepik River Expedition", February 20th to March 10th 1919 (Richards papers) at Appendix D for difficulties experienced in recruiting during the military administration. The extracts also show the background of recruits from this area and perhaps give a reason for European insistence on the need for discipline by flogging. 4. Hentze/Roberts paper, p. 14 5. Corris, Passage, port and plantation, p. 59 151 It is interesting to compare Corris's final point with Denoon's assertion that labourers ’represented a direct subsidy from household subsistence production, to plantation production of commodities'. Further, as Denoon sees it The household has carried the cost of bringing labourers into the world, rearing them through infancy, supporting their families while the labourers are away, and caring for them when they are too old for plantation work. These comments apply to every society that has produced labourers for capitalistic enterprises, not just New Guinea, but the point is taken that plantation labourers were regarded more as a commodity them a human resource. With the prevailing attitudes of the period, this is hardly surprising. Labourers received a monthly wage of between 5s and 10s, depending on their length of service and experience. The average annual cost of an indentured O plantation labourer was assessed by Cobcroft at yi6.10.0, but indentured labourers received cash and goods amounting to less than 6d a day. Casual labourers were paid a flat rate of Is a day and in three days earned the same as an indentured labourer in one week. This anomaly meant that casual labouring had obvious attractions. During the early years of the Board it was extremely difficult to recruit suitable labourers and sometimes boys barely past puberty who were physically incapable of a full day's labouring on a plantation were signed on. They could only be used for light duties, for example: a group of monkeys^ brought with them their morning's catch - ten beetles each, caught in the coconut trees. They tie one to the quill of a palm leaf, and present a bunch of ten quills with a struggling rhinocerous or elephant beetle or a white 123 1. Denoon and Snowden, A history of agriculture in Papua New Guinea: a time to plant and a time to uproot. Introduction, p. 4 2. Cobcroft Report, p. 36 3. Reed, The making of modern New Guinea, p. 230. 4. more correctly "manki" in pidgin English - a male native youth. 152 grub kicking on the end, for inspection by the boss.1 Although the Australian government frequently affirmed that its principal function in New Guinea was to look after the interests of the natives, it seems it believed that this would best be served by encouraging natives to work on plantations. There was a firm belief that the colony's most valuable natural asset needed work and discipline to develop. In many cases regular work, regular food and a safe environment noticeably improved the health and physique of natives. But the Administration was concerned to note that in a list of comparative nutritive values of various rations in colonies as far apart as Papua, East Africa and Barbadoes, prisoners and labourers in New Guinea ranked 21st and 22nd o respectively out of a list of 23. Yet nothing was done to insist that native foods (fish, yams, taro, coconuts, fruits) be either grown on plantations specifically for labourers, or provided for them. Obviously this involved a deal of expense: Ettie Kaumann of Kurakakaul plantation said it cost her V20 a month for fresh food for O her labourers. Perhaps there was a reluctance to use plantation land for gardens (although most of the expropriated plantations had land to spare), perhaps it was easier to continue importing rice and tinned meat or fish as labourer's rations, perhaps the companies were reluctant to give up the very profitable shipping of these goods from Hong Kong and Singapore to Rabaul, via Sydney. The greatest problem the Board faced with labour was that it was not used properly. The success and existence of plantations under the Board's care depended upon an adequate supply of labour and, in a sort of Darwinian concern 123 1. Bassett, Letters from New Guinea, p. 59 (the Germans had "task-days" on which it was the duty of all male natives to search for and destroy the larvae of the rhinocerous beetle which was a constant plantation pest. Former German Possessions. p. 56). 2. Papua Annual Report 1920/1921. p. 101 (I have assumed Murray was referring to New Guinea under the military occupation). 3. Australian Archives Office, Canberra. Series CRS A457 file G118/7 - New Guinea. Expropriated properties - letters for transmission to Treasury Department, letter of 3 December 1923 from Edith A. Kaumann to Chairman, Expropriation Board. 153 for them, Europeans saw villagers as lazy in not signing on more readily while their alleged lack of economic ideas, of continuity of effort or aim, of incentive to work and lack of agricultural instincts, were a continuing worry. Plantation work was constant: dry coconuts had to be searched for, picked up, either cut in the field or taken to the cutting shed by ox-cart or, more usually, carried there in bags by labourers, cut, dried, bagged, weighed and moved to a shipping depot, grass and weeds had to be kept under control, new areas cleared and old and new plantings checked for pests, and general maintenance carried out around the plantation. One Board manager was said to use as many labourers on a plantation as the previous owner had used on two; he admitted that there were more coconuts rotting on the ground than were being cut into copra because, he said, he did not get a commission on making copra.* There was some attempt to rationalise labour use, and quotas were suggested for board plantations. One suggestion was that "clean" estates (i.e. those cleared of undergrowth and largely free of kunai grass) were to have one labourer to every ten acres, and "dirty" o plantations were to have one to every seven acres. But the Board set the quota at a flat one labourer to every six and a half acres regardless of the plantation's O condition. By comparison, an average of eighty-five labourers were employed daily in the Rabaul Botanic Gardens, an area of about ten acres. ^ According to figures in the Catalogue of Expropriated Property (First Group), labour lines on Board plantations varied according to their size, location and planted area. Raniolo, an original Company plantation close to Kokopo, required 95 labourers to maintain its 374 ha. fully planted with coconuts which produced 300 tons of copra a year. Old Massawa plantation in the Baining area - accessible only by sea - needed 78 labourers to maintain 145 ha. producing 144 tons a year, while Maulapao (subsequently Malapao) plantation on the shores of Weberhafen - connected to Rabaul by a rough road - operated with 100 labourers for its 492 ha. producing 180 tons of copra a year. Plantations such as Ulaveo and 123 1. Hopper, "Kicking out the Hun", p. 129 2. Cobcroft Report, p. 43 3. ibid., p. 36 4. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1926/1927. p. 43 154 Kenabot (both near Kokopo) where overseas ships could anchor close to shore and load copra stockpiled from neighbouring plantations, had 125 and 80 labourers handling 600 tons and 312 tons a year respectively, as well as providing some of the labour needed to load the ships. The Catalogue shows an estimated total of 2,758 labourers servicing 10,481.8 ha. of planted land on the Gazelle Peninsula, or roughly 1 labourer to every 4 ha. If unplanted land is included on the assumption that some sort of work was in progress on it, the figure drops to 1 labourer to about every 7 ha. Even if the Catalogue's figures were correct the Board was ignoring its set quota of 1 labourer to every 6.5 acres. Generally, the older plantations (such as Gunanur, Matanatar, Kuradui, Maulapao) which had no unplanted land seemed to have a large labour force for their copra production. Newer. plantations (such as Varzin, Wangaramut and Kurakakaul) which had sizeable areas of unplanted land and annual copra productions reasonably near those of the older plantations, had fewer labourers. Plantations in the Baining area, and those on the west coast of the Gazelle Peninsula between the Baining and Nodup, employed more labourers than those on the "near" Gazelle Peninsula (i.e. mainly in the Kokopo area). Perhaps the more distant and isolated plantations needed extra hands for extensive clearing and planting programmes, as well as for loading and unloading ships. The table on p.155 shows the planted and unplanted areas of Gazelle Peninsula plantations, their annual copra production, number of labourers and number of coconut trees and (if looked at in conjunction with the main map at p. 331) is a good indicator of where development was occurring. Most of the plantations in the Baining, as well as Matanatar, Gire Gire and Ulaveo plantations on the "near" Gazelle Peninsula also had significant (but mainly immature) cocoa plantings which, being a more labour intensive crop than coconuts, required a bigger labour force. From the Catalogue figures there does seem to be an inconsistency in labour distribution on plantations, leading to the conclusion that available labour was not always used to full economic advantage. The Board would have been wise to keep the size of labour lines on its plantations under constant review, but due to the varying quality (and quantity) of its supervisory personnel this could not be done. 155 GAZELLE PENINSULA COCONUT PLANTATIONS - 1920 Plantation Area Labour Output Planted Unplanted Palms ha. tons p.a. ha. ha. Ablingi 237.5 60 36 173.5 64.0 22,479 Arawe 605.15 170 204 436.15 170.0 51,070 Galtum 99.72 30 36 99.72 14,929 Gavit 347.75 82 84 286.25 61.5 39,979 Gire Gire 2,347.40 95 180 453.75 1,903.65 26,145 Gunanur 412.8 100 300 412.8 42,941 Guntershohe 400.0 112 54 400.0 52,454 Kabaira 497.01 40 102 170.0 327.01 19,305 Kabanga 277.0 50 63 177.0 100.0 25,461 Kenabot 386.04 80 *312 319.45 665.9 31,756 Kuradui 135.0 30 72 135.0 16,000 Kuraiba 104.0 19 6 104.0 9,066 Kurakakaul 401.0 50 120 300.0 101.0 19,288 Lassul 512.28 73 60 306.5 205.78 17,089 Makada 106.87 30 120 106.87 10,556 Matanatar 635.01 95 144 407.0 41,889 Maulapao 492.27 100 180 492.27 53,160 Mioko ) 16.21 5 18 16.21 1,665 Inabui ) Nam bung ) 100.0 +65 74 26.0 7,408 Neinduk ) 322.38 200 295.34 27.04 29,534 New Massawa 2,127.07 75 100 354.1 1,872.97 23,410 Nonga 34.02 9 36 34.02 5,720 Old Massawa 144.93 78 144 144.93 11,293 Palmalmal 900.0 54 3 118.5 781.5 14,620 Pondo 1,000.0 155 216 502.0 498.0 60,666 Put Put) ) 15,000.0 66 132 237.98 15,670 Warangoi ) 11,362 Rangarere 298.67 32 48 130.0 168.67 14,665 Raniolo 374.31 95 300 374.31 36,932 Rapopo 171.0 41 112 167.0 4.0 26,053 Raulawat 651.32 63 156 225.0 426.32 28,086 Ravalien 296.48 75 264 296.48 32,807 Tobera 509.49 130 276 500.0 51,074 Tokua 1,181.84 47 60 262.0 919.84 29,913 Tovakundum 216.91 65 204 212.0 4.91 24,543 Tovanakus 130.0 29 30 90.0 40.0 11,297 Ulaveo 550.6 125 600 530.0 20.6 61,084 Upper Seeburg "an uncultivated plantation” Varzin 467.0 42 180 237.0 230.0 20,991 Vunabere 164.0 50 54 150.0 14.0 17,836 Vunakambi 160.01 50 36 151.0 12.01 15,031 Wangaramut 492.02 90 288 300.0 192.02 32,450 Wunabugbug 97.69 40 96 97.69 16,120 * this figure is unusually high + worked as one plantation source; extracted from Catalogues of Expropriated Property 156 Expropriation Board staff Within a year of the Australian occupation of New Guinea a Federal Parliamentary War Committee had examined how federal and state committees could suggest ways of providing employment for returned soldiers. It acknowledged that employment for our men at the conclusion of their service to the Empire is a matter for the Nation .... The Commonwealth Government has ... promised to give preference to returned soldiers in respect of general employment. It should be remembered that recruiting in Australia for staff for the Expropriation Board started two years after the war had ended, when most Australian exservicemen had returned home and settled down. It seems likely that those who accepted appointments with the Board had found it difficult to return to civilian life. The task undertaken by the Board involved the entire re-organisation of the commerce of New Guinea, with outposts scattered over a wide area having unreliable and infrequent methods of communication. The furthest branch of the Board's operation was at Eitape (subsequently Aitape) in the Sepik district on the mainland, over 600 miles from headquarters at Rabaul. Islands under the control of the Board were 400 to 500 miles east of Rabaul. The Board took over some 268 plantations, some 20 large stores including branches, and auxiliary services in the organizations of German companies and planters such as shipping, workshops, O hospitals, etc. The chairman of the Board arrived in Rabaul in August 1920, a month before the Expropriation Ordinance, quite apart from the New Guinea Act, came into effect. He was accompanied by two accountants and seven plantation inspectors and overseers; within three months an additional 34 plantation inspectors and overseers had arrived, and by June 1921 another 101 overseers.1 1. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. Vol. V. 1914-15-16-17. Papers presented to Parliament. "The War; Returned Soldiers. Recommendation of Federal Parliamentary War Committee on employment, 1915". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1917. pp. 1453/1454 2. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 9 157 From 1 September 1920 to 30 June 1922 about 280 men* were engaged to replace Germans working in stores and offices, beginning with the lower grades and ending in August 1921 with the dismissal of the managers of the three biggest companies. New Guinea was considered ideal for Australian returned servicemen, despite current opinion that it was ’the home of intractable savages ... unsuitable for the habitation of white men’ and the warning that 'the country is one for men between twenty-five and forty years of age’ because 'the insidious climate fastens o relentlessly upon any physical weakness'. The Board was said to be 'very o . selective in its sta ff but as it gave preference to Australian returned soldiers (as did the Administration which was also advertising for staff) New Guinea quickly became regarded as 'the means of finding jobs for ex-officers of the Australian Expeditionary Force and that most sent were of the "nigger-driving" kind'.^ This was challenged in the Australian Parliament where one member cited in support of his argument: five returned soldiers, who are men of the best type. I know every one of them and they are jolly fine fellows. To give an idea of the type of men they are, I might say that one is a son of Sir Henry Braddon [ a director of W.R. Carpenter 1. Stewarts Handbook 1922, p. 391, says the number was about 210. 2. Mackenzie, The Australians at Rabaul. p. 33 3. Theo Thomas, Forster (N.S.W.), July 1986 4. Hudson, "New Guinea mandate: the view from Geneva", p. 142 5. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 4967 158 to get a job in New Guinea as Beazley remembered: I was walking down Queen Street, Brisbane, keeping a lookout for a familiar face ... I had just commenced a holiday in that city after delivering a mob of bullocks in the Channel Country ... . Then I met Bert Jackson. He was quite excited, having just signed a contract of service to go to New Guinea in the employ of a newly formed Government Department - the expropriation Board. Its duties were to take over German instrumentalities in the Mandated Territory and run them ... . Jackson said to me "You were always talking about going to the islands, try and come with me to New Guinea. Do you know anyone who could wangle you a job there?" ... if any man could get me into New Guinea it would be the Colonel of my old A.I.F. Unit, who was now a member of Parliament. ... Eight days later, a party twenty strong, we landed at Rabaul and were detailed to our jobs. Townsend wrote how the "old boy" network helped him, first with the Board and O then with the Administration. Stuart went to New Guinea because > I was offered the job as overseer on Inus Plantation on Bougainville ... at fourteen pounds per month which also happened to be the basic wage paid to unskilled labourers in Australia. However, at this stage salary was of minor importance, as the idea of being on a tropical island bossing natives around sounded very romantic. Although Stuart was an employee of Burns, Philp his recruitment and expectations were the same as a Board employee. All had two things in common; one was the restless feeling that all soldiers experience d after returning from Active Service, so after the Great War [ I] turned [ my ] footsteps towards New Guinea in search of new adventure. 1 1. Beazley, New Guinea adventure, pp. 1/2 2. Townsend, District Officer, pp. 17/21. (Townsend was appointed a General Assistant with the Board, worked in the former Company store in Rabaul, and was later appointed to the field staff of the Administration working in mainland centres). 3. Robert Stuart, Nuts to you!. Sydney, Wentworth, 1977. pp. 34/35 4. E.C.N. Helton, Booklet on Pidgin English. Brisbane, Adams, n.d. p. 3 (Preface) 159 The other was a complete lack of experience in coconut cultivation or the production of copra; however, some had actually seen a coconut. Charles Blake, a forester sent to New Guinea by the Australian government was appointed Inspector of all plantations’ even though he had ’never seen a coconut before other than in a window’.* Beazley admitted All I knew of coconuts was that I had seen them growing in the Fiji Islands, had seen them in shops and at shy-alleys at White City, Sydney. German plantation managers and overseers were gradually replaced by Australians preferably with some sort of farm, orchard or other agricultural experience. Fred Archer, for example, had grown apples at Stanthorpe, Queensland, and then worked in a sugar mill in Murwillumbah, New South Wales, before joining the Board in 1921.** Because so few of its staff were experienced in any form of agricultural work, the Board was frequently compelled to place inexperienced men in charge of plantations and train them practically at the expense of the plantation.^ Cobcroft had earlier suggested using Kalili plantation as a training school^ but this was not done as Lucas considered a training school for overseers was necessary 'only if the board is to become permanent'. New arrivals were quite often left on a plantation to teach themselves how to operate it. The results were predictable; Cobcroft was later shocked by the neglect he saw. He wrote of Suma Suma plantation (in the isolated Western Islands) that it had the appearance of an abandoned nursery, the whole of the bearing area being thickly covered with growing nuts - shoots on them 6 to 8 feet high. I counted 150 germinatecL nuts under one palm in various stages of growth. 1 1. Charles Blake, Brisbane, March 1986 2. Beazley, New Guinea adventure, p. 8 3. extracted from Archer papers. 4. Cobcroft Report, p. 41 5. ibid., p. 43 6. ibid., p. 82 7. ibid., p. 34 160 On the Gazelle Peninsula plantations of Malapao, Gire Gire, Natava, Longan and Kurakakaul coconuts have been collected into heaps and through various reasons - shortage of labour, inadequate drying facilities, or in one instance where the whole of the labour force had been concentrated on hoeing between the coconut palms to combat the depreciation of the grasshoppers, the nuts had been allowed to germinate and the consequent loss of copra has been very considerable. The Board recruited ’’seven Sydney University men” who improved its image even if they regarded themselves as superior to other Board employees. Bassett remarked that they weren’t 'on speaking terms with the riff-ra ff which must have made working relationships on isolated plantations quite uncomfortable. Bassett also wrote, less glowingly, of recruits like a man called Atcherly, a returned soldier, who ... had been an inmate for three years of No. 11 General Hospital, Caulfield, and was going over to New Ireland to be tried as an overseer of one of the plantations under the Expropriation Board. One wonders how useful a man who had spent three years in an Army repatriation hospital would be in an outdoor job as an overseer, but a J.R. Atcherley, overseer of Guntershohe plantation in the Baining, is recorded as giving evidence in a labour enquiry in 1924. If it was the same man, he had moved from the relative comfort of New Ireland to the more rugged Baining area, so his health had obviously withstood - if not benefitted from - his duties as an overseer. Generally, employees of the Board were attracted to New Guinea by the prospect of buying a plantation, and used the Board as a means towards this. As plantation overseers they were instructed and supervised by District Plantation Inspectors each of whom had a "reasonable" amount of plantation experience and 1 1. Cobcroft Report, p. 34 2. Bassett, Letters from New Guinea 1921. p. 58 3. ibid. 161 was responsible for one of the 'about'* eight plantation districts. Regardless of the attractions of New Guinea there were employees who O either didn't like the colony and returned to Australia on the next boat , or who proved unsuitable. Of the 562 staff engaged for the Board up to 17 October 1923 the attrition rate was unsatisfactorily high; terminated for medical reasons 34 dismissed 116 resigned 107 deceased 14 Total 271 source: Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 8 As at 17 October 1923 the Board employed 291 staff, including 8 plantation inspectors and 174 overseers. They were not highly paid: inspectors received 7450 7500 a year, overseers 7300 to 7400. Considering that the employees were, supposedly, fit young men who had been medically examined before appointment, the number lost through medical reasons and death was high. Together with those dismissed and those who resigned they represent almost one in every two men engaged by the Board. The comings and goings of staff on plantations put a serious strain on productivity, and was unsettling to labourers who had to accustom themselves to a succession of "masters". Even though the Board tried to attract returned servicemen to New Guinea the turnover in staff meant that inevitably some positions either remained unfilled, or were filled by non-returned servicemen. In 1922/1923 the Board tried unsuccessfully to secure the services of a returned serviceman accountant, but was unable to do so and appointed a non-returned serviceman to the position. This was immediately attacked by the Rabaul branch of the RSSAILA which, determined that Hughes's promise of "New Guinea for the returned servicemen" would be honoured, advised the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department that 'this branch views with apprehension the encroachment upon the rights of returned soldiers and sailors by non-returned men and women who are employed by the 12 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/1922. p. 124 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v.114 1926. p. 196 162 Administration and the Expropriation Board'.1 In his reply the Secretary invited the Rabaul branch to locate a returned serviceman accountant interested in the position, as the Board had been unable to do so. The matter rested there. Some of the returned servicemen transferred to the Administration as the occasion arose. Lulu Miller recalled how in 1920 my husband and I went to Malaya and Indonesia then we returned back to Sydney, in the meantime the war was over and as so many soldiers couldn't get work, so I told my husband we will try our luck in Rabaul, ... . When we arrived ... my husband got a position as Clerk in the Expropriation Board headquarters ... and after a year was transferred to Native Affairs as a Patrol Officer. O The Board was accused of bringing 'some truly un-speakable men' into the Territory which was not unusual as New Guinea had always attracted drifters and social misfits. The isolation and loneliness of some plantations affected many Australians. Beazley wrote how in the Anchorites - the most northerly plantation area of the Bismarck Archipelago - One overseer returned to Maron after a stay there of three months. On the second night following his arrival he walked away from a card party, and was never seen again. It was surmised that he had walked over a reef. ... The man who relieved him was there three months. When he in turn was relieved his mind seemed to be affected. ... The man who relieved him was a tough, really tough Australian. ... three months passed before another schooner was available to go to the Anchorites. As I landed there came towards me a broken man. He shuffled along grasping a pole in either hand. He was gaunt and wasted, and a boy on either side assisted him. The tough man had cracked. 123 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A457 item V3/19 - Returned Soldiers. Preference to Returned Soldiers in Rabaul. letter of 23 July 1923 from Secretary, Rabaul RSSAILA to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department reporting resolution of 17 July. 2. Miller, Reminiscences, p. 9 3. Bassett, Letters from New Guinea 1921. p. 44 4. Beazley, New Guinea adventure, p. 58 163 On small, isolated plantations an Australian man could live for months with his labourers and local villagers without seeing another European and, as a result, many formed a liaison with village women despite Administration disapproval of this. Godeffroy's warning fifty years earlier to his traders not to associate with native women* was just as relevant to new arrivals in New Guinea. Loneliness, and the scarcity of European company, broke the control of many Australians who began to drink heavily. Some of their concoctions were memorable. Beazley was introduced to the "Maron cocktail" - a mixture of champagne, brandy, claret, some bitters, the beaten up yolk of a dozen eggs, and for good measure, a tin of O chopped peaches. Bassett had noted earlier that the only European men she saw drink water in New Guinea were the "Sydney University men" and the Administrator. - Exacerbating these problems was the refusal of the Board to permit wives and families of the employees to join them in New Guinea, claiming that every employee before engagement in Australia has it carefully explained to him that the operation of replacing Germans with Australians in the expropriated businesses and properties necessitates the men being mobile, so that they may be freely moved about as circumstances demand, therefore it is impracticable for them to be hampered by family responsibilities until the Germans have been repatriated, the new men have been fixed in fairly 123 1. Appendix to Journal of House of Representatives, New Zealand, 1874, vol. i. Papers relating to South Sea Islands, A.3. Memorandum by H.B. Sterndale - "Memorandum by Mr Sterndale on some of the South Seas Islands", p. 4 2. Beazley, New Guinea adventure, p. 58 3. Bassett, Letters from New Guinea 1921. p. 44 (during the Company and Imperial administrations impressive quantities of wine and beer were drunk as fresh water (other than from tanks) was impure. Sack noted that natives used the German bottle dump at Finschhafen as 'an obsidian mine' for years after the station was abandoned. (Sack, Land between two laws, p. 80). The German precedent was enthusiastically followed by Australians). 164 stable locations, and suitable quarters are available. Leaving aside the fact that most Germans had been repatriated by early 1922, the significant part of Lucas’s statement was the need for a staff capable of being ’’freely moved about” at the whim of the Board. The lack of their families, and the way in which staff were moved all over New Guinea with little warning, was a major reason for the high number of resignations mentioned above. A few weeks later Lucas reinforced his earlier claim in a telegram to Jolley (deputy chairman of the Board in Rabaul) that in his opinion malarial parts New Guinea no place for breeding women or young children. This was nonsense. The families of members of the Military Administration had lived in Rabaul and other centres with no ill effect to children or their mothers; many of its officers who transferred to the Civil Administration kept their families in New Guinea. Had newly appointed Board staff been allowed to bring their families with them they may have been more stable and not taken their frustrations out on plantation labour lines. Stories of floggings and assaults filtered back to Rabaul and reached the Australian press, and through it the League of Nations in Geneva. This was unfortunate as Australians were already considered 'particularly sensitive [ to ] and not over-enthusiastic about the O League' and certainly did not welcome criticism from it. Administration officials were quick to point out how they had to mediate in trouble caused by Board employees who should, they claimed, have never been allowed in the Territory. One Board manager was called 'the scum of Australia ... the District Officer requested he and another Board employee be removed in the interests of 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1 CP 146 item 650/4 - Territory of New Guinea. Administration - Central. "Employees wives and families admission to the Territory". Memo of 3 December 1920 from Chairman of the Expropriation Board to the Prime Minister. 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1 CP146 item 650/4 - Territory of New Guinea. Administration - Central. "Employees wives and families admission to the Territory", telegram from Lucas to Jolley, 29 January 1921. 3 3. Hudson, "New Guinea mandate: the view from Geneva", p. 142 165 the country'* Continuity of reliable and intelligent management is essential for maximum copra production; how plantations managed to keep producing with the generally low quality and high turnover of Board staff is a mystery. Between January 1920 and November 1922 while the Board was involved in preparing inventories and descriptions of expropriated properties for inclusion in the Catalogue of Expropriated Property (First Group), it experienced difficulties ranging from active interference by prescribed German nationals awaiting deportation to an almost totally inexperienced staff whose mistakes were to be an unfortunate legacy of the post-Board years. The infra-structure of New Guinea (coastal shipping, wharves, roads) had been neglected under the Military Administration, there were unpredictable fluctuations in the world price of copra and severe labour problems. All of these harrassed the Board and lend weight to the analogy drawn earlier with Pepys' view of the British navy. It is appropriate now to see whether the Board learned from its mistakes and improved its performance in the middle and last years of its existence. 1. Hopper, "Kicking out the Hun", p. 136 CHAPTER FOUR The later Board years 1923 - 1927 166 Soon after Civil Administration commenced in 1921 the Sydney Morning Herald warned that 'our handling of this Mandated Territory is on the way to becoming a first class scandal'.1 It was alleged that copra was not always sold for the best price and that the Board had lost £20,000 (at a time when the annual Australian grant to Papua was £30,000) by refusing an offer of the New Guinea Company to take 1,500 tons of copra then in store at a price of £38 a ton f.o.b. Rabaul. It was later sold in Sydney for between £16.10.0 and £18.17.6 a ton when the London price was £22.12.6.1 2 3 By 30 June 1922 (i.e. two and a half years after assuming control of plantations and other former German properties) the Board had a deficit of £702,032.18.1; a year later it had increased to £893,544.9.0.^ The Board admitted that operating losses would continue to occur because of the general inexperience of its staff, and other reasons including the collapse of the copra market, the effects of the Australian shipping strike, the lack of interest of those Germans retained temporarily on the Board's staff, and the transition period from German control to that of the Board. Confidence in New Guinea was replaced by an air of depression and stagnation which caused a visitor to comment that the place is quenched, squashed; a rich colony ha [s ] in an absurdly short time become insolvent. Outside Rabaul no pulse beats, the country is dead. Almost from the day the Board took over the plantations work commenced on counting coconut palms and estimating their ages, but as few plantations had up-to-date or accurate estate maps showing progressive plantings, a certain amount of guesswork was ineluctable. The Board took four years to collate inventories into the first Catalogue of expropriated properties. Because of the varying quality of its staff, many of its inventories and palm counts (discussed 1. Sydney Morning Herald, 22 November 1921 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. XLVII1921. p. 12009 3. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 16 4. Stead's Review 6 May 1922 167 below) were inaccurate while its refusal to do more than keep the plantations producing meant that normal maintenance work (clearing kunai grass, deeming drainage ditches, destroying insect pests) was neglected, if not abandoned eiltogether. Within a very short time plantations ran down emd became infested with kunai emd weeds, uncollected nuts sprouted in the long grass, and the Board found that the profitable properties it had taken over were becoming liabilities. Most of the older plemtations were on the Gazelle Peninsula where they were accessible to 'Sydney businessmen, travellers and tourists'* who visited Rabaul and Kokopo and it was not long before stories of their neglected state reached the Australian press. Criticism of conditions In 1923 Murray Ellis, an Australian journalist, 'went round the islands on a vessel, and was there for about a fortnight or three weeks'. He then wrote a series of articles for the Sydney Daily Telegraph in which he systematically criticised conditions in New Guinea. The criticisms were directed at the operation of the Civil Administration, but they related mainly to matters controlled by the Expropriation Board. Ellis's articles were discussed at length in the Australian Parliament, one member claiming that From what Mr Ellis says, the administration is being conducted in the interests of special private companies or individuals to enable them to make excessive profits at the expense of others. This was very close to the truth. Suspicion of company influence could be traced back at least to 1915 when Burns, Philp pressed for special permission to export 200 6-lb cases of meat from Sydney. This meat had been 'prepared to the high standard required for the British market and the only reason they have refused an Export Certificate was a slight carelessness during the scalding process which resulted in some wood 1 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 450 2. ibid., p. 926 3. ibid., p. 450 168 splinters from the troughs adhering to some part of the Meat'. But, as the firm hastened to point out, if export permission was granted the meat would be used 'solely for the feeding of our own Native Employees on our own O Plantations'. It was clear even then the part New Guinea was destined to play. The Australian government was severely embarrassed by Ellis's articles which came at a time when there was 'a strong feeling that the administration in O the Mandated Territories (sic) [ was ] very unsatisfactory'. Despite the guidance so generously offered by Walter Lucas^ the Board seemed unable to institute new, or maintain existing German, practices. Businesses and stores were allowed to run down; one store reportedly had a stock reduction from ^50,000 to y750;^ some closed, others amalgamated. Even though the plantations continued to produce copra for the European market, concern for conditions in New Guinea increased. To counter this, the Australian government in 1924 appointed Colonel John Ainsworth, a British administrative expert from Africa, to make an administrative survey of New Guinea. Ainsworth examined almost everything he could - to the alarm and irritation of Administration officers and Board staff. He found the Board to be 'almost a regular government concern' employing over 300 whites (almost all of whom were returned servicemen), often at the expense of other, 123456 1. unsigned letter (?W.H. Lucas) of 14.12.15 from Burns, Philp, Sydney, to Department of Trade & Customs, Melbourne. Burns, Philp Archives, Head Office. 2. ibid. 3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 450 4. 'on account of my previous connexion with Burns, Philp and Carpenters Ltd who are large tenderers for goods a n d buyers of produce I have consistently declined to use my unquestioned experience in the handling of individual transactions knowing that I would certainly be accused of bias'. Lucas in Cobcroft Report, p. 86 5. Hopper, "Kicking out the Hun", p. 145 6. Ainsworth Report, p. 13 169 equally suitable applicants. ’The redoubtable Ainsworth’1 regarded the employment of returned soldiers as unreasonable in every instance, pointing out that most would soon be too old for ordinary appointments in the Territory which he considered was a place for young men to start their careers. The Territory, he o urged, 'should not be made subject to ideals'. The Methodist Mission voiced cautious concern that Just as we rigorously exclude those who might damage our White Australia, so we must make a fine sieve to keep out from the Brown Pacific those coarse elements which would harm the native and retard his development. Just here a note of warning must be sounded regarding the policy of placing Returned Soldiers in these official positions. There is just a danger that, in our laudable desire to help men who have so splendidly served the Empire, we may unwittingly render disservice to the native race. If all other things are equal, then by all means let there be preference for returned men, but we must take care that efficiency is the measure of the selection, and that no sentiment, however worthy in itself, should be allowed to tip the scale. Another problem that had been remarked on was the rivalry between the Board and the Administration which saw the duplication of many administrative functions. For example, both maintained hospitals for native labourers; in Rabaul these were almost side by side, prompting the comment that There is something Gilbertian about this position; but it serves to indicate an absurd condition of affairs in the relations between the Administration smd the Expropriation Board, which should not be allowed to continue. One cannot be many days in the Territory before it becomes obvious that a state of friction exists between the two bodies, and in many cases the strained relations are evidenced between the respective employees even in outlying districts. 123 1. Townsend, District Officer, p. 91 2. Ainsworth Report, p. 6 3. Burton, The Australian Mandate in New Guinea, pp. 8/9 4, Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 23 170 The dual functioning of the Board and the Administration was acknowledged by the Prime Minister who advised the House that ’it is almost impossible to separate one from the other, and the actions of the Board are reflected upon to an even greater extent than those of the Administration’.'*' He reminded the House that 'By our administration of this mandated territory we O shaU be judged by the world’ and inferred that Ellis's articles might be linked to a concerted attempt by Germany to discredit Australia with the League of Nations. Australian delegates who attended the League's Assembly in Geneva in 1922 found that pamphlets attacking Australian actions in New Guinea had been distributed to all delegates (except themselves) by the "League of German Patriots". The pamphlets contained extracts from Australian newspapers of articles critical of events in New Guinea. They were seen as deliberate attempts by Germans to prejudice the position of Australia as the mandatory for New Guinea, and Prime Minister Bruce tried to discredit the aUegations of Ellis and others as more German propaganda. But in the 1922 edition of Stewart's Handbook of the Pacific Islands an article on New Guinea plantations had stated It would be impossible for any plantations to deteriorate more quickly than some did ... during the past thirteen months since the arrival of the Board. The Handbook was not a German sponsored publication, but an Australian one with wide circulation in the south Pacific and other tropical areas. Finally, the same year as aU this came to a head extracts from another German publication, Die Deutsche Wacht (The German Watch), were being quoted in the Australian Parliament^ where concern for conditions in New Guinea was growing. It was felt that the "aloofness" of buyers from properties in mandated territories (including New Guinea) was a result of a grand scheme by the German government - or at the very least, influential individuals - to discredit the new metropolitan governments administering the territories. This was reported to the Permanent 123 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 450 2. ibid, p. 921 3. Stewart's Handbook of the Pacific Islands, p. 340 4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 456 171 Mandates Commission of the League of Nations which, it was hoped, would rectify the matter1 but it was almost impossible to prove the suspicions against Germany and the matter passed into cm uneasy abeyance. Stung by the allegations against it, the Australian government sent four members of the House to New Guinea in 1923 to investigate and gather information to refute them. That there was truth in the allegations had already been made clear earlier that year by a Member of Parliament who visited New Guinea privately and wrote plantations everywhere are falling into a state of neglect ... they certainly did not reflect credit upon the Administration on behalf of the League of Nations. But the government was obliged to ignore this private opinion in favour, this time, of formal action. The delegation duly visited New Guinea and presumably toured the various centres which had been the subject of Ellis's attacks. Also presumably it submitted a report on its return to Australia but as this cannot be traced, and references to the delegation in subsequent volumes of the Debates are sparse, it might be assumed that members found more than a grain of truth in the allegations. Coincidentally, doubts were being expressed in the Australian Parliament whether 'the Mandate will prove more of a millstone than a blessing' as it was registering with some parliamentarians just how much money would be needed to administer New Guinea satisfactorily. 'Money', continued the speaker, 'that at present we can ill afford'.^ But the Australian government did not introduce changes to practices in New Guinea for in 1925 Jens Lyng wrote 1234 1. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 26 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p.986 3. ibid., p. 456 4. ibid., v. 104 1923/1924. p. 2425 172 One need not be a pessimist to admit that the economic development of the Mandated Territory has received a temporary set back which it will take time to make good, even if the plantations once more pass into private ownership. A closer look at the plantations will be useful in assessing just how the Board was maintaining them until they were offered for public tender. Plantations It had been recognised early in the military occupation that the main o industry of New Guinea was, 'and must continue to be', agriculture. It will be remembered that during the military occupation new plantations had been laid out, so as a result of the German's 'vigorous developmental policy' vast areas of O palms 'passed into the Custodian's hands'. Some of the plantations were recognised throughout the south Pacific as models of coconut agriculture. In 1921 Bassett had praised Kalili plantation as 'the best example in the islands'; it comprised nine thousand acres ... employed six hundred men ... oranges, pawpaws, pineapples and bananas grew nearby in a garden where there [ was ] a flourishing patch of English vegetables. There were goats and pigs and Javanese sheep, hens emd ducks, emd [ the manager ] never [ ate ] anything out of a tin except milk. C Yet two years later 'a glance at it beggars description'. Roads were swampy, irrigation channels had fallen in, palms choked by undergrowth four metres high were infested with weevils. By 1923 other prime plantations were in a similar state of neglect. At Tokua plantation the manager had hacked palm frond 1234 1. Lyng, Island Films, p. 240 2. Interim & Final Reports (Majority), p. 32 3. Auditor-General's Report 1927/1928. p. 31 4. Bassett, Letters from New Guinea 1921. p. 23 5. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 456 173 extremities from young trees to prevent them being fouled by ground cover - they were left looking like young pineapples. At Put Put plantation three thousand old and new palms were cut down 'because they were infested by leaf beetle'.* At New Massava plantation Murray Ellis was photographed on horseback in the middle o f the plantation; all that was visible was his white helmet. At Guntershohe plantation Ellis claimed to have walked three to four feet above ground on O rampant ground cover . He later wrote 1 have never seen anything approaching the Baining for jungle-like untidiness. Its condition forms a damning indictment of the Board and its ways and the depreciation must be almost beyond computation. ... They may clean it up, but the fact remains that they can never bring back the dead trees, never recover the income which has been lost, never repair the tremendous retardation which every plantation has suffered through ill-treatment. Ellis's allegations centred on plantations in the Baining area of the Gazelle Peninsula which was relatively isolated from Rabaul, being only easily accessible by sea and only comfortably so during certain times of the year. The Australian government was delighted to be able to counter his criticisms of plantations by quoting comments of George Fulton, manager of Levers' Pacific Plantations (mainly located in the British Solomon Islands), who was in Rabaul in late 1922 and subsequently said I visited a large number of plantations under the control of the Expropriation Board in New Britain, ... these, with few exceptions, were being well cared for as regards diseases and pests, and were being maintained in good order and condition as regards weeds and grass. Any exception to this general condition was usually due to lack of labour to do the 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 456 2. this is a little hard to believe. Ground cover was just that - a spreading, creeper type plant which choked kunai grass and small weeds. During World War Two plantations which had been kept clean pre-war with nitrogenous ground cover survived in a better state than those which had not used ground cover and, as a result, 'noxious weeds ran riot'. Alan Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea. Rabaul, n.p., 1951. p. 26 3. Brisbane Daily Mail, 27 June 1923 174 work, and the neglected condition of the property when handed over to the Board by their former German owners. Both Ellis’s and Fulton’s comments should be viewed with reserve. Ellis, as a journalist, seized on anything that would make good copy and while there was undoubted truth in a lot of what he wrote, the suspicion lingered (particularly in the Australian Parliament) that he was inclined to sensationalism. Fulton, visiting New Guinea privately, was an employee of a major copra producer and oil crusher (potentially Burns, Philp’s strongest rival) and his rather qualified comments were tactful. Both Ellis emd Fulton saw run-down emd poorly managed plemtations but whereas Ellis inclined to journalistic license in writing of these, Fulton looked behind the neglect for the reason. It was a reflection of the times that he blamed the lack of labour emd the condition of some of the plemtations when taken over by the Boeird as reasons for visible neglect. Labour problems in the early Board period were discussed in Chapter Three emd are an acceptable peirt-reason for the neglect of some plantations, but it is significant that blame for this was still being placed on former German owners who could hardly have been expected to maintain property in perfect condition after it had been taken from them. But more support for the way the Board was caring for the plantations came from Staniforth Smith, the Director of Agriculture in Papua, who wrote I saw a considerable number of plantations controlled by the Expropriation Board, and I , congratulate you on their appearance. The management seemed to be quite satisfactory, and considering the new material you had to handle, the results are surprisingly good. I also compared the plantations along the north road with their condition when I was there eighteen months ago, and noticed a great improvement. 1 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 928 2. ibid., p. 929 (see also footnote 1 p. 177) 175 Fulton and Smith had the experience to speak authoratively and their praise helped the Australian government turn aside some of the concern stirred up by Ellis's articles. Yet the criticism was so protracted, and so pointed, that neither the Administration (which bore the brunt of it), nor the Board, could damp it down. Much of the overseas criticism depended on information supplied by Germans still in New Guinea. Many German planters (mainly those married to Samoan, or other non-German, wives) who had appealed against prescription and expropriation were compelled 'to look helplessly on while the land which untiring years and even decades of patient labour had wrung from the tropical bush ... was being allowed to fall into decay as a result of unspeakable maladministration'.* The same inept administration of plantations occurred in the former German colony of Samoa which had been seized by New Zealand. In 1920, when a New Zealand Parliamentary Party visited Western Samoa it found three rubber companies had been bankrupted, while the demise of the Upolu Cacao and Rubber Estates Ltd was imminent. There and elsewhere in Samoa 'beautiful plantations of rubber and cacao were choked with weeds and had become the breeding ground for O pests'. It was as if Australia and New Zealand had deliberately set out to ruin the framework of enterprise in the former German colonies they had taken over, rather than profit from it. It was hoped that the newly appointed Director of Agriculture for New Guinea would assist and advise the Board's staff on maintaining plantations. Appointed in late 1922 Dr G.W. Bryce - who was not an Australian returned soldier - took up duty the following year. Possibly because his field was mycology (fungi) he was astonished by the emphasis on coconut cultivation and wrote in his first report that 1. H. Schnee, The German colonies under the Mandates. Leipzig, Huelle & Mener, 1922. p. 160 2. Western Samoa; land, life and agriculture in tropical Polynesia, p. 42 (quoting W.H. Triggs, "Samoa under New Zealand" in Quarterly Review no. 473, 1922). 176 The planting of coconuts has been carried out so extensively on European plantations, almost to the exclusion of other crops, the native inhabitants have been so much pressed to plant coconuts in their villages and coconut plantations, that the Territory may be said to be labouring mentally under the desolating blight of an obsession of coconut planting, which the natives may not unreasonably regard as the sole object of the presence of the white man in their country. True as they were, his remarks did not endear Bryce to the Board or the Australian government which were then preparing to offer the expropriated plantations for international tender. Bryce was concerned with New Guinea's dependence on one crop and warned that this was economically dangerous, particularly as it was produced on plantations under the control of the Board and run largely by unqualified and in experienced staff. He urged crop diversification and by 1925 was able to report an awakening interest in other crops, notably cotton (abandoned by the German administration in 1900 as labour intensive and economically impractical) which he hoped would broaden the base of agriculture and help stabilise the colony's financial position. He was all too aware of the dominance of the copra industry as the colony's export figures showed. The ratio of copra to other exports was alarming: 1919/1920 87.7% 1920/1921 95.5 1921/1922 95.0 1922/1923 98.2 1923/1924 97.9 1924/1925 98.15 source: Annual Report to the League of Nations 1924/1925. p. 22 This showed clearly that New Guinea had, as Bryce put it, 'all its eggs in one o basket' . An unfortunate result of this was that when the Bounties Act 1926 came into effect New Guinea could not take up opportunities for entering a significant market for coffee, cocoa, spices and tapioca through lack of planter action in 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1923/1924. p. 40 2. ibid., 1924/1925. pp. 21/23 177 diversifying their crops. Bryce was critical of the method of coconut cultivation on some plantations, urging the introduction of a good type of ground cover between young palms to reduce grass-cutting gangs, and cattle to graze between mature palms. But the cost of bringing cattle to New Guinea was high. Staniforth Smith commented that At present it costs a private plantation owner yiO per head to land cattle on his plantation from Australia, as the freight alone is Y_6 per head. ... assuming the Expropriated plantations are stocked up to 1 beast for every five acres, the cost would be #40,000, while a further y25,00Q would be required for fencing yards and cattle dips. Quite apart from the cost it was not easy to land cattle at some of the more isolated plantations where copra was carried to ships in lighters and cargo brought ashore the same way. Wilkinson tells how Large numbers of cattle were taken to the islands by the Malayan and during one voyage over a thousand head were taken on at Brisbane for the various plantations owned by BP & Co. Unloading where wharves did not exist was a hazardous experience, the cattle leaving the ship from a ramp to swim ashore. The bulls made straight for the land but the heifers would swim in any direction, often towards the open sea. The native "cowboys" in canoes rounded up the strays. Bryce also suggested that mature coconuts collected on plantations should be taken to a central point by wheeled vehicle similar to the bullock carts Germans had used, rather than be carried in sacks by labourers who would be more usefully employed in other plantation duties. Finally, and most significantly, Bryce said that the method of preparing copra needed improvement. Kiln-dried and sun-dried copra, he said, was preferable to smoke-dried copra which was 1 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1 Item 23/6377 - Valuation of coconut plantations. Letter of 10 March 1923 from Staniforth Smith, Administrator and Director of Agriculture, Papua, to Prime Minister, (note: Smith went to New Guinea ca. early 1923 "to act as umpire in an arbitration case, involving German interests, in certain coconut plemtations"). 2. B.A. Wilkinson & R.K. Wilson, The main line fleet of Burns Philp. Cemberra, The Nautical Association of Australia, Inc., 1981. pp. 100/101. 178 sometimes either burnt from over-drying or insufficiently dried. His comments show that Australians had simply taken over German ways of running plantations without developing newer, more practical, labour-saving methods. For example, it was not until 1970 that a coconut de-husking machine was brought into use.* Although Australia was charged with responsibility for developing New Guinea for the ultimate benefit of its natives, there was little official interest at this time in improving, or even commencing, native plantations. But there was concern that diseases and insect pests 'not so much in the extensive plemtations under European management as in the little cultivated emd poorly tended areas O owned by natives' should be controlled. District Officers on the New Guinea mainland (formerly Kaiser Wilhelmsland) did not continue the German practice of O "Kiap" plantations - that is, encouraging native plemtations - and existing native plantations there were neglected. District Officers on the Gazelle Peninsula and New Ireland were better able to promote emd oversee native plemtations because of their nearness to the administrative centre of Rabaul. Between 1910 and 1922 there was little increeise in native plantation copra production which was said to be about 6,000 tons'* in 1922. The only available figure for the area of land under C native copra plantations was given in 1921 as 20,000 acres and this figure seems to have remained stable for the rest of the Australian administration period. I have assumed that it does not include the area of village land forming self generating coconut groves rather than specifically established native plantations. Native copra was often imperfectly dried and generally brought a lower price than 1234 1. What do we do about plantations? p. 8 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1914/1921. p. 21 3. Melanesian pidgin for ''Captain'', i.e. a government official - usually a District, or patrol, officer. Mihalic, Grammar and dictionary of neo- Melanesian. p. 58 4. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/1922. p. 94 5. ibid., 1914/1921. p. 14 179 copra made on European plantations1 but it was still bought by local traders - usually Chinese - who paid badly, often in inferior trade goods. There had been a lot of strong feeling among natives and, to a more limited extent, among Europeans, that native plantations were an imposition on the natives and were really only encouraged for gains the Administration received in head tax payments earned from working on them. The truth was the Administration found native plantations difficult to create and tiresome to administer. Bryce's earlier comments about coconut cultivation indicated his feelings towards more coconut plantings and he stated he would institute agricultural development under which natives could gradually become producers of O crops other than coconuts if this was approved by the Administrator. The policy was not developed as his successor, H.G. Murray, was to claim that 'Prior to my 9 duties here no attempt had been made to organise native agriculture', which was rather sweeping. What could have been done was minimal. The Department of Agriculture depended very heavily on the pioneering work of the German administration which centred on the Kerevat Experimented Pleuitation established in 1905 on the north coast of the Gazelle Peninsula. Any expansion of this, or innovation of etny sort, depended in turn on the availability and expertise of staff. During 1922 eill European-established plemtations had been visited 'eis far as possible, also native groves and the trees in native villages'^ and detailed information and practiced demonstrations given to native owners supported by "careful instructions" written in Village Books (for the benefit of whom? Very few vdlagers could read or write). Short lectures, always including advice on the care of coconut groves, were given to villagers where they could be gathered together. One observer was not convinced that much was being achieved noting that 1. Interim & Final Reports (Agree), p. 17 2. Ainsworth Report, p. 7 3. H.G. Murray to Prime Minister of Australia, 19.7.37. Cilento Collection, Fryer Memorial Library, University of Queensland. 4. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/1922. p. 94 180 For all practical purposes other matters connected with agriculture are neglected ... the general impression left on my mind is that the native is mainly considered from a point of view of his usefulness in the planting of coconut palms and the output of copra. He continued; I am forced to the conviction that if the finances of this Territory cannot support an agricultural policy in addition to the education scheme just started, then the wisest course to adopt will be to scrap the "educational” theme, and start a general policy of enforced agricultural production amongst the natives with the help of inspectors. But there were too few staff to continue supervising or inspecting native plantations throughout New Guinea, or even on the Gazelle Peninsula alone. This, together with the fear that anything involving force might alarm the League of Nations, made the Administration reluctant to compel either the commencement of new native plantations, or the expansion of old ones. Native copra production accordingly remained variable depending largely on what trees villagers had access to. There were high hopes that copra production would increase annually as the Board settled into its job and the plantations were progressively taken up by new owners. In 1923 a total of 18,232 tons of copra was produced on Board plantations which was almost 3,000 tons higher them the previous year. Cobcroft prepared conservative estimates - ’subject to good management emd sufficient labour' - for production from Board plantations as follows; 30 June 1924 21,331 tons 1925 23,702 1926 25,741 1927 28,627 1928 30,941 1929 33,655 1930 34,469 source; Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 18 1. Ainsworth Report, p. 41 181 For the period to 1927 the estimates were conservative indeed but, as the table on p.217 shows, after that year when the majority of the plantations were owned by individuals or companies production grew steadily in volume, if not always in value. Cobcroft's projections could not have anticipated the way copra prices would rise and fall, nor could he have anticipated that the demand for coconut oil would weaken as technological advances allowed heavier oils to be refined to the point where they could replace coconut oil. Industry in overseas countries tended to favour oils manufactured locally from sunflower seeds, rape, soyabeans and animal fats in preference to imported raw products, and the demand for the latter fell away. It was unfortunate that the decline in demand for coconut oil coincided with the acceptance of tenders for the First and Second Groups of expropriated properties in New Guinea. Disposing of the plantations As soon as the First Group of properties was advertised for sale Burns, Philp received requests for financial assistance from would-be planters. Few had enough money for even the required deposit and they turned to Burns, Philp for help* even though it was later claimed that W.R. Carpenter & Co. had financed most of the successful tenderers in the Rabaul area. Burns, Philp had decided in principle that it would make the deposit for such men as have sufficient money to carry on the upkeep on the Plantations without further monetary assistance and who sign a Trading Agreement to sell the whole of their Copra and other produce to the Company, and buy the whole of their merchandise needs from the Company on an agreed upon basis. Each planter financed signed a "charging agreement" by which he 1 1. Buckley <5c Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns Philp 1914-1946. p. 181 2. ibid., p. 184 3. F. Wallin, Sydney, to F.O. Greenwood, Rabaul. 18.8.25. Burns, Philp Archives, Head Office. 182 bound himself to ship, buy, sell, insure and recruit through Burns, Philp and there was virtually no other trade with any other firm or person until he was "free", that is, had made all his repayments. Also included in the charging agreement was the requirement for the planter to sell all his produce to the firm at a price based on ^7.10.0 below the London price for hot air copra delivered to Rabaul (as quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald each Monday). As well as loaning would-be owners the percentage of purchase price due on acceptance of a tender, both companies advanced cash to take over stores, labour etc., and to pay quarterly instalments due to the Custodian. Of the 45 plantations offered for sale in the First Group 41 were successfully tendered for by Australian returned soldiers - most of whom were Board employees. The new owners (see Appendix A) took possession on 1 June 1926. The terms applicable to Australian returned soldiers were generous: 5% of the purchase price had to be submitted with the tender, 10% submitted within three months, and the balance was to be repaid over 20 years at 5% interest O payable annually. By comparison, 'outsiders' (i.e. successful tenderers who were not Australian returned soldiers) had to submit 10% of the tender price with the tender, 10% for each of the next four months, and the balance of 50% was to be paid over 5 years at 6.5% interest payable annually.4 A returned serviceman planter's payments spread over a twenty year period were calculated at the rate of about m a quarter (interest and principal) on every yi,000 of the purchase price of the plantation, after the deposit of 15% was paid. For example, 123 1. Hopper, "Kicking out the Hun", p. 182 2. one informant repeated the story that the Rowe Brothers of Malapao plantation had a charging agreement with Burns, Philp which required them to sell all the plantation's "produce" to the firm. Sensing a flaw in the terms of the agreement the brothers provided piles of unhusked coconuts for the firm's trucks, saying they represented the "produce" of the plantation and that Burns, Philp had the responsibility for processing them into copra. The informant claims Burns, Philp cancelled the brothers' charging agreement in return for a promise not to advise other planters of the legal flaw until all its agreements could- be re-drafted. 3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 4979 4. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 25 183 Ningau plantation with a purchase price of ^64,000 attracted mean payments of about y3,600 a year. At the conclusion of the sale of First Group properties the Rabaul branch of the RSSAILA thanked the Australian government for 'the manner in which the recent sale of the properties was conducted, and for the very liberal terms given to returned soldiers'.* These proved a mistake as returned soldiers tended to outbid each other for choice plantations, and so inflated prices. Yet upset prices for the First Group, according to Archer, were very low. Whether this was to encourage tenders after the initial poor response in 1922 when only one tender was received for advertised properties is not clear, but Archer claims prices rose quite sharply for Second Group properties and higher still for those in O the Third Group. Properties in the Second and Third Groups were offered later in 1926 (the Third Group properties were not finalised until July 1927); their tender prices were substantially higher than those paid for First Group properties. All plantations attracted high prices: for example, Archer paid ^20,225 for Jame O plantation in Buka Passage which had been valued at 78,800. It was suspected by potential tenderers in Rabaul, Sydney and Melbourne that Burns, Philp and Carpenters forced prices up to discourage individual buyers who were not under a financial commitment to them. As a result, the upset prices of Second and Third Group properties were disclosed to all tenderers before tenders were accepted to allow them to submit amended tenders if they wished1* and also to avoid any accusations of malpractice. 123 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 4979 2. F.P. Archer to B. Molloy (solicitor), Sydney. 17.12.51. Archer papers. 3. ibid. 4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 4399 184 When the price of copra fell - and it did soon after all the plantations had been bought - many purchasers were unable to meet their monthly instalment repayments of capital, with predictable results. Burns, Philp and Carpenters^ had anticipated that the price of copra would fluctuate as the world demand eased, and had also anticipated that some plantations would fall into their hands as returned soldiers became financially troubled. The Yarwood, Vane Report had stated bluntly that the number of returned Australian soldiers with sufficient capital to put up the 25 per cent purchase money required in the first three months who would wish to invest and settle in the Territory would be few; ... copra plantations in small areas carrying a load of debt (e.g. Suma Suma [ in the Western Islands ] ) in respect of purchase money, are not investments greatly to be desired ... If the extended terms of payment of purchase money under Regulation No. 50 ... are framed to induce men of small capital to purchase a plantation with a view to working on it and paying off the balance by annual instalments out of the profits to be made, we are of the opinion that they are not sufficiently generous to attract, unless the value of copra should rise considerably. At average prices for the returned Australian soldier able to put up only the early instalments, amounting to 25 per cent of the purchase, would have strenuous work to meet his interest bill and purchase money instalments and the requirements of his family resulting from tropical residence. Even Lucas had foreseen that some of the larger plantations would pose problems to individuals beyond their capacity to meet and had suggested ’they were more 9 properly company ventures'. But this would have offended the concept of rewarding Australian exservicemen with a plantation in New Guinea, and the advice was ignored. No one seemed to think it unusual that New Guinea, which the Australian government insisted had to be self-sufficient as soon as possible, 123 1. the way these two companies were regarded in New Guinea is shown in Buckley's note that their initials caused them to be known as ''Bloody Pirates", and "Would Rob Christ". Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 147 fn. 2 2. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 26 3. Cobcroft Report, p. 80 185 depended for its revenue on a single crop produced on plantations mortgaged to the Custodian o f Expropriated Property whose owners were, mostly, financially dependent on one of the two rival companies. These anticipated eventually owning all the plantations as planters defaulted on their debts and the companies took over the properties. But in this they were wrong; each expropriated plantation was mortgaged to the Custodian who, until his account was fully settled, remained the owner. Not every planter realised this and some were intimidated by the companies threatening to take over their plantations for unpaid debts. From the beginning of Australian administration it was clear that major companies, rather them individuals, would ultimately benefit whatever initially happened to the plantations. If they were sold to private owners and operated successfully the companies would benefit as agents and shippers; if the government had accepted the early tenders of Burns, Philp and later the Melanesia Company (discussed below) they would benefit from profits, tax reductions and, undoubtedly, subsidies for lean periods; and even if plantations were operated unsuccessfully (as happened in many cases) the company would benefit from the "charging system" mentioned above, freight rates and general shipping. Many plantations eventually fell into the hands of Burns, Philp and Carpenters as planters could not meet their debts or maintain their properties because of the low world price for copra. Few had cash reserves, and in turning to the companies for help many started the long slide towards losing control of their plantations. By 1928 Burns, Philp had interests in a number of former Expropriation Board properties valued at more than yi.,000,000.1 It is ironic to think that the Australians who had eagerly replaced the German plantation owners less than ten years earlier were themselves being replaced as owners. In retrospect the companies were probably relieved at their lack of success in acquiring all - or a sizeable number - of the plantations as their capital value fell with the price of copra, and the basis on which they had been valued (the 1925/1926 copra prices) was permanently altered. 1. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns Philp 1914-1946. p. 107 186 Even before the Board was wound up in November 1927 complaints were received that the actual number of coconut palms on many plantations differed from the total stated in the Catalogues. In accordance with Treaty of Peace regulation 51AA purchasers of expropriated plantations were advised that where the number of coconut palms on their plantation/s was ten per cent or more below the advertised number they could claim a reduction on the purchase price based on this difference.^ In August and September 1927 the Custodian and the chairman of the Board placed newspaper advertisements advising that all claims for shortages had to be lodged by 31 October. A notice in the Rabaul Times no. 147 of 10 February 1928 extended the date to 30 April 1928 and informed planters that the Custodian would visit New Guinea to settle disputes of palm shortages. A subsequent notice in issue no. 195 of the Rabaul Times stated the Custodian "would not entertain claims" after 31 December 1928, and a final notice - this time in the Government Gazette - advised that all claims had to be lodged with the Custodian before 31 March 1930. Archer discovered that the count for Jame plantation was 2,270 palms short and submitted a claim for adjustment. His experience with the Board was probably typical for all affected planters: In Aug 1928 a Custodian's Inspector (Shepherd) came out and counted palms. He made the shortage 1354 palms and, as the Custodian would not recompense a purchaser for loss (or shortage) unless the shortage was over 10 per cent, my claim was rejected. ... Shepherd only made the shortage LESS than 10 per cent by including in his count 915 "Replants" of (allegedly) 3 years planting. The Custodian sold me 6-7-8 year old palms and with no mention of "Re plants". Besides, these "replants" were not such - they were merely germinated nuts that had been placed in position - alongside or on top of an original palm that had died out and rotted - by the weeding gang on its rounds. They were just placed there without any attempt at planting and could never, in any case, have survived. In counting I had not taken them seriously but had not removed anything in case it might be said that I had interfered with growing palms in order to reduce my numbers before a check was made by an authorised officer. I thought that1 1. Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.57. Department of Territories Correspondence File. 'C' Series, "a) Shortage of Palms, b) Native Rights", 1927-1935. Opinion no. 126/1929 of Crown Solicitor to Secretary, Attorney-General's Department. 187 their origin and worthlessness was so obvious that no one would attempt to count them. I protested to Shepherd about it - he was an inexperienced man as regards plantations and had been in a clerical position. He said, "Well, 1 must count everything that is growing but I will put them in as 'Re-plants"'. ... I have always maintained that the Com. Govt sold me something that did not exist and that it could not be honest or correct. I have asked about it since but have always been refused a hearing. Archer said that his claims for 2,000 palms at j l a palm ('at the purchase price rate') was refused on a technical point. This, as the Minister for Territories subsequently advised him (in 1952) was because at the time o f counting you argued with the Inspecting Officer on the inclusion of what you alleged to be the baby and inferior palms. The then Custodian took the view that he was bound by the Regulation which referred only to a difference in the number of palms and not to any description or quality, and in the circumstances he was unable to accede to your request to have the benefit of Regulation 51AA extended to your case. Archer's letter to his solicitor reveals serious faults in the compilation of original material for the Catalogue of First Group properties. To make sure these did not recur Alan Richards was 'called to Australia from Madang [ in 1926] to help in Melbourne with the 2nd and 3rd Group Catalogues [ as well as ] advising the q tenderers on properties for sale'. After touring Second and Third Group plantations in 1927 to check details, Richards was appointed Branch Manager of the Board at Rabaul. But even with an acknowledged expert checking Catalogue details mistakes occurred. Up to 1938 Richards investigated claims of palm shortages and other alleged deficiencies which resulted in compensation payments of about #50,000 being made to owners.^ The Australian government was in no1234 1. F.P. Archer to B. Molloy (solicitor), Sydney. 17.12.51. Archer papers. 2. copy of unsigned letter from Minister for Territories, Canberra, to F.P. Archer, Jame plantation, Bougainville. 7.2.1952. Archer papers. 3. extracted from curriculum vitae in Richards papers. 4. extracted from notes in Richards papers. 188 hurry to settle claims - one submitted by H.A. Coldham of Bali plantation in the Witu islands took 24 years to finalise.1 Incorrect palm counts were yet another complication to the existing problems involving land titles and native claims, all of which became the sole responsibility of the Civil Administration after the Board was wound up. It is examined more closely in Chapter Five. Selling the plantations In early 1925 Lucas resigned as chairman of the Expropriation Board and withdrew from the New Guinea scene. He was replaced by his deputy, Jolley, but this was only a temporary arrangement as the Australian Cabinet decided in April that he should be dismissed because o f his eccentric behaviour and abrasive personality. When two unspecified positions on the Board were advertised, Jolley O realised his was one of them for he left Rabaul suddenly in July and went to England. It was alleged in the Australian press that he took with him 'valuation figures of plantation properties in New Guinea* to which he had access as deputy chairman, and subsequently chairman, of the Board. It was further alleged that before he left Rabaul Jolley had ordered a clerk to gather certain other figures for him with the promise of 'a large cash bonus and a job on the plantations' as a reward. These figures were placed with a friend of the clerk in Sydney, from o whom they were subsequently removed by the New South Wales police. , In London Jolley was associated with the formation of the Melanesia Company, incorporated as a private company on 31 March 1926. It was financed by H.M. Warburg & Co. of Hamburg (which, it will be recalled, had helped finance Wahlen's takeover of Queen Emma's empire in 1910) and subsequently by the Hamburgische Sudsee Aktien Gesellschaft (HSAG). With a nominal capital of 12 1. F.P. Archer to B. Molloy (solicitor), Sydney. 17.12.51. Archer papers. 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 4978 3. Smith's Weekly, 4.9.26. p. 1 189 yil0,000, it was formed for the purpose of 'acquiring and turning to account lands, rights or options in respect of land, and of cultivating and utilising the same for tropical agriculture or any other purpose'.* Jolley's up-to-date knowledge of the expropriated properties - even without the support of the "figures" - was invaluable to the Company which submitted a tender for V2,200,000 (about ^350,000 more than the 1926 collective valuation of the properties) for all properties in New Guinea and Papua offered for sale by the Custodian in Melbourne on 31 March 1926; coincidentally, the same day the Melanesia Company was incorporated as a private company. The tender was marginally lower than two others also submitted from London for all the plantations: those of Inigo Freeman-Thomas, and the combined tender of the Scottish-Malay Rubber Co. and J.A. Hunter. The Melanesia Company's tender for all plantations in New Guinea caused consternation in Australia and New Guinea as it was obviously a front for German business to "buy back the farm". The Administrator advised the Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department that in my opinion the Melanesia Company is dominated by German influence, and does or may form a powerful group in the Territory, with the consequent development of a paramount German commercial and industrial element controlling the greater part of the raw material products, with all such a control connotes in the way of shipping, imports etc., ... 12 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Accession CP176/83, item A314. The Office of Public Trustee and Custodian of Expropriated Property, Subject Index to General Correspondence of the Public Trustee, "Melanesia Company Limited. Application to charge its rights under contracts of sale in favour of the British and International Trust Limited, and appointment of Receiver on behalf Debenture Holders", 1928-1931. "Observations" by Geo. W. Hutcheson, Assistant Official Receiver, London. 13.9.32. 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A518, item F824/1, Part I. Department of External Territories, Correspondence file, multi-number series, classes relating to External Territories: "Dummying in Expropriated Properties, 1929". letter of 21.9.29 from Administrator, Rabaul, to Secretary, Prime Minister's Dept., Canberra. 190 He urged the need ’to be posted in the situation to the utmost possible'1 because of the dangers he felt the company posed. The RSSAILA was also alarmed that the entry of the company into New Guinea might open the way for German investors to regain properties to the exclusion and detriment of Australian returned soldiers. Germany's continuing interest in its former colony had been shown in 1916 when former Governor Hahl sought to enter New Guinea alone, and again in 1919 with H.R. Wahlen. Both applications were refused by the Australian 2 government. The company's tender was officially rejected because of its preponderance of German share-holders; the Australian government did not consider that, as constituted, it was eligible under the Treaty of Peace to own lands in New Guinea. To by-pass this its' Articles of Association were amended in November 1926 by special resolution to ensure that two-thirds of any shares, debentures etc. issued by it were held by British subjects (giving rise to the interesting thought that a major "dummying" (discussed shortly) company itself may have had "dummies" as share-holders). Nominal British share-holders were invited to join its board, but by the time formalities were completed all First Group properties had been allocated. Most of the Gazelle Peninsula plantations were sold in the First Group of properties (see Appendix A) and it could be argued that as the oldest emd most productive of the colony's plantations, they were the pick of them. It could also be argued that by not securing some of these choice, producing plantations the Melanesia Company's future was almost immediately at risk.21 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A518, item F824/1, Part I. Department of External Territories, Correspondence file, multi-number series, classes relating to External Territories; "Dummying in Expropriated Properties, 1929". letter of 21.9.29 from Administrator, Rabaul, to Secretary, Prime Minister's Dept., Canberra. 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1 item 23/2018 - Department of Home & Territories. Correspondence files, Annual single Number Series. Minute 16 June 1919 from Secretary, Prime Minister's Department to Secretary, Home & Territories Department. 191 Tenders for First Group properties were received mainly from Australian ex-servicemen. These included former members of the military Administration who had returned to Australia, others who had transferred to the Civil Administration and remained in Rabaul, and those who had never been in New Guinea but who submitted tenders in their own name on behalf of companies (Carpenters, the Melanesia Company, Burns, Philp) using company funds. Those "dummies" who won plantations transferred control of them by power of attorney to the financing company. The frequency with which powers of attorney were given to companies did not seem to concern the Custodian at any time. Jack Chapman is an example of a dummy who used money advanced to him by Carpenters to tender successfully for the following plantations; name tender price Kuradui ■/4,250 Maulapao 8,300 Neinduk 19,500 Palmalmal 4,000 Raniolo 19,000 Ulaveo 63,000 Wangaramut 22,500 ■/141.100 These were all quality First Group plantations located on the Gazelle Peninsula, well-established and bearing well. Chapman transferred a twenty year power of attorney to Carpenters for every plantation; he did not visit New Guinea to inspect the plantations he had won. But Chapman's remarkable affluence attracted the attention of many people and led to Senator Chapman (presumably no relation) asking in Parliament if all the above plantations, as well as Kul, Dogumor, Bogadjim, Siar, Potsdamhafen, Katu, Fissoa, Fileba, Kolube, Koka, Komalu, and Ungan plantations were taken over and being worked by the original allottees. Senator Chapman also asked if the allottees had ever visited them, or if they were taken over by one firm on their behalf. Chapman had opened a Pandora's box of deceit and trickery and the answer given by the Minister for Home & Territories tersely agreed that 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series - Individual Plantations, New Guinea, file S.186 Maulapao plantation. 192 the plantations had been taken over by one company under power of attorney, and were being worked on behalf of the respective purchasers. The answer concluded that until all the purchase money had been paid to the Custodian, he remained the owner, and ’no assignment, or transfer, or charge on the purchaser's rights under the contract of sale may be made without the Custodian's consent'. 'The Government', the answer admitted, 'has no control over agreements between the Australian soldiers and the companies, firms or persons financing them'.* There were so many pointers as to what was happening in the scramble for plantations that it is hard to understand how they were missed. It is obvious why companies encouraged returned servicemen to dummy for them and gain plantations; apart from enjoying (illegally) ex-servicemen's concessions - discussed above - the savings in capital outlay emd interest were considerable. Few dummies came to New Guinea to see their properties even though regulation 49 of the Treaty of Peace provided that each tender should contain a statement that the tenderer had inspected the property for which he was tendering, or was prepared to accept it with all faults if his tender was accepted. It would be interesting to know how many, if any, "owners" subsequently lodged claims with the Australian government for palm shortages, or incorrect total land areas, where they had not inspected the plantation prior to tendering. In a sense this was done as the firm funding the purchase had undoubtedly inspected the plantation, but the nominal owner (i.e. the dummy) in most cases had not. It was a flaw in the conditions of sale that there was no obligation for a successful tenderer to either live on his property, or elsewhere in New Guinea. Possibly the Board was preoccupied with internal problems and missed these points. Its chairman had resigned, its acting chairman had sensed his dismissal was imminent and gone to England, was dismissed, and then became closely involved with a German sponsored company intent on buying all the New Guinea properties. Pinner, the Board accountant and sole remaining member of the Board, carried on in Rabaul while the Australian government searched for a new chairman. Faithful to the period, it chose a soldier - Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O., who was appointed in 1926 at an annual salary of 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 117 1927/1928. p. 2137 193 yi,500. The Australian Treasurer advised Parliament that Peck had ’good organizing and business ability' and had 'studied various businesses in England after the war'.* But members were now paying close attention to New Guinea affairs and, pressed to amplify Peck's experience in coconut plantations, the Treasurer replied that Peck had a wide experience of affairs, and before his appointment as chairman of the board had some knowledge of tropical conditions. [ But the Treasurer was forced to admit that ] Prior to his present appointment he ha [ d] not been employed directly in tropical work. This vague statement - smacking of a "jobs-for-the-boys’’ appointment - did not satisfy the questioner who retorted, with unusual perspicacity, that 'One could gain some knowledge of tropical conditions by reading a novel of Beatrice O Grimshaw’. Peck had filled administrative posts in the Australian Imperial Force during and after the war, the last one as Director of Supplies and Transport. While administratively experienced, he had no knowledge of New Guinea or tropical conditions generally. With the departure of Lucas and Jolley the Board needed a firm, well-qualified chairman to finalise the disposal of expropriated properties. The Australian government had weathered the storm of international criticism on its administration of New Guinea and the expropriated properties (mainly by ignoring it), and it was obvious that with sales of First and Second Group properties completed, the Board was coming to an end. Peck's demise as chairman was hastened by revelations that a private individual (Mrs F. Gilmore) had signed Board letters on behalf of the branch manager at Rabaul4 which Peck denied. He was proved wrong, and his appointment lapsed. Following this it was decided that as the winding up of the Board was imminent, the Custodian's interest in expropriated properties could be looked after by the appointment of a Delegate to the New Guinea Administration. The1 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 4969 2. ibid., p. 4970 3. ibid. 4. ibid. 194 first Delegate, A.J. Egan, took up his position in late 1927 with a small staff of officers including a Cashier, Titles O fficer, Properties Officer and certain Inspectors whose number varied according to requirements.* The Delegate's office took over the collection of local instalment payments, adjustments to title matters, exercised a general supervision over the properties mortgaged to the Custodian, and managed such properties still in the Custodian's hands or which might return to him for any reason. He maintained records in Rabaul, and only some copies of these were sent to Melbourne or Canberra - a serious lapse of judgment which is discussed in Chapter Five. Egan was supposed to report regularly to the Custodian but his reports were less frequent and less detailed than those of his successor, J.C. Archer. Bredmeyer says that Archer took over from Egan in mid-1930 but letters in Burns, Philp's archives signed by Egan indicate he was still the Delegate in mid-1932. Shortly before the closing date for the sale of Second Group properties the Custodian, W.C. Harvey, visited New Guinea where he was urged by the President of the RSSAILA to limit the valuation of plantations sold to any person to 750,000 as the League was concerned about the effects dummying could have on its members. Although acknowledging the idea had merit, Harvey considered that placing a value limit on successful tenderers might reduce interest in properties which would be reflected in the number and value of tenders received. This could mean that the Australian government would be liable to compensate the German government for any difference between open, unrestricted sales and actual sale prices. Harvey's caution proved unnecessary for in March 1927 the Australian government restricted the value of properties sold to any person to 775,000, except where no other tender reached the approximate official valuation of the property. This decision relied on the original Treaty of Peace regulation 50D(3)123 1. Auditor-General's Report 1927/1928. p. 29 2. Bredmeyer, The registration of land in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, p. 130 3. for example, reference 5239/A.238 of 20 June 1932 - A.J. Egan (Delegate of the Custodian of Expropriated Property) to the Director, Burns, Philp & Co. Ltd., Sydney. Burns, Philp Archives, University of Sydney. 195 (the title for any property remains with the Custodian until fully paid for), the provisions of the Transfer of Land Control Ordinance 1924 and subsequent amendments, and the new Treaty of Peace regulations 60 (ability to call witnesses) and 61 (tender made in good faith), to control the acquisition of property emd to check dummying. By the time it was introduced the restriction only applied to Third Group properties which were not as attractive as those in the First and Second Groups: they were newer, generally located in the more remote areas of the colony, and were already experiencing labour problems. Tenders for Second Group properties closed in November 1926 amid accusations of dummying*, a practice not new to New Guinea. It had been fairly common knowledge during the German Administration that Kaiser Wilhelm had a share in Aropa plantation (Bougainville)2 and possibly others. Robin McKay (a former owner of Aropa) told me he knew of Kaiser Bill’s involvement in Aropa. The German Government developed it as an Experimental Station, cleared and planted it etc. and paid the "owners" (the Berlin Board) for the privilege, and Directors fees etc. A very profitable little racket. Dummying for all plantations in New Guinea - whether expropriated or no - was very prevalent as companies and individuals moved to acquire as many properties as possible. The Administrator strongly suspected that Jolley, who had returned to Rabaul as manager of the Melanesia Company, was dummying for his principals in buying privately owned properties worth /LOO,000. The Australian Cabinet considered the question of dummying on 13 December 1926 and how it might be checked. Under the Treaty of Peace regulation 50D(3), and the New Guinea Transfer of Land Control Ordinance 1924, a purchaser of an expropriated property 12 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. pp. 5380/5381 2. Captain L. Klugkist, on board M.V. "Ravenstein", to F.P. Archer, Rabaul. 9.4.63 (Klugkist was a nephew of Captain "Savee-Box" - whose name was translated into pidgin by Australians: in German "Klug" means wise, and "kist" means box. The elder Klugkist had been an NDL captain in the German period, the younger was captain of the Bremerhaven 1928/1935). 3. personal communication from Robin McKay, Alstonville. 23.12.86. 196 could not transfer or deal in any way with his interest in that property without the approval of the Custodian and the Administrator. The Australian government had been satisfied that this prevented a transfer from a dummy to his principal but, after confirming the Second Group tenders accepted by the Custodian (see Appendix B) it decided the legislation needed strengthening. Under the Treaty of Peace regulation 46A which came into force on 14 July 1927 the Custodian was prevented from selling to anyone property which exceeded 7250,000 in value, or property which together with other property that person was purchasing, exceeded 7250,000. Amendment no. 26 of the Transfer of Land Control Ordinance 1924 (which also came into effect on 14 July 1927) provided that the Administrator "shall not approve" any transaction which would result in a person having land in New Guinea worth more than 7250,000 without the consent in writing of the Minister. Amendment no. 14 of 1928 qualified this still further by adding "which in the opinion of the Administrator is more than 7250,000". The Melanesia Company was fortunate that the 7250,000 limit was introduced after sales had been made to it, or its agents. The company was sold Second Group properties worth 7?6,742. Its tendering attracted a lot of interest in New Guinea where it was widely thought to be the source of funds for a number of prominent Australian ex-servicemen who had won plantations. The Company was the second highest tenderer for many properties in the Second Group but, as mentioned above, the Australian government had placed a limit of 775,000 on individual plantations sold to any one person except where no other tender reached the official valuation. This was prompted by the suspicion that plantations totalling 7365,283 bought by Jolley, Stroyan, Griffiths and Blaxland (all employees of the Melanesia Company), as well as by Sir Robert Anderson (a director of the Company) were actually obtained on behalf o f it. A full list of the New Guinea interests of the Melanesia Company, its employees, directors (and ex-directors) and agents showed holdings totalling 7595,856.1 Of this, only Raulawat plantation - previously owned by Jolley but transferred to his wife in 1915 - and Kulon plantations were on the Gazelle Peninsula; the remaining plantations were mainly on New Ireland. 1. Auditor-General's Report 1928/1929. p. 30 197 The Administrator was suspicious of all these purchases and recommended that no further properties be sold to the Company or its known dummies. At the conclusion of sales of Second Group properties in December 1926 the Melanesia Company and its "agents" held the following property: approx, price Melanesia Co. Ltd. 5 plantations and various yi73,000 business premises F. R. Jolley (Company manager) 3 plantations 146,000 Sir Robert Anderson (Company director) 2 plantations 102,000 W.E. Griffiths (Company accountant) & G. H. Blaxland (Company employee) 4 plantations 76,000 J.R. Stroyan (? Company employee) business premises 17,000 -/514.000 source: List of New Guinea Properties sold by the Custodian of Expropriated Property as at 1st January 1928. All five individuals named were Australian ex-servicemen. In January 1927 the contracts of sale between the Custodian and Anderson, Griffiths and Blaxland were presented to the acting Administrator (Judge Wanliss) for approval under the Transfer of Land Control Ordinance 1924. Wanliss withheld approval as he considered them dummies and sought clarification of their ownership. He said that public feeling in New Guinea was strongly against dummying which was known to be widespread. At the same time he recommended the introduction of an Ordinance to provide for the cancellation of a contract and the forfeiture of all monies paid if it were proved the purchaser was a dummy. His recommendation went further than the provision of Treaty of Peace regulation no. 61 which simply allowed for a tender to be rejected, and was not accepted by the Australian government - perhaps because of discreet pressure from the companies. 198 The Secretary of the Department of Home & Territories referred Wanliss's objection to the Treasurer who, in turn, accepted the Custodian's advice that as the sales had been approved by Cabinet they should not be cancelled. The Administrator's suspicions about dummying were being proved correct, but not even he could have guessed how widespread it was. The first indication of a link between the Melanesia Company and Carpenters appeared early in 1927 when Jolley admitted that Stroyan was an agent for Carpenters (and not, as had been suspected, the Melanesia Company) which had provided all the monies for his purchases. In February, Sir Robert Anderson's solicitors in Melbourne advised the Custodian that his tenders had also been made on behalf of the same company even though Anderson was a director of the Melanesia Company.* The link was further revealed when Anderson and Stroyan subsequently applied to transfer their properties to the Melanesia Company; the Custodian refused this. Alarmed that one of the two major firms in New Guinea was co-operating in the stealthy expansion of German enterprise there through financing dummies to acquire properties, and then later seeking to transfer them to the German company, the Administrator prodded the Custodian into examining records to see if other dummying had occurred for Carpenters. The Custodian wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Home & Territories on 21 October 1927 that he had been unable to secure any proof that the purchasers of the plantations mentioned ... have acted, or are acting as dummies for W.R. Carpenter <5c Company Limited. ... there is every evidence that the purchases were made in good faith as required by Treaty of Peace regulation no. 61. Harvey's statement was very much at odds with the facts and may have alerted the government even more. In retrospect, there was no need to worry. 12 1. Auditor-General's Report 1928/1929. p. 30 2. Commonwealth Archives Office; CRS A518, item F824/1, Part I. Department of External Territories, Correspondence file, multi-number series, classes relating to External Territories: "Dummying in Expropriated Properties, 1929". 199 Under eleven agreements with the Custodian dated 24 March 1927 the Melanesia Company had purchased properties in New Guinea, and by the terms applicable to all contracts for the acquisition of expropriated property the purchase prices were payable in quarterly instalments with the vendor (i.e. the Custodian) retaining ownership until payment had been made in full. But the Company was experiencing financial difficulties, and in July 1928 H.R. Wahlen (former chairman of Forsayth Gesellschaft and the most prominent planter in New Guinea at the time of occupation) and his nephew, Max Thiele, joined the board to supplement Jolley's practical knowledge. They could do little and on 15 February 1929 the Company executed in favour of British & International Investment Trust Limited a second mortgage (subject to those held by the Custodian) over its Kulon and Bulung plantations. The Company was foundering, and plantations that had been profitable under German administration were turning into liabilities under Australian administration. The situation was so bad that Wahlen sought to enter New Guinea in 1929 to investigate but, he claimed with typical bombast, 'the Australian Government in Canberra ... feared that my great influence during the German times might cause restlessness among the natives'1. The truth was that Germans were very much persona non grata in New Guinea, so much so that a British director (C.B. Crisp) of the Melanesia Company informed the Custodian that his board was trying to purge "the German element" from it. This was an interesting thought as the Company was almost completely dependent on HSAG for finance; it had not been overwhelmed by British underwriters on its formation. Between 1926 and 1929 the Company recorded losses of y20,452.9.0 and its accounts for the last year of operation could not be audited as it did not have the funds to pay the auditor. On 25 November 1929 Crisp again wrote to the Custodian to advise him that the board wished to sell out and had interested an Australian firm in taking over the Company's operations. But before this could be done, the ^250,000 value limit placed on any company's ownership of property in O New Guinea would have to be waived. The Custodian supported the request, knowing that if the properties reverted to him by default he would have to arrange for their re-sale. 12 1. undated (?1962) copy of letter from H.R. Wahlen, Hamburg, to Foreign Office, Bonn. Archer papers. 2. Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra. Accession CP176/83 item A314. "Melanesia Company Limited. Application to charge ...." 200 By 21 February 1930 the Company had fallen so far behind in its instalments that four days later a Receiver was appointed on behalf of the debenture holders of whom HSAG was the main creditor, being owed nearly $50,000. A balance of $54,507.3.5 on the purchase price of properties was still due on 30 April and legal ownership had not passed to the Company. Directors claimed (in common with other plantation owners at this time) that the low world price for copra had defeated them. There was an element of truth in this, but the company's collapse was helped by over-tendering for middle quality plantations (see the comparative valuation emd sale prices for these below), extravagant salaries (Jolley's salary, for example, was to reach $,000, twice that of the Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence)*, a good deal of latent animosity in New Guinea towards Jolley, and a lingering hostility towards anything German - encouraged, no doubt, by the RSSAILA. PLANTATIONS BOUGHT BY THE MELANESIA COMPANY OR ITS ASSOCIATES valuation sale price ± A £A Gamoi 385 600 Hilalon 15,161 17,105 Kalili 73,519 73,519 Kurumut 10,420 13,905 Lama 39,000 56,850 Maritsoan 26,570 35,680 Meto 48,729 73,000 Pananas 7,724 9,705 Seleo 2,656 10,000 Talasea 2,500 9,650 source; List of New Guinea properties sold by the Custodian of Expropriated Property as at 1st January 1928 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 5458 201 Burns, Philp offered £40,000 for the Company's interest in plantations and plant, tools, motor vehicles, etc. in New Guinea and book debts due there.1 At the time the offer was made the estimated deficiency of the Company's assets to meet its liabilities, subject to the cost of liquidation, was £258,896.7.5 - an impressive amount for a Company with a total share capitalisation of £110,000. Neither the Administrator nor the Custodian would agree to the sale until the Company was wound up and the "German element" finally purged from New Guinea. On 16 June 1931 leave was granted to the Receiver and Manager to accept Burns, Philp's offer as the Australian government had waived the £250,000 value limit for property on the recommendation of the Custodian. The plantations acquired from the Company were added to Burns, Philp's other properties which it had commenced establishing in 1930 as separate holding companies. In 1930 the firm had registered New Guinea Plantations Ltd and New Ireland Plantations Ltd in Sydney; in 1931 Kulon Plantations Ltd was formed, followed by New Hanover Plantations Ltd. The properties acquired from the Melanesia Company at 'rock- O bottom' prices were absorbed into the framework of these companies and placed Burns, Philp in an unchallengeable position as the principal plantation company in New Guinea. Some concern was expressed at the waiving of the £250,000 value limit in favour of Burns, Philp as it cut across the recommendation of the Administrator to limit the holdings of the major firms. The Administrator 'Saw the possibility of a continued process of "squeezing out" the returned soldier who is temporarily embarrassed financially' and pointed out that Burns, Philp now had interests in New Guinea lands (excluding Choiseul Plantations Ltd in the (former German) Solomon Islands) valued at £1,240,000.^ Carpenters' interests were valued at £1,553,000 but these were more diverse and included trading stations, shops, residential blocks, etc. as well as plantations. To those prepared to see, it was clear that New Guinea was being parcelled out between Burns, Philp and 123 1. Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra. Accession CP 176/83 item A314. "Melanesia Company Limited. Application to charge ..." 2. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns Philp 1914-1946. p. 231 3. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A518 item C46. Department of Territories. "Charging Agreements - Approval by the Custodian (1929-1936)". letter of 31.10.31 from Administrator, Rabaul to Secretary, Department of Territories. 202 Carpenters who, despite the protests of the Administrator and the occasional concerned letter from the RSSAILA, appeared untouchable. But, although apparently secure in certain respects, they were as vulnerable as the smallest individual plantation owner to the labour problems which were beginning to pre-occupy the industry. Labour Murray Ellis's series of newspaper articles included allegations that some native police and plantation managers were flogging labourers, although flogging had been prohibited in 1919, except for special cases. Both free and indentured labourers, Ellis claimed, were so brutally treated that some required hospital treatment.'*’ As a result of these articles the Australian government in 1924 appointed A.S. Canning, an ex-police magistrate, to inspect labour conditions in the Territory. He commenced by inspecting over a thousand villagers of the North Coast of the Gazelle Peninsula "mustered" at Nodup, before touring the Territory. Canning's report praised the 'manifest confidence and trust the natives appeared to have in the officials', remarking that they seemed 'to fairly revel in their work, particularly in connexion with the ship and loading the copra thereon'.^ He rejected any suggestion of forced labour (which Ellis had claimed was common), stating that in its "legal or colloquial sense" it was a myth. Usually quick to criticise the Administration for any real, or imagined, wrong action the chairman of the Methodist Mission in giving evidence contradicted an aspect of Canning's report by saying that there may be forced labour where Government officials come out and call in the natives from the nearby villages to keep the roads in order [ but he felt ] ... that this, being an order for the natives' own benefit, would be justified ... . I think the 12 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p.457 2. Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1923-24. v. 4 "Report of inquiry into allegations of flogging and forced labour of natives" by A.S. Canning. Melbourne, Government Printer, 1924. p. 1221 (hereafter "Canning Report, p. ...") 203 government is quite within its rights to send out natives to keep the roads in order. Canning missed, or ignored, claims that time-expired labourers were kept in quarantine in Rabaul for months at a time during which they accumulated such debts that they were obliged to sign on again for another term of labouring. It was further alleged that whilst "waiting" in Rabaul to be returned to their villages labourers received insufficient rations; in one case it was said that eighty o labourers received only one 561b bag of rice daily. Canning's report was a whitewash, but at least the Australian government had been seen to act on Ellis's allegations. No-one in Australia, or the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva, seemed interested in carrying the matter further. By 1925 most labourers on Gazelle Peninsula plantations came from the Sepik, Aitape and Morobe areas of mainland New Guinea. Labourers from the Tolai and Duke of York villages, and some west coast New Ireland villages, were rare although a number worked as personal servants in plantation residences. As mentioned above, the supply of labour depended a great deal on the personality of the employer. Thomas recalled how his father had little difficulty obtaining Tolai labourers to lay out Ralabang plantation, and even after the plantation had been sold to concentrate on a chain of trading stations across the Gazelle Peninsula, he Q was still able to rely on Tolai assistance. Villagers from other parts of New Britain (admittedly the more recently contacted areas) did not impress Ainsworth who wrote: To see some of the village dwellers in the Baining country, along the south coast of New Britain, and parts of the New Guinea coast, is to make one think that many of these people, particularly the older and middle generations, are of such a low order of humanity that nothing short of a miracle can 1 1. Canning Report p. 1223 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 457 3. T. Thomas, Forster. July 1986 204 possibly change them into normal humans.* Three years later a visiting Australian parliamentarian was able to say I saw new recruits working on the ships in Rabaul. At first they staggered under the weight of a bag of copra 201b or 301b lighter than a bag of wheat, and several of them collapsed under the load. After six or twelve months training, however, assisted by decent food and fair treatment by their white employers, they are to be seen running and laughing while carrying the same weight of copra. I am satisfied that we are doing a great deal to uplift them ,... Quite apart from the concern shown by the parliamentarian, his remarks point up the difference in stamina and physical development of villagers from different areas of New Guinea. There was a noticeable improvement in the general health and physical ability of labourers entering the work force from villages which had previously been recruited, although planters still expected that they would be unproductive for the first six months of indenture. During this time labourers were taught pidgin English and basic hygiene, introduced to European tools and their use, shown their duties emd told what was expected of them. ’There were times', said one planter, 'when you wondered if it was worth it. They were so raw O they were bloody useless, but there was no alternative'. There is no correlation between earlier comments above and the protests of Gazelle Peninsula planters that available labour was of poor quality and of little use. But this only applied to certain areas, and there seemed no shortage of recruits from mainland villages although the price charged per head by some recruiters increased considerably. Until Australians realised how lucrative recruiting was, most of the private recruiters' licences were held by Chinese who were often accused of unscrupulous practices. To prevent these, people "not of good character" (a more exact definition was not given) were not granted recruiting licences, and the Administration considered that this minimised, if not prevented, trickery and coercion in recruiting. In accordance with s.29 of the Native Labour Ordinance 1 1. Ainsworth Report, p. 16 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 117 1926. p. 2138 3. C. Blake, Brisbane. March 1986 205 1923, a recruiter had to pay ^50 for a licence before entering an approved recruiting area with trade goods to attract the young men and presents for the village elders. Administration officials were confident breaches of the Native Labour Ordinance would be revealed during their inspection of plantations when labourers were lined, inspected by a doctor or medical assistant, their contracts checked and grievances sought.* But a labour inspection took place only when there was an Administration official able to do it; and some inspections did not proceed beyond the veranda of the plantation bungalow. As only one of the private recruiters owned a motor schooner for easy coastal recruiting, the others had to go into the "back country" (inland areas) where it was difficult for Administration officials to check on them. Once free of the restrictive presence of native labour inspectors and other officials, recruiters did much as they pleased. Recruiting was hard - but profitable - work and attracted some extraordinary characters. Beazley recalled 'the last man to shanghai natives in the old blackbirder style' who 'entertained them with sleight of hand tricks down the hatch of his schooner, clapped on the hatch covers and sailed O away to land them down the Huon Gulf. Another attracted recruits by playing on their lack of sophistication through simple parlour tricks, such as His pulling of a shilling or an egg out of a boy's wool; his explaining to the natives that they would be able to dig holes in the ground to plant coconuts if they followed him, and digging a hole under their very eyes and uncovering in it a shilling or some desirable bauble; his ability to pull a piglet out of his Stetson before their wide gaze; the ease with which he removed his apparently firm teeth; such wonders a s these play upon primitive fear and respect. The Expropriation Board used One of the best recruiters the Mandated Territory ever knew ... . His favourite recruiting costume was famous. It w eis origineilly an old claw-hammer dress suit, including a high hat. When the outfit needed replacement he commissioned a Chinese tailor in 1 1. Canning Report, p. 6 2. Beazley, New Guinea adventure, p. 76 3. Margaret Matches, Savage paradise. New York, 1930. p. 60 206 Rabaul to copy it in white calico, tail-coat and all, bound with red, and with large red buttons, and with stripes down the trousers legs. Across the back of the coat, in red braid, was the legend EXPRO BOARD. A huge top hat, in the manner of Uncle Sam's, was covered with white calico, and from its crown floated many coloured streamers. It is easy to imagine the effect of this apparition bn unsuspecting natives. But although awed by some of the antics of recruiters, villagers were always deeply suspicious of their intentions. Wahlen recalled bringing recruits to Herbertshohe to be medically examined who when [ they ] saw the doctors in their white dress they cleared out because they believed to be killed now and to be put in tins as food for the whiteman. This story Charlie Munster, a trader in the Admiralities had told the natives when he was opening a tin. It took some time to bring the natives back. As Europeans in New Guinea quickly found out, unsophisticated villagers took a literal interpretation of everything new they were told. Heavy recruiting for the insatiable plantation labour lines had quite serious effects on the fabric of village life. Reed tells of a village in the Sepik District from which almost three-quarters of the able-bodied men had been recruited. Village women went to the Assistant District Officer at Angoram to "make court". They accused the village tultul of neglecting his duties by refusing to have intercourse with them, arguing that since the Administration had sanctioned the recruitment of their men it was up to the tultul, as an official appointed by the Administration, to keep them sexually satisfied. The tultul wailed that he had done his best, but had reached his limit. "Mi lez long pushpush", he cried, "baimbai sakin belong me i lus finish" (1 am tired of intercourse. Soon my skin will become completely loose'). Reed does not record the solution to the women's problem which was by no means unique to the Sepik area. Nelson tells of 1 1. Matches, Savage paradise, p. 62 2. H.R. Wahlen, Hamburg, to F.P. Archer, Rabaul. 21.11.62. Archer papers. . 3. Reed, The making of modern New Guinea, p. 261 207 Some areas [which] suffered from heavy recruiting. F.G. (Monty) Phillips who conducted an enquiry into recruiting in 1927 said that some accessible villages had lost nearly all their able bodied men. At Sialum village on the north coast of the Huon Peninsula fifty-three adult males were away. This left eight fit adult men in a village of 149 females of all ages, eight old men and eighty-six male children. Plantation owners were generally not enthusiastic about families accompanying labourers to plantations. Ainsworth in 1924 did not favour women leaving villages o for plantations : quite apart from the travel and accommodation costs involved, there was always the danger of unmarried men attempting to interfere with them. As a result, plantation barracks were all-male and as few local village women would associate with "foreign" natives, it was inevitable that homosexual acts (an accepted practice in many mainland villages) commenced. Also inevitably details reached the Australian press where they were reported in sensational, but cautious, articles. For example in the Sydney Sun in a special article headed "Gods of New Guinea", and in the same journal of the 2nd November last a long article appeared under the heading "Awful Depravity", in which it was stated "Extraordinary disclosures of the revolting depravity and disease among the natives of former German New Guinea are contained in a report presented to the Minister for Home and Territories (Mr Marr) by missionaries who attended the conference held recently in Rabaul". The Administration was well aware of these practices, but could do little to prevent them or to pressure plantation owners into allowing families to accompany labourers to the plantations. Similarly, the Australian government was concerned and repulsed by the missionaries' report, but there was little it could direct the Administration to do. Insisting on families accompanying labourers to plantations would have led to a demand for transport and accommodation subsidies from planters, and the influx of "foreign" women and children would have alarmed 1 1. H.N. Nelson, Black, white and gold; goldmining in Papua New Guinea 1878-1930. Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1976. pp. 264/265. 2. Ainsworth Report, p. 31 3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 117 1926. p. 2138 208 local villagers. Male labourers were tolerated provided they stayed within the precincts of plantations, or the common ground o f towns; bringing their families with them would either result in demands for gardening land, or illegal squatting on village or undeveloped plantation land. Towards the end of the 1920s competition from the mainland goldfields for labour was very noticeable: Early miners were desperate for labourers. One man wrote to his sister in Cairns, ’we have just got to get those coons or come home'. A miner needed twenty- four labourers to work a claim efficiently; eight men to sluice and sixteen to lump stores from Salamaua. The carriers could complete a round trip in three weeks. By the end of 1926 recruiters, who had been charging V5 to - f t for a 'three year boy', were asking ^20 for a man willing to sign-on for one year, and there were stories of miners paying V30 and offering more. The labourers benefitted little from their scarcity. Most of them were paid 10s. a month while the standard wage for plantation worker remained at 6s. Many planters felt the Administration did nothing to ease the situation (presumably by opening more areas to recruiting, or introducing some form of forced labour on plantations), but encouraged it by granting pay rises to native police which, in turn, meant planters had to pay higher wages to retain their o skilled and experienced labour. Most Europeans believed the Administration existed primarily for their benefit and objected to changes. The Rabaul strike of 1929 during which native workers put forward their claims for higher wages alarmed and angered Europeans. The strike achieved little for the labourers but, according to Gam mage, it gave planters and their allies a great opportunity to settle accounts with various unpopular Administration officials and to order the O laws and practices of New Guinea more to their liking. Despite this, the falling off in the number of recruits, their reluctance to work far from home villages, and increased recruiting and general labour costs, was not diminished. Burns, Philp 12 1. Nelson, Black, white and gold: goldmining in Papua New Guinea 1878 1930. p. 261 2. Gammage, "The Rabaul Strike 1929". p. 21 3. ibid. 209 was aware of rising costs, which had not been anticipated by many who had bought Board plantations. In a letter to the firm’s head office in Sydney, the Rabaul plantations inspector warned that 'the costs of recruits are going up leaps and bounds on account of the gold rush' and noted that 'it is very necessary at the present time for us to keep on the right side of our local labour'.1 The warning was passed to all plantations Burns, Philp was associated with, but other employers were unconcerned and did little to encourage labourers to re-engage at the end of their indenture. Many planters in fact protested that the Administration's attitude to labourers was so liberal it made business difficult, and o so protective that the natives would eventually grow arrogant and cause trouble. Within a very short time of taking over a plantation, the manager's dream of running it from his bungalow veranda was shattered. Labourers had to be constantly supervised to make sure they understood what they were doing, to check that all allotted tasks were completed satisfactorily, and to oversee every aspect of plantation management. Managers who inherited a reliable, well-trained bossboi (native foreman) were fortunate. He was used to pick 'the brightest boy' out of each batch of newly arrived indentured labourers who would then be given 'an intensive course in pidgin' so that he could 'turn the talk' (i.e. translate) for his q brother recruits as well as communicate with the manager and plantation staff. To lessen irritation between overseers and labourers through haphazard labour practices (mainly caused by communication problems) managers tried to establish definite plantation routines. For example, every morning at 5.30 Stuart used to gallop up to the number two section where the labour lines were located ... crack my whip and in a loud voice order the boys to come out of their houses and be counted. ... On these occasions a great deal of yelling and shouting by the boss boys was necessary in order to get the boys out ... counting was always a lengthy affair as some were always 123 1. A.M. Turnbull, Rabaul, to F. Wallin, Sydney. 3.9.26. Burns, Philp Archives, University of Sydney. 2. Gammage, "The Rabaul Strike 1929". p. 21. 3. C. Blake, Brisbane. March 1986. 210 missing. These were usually found hiding under beds or shamming sickness. Once the communication gap was bridged, the reliability of labourers and their work output generally improved. Stuart found a clever way of combining native skills with the requirements of a repetitive task in weighing all the bags of green copra brought in each day. As none of the boys could read or write, it looked as though I would be saddled with this job ... . However this difficulty was solved by instructing the Boss Boys to record the weight of each bag on a bracken fern stem. A bracken stem had about twenty thin leaves about four inches long attached to either side of the stem. Each ten pounds on the scale was recorded by breaking off the tip of a leaf and leaving about two inches adhering to the stem. Thus a bag weighing about one hundred and thirty pounds would be recorded by thirteen broken leaves. After this was done two leaves would be completely removed from the stem indicating that the total weight of one bag had been recorded and the weight for the next one commenced. The three groups of broken leaves recorded on each stem gave the weight of each bag of copra cut by an individual. This system of tallying fitted in nicely with a native method of counting, and was handled confidently by all labourers. A major disadvantage of plantation labouring was that the work was tedious, repetitive and labour intensive. Some managers tried to rotate labourers between collecting nuts, cutting grass and weeds, cutting copra and general maintenance but the duties were limited and weeds reappeared quickly. Stuart writes of grass gangs with sarifs (four foot lengths of inch wide hoop iron, razor sharp on one side, used to slash kunai grass and soft weeds underneath palms) which were supposed to work their way through the plantation, but did little work unless he stayed with them all day. Copra cutters were similarly scattered over a plantation on a continuous cutting cycle, and as the planted area expanded they became more difficult to check. Many made a habit of bringing in their bags of cut coconut meat as late as possible to avoid completing their work quota. Each 12 1. Stuart, Nuts to you, pp. 46, 50. 2. ibid., p. 52 211 was supposed to fill three copra sacks daily but 'we considered ourselves lucky if the majority arrived at the drier with only two bags by 6 p.m.'1 This irritating and expensive unreliability of labourers forced planters and their overseers to stronger methods of discipline (e.g. personal assault) to get the required work done. If a planter was seen to be "soft" in working his labour this was taken advantage of, particularly if he was a newcomer uncertain of himself. Beazley wrote of the problems faced by new staff arriving for the Board: They knew nothing of coconuts and natives ... . How to get them to work well; how to be fair and just, knowing that some instantly took advantage of any concessions or weaknesses shown; how to keep discipline - one white man alone ... with up to 100 labourers.... This raised very real problems which the Board simply did not face. As stories of labour problems were exchanged in clubs and on the verandas of plantation residences all labourers tended to be seen as malingerers; planters and overseers became suspicious of any delays in work schedules, and were forced to supervise the most menial duties emd perform the more exacting work themselves to make sure it was done. The frustrations and irritations of labour problems caused managers and overseers to press for stronger discipline for labourers. Missions usually opposed this and the Rabaul Times reflected the planters' feeling in claiming that while indentured labour is obtained without coercions, mental, moral or physical, under supervision of Native Affairs Officers, apparently no control is exercised over the several institutions in the Territory that, under the cover of religion, extort to the uttermost farthing in work or produce, without any other reward than the promise of purely problematical rewards or threats of punishment after death.1 2 1. Stuart, Nuts to you, p. 45 2. Beazley, New Guinea adventure, p. 19 3. Rabaul Times, 10 July 1925 212 Missions were fair game for this sort of criticism although they shared the same labour problems as private planters. They were at more of a disadvantage because their labourers quickly realised they would not be physically "encouraged" to work, nor would they be taken before an Administration official for disciplining, and took advantage of this. The Rabaul Times also revived planter demands for corporal punishment* even though the Minister for Home & Territories had advised the Australian Parliament - incorrectly - in 1923 that flogging would not be tolerated under Australian administration, and, of course, it was not permitted during the term of military administration, ... The inevitable result w a s ...... planters under our management had not the same control or the same driving power over the natives. Consequently, there has been a slackening in the native labour output. The Administrator rejected corporal punishment for labourers, although he was aware that most planters followed Beazley's simple approach to recalcitrant workers: ’If they played up’, Beazley said, Td belt them'.4 For reasons that may have been overstated, labour - or the perceived lack of it - was a constant worry to planters. Yet Annual Reports frequently speak of an abundance of potential labour in areas not yet recruited. Whether these were inaccessible, or considered unsuitable for immediate recruitment, is not clear. Many new recruits were under age and physically immature, reflecting the reluctance of adult males to sign on. Many had heard of the 'hunger, cold, C exhaustion, disease, and attacks by bushmen' experienced by labourers on the Wau goldfields and assumed that these were normal to the white man's world. In theory there was no forced labour (but villagers were encouraged to work for the common good, e.g. in maintaining roads near their villages) during the 1234 1. Rabaul Times, 7 August 1925 2. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 452 3. Rabaul Times, 7 August 1925 4. Beazley, New Guinea adventure, p. 20 5. Gammage, "The Rabaul Strike 1929". p. 27 213 administration of the Board as antagonism between it and the Administration meant that each watched the other closely for breaches of the Native Labour Regulations. In practice there must have been times when villagers were encouraged by both sets of officials to perform tasks seen as being in their own interests. This raises a criticism constantly made of colonisers - were the natives consulted about tasks, or simply told to do them? One wonders how much would have been achieved if every administrative action of this period was discussed with, and explained to, villagers or labourers before it was commenced. It is clear that during the Board administration available labour was not always used to its best advantage. As a result, many plantations deteriorated because the way of preventing this was simply not understood. Economic development The first Annual Report of the Civil Administration listed copra as the main export of New Guinea as well as 'a small quantity of feathers and marine products’;* this was hardly a sound financial base for a colony which the Australian government insisted had to be self-supporting. In 1923 a joint report of two prominent Australian firms - Burns, Philp and Dalgety & Co. - noted the falling off of the quality of copra shipments from Rabaul. Various reasons were given for this, including (a) collecting and processing immature nuts which gave n the copra a high proportion of fatty acids; (b) cutting copra in the fields (where foreign matter - stones, twigs, husk fibre - was collected into bags with the newly cut coconut meat) instead of in cutting-out sheds, and curing by smoke driers 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/1922. p. 94 2. 'All oils consist of glycirides of fatty acids. These can be split into three components, fatty acids and glycirides in various ways. ... oils formed from stale mouldy copra, or which have been allowed to deteriorate in the presence of moulds or other ways, are found to contain fatty acid in the free state, i.e. free from their contamination with glycerine. Fatty acid is undesirable, particularly in edible oils, and has acid oils which have to be refined for edible purposes, which results in losses up to twice the weight of the Free Fatty Acid present'. Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea, p. 37 214 which caused copra to turn an unattractive dark colour; (c) bagging improperly dried copra; and (d) damage through excessively long storage or in places subject to moisture.* Inexperienced overseers and the reluctance of the Board to spend money maintaining plantations combined to lower the quality of copra. Few Board officials appreciated the labour intensive demands of copra production; for O example, it took over 135,000,000 coconuts to produce 22,000 tons of copra with each coconut and each bag of copra being handled many times between the tree and the ship taking it to market. The Board received a 10% commission on copra it sold for Chinese traders and other customers, including copra purchased from native traders, some of which it re-dried before marketing. There was criticism from overseas buyers that New Guinea copra was of poor quality and this was blamed on the sun-drying methods used by Chinese traders on the Gazelle Peninsula. Although some probably was imperfectly dried, much plantation copra was also of poor quality which was frequently attributable to the Board’s neglect of copra driers. Lucas, as chairman of the Board, had stated that If the board’s control is to be only temporary, then cheap smoke driers, constructed of native material for a few pounds, are preferable as a temporary measure, although the price realised for smoke-dried copra is/1 per ton less than for sun-dried. In 1918 a report on copra drying plants had been sent by the Military Administration to the Department of Defence in Melbourne with notes on two suggestions - a steam system, and the Rondahl vacuum system. The report was referred to the Institute of Science and Industry for examination, and eventually passed to Lucas after the Board had been formed. He rejected the suggestions as 'merely 6m incomplete collection of old driers which have long been in use in New 123 1. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 18 2. Cobcroft Report, p. 83 3. ibid., p. 82 215 Britain and other tropical countries1,* then claimed ownership of the original plans and refused to return them. Low quality plantation copra during the Board's administration was generally traceable to poor driers; the standard was so low that an average of twelve driers a year burned down. There was no excuse for this neglect as the Board had workshops at Rabaul, Kavieng and Madang with white engineers in charge whose work included making and repairing parts for copra O driers. A recommendation by Cobcroft for the installation of a type of Samoan O drier on each plantation was not followed, because no private planter - and certainly not the Board - was prepared to pay y700 for it. There was a continuing large trade in native copra, but no records were kept to say how large this was^ despite the earlier tantalising claim that the natives have little appreciation of the value of money ... of what they receive at least four-fifths goes to the Rabaul Chinaman ... the amount of money banked by the Chinese in Rabaul is enormous. Native copra was generally smoke-dried and 'of inferior quality ... no doubt it is partly to blame for the low price realised for copra from this Territory'® yet nothing was done to stop its export until 1927, or to teach native producers better drying techniques. That year the Australian Minister for Home Affairs conferred in Rabaul with European planters and Administration officials and agreed that classifying copra for export was important. As a temporary measure the Minister approved the appointment of an inspector 'to supervise generally the copra export12 345 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1 file NG23/31 - Agriculture. Copra Buying. Plantations. New Guinea, letter 529/18 of 30 December 1918 from Chief Surveyor to Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne; ''Report on copra drying plants". 2. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 23 3. Cobcroft Report, p. 42 4. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1923/1924. p. 24 5. Stewarts Handbook 1922. p. 389 6. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1927/1928. p. 24 216 trade’1 but it is not clear whether he was to control, supervise or work with inspectors already employed by the Board. The Minister urged planters to support the creation of an Export Control Board to monitor the quality of all copra for export, but no such Board appears to have been established in New Guinea. Two aspects of the conference were significant: one, the blame for poor quality copra was shifted from villagers to the Chinese who were actively competing with Europeans for trade copra; and two, the Board was not instructed to take more care in preparing copra on the plantations it controlled. Possibly as a result of this conference - but more likely because a number o f the Board's plantations were being transferred to new owners who were keenly interested in copra prices - the Aministration commenced drafting a Copra Ordinance. This contained provisions for enforcing the cleanliness of plantations (weed and pest control), and the right methods of preparing copra. Between 1921 and 1927 there was a steady increase in copra exports with a marked jump in 1928 (see table p. 217), so much so that the Rabaul Times warned that 'there was too O great a desire to turn out quantity and not quality'. It was clear that efficient production methods were vital for the industry at home and its reputation overseas, and the Ordinance emphasised official recognition of this. Until 1924 Burns, Philp and Carpenters had shared the monopoly of copra buying in the Territory. Tenders were invited in Rabaul and Sydney as parcels of copra became available from Board plantations; particulars received in Rabaul were radioed to Sydney where the New Guinea Trade Agent accepted the 9 highest bid. The companies alternated in tendering, and also competed for copra from ; private plantations (e.g. Raulawat), mission plantations, those of the Melanesia Company and that offered by traders. Burns, Philp either bought copra ''on the beach" at plantations, or took it on consignment from the depot at Rabaul, or from the smaller depots at Ulaveo and Kenabot plantations near Kokopo. 12 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1927/1928. p. 75 2. Rabaul Times, 13 April 1928 3. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 13 217 NEW GUINEA COPRA PRODUCTION 1913/1928 year tonnage value average price ± per ton ± 1913 ca. 14,000 309,000 22.07 1918 ca. 21,000 373,000 17.76 1921 23,735 641,045 27.00 1922/23 9 1923/24 34,974 686,519 19.62 1924/25 39,151 815,938 20.84 1925/26 45,806 1,023,764 22.35 1926/27 47,613 849,852 17.85 1927/28 65,285 1,176,040 19.01 source: Annual Reports to the League of Nations note that in 1925/26 (when the expropriated properties went up for tender) the price per ton for copra was the highest since about 1921. 218 After it was sold, the price - less transport, commission and any other charges - was credited to the planter or trader. If he was tied to a charging agreement the firm deducted the full, or partial, amount owing and paid him the balance. Burns, Philp preferred to buy copra outright on a "futures" basis - i.e. it gambled that there would be a price rise after it had bought the copra - but some of the larger planters, particularly those with capital to support them during the marketing process and not tied to a charging agreement, would deal with the firm only on the basis of consignment. A high proportion of copra acquired by the firm was sent to markets in Britain and Europe.* One effect of the charging system was that the price of copra paid to the producer could be dictated by the companies. Burns, Philp and Carpenters controlled most of the Territory's copra exports and planters complained that they were not getting a fair price for their product. The firms' prices in New Guinea or Australia were based on the London copra exchange where the Australian pound attracted a lower exchange rate. Planters asked the firms to reduce the basic parity (i.e. the ratio of sterling with Australian currency A at particular times ) which was based on the price for copra current when the plantations were sold in 1926. They refused to do this, or to tell planters how parity was calculated. Despite fluctuations in copra prices the commercial stability of the Territory seemed assured; in the two years to 1926 only three companies were o wound up while thirty-eight new ones were registered. How many were independent, rather than affiliates of the major companies, cannot now be determined. In 1926 the Bank of New South Wales opened a branch in Rabaul and, together with the established branch of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, widened banking services as well as providing much-needed competition. The Territory was always at risk from monopolies and the new bank was welcome.1 1. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 13 2. In Australia "parity" is commonly referred to as the ratio of sterling with Australian currency at particular times'. A discussion of parity is included in R.E.P. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, v. 2 no. 2, October 1936 (whole issue), p. 44 3. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1924/1925 p. 21; 1925/1926 p. 14 219 As early as 1922 the services required by the plantation industry on the Gazelle Peninsula saw the opening of a variety of businesses, and expansion of established ones. A lucrative one-owner small business proposition in which the Board assumed control was that of trading stations; these were scattered throughout the Territory usually near, or in association with, plantations or villages. They consisted of small areas of land with a trade store where native copra was bought and trade goods sold. The Catalogues of Expropriated Property show that almost every plantation had at least one trading station which was usually operated jointly with a trade store. For example, the Ulavolo station was situated on the main Tavui-Rabaul road, in close proximity to a water frontage. The station was contiguous with Vara Vara plantation. The area is 0.75 hectares. At Kabaira, the trading station was situated on the main North Coast-Rabaul road, in close proximity to a water frontage. This station abuts on Kabaira plantation, and is 20 miles from Rabaul. The area is .5 ha. „One Asiatic store and dwelling ... is on the property. German plantation owners had frequently worked these stations themselves, or put natives or Chinese in charge for a wage; alternatively they were leased to Chinese and, occasionally, Europeans. These plantation trading stations were owned and operated by the plantations which could lease them on their own terms. The substitution of German plantation staff by Australian overseers, together with the fall in copra prices, disturbed existing conditions for these trading stations. Arrangements were then made by the Board to lease them on a tender basis to Chinese traders for a minimum rental and a charge of 10% on all copra sold. Trouble arose in 1923 with trading stations located on land other than plantation land. A system of leasing these to Australian returned soldiers commenced as a result of protests from the RSSAILA that Burns, Philp was securing trade sites and trading licences and sub-letting them to Asians. Even though the Australian government decided on 30 June 1923 that all such licences 1 1. Catalogue of Expropriated Property (First Group), p. 105 2. ibid., p. 103 220 were to be given to Australian returned servicemen'there were still complaints that Burns, Philp engaged Chinese to compete unfairly with them.* Trading station leases were granted to returned servicemen for the highest rental tendered for a station subject to two conditions: that all copra obtained was sold through the Board at a commission of 7i%, and that each new lessee had to obtain 90% of the copra output of his predecessor or his lease would be cancelled. As neither condition was included in new leases granted to Chinese for trading stations on plantation land, they were objected to by returned soldiers also granted leases for trading stations located on plantation land. It was considered that as long as adjoining plantations were in the hands of the Board it was desirable for copra purchased at trading stations on those plantations to be re-sold through the Board, and as the lessees paid all handling, storage and transport charges the commission was reduced to 2i%. Trading stations were very profitable; an indication of this is that Carpenters tendered (in its own name) for more expropriated trading stations in First Group properties than it did for plantations. Although by 1926 plantations had overtaken trade copra, trading was still a significant and highly profitable business - so much so that a year later the number of trading stations had increased to handle the volume of trade copra delivered to them. There were suspicions that coconuts were being stolen from nearby plantations by villagers and labourers emd either processed into copra, or traded raw, with the stations. John Vuia said that this had not occurred on plantations located near coastal Tolai O villages , but it was reasonably common in other areas. The Administration decided that a review should be made of stations that could be established in an area and this caused concern to traders and, surprisingly, to planters who might have been expected to support it. Exactly what the basis of the concern was is difficult to pinpoint, but the review may have been seen as a threat to the number of trading stations that could be established on one plantation. After discussions with the Administration, the Minister for Home & Territories approved (1) that trading stations, after the expiration of existing trade licences, should not be established on any European plantation1 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 109 1924. p. 4248 2. John Vuia, Rabaul. 14.4.86 221 except by or with the consent of the owner, nor should any be set up within two miles of the boundaries of such plantations; and (2) outside that two mile limit there should be no restriction and the establishments of trading stations should be open to all Europeans. The map at p.331 shows the Gazelle Peninsula ringed with plantations which meant that observance of the two mile limit would push many trading stations inland away from water transport and a good supply of native coconuts. The two mile limit could be seen as a means of encouraging local natives to deal only with plantations in their immediate area, and not to sell to itinerant traders. It was again alleged to the Minister that trading stations licensed for Europeans to operate had been sub-let to Chinese and although he found no actual proof of this, the Minister did find that a considerable number of traders employed Chinese in their trading stations as they were ’more acceptable to the work and better educated than the natives’.1 With an eye to the League of Nations (but not, it would seem, to consistency), the Report continued that traders were generally well-disposed towards employing natives in trading stations and were endeavouring to train them for that work. The volume of copra produced and the business demands this generated reached the stage where the need for a central body to handle copra exports and buy material for the Administration was essential. Fortunately, the Australian government did not offer this to one of the two major companies. In April 1921 it established a Government Trading Agency in Sydney and so created a very powerful commercial enterprise of its own. Through the Agent, the Custodian of Expropriated Property induced competition for the supply of merchandise, disposal of copra and other produce by public tender, and generally ensured that the Board's business was conducted independently of any one commercial interest. The system proved successful with the Agency operating on a commission basis. It did not operate within the Territory, nor did it undertake any other business other than to act in a similar fashion for the Administration of Nauru. The Agency was not taxed on profits but paid import and export duties, and direct taxation. It was 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1927/1928. p. 75 (Chinese were always ready to extend credit to natives - Europeans would not - even when the German Administration forbade this, see German New Guinea Annual Report 1909/1910 (H.A. Thomson translation), p. 9). 222 financed through the commission it earned, and any declared profits were held in a trust fund to be distributed annually between the New Guinea emd Nauru administrations. The Agency proved to be lucrative: in 1928 it declared a profit of ^3,387.5.11 and earned y il,726.19.9 from commission and brokerage.1 That level of profit emd commission indicates the volume of merchemdise purcheised (mainly from Sydney firms) and the amount o f copra emd other products it handled in Sydney. As a result, the Trade Agent (W.C. Harvey) was a very influential person in the Australian business world, and although there is nothing to suggest that he favoured either Burns, Philp or Carpenters in accepting tenders for the supply of merchandise and other services, they were the two largest Australian firms specialising in Pacific Islands trade and some sort of familiarity may have developed. Harvey enjoyed his position which seems to have been little supervised. In 1929 he was charged under s.55 of the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1922-1928 with buying from the Konkrete Paint Company Limited of Sydney without Commonwealth approval (i.e. without calling tenders for the supply of paint), with receiving 300 shares in the paint company from "one C.J. Piggott" who was a large supplier of fruit and vegetables to the Trade Agency, with receiving ^550 from "one Mrs E.F. Willson" whose company - Red Star Mail Order Company - was a large supplier of goods to the Agency, with offering a gratuity to the Superintendent of Public Works at Rabaul not to report adversely on Konkrete Paint products, for not keeping proper records of tenders received by the Agency between 1922-1926 and thus ’affording grave irregularities in connection with such tenders’ and for personally bringing from New Guinea in December 1926 a tender by "one Peterson" for ^7,000 for the purchase of Lassul plantation which, in contravention of the regulations, was not accompanied by the 2 required deposit. Harvey was disciplined and his salary reduced as a result of these actions. He resigned as New Guinea Trade Agent shortly after to take up 12 1. Auditor-General's Report 1927/1928. p. 33 2. Australian Archives Office, Canberra. Series CRS A571 item 29/1555. Department of the Treasury Correspondence File, Annual Single Number Series: "Report on questionable transactions in office of Custodian", 1929. Statement of charge by J. Heathershaw, Chief Officer, Department of the Treasury, 29 April 1929. 223 the position of London manager for W.R. Carpenter <5c Co. Ltd.1 Australian firms were attracted to the potential that trade with New Guinea promised. There is no record of the total quantity of copra sent to Sydney from Board plantations, but it must have been substantial as the companies were ’very keenly interested in seeing that the trade does not go away from Australia' 9 Sydney was ’the emporium of the copra trade of the South Pacific’0 with, it was claimed, postal and shipping connections to Eastern and European countries 'more direct and more ample than any other port of the Pacific'.^ The 'final catastrophe'1 5234 6 of the Navigation Act 1920 gave the passenger and freight monopoly to Burns, Philp until Carpenters introduced a modest challenge to freight with ships in the late 1920s. The Act ensured that the export of copra from New Guinea was confined to Australian ports and one Australian shipping firm, it blocked competition from European shipping lines interested in operating between Eastern ports and Australia via New Guinea for it laid down conditions for the manning of ships, and the pay and accommodation of crews which were designed to protect the conditions of Australian mercantile seamen. The Act permitted overseas ships to make Rabaul a port of call provided they did not carry passengers and cargo between New Guinea and Australia. This reduced Rabaul to the status of a terminal port with inter-island connections, rather than reverting to its previous status as a port of call for steamers with Singapore connections (as both Pethebridge and Holmes had pleaded for during their terms as Military 1. Commonwealth Archives Office, Canberra. Series CRS A518 item F824/1, Part I. Department of the External Territories, Correspondence File, multi-number series, classes relating to External Territories: "Dummying in Expropriated Properties, 1929". letter to Custodian from T.L. McAlpine, Sydney. 4.4.37. 2. Interstate Commission Report, Appendix G (evidence W.H. Lucas), p. 31 3. ibid., p. 80 4. ibid., p. 116 5. Readings in New Guinea history, edited by B. Jinks, et al. Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1973. p. 115 6. Interim & Final Report (Major), p. 47 224 Administrator). It also largely increased the freight rates of imports and exports.1 Burns, Philp had dominated New Guinea shipping from the time of the military occupation through its greater experience and fleet of vessels able to be diverted from Australian and Eastern waters as required. In 1919 Carpenters had bought the schooner Lulu with a capacity o f 75 bags of copra (about 5 tons) to move copra from near Gazelle Peninsula plantations to depots at Timbur and Ulaveo, near Kokopo. It later bought the schooner Camohe (240 bags), and then the Meklong (5100 bags), Vella (600 bags) and France (650 bags).^ None of these challenged Burns, Philp's grip on export freight and the two firms reached an understanding to oppose any competition in their shared monopoly. They were in a very comfortable position for in bidding for parcels of copra they were able to set the purchase price, and then freight it on their vessels. Many planters were tied to one of the firms by a charging agreement and provided a guaranteed outlet for goods brought to New Guinea in Burns, Philp ships, and distributed between the plantations on Carpenters' ships. The Navigation Act quickly proved unpopular with planters who claimed the three-weekly service was inadequate, and that there were obvious disadvantages in having to ship to, and sell in, Sydney rather than Eastern or European markets. In Papua as well as New Guinea the demand grew for direct shipping to Europe, or to America via the Panama Canal. Sydney merchants met the planters' protests by saying that although Australia was only a small consumer of copra, the world bought and sold copra in Sydney. They claimed that direct shipments to Europe or America would not protect planters from manipulation of the market, or ensure that cargoes would be directed to the most profitable region of demand at any given time. The argument was plausible but planters still 12 1. Ainsworth Report, p. 13 (this was the heart of the matter which Ainsworth - as with practically everything else he commented on - emphasised with embarrassing accuracy). 2. J.L. Whittaker, et al. Documents and readings in New Guinea history: prehistory to 1889. Milton, Q., Jacaranda, 1975. caption to plate 510, p. 230 225 insisted that they were being deprived of a fair price for their copra particularly as extra freight to Sydney, plus charges there for handling copra under stringent Harbour Trust regulations, added - fp or more a ton to the price the planter paid to get his copra to a purchaser.* All this was closely considered in Melbourne and towards the end of 1922 there was an important policy decision by which Board copra would be sold f.o.b. Rabaul to facilitate direct shipment to European ports. Non-Board copra would continue to be shipped to Sydney. Burns, Philp immediately sought a revision of its shipping contract by which most copra was shipped to Sydney and there transhipped to overseas markets as required. To console the firm it was decided that Board copra from plantations in the distant Manus, Maron, Kieta and Witu areas of New Guinea were to be taken direct to Sydney (rather than to Rabaul) by its steamers. The arrangement really was a subsidy to Burns, Philp additional to its existing mail subsidy and was clearly compensation for freight lost in copra shipped directly to Europe. The balance of the Board’s copra was sold by tender - mainly to Burns, Philp and Carpenters - and o most of it was exported directly to Europe. Burns, Philp did very well out of its "distant plantations" contract with the Australian government which added approximately 8,000 tons of copra a year to its cargoes. Had this copra been put up for tender in the Territory for direct overseas shipment with the rest of the Board copra, it would have realised - f2 a ton O better than the price obtained m Sydney. In retaliation to the firms’ grip on overseas and coastal shipping, and their secretive assessing of parity for copra payments, some planters chartered the NDL’s Bremerhaven to take a trial shipment of copra to Europe, by-passing123 1. Stewarts Handbook 1923. p. 386 2. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. pp. 159/167 ! 3. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 22 226 the firms.1 At the end of 1928 the Melanesia Company terminated its freight contract with Burns, Philp and transferred its custom to the NDL which planned to run the Bremerhaven between Rabaul and Hong Kong with calls at Witu and other O plantation centres. Burns, Philp protested so vehemently that the Australian government would not permit any further export o f copra direct to Europe by planters, or the use of "non-British” ships for such freight. The object was to force the Germans out of competitive shipping, and keep the lucrative freight monopoly in the hands of Burns, Philp and Carpenters. It was alleged by planters that the firms distorted and mis-represented facts to prevent the continued operation of the Bremerhaven, but the government stood firm and the export of copra reverted to Burns, Philp and later, Carpenters. The Military Administration had taken over a respectable fleet of 9 coastal vessels'' but by the time they were passed on to the Civil Administration the frequency with which they were laid up for repairs severely reduced their use and added to the Administration's problems in operating its own coastal shipping service. As a result the subsidised inter-island mail contract with Burns, Philp was extended. In 1922/1923 the Administration suffered a loss in revenue of V9,647.15.4 caused by its s.s. Sumatra being lost at sea, while a preliminary overhaul of the two remaining vessels of its "fleet" revealed the need for extensive repairs which would keep them o ff the inter-island run for a considerable period. It was decided not to re-commission Administration vessels, but to carry out the inter-island service (mail, general freight and copra, labourers) by charter. This worked reasonably well until the chartered vessel, the s.s. Tintenbar, was wrecked in April 1924. The Administration then withdrew from commercial shipping and left it to private enterprise. 12 1. identical action was taken in the early 1950s when a group of Bougainville planters formed the Bougainville Company and bought the m.v. Polurrian to move copra from Bougainville to Rabaul. 2. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 205 3. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 21 227 In 1922 the Sydney Harbour Trust had removed some of its restrictions on copra. The overseas freight rate to Britain was reduced to 73.10.9 a ton, a welcome relief from the previous rate of 73 a ton to Sydney and the earlier rate of 75.5.1 direct to London.1 According to the Director of Agriculture in 1925 an estimate of freight for copra carried on privately owned vessels to Sydney would have ranged between 72.15.0 and 73.10.0 a ton. As an indication of the profits Burns, Philp was making the inter-island freight rate was between 10s and VI. 5.0 a ton; in cases where the pick-up points were a long way from Rabaul (e.g. the Witu and Hermit islands) it was between 72 and 72.10.0 a ton. The overseas freight rate to Britain or European ports was usuaUy quoted as 73.5.0 sterling, or y4.1.6 Australian, which was the rate charged by the NDL line to Europe discharging at Genoa, Marseilles or Hamburg as required. Planters had to meet other charges as well: wharfage and handling cost about 2s6d a ton; copra received and stacked in the customs shed attracted a weekly charge o f 6d a ton and there was another wharfage charge of Is a ton payable to the Customs Department. Planters were taxed 71.5.0 a ton export duty and there was a charge of 10% ad valorem on copra sacks (about Id a sack). Each ton of copra required 16 bags and there was no refund of duty on sacks when they were exported. Finally, there was the business tax which was initially 1.5% of gross turnover. It proved difficult to administer and was replaced by calculations based on declared profits. This was also rejected because of the 'varied nature of the business undertakings, and the fact that many of the traders in the Territory lack the knowledge necessary to enable them to keep their books in such a way as to O accurately set out their profits and losses'. If this was an oblique reference to Chinese trading, it was quite wrong. The Chinese understood very well how to O operate their businesses but many found it useful to suffer lapses of English 123 1. Sydney Morning Herald, 2 October 1922 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1925/1926. p. 24 3. see, for example, David Yen-Ho Wu, "to kill three birds with one stone: the rotating credit associations of the Papua New Guinea Chinese" in American Ethnologist, v .l no.3 August 1974. pp. 565/584. Although Wu is writing of post-1945 Chinese, the principles of business (excluding the sudden accumulation of wealth from war damage claims) had not changed. 228 comprehension in the presence of Treasury officials. The business tax was eventually abolished for all earnings subsequent to 30 June 1925, but collections were made in the 1925/1926 financial year of assessments of earnings during that year. The Administration explained its action in abolishing the tax by claiming that The revenue of which the Territory has been deprived by the abolition of the business tax will be partly balanced by the incidental savings effected as a consequence of the non-recurrence of the expenditure hitherto incurred in collecting the tax, partly by the increased Customs Tariff referred to later in this Report, and partly by increased revenue from the anticipated development of the resources of the Territory^ which the abolition of the tax will help to promote. This obviously satisfied the League of Nations and the Australian government. In 1919 the Australian government had been warned to make things as easy as possible for investors in coconut plemtations (not necessarily all of whom might be returned soldiers) while their palms matured. This was echoed in 1924 when the extension of business and export taxes to small plantation owners was criticised as representing a much larger percentage of profits paid in taxation than a farmer in New South Wales would have to pay in federal and state tax combined. ... It is of prime importance to a prospective plantation buyer that the property he seeks shall be in the domain of an economical Administration ... . There are enough difficulties to contend with in tropical island plantations witlmut having to meet the tax-gatherer too frequently. The warning was timely as inventories of expropriated plantations were being prepared for inclusion in catalogues advertising them for sale. The business tax was withdrawn as an additional incentive to attract buyers. It was in trying to raise revenue that the Administration's error in allowing the continuation of a single crop economy became apparent. There was almost no-one else to tax but planters and traders, and almost nothing else to place indirect taxes on but coconuts. The continuation of a head tax for villagers 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1925/1926. p. 24 2. Yarwood, Vane Report, p. 21 229 had placed 'an undesirable imprimatur on plantation labour'1 making it virtually the only source of continuous employment available, while the introduction of an education tax in 1921, also for villagers, was deplored by Ainsworth who considered 'one man, one tax ... the more reasonable practice'. Although the cash raised in head tax was substantial, there were significant problems in collecting it which detracted from the overall gain. The education tax was short lived, not being imposed after the 1922/1923 year. Neither the Administration nor the Board took advantage of the New Guinea Bounties Act 1926 which provided an annual bounty of ^25,000 to assist and encourage the development of produce in the Territory for which there was a q market in Australia. Strangely, the Act excluded coconut products other than coir (made from the fibrous husks of dry coconuts) which attracted a bounty of y3 a ton. At that time there was no production of coir from husks (a constant by product of the coconut industry), as Ainsworth was surprised to find.^ Husks were e used as fuel in copra driers. The Act did little to stimulate crop diversification possibly because so much capital and land was tied up in coconut plantations at a time when copra prices were by no means stable, but more likely because the Department of Agriculture was understaffed, with little status in the Administration, and had just lost its Director. It also had to contend with Board policy not to develop plantations still under its control, and to have no part in experimenting with new crops. Finally, the system of agricultural leases which had been introduced by the Land Ordinance 1922 was so hedged with limitations and prescriptions that the acquisition of land for plantations, let alone for other agricultural purposes, became a fairly formidable task not worth pursuing for experimental crops. The same year that the Bounties Act was introduced the 12345 1. Hentze/Roberts paper, p. 4 2. Ainsworth Report, p. 35 3. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1925/1926. pp. 102/104. 4. Ainsworth Report, p. 38 5. Cobcroft Report, p. 35 6. Reed, The making of modern New Guinea, p. 196 230 Customs Tariff (Papua and New Guinea Preference) Act listed whole and prepared coconuts in the Schedule.1 To an extent, this balanced the omission from the Bounties Act but did not encourage a change from coconuts to other crops. Undoubtedly there was behind the scenes pressure from Burns, Philp and Carpenters, which were heavily involved in coconut plantations, not to change the agricultural emphasis of the Territory. Both companies were geared to handling coconut products through their ships, business contacts and capital investments (storage depots, plantations, oil crushing mills and margarine factories) in New Guinea, Europe and San Francisco. In other words, the agricultural development of New Guinea was being controlled for the benefit of selected Australian companies and their affiliates in Europe. Once again, the Australian government should have stepped in and examined its Mandate obligations carefully. Once again it did nothing and the two companies consolidated their position unchallenged, if not tacitly encouraged. But they were compelled to make an occasional concession. In 1925 freight for copra from Rabaul to Sydney was reduced from - fZ to yi. 15.0 a ton, but with an anticipated annual export of 50,000 tons of copra^ a shipping service was still a very attractive proposition. As well as operating between Sydney and Rabaul, Burns, Philp took over the coastal service between island groups of the Bismarck Archipelago and the Gazelle Peninsula, providing two steamers for an Australian government subsidy of ^20,000 a year1 23 4 which was additional to the 732,000 a year it received for operating a six-weekly service to Rabaul and other New Guinea ports.^ There was talk of reducing the inter-island service but traders and planters throughout the Territory joined with other residents in protesting about this, and the Minister decided to let the matter rest until December 1928 when new contracts were due to come into effect.3 This was 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1925/1926. pp. 100/101 2. Interim & Final Report (Major), p. 39 3. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1926/1927. p. 56 4. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 103 1923. p. 54 5. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1927/1928. p. 76 231 dodging the issue as no other Australian shipping company ever submitted a tender in opposition to Burns, Philp for any part of the New Guinea service. As a result of the planters' act in chartering the Bremerhaven to move their copra to Europe Carpenters increased its shipping services, first by chartering the Queen of Scots for its first direct shipment of copra from its own plantations to Europe. This was followed by the charter of the m.v. Columbia which proved so successful that the company bought the m.v. Glen Tara (renamed the Salamaua), the m.v. George Washington (renamed Rabaul), and commissioned the building of the s.s. Suva.* Each carried approximately 6,700 tonnes of copra and was used for moving company produce from other Pacific Islands areas, as well as New Guinea. Carpenters and Burns, Philp had come to an agreement about shipping and each appreciated that the other would ship copra from its own plantations - and those of planters tied to it - by its own ships. There was no poaching and the system worked to their mutual advantage. Undoubtedly the freight charged covered that lost by the planters' unilateral action in shipping copra by the Bremerhaven. Exports of copra increased so rapidly that in 1924 Carpenters built a storage shed in Rabaul with a capacity of 1,750 tonnes and a wharf on land leased from Ah Tam, a prominent Chinese businessman. A small wharf had been built there earlier for schooners to discharge copra and marine shell, and for lighters to load produce onto ships anchored close by. The company's store was destroyed by fire in January 1923 and as a temporary measure the hulk Loch Katrine was towed to Rabaul for copra and coal storage, but it proved unsatisfactory. Carpenters then bought 6.7ha of land at Toboi on Simpsonhafen where it erected sheds, each with a capacity of 3,500 tonnes. Between 800 and 900 tonnes of copra a day could be loaded from the new wharf in front of these sheds. In 1924 the company opened another store in Rabaul specifically to purchase island produce and sell general merchandise. It also took over the role of the former German-owned stores in providing finance (even though there were branches of the Commonwealth, and New South Wales, banks in Rabaul after 1926) and goods for the ventures of Europeans, Chinese and Japanese in fishing, harvesting marine shell and beche-de-mer, timber-milling emd plantation development. Business in 1. Whittaker, Documents emd readings in New Guinea history, captions to plates 512/513. p. 231 232 the colony continued to benefit from the high price of copra in the early to mid- 1920s and this encouraged Carpenters to tender for the Neu Guinea Kompagnie's site in 1926. The two hectare block was probably the best business site in Rabaul with water frontage to Simpsonhafen, a wharf, a large retail store which dominated Rabaul, a separate hardware store, boat repair building and a number of smaller buildings. After its tender was accepted Carpenters assumed the name "New Guinea Company" by which it became formally known, although "Carpenters" remained in popular use. After its tender was accepted Carpenters assumed the name "New Guinea Company" but did not become known as this until well after 1945. "Carpenters" remained in popular use both pre- and post-World War Two. Because no pre-1942 Carpenters records exist it is not possible to state the extent of the firm’s involvement in private enterprise but it is worth noting the comments of the Australian Auditor-General on the way funds were transferred from New Guinea by firms acting as bankers. He wrote that towards the end of 1927, it was found that funds, arising mainly out of the payment of instalments locally which were accumulating in Rabaul, were being exchanged with a private trading company for demand drafts on the Company's Sydney office. The object of this arrangement, it was explained, was to effect a saving in exchange charges. Amounts as high as V15,000 were at one time outstanding. In respect of one draft 33 days elapsed between payment to the company of the money and the cashing of the draft by the Custodian in Sydney, owing to the infrequency of mail services from Rabaul. I took exception to this method of transferring funds, principally on the grounds that Commonwealth moneys were being held by a private concern for no sufficient value given, that the security of the company is not equal to that of the Commonwealth Bank, and that banking business was being conducted by a private Company although the Commonwealth Bank had a branch at Rabaul. It will be recalled that following the opening of the branch of the Commonwealth Bank in Rabaul in 1916, the Miitary Administrator decreed that from 1 May 1916 1. Auditor-General's Report 1927/1928. p. 32 233 all banking business in the colony had to be done through it and not private companies. Although this was not incorporated in any legislation it seems unlikely that the subsequent Civil Administration would have waived this requirement, particularly after a branch of the Bank of New South Wales was opened in Rabaul in 1926. But it is quite obvious that the Administration did not enforce it. The actions of the (unidentified) company, as detailed by the Australian Auditor- General, were at variance with established practice and it is curious why this was permitted by the Administration's Treasurer. Although the mail service from New Guinea was "infrequent" (in fact, Burns, Philp ran a three-weekly mail and passenger service between Rabaul and Sydney) Rabaul had been in radio contact with Australia since 1916. It is likely that radio advice of demand drafts paid into the Rabaul office of the company was immediately relayed to the Sydney office which had credit arrangements with its bank. In other words, the company was probably enjoying credit for money which belonged to the Australian government. The practice was stopped by the government immediately the Auditor-General's report was printed and future drafts were paid to the Rabaul Treasury which transferred it to the Custodian's office in Sydney via the Commonwealth Bank. , The end of the Board The influence of the Board peaked in mid 1927 when the last of the properties were put up for tender. Once all were sold there was no reason for the Board's continued existence, and in a rather laboured flourish of patriotism it was wound up at 11 a.m. on the eleventh day of November 1927. Although the Board passed into history, a Custodian of Expropriated Property remained within the Australian government until the independence of Papua New Guinea in 1975. Free of its commitments to dispose of expropriated property, the Australian government decided to extend to the Territory a measure of local government similar to that already operating in Papua. A Legislative Council of official and non-official members was planned, together with an Executive Council comprising senior officials of the Administration and one non-official member of the Legislative Council.* The Australian government had always insisted that the Territory strive for self sufficiency (an insistence described by one Australian 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1927/1928. p. 7 234 parliamentarian as 'ridiculous and unworkable'*), and with the sale of expropriated properties finalised apparently considered its immediate obligations had been met. One of its fined acts was to approve the payment of yi70,000 to those British subjects (including the British wives of German planters), neutrals and Germans released from expropriation whose property had been sold at their request, and to allow payments of approximately /3,000 to neutrals whose cash deposits with the O major German firms had been seized during the military occupation. This was carried out by amendment no. 24 to the Expropriation Ordinance even though the q Attorney-General advised that the payments were illegal. It is worth contrasting this somewhat self-conscious generosity with the earlier flat refusal to recognise debts of German firms outstanding at the time of occupation. For example, during the military occupation, the Bremen Sudsee Gesellschaft had acknowledged a debt of 1,400M to a Malay in Batavia but the Australian government would not waive currency restrictions to allow money to be transmitted to Batavia in settlement claiming that 'it is desired at the present juncture to permit as little money as possible to leave the Territory lately known as German New Guinea'^. It did, however, agree that the debt could be discharged locally but as the Malay could not come to New Guinea,the debt remained undischarged by the Australian government using the German company's funds. With the end of the Board the Territory was more or less relegated to a position under the control of Burns, Philp and Carpenters. Under an agreement worked out between them in 1928 uniform terms of trade for merchandise and1 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 104 1923/1924. p. 2424 2. extracted from Australian Archives, Canberra. Series A1781 item A99, Department of Territories. "Balance Sheet of the Custodian as at 30th June 1928 (1921-1929)". 3. Auditor-General's Report 1927/1928. p. 29 4. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series A2 item 20/2787. Enquiries and advices re/ins in Australia and New Guinea, letter D/20/5964 of 2 July 1920 to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department from acting Comptroller General, Department of Trade & Customs, Melbourne. 235 copra were settled, and each agreed not to accept as a customer a person who was indebted to the other. * This was clearly intended to reinforce charging agreements which tied planters to them. The winding up of the Board meant that the Territory now had to look after itself; financial deficits and mismanagement could no longer be blamed on the Board and its staff. At a time when copra prices were particularly uncertain (although gold discoveries on the mainland were proving significant) the Territory had to compete for a place in the world copra market without the support of a government-backed organisation. The business contacts of Burns, Philp and Carpenters were, of course, willing to help. The next fifteen years were to prove vital for the plantation industry in New Guinea, particularly on the Gazelle Peninsula where the productivity of some of the older plantations was declining because of their age. 1. Buckley <5c Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 225 CHAPTER FIVE The Australian Civil Administration 1928 - 1942 236 Developing the plantations In 1927 the new owners of the plantations faced them with enthusiasm and a conviction that they would do well. Most had gained plantation experience as former Board employees - indeed, many now owned (at least nominally) the plantations they had previously managed. G.H. Murray, the new Director of Agriculture appointed that year, was a practical man, toughened in the penurious economy of Papua and determined to help planters run their plantations profitably. He faced many problems, including the inexperience of the few non Board managers and occasional reluctance of former Board managers to test new methods of plantation agriculture. For example, in laying out a new plantation, or re-planting sections of an established one, the ground was cleared and six-months old palm seedlings spaced generally at a distance of 30 feet apart on the triangle to give 138.13 palms to the hectare, or if planted on the square 119.60 palms to the hectare.* Square planting was very attractive when done properly; Fred Archer was proud of the way his palms were seen to be in perfect alignment from any point on his plantation and said it made grass control and the collection of mature nuts much easier. But it was possible only on fairly flat land, and outside the immediate Kokopo area of the Gazelle Peninsula most of the plantations included areas of hilly country. Murray soon realised that while inexperienced planters could manage triangular and square planting quite easily, few appreciated the value of ground cover, or any form of inter-crops (peanuts, cocoa, native foods) with the result that kunai grass took over. The area then had to be cleared again at considerable expense, and occasionally abandoned. From the time of Murray's arrival all new plantings on the Gazelle Peninsula had leguminous crops and creepers sown between seedlings to control noxious grasses (particularly kunai), while green manure was used and constant tillage practised on plantations with experienced owners/managers. The mainly self-sown village groves did not need ground cover as the canopies of their closely-planted palms shut out light and effectively controlled grass and weed growth, but their yield per tree was small. 1. Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea, p. 23 237 Because kunai grass was such a nuisance the Department of Agriculture issued a special Bulletin on how to deal with it which led to more correspondence from planters seeking advice on cover plants, and general agricultural practice. The owner of Ravalien plantation near Kokopo arranged with the Department to clean five acres of his kunai-infested land as a trial; he supplied labour and tools while the Department provided cover plant seed and an officer to supervise. * The trial worked well and was a boost to Murray in re-establishing the importance of the department as a source of practical advice to planters. Murray favoured a vigorous agricultural extension policy emd his inspectors and instructors were kept on patrol inspecting and reporting on European plantations and village groves and gardens. Within a short time of his appointment the department had completed locating almost all village groves in the Bismarck Archipelago, a significant achievement. Special inspections were carried out by Murray, the entomologist and the Economic Botanist, and for the first time during the Australian Administration of New Guinea the department had sufficient qualified and trained staff to follow a continuous programme of inspecting, advising and experimenting with aspects of coconut planting. As a result of Murray's determined approach to plantation inspections, coconut plantations around Finschhafen, Madang and Wewak on the New Guinea mainland received a new lease of life, while village groves in other parts of the mainland were closely looked after. Seed coconuts to improve the quality of copra produced on the Gazelle Peninsula were obtained from the Markham Valley on the mainland and a patrol officer later remembered how my first sight of a Markham nut made me rub my eyes, for they were huge things nearto four times the size of the nuts found on the coast. Other seed nuts were obtained from Lever Bros, plantations in the Solomon Islands, from Malaya, and from Kabaira plantation on the eastern Gazelle Peninsula. As well as trying to improve the coconut strain the department sought to control pests and experiment with alternate crops. A government entomologist 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1927/1928. p. 23 2. J.K. McCarthy, Patrol into yesteryear; my New Guinea years. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1963. p. 87 238 was appointed to research, among other things, pest control on plantations by means of 'insectivorous birds'* which had mixed success as there was a fear that in defeating one pest the department might introduce another. Trial plots of oil palm, coffee and kapok were planted at the Kerevat Experimental Farm where a plot of Sea Island cotton sent from the New Hebrides made 'rapid and vigorous O growth'. All these crops had been experimented with during the German administration and a limited amount of their produce exported, but had not displaced coconuts as the principal plantation crop. Several Australian planters also experimented with growing rice and were able to supply a portion of their labourers' rations. Many Tolai villages near Rabaul grew small areas of rice for their own consumption, and sold any surplus to nearby plantations. But despite Murray's attempt to encourage crop diversification, coconut plantations remained the focus of agricultural effort and the Gazelle Peninsula remained the most important plantation area in the Territory, closely followed by New Ireland. The size of plantations varied from the Put Put/Warangoi complex which totalled 15,000ha. to the modestly sized Kuraiba and Kuradui plantations of about lOOha. A number of the smaller plantations (together with their trade stores) were started by Australians in the more westerly coastal areas of New Britain following the opening of new government stations.^ Realising that there was a limit to the physical and financial capacity of private planters, the Administration set the maximum area of land for new plemtations at 4,800 acres (2,000ha.). By 1930, following the introduction of new strains of coconuts, and with the interest of a vigorous department led by an enthusiastic director, it appeared that the copra industry would experience a resurgence. The revitalised department was praised by the Minister for Territories during his visit in 1932: 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1928/1929. p. 45 2. ibid., 1929/1930. p. 61 3. ibid., 1932/1933. p. 142 4. of the 140 plantations in New Britain in 1938 about 36 had been established in this new area; the balance was located in the Gazelle Peninsula, and the Witu and Duke of York island groups. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1938/1939. p. 91 239 I was greatly impressed by the work at Kerevat [ he wrote ] where experiments are being carried out as to the most suitable crops that can be grown in the Territory. It has been demonstrated that many crops other than coconuts can be grown successfully. I cannot speak too highly of the very useful work that is being carried out by the Department of Agriculture. Even though the Minister had praised Murray's work which, with the onset of the depression, was vital to the agriculturally dependent colony, Murray's relationship with the Administrator and the Government Secretary was becoming increasingly difficult. The Minister later commented that 'it is a shame that O developmental work is retarded because McNicoll and Page do not like Murray' and the unpleasantness culminated in Murray's protest (unsuccessful, as it appears) to the Prime Minister that the department was being denigrated and he, personally, victimised. The ill feeling came to a head when the Administrator refused to approve the purchase of a crop power duster for controlling insect pests O on plantations. A severe attack of Promocotheca Antigua (moth)0 on Lindenhafen plantation, Talasea (south New Britain), resulted in the plantation almost being ruined and the company which owned it forced into liquidation.4 Murray claimed that a power duster to spray the crowns of palms would have effectively checked the outbreak, but without it little practical help could be given. He was also concerned that many of the old established plantations were ceasing to produce before their time and wanted to discover why; areas on Matanatar (HSAG's original experimental plantation), Ravalien and Kuradui were selected for experiments. The Administrator ordered these to stop. The planters were aggrieved and Murray publicly embarrassed. Discussions with planters indicate that Murray may not have been the most tactful of men, but his ability was 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1932/1933. p. 142 2. R.R. McNicoll, Walter Ramsay McNicoll, 1877-1947. Melbourne, private circ., 1973. pp. 239/240 3. George H. Murray, "Outbreak of Promecotheca antiqua - Lindenhafen estate" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, v. 3 no. 2. December 1937. pp. 1/2 4. H.G. Murray to Prime Minister. 14.9.37 240 appreciated. It is safe to say that by the end of the 1920s the plantation industry was progressing well under the firm guidance of Murray and - even allowing for variable copra prices - there was every reason to hope it would continue to do so. Compensation for incorrect palm counts As mentioned above, advertisements calling for claims for alleged short counts of coconut palms on expropriated plemtations were invited as early as 1928. Between that date and 1932 planters were urged to notify the Custodian of short counts in accordance with Treaty of Peace Regulation 51A A which read, inter alia, In the case of an error relating to the number of coconut-palms, ... the purchaser shall, where the error amounts to ten per centum or more of the number so published, be entitled to claim a reduction of the purchase money in respect of ninety per centum of the difference between the number of coconut palms, ... on the plantation and the number so published by the Custodian. Archer has shown that the count of palms on expropriated plantations following a claim was often done by unskilled personnel; it is probable this occurred with the original counts. He also wrote that germinated nuts placed in the ground space of dead palms were counted as palms on Jame plantation, so it is also probable this occurred on other plantations. In the absence of a current and up to date planting map the number of palms on a plantation can be estimated with reasonable accuracy by determining the actual area under palms and whether they were planted On the triangle (138.13 palms to the hectare) or the square (119.60 palms to the hectare). I have shown above that records of total plantation land - let alone the area planted with coconuts of varying ages - were often inexact. This, together with the possibility that some plantations had plantings both on the triangle and on the square, would have made an accurate count unlikely. From the available evidence it appears that palm counts - either for the Board's Catalogues 1 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.57. Dept, of Territories, Correspondence File 'C' Series, "a) Shortage of palms, b) Native Rights", 1927-1935. Opinion 126/1929 of the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor. 241 of Expropriated Property - or as a result of planter claims of shortages were extremely difficult to carry out satisfactorily. With potentially over 300 expropriated plantations in New Guinea to check, the task of accurately assessing the toted of growing pedms on each would be formidable. As mentioned above, Richards was occupied for some years re-checking Catalogue palm counts but even he made mistakes. I conclude that many claims for short-counted pedms - provided they were not excessive and there was a reasonable chance they were legitimate - were approved simply because it was beyond the resources of the Administration to prove otherwise. Undoubtedly - like War Damage Compensation claims following the second world war - some claims were inflated, but it rested with the Administration to prove this. Perhaps the Australian government chose to regard the compensation for short counts as cash-in-the-hand assistance for struggling planters. There can be no doubt that this came at a time when it was desperately needed, but inaccurate palm counts were one more grievance planters could raise with the Australian government in their demands for concessions. Many were now seriously alarmed by falling copra prices and wondered what future, if any, they had in New Guinea. Accustomed to the protection and favoured treatment initially offered by the Australian government (zealously monitored by the RSSAILA and the New Guinea Planters' Association) returned servicemen planters began to suspect that they were being neglected. This coincided with feelings in Australia that New Guinea was an encumbrance, but these were temporarily diverted by the depression into saving the colony, and its planters, from bankruptcy. • The economics of the industry The costs associated with establishing a plantation depended on many variables; location, ground type, manager/owner expertise, capital available and the current price of copra. Richards gave the following guide for developing a plantation of 300ha. in the 1930s with palms planted at 30 feet triangle. For palms up to nine or ten years of age: 242 planting up 72191. 0.0 plantation maintenance, tools, office, licences 5538.10.0 buildings 1437.10.0 management 4020. 0.0 labour fluctuations 578.10.0 Total 713585.15.0 1 No allowance was made for profit from palms which could be expected to bear from about seven years of age. Richards claimed he knew of one plantation producing heavily when its palms were five to six years of age, and others where crops were insignificant until the palms were twelve or fifteen years old. Within a single plantation or grove there might be a wide difference in yield and in length of bearing due to variations in soil and drainage conditions, and exposure to drying O or damaging winds. In his estimate Richards also made no allowance for kilns, driers, copra stores, harvesting crops or interest on borrowed capital which, although unique to individual plemtations, would have increased overall costs. However, he did suggest a "cost per palm" establishment cost: cost per palm pence Australian to plant up 12.7 office and unforeseen 2.2 licences .56 maintenance 28.3 buildings 8.33 management 23.03 labour fluctuations 3.35 Total 78.47 But with the disparity of plantations and the varying quality of their managers, it is impossible to be precise about plantation production costs.1 23 1. Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea, pp. 26/28 2. H.C. Brookfield & Doreen Hart. Melanesia: a geographical interpretation of an island world. London, Methuen, 1971. p. 141 3. Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea, pp. 26/28 243 Richards estimated a general average cost, in the 1930s, to produce a ton of copra was: labour cutting copra 13. 6 maintenance and pests 1. 0. 8 bossbois and servants 5.11 management 1.12. 4 sacks, twine, ink etc. 1. 1. 9 buildings and tools 10. 8 insurance 1. 8 licences 10 Total £5. 7. 4 This shows that about 18% was absorbed by labourers cutting copra; about 6% was absorbed by bossbois and house servants; the cost of maintaining the plantations and controlling pests ' took about 19% while the heaviest costs were for management and the means of preparing copra for market (sacks, twine, ink) which together accounted for 50% of total production costs. Although not specified in Richards' figures the drying of copra was probably included in the mangement costs. According to Reed, the best estimate of the cost per acre to O bring a plantation into bearing was £10 and this figure seems acceptable. Planters expecting to do well from their plantations were soon disillusioned. In 1929 Carpenters provided figures to the Australian Treasurer concerning its clients who had bought expropriated properties. Carpenters argued they could just make ends meet when the London copra price was £20.10.0 a ton. From this, £7.10.0 was deducted to cover mercantile charges (freight, etc.) and export duty, leaving £13 payable to producers for copra delivered at Rabaul. There was a further reduction of £2 for the cost of bags and freight from islands to Rabaul. Of the remaining £11 a ton Carpenters allocated £6 to cover interest and redemption on the purchase price of the plantation and £5 as the cost of producing 12 1. Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea, p. 29 2. Reed, The making of modern New Guinea, pp. 197/198 244 a ton of copra. This consisted of V3.13.6 for labour, 17s for overseers and 7s for sundries.* The problems facing New Guinea planters were common throughout the Pacific: Sir James Burns wrote to H.W. Gray (Burns, Philp manager at Lautoka, Fiji) that 'as we know from our experience even the best Coconut Plantations in the Pacific cannot pay their way when copra is only bringing about y6.10.0 to y 7.10.0 per ton'.^ (I assume that Burns's figure was the amount remaining after all deductions had been made). One good thing came out of all the trouble: low prices were for smoke or kiln-dried copra whereas the price for plantation copra was usually higher (see table of average prices 1928/1940 at p. 245). This encouraged Carpenters and Burns, Philp to instal hot-air driers on the plantations they controlled which not only improved the quality of copra produced, but usually reduced the number of "firemen" (labourers) required to dry the copra. The profitability of plantations obviously varied according to production costs and copra prices. As Brookfield says 'the most important single variable in plantation costs is the quality of management: it is reflected in the use of labour, in the level of "other operating costs" and in the state of the plantation O generally'. Efficient managers of New Guinea plantations (as the Expropriation Board had learned) were always scarce, and rising costs and fading markets meant that many plantations simply could not afford good managerial staff. The Methodist Mission, for example, found it extremely difficult to keep managers at its Ulu and Vunakambi plantations for 'The slump in copra prices in the Depression Years meant ... the managers had to be withdrawn'.^ When it engaged lay staff to run the plantations the Mission found there was no improvement; both plantations had to be supervised by the nearest Methodist Minister and maintained, in their spare time, by schoolboys or pastoral students. The results were predictable. Poor managers lead to badly run and unprofitable plantations which go downhill until they reach a point of negative productivity and are financial disasters. 1 1. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns Philp 1914-1946. p. 233 ("Details from a document in B.P. papers") 2. ibid., p. 251 3. Brookfield and Hart, Melanesia: a geographical interpretation of an island world, p. 146 4. Williams, The United Church in Papua, New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, p. 144 245 NEW GUINEA COPRA EXPORTS 1928/1940 year value -/A quantity average price tons ± A per ton in Rabaul 1928/1929 933,769 60,435 15.45 1929/1930 864,358 63,832 13.54 1930/1931 716,543 62,303 11.5 1931/1932 618,298 59,452 10.39 1932/1933 543,906 59,040 9.2 1933/1934 283,329 62,279 4.55 1934/1935 361,413 56,251 6.42 1935/1936 761,309 66,684 11.41 1936/1937 1,231,309 76,409 16.11 1937/1938 847,734 73,716 11.5 1938/1939 727,949 73,345 9.92 1939/1940 504,627 59,368 8.49 source; Annual Reports to the League of Nations 246 It was the unhappy experience of many owner/managers unfamiliar with plantation work that there was more to running a coconut plantation than they had been led to believe. Considering the number of small planters who were beginning to experience financial difficulty in meeting their obligation to the Custodian, as well as to their charging agreement, the Administration’s decision in the early 1930s to invite tenders for the leases of its plantations is difficult to understand. It had found it difficult to meet the demands these plantations made on its staff and resources, and in putting them up for lease must have realised it would add to the list of potential small property bankruptcies. Under the Treaty of Versailles all German administration properties passed to the Australian government which did not have to account to the German government for them. Perhaps as a result of this records of Administration plantations were patchy and it is uncertain exactly how many plantations the Administration owned, but according to Annual Reports of the period there were ten. The plantation at Kieta was leased during 1929/1930 but reverted to the Administration the following year when the plantation at Namatanai (New Ireland) was leased.*- In 1931/1932 plantations at Sisano (Aitape), Buka Passage, Manus, Morobe, Gasmata and Talasea in New Britain, and Kavieng in New Ireland were leased.2 The 1934/1935 Annual Report contains the statement 'the Administration has disposed of the several plemtations previously maintained by it with the exception of the demonstration plantation at 9 Kerevat'. This indicates the Administration had owned 10 plantations, leased 9 and retained 1. The table of Administration plantations at pp. 247/248 is a good example of the difficulty in relying on figures in Annual Reports, but figures can be obtained nowhere else. In a general section dealing with plantations in the 1922/1923 Annual Report the number of bearing coconut palms on Administration plantations is said to be 'over 25,000'4, yet no such figure (or any figure at all) appears as a total in the table of "Government" plantations. In no Annual Report 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1930/1931. p. 58 2. ibid., 1931/1932. p. 56 3. ibid., 1934/1935. p. 64 4. ibid., 1922/1923. p. 52 \ GOVERNMENT PLANTATIONS IN NEW GUINEA1 Plantations Palms Copra Age of palms Production area cleared cultivated planted bearing tons 10 years+ 9 years 8 years 7 years 6 years 5 years value costs profit/loss & under 1914- 15 1915- 16 1916- 17 1917- 18 1918- 19 1919- 20 1920- 21 1178.18.2 2 1921- 22 7000 planted, approx. 35000 bearing 3422.10.11 3979.13. 5 557. 2. 6 1922- 234314 acres 168 acres 168 acres 168 acres 126 acres 57 (approx. 60003 bearing) 2985. 5. 5 5 1923- 24 314 168 168 168 126 57 5703. 0. 6 6 495. 4. 9 5209.15. 6 1924- 25 314 168 168 168 126 43 6026.18. 6 607.13. 9 5419. 4. 9 1925- 267 67 23 23 5742. 2. 6 412. 6. 4 5329.16. 2 23 23 35 247 1926- 27 399 299 229 189 149 43 1140 - 2000 3500 2100 200 5015.18.10 * 478. 2. 5 4537.16. 5 1927- 28 161 ha. 121 ha. 92 ha. 76 ha. 60 ha. 60 1140 2000 3500 2100 200 200 5545. 1. 9 551.15. 0 4993. 6. 9 1928- 29 490 ha. 156 ha. 74 ha. 65 ha. 51 ha. 55 - 5400 1000 - 1000 500 5487.16. 0 498. 0. 3 4989.15. 9 1929- 30 330 ha. 136 ha. 84 ha. 68 ha. 56 ha. 65 6800 1000 - 1000 - 340 4315.15. 2 312. 2. 8 4003.12. 6 1930- 31 330 ha. 149 ha. 113 ha. 77 ha. 69 ha. 71 6891 - 1000 - - 677 1812.19. 7 8 155. 2. 10 1657.16 9 1931- 32 250 ha. 82 ha. 60 ha. 8 ha. ------528 911.18. 5 115.18. 2 796. 0. 3 1932- 33 250 ha. 140 ha. 90 ha. 8 ha. ------728 833.15. 6 62. 5. 4 771.10. 2 1933- 34 301 ha. 140 ha. 60.5 ha. 8 ha. ------960 454. 7. 2 9 54. 7. 3 399.19.11 1934- 35 All administration coconut plantations leased source: Annual Reports to the League of Nations Footnotes on page 248. 248 1. location of these given in Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/22 p. 94. There is no individual or district production figure. Following the normal pattern of production and location I have assumed most were on the Gazelle Peninsula where the bulk of plantations occurs 2. no record of quantity produced, costs, or specific profit/loss 3. "Periodically a recount of the trees is made, and at a number of the Administration plantations such recounts were made during the year, returning, in most instances, a greater number of trees than had previously been recorded. This, together with the inclusion, among bearing trees, of trees attaining six years of age, has increased the record of bearing trees by over 25,000". Annual Report to the League of Nations 1922/23. p. 52 4. division into Rabaul, and other districts, commenced 5. "Apparent decrease caused by stocks accumulated prior to 1 July 1921 disposed of during 1921/22". Annual Report to the League of Nations 1922/23. p. 55. Reference is also made to sales of copra amounting to '78824.3.11 for previous year" (Annual Report to the League of Nations 1921/22 p. 94 refers to V3422.10.il as Administration plantation copra sales for 1921/22). 6. "Proceeds of the sale of copra from Government Departments and other revenue of the Department of Agriculture". Annual Report to the League of Nations 1923/24 p. 45 7. no explanation appears in the Annual Report to the League of Nations for the drop in area figures, and the increase for 1926/27 89 8. Decrease due to all in price of copra and disposal of some plantations by leasing. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1930/31 p.75 fn.O 9. low price of copra reflected here * decrease due mainly to sale of Administration plantation, Tamiliki. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1926/27 p. 61. (where was this sale recorded? Not in Statements of Revenue 1925/26 to 1927/28) 249 is the number of plantations operated by the Administration shown, and there are other strange discrepancies. For example, in the 1926/27 Annual Report (the first to allege totals of palms in age groups) 200 palms are shown in the column "5 years and under”, 2100 as "6 years” , 3500 as ” 7 years", 2000 as "8 years", nil as "9 years" and 1140 as "10 years". From the 1931/32 Report onwards (i.e. when the Administration was trying to lease its plantations) no figures, other than for "5 years and under", were given. Perhaps the Administration realised how poor its records were, for that Report also included the qualifying statement before the table of all plantations in New Guinea that 'planters from time to time submit particulars of their plantations'.1 In other words, inaccuracies were the fault of the planters supplying figures. But it seems extraordinary that the Administration could not arrive at a constant total of all plantations in New Guinea (note; these included cacao, coffee, kapok and "other" plantations as well as coconut plantations) either in districts or as a total in the colony. The table at p. 250 shows how district emd colony totals varied from year to year during the period 1930/35 reflecting a lack of attention in preparing statistics as well as showing a lack of concern at the League of Nations at their irregularity. In no Annual Report is a correcting statement made of a previous year's statistics as the result of a query from the League. Because of their size and annual production, the Administration plantations were little more than "hobby-farms" - attracting semi-retired lessees who may not have needed to rely on them solely for income. This was just as well as copra prices dropped, and dropped sharply; Fred Archer wrote of his copra O falling tof3 a ton on the beach at Jame plantation. 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1934/35. p. 64 2. F.P. Archer to B. Molloy (solicitor), Sydney. 17.12.51. Archer papers. 250 NEW GUINEA - NUMBER OF PLANTATIONS1 year Aitape Kieta Madang Manus Morobe New New Total Britain Ireland - 1930/1931 22 46 49 37 12 122 128 416 1931/1932 22 49 50 36 11 128 127 423 1932/1933 18 46 55 38 10 132 137 436 1933/1934 18 48 50 33 10 128 135 422 1934/1935 19 51 56 34 10 132 134 436 source: Annual Reports to the League of Nations 1. no indication how many are coconut plantations 251 Few planters kept accurate and up to date records of costs (although urged to do so as early as 1924)*; those that were kept were destroyed during the Japanese invasion emd occupation in 1942. It was not until many of the plantations came under the control of Burns, Philp and Carpenters that positive attempts were made to estimate costs per acre, and relate these to labour and other production costs. One such attempt was in 1931 when A.M. Turnbull, the manager of Burns, Philp's Islands Agencies department in Sydney (responsible for the operation of plantations in New Guinea), visited New Guinea to take over and re organise the plantations bought from the Melanesia Company. Turnbull gave frank evaluations of the plantations (mainly Second Group purchases) which suggest they may not have been the bargains they were thought to be. He directed that the number of labourers be reduced (discussed below), and recommended cattle to control grass and weeds. He also examined each plantation's buildings which were generaUy in poor condition. For example, he noted that it was necessary for the manager of Kimadan plantation to place large hardwood piles under the copra drier to keep it from collapsing; and warned that if there was "a change of District Officer" the woven bamboo walls of labour houses at Ramat plantation O would have to be replaced with iron. TurnbuU's report highlights both the condition many plantations were in at the start of the depression years, and the way some were/had been run disregarding the Native Labour regulations. Native plantations After shedding its plantations the Administration gradually reduced the control and supervision of native plantations. The most immediate reason for this was the collapse of the copra market and the accompanying drop in demand. As mentioned earlier, it proved extremely difficult to explain to native producers that the rise and fall in copra prices was dependent on demand on the other side of the world. Australia's consumption of copra was modest, and the bulk of copra was still being shipped to markets in London and on the Continent. From1 2 1. Yarwood, Vane Report, pp. 7, 13/14 2. A.M. Turnbull, Manager, Island Agencies Department, to F.W. Wallin, Sydney. 12.11.31. Burns, Philp Archives, Head Office 252 producing a reasonable amount of copra natives reverted to trading; by the middle o f the 1930s a substantial number of Tolai on the Gazelle Peninsula were working for Europeans in occupations ranging from domestic servants to small ships crews. Where men were involved in regular daily employment it fell to the women of the villages to maintain coconut groves and the areas of coconuts villagers had planted for copra production. Gradually the attention to producing copra shifted to trading either whole nuts, or green coconut meat (i.e. shelled nuts) to traders. Even though there were over 70 native copra driers in the Rabaul/Kokopo area by early 1937 not all were in constant use, or capable of being used. Villagers tended to stockpile coconuts until a sufficient quantity was available for processing, then there was a period of strenuous activity during which nuts were husked, shelled, the flesh cut into strips and placed in driers. With the more stringent control and inspection of copra under the Copra Ordinance a lot of village produced copra was rejected as imperfectly dried. Some of this was sold to Chinese traders for re drying, but a significant amount was destroyed. This led to a lessening of interest in producing copra although the standard of some village produced copra compared favourably with a lot of plantation copra.1 On the Gazelle Peninsula, Tolai were now growing ’'European" (i.e. from introduced seeds and plants) foods for sale at markets in Rabaul and Kokopo, as well as increasing their gardens of native food to sell to plantations. With so many labourers from mainland New Guinea and the more remote island areas working in some connection with plantations and living close to major towns and settlements, there was sufficient work available for Tolai to obtain money for head tax so the need to raise this from copra production eased. Whether or not the Administration had hoped to attract native lessees of its plantations cannot be determined; stimulating native interest in plantation management by doing this would have increased demands on it for advice and assistance. By 1937 other money-making ventures were attracting the interest of villagers on the Gazelle Peninsula, and the eruption of Matupit volcano that year - which saw many of the native coconut groves and plantations in the Kokopo area destroyed - hastened the decline of native plantations in popularity and importance. 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1936/1937. p. 83 253 Labour Although machinery and new agricultural techniques were being introduced on some plantations by the early 1930s, many planters tried to cut operating costs by reducing labour lines which, once the work of establishing or re-planting a plantation had been done, could be kept at a lower strength until the plantings matured. A few were able to introduce tractors* and rotary hoes to control grass and weeds between palms, and bring mature nuts to cutting sheds. Those who could not planted ground cover to smother kunai grass and small weeds, but this sometimes made it difficult to locate fallen nuts until after they had germinated and were then of little use for copra. Planters with sufficient private or company funds installed modern copra driers but new driers were expensive and where "owners" were bound by a charging agreement to a firm it was made clear that the expected order of progression was production and profits first, and innovation second. The need for, and emphasis on, labour-saving devices within ten years of Australia receiving the mandate for New Guinea seems a contradiction of the perceived need to compel 'the natives to work and grow if the O race is to be saved from extinction, and the group to advance'. Also, there was a not insignificant system of inter-dependent businesses - recruiters, coastal shipping (and, later, air services), trade stores, import/export firms, shipping and customs agents in the Territory and Australia - which were supported to a large extent by plantation labour requirements. A marked drop in the number of labourers moving from home villages to plantations would cause an appreciable reduction in head tax and other government advantages at a time when revenue was under threat from low copra prices. Some retrenchment of labour took place as indentures expired for only the better labourers were urged to re-sign. But thoughtful planters looked ahead to the time when their plantations would need to expand or be re-planted and worried that additional labour might not be available. Discussed among 1 1. Stuart (a private planter who looked after some of Burns, Philp's Bougainville plantations as a sideline) convinced Burns, Philp that a tractor 'would eventually do away with most of the grass gang'. Stuart, Nuts to you! p. 54 2. Hentze/Roberts paper, p. 3 254 themselves, this gradually grew into a fear that a labour shortage was imminent. Although this did not occur during the depression and recovery years, it preyed on planters' minds so much that in 1939 the Administration established a Commission to look into the labour position (discussed below). It was this self-generated fear of a labour shortage, rather them any actual shortage, that was a constant source o f anxiety to planters during the 1930s. As mentioned below, with the collapse of the world copra market the demand for plantation labour eased almost overnight as most planters postponed expansion, re-planting and even some of the less essential plantation maintenance. In the late 1920s plantation labour lines were kept at the same level they had been for 1914 German plantings, and were certainly not increased on those few plantations which carried on re-planting during this period. Some clever labour-saving methods were used, for example at Vunakambi plantation where the boys pile the nuts close to the edge of a creek which runs through the centre of the plantation, and when all the nuts are collected, they are floated down this creek to the main road on the plantation, from where they are carried in bags to the copra house. But it was a fallacy to think that significant savings could be achieved by continually reducing labour lines. Richards' figures for production costs (discussed above) show that the labour cost in producing a ton of copra was already quite low, and it was apparent that further reductions would only affect the plantation. Some economies were made in management costs as the depression years ground on, but here again there was a limit. There was not much room to manoeuvre in paring costs and the industry was caught in an awkward situation where it was unable to economise further without jeopardising the palms on which it depended. The estimated cost of labourers varied so much (see, for example, the variations in Cobcroft's examination of sample plantations at pp. 47/76 of the Yarwood, Vane Report) that it is not possible to state a figure common to all plantations in New Guinea. Ainsworth noted that where a Tolai trader employed 1. W.R. Huntley, ''Vunakabi Industrial Mission" in The Missionary Review, August 6 1934. p. 19 255 fellow villagers to produce copra the cost per man was about 5s a month in wages, and about 14s a month in rations (an annual total of yil.8.6) because he was not bound by the requirements of the Native Labour Ordinance. But where a "boy" was employed by a European who was bound by the Ordinance, the annual cost was much higher: ~ wage (12 x 6s) -/3.12.0 rations/issues (12 x 15s) 9. 0.0 initial cost 18.0 recruiting/repatriation 2. 8.4 annual issue 5.0 government fees 2.4 taxes 6.0 average medical costs 12.0 total £7.3.8 There were other estimates of the annual cost of a labourer. Decker estimated that the "all-in" cost was V26.8.0 , while Hentze and Roberts claimed that after deducting the cost of wages and rations employers made a clear annual profit of 16s per "boy", and that considering the 'ample and nourishing diet given to the labourer there seemed every reason for his health to be superior to that of the O ordinary [ i.e. unemployed ] native'. Richards' estimate, based on his own plantation experience, of yi6 a year for a labourer on the Gazelle Peninsula working ten hours a day for 283 working days a year^ is probably the most e realistic, being remarkably close to the figure of yi6.16.3 set by Cobcroft. Being able to move labourers between duties on a plantation was important. The ability to stagger copra making and reduce floor maintenance (grass-cutting) even to the point where it ceased during the depression years, enabled many planters to survive. Yet it was a matter of pride to keep plantations clean for 1 1. Ainsworth Report, p.34 2. Decker, Labour problems in the Pacific Mandates, p. 190 3. Hentze/Roberts paper, pp. 5, 8 4. Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea, p. 10 5. Cobcroft Report, p. 44 256 Any planter will tell you that you may judge the occupier of a place by the condition of the grass between the palms. "Let the kunai beat you and you might as well give up", is urged as an axiom among ..planters who know their job. The unkempt appearance of many plantations during the depression years was a clear sign that those planters were struggling. Fortunately for the industry the coconut palm is "a remarkably understanding crop" at a low, but tolerable, level of productivity; higher productivity requires close attention to maintenance, O fertilising, pest control and copra making. Planters able to accept lower returns managed with a great deal less labour input. Some of this flexibility was lost when copra production on the Gazelle Peninsula was combined with other enterprises (dessicated coconut, coir) as more and better trained labourers were needed to handle these more specialised products (discussed below). Generally, however, the ease of combining crops was a help to plantations struggling with difficult economic conditions, although not many planters realised this. The industry was also fortunate that about 1929/1930, when labour was becoming scarce because of the demands of gold-miners on the mainland, the immediate need for it eased. Just when all large plemtations on the Gazelle Peninsula appeared poised for rapid expansion, the copra market overseas collapsed and with it the need for additional plantation labourers. However, the way those plemtations which had steirted to expand were able to function without increasing their labour lines may indicate that they were previously over-supplied with labour which - as the Expropriation Board had experienced - was not always used efficiently. An instance of this was when the manager of Burns, Philp’s Islands Agencies department in Sydney discovered that labour lines on plantations which the firm had bought from the Melanesia Company were unnecessarily large. At Kenabot plantation the manager was instructed to reduce his line from a total 1 1. William C. Groves, "Life on a coconut plantation" in Walkabout, 1 July 1935. p. 35 2. Brookfield & Hart, Melanesia: a geographical interpretation of an island world, p. 148 257 strength of 60 to 42, i.e. 6 "units" to every 100 acres or 1 labourer to every 16 acres (it will be recalled that the Board set a quota of 1 labourer to every 6.5 acres on its plantations which, at the time, was considered severe). The manager protested that he could not keep the plantation clean-weeded with the reduction but was told that with 160 head of cattle on the plantation 'it should be done easily'.^ The three small plantations comprising Kimadan plantation had a reduction to 90 labourers from 124; Karu was reduced from 85 to 55; and Bopire from 96 to 70. Most managers protested, but Turnbull was firm and the reductions stood; there were few subsequent protests once plantation routines and production schedules were re-cast. There was no marked improvement - or reduction - in copra production as the plantations were operating at their peak; perhaps extra labourers may have been needed for re-planting and normal expansion but this was not then a high priority. Turnbull had shown that with firm direction and the ability to disregard club veranda gossip, plantation managers could reduce their labour lines and still continue to operate successfully. In the search to contain labour costs two possible alternatives were not investigated; one, the payment of incentive rates to gangs of copra-cutters to move between plantations cutting set quantities of copra for a contracted price; the other, encouraging native share-farmers. The daily amount of "green" copra cut by labourers varied between plantations: on some it was 120 lbs per labourer, on others it was 360 lbs. As with production costs, it proved impossible to set a daily quota of work common to all plantations. Whether the copra gangs could not manage a set daily rate, whether it was thought they might infringe the Native Labour Ordinance, or whether it was feared there would be social problems between itinerant cutters and local villagers cannot now be determined. Problems had been experienced between labour lines and local village women in German times - on one occasion Wahlen had protected village women from molestation by O simply moving the entire village to another location - so it was logical to assume they would also be experienced during the Australian Administration. The concept 1. A.M. Turnbull, Island Agencies Department, to F.W. Wallin, Sydney. 12.11.31. Burns, Philp Archives, Head Office. 2. undated letter (?March 1962) from H.R. Wahlen to F.P. Archer. Archer papers 258 of share-farming was never accepted by Australian planters in New Guinea even though it proved successful at Gizo in the British Solomons-*- where the incentive to earn more was said to have greatly increased labourers' efficiency. Share farming in New Guinea would have brought problems with land ownership - particularly under the matrilineal Tolai system in the Gazelle Peninsula where former owners were distressed by how much land Europeans had acquired. The sight of "foreign" natives settled and growing crops for sale on plantation land would have heightened this distress. One hidden advantage of the depression years which helped planters was the deferring o f any cash or material improvement in labourer's conditions. As the Australian government had to support the copra industry by reducing export duty and other taxes, there was little chance it would introduce amendments to the Native Labour Ordinance which would increase labourers' costs on plantations. The employers' fear of a potential labour shortage was strengthened as fewer native men offered for work because of improved commercial prospects in their villages or districts, yet few employers tried to make plantation work attractive, if not challenging. There was little sympathy among Europeans on the Gazelle Peninsula for any improvement in labourers' conditions following the Rabaul Strike in January 1929 although the acting chief of police in Rabaul O commented that 'The strike was a traditional Australian way of doing things'. It achieved nothing material other than to frighten the European population into demanding tougher control of labourers through the Native Labour Ordinance. The idea of strikes remained anathema to Europeans; when miners struck in Bulolo (New Guinea mainland) about 1935/1936 there was "horror" in European circles - 0 'What', they wondered, 'will the natives think?' There remained an unshakeable master/servant relationship between labourers and their employers, typified by Groves's comment that 1. Pacific Islands Monthly, 20.2.31. p. 7 2. Gam mage, "The Rabaul Strike 1929". p. 23 3. discussion with Robin McKay, Altstonville. June 1986 259 I know no more pleasing relationship between human beings than that between natives and master in a plantation house where there is mutual understanding and give-and-take. It was considered there were 'Three dominant features of life - food, amusement and sex' which kept villagers 'happy emd contented recounting daily incidents of O the chase when sitting round the fire chewing betel nuts at night'. The same insensitivity occurred in the Director of Agriculture's discussion on the possible introduction into New Guinea of a new type of pawpaw from Hawaii which, he thought, was better for "table use" than a local variety considered 'more suitable for issue as pig feed, and even to native labourers whose palates may not be quite ...... ' ' ' 9 ...... ' ' ' ' ' so sensitive as those of Europeans'. Private companies shared a similar concern for economy - Stuart was advised to commence growing sweet potatoes and corn to feed the labourers and pigs.^ As well as being a good example of how the format of Administration statistics vary, the table on p. 260 showing plantation labour for the period 1929/1940 has a number of points of interest. It is clear that New Britain (particularly the Gazelle Peninsula) was the centre of the plantation industry, closely followed by New Ireland. The other major plantation areas (Madang, Kieta and Manus) were all established during the German administration - the Manus district was where H.R. Wahlen created his plantation empire based on the Western Islands. The minor areas of Morobe and Aitape (subsequently Sepik) were mainly developed during the Australian administration. Lae, in the Morobe district, was selected as the alternate capital site for New Guinea following the 1937 eruption in Rabaul. The impact of the depression years is noticeable in all districts, strikingly so in New Britain. There the total of plantation labourers 1. Groves, "Life on a coconut plantation", p. 36 2. Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea, p. 15 (one is reminded of Huntley's comment 'we must consider these people, for they are just as human as we are'. Huntley, "Vunakabi Industrial Mission", p. 19) 3. G.H. Murray, "Pawpaws (or papayas)" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, v. 4 no. 2 April 1938. pp. 37/38 4. Stuart, Nuts to you!, p. 71 LABOUR EMPLOYED ON ALL PLANTATIONS IN NEW GUINEA, 1929-40 Aitape Kieta Madang Manus Morobe N. Britain N. Ireland total male female male female male female male female male female male female male female 647 10 2191 24 2459 23 1335 7 534 - 6941 166 4987 201 19535 622 13 2348 18 2813 14 1408 22 565 9 6669 151 5031 189 19872 610 3 1723 13 2379 24 1290 11 499 18 6385 27 4601 150 17733 645 - 1790 3 2199 9 1283 4 442 9 5532 118 4174 127 16335 611 7 1837 4 2476 29 1240 40 327 5 5630 189 3950 160 16505 465 5 1656 20 2368 28 1148 63 332 6 5971 189 3981 181 16413 ind. cas. ind. cas. ind. cas. ind. cas. ind. cas. ind. cas. ind. cas. 434 16 2120 139 2404 52 1039 10 404 26 4260 150 2724 216 14094 750 15 2271 67 3237 121 1219 55 571 11 6157 20 4568 262 19324 19760 20855 527 2485 4156 1274 619 7080 4516 20657 520 2561 4405 1207 575 7050 4405 20477 Annual Reports to the League of Nations (compiled "from Returns submitted by Planters") "Aitape" changed to "Sepik". "Indentured" and "casual" replaces male and female. Total figure only provided. Indentured figure only provided. 261 dropped from 7107 in 1929 to 5650 in 1932 with a slight increase each year until 1935 when it plummeted to 4410. This shows that planters were reducing labour lines in an effort to cope with low prices and a lack of markets during the depression years. Two other significant points can be drawn from this table: one, that women were being employed on plantations despite alleged planter opposition (although their duties are not known I suggest most were either domestic servants or piece workers); and two, that there was little difficulty in obtaining replacement labourers for those dispensed with during difficult times. In 1929 there were 19535 labourers employed on all plantations, in 1935 the number was 14094, by 1940 it had soared to 20477. Had there been a genuine labour shortage some mention of this would have appeared in a contemporary Annual Report. As none does, my contention that labour was not always carefully used - except in times of extreme stringency - appears correct. There were no noticeable increases in re-plantings or newly planted land during this period, although admittedly production of copra probably was severely reduced which would, in turn, have reduced the number of labourers needed to process it. It should be noted that the figure of 20477 labourers employed on plantations in 1940 is only 1384 higher than the figure for the last full year of German administration (see fn.l, p. 51). When it is remembered that there were at least a third more plantations in 1940 than in 1913, it is clear that Australian planters were beginning to use available labour sensibly. Even with the Administration's insistence on the requirements of the Native Labour Ordinance, the manner in which labourers were recruited was still unclear to "informed" observers. During discussions in 1939 on the possible combining of the administrations of Papua and New Guinea it was stated that 'in New Guinea a bonus is usually paid to natives entering into indentures - 20s for a three year contract, 15s for a two year period and 10s for one year'.^ This had been developed by the Expropriation Board and lapsed with the winding up of the Board in 1927. *12 1. Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament. Vol. Ill, Session 1937-38-39-40. Report of Committee appointed to survey the possibility of establishing a combined Administration of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea, and to make a recommendation as to a capital site (1) for the combined administration if that is favoured; or (2) for the Territory of New Guinea if the retention of separate Administrations is recommended. Canberra, Government Printer, 1939. p. 724 (hereafter cited as "Combined Administration Report, p. ...") 262 By the late 1930s the districts from which labourers were recruited had expanded to previously unopened areas of the New Guinea mainland, as well as heavier recruitment from the Sepik River - although the Administration limited the number of recruits. In 1937 there were 'Sepik River men'1 on the Methodist Mission plantation at Ulu, as well as on most plantations of the Gazelle Peninsula. Their standard had improved from that of earlier recruits, but they still needed careful training and for the first six months of employment were not considered reliable - or productive - workers. A tried group of eagerly-awaited labourers from the Highlands districts of mainland New Guinea was a disappointment. Richard claimed in retrospect that they had not been such a great success as hoped for. These boys are of a particularly dull type. They look strong and healthy but their working ability on a plantation is about on the ratio of one lowland native to at least 3 highland natives. Planters tried to select the areas they wanted their labour recruited from, but frequently had to be content with those available. Of the 30% of the total male native population of New Guinea fit for working (i.e. adult, of working age and in good health) it was said that only 14% was actually available for recruitment. The steady growth of a villager workforce dependent - by chance or circumstance - on European employment is shown by their renewal of contracts for a typical three-year period: 12 contracts renewed for 1 year 929 2 years 3,812 3 years 1,900 Total 6,777 1. R.N. Wayne, "The Volcanic eruption in Rabaul 1937" pp. 76/98 from notes and photos from the journal of R.N. Wayne prepared by Mrs Helen Wayne. (R.N. Wayne was a resident of Rabaul and area 1924/1942, originally with the Methodist Mission at Ulu in the Duke of York islands, and later with the New Guinea Administration. With the exception of this extract, all his journal material was lost during the Japanese invasion of Rabaul in January 1942) 2. Richards, Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea, p. 9 3. ibid., p. 10 263 On plemtations close to developing urban settlements such as Rabaul and Kokopo on the Gazelle Peninsula, and Madang on the New Guinea mainland, some "foreign" labourers were choosing to remain in the area on completion of their indentures. Some married local women, others brought wives and families from their home villages. Occasionally land and fishing right problems arose with local villagers, but the full consequence of these did not become apparent until the postwar years. Before 1942 these migrant family units formed the nucleus of a plantation workforce from which casual, as well as permanent, labour could be drawn and were preferred by many planters. Depending on the personality of the plantation owner/manager these migrant labourers could encourage local natives - in whose villages, or on whose land, they were living - to offer for casual work. But the Administration, and the planters, remained anxious about the labour situation. A Commission appointed in 1939 to study it presented a report the following year, but its recommendations were shelved because of the approaching war. The Commission had found that the normal annual expansion of agricultural holdings in New Guinea was about 6,000 acres which required an annual increase of 500 labourers. It expected that the demand for plantation labour would reach 50,000 by about 1945 to keep up with this, but calculated that if all alienated land was developed the required figure would exceed 85,000. The Commission showed that there was a widening gap between the rate of land alienation and development, and laid down a principle that "the requisition of land and the labour required for its development were interdependent". Agreeing that 33% of fit adult males in a locality (village, language/dialect group) in areas where a census had determined the population should be the recruiting limit, the Commission noted that the current rate of recruitment was between 21.4% and 27.8% and concluded that there was sufficient labour available until 1945 to meet anticipated demands if the rate of development did not exceed that of the past. It recommended the continuation of the indenture system, with some new principles and the tightening-up of administrative control to give better operation. It noted the danger of long-continued absence of recruits from their home villages and recommended that an absence of 25% of adult males from an area should be seen as a danger signal. Among the Commission’s other recommendations were; areas of common economies should be considered for recruiting instead of individual villages; readjustments should be gained by the repatriation of absentees rather than prohibitions on recruiting; wide conceptions of communal welfare should be 264 developed; more stringent supervision of recruiting and repatriation should be assured; discipline over labour could be assured by an overhaul of the prison system and general administration rather than by returning powers of corporal punishment to employers (said to be favoured by some employers and missionaries); and superior standards of medical examination, housing, diet and general welfare needed to be instituted. There were general comments about plantation work, the administration of the Ordinance, inspections and liaison between Government officers and departments, but no recommendation was made for any alteration of hours and wages. There was the usual recommendation of an extension of native education in industrial and technical training which had been made so often in the previous twenty years that it was a basic part of any official report on New Guinea. Few of the recommendations dealt with principles of employing labour; almost all were palliative (to the planters) or disciplinary; the report did, however, imply that the indenture system was very nearly terminal and that a crisis (which, as mentioned above, had been worrying the planters for years) was not far off.'*' There could have been no clearer statement that the natives of New Guinea were still regarded as an asset in the development of the colony, nor could there have been a clearer indication of the power and influence of the O planters in retaining the status quo. Like Cobcroft the Commission was not enthusiastic about the idea of plantation "labour villages" preferring to see labourers return to their home villages at the end of their indentures. Yet it was later claimed that the Commission 'expressed opposition to the idea of Plantation Villages ... because it would lead to the economic ruin of the natives concerned'** at a time when there were plantation villages already established to the mutual satisfaction of planters and labourers. The first recorded instance of such a village was in 1926 when Octave Mouton allowed some retired labourers from other parts of New Guinea to live and garden on part of his Kinigunan plantation. 1. W.E.H. Stanner, The South Seas in transition: a study of post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction in three British Pacific dependencies. Sydney, Australasian Publishing Company, 1953. pp. 53/56 2. Cobcroft Report, p. 37 3. A.P. Elkin, Wanted - a charter for the native peoples of the south-west Pacific. Sydney, Australasian Publishing Company, 1945. p. 33 265 These men made no claim to ownership of the land.* By the end of the 1930s the structure of the labour force on plantations was changing. The drift from villages to urban centres - a major problem in the closing years of the postwar administration of Papua New Guinea - had commenced. Labouring on a plantation was the single biggest adventure many male villagers experienced; those who returned home were permanently altered by it. European influence was introduced into isolated villages on the mainland and the foundation laid for an urban poor society, a problem not then appreciated by the Australian government. In retrospect, it was probably fortunate that New Guinea and the plantation industry were so affected by the world depression and collapse of the copra market; had these not occurred the demand for labour would have seen more villagers attracted into indentures, hastening the breakdown of village life and values. The coconut plantation industry, in which millions of pounds were precariously invested, depended on indentured labourers for its continued existence. A total dependence on casual labour might have caused the closing down of some plantations located in sparsely populated areas (e.g. the Hermit islands) as their high ratio of labour costs added to final production costs. This actually happened after 1945 when Carpenters gave back to the Custodian the plantations of Tumavali, Agita emd Watolla on Wuvulu island as being O uneconomical to work. Stanner considered that the ultimate rationalisation and possible relocation of the plantation industry - with much loss of capital - could scarcely have been avoided had the war not intervened, although it is not clear where the plantations could have been located. The main map at p.331 shows the 1. Bredmeyer, The registration of land in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, p. 112 2. Sinclair tells how time-expired labourers returned to their mainland villages with orange seeds and how oranges quickly became a food and trading item. He also records some of the earliest attempts at transporting recruits by air to Gazelle Peninsula plantations. James Sinclair, Wings of gold; how the aeroplane developed New Guinea. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1978 3. F.P. Archer to B. Molloy (solicitor), Sydney. 17.12.51. Archer papers 266 Gazelle Peninsula ringed with plantations, while the map on p. 267 shows expansion on the adjacent Duke of York islands. Common to both areas was the location of plantations on the best available land, and with the best available access by sea. It would have been difficult to relocate these plantations elsewhere in New Guinea. Ideally, there needed to be a correlation between plantation centres and their work force, preferably in an area of commercial development well served by coastal and overseas shipping. A moderate rate of change towards a completely "free”, or contract, labour system together with rationalisation and relocation might have been attempted in an effort to re distribute labour effectively, but this was never a positive aim in the Territory, or in Papua. * Copra It was the ease with which raw coconut meat could be processed into copra that made the industry so attractive. But because of the Board's policy of not spending any more on plantations under its care than was absolutely necessary to maintain production, many copra driers on former Board plantations were in a poor state of repair. Ainsworth had remarked on the neglect of German plantation equipment saying that driers had fallen into disrepair and been abandoned even when they could have been repaired. 'Modern devices for drying the copra were general here at one time', agreed a later Annual Report, 'but were allowed to get out of order and then abandoned, primitive methods of curing O afterwards being adopted'. As a result the standard of New Guinea plantation copra fell and a Rotterdam broker included it in his claim that 'The copra from the South Sea Islands has the reputation of being badly cured';0 market rejection of copra decided the Administration to compel planters and traders to take greater care in its production. The Copra Ordinance 1928, brought into effect on 1. Stanner, The South Seas in transition, p. 52 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1927/1928. p. 28 3. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry", p. 32 267 SCALE YDS O 1000 2000 3000 APPROXIMATE PLANTATION LOCATIONS DUKE OF YORK ISLANDS, 1940 268 10 January 1929 (i.e. nine years after the Board had taken over German plantations) provided that no person might make, buy or sell copra from other than mature nuts. A penalty was provided for selling undried kernel, imperfectly dried, sweated or rotten copra, or copra mixed with shell, stone, dust or other foreign substance. The Ordinance also provided for the appointment of inspectors with powers to pass or condemn copra for export. All copra shipped from plantations, or brought from plantations to Rabaul, Kavieng or Madang, had to be inspected before shipment or trans-shipment; copra which complied with the provisions of the Ordinance, and was otherwise fit for export, was passed. As a result the average quality of New Guinea copra improved greatly from the late 1920s. In some districts before the introduction of the Ordinance, about 60% of copra submitted was badly or carelessly dried,* with a distinct lack of uniformity in the product. This almost ceased with regular inspections by the two inspectors in Rabaul, and one each at Madang and Kavieng. The Ordinance was favourably received by most planters and other commercial interests who realised its value, even if they occasionally challenged inspection reports. For the six months to 30 June 1929, a total of 25,966 bags of copra was inspected at Rabaul; 66 bags - O about 4.5 tons - were condemned and destroyed. The decisions of the inspectors were disputed in six cases but were upheld by the court. So successful was the Ordinance, and so marked was the improvement of copra, that J.C. Mullaly of Natava plantation subsequently expressed general planter satisfaction with it, claiming it had added ^60,000 a year to the wealth of the Territory.** Perhaps as a result of the appointment of H.G. Murray as Director of Agriculture following the resignation of Dr Bryce, closer attention was paid to the way copra was dried. Murray had experience of Papuan coconut plantations, and with a larger staff, supported by the provisions of the Ordinance, was able to insist that copra was correctly prepared for export. Many planters had already realised the need for proper driers and those who could afford to had installed them. Murray hoped that the Copra Ordinance would make kiln drying "general" 1. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry", p. 65 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1928/1929. p. 42 3. H.G. Murray to the Prime Minister. 14.9.x3n7. Cilento Collection, Fryer Memorial Library of Australian Literature, University of Queensland Library 269 and so improve the quality of copra produced in New Guinea. Properly dried copra should contain no more than 5%1 moisture to prevent deterioriation during shipment overseas as excessive moisture allowed development of harmful fermentation, fungus growth and increased free fatty acid content. In a 1936 Department of Agriculture report on the coconut industry in New Guinea it was claimed 'There [ were ] almost as many types of driers used as there are . . 9 plantations m the territory, and the capital cost must be very considerable'. They ranged from amazing Heath-Robinson contraptions to well-built handyman affairs, but until economic conditions improved little could be done to standardise driers and guarantee better copra production. Administrator McNicoll saw a hot air drier called a "Chula" or "Ceylon" drier after its origin, for the first time at Gavit plantation in the Baining. It struck him 'as being a more scientific method than any other [ he ] had met or heard of'.'* A diagram of a Chula drier is at p. 270. However, like other oil-fired driers, the Chula drier was expensive and many planters had to make do with less elaborate ones. Stuart found on Bougainville that the ideal drier consisted of a wire platform about eight feet off the ground and enclosed by a galvanised building with a skillian (sic) roof. The floor of the drier was a large pit in which coconut husks and shell were burnt for drying the copra. Ventilation for the escape of smoke was provided by a gap of ten inches below the roof in the front and rear of the drier. If the copra was placed in the drier at 6 p.m. it was usually cured by 8 a.m. the next day provided the firemen had remained awake to stoke the fires. There were always four firemen to each drier; two for the day shift and two for the night shift. Drying commenced as soon as the pit had been filled with skins and lit. Columns of smoke would appear when the skins were first lit after there was little smoke but intense heat from the glowing coals. After lighting the fire the firemen usually fell asleep and only woke up when the fires had died down and they felt cold! This would go on throughout the night and early hours of the morning until the copra was cured. 123 1. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry", p. 32 2. ibid., p. 68 3. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1935/1936. p. 109 4. Stuart, Nuts to you! p. 48 270 -ISlWETRI~ .sKEreH ,,,/1, e~~d ,.OII'IfJt'tKI /rJ ~how in/.,.,a,. ~~- -'r~li... J!Wi' ~ 5' IS' ~· I . -~ .,..,.... UMA MJIIIIU· ~ .,. bl.dg ...,.:«g -IM.dfy 1. .- · ~· ·~·-- • • _.... ,.., .. ,.~ eJ.W,_...... ,,. . _,.,..,_11.-Md _..,.-~. •• fi/).1/ICI JJM/J£t!.ll£,..,. ... ~-IJIIYINS ~.,~ ~ .. -~N- .SMfr I •,. n.J J/)IAGRAM OFON£ TYPE ;;;:-cEYLON tJOPRA DRIER source: New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, v.4 no.l January 1938. pp. 35 271 It seems that the standard of drier used on a plantation indicated the financial status of the planter. But possession of the best drier did not always free planters of problems as one Madang planter found: It was no easy task educating our labourers to Ceylon methods. They were most conservative in their outlook, and did not hesitate to set fire to the Ceylon driers. It was not until a labourer was caught in the act of pouring kerosene over copra in one of the copra stores, in his zeal to send everying connected with Ceylon curing methods up in smoke, and suitably dealt with in the Supreme Court, that we made any appreciable headway. However, the introduction of good quality hot-air driers and the phasing out of sun and smoke drying processes made it possible to replace the "South Seas" designation of New Guinea copra with the term "Rabaul hot-air dried" which became an acceptable market standard and, as a result, New Guinea copra rose from 19th to 9th place in the 1935/1936 trade price lists. The price of copra peaked about two years before the winding up of the Board when successful tenderers for plantations assumed what was, in effect, a paper asset steadily losing value. When it is remembered that prices reached £300 a ton during the heady days of the war, dropped to about £30 a ton in 1919/1920 emd fell further to about £20 -£24 a ton in the mid-1920s (a table of average prices for all grades of copra is at p. 272) it is obvious that the copra industry was definitely no longer as attractive as it had first appeared. Rabaul hot-air copra maintained a continuously high level of more than £24 a ton for the period 1923/1928; the next year weis the turning point with prices fluctuating between £23 O and £19.10.0 a ton and then dropping as shown. As with trading in coconuts in 1878/1880, the early years of high profits were soon over and the copra industry declined until the bottom fell out of the market in 1933. A year later the lowest price ever recorded in London for Rabaul hot-air dried copra - £7.10.0 a ton** - ruined many planters without capital reserves. Prices improved in 1935, but never regained the levels of the fifteen years from 1915. 1. New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, v.4 no.2 April 1938. p. 34 (letter to Director of Agriculture) 2. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry", p. 42 3. ibid., p. 45 272 NEW GUINEA COPRA EXPORTS 1913- 1928 year value /A quantity average price tons £A per ton in Rabaul 1913/1922 3,238,019 160,026 20.2 1922/1923 619,715 32,648 18.98 1923/1924 686,519 34,974 19.62 1924/1925 815,938 39,151 20.84 1925/1926 1,016,930 45,806 22.2 1926/1927 849,852 47,613 17.84 1927/1928 1,176,040 65,285 18.01 source: Annual Reports to the League of Nations 273 The fall in copra prices had an effect not fully anticipated. It proved impossible to explain to native copra producers on the Gazelle Peninsula and elsewhere why prices fluctuated; they would not make copra at a lower price and so production fell. This was a constant problem during the 1930s as price variations on the London exchange reached the South Pacific islands. The lack of village copra - or the coconuts from which to make it - may have forced a few planters to use immature nuts (regardless of the penalty provided by the Copra Ordinance) for in 1929/1930 a total of 3,374 bags of poorly prepared copra was destroyed by Inspectors who ordered another 8,433 bags reconditioned* (re dried). Planters pressed for relief because of the decline in the market in the early 1930s, and as a result customs duty on copra sacks (which added about ls3d a ton to production costs) was withdrawn. This was the first of a series of tax reductions the Australian government was forced to make to prevent the collapse of the industry. The corresponding loss of revenue in the Territory meant that all development stagnated, along with plantations. The position the planters were in is shown by the steady concessions made by the Australian government. Apart from concessions for instalment repayments (discussed below) the government introduced Customs Tariff proclamations No. 6 of 2 July 1930 and No. 7 of 19 March 1931 to reduce export duty on copra from 20s to 15s a ton, and during the period 1 August 1930 to 30 O June 1931 payment of the Native Education Tax was also suspended. This latter tax, at the rate of Is a month for each employee, was re-introduced three years later only to be discontinued on 12 July 1935 for a further period until 30 June 1937. Export duty on copra was again reduced on 22 September 1931 from 15s to 7s6d a ton, an estimated savings to planters of yi6,000 a year. Because of the continued low market price for copra, planters who had bought their plantations from the Expropriation Board had the suspension o f their instalment payments extended to 30 June 1932. It was now becoming very clear to the Australian government that New Guinea was not the prosperous colony it had appeared to 12 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1929/1930. p. 57 2. ibid., 1930/1931. p. 60 274 be. Finally, in a desperate attempt to keep the plantations producing and the copra industry alive, Customs Tariff Proclamation No. 10 of 9 August 1932 reduced the export duty on copra from 7s6d a ton in accordance with the following sliding scale; assessed value per ton duty per ton does not e x ce e d /ll a ton 2s. 6d exceeds /LI but not/L2 3s. 6d exceeds/L 2 but not/13 4s. 6d exceeds /L3 but not /L4 5s. 6d exceeds /L4 but not /15 7 s. Od exceeds /L 5 but not /L 6 83.6d exceeds/16 but not/L7 10s. Od exceeds/17 but n o t /l 8 lls.6d exceeds /L8 an additional 2s per ton for every /L per ton or portion of /I in excess of/181 The "assessed" value of copra was defined each month by the Administrator to be the value per ton of copra exported during the month, and was computed according to a specific formula. The scale o f duty gave considerable relief to the industry, and planters gained more by the suspension for a further year of quarterly instalments of purchase price and interest they owed the Custodian for their plantations. The position for some planters was so grim that Burns, Philp and Carpenters agreed to reduce their interest rate from 10% to 2% (discussed below). On 1 November 1933 the export duty on copra was varied to provide that where the assessed value of copra was less than /5.15.0 a ton no duty was to be charged, and where it was between /5.15.0 and /LI a ton the duty was to be 2s6d a O ton. Correspondence between the firms and the Custodian during this period reveals the struggle some planters had to meet their instalments. Burns, Philp advised the Custodian in December 1930 that six of its clients mentioned in a letter drawing attention to outstanding instalment payments had no funds, and were writing separately to him for a respite. A check on other letters on this file shows increasing advice to the Custodian that many of Burns, Philp's clients were in severe financial difficulties. A tart letter from the Custodian to Carpenters' Sydney office in January 1932 drew attention to outstanding instalments for 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1932/1933. p. 76 2. ibid., 1933/1934. p. 69 275 plantations that were either charged to, or managed by, it; it seems that both large companies were finding the situation as desperate as their clients. * That the Custodian was unsympathetic to struggling planters was shown when a letter addressed to J.C. Archer (his delegate in Rabaul) was wrongly delivered to Fred Archer. The Custodian wrote In regard to taking over plantations, proceed only so far that withdrawal can be made at any time: without loss of prestige to the Custodian. Clearly, the Custodian was pressing people for instalment payments and threatening to take over their plantations. This was a bluff as the last thing he wanted was to have plantations revert to his care while the process of putting them up for tender and attracting new buyers recommenced. But it is indicative of the Custodian's approach in publicly professing concern for planters, while privately instructing his staff to harrass them to meet their obligations. As a leading opponent of the Custodian, Fred Archer quickly made his duplicity known and resentment against his and the Australian government's handling of the planters' position increased. At a time when the government was being besieged with demands for concessions by the planters, Archbishop Duhig of Brisbane became concerned with the manner in which New Guinea was being administered by Australia and urged O its direct return to Germany. Duhig may have been moved to act by the plantation-wealthy Catholic Mission in New Guinea which had a preponderance of German nationals as priests, nuns, brothers and lay staff. But, as mentioned above, Australia had been forced by the Treaty of Versailles not to expropriate Christian Mission properties and in retaliation kept a close watch on German missionaries for any form of "subversive behaviour". The Australian government did not care for Duhig's action and although there is no proof that it raised the matter with him, his initial flicker of interest in giving New Guinea back to Germany soon died. 21 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1781 item A238. Property payments - Demands on WRC [arpenter ] and B [urns ] Pthilp] (C43). (1930-1933). see letters between companies and Custodian of Expropriated Property. 2. F.P. Archer, Buka Passage, to B. Molloy (solicitor), Sydney. 17.12.51 3. Manchester Guardian, 10.7.33 276 Strangely, at a time of reduced imports and exports, the subsidized shipping service between Australia and New Guinea operated by Burns, Philp was expanded with the introduction of the m.v. Macdhui (4,561 tons) in place of the s.s. Montoro (4,057 tons). The Macdhui commenced a monthly service completely separate to the six-weekly service which continued to be operated by the s.s. Marsina.* The increased subsidized service contrasted with the decision to O withdraw the Administration’s s.s. Franklin ’as a measure of economy'. Low market prices during the depression years meant that planters had to ensure that copra was as attractive as possible to potential buyers. By 1935 the change to better-quality driers which had commenced in the late 1920s/early 1930s was showing a marked improvement in copra produced. The Rabaul plantation grade made on European plantations was recognised as being white, hard and with low moisture content, free of dirt, moulds and smoke and containing not less than 65% oil. New Guinea copra was also sold on the London market in the classifications ”Hot Air Dried", "Plantation Sun Dried", "Fair Marketable Sun 9 Dried", and occasionally "Common or Smoke Dried". In 1936/1937 copra production reflected satisfactory prices; that year the export total was up by 9,725 tons on the previous year.4 Quality continued to improve, and "Rabaul Plantation Hot-Air Copra" was valued at 20s to 25s a ton higher than the general classification of "South Seas Copra". For the rest of the decade there was a steady amount of copra produced which attracted acceptable prices until the threat of war in Europe pushed prices down again. 312 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1930/1931. p. 71 2. ibid., p. 72 3. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry", p. 32 4. Annual Report to the League of Nations ,1936/1937. p. 80 277 Economic development In the late 1920s prospects for fin increase in revenue were bright. Following the sale of expropriated plantations, export duties increased with improved ’efficiency in the collection of copra’1 and an increase in the ships carrying copra (mainly from Rabaul) to market. More trading and recruiting licences were issued because of the demand for labourers on expanding plantations and on the goldfields of mainland New Guinea. Cocoa plantings were beginning to bear on some plantations in the Kokopo and Baining areas of the Gazelle Peninsula, and there was a short-lived O interest in kapok production but there was not the expertise, the capital or the interest to alter New Guinea's dependence on copra. Some half-hearted attempts O were made to import fresh coconuts to Australia as food; to develop a coir fibre industry on the Gazelle Peninsula (discussed below); and to expand dessicated coconut production (originally commenced during the German administration - see below); but no clean break with coconut production was made. Under the Papua and New Guinea Bounties Act 1926 the Australian government had granted a bounty of 1.25d a pound on cocoa planted in New Guinea and exported to Australia for home consumption; this encouraged a slight initial improvement in cocoa production in the financial years up to 1934 as the following table shows year bounty paid 1926/1927 - 1927/1928 V184 1928/1929 1,631 1929/1930 1,058 1930/1931 944 1931/1932 831* 1932/1933 5,280 1933/1934 844 12 * includes a small amount for nutmeg source: Annual Reports to the League of Nations 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1926/1927. p. 62 2. ibid., 1933/1934. p. 62 3. ibid., 1934/1935. p. 60 278 The bounty received for cocoa each year was generally small, and there was little incentive to increase cocoa planting, or to plant any other crop. The 1932/1933 figure was mainly due to the maturation of early trial plantings which subsequently were neglected as planters concentrated on their coconut palms in the hope the market for copra would rally. The German Administration had proved that a wide variety of crops could be grown on the Gazelle Peninsula yet the Australian Administration repeated trial plantings of these. About the only people to benefit from this repetition of German pioneering work were the staff of the Experimental Farm at Kerevat, and the occupants of Government House where, no doubt, the exotic fruits impressed local and visiting dignitaries. But their potential was never realised and agriculture in the colony continued to focus on the coconut. Within a year of the introduction of the Bounties Act there was a fall in the price of copra which restricted the purchase of ’luxuries'*- at a time when the revenue lost through the duty-free importation of material for the development of the goldfields began to be felt. By 1929/1930 duty on copra had been reduced to 20s a ton, the first of many such reductions to cushion the effect of dropping world prices. Export duty revenue fell and the indications that a difficult economic period was beginning for New Guinea were there for those who wanted to see them. The planters were in a quandary whether to continue copra production at the usual rate fearing that to produce less would lead to the stockpiling or destruction of mature nuts. Burns, Philp's initial response to shrinking markets for South Pacific products was to increase production; for example, the firm urged traders and planters in Vila who owed it money 'to get to work and try and produce more to make an off-set against the lower price O ’ ruling'. But as far as the New Guinea planters were concerned, this made sense only where coconut trees were still coming into full bearing. There was little point in new plantings.1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1928/1929. p. 52 2 . Buckley 3c Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1916. p. 225 279 The start of the 1930s saw a steady reduction in the countries importing New Guinea copra. The United States, which had imported 12% of the total production (valued at over yi00,000) in 1929/1930, ceased in 1930 because of its foreign purchasing policies and processing taxes. France reduced its imports to 8% after taking one third of the total production in 1929 and one quarter in 1933/1934. Honouring its commitment to assist Empire production the United Kingdom almost trebled its imports after 1929, and by 1935 was easily the largest importer of New Guinea copra. A reason for the decline in copra exports was the enormous over-production of all classes of vegetable oil-seeds and of whale oil*- (Fred Archer used to hope that all whales '‘would drop dead") and the technological breakthrough which allowed them to be refined and better used in food preparation. Part of the problem was that European farmers 'churning out more o cheap butter' were also in difficulties and their governments took protective action by imposing restrictions on margarine production and imports. Price falls were passed on from manufacturers to merchants and to the producers of the raw materials. Losses were offset to some extent by the devaluation of the Australian pound in 1931, and unexpected help came from Italy which increased its imports from 1% of production in 1929 to 22% in 1934/1935** to meet the demands of its colonial wars. The industry was fortunate that the production of dessicated coconut, which had experienced a hesitant beginning during the Australian Administration, appeared ready to help ease the problems caused by the collapse of the copra market. Dessicated coconut (known as "Raspelkopra") had been experimented with during the German Administration.^ It was produced towards the end of the Expropriation Board period, but the first sample shipment 'of the fine quality and artistically packed' product was not exported to Australia until May 1928. 1 1. Pacific Islands Monthly. 14.4.31. p. 14 2. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 251 3. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry", p. 34 4. Preuss, Die Kokospalme und ihre kultur. p. 186 5. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1927/1928. p. 21 280 DESSICATED COCONUT PRODUCTION IN NEW GUINEA year tons average value price t i 1928/29 26 59 1,546 1929/30 122 71 8,640 1930/31 941 40 37,640 1931/32 1,282 50 64,100 1932/33 1,335 55 73,452 1933/34 1,463 56 81,562 1934/35 1,610 28 45,080 1935/36 1,647 40 65,433 1936/37 1,632 53 86,930 1937/38 1,579 46 73,423 1938/39 1,590 44 69,960 1939/40 1,781 50 89,050 source; Annual Reports to the League of Nations note; despite increased production the low average price reflects the slow recovery of the iced vo-vo and lamington industries from the effects of the depression years. 281 Two factories were erected, one at Pondo plantation4 in the Baining area and the other at Kulili plantation, near Madang on the New Guinea mainland. It was anticipated that once problems with unskilled labourers were overcome there would be a rapid improvement in the quality of the product. By 1928/1929 a third factory had been established at Lindenhafen plantation on the Gazelle Peninsula and all were producing good quality dessicated coconut for a ready market in Australia. In accordance with the Papua and New Guinea Preference Tariff of Australia, prepared coconut from New Guinea was admitted free of customs duty (except for primage), while ordinary customs duty was 2d a pound below the British Preferential Tariff (plus primage). By proclamation of 4 April 1930 the importation into Australia of prepared coconut was prohibited except with the consent of the Minister for Trade and Customs; prepared coconut from New O Guinea was exempt. As a result of this assistance from the Australian government, the value of dessicated coconut was increasing by 1934/1935 despite cheaper southeast Asian competition, over production and the difficulty of finding new markets.^ Only two of the three factories were working full-time in 19374 but an increase in consumer demand saw all three in normal production by 1940.^ The on-again, off-again approach of the Administration to coir is indicative of its approach to alternative industries. "Koir" - a guaranteed by product of coconut plantations - had been produced at Herbertshohe during the German Administration fi and in 1924 Ainsworth had urged its production. 7 Provision was made in the Papua and New Guinea Bounties Act 1926 for the 1 1. a small motor vessel, the Balus, brought coconuts from plantations on New Britain and New Ireland to Pondo which produced about 100 tonnes of dessicated coconut a month for collection by vessels en route to Australia. Coconut fibre and charcoal were (limited) by-products. Whittaker, Documents and readings in New Guinea history, plate 523 p. 234 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1930/1931. p. 50 3. ibid., 1934/1935. p. 74 4. ibid., 1937/1938. p. 83 5. ibid., 1939/1940. p. 72 6. Preuss, Per Kokospalme und ihre kultur. p. 191 7. Ainsworth Report, p. 21 282 payment of a bounty of £3 on coir fibre imported into Australia before 1 January 1937 as a sample prepared by the Department of Agriculture had aroused some interest. It was recognised that the industry would be of considerable advantage to New Guinea, but the Administration was slow to move. In 1930 the industry had not been established although the Department was studying information on it. Machinery for coir production arrived in 1931 but was not operating;* although a mill had been completed the industry was seen as 'largely of an O experimented nature'. Three years later, samples of fibre were favourably reported on, but there were no exports.^ In 1937/1938 a fine quality of fibre was produced emd said to be absorbed by loced upholsterers^ (there is no other mention of upholsterers in New Guinea Annual Reports). Yet, surprisingly, the manufacture of coir was not recommended for individued plemters, being considered more suitable for 'capitalistic enterprises where there are large nearby supplies of coconut husks'. Perhaps the Administration felt that danger from spontaneous combustion limited coir manufacture and storage to big companies with facilities to control outbreaks. Coir was said to be an unpopular cargo on Carpenters' ships because of the risk of it bursting into flames. ‘ The coir industry continued in an experimental stage until all the factories were destroyed during the Japanese invasion of New Guinea in 1942. 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1930/1931. p. 50 2. ibid., 1931/1932. p. 51 3. ibid., p. 69 4. ibid., 1934/1935. p. 60 5. ibid., 1937/1938. p. 83 6. E.T. Caulfield-Kelly, "Quality and reputation in copra from the market viewpoint" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, v.3 no. 2 December 1937. p. 12 7. Bernard Parer, Brisbane. March 1986. 283 But just when some continuing interest was being shown by planters and the Administration in alternate crops or products, higher copra prices in 1935 increased import duties by £33,874 over that of the previous year. This was because of the improved purchasing power of the community, and the slight (3%) increase in the European population*, and was hailed as a sign that things were improving. Public works deferred for lack of funds were commenced and the colony regained its confidence, supported by a strong upward movement in the O price of copra which resulted in increased production. But the recovery was illusory. The effects of the volcanic eruption in May 1937 were a severe blow to the industry which was emerging from the depression. Damage to European and native plantations and groves kept production down, but uncertainty generated by Q the proposal to move the capital from Rabaul to Lae on the mainland to escape any future eruptions imposed a psychological barrier to planters improving their plantations. From 98% of total exports for 1923/1925, copra declined to 14% in 1939/1940 (see table p. 284). In the post-depression years 1936 to 1939 its value was roughly 25% of exports. Gold royalties supported the colony during this difficult period. Stanner states that while the balance of payments position has never been closely studied in New Guinea, the remittance of net profits and savings to Australia was known to be high, and shipping and insurance charges paid externally were heavy. Because of the tendency of a large company to operate through a series of small affiliated companies - not all of whom were identifiable as belonging to the parent company - it is difficult to comment on company profits other than to say that Australian companies operating in New Guinea paid respectable dividends and accumulated solid reserves. One of the most interesting indications of this is given by the deposit-advance ratios of the local trading banks. Between 1931 and 1941 total deposits at half-yearly intervals were never lower than £724,000 and rose as high as £1,830,000; total advances never exceeded £124,000. The deposit-advance ratio declined steadily over the decade. 1 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1935/1936. p. 67 2. ibid., p. 61 3. Combined Administration Report, passim. 284 COMPARATIVE VALUES OF GOLD AND COPRA PRODUCTION AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ANNUAL EXPORTS 1914 - 1940 12 P rice Q uantity Value % copra gold copra gold copra gold copra gold ton oz ton oz y.s.d. y.s.d. 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917-18 18. 5. 4 19708 91 1918-19 16.8.3 14886 90 1919-20 32.16. 3 22708 88 1920-21 27. 0. 2 23735 96 1921-22 18. 6. 2 25894 95 1922-23 18.19. 8 32648 98 1923-24 19.12. 7 2.10. 0 34974 6617 686519 16542 98 l 2.3 1924-25 20.19.10 2.10. 0 39151 7417 815938 18512 98 L 2.15 1925-26 22. 3. 6 2.10. 0 45806 10067 1016930 25169 92 2.27 1926-27 17.17. 0 2. 6. 0 47613 84760 849852 195428 79 18.09 1927-28 18. 2. 6 2. 5. 0 65285 113874 1176040 256216 80 17.42 1928-29 15. 9. 0 2. 5. 0 60435 79748 933769 179433 81 15.66 1929-30 13.10.10 2. 5. 0 63832 42819 864358 96338 87 9.66 1930-31 11.10. 0 2. 5. 0 62303 57874 716543 132239 78 14.38 1931-32 10. 8. 0 3.12. 8 59452 108647 618298 398939 56 35.96 1932-33 9. 4. 3 4.15. 0 59040 196823 543906 933940 34 59.06 1933-34 4.11. 0 5. 6. 0 62270 257511 283329 1367616 16 77.4 1934-35 6. 8. 6 6.12. 3 56251 299757 361413 1897244 15 88.1 1935-36 11. 4. 6 5.12. 6 66684 302619 1704498 30 66.23 1936-37 16. 2. 4 76409 373197 2020667 36 59.09 1937-38 11.10. 0 73716 410058 2028980 28 67.74 1938-39 9.18. 6 73345 400672 2129673 25 71.61 1939-40 8.10. 0 59368 491738 3021731 14 82.09 source: Annual Reports to the League of Nations 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1924/1925 p. 22 quotes 97.9%; Annual Report to the League of Nations 1926/1927 p. 55 quotes 96% 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1924/1925 p. 22 quotes 98.15%; at p. 61 quotes 95%; and Annual Report to the League of Nations 1925/1926 p. 15 quotes 95.8% " " 285 There were strong presumptions that the real benefits of external trade were increasingly disadvantageous, that both New Guinea and Papua were drained of developmental funds, and that their poverty was self-perpetuating.1 One method developed on the Gazelle Peninsula of selling copra that would have confused calculations based on these figures (but not necessarily be reflected in official export figures) was through futures - selling copra on the speculation of future prices. The agent of a firm - perhaps operating in Hamburg - would buy copra at a particular price but at a bank usance of 90 days. The bank at Rabaul would pay 23 7/8% of the purchase price to the seller immediately the copra was shipped, and so funds were available to plantation owners at a difficult economic time. The owner might lose the advantage of any rise in price during the transaction, while the firm speculated on the chance of the copra price o rising. This was quite profitable with the volatile price structure of the 1930s. As mentioned above, New Guinea was fortunate that gold production was sufficient and constant to offset the effects of the depression years on plemtations. By the end of 1940 the prospect of any market for copra was poor, and those attracted to the colony by an article in an issue of that year's Australian Quarterly detailing the opportunities awaiting in New Guinea for young men with 'a few thousand to invest in the land which will give him a handsome return' found O that adaptability and 'sticktoitiveness' were inadequate. The collapse of the copra market in 1940 was officially recognised as having 'a serious effect on affairs in the Territory' and attempts were made to devise a scheme to maintain plantations and their owners 'pending a search for new markets or new processes for the utilization of copra'.^ Brave words, but such a scheme should have started on 21 May 1921 - the day the Australian mandate of New Guinea became legitimate and the day the seizure commenced of German established plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula for distribution to Australian returned servicemen.123 1. Stanner, The South Seas in transition, p. 37 2. Dwyer, ''A survey of the coconut industry", p. 45 3. Thomas, "Land settlement in New Guinea", p. 54 4. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1939/1940. p. 9 286 The industry in trouble By the late 1920s it was clear that the plantations were heading for trouble. Planters who had been eager to secure finance from the big companies were fretting against the contracts they had signed, and the charging agreements they had entered into. They reasoned that by obtaining title to their properties they could raise a second mortgage with banks in Rabaul which would give them greater freedom of action in buying stores and selling their produce and so escape the clutches of the companies. In 1928 the first private approaches were made to the Custodian to release titles; this was followed early in 1929 by the Planters’ Association of New Guinea formally asking the Custodian if he was prepared to give titles to planters and secure them by first mortgage. As planters had already entered into contracts of sale with the Custodian in purchasing their plantations it is not clear how the request could have been met. The Custodian decided in May to defer any action for twelve months saying that agreement to the proposal would be a privilege under the Treaty of Peace regulation which provided that until the whole of the purchase money and interest was paid, all rights, title and interest in the properties remained vested in himself.1 There were two reasons for the deferment: that although the Administration was investigating land titles as rapidly as it could they would not be finalised for many years (up to 1928 about n 12 titles were issued) and he was concerned that planters, using titles as a guarantee, might borrow more than they could repay if there was a fall in the price of copra. In 1930 with the planters still pressing the matter the Delegate discussed the proposal with the Rabaul banks to gauge their reaction. Each said it would be reluctant to finance planters on second mortgages - obviously they were aware of the Treaty of Peace regulations - whether the planters held titles or not. Mainly because of the low price of copra there was little extension of planting at this time by new owners. The industry remained quiet although the red 12 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 Item C58 Pt4. Titles N[ew] G |uinea] (1918-1932). Details extracted from documents on file. 2. "Statement by New Guinea Planters' and Traders' Association to the Commonwealth Government" in F.W. Eggleston, The Australian Mandate for New Guinea. Melbourne, Macmillan in association with the Melbourne University Press, 1928. p. 59 287 lights were winking; there were indications of the coming depression and the effects it would have. Some new owners of plemtations quickly fell into finemcial difficulties through inexperience and low prices, and to help them the Treaty of Peace regulation no.59 had to be amended in 1930 by the addition of the following proviso; Provided that, where the Custodian is satisfied that, by reckon of a fall in the meirket price of copra or other extraordinary circumstances not within the control of the purchaser, such purchaser is temporarily unable to make payment of monies falling due under his contract of sale, the Custodian may defer payment of the whole or any portion of the moneys so due for such period and on such terms as the Minister approves. The government may not have realised that this moratorium on payments for expropriated properties would last from 1 July 1930 until 30 June O 1936, or that the total sum involved would be approximately £500,000. It is an indication of the effect the depression had on the copra industry that for six years the purchasers of plantations were not called upon to pay instalments of principal or interest. That same year (i.e. 1930) the Custodian reported the completion of accounting under Article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the realisation of expropriated property in New Guinea, and detailed statements of accounts were forwarded from the Australian Clearing Office (which collected money paid to the Custodian for expropriated property bought by Australians) to the British Clearing Office in London for transmission to the Government of Germany. Accounting for 12 1. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1929/1930. p. 109 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.39. Department of External Territories, Custodian of Expropriated Property, Correspondence File, C Series. ("Expropriated Property in New Guinea"), 1930-1944. Cabinet minute "Expropriated Property - New Guinea" by R.G. Casey, Treasurer, 25 February 1936 288 the amount involved -/2 ,127,882.6.61 - had taken an extraordinarily long time to finalise; the war had ended twelve years earlier and the last properties had been sold in 1927. Exactly how much came from the two big firms, either in direct payments or through sponsoring the purchase of properties through the charging system is not known, but it would have been a significant amount, indicative of their involvement in New Guinea commercial affairs. Almost coinciding with the rise of National Socialism, this reminder of Germany's defeat in the Great War was ill-timed. Relief for planters Burns, Philp and Carpenters became concerned at the immediate, and potential, inability of some of their charged clients to meet repayments to themselves, and in 1929 approached the government seeking relief for planters O from their quarterly instalment obligations to the Custodian. This was rejected by Cabinet which suggested that the companies should provide relief by reducing their 8% interest charge. The Cabinet repeated the Custodian's advice that relief had already been granted to planters for shortages of palms (discussed above) which had not been originally anticipated. The firms claimed they could not continue supplying credit to planters and, with a little judicious pressure, encouraged the Planters' Association and the RSSAILA in Rabaul to request assistance. Representatives from both organisations visited the Federal Treasurer in Australia and kept the Prime Minister well advised of the situation by cables. At this point the financial position of the plantations held by Australian returned servicemen in New Guinea was; 12 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1781 item A234. Nerein der Enteigneten Deutschen aus N [ew] Guinea, 1930-1931. Submission o f the Custodian of Expropriated Property and the Public Trustee for the Commonwealth of Australia "Proceeds of the realization of property rights and interests of German Nationals under Australian emergency war legislation and Treaty of Peace regulations". 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.37 Pt.I. Moratorium (Suspension of Payments on Expropriated Properties) (1928— 1940). Cabinet decision May 1929. 289 no. charged to Burns, Philp or Carpenters no. of owners not on their plantations The Melanesia Company, both in its own right and through its dummies, was free of any charging agreement with Burns, Philp or Carpenters. As mentioned above, both these firms enjoyed power of attorney (frequently for a non-revocable period of twenty years) over those plantations whose "owners" neither resided on them, nor elsewhere in New Guinea. It was always suspected that these were "dummied" plantations, but it was not always possible to prove this. Regardless of the concessions and assistance already granted to planters, the desperation of their position was such that the Australian government introduced the Moratorium Act 1930 which lifted capital and interest repayment obligations on expropriated properties for an indefinite period. The Prime Minister had already approved the temporary suspension of interest payments in special cases and soon followed this with the suspension of instalment payments. The Custodian was also authorised to consider individual applications from purchasers of expropriated properties other than plantations (e.g. trading stations) for temporary relief from payments due under the charging system. A reduction of 1% in the interest rate on amounts outstanding for the purchase of O expropriated properties was also made with effect from 1 May 1931. O But the planters wanted more. In a long letter to the Prime Minister early in 1932 J.C. Mullaly (who had been a Commonwealth Audit Inspector attached to the Expropriation Board, and then an inspector in the Administration’s Department of Native Affairs and was currently Vice-President of the Planters' 1. Australian Archives Office, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.37 Pt.I. Moratorium (Suspension of Payments on Expropriated Properties) (1928-1940). Cabinet decision May 1929. 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series A 1782 item C.37 Pt. I. Department of Territories, Custodian of Expropriated Property. Correspondence File, C Series "Moratorium - Suspension of Payments on Expropriated Properties" (1928-1940). Approval contained in Cabinet minute of May 1932, retrospective to May, 1931. 3. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A518 item G812/1/1 Part I. "Territories, General. Commerece. Copra Prices". J.C. Mullaly to Prime Minister, 29.1.32. 290 Association of New Guinea), complained that Burns, Philp and Carpenters were paying too little for the copra they bought. He claimed that their deductions were based on parity which, although stipulated in charging agreements, was too great. It was only when the Bremerhaven began to move copra to Europe in 1931 that a comparison of prices could be made and the unfairness of parity realised. Burns, Philp used political pressure to have the Bremerhaven venture banned by the Australian government; and in 1934 the firm scored another victory when the NDL line proposed running two ships - the Neptuna and the Merkur between Hong Kong and Australia with calls at ports in New Guinea. Supported by Carpenters, the firm 'induced the German company to change its mind'* and sell it the two ships. The victory was sweet for Burns, Philp which had never forgotten how the NDL had forced it to cease operating an Australia-New Guinea service in 1907 by contracting to move copra to Europe at an unbeatably low price. The government refused to be drawn into the argument between planters and the firms, saying it was a matter of contract between them. It did not, however, say it could do nothing about the assessment of parity, which point seems to have escaped the Planters' Association. A letter written in December 1932 from Burns, Philp's head office to its manager in Rabaul makes one wonder whether the Planters' Association's action was truly representative of all planters. The letter indicates an appreciation of planters' problems which had necessitated the Australian government to call upon purchasers of properties, who have been receiving the benefit of the suspension of payments, [ i.e. instalment and interest ] to make payment at the reduced rate of 4 (four) per cent in the case of Returned Australian Soldiers, and 5i% in other cases. We also advise you to inform your clients of this decision, and at the same time, intimate to them that the ex gratia interest rebates we had hitherto been allowing, of 2% would, as from the 1st of January, 1933, until further notice, be only at the rate of 1%.1 1. Buckley <5c Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns Philp 1914-1946. p. 214 291 ... You will, we feel sure, in advising your several clients, maintain a courteous tenor in your letters, with a view to preserving the present mutual goodwill existing with these friends. It is unfortunate that this gentlemanly decision could not have been made earlier in the year and advised to the planters. In his letter to the Prime Minister Mullaly reiterated the terms Burns, Philp and Carpenters had offered in return for financing returned servicemen. They are worth including here to emphasise the extent of planter commitment. The terms were: 1. to provide the 10% of purchase price due on acceptance of a tender; . 2. to provide cash to take over stores, labour etc.; 3. to pay quarterly instalments to the Custodian on the following terms: "that the purchaser signing a charging agreement undertakes . to sell all his produce to the firm at a price of/7.10.0 under the London price for hot air copra delivered at Rabaul and quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald on the Monday of each week (this parity included 25/- a ton export duty); . to purchase all goods required for the conduct of the plantation at ruling prices; . to conduct all plantation business through the firm; and O . to pay an interest charge of 8%." Charging agreements were to remain in force either for a specified term of years at the end of which all remaining money was repayable, or for such periods as the money was owing. The planters' approach was turned down by the government, yet the O Rabaul Times noted that even though an official reply had not been received by1 2 1. F. Wallin, Sydney, to F.O. Greenwood, Rabaul. 23.12.32.' Burns, Philp Archives, University of Sydney. 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A815 item G812/1/1 Part I. Territories, General. Commerce. Copra Prices. 3. Rabaul Times 11 March 1932 292 the planters the firms reduced parity from £4.3.0 under the London price to £3.10.0 plus a bonus of 10/- a ton from 29 February. Four days later Carpenters quoted figures to prove that the firms were still paying 3/6 a ton more for copra than planters who shipped their copra on the Bremerhaven had received.1 It was the ease with which the firms juggled the price of copra that strengthened the belief they were making huge profits at the expense of planters and the Administration. To further help the planters the Mortgagors Relief Ordinance (no. 31 of 1934) was passed by the New Guinea Legislative Council. It provided for a reduction of interest rates on existing mortgages and charging agreements to not more than 6% per annum and remained in force until February 1937, being amended in 1935 (no.16) to reduce the interest rate again, and by no.14 of 1936 which extended the operation for one more year. It was obvious by now that the situation in New Guinea required an on the spot investigation and the Minister in charge of Territories visited the colony in mid-1935. He met with representatives of planters who said the decision that payments for expropriated properties were to be resumed after June 1936 had concerned owners of expropriated plantations, many of whom would be forced ’to o walk off their properties'. The planters argued that a further devaluation was needed, together with writing off portion of their debts to companies. Pearce noted that with the assistance already granted, some planters were in a reasonable position but acknowledged that others probably never would be unless there was a substantial rise in the price of copra, or unless they received more aid from the government. In a quid pro quo suggestion, he received oral assurance from Carpenters that it would make considerable adjustments of debts due to it if the government would agree to satisfactory adjustment of quarterly instalment payments. The company pointed out that a considerable amount of assistance given to planters was being expended in legal fees. Pearce undertook a very close 12 1. Pacific Islands Monthly 15 March 1932 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.39. Department of External Territories, Custodian of Expropriated Property, Correspondence File, C. Series. ("Expropriated Property in New Guinea"), 1930-1944. Minute "Expropriated properties - representations to Minister in charge of Territories during visit to Territory - August, 1935" by G.F. Pearce, Minister in charge of Territories. 17 October 1935 293 study of the situation while in New Guinea, noting the following position of plantations: 35 plantations are being purchased by companies (27 by ex- y soldier companies). This is about 20 per cent of total number of plantations sold. Amount of indebtedness to Custodian is 605,143 25 plantations are being purchased by absentees for whom companies (Burns, Philp and Carpenters mainly) manage under Power of Attorney. Approximately 14 per cent, of toted plemtations. Indebtedness 505,120 60 Companies emd absentees. 34 per cent, of plemtations - Indebtedness 1,110,263 46 plemtations are being purchased by men who are in reasonably good position. These represent 25 per cent, of plantations. Indebtedness 365,164 63 plemtations are held by men whose position is not good, but it is not hopeless. These account for 36 per cent, of plantations. Indebtedness 537,927 6 plemtations are held by persons whose position is quite hopeless. These represent 3 per cent, of edl plantations. Indebtedness 55,290 175 2,068,644 4 plemtations are being worked by Custodiem. These are properties which were sold, but which have come back to Custodian's hands from one cause or another. 1 The average capited liability of each purchaser in the several groups shown above is - y Companies 17,300 Absentees 20,200 Purchasers in good position 7,900 Other purchasers (not hopeless) 8,538 Hopeless cases 9,200 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.39. Department of External Territories, Custodian of Expropriated Property, Correspondence File, C. Series. ("Expropriated Property in New Guinea"),1930-1944. Minute "Expropriated properties - representations to Minister in charge of Territories during visit to Territory - August, 1935" by G.F. Pearce, Minister in charge of Territories. 17 October 1935 294 Pearce dismissed the possibility of planter pressure for a reduction in the original prices paid for their plantations saying that they had made their own prices when tendering (it will be recalled how prices for Second and Third Group properties were much higher than those received for First Group properties). He also stated that sales of plantations had not shown any drop in their value as about one third had changed hands since 1926 at prices equal to, or higher than, their original purchase price. Pearce may have confused his facts here. Plantations sold in the 1926/1928 period enjoyed good prospects of economic success. Admittedly, the London price of copra had dropped from 727.7.6 a ton in March 1926 (when the First Group was sold), to 726.12.6 a ton in November 1926 (when the Second Group was sold), to726 a ton in July 1927 (when the Third Group was sold) but this still gave a very comfortable profit margin. Between 1928 and 1931 there was a considerable drop in the real value of plantations, reflecting the uncertainty of the copra market with the looming depression. Plantations bought during this period were obtained at good prices and buyers also enjoyed the advantage of the moratorium on instalments payable to the Custodian. The purchase for 740,000 of the Melanesia Company plantations by Burns, Philp is a case in point. The way in which companies apparently benefitted from privileges introduced to help ex servicemen angered many planters but after Burns, Philp assumed the holdings of the Melanesia Company nothing was done to alter the terms of sale if, indeed, the government wished to do this.* Pearce pointed out to the planters that reductions had been gained in the purchase price of 89 plantations (about half those sold) through reimbursement for shortages of land and palms. The total value of these reductions was 1 1. strangely, there is nothing on file to indicate that any other individual - or firm - was interested in the plantation holdings of the Melanesia Company when its collapse was imminent, see Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1781 item A191. Custodian of Expropriated Property - Melanesia Company Limited. (1926-1929) 295 7211,000.* He would not agree to the planters' demand to limit assistance only to those purchasers of plantations who were resident in New Guinea (in an attempt to penalise dummies) on the grounds that this would restrict assistance to about two- thirds of the plantations. He claimed that practically all absentee purchasers were ex-soldiers or ex-soldier companies, and considerable pressure for inclusion in any scheme of assistance could be expected on their behalf. He foreshadowed the introduction of a sliding scale of payments for copra (discussed below) and declared that any planters unable to make repayments under such a scheme should accept that their position was hopeless and relinquish their plantations. Pearce remarked that four plantations returned to the Custodian through the failure of their purchasers to make a living were being run by the Custodian without a loss, even though their managers were paid higher salaries than managers paid by companies received, or those employed by plantation owners. He recommended the appointment of a committee to investigate cases considered worthy of assistance, but this does not seem to have been pursued. Pearce's visit certainly cleared the air for the government, but did not satisfy the planters. The Planters' Association next claimed that although there had been an improvement in the copra market as the depression weakened, prices were still not sufficiently high enough to enable its members to recommence the payment of quarterly instalments required under the contracts of sale with the Custodian. The Association submitted a scheme to link these quarterly instalments to the O market price of copra which was supported by the Rabaul RSSAILA whose members were mainly planters. The government considered the proposal impractical but, using its principle, the Custodian evolved the following alternative; 1 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.39. Department of External Territories, Custodian of Expropriated Property, Correspondence File, C. Series. ("Expropriated Property in New Guinea"), 1930-1944. Minute "Expropriated properties - representations to the Minister in charge of Territories during visit to Territory - August 1935" by G.F. Pearce, Minister in charge of Territories. 17 October 1935. 2. ibid. 296 1. payment of instalments [ were] to be recommenced on 1st July, 1936, on a sliding scale based on the Rabaul f.o.b. price of plantation hot air dried copra. 2. this price [ was! to be the average price for the three months immediately preceding the quarter in which payment [ was ] to be made (i.e. the average price in the June quarter [ would ] determine the instalment due on 1st July) the monthly prices for computing the average price to be determined in the same manner as the New Guinea Administration determine [d ] the price of copra for the purpose of assessing export duty. 3. scale of quarterly payments: Price per ton Quarterly payment Interest payable f.o.b. Rabaul in respect of each quarterly 71,000 of principal Returned Others tor part thereof) Soldiers Rate Rate p.a. p.a. Under 710 Nil 1% l i % 710 and under -/ll 1 5 1% li% 711 and under 712 1 6 1% l i % 712 and under 713 77 1% l i % 713 and under -/l4 78 2% 2 i % 714 and under -/15 710 2% 2 i % 715 and under 716 712 2% 2 i % 716 and under -/l 7 712 3% 3i% 717 and under 718 714 3% 4% 718 and under 719 716 4% 5% 719 and under 720 718 4% 5% 720 and under 722 720 4% 5% 722 and under 725 722 4% 5% 72 5 and over 725 4% 5% 4. period of contracts to be extended by 20 years for returned soldier purchasers and by 10 years for other purchasers from 1st July 1936. 5. this scale of payment [was not to be 1 applied to Trading Stations. To give purchasers of these properties relief it [ was ] suggested that the balance owing to the Custodian at 30th June 1936, be paid off in forty equal quarterly instalments plus interest at the rate set forth in the foregoing table for plantations, subject to any special terms in the contracts relating to leasehold properties. 1 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.39. Department of External Territories, Custodian of Expropriated Property, Correspondence File, C. Series. ("Expropriated Property in New Guinea"), 1930-1944. Minute "Expropriated properties - representations to the Minister in charge of Territories during visit to Territory - August 1935" by G.F. Pearce, Minister in charge of Territories. 17 October 1935. 297 This was submitted to, emd approved by, the Australian Cabinet which before announcing it instructed the Minister for Territories to approach Burns, Philp and Carpenters for a similar level of reduction. They refused, but agreed to reduce interest to 2% in the 10% deposit advanced to planters, and increase that by £% for every Yl above Y10 for the price of copra in Rabaul. This was to apply when interest [ was ] actually paid, not when it [was] merely added to the debt. The companies also complained to the Minister that the Moratorium Act and Ordinance had added to their hardships, citing the example of Rowe Brothers of Malapao plantation. The brothers, they claimed, were selling copra privately, had shown no production for three years and were only adding to their debt with Burns, Philp. The companies urged the Custodian to demand that quarterly returns of copra production from charged planters be supplied to them (it is surprising this was not part of the charging agreement) to prevent this. They further urged that the Moratorium Ordinance be rescinded otherwise 'we [ will ] get nothing'.^ Their urgings were ignored. The government felt that the sliding scale of payments would enable planters to increase equity in their properties by small amounts when the price of copra was low, and by larger amounts as the price improved. Although planters were not pressed for payment during the depression years, many were concerned about growing old without increasing the value of their interest in their plemtations. The Custodian considered that payments under the sliding scale represented very liberal terms, and that any planter unable to meet them should have his contract cancelled. The planters, in turn, proposed that if payments under the sliding scale were insufficient to complete the purchase price of their plantation/s in twenty years, the amount paid should be accepted as payment in full and the balance written off. The Custodian rejected this, stating that most planters should be able to discharge their obligations in that time and he felt properties should be paid for in full. He was well aware that waiving the principle 1 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.39. Department of Territories, Custodian of Expropriated Property, Correspondence File, C. Series. ("Expropriated Property in New Guinea"), 1930-1944. Notes on correspondence from Burns, Philp and Carpenters following Cabinet proposal of 25.2.36. 2. ibid. 298 of payment for planters would set a precedent for a similar demand from returned servicemen purchasing war service homes in Australia. A final, more modest, request of the planters was that returned soldier planters should have twenty years at 4% interest to repay their loans (which required little adjustment to the already agreed upon sliding scale of repayments), while "outsiders" should only be granted a ten year repayment period at 5%. This was approved as the loss of interest would be small. It is now difficult to determine if the Planters' Association - or individual planters - tried to arouse public interest or sympathy for their position in Australia. I have shown that some of the planters, and certainly the major firms, had good connections in Australia with members of the political and commercial establishments and it is possible approaches were made to them to pressure the government for more concessions on behalf of the planters. Burns, Philp and Carpenters had already interceded with the government to suspend instalment and interest repayment for expropriated plantations, but this may have been prompted by anxiety that debts owing to them would otherwise not be met. New Guinea was of little interest >to Australians re-building their lives after the devastation of the depression years, and so the most obvious go-between for planters appeared to be the academic circles at Australian universities. Melbourne had acted as the Australian capital from Federation in 1901 until the establishment of the federal capital of Canberra in the Australian Capital Territory in 1927 and some federal departments were still located there in the late 1930s. As a result, academic activist groups in Melbourne were able to press issues more readily than those in other Australian universities. In 1937 a group at the University of Melbourne urged the redistribution of the territory comprising the Mandate of New Guinea1 but did not say how this should be done. It is significant such a suggestion should be made at a time when Australia was emerging from the depression years as it shows disillusionment in intellectual circles with Australia's role as guardian of the "sacred trust" of the mandate. Nothing came of the move, perhaps because it appeared in a London newspaper, but more likely because few Australians were concerned about New Guinea while the government realised that the mandate was irrevocable. It was, however, one more expression of Australian disenchantment with New Guinea. 1. The Times, 17.4.37 299 Regardless of what they had received, and encouraged by actions such as that of the Melbourne University group, the planters sought more concessions. In the Fourth Session of the New Guinea Legislative Council in March 1937 W. Grose (a prominent New Ireland planter and member of the Planters' Association executive) attacked the decision not to extend the Mortgagors Relief Ordinance, due to expire in February 1939. He wanted it extended by a further three years and took the matter up with the Minister who sought advice from the Custodian who was neutral, merely pointing out the concessions given to purchasers by the sliding scale of repayments. It is not clear why the planters wanted an extension as the depression years had ended and the market was rallying, but pressure continued until the Administrator, Ramsay McNicoll, set up a committee in February 1939 to enquire into the advisability of granting further relief to mortgagees. The committee comprised: Gerald Hagen Chairman J.C. Archer Delegate J.C. Mullaly Planters' Association R.H. Siggins Administration representative1 It decided against another moratorium as 38% of the plantations were under first or second mortgages to the "principal merchant companies" (i.e. Burns, Philp or Carpenters) and private individuals who, the committee considered in a frank reference to dummied properties, would gain concessions meant for ex servicemen. The position of mortgages was: contracts of sale with Custodian 195 securing 71,934,981 1st mortgages held by principal 22 securing 90,370 merchant companies mortgages to banks 20 securing 49,486 mortgages to private individuals 28 securing 105,549 2nd mortgages held by principal 51 securing 192,959 merchant companies TOTALS 316 72,373,345^ 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.14. Moratorium (Suspension of payments on Expropriated Properties). (1928 1940). 2. ibid. 300 The Planters' Association rather grudgingly accepted the principle of the committee's report, but was by no means satisfied with it. It pointed out that the Custodian had waived repayments by non-soldier purchasers in 1936 under Treaty of Peace regulation 50AA with the proviso that the mortgagee might demand repayment on or after 30 June 1946, or at the expiration of ten years from the coming into force of the proviso, whichever was the later. Therefore, the Association considered that to maintain "the most-favoured purchaser" status of ex-servicemen planters, the companies should similarly waive repayments of monies owing to them for the same period. The reaction of the companies to this demand can be imagined. An examination of the 51 second mortgages held by the merchant companies (principally Burns, Philp and Carpenters) shows; purchase price of properties ^718,253 owing to Custodian 512,227 owing under second mortgage 192,959 first deposit (5%) on purchase 35,913* Some of these mortgagees had provided a proportion of the purchase money in addition to the original deposit of 5%, but in the majority of cases the original 5% represented the total investment of the purchaser in the mortgaged property. The committee found that there was a total of 69 ex-servicemen and "outsiders" mortgages securing y.247,650 in force as at 31 March 1934, and 47 securing £86,111 in force as at 30 September 1938. It is not clear if these were all for plantations or other expropriated properties, but obviously sufficient profits were made by 22 mortgagees during that period to repay their advances, and allow a reduction of £1,539 in toted advances. Some of these profits were used to pay off commitments to the Custodian, emd purchase capited assets. The committee's report concluded: From our general examination of the industry, and analysis of the figures submitted to us, we are of the opinion that, except in a small proportion of cases, mortgagees in this class have, or could have, met working expenses or investment charges on their mortgages during the period 1928/1938, and that the present position of a number of them is due mainly to the fact that the profits earned have been re invested in the industry, or otherwise used. 1 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.14. Moratorium (Suspension of payments on Expropriated Properties). (1928 1940). 2. ibid. 301 This probably led to the suggestion that 'the position of the planters was not really desperate in the early years of the depression'1 (i.e. to about 1932) which contrasts with the opinions of Gazelle Peninsula planters (Blakes, Broad, Thomas, McKay) who rejected the contention that because few planters appeared to have lost their property they were unaffected by the depression. They pointed out that the "tentacles" of the companies could be firmly wrapped around every palm on a plantation without this being public knowledge. The secrecy with which the companies dealt with planters charged to them is shown in the agreement, drafted by W.R. Carpenter, and signed by Carpenters, Burns, Philp and Colyer, Watson & Co.^ that none of the three companies would buy copra from the current clients of each Other. The existence of this agreement, signed on 15 September 1937, was kept secret at the time. It showed Carpenters with 154 clients covering 163 plantations and trading stations, Burns, Philp with 113 clients and 175 plantations, O and Colyer, Watson with 43 clients covering 54 plantations. A summary of titles prepared in March 1939 tends to support Buckley and Klugman, with qualifications. It showed: properties transferred or conveyed to purchaser 175 contracts of sale held by the Delegate 208 draft contracts of sale issued 67 draft contracts prepared, but not yet issued 29 inchoate titles in various stages of preparation 61 applications for land - registered 70 unregistered 3 731 234 The summary needs some explanation. On the face of it, titles were issued for 175 properties (it is not specified exactly what these were; I suggest the division was roughly one-third plantations, and two-thirds trading stations, residential 1. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns, Philp 1914-1946. p. 235 2. Colyer, Watson & Co. entered the New Guinea scene in the early 1930s as a sometime competitor with Burns, Philp and Carpenters. It attracted clients disgruntled with them, but never achieved their importance and influence. 3. Buckley & Klugman, "The Australian presence in the Pacific" - Burns Philp 1914-1946. p. 332 4. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.28. Information re titles (1928-1939). 302 houses, stores, building sites etc.) but there is no indication how many, if any, were dummied properties owned by the major firms. Regardless of who the actual owners were, they had made all their repayments to the Custodian in about thirteen years, which was well within the specified twenty year repayment period. The Delegate in Rabaul held 208 titles for properties which had not been paid off, but were close to being finalised. These consisted of draft contracts both issued and not issued, titles in various stages of examination and preparation, and applications for land. Allowing for the problems involved in examining and finalising titles as Bredmeyer has detailed, there was steady advancement in the processing of land titles. The depression years The depression years were grim for all planters; those who survived led very frugal lives while others were ruined, and some saw formal control of their plantations pass to one of the major companies to whom they were impossibly in debt. Those who survived did so partly because they had capital reserves which, together with a reduced life-style, carried them through. Some planters - depending on the location of their plantations - supplemented their diet with seafoods, locally grown vegetables and fruit, poultry and any available game. "Freezer" goods (i.e. meat, dairy products and fruit and vegetables imported from Australia) became luxuries; Charles Blake spoke feelingly of ’floating hot meat'1 - 4 lb tins of corned meat which had been kept in hot stores until the fat had turned to oil. There was constant preoccupation among all planters with paring costs and opposing any form of social policy that might swell overheads (e.g. increased wages for labourers). Planters became increasingly disenchanted with their position and critical of Australian government policy regarding the continued depreciation of the copra industry. A planter’s comment on the design of a New Guinea stamp in 1931 illustrates this nicely: 1. Charles Blake, Brisbane. March 1986 303 "A man who has never seen a coconut before would be depressed on seeing the palm on that stamp". ... "How that palm ever got past a pest inspector", [ he wrote ] "is beyond my comprehension. It has been close-planted, below high-water mark, has elephant beetle weevil, brontispa, hispa, malnutrition and grasshoppers. It is also depressed and barren. Unfortunately, it is a faithful representation of the state of the coconut industry today, but we should not bruit it about on such a wonderful advertising medium as a stamp". Some planters began to think of leaving New Guinea, attracted by advertisements such as: Find out about the possibilities of farming in South Africa. Be your own master in a land where there is sunshine and freedom; where land, labour and living are cheap; and where markets are improving. Although intended to attract settlers from Britain these apparently congenial conditions were of interest in New Guinea where alarm at the slump in world copra prices, the failure of the Australian government to guarantee prices for copra and rubber, the increasing difficulty of obtaining labour, irritation with the restrictive practices of local firms and with accumulating debt was evident among planters. There was some pressure from New Guinea residents for direct O representation in the Australian Parliament to protect their interests, and to provide a public airing of their complaints. In retrospect, such representation would have been useful in controlling the acquisition of plemtations by the two major companies. This occurred where the company financing a planter allowed him to get deeply into debt with it and then sued for recovery. The planter was declared bankrupt and the plantation was then, allegedly, sold "for a song" to the Company which agreed to absorb the debt owing to it. An example of this is Kiep plantation, owned by Karl Mainka and being bought from him by Phebe Parkinson (a sister of Queen Emma). It was purchased by Burns, Philp on 1 October 1930 at auction from the Sheriff of the Court at Rabaul for judgment of a debt owing to it by Phebe Parkinson. The details of the purchase are: 12 1. Pacific Islands Monthly, 20 February 1931. p. 6 2. The Times, 1 November 1934. p. 1 3. Stanner, The South Seas in transition, p. 39 304 bid at auction y350. 0. 0 owed by Parkinson 3237.10. 0 payment of mortgage 2725. 4. 5 charge of draft to Mainka 510.18. 9 legal expenses etc. 92. 0. 2 total cost of property 6915.13. 41 It is easy to see how Burns, Philp could be accused of buying plantations "for a song". Publicly, it bid ^350 for the plantation which was paid to Parkinson, while privately it absorbed her debt to itself of Y3,237.10.0 as well as paying out the mortgage of 725.4.5 to Mainka, and associated expenses. Claims that Burns, Philp (and Carpenters) deliberately encouraged planters to get heavily into debt should be viewed cautiously: in fairness to both firms it must be said that there were some planters who ran up enormous debts with whichever company was their "patron" while claiming that copra production (particularly during the depression o years) could not match their operating expenses. Blake recalled that when he took over the management of Ningau plantation for Carpenters he produced 100 tons of copra a month and received an angry letter from the firm’s Rabaul office telling him not to process immature nuts. On checking plantation records he discovered that the previous manager had only ever sent 50 tons of copra a month O to the firm in Rabaul, selling the balance privately. Many charged planters did this, selling copra mainly to Chinese traders who re-sold it to the companies as trade copra. Eventually the point was reached where the company foreclosed; after some obligatory haggling the owner was quite happy to take the price offered (or transfer his obligation to the Custodian to the firm) which, with his company debt absorbed and the undeclared profits he had made selling copra illegally, gave him a very comfortable capital sum. Such a transaction was viewed with great approval by other planters who saw it as a blow against the alleged rapacity of the company which, although probably suspecting what had happened, was content to add control of another plantation to its holdings and so strengthen12 3 1. extracted from documents on "Kiep plantation" file. Burns, Philp Archives, University of Sydney. 2. anonymous, name withheld. 3. Charles Blake, Brisbane. March 1986 305 its grip on the copra industry.* Occasionally, as part of the settlement, the former owner was kept on as manager and probably continued supplementing his income. As mentioned above the capital value of plantations fell sharply with the onset of the depression. Until June 1930 the principle followed in assessing O the value of a developed plantation was to capitalise a proportion of total debits to the plantation revenue accounts in the ratio that the non-bearing areas held to the total planted area. After that date a scale was introduced by which a palm was taken as being worth 2s6d for the first year, and ls3d for each of the succeeding nine years making a total value of 13s9d at ten years. At 48 palms to the acre on the square planting system this meant that y33 an acre was required to bring the palms to ten years of age, less any profit for coconuts harvested. If the spacing was 56 palms to the acre on the triangle the cost would be ^38.10.0. It was, therefore, considered that the arbitrary basis of a graded sum of ls3d a palm O was excessive. Although there was a general increase in plantation enterprise during the 1920s and early 1930s there was a pause during the depression years of land alienation for new, or expanding, plantations. The confidence of local planters was largely restored by the Australian government readjusting the basis of future payments for expropriated properties in accordance with actual cash returns from the properties concerned.^ In the final ten years of pre-war administration the plantation industry was no longer all important. Gold mining on the mainland was producing sizeable returns as well as competing vigorously for available labour, a good number of123 1. see Hopper, "Kicking out the Hun", p. 213 2. for all plantations in New Guinea, but it will be remembered that most of the more productive ones were located on and near the Gazelle Peninsula. This is a prime example of the way in which an adjustment directed to a specific part of the colony had to encompass the entire colony. In this way the plantations of the Gazelle Peninsula tended to become "submerged" in the overall economy. 3. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry", p. 58 4. ibid., p.. 68 306 palms on some of the original German established plantations had declined in productivity and needed replacing, yet others were to continue producing - even allowing for war damage - until the 1960s. Richards noted in 1963 that of 139,000 palms on some of Carpenters' pre-1900 plantations all were "senescent to senile"; that 223,500 palms on certain plantations established in the period 1905 to 1915 were of "declining yield"; while plantations established from 1920 were maintaining their yield. Signs of age and reducing productivity would have been apparent in the 1930s on these plantations as copra production all but ceased in 1940, and ceased completely from 1942 to about 1947 when some plantations were re-opened following the devastation of the war years. Richards stresses that not all plantations suffered aging and reduced productivity as his following tables show; in 1963 re-plantings not necessary on: Koka planted after 1915 Cape Rigney 1916 Patlangat 1919 Put-Nonu 1923 Palmalmal 1926 Kaf Kaf 1930 Ralabang 1930 Taboona 1930 Odnop 1935 re-planting necessary for pre-1915 plantations Maulapao 1,215 acres Wangaramut 900 Pondo 430 Raniola 300 Kolube 800 Matandeduk 100 Potsdam 300 Komalu 250 Kokola 430 source; Richards papers As these tables (particularly the second one) include some of the best plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula, their productivity had commenced declining in the 1930s and would have been particularly noticeable in the 1940-1950 period had annual production been continued then. 307 Some tentative attempts at planting alternative crops were made, but the main problem the colony faced was that the area used for effective economic production (and the generation of taxes in one form or another) was only a fraction of that which the Administration had to maintain. Previous warnings of the danger of depending on one crop were realised; New Guinea was fortunate that the copra collapse was cushioned by goldmining on the mainland as shown by the table on p. 284. The eruption The eruption of Matupit volcano on the north-eastern outskirts of Rabaul on 29 May 1937 caused a great deal of damage to plantations and village groves around Rabaul and Kokopo.* Forty-nine village groves were destroyed or affected, while eleven European plantations were affected and five badly O damaged. An eye-witness wrote: What we had seen on the road and what we saw now at and from Kabakada made it obvious that the severest damage had been at Kabaira plantation and Vunaraima. Kabaira ... suffered most, all of the palms being broken, to say nothing of the palms that had fallen. The fronds had not only bent down under the weight of mud but the midribs had broken at the bond - a most unusual damage for a leaf to suffer. It was heartbreaking to look along lines and lines of thousands of palms and see only the topmost uncurled frond sticking up like a spearhead. Cacao trees planted by Washington [ at Kabaira plantation ] between the coconut palms suffered equally severely, and although many of the pods are so advanced that they may ripen the fate of the trees is doubtful. The coconut palms may recover in two or three years. Natava (Jack Mullaly's) is badly damaged as is Tovakandam (Bertie Heron's) but not as severely as Kabaira. As you retreat from Vunairima to Kabakada so the damage decreases in violence. Vunakabi, adjoining Vunairima on the far side suffered a little. Raulawat, a couple of miles 1 1. for a description of the eruption see Rabaul Times, no. 633. 4 June 1937. (stencilled issue printed at the Catholic Mission, Vunapope) 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1936/1937. p. 80 308 further on still received only a thin layer of ash. Kerevat, a couple of miles further on still, escaped. Part of the damage was caused by pumice discharged from the volcano weighing down palm leaves, in some cases resulting in the collapse of the crowns, while in others flowering spathes and immature nuts were destroyed. Very severe damage was caused through flash floods from cloudbursts which scoured out and carried away thousands of palms. On the Kokopo road large numbers of palms in groves o and villages were covered with pumice and completely destroyed. News of the eruption caused some concern in Sydney, which - as the following radio message shows - was tinged with a certain pragmatism: ...... Australia shocked at Rabaul's calamity. Delighted apparently no fatalities. Information scanty. Prospective losses and trade interference has caused Carpenters and Electric shares to ease. Copra, sun- dried yi5.15.0, smoked y i5.2.6, Rabaul£16.15.0. It was later discovered that two Europeans had been killed. It is surprising the number was not higher as there was only the one clear road out of Rabaul - Malaguna Road, which forked at the town outskirts to Taliligap via Tunnel Hill, or to Kokopo along the coast road. The latter was choked with fallen palms and deposits of pumice so the town population jammed the road to Taliligap. Obviously the evacuation was not as orderly as it should have been for a Methodist missionary later commented that In a land where "the dignity of the white race" should be a matter of everyday deportment, and where unusual circumstances should indice (sic) greater self-control, it was a sorry sight to see white men running in panic. Wayne was an idealist; few people stroll through the centre of a volcanic eruption. Native casualties were severe, as 1 1. extracted from "The Volcanic Eruption in Rabaul 1937" from Notes and photos from journal of R.N. Wayne, pp. 76/78 2. Annual Report to the League of Nations 1937/1938. p. 83 3. Rabaul Times, 4 June 1937. ("Electric shares" refers to the public company which owned and operated the supply of electricity and power to Rabaul) 4. extracted from "The Volcanic Eruption in Rabaul 1937" from Notes and photos from journal of R.N. Wayne, p. 77 309 a number of the villagers were out on their portions of the reef gathering fish, unmindful of or unknowing the potential danger. When the volcano erupted very few of these people seem to have survived, and most were covered by the erupting material and killed. The Administration was unable to account for a total of 436 natives of this particular area and from Valaua [ Valaur] 186, from Tovana 104 and from Latlat 25 appear to have lost their lives. ... The original villages lining the Kokopo road disappeared and are probably covered by the lower western slope of the feature known as Vulcan. Pumice "dust” covered the area between Valaur and Kerevia (opposite Vulcan island) and westwards to the shores of Weberhafen. The channel between the mainland and Vulcan island was filled by the volcano which in three days grew to 795 feet in height, 1600 feet across the top and 3400 feet across the base. Nearby villages were buried under 40 to 50 feet of pumice, some of which later O drifted 100 miles out to sea. Most of the inner Gazelle Peninsula plantations missed the full force of the volcano and the heavy fall of pumice which blanketed Rabaul, the Nodup/Nonga area of the north coast, and that part of Kokopo in the path of the volcano's blast. Fortunately, only a few were severely damaged; even so, the Custodian suspended all instalments of principal and interest payments for 9 seven months to help planters recover. To receive the benefits of suspended instalments planters had to give details of their current debts; one revealed that he was paying interest at 6% on his debt with Carpenters, another - Mrs E. Juker (formerly Kaumann) - was paying 8%, also to Carpenters. A comparatively rapid recovery of affected plantations was made after the northwest monsoon started and washed dried mud and pumice dust off coconut palms.123 1. Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1965-66. (Tolain, Tapalau, Michael Towarunga and other villagers of Latlat village v. the Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. In re Vulcan land), p. 244 2. Raphael Cilento, "The New Guinea eruption of May, 1937" in The Historical Society of Queensland Journal, v. Ill, no. 1, December 1937. pp. 46/47 3. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.100. Volcanic Eruption - Rabaul. Relief to North Coast Planters 1937-1938. 310 Dummying revisited No sooner had the dust of the eruption settled than another storm broke over the troubled plantations. In 1937, T.L. McAlpine - a plantation inspector employed initially by Burns, Philp and then by Carpenters - wrote to the Prime Minister alleging Carpenters was still heavily involved in dummying in plantations. He provided a list of 29 plantations (see p. 311) with a total value of £772,870 whose owners, he alleged, were Carpenters’ dummies. The plemtations were mainly in the Gazelle Peninsula/New Ireland area and included the choice plantations of Pelleluhn, Raniolo and Ulaveo. As well as these plantations, McAlpine eilleged that Pondo plemtation was subsequently transferred by D.L. Alcorn to Carpenters, and that Selapiu plantation weis transferred to B.B. Perriman, Carpenters’ Rabaul manager. Few of the ’’owners” lived on - let alone visited - the plantations; all had transferred 20 year powers of attorney to Carpenters to operate them. McAlpine's allegations continued until 1951, coming to a peak with a letter to the King of England in which he claimed that by acquiring properties won initially by ex-servicemen both Burns, Philp and Carpenters were enjoying interest and payment concessions applicable to ex-servicemen. The Minister in charge of External Territories in answering McAlpine's earlier allegations had advised him that 'where a Company has obtained the properties by transfer [ it ] would cease to be subject to returned soldiers' conditions as soon as the plantations pass out of the hands of returned soldiers’.1 This did not satisfy McAlpine, who continued to ask embarrassing questions about plantation ownership by members of the Carpenter family or their close associates; e.g. F.R. Page who had successfully tendered for two plantations was a brother of a deceased director of the firm; and G.W. Luff, who had also won two plantations, was Carpenter's nephew. McAlpine suggested a Royal Commission should be appointed to look into the disposal of all expropriated plantations. But because the principals he alleged were the ’’ringleaders" of the plantation swindle - Sir James Burns, Sir Walter Carpenter 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A518 item F824/1, Part 2. Department of External Territories, Correspondence file, multi-number series, classes relating to External Territories: "Dummying in Expropriated Properties, 1929". Minister for External Territories to T.L. McAlpine, Sydney. 9.9.40 311 PLANTATIONS ALLEGED BY T.L. McALPINE TO HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED BY DUMMIES FOR W.R. CARPENTER 6c CO. Agita ) L.F. Howard Watolla ) Tumavali ) Baudassin W.E. Johnson Bogadjim * G.W. Luff Dewau A.C. Somerville Dogumor G.W. Luff Enuk group L.F. Howard Fileba ) J.O. Robertson Fissoa ) Katu A. McCouat Kavilo A.C. Somerville Koka ** F.A. Page Kolube A.C. Somerville Komalu F.A. Page <5c W.F. Bennetts Kopo A.C. Somerville Kul Kul W.F. Bennetts Kuradui J. Chapman Marangis L.F. Howard Maulapao ) J. Chapman Neinduk ) Palmalmal ) Pelleluhn W.F. Bennetts Pigibut W.E. Johnson Potsdamhafen L.W. Parkham Raniolo J. Chapman Teripax ) E.C. Woolley Cigaregare ) Ulaveo W.F. Bennetts Wangaramut J. Chapman Longan E.C. Woolley * nephew of Sir Walter Carpenter ** brother of late T.E. Page, Director of W.R. Carpenter 6c Co. Pty. Ltd source; Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1781 item A232 Pt. 2. Custodian of Expropriated Property Sales by Dummying 1929-1934 312 and Sir Charles Marr - were all prominent members of the Australian establishment, McAlpine appears to have been fobbed off and ignored. The man possibly was a crank but he did uncover some curious facts, including that Sir Walter Carpenter gave his palatial Sydney residence to the Australian government for a children's home before leaving Australia to settle in Canada, and that Sir Charles Marr (a former Minister in charge of Territories) held 800 of the 1,000 shares issued of Pelleluhn Plantations Pty Ltd - described as the "plum" of the expropriated plantations. Pelleluhn was originally sold by the Expropriation Board to W.F. Bennetts (alleged to be a Carpenters' dummy) for ^115,000, yet McAlpine claimed that his search in the Registrar-General's Department in Sydney in July 1938 revealed that its capital was ^5,000, and was allegedly in debt to the parent firm for /130,313.17.7. Of the 1,000 allotted shares in the company Sir Charles Marr held 800, J.T. Wallis (an employee of Carpenters) help 199, and W.G. Higgs (the plantation manager) held l . 1 Had Carpenters' records not been destroyed pre-1942 some of McAlpine's allegations might be satisfactorily answered. Although his aUegations were dismissed and the government took no public action on them, it is interesting to note that of the three parts of the Custodian's file dealing with the sales of expropriated property by dummying, Part 3 covering the period 1937-1942 remains closed (i.e. unavailable for public scrutiny) in 1986. The total capitalisation of the plantation industry in New Guinea by 1940 was about y5,000,000 of which almost y.3,000,000 represented the capital O value of expropriated plantations. The structure of ownership was never clear. It was reported in the late 1930s that the Board still had an interest in 60% of the plantations, and apparently at least 25% were owned outright or under the partial control of Burns, Philp or Carpenters. How many plantations were indebted to these and other firms by second mortgage or charge agreements against growing crops was never accurately known, but a large part of the industry was tied to a significant capital and working debt. The influence of the two main firms was 123 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1781 item C.232 Pt. 2. Custodian of Expropriated Property Sales by Dummying 1929-1934. 2. see Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1781 item A232 Pts 1 (1926-1932), 2 (1929-1934), 3 (1937-1942). Custodian of Expropriated Property - Sales by dummying. 3. Dwyer, "A survey of the coconut industry*', p. 69 313 very extensive, involving not only a greater part of the copra industry, the largest sector of the merchandise trade and inter-island shipping, but also air and sea communication with Australia, and insurance as well. The "strangle-hold", as it was alleged to be, led to widespread complaint among the smaller planters but the Administration was unable to exercise much influence except through fiscal duties and a very indirect (and somewhat ineffectual) control of labour.1 The destruction of titles records Carpenters' store in Rabaul was destroyed by fire in 1939, and with it the Delegate’s office and most of the records of expropriated properties kept there. Papers kept in safes were badly damaged; of the 267 contracts of sale held in the Delegate's office, 180 were recovered in a charred condition but with their numbers identifiable. The destruction of these vital records was a blow to the Custodian who was finalising titles for all expropriated properties. Two strange facts emerged from the fire: copies of title records had not been sent to Melbourne or Canberra as a safeguard, and that the Delegate's office was located in the building of a company shown to be heavily involved in the dummying of expropriated property. It has been suggested to me that the destruction of the O Delegate's office was a deliberate attempt to wipe out planter liabilities* which was a futile move as records were available in Canberra (and in some cases, with the big firms) of the repayments made for all properties. The destruction of titles records meant that in many cases the cycle of hearing native claims against land purchases and compensation payments might have to be re-started. After discussions with the Administrator, and reviewing the situation with the Australian government, it was accepted that the ownership of properties was well established and need not be re-examined. The Delegate was instructed that where titles had been completely destroyed he should apply s.72 of the Expropriation Ordinance and give sixty days notice in the New Guinea Gazette of his intention to re-issue titles to claimants of the properties. This involved a12 1. this paragraph is based on Stanner, The South Seas in transition, p. 34 2. anonymous, name withheld. 314 preparation of title fee of VI and a 15/- application fee which were not viewed kindly by planters. They felt neither should have been imposed as the destruction of titles records had occurred through no fault of theirs. Presumably at the Delegate's request, amendments 71A and 72A to the Ordinance provided that where titles were damaged but not destroyed the Delegate could issue new titles without any need to advertise in the New Guinea Gazette. The /I preparation of title fee only applied in these cases. Advice of the proposed issue of titles for 97 properties appeared in New Guinea Gazette no.575 of 16 December 1939 (on the file, a minute of 20 March 1940 noted there was a discrepancy of one in the number of contracts of sale destroyed and the number gazetted).* The fire was a serious setback in finalising titles to plantations, and satisfying native claims relating to these. There remained an aura of mystery about it which was never satisfactorily explained. It threw additional work onto the Delegate at a time when his duties were winding down after nearly twenty years of examining titles to expropriated property, initially with the Expropriation Board, but largely in his own right. The end of an era The Delegate had barely started re-issuing titles when war was declared in Europe and the position of plantations in New Guinea, and the copra industry they supported, worsened. It was a grim time for planters: Robin McKay received a letter from George Naess of Tol plantation in Wide Bay dated 4 August 1939 in which he said 'We are all on the bread line now, there is no copra being cut on o most places' . As plantation equipment broke down or wore out it was not replaced; in November 1940 Kurakakaul plantation ceased production when its drier burnt down and it was decided not to replace it until after the position of the copra market and shipping became clearer. In December 1940 Burns, Philp advised that owing to the state of the market it would purchase only two-thirds of copra 1 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.92 Part 2. Fire at Rabaul Pt. 2 (1933: 1939-1941). minute of 20.3.40 2. discussion with Robin McKay, Alstonville, N.S.W. June 1986 315 produced on its own, and charged, plantations.* In early 1941 the Delegate was appointed Executive Member of the Territory of New Guinea Copra Control Board set up under the National Security (Copra Control) Regulations. His two o inspectors were also transferred to the Control Board. But events overtook them. In March 1941 Carpenters advised its Rabaul office that if the government did not provide assistance it would take "a serious view" of the situation as it was not going to continue financing plantations and bearing heavy losses 'just to keep a few managers and labourers in employment'. The next month Burns, Philp advised that it would not accept any more copra.^ The Custodian agreed to requests that labour be reduced to an absolute minimum on expropriated plantations and that the European managers be replaced by Asiatics, if these could be found. Once again the plantations remained static while planters hoped for a settlement of the crisis in Europe. But this was not to be and, following the evacuation of European women and children to Australia in December 1941, it was obvious that New Guinea was once again involved in a war - this time on a far more serious scale them in 1914. In January 1942 Japanese aircraft attacked the Gazelle Peninsula and shortly after Japanese vessels steamed into Simpsonhafen bringing soldiers to invade and occupy the area. And so ended an era, to be mourned by those whose lives and hopes had been bound up in coconut plemtations which never really met the expectations held for them. 1 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.103. Properties re-possessed by the Custodian (May-June 1941). Burns, Philp to Custodian, 7.12.40 2. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.105. Position of Delegate and staff, minute on file 3. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.102. W.R. Carpenter ic . Co. Pty. Ltd. W.R. Carpenter to (un-named) branch manager, Rabaul. 7.3.41 4. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1782 item C.103. Properties re-possessed by the Custodian (May-June 1941). copy of unsigned, undated letter to Custodian CONCLUSION 316 Although coconut plantation agriculture was always a ’tempting alternative'* to trading in raw coconuts it was a high risk industry depending on reliable labour, mature palms and an economically acceptable world price for copra. Queen Emma at Ralum and the Company at Herbertshohe proved that properly established and maintained coconut plantations could be profitable ventures on the Gazelle Peninsula; their decision to establish plantations there was the most significant ever made in New Guinea. Indeed, the Company's plantations not only saved it from financial disaster but, together with those privately owned, developed the Gazelle Peninsula into a commercial success recognised throughout the South Pacific. By about 1900 when the stability of the Protectorate, the rising world demand for coconut oil and some clever drumming up of investor interest in Berlin had attracted more individuals and companies to invest in the Gazelle Peninsula, o New Guinea was firmly committed to coconut agriculture. The Company paid its first dividend in 1912 when plantations laid out in the 1890s and early 1900s were close to full, production but agricultural concentration on the Gazelle Peninsula meant that other parts of the Protectorate were ignored. By 1914 there was too much capital tied up in coconut plantations for any to be broken into smaller blocks for alternate crops - even if there had been any interest in doing this. Visitors to the Peninsula wrote of its sense of purpose and progress, and the obvious richness of the plemtations, without realising that New Guinea was a poor country with few discovered useable resources and an economy dependent on one crop produced mainly in one part of it. Despite the millions of marks'* poured into the Protectorate one of its most tangible advantages to Germany was the ability 123 1. Firth, "German firms in the Pacific Islands", p. 7 2. as occurred in Ceylon where 'The economy was now solely dependent on the plantations'. Malinga H. Gunaratne, The plantation raj. ?Ceylon, Cave, 1980. p. 50 3. 'the "Hamburgischer Correspondent" of 23 June 1917 wrote ... the capital invested in the German South Seas possessions is almost 102 million marks higher them that placed in any other German colony except East Africa, and only five million marks below that invested there'. Interstate Commission Report, (Appendix F). p. 1. Towards the end of the German colonial period the bulk of developmental funds was directed to New Guinea. 317 to recruit troops there, particularly in 1905 for use against the Maji Maji rebels in East Africa.1 All of Germany's Pacific colonies provided less than 8.5% of her total copra imports; by comparison Britain received 48.5% from her colonies, and A Holland 40% from the Dutch East Indies. Sir Hubert Murray (Lieutenant- Governor of Papua) warned in 1916 that the trade of the German colonies has never represented more than a small fraction of Germany's total trade: in 1913 one-half of one per cent of her imports and one-half of one per cent of her e x p o r t s ...... Although this should have made the Australian government look more closely at New Guinea, Murray's warning went unheeded. Instead, Australia seized the chance to occupy New Guinea with a speed that was truly remarkable. The Protectorate was, ostensibly, seen 'more as a strategic asset than as a threat against the British Empire'^ although its seizure added little to British security in the area. The chief of the Australian General Staff wrote in 1917 that 'it is decidedly desirable that the territory south of the line should remain in British hands so as to round off the British possessions of Papua, and the Solomons'.^ If this was to form a protective arc for Australia against possible attack from the north it was illusory for in observing the mandate condition not to fortify New Guinea Australia made it an easy conquest for Japan - the very country it feared - in 1942. The British government hoped that military operations conducted against all German colonies would not prejudice the outcome of the war (mainly for fear 1234 1. Woodruff D. Smith, The German colonial empire. Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina, 1978. p. 109 2. Firth, "German firms in the Pacific Islands", p. 3 3. Interim & Final Reports (Murray), p. 81 4. Gaddis Smith, 'The British government and the disposition of the German colonies in Africa, 1914-1918' in Britain and Germany in Africa, 1914-1918 - imperial rivalry and colonial rule, edited by Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967. p. 275 5. Foster memorandum, p. 3 318 that their seizure would give the appearance of 'unalloyed imperialism'* but Australia was adamant it would keep New Guinea. Yet after occupying it, Australian interest waned. Provided the supply of copra was maintained and no serious problems arose, the "new possessions" were left to the control o f the Military Administrator. There was, however, keen interest shown in other quarters. With a speed that matched that of the occupation, the Australian firm of Burns, Philp & Co. recommenced its shipping service to Rabaul and Herbertshohe (which NDL competition had curtailed in 1905) and offered to continue it in return for an annual subsidy from the Australian government. The manner in which Burns, Philp (and later its rival, W.R. Carpenter & Co.) was permitted to almost control commercial life in New Guinea - by setting high freight charges, refusing to carry copra from plantations whose owners did not buy supplies from it (alleging there was "no space available"), only deviating from scheduled ports of call for a substantial fee, and setting its own price for copra bought from plantations heavily in debt to it - was a major mistake. The remarkable rapport the firm enjoyed with factions and individuals in Australian government circles remains a feature of New Guinea history. With the appointment of W.H. Lucas - the firm's Pacific Islands shipping manager - as chairman of the Expropriation Board and Technical Adviser to the Australian government on New Guinea affairs, its position was assured. The process of formally acquiring the mandate for New Guinea, and the inventorying and cataloguing of expropriated properties, took so long that many Australian returned servicemen lost interest in tendering for them; those who remained interested lacked capital. It was predictable that they would seek financial assistance and equally predictable that Burns, Philp or Carpenters would be happy to provide it - for a charge. This either should not have been allowed, or else closely regulated. It must have been obvious that inexperienced men attracted to New Guinea by tales of instant wealth and a sybaritic lifestyle as planters would need support if the plantation industry was ever threatened. 1. Gaddis Smith, 'The British government and the disposition of the German colonies in Africa 1914-1918'. p. 296 319 During the military occupation some plantations on the Gazelle Peninsula were expanded and improved by their German owners to the ultimate benefit of Australia when it expropriated German properties. At this point more mistakes were made; determination to "kick out the Hun" ensured that almost no trained personnel were left to look after the plantations or train newcomers, nor was there a carefully thought out programme of progressive expropriation. It was done with a rush.1 Quite obviously it did not occur to the government that fulfilling its mandate obligations would require expertise in many areas. Prime Minister Hughes's reaction to Australia being given a 'C' class mandate to administer New Guinea instead of being able to annex it as Australian territory ■ ...... 9 ...... ■ has been revealingly documented by Hudson* and may explain his subsequent lack of interest in its affairs. Feelings against Germans reached an almost hysterical level in Australia, encouraged by the rantings of Hughes and Lucas. Neither had a policy for New Guinea beyond the immediate deportation of till Germans and the grabbing of their possessions. Hughes's promise to distribute blocks of land to Australian returned servicemen was replaced by the decision to expropriate German properties and put them up for tender with terms favouring Australian or "British" ex-servicemen. This reflected no great credit on Australia which could have allowed Germans to apply for Australian citizenship, retain their properties and remain in New Guinea. The principle had been followed successfully in former German East African colonies where German colonists were permitted (if not actively encouraged) to take British citizenship and remain. Germans in New Guinea were replaced by Australian employees of the Expropriation Board generally eager to do well, but totally ignorant of conditions. It is hard not to criticise the Australian government for the neglect and mismanagement of plantations under the control of the Expropriation Board. Their value induced Australia to acquire New Guinea so their care should have been all important. But inexperienced men were employed as plantation 1. "Within less than two weeks, German New Guinea, Kaiser Wilhelmsland, Samoa and the Bismarck Archipelago had disappeared from the map as German possessions". M.E. Townsend, The rise and fall of Germany's colonial empire, p. 368 2. Hudson, "New Guinea mandate: the view from Geneva". 320 "managers" and although some were genuinely interested in gaining experience in the copra industry, there were those who saw a Board appointment as a stepping stone to another career. As a result their work was often poorly done; one example of this is that by 1930 a total of 111 claims for palm shortages were received for the 268 plantations the Board put up for tender.1 The Board itself, under the domination of W.H. Lucas, was only interested in maintaining plantations until new owners took them over. What should have been a straight forward job quickly became tangled in politics with the Administrator being reduced to carrying out orders from Melbourne - some, no doubt, originating from Lucas. The Australian government should not have allowed him almost unfettered control of New Guinea as chairman of the Board - particularly as he was suspected of retaining his links with Burns, Philp although this was never satisfactorily proved (or denied) - and should have paid more attention to protests about the way the Board was "looking after" the plemtations. Australians came as second-hand colonists to New Guinea which should have continued as the plantation showplace of the South Pacific. But constant staff changes within the Board, bickering between it and the Administration, fluctuations in world copra prices, and lack of Australian government interest prevented this. Barely removed from colonial status itself, Australia had no personnel (apart from those in the Papuan service) experienced in - or at least familiar with - colonial administration or tropical colonial agriculture. As a result practically all Administration positions were held by returned servicemen whose chief qualification was their war service. Australia could have asked Britain for the secondment of an experienced colonial official to act as Administrator, or asked Sir Hubert Murray of Papua to release a senior official - say, the Government Secretary - for the purpose. Determination to prove itself as a new nation may explain the apparent lack of action with the first choice, but no action on the second is difficult to understand. Murray may have rejected an approach because of his interest in seeing Papua and New Guinea amalgamated with himself as Administrator. Australia continued to send high-ranking service officers to New Guinea as Administrators, perpetuating the military pattern of its 1. Australian Archives, Canberra. Series CRS A1781 item A.77. Claims of shortages 1926-1931. extracted from documents on file. 321 administrations - none of which showed any great flair for agricultural matters. In contrast to German officials and planters there were very few Australians with agricultural qualifications in New Guinea at the time civil administration commenced, or lengthy experience in operating a plantation. Despite warnings of the inadvisability of letting inexperienced men with little capital take over plantations the Australian government, flushed with gratitude to its returned soldiers, positively encouraged this. The transferring of plantation ownership from a government agency (the Expropriation Board) to what were in effect government mortgagees was hardly calculated to bring into the Territory the capital needed to expedite its development.1 In its zeal to look after its returned servicemen the government left itself open to constant attacks from the most powerful pressure group in Australia - the RSSAILA - which zealously monitored conditions for exservicemen in New Guinea. Many plantations had been grievously neglected while under the control of the Expropriation Board and their new owners faced substantial rehabilitation work. This was not immediately recognised as a danger signal as the plantation industry enjoyed good prices and a steady market in the period 1924/1929, which was probably the high point for plantations in New Guinea. Another danger signal ignored was the almost total dependence of the new planters on the Department of Agriculture for professional advice, yet it took nearly three years from the commencement of civil administration for a Director of Agriculture to be appointed. He found it difficult to work in the Board dominated Territory and resigned within four years. The position was eventually filled from the Papuan service but the new director was hampered by staff and finance problems, and by the antagonism of Administrator McNicoll. The German practice of importing agricultural experts from neighbouring colonies to advise planters was not continued under Australian administration (with the possible exception of Cobcroft, who reported on plantations rather than advising planters on planting methods). The experimental farm/plantation/training institute established by the German administration at Kerevat in 1905 could have been expanded to study all 1. Heather Radi, "New Guinea under mandate 1921-1941" in Australia and Papua New Guinea, edited by W.J. Hudson. Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1971. p. 85 322 forms of tropical agriculture (as was done in the 1950s/1960s) in the Territory and strengthen its place in the South Pacific. This was not done. Having accepted the mandate for New Guinea, Australia should have insisted on the introduction of alternate crops to lessen dependence on coconuts and broaden employment, trade and development opportunities. Instead of only producing copra from coconuts, the many other items obtainable from the coconut palm might have been developed into cottage indutries for villagers and an extra, modest source of income for planters. Palm leaves can be woven into hats, floor mats and braid; coconut shells can be carved into buttons and curios or turned into charcoal; while the husk is valuable for fibre, yarn, rope, brushes, matting and can be compressed into building material. Australia was an obvious market for these items whose manufacture would introduce significant light industries into New Guinea. Any competition from nearby colonies could have been controlled by preferential tariffs and/or import quotas. But copra remained king and demanded total loyalty. In fairness it must be admitted that the Australian government was in a dilemma. The introduction of alternative crops such as sugar, bananas, tobacco and cotton which the Germans had grown successfully in New Guinea would have competed with similar industries in New South Wales and Queensland whose voters would soon make their displeasure known to the government. Forward planning in the early 1920s and a continuous programme of encouraging and developing new industries would have reduced - if not completely avoided - dependence on coconuts. One cannot look at the plantation industry for long without concluding that Australia had been attracted to New Guinea by the superficial glamour of its plantations without appreciating the economic danger of this one crop dependency. Australian Administrators tried to interest planters in crop diversification, in many cases repeating German experimental plantings in the search for an acceptable alternative, but met the same lack of interest that Hahl had experienced. Even the introduction of the Bounties Act in 1926 with financial inducements to cultivate and export specified crops failed to break the planters' obsession with coconuts. Yet concentration on one crop meant that through their unwillingness to change (although it was by no means clear what they could change to) planters continued to be tied to world prices for coconut oil emd copra. There was also pressure from commercial sources to contend with. Firms and individuals in Sydney, and to a lesser extent in Brisbane, did very well 323 out of handling copra shipments and supplying goods to New Guinea. Commercial transactions favoured the business firms rather than the planters. It is obvious that maintenance needed to ensure steady production from healthy palms was not always carried out during the Expropriation Board period. The regression of some plantations - particularly in the more isolated parts of the Baining, Kerevat and Warangoi areas of the Gazelle Peninsula - was never fully corrected and their productive ability was seriously weakened. The effects of the depression years, together with declining world interest in coconut oil following the discovery of new techniques for refining oils and fats previously unsuitable for food manufacture, meant that the prosperous plemtations Australia had expropriated were no longer the solid economic investment they had appeared. There were exceptions (e.g. Malapao, Kabaira and Rapopo) but all plantations were affected by external circumstances regardless of how well they were run. With the collapse of the copra market during the depression years New Guinea quickly changed from an attractive colonial appendage to an almost bankrupt colonial dependency. Once again the lack of planning became evident. The Australian government was dismayed to find in the 1930s that significant concessions in tax, duties emd instalment repayments were needed to prop up the plantation industry. It also realised its mistake of confusing the sacred trust of the mandate with the sacred right of returned servicemen who felt they were entitled to special consideration and the waiving of financial responsibilities in times of hardship. A Copra Fund (into which a percentage levied on each ton of copra exported was paid) for the specific purpose of paying a bounty to producers if world prices fell to an unsatisfactory level had not been created. The Copra Pool established in 1941 in anticipation of wartime restrictions was too late to be effective. The financial difficulties of many planters gave Burns, Philp and Carpenters the chance to acquire more plantations, and develop impressive holdings. This might have been avoided had the Australian government guaranteed planters’ debts with the companies, but with the depression biting into Australia's economy there was little chance of such favourable treatment. Although gold discoveries on the New Guinea mainland in the late 1920s and early 1930s provided more government revenue than did copra exports, there remained a dependence on plantations; if Australia rode on the sheep's back, New Guinea basked in the warmth of the copra driers. Whether the product of those 324 driers could be sold was another matter. Gold royalties eased the extent of Australian assistance but gold production was finite, while the financial structure of the Territory rested on the coconut industry which in turn rested on the vagaries of a market on the other side of the world. Because of the uneasy world situation in the late 1930s the value of gold was high and although the consistency of production could not match that of the plantations, it saved New Guinea from bankruptcy. During the last ten years of Australian administration the myth that coconut plantations were constantly successful was irretrievably shattered. The depression years were blamed for the ruin of many small planters, but their own inexperience and lack of training almost guaranteed the bankruptcy of some. The Australian government was warned by Sir Hubert Murray as early as 1915 o f the problems small planters would experience, not least of which would be the influence of the big companies which he saw as: ... the difficult people to get on with; they are always on the grab ... Murray's warning was supported five years later by Lyng who said the powerful company with large estates is destined to play the leading part in the agricultural development of these islands in the future. New Guinea soon proved to be no place for small planters with limited cash reserves. Had any of the advice offered on the pitfalls of coconut planting been foUowed, some who had attempted to join the "plantocracy" of the Gazelle Peninsula might have been spared heartbreak and ruin. The situation became so bad that from about 1930 many plantations - as they were acquired - were combined into companies, usually as subsidiaries of Burns, Philp or Carpenters to minimise production and management costs. The lack of Australian government action in keeping the companies in check allowed them to acquire many of the choicest plemtations on the Gazelle Peninsula and so increase their control of the plemtation industry. 1. West, Selected letters of Hubert Murray, p. 87 2. Lyng, "Our new possessions", pp. 60/61 325 It has been shown above that Australian interest in New Guinea, once the frantic patriotism of the war years had calmed, was slight. It seems that Australians were never really clear what their responsibilities to New Guinea under the mandate involved. Many saw it as an extension of Australian soil, confusing their trust for its inhabitants as ownership of the land. Gibbs noted the lack of understanding of what sovereignty of the Territory meant; it has been variously suggested that the sovereignty resides in the Mandatory, in the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in the League of Nations, and in the communities which inhabit the mandated territories. He continued that although a mandated territory did not become part of the dominions of the mandatory, yet, subject to the terms of the mandate, the o mandatory had, at international law, full power to govern it. Quoting Sir Robert Garran - "the change over was effected to a ready made suit of laws, of British Character, that would do well enough till the administration had time to make a new suit to order" - Gibbs suggested that the suit had some rather vital gaps which the Administration never found time to mend. It was discovered that some British laws thought to have been transferred to New Guinea under the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 were not currently in force in Queensland, and in some cases a legal vacuum - apparently unnoticed - occurred. Translations of German law would have been a useful guide to Australian administrations yet as late as 1930 the Chief Judge (W.B. Phillips) in Rabaul declined to give a decision involving ownership of land under German laws in force before 8 May 1921 remarking tartly that the only direct reference I have heard on the part of learned counsel to the laws in force before 9th May 1921, was the observation by the Crown Law Officer that he did not know what they were and knew of nobody in the Territory who did. 1. H.T. Gibbs. The laws of the Territory of New Guinea - their constitutional source and basic content. L1M thesis, Brisbane, University of Queensland, 1945. p. 9 2. ibid. p. 12 3. Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971/1972. ("Mortlocks"). p. 629 326 Similarly, there was confusion about the mandate itself. During Australian administration of New Guinea doubts developed whether it had been wise to seek control of it. In 1918 a secret Australian memorandum had made it clear that colonies were regarded as assets to be swapped between metropolitan powers by suggesting that In re-adjustment after the war consider whether possible to make a bargain with France with regard to New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Society and Marquesas Islands. This might be arranged by compensation in Africa. If Australia held similar views about ridding itself of New Guinea they were dashed in 1927 when Lord Parmoor, speaking in the British Parliament, made it clear that a mandate was irrevocable. Using the mandates for Tanganyika and Samoa as examples, Parmoor told the House that a 'Mandatory Power is not in the position of an ordinary sovereign Power, ... but is that of a trustee'. In reply, Viscount Cecil confirmed there was no power of revoking a mandate conferred by the Covenant of the League of Nations, although it could be resigned.^ Australia therefore had no option but to continue with the mandate; although Australians O . were indifferent to what happened in New Guinea. Eight years after Latham's minute suggesting the trading off of Pacific islands among metropolitan powers, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer warned that 'peace cannot be maintained permanently if Germany ... is excluded by her rivals from colonial expansion'.^ This warning - which coincided with the rise of the Melanesia Company - was too late. After its eagerness to win New Guinea Australia was beginning to realise the mandate would be more of a nuisance than a benefit; the feeling was strong that New Guinea was an unnecessary encumbrance on a country that was itself feeling its way in the world. In 1936 it was claimed that 1. Latham papers, p. 5 2. Great Britain Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords). Fifth series - Volume LXVI. First volume of session 1927. pp. 210/220 3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 93 1920. pp. 4452/4457 4. Wolfe W. Schmokel, "The hard death of imperialism: German and British colonial attitudes, 1919-1939" in Britain and Germany in Africa - Imperial rivalry and colonial rule, p. 309 327 Economically, Australia could hardly be inconvenienced by any possible relinquishment of her Mandated territory of New Guinea. This not only overlooked the gold royalties which had kept the Territory solvent during the depression years, but also played down the profits companies and individuals were sending to Australia, as Stanner outlined above. It is beyond question that European interest in New Guinea was primarily exploitative. The Germans saw the Protectorate as a source of raw materials for the fatherland and as a market for German manufactured goods. Australia was attracted to New Guinea by the promise of its plantations although it masked this attraction to a certain extent by claiming New Guinea was essential for Australian defence. Commercial colonialism was common to the period - even the Christian missions developed plantations. To a question whether European interest in New Guinea was exploitative a former planter of the Gazelle Peninsula answered Of course it was. No one pretended otherwise. Why else would Europeans go to New Guinea? The traders, the missionaries, the planters, Admin, bods - each in his own way exploited the native. We used to joke about "the Prophet motive" but really the missionaries - particularly the Popies [ i.e. Catholics ] - had some damn good businessmen among them and they used them to their fullest advantage. But my informant was adamant that New Guinea natives benefitted more from European intervention than they may have lost through commercial exploitation. At various places in this thesis I have shown how ill-prepared Australia was to assume the responsibilities and duties of the mandate for New Guinea, and the remarkable lack of knowledge or interest most Australians had in it. Comments from three quite different individuals illustrate this. The first came from Brigadier-General Wisdom who was asked before leaving Melbourne: 1. Ernest Osborne, "Australia and the Pacific Mandates: the position of Germany and Japan" in The Defender, v. 1 no. 1 July 1936. p. 55 2. anonymous, name withheld. 328 "What does a Patrol Officer do?" "I really don't know", came the astonishing reply of the Administrator-elect, "but I imagine he works in the bush. Native Police and that sort of thing". The second came from an Expropriation Board employee eager to leave the Territory: As he packed his clothes, making ready to depart, I asked him my duties. "Ahhh, forget 'em. Have another beer". I urged him to give me information and show me anything of importance during the short time available. "Don't let it worry you, digger", he said, "in a few weeks you'll know more than all these bastards put together". That was how a casual Australian handed over property valued at some tens of thousands of pounds. The third comment came from the former Prime Minister (W.M. Hughes) who, it wiU be recalled, was the driving force behind Australian acquisition of New Guinea. In a confusion of mixed metaphor and cliche he was quoted in the Rabaul Times as saying we got our Mandate and on this rock we have built our church, and all hell is not going to take it away. This Territory has a great future, and what we have we shall hold. Some people down below ask what will happen if they took the Mandate away from us. I say: nothing. Quite apart from showing a surprising lack of understanding about how the mandate was granted, Hughes's comment caused great embarrassment to the Australian government and was soon retracted. The ambivalency of Australian attitudes to New Guinea reinforces the feeling that perhaps a mistake had been made in accepting the mandate. But, as shown above, it was irrevocable. To resign it would have considerably lowered Australia's international status. In writing about the Australian period of New Guinea (1914-1942) all plantations of the Gazelle Peninsula tend to become submerged in the overall problems of the Territory. This is because little happened there that could not be 1. G.W.L. Townsend, District Officer, pp. 17/21 2. Beazley, New Guinea adventure, p. 6 3. Rabaul Times, 8 June 1938 329 traced to, or found to depend on, them. Even the supply of labourers to the gold fields was subject to the angry protests of planters who claimed the requirements of their plantations should take precedence over those of gold-miners. The Gazelle Peninsula was the main copra producing area in New Guinea with the best shipping (and later, air) connections with Australia and overseas through the capital of Rabaul where Administration headquarters, the major commercial houses and the bulk of the Chinese population, were located. Its Tolai villagers had been exposed the longest to European contact and were the most sophisticated in the Territory. Planters clung to the mystique of "the plantocracy", and invitations to plantation functions were cherished among white residents of Rabaul emd Kokopo. But by the end of the 1930s the independent plantation society of the Gazelle Peninsula was a facade; most of the smaller plantations had either been bought out by, or were so hopelessly in debt to, Burns, Philp and Carpenters that their owners were little better than unacknowledged managers. Just as the industry was recovering from the depression, the eruption of Matupit volcano caused more uncertainty. The Australian government decided to move the capital to Lae (on the New Guinea mainland) and business confidence in the Gazelle Peninsula slumped with the prospect of Rabaul being reduced to a transit port rather than remaining the shipping terminal and principal copra exporting port for New Guinea. The Japanese invasion of the Gazelle Peninsula severely damaged - if not completely ruined - many plantations. From a state of post-depression uncertainty the industry moved into almost total oblivion as palms were either destroyed in bombing raids, or cut down for airstrips^ while military installations were built on some plantations. Labourers and local villagers fled, and the abandoned plemtations quickly returned to jungle. Many European managers and their staff were captured by the Japanese; some were executed immediately, others allegedly died on the Montevideo Maru in the South China O Sea, some planters stayed on as coastwatchers and a few escaped to Australia. 1. e.g. Rapopo, Tobera, Vunakanau and Ratongor airstrips, see War Department Corps of Engineers U.S. Army. Rabaul B56/2 New Britain Provisional Map. First revision 1943. 2. see A.H. Sweeting, "Civilian wartime experiences in the territories of Papua and New Guinea", an appendix to Paul Hasluck, The Government and the people, 1942-1945. Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1970 330 Australia had committed herself to a mandate mainly because it was attracted by the apparent wealth and potential of New Guinea's coconut plantations - particularly those on the Gazelle Peninsula. But in disposing of them to (theoretically) returned Australian servicemen the government allowed men without experience, training or capital to commit themselves to ventures generally beyond their competence. The value of the plantations was not insignificant: of those sold by the Expropriation Board, 169 went to returned servicemen for a total purchase price of V3,345,027. Inevitably, the two major Australian firms of Burns, Philp and Carpenters acquired control of expropriated plantations and, in doing So, acquired control over virtually all of New Guinea's commercial life. Perhaps if the second World War had not intervened the manner in which control of the expropriated plantations largely shifted from returned servicemen to these two firms would have resulted in a Royal Commission - as McAlpine had suggested constantly since 1937 - to enquire into why this was allowed. This was not done, and those coconut plantations of the Gazelle Peninsula founded and nurtured by Germans and then expropriated by Australia were, like imperialism, not to die so much from natural causes ... . They were a casualty of the Second World War. There was to be a revival in the 1950s when world demand (and a guaranteed price from Britain) caused a copra boom for a few years which was followed by a decade of demand for cacao. But the real coconut plantation industry, and its colonial attitudes and lifestyle, had gone forever. Perhaps this was not a bad thing. 1. Schmokel, "Hard death of imperialism: German and British colonial attitudes, 1919-1939". p. 335 Kabakab Ptn Reiven Ptn Tamalili Ptn Bulung Ptn Kulon Ptn Mokurapau Ptn Put Put Ptn 68 Matala Ptn \ Induna Ptn Talilis Ptn GAZELLE PENINSULA M A P 11 ALLIED GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION 15th OCT. 1944 Plantation names generally follow contemporary spelling 770 Sum Sum Ptn Tol Ptn 332 Appendix A SUCCESSFUL TENDERERS FOR FIRST GROUP PROPERTIES j Hunts of Properties acquired and Os Amount or accepted Tenders for I u d Addresses of tfce Individual. or Upset Price - .n o wars smveesfai Tenderers for the such Properties. . o f f s e t . . r4 gunropeh ted Proparttn Property Sold. ^ tAs Mandated Territory cf New Guinea. Am ount of Name Property. at Accepted Tender. Plahtations. £ «. d. £ «. d. O k rM .. ' C 55,073 0 0 Kuradur .. 2,061 0 0 Jaek Chapman, e /o W. R. Carpenter end Palmalmal 2,174 0 0 On* 19 O’Conoell-street, Sydney. N.S.W.- ■ Maulapao .. 141,100 0 0 -j 5,471 0 0 Raniolo .. 15,775 0 0 Wangaramut.. 19,206 0 0 Neinduk .. _ 17,196 0 0 141.100 0 0 116,956 0 0 T. R. Jolley, Majestic Mansions, Fitxroy- Armwe .. 21,000 0 0 20,173 0 0 ■treet, St. Kilda, Victorie 8 .8 . Mackenzie, 22 Realyn-street, Brighton J Matanatar .. 13,000 0 0 13,051 4 8 Ablingi .. .. Beech, Victorie | 1,300 0 0 1,291 17 10 RavaUen .. .. 14,433 0 0 14,432 12 6 J. J. Gilmore, o /o Expropriation Board, Put Put and Warangoi 17,500 0 0 16,151 2 6 Rabaul, New Gninee E. J. Dengate, North-roed, Eastwood, Sydney, Kenabot .. .. 18,773 6 1 18,773 5 1 N.S.W. Vunakambi and > 5,520 0 0 T. V. Gerrett, o/o Expropriation Board, J 7,150 0 0 Bebanl, New Guinea • | Vunacoco J Vanin .. .. 12,450 0 0 12,565 3 6 J. 0 . Smith, Rabaul, New Guinea.. .. Wnoabogbug .. 9.500 0 0 3,671 13 6 Gavit . . .. 14,100 0 0 8,853 11 11 E, G. Hicks, Town Hall, Melbourne, Victoria j Galtum .. .. 5,000 0 0 3,006 18 3 J. Mac Lean, c /o Expropriation Board, Rangarere.. .. 3,500 0 0 3,191 2 2 Rabaul, New Guinea E. Roberts, Rabaul Hotel, Rabaul, New Nambung .. .. 3,100 0 0 2,148 6 4 Guinea * Karaibtt .. .. 1,050 0 0 668 0 0 Mioko InAbui R. K . Moore, Toma, New Guinea .. and Trading > 14,000 0 0 13,697 4 2 Stations ' J J. E. Sabine, Aitape, New Guinea .. Gonanur .. .. 15,000 0 0 14,140 8 4 V. B. Pennefather, Kavieng, New Guinea .. Tokua .. .. 13,100 0 0 12,541 7 7 H. L. C. Woolcott, Expropriation^Board, Kabanga .. .. 10,250 0 0 7,706 6 4 Rabaul, New Guinea T. Cutler and V. A. Pratt, 11 Park-street, Tobera .. .. 14,060 0 0 14,144 15 4 Middle Brighton B. W. Costello, Rabaul, New Guinea .. Gire Gire .. .. 11,594 0 0 11,594 1 1 W. L. Heron, c /o H. L. Heron, Commercial Tovakundum .. 14,115 3 5 14,115 3 5 Bank, Collins-street, Melbourne, Victoria C. Winand, Matandeduk, New Guinea .. Matandeduk .. 21.500 0 0 20,913 12 7 N. D. Mackay, Riversdaie-road, Middle Cam Vuuabere Tora- 12.500 0 0 3,880 15 I berwell , nakus J. M. Alcorn, Moss vale, N A W . .. .. Pondo .. .. .20,000 0 0 16,092 5 8 H. H. Geogbegan, Treasury Flats, Rabaul, Old Massawa .. 10,733 0 0 10,732 11 3 New Guinea CL G. Chaddenton, “ Inniafail," Booth-street, Kapsn .. .. 6,200 0 0 6,004 19 2 Arnecliff, Sydney W. R. Carpenter and Co. Ltd., 19 O’Connell- Matupi Farm .. 4,250 0 0 1,064 0 6 street, Sydney, N.S.W. J. Washington, Rabanl, New Guinea .. Kabaira .. .. 9,300 0 0 6,578 0 0 Neill, Rabaul, New Guinea .. .. Lassul .. .. 5,556 0 0 3,663 0 0 E. Peterson, Rabaul, New Guinea .. Guuterahohe .. 3,100 0 0 1,947 0 0 C. htullaly, Rabaul, New Guinea .. Natava .. .. 10,000 0 0 8,927 0 0 J. L. Peadon, Rabaul, New Guinea .. Upper Seeberg .. 175 0 0 100 (4 0 N. A. O'Dwyer, Rabaul, New Guinea .. New Massawa .. 12,100 0 0 9,361 0 0 E. J. Goodson, Manus ...... Mortlocks .. 3,684 0 0 1,842 0 0 (Custodian’s interest) source; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 114 1926. p. 4209 333 Appendix B SUCCESSFUL TENDERERS FOR SECOND GROUP PROPERTIES Vame of Property Price Names ami Addresses of finecesstul Tenderers. Sold. Upset Pzloe. Realized £ £ Melanesia Company Ltd., Cross Keys House, 56 Moorgate, Me to .. .. 46,729 73,000 London, E.C. Sir R. McC. Anderson, 19 WaHaeoy-road, Double Bay, Lama .. .. 39,000 56350 Sydney W. Baker, Rabaul Hotel, Rabsui ...... Laugu .. .. 40,177 45,000 H. T. Cold ham, care of W. R. Carpenter and Co., (Rabaul, Bali .. .. 26.209 32,300 JIG. Jaa. Burns, 7 Bridge-street, Sydney ...... Ningau - . 55,524 64,000 W . L. Heron, Tovakundum Estate, North Coast, Hia .. .. 30,499 30,127 Rabaul, N.G. Sir R . McC. Anderson, 19 WaHaroy-road, Double Bay, Virgin Laud, Witu 4,454 9.605 Stydney S * R. MoC. Anderson, 19 Wallaroy-road, Double Bay, Talasea .. 2,500 9,650 G. P. M. Thompson, Rabaul, N.G. .. Ibolri .. .. 12,000 14,500 L. F. D. Carter, Raibaul, N.G. .. / Tepisr -. 2,846 \ 16999 1 Tadji and Vaukan 3,686 ; Melanesia Company Ltd., Cross Keys House, 56 Moorgate, Aitape Head- 1,733 2,000 London, E.C. quarters F. A. Smith, care of Main Roads Board, Group 131, Panb .. .. 204 25 Heater, W.A. Melanesia Company Ltd.,Chose Keys Hoase, 56 Moosgate, Selee .. .. 2.656 W.000 London, EX!. W. A. Mossman, 5 Power-street, Balwyn, Victoria .. Suein .. .. 1,047 1,300 H. O. Fletcher and A. M. Davies, Madang, N.G. .. Walis .. .. 5,020 9,000 H. 0 . Norris, 34 Ocean-stseot, Kogaxah, N.S.W. .. Karawop .. 1,575 3,000 D. M. Forsyth, P.0. Box 4, Rabaul, N.G. .. .. Muschu .. 8,800 13,150 R. M. Glasson, Rabaul, NXr. . . .. j Boram 3,132 1 26,150 Munum and Brandi 15,830 | E. 3 . Waaehope, Rabaul, N.G...... Awar .. ... 15,419 30,000 C.M. Roaw, e/o Adams and Cooper, Rabaul, N.G. .. Nubia .. .. 5,712 20,000 L. W. Paekham, “ Maclean,” Gladstone-street, Behnore, Potsdsmhkfen .. 13,915 20,650 N.S.W. G. W. Tudberry, Potsdambafen Plantation, Madang, N.G. Kelaua ... 3.JH 7,200 G. W. Luff, Pembroke-street, Cairns, Queensland .. Dogumor .. 6,686 15950 S. W. Evans and others, e/o Hancock and Woodward, THerenap .. 1,495^) 331 Collins-street, Melbourne J Sarang .. 2,557 1 50,006 j Dyhxp .. 8 t f » f J Wjfclpg .. 9,333J W- F. Bennetts, Plunkettotreet, Drummoyne, N.S.W... Kul Kul .. 10.000 30,750 L .T . Howard, 71 Terraoe-road, Dulwich Hifl, N.S.W. -. Marangis .. 21,056 30,680 W. Middleton, c /o Bank of New South Wales, Rabaul, RuKH .. .. 14,350 22,590 NJ3. L. F. Howard, 71 Teizaea-ruad, Dulwich HUl, N.8.W . . - Kavilo ... 5334 ' 9,800 E. V. O’Brien, Madang, N.G...... Matukar .. 1,522 ’ 3,895 F. A. Page, 1 Adelaide-street, WooBahra, N.S.W. .. Siar .. .. 9,000 23,430 Mdanssia Company Ltd., Gross Keys House, 36 Moor Gamoi .. 585 600 gate, London, E.C. , T. A. Schilling, Madang, N.G. .. - . .. Matupi .. 1.5*2 ' 6,155 Sir R. McG. Anderson, 19 WaBaroy-road, Double Bay, Madang Store .. 3,700 26,205 Sydney E. V. O ’Brien, Madang, N.G. -. * ■. .. i WTagol .. w a n 9^00 \ Metro . . a,7oo; W. Southcott, Kokopo, via Rabaul, N.G. .. .. Erimabalen .. 3.649 12.050 R. McGregor, 12 Hardy-street, Bondi, Sydney, N.S.W. | Erimahush .. 4,7941 : 12,466 { Dual .. B A M f sources Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 115 1927. p. 944 334 SECOND GROUP PROPERTIES (contd.) £ £ O, W. Lad, Pembroke-street, Cairns, Queensland Bogadjim 13,119 20,100 g , O. .Hatcher and A. U. Davies, Madang, N.G. ( Melanin 4,9771 5,900 \ Cape Rigney 1,788/ W . 1L Middleton, Rabaul, N.G. .. .. Heimhote Spit 100 550 'Bukausip 642 1 25,500 P. E. Ifadigaa. Rabaul, N.G. .. .. Bulo .. 2,009 " Metahni 194 Singawa 7,859 J. Duncan, RaWul, NG. .. . ■ .. .. clapopo n ,2 7 i 18,400 W. E. Griffiths and G. H. Blaxland, 8 Glendon-road, Eurumut 10,420 13,905 Double Bay, Sydney J. A. Page, 1 Adeiaide-street, Woollahra, N.S.W. ■. Komalu 15,909 20,300 A. C. Sonunerville, Nelson-street, Gordon, N.S.W. .. Kolube 33,027 55,000 A. HcCouat, 270 W&rdell-road, MarriekviBe, N.S.W. .. Koka .. 12,463 21.200 H. Adams, Baiatd, N .G ...... Patlangat 5,168 10,500 W . E. Griffiths and G. H. Blaxland, 8 Glandon-road, Panaras 7,742 9,705 Doable Bay, Sydney ■ M. D. Less, Kokopo, via Babaoi. N.G. .. .. Lamemewei 1,484 4,167 C. E. P. Davis, Babaoi, N.G...... Sicacui.. i 2,373 8,050 B. S. Hore, Rabaul, N.G...... Laburua 4,905 10,000 TDjaul 16,720 1 W . G. D. MacPhersoa aad C, V. Tima, 34 Mona-road, -< Begail Group 10,639 V 71,520 Edgecliffe, N.S.W. 1 Lemus, &o. 29,881 J B. Perriman, Rabaul, N.G...... Selapui 4,866 10,709 I W. P. Barnetts, Plunkett-street, Drsmmoyne, N.S.W... Ungan Group 10.023 16,750 W . H. Wamock, c/o Smith and Emmerton, Bonrke-stmut, Panapai 11,616 25,000 Melbourne A. McCouat, 270 Wardell-road, Marrickville, N.S.W... Katu .. 1 «,621 .7,100 H . J, Murray, Kavieng, N.G...... Baia .. 8,831 15,640 H. J. Murray, Kaviang, N.G. ■. .. .. Lakuramau 15,096 19,700 J. 0. Robertson, “ Terida,” Rose Bay-avenue, Edge* Fileha .. 15,730 23,100 cKffe, Sydney J. 0. Robertson, “ Terida,’’ Rose Bay-avenue, Edge- Fissco .. 20,623 27,100 clifle, Sydney W . E . Grose, Rabaul, N G . • ■ ■ ■ ■. Libba Lossu 9,141 26,385 B. 0 . Mosatta, Rabaul, N.G. .. . ■ .. Lamussong 6,127 15,150 W. E. Griffiths and G. H. Blaxland, 8 Glendon-road, I Hilalon 15,1611 52,785 Double Bay, Sydney \Maritsaon 26,670 f I, . W. Oaraon, 17 Craigend-street, Darlinghurst, N.S.W. Eead Islands 40,545 40,000 C. A. E. Peterson, Guntershobe Ptn., via Rabaul, N.G. Lassul ■. 3,663 7,000 source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 115 1927. p. 945 335 Appendix C THIRD GROUP PROPERTIES A list of these properties (mainly trading stations, blocks of land and building allotments), and their purchasers, was not published. The Minister for Home and Territories (Mr C. Marr) supplied the following answer to a question in the House of Representatives seeking advice on which plantations (if any) remained unsold on completion of the sale of Third Group properties: No plantations were left unsold after tenders for the third and last group had been accepted. 1. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates v. 117 1928. p. 2968 336 Appendix D THE SEPIK RIVER EXPEDITION February 20th to March 10th, 1919 Disquieting information has been received by Administration Headquarters Rabaul... . Hostile tribes on the Sepik River were murdering, looting and burning villages. It was absolutely necessary to send an expedition as soon as possible, and on the 20th February two machine-gun sections, a three- pounder and crew, also 80 native police boys boarded the "Sumatra" at Rabaul and at Kokopo, leaving for these wild and unknown parts at 6 p.m. Information was obtained concerning savage hordes ... looting, burning and murdering among the dwellers of peaceful villages. ... everything pointed to the real necessity of what was needed - the strong hand. Itfe the only way to handle them, and we had to take firm hold right at the beginning... Early on the morning of the 24th February we sighted the entrance to the Sepik. Either bank presented a sea of wanton, prodigal vegetation. All about us were huge rooted trees, while coils and knotted climbers of the girth of a man's arm were thrown from lofty branch to lofty branch or hung in tangled mass like so many snakes. *Diis, then was the beginning of the mysterious, evil forest we would soon be penetrating — a charnel-house of silence. No time was lost in immediately attacking these cannibals, and upon a visit being made to Arguran village, ... we steamed towards Mongendo village where some of the worst cannibals on the river are to be found. Suddenly there was a wild chorus of warning cries from the police-boys as the village was seen a quarter of a mile away. No. 1 machine gun opened rapid fire to cover the advancing party.... A row of a dozen grass houses confronted us and each one was thoroughly searched for any lurking cannibal that may be hiding inside. Standing out more prominently than the rest was a huge king post carved into obscene and monstrous forms, half human and half animal. This was "House Tameran" or "Mystery House", where Death, swift, silent and terrible, surrounded one ■Die conduct of these savages take some understanding. They eat natives belonging to a village a few miles distant, and sooner or later, the eaters or some of their tribe are eaten. Strings of fish tails and half cleaned dog and crocodile skulls did not add to the wholesomeness of the place, and no one lingered longer than possibly he could help. Die startled utterance from one of the police boys caused a hurried exit towards a small 337 grass house, open sided, a mere rain shelter, under which a fire seemed to smoke excessively... Upon looking close we discovered the heads of the murdered blacks from Arguran village. They were fresh - the smoke curing had just begun, and save for the closed eyes, all the sullen and animal virility were plainly seen in their features. Here were these monstrous looking things dangling and twisting in the eddying smoke, who had oily 24 hours previously been living human beings. To locate the cannibals was anything but an easy task. The native police boys, whose heavy, muscular legs advertised their walking powers, and with scars of bullet cm* spear wounds on their bodies, were wild for a chance to get at the head hunters. Killing was their natural vocation and with glistening eyes, grinning faces, naked save for their loin cloths they entered the runaway - or trail leading from village to bush. It was useless to go further and the party returned to finish their work as far as the village was concerned, and in a few minutes Magendo was a mass of flames. These savages had to be taught that to eat tl^ r kind and take heads, although good morality few them, was not the white man's idea, and it had to cease. The village was burnt to the ground, and the guns trained cm another part of this village lying in swampy country behind it. Both the three-poimder and machine guns poured a hail of lead into it setting fire to and demolishing it utterly. The natives were seen on the banks as we passed close in towards the village, chattering like a lot of monkeys. They looked just what they were, human beings of a very low order. They were allowed to approach without any opposition but a state of preparedness was evident on board and we were ready for immediate action. The first code to be learned by the white man is never to show fear before savages and this was well carried out by all on board. Awangal village proved to be full of head hunters of the worst kind, and the three-pounder and the machine guns got busy on the village, doing considerable damage and after the usual landing and search, the village was burnt to the ground. 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Walter Ramsay McNicoll 1877-1947. Melbourne, private circ., 1973 MACPHERSON, R.K. Tropical fatigue. Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1949 MASTERMAN, Sylvia. The origins of international rivalry in Samoa 1845-1884. London, Allen & Unwin, 1934 MATCHES, Margaret. Savage paradise. New York, Doubleday, 1930 "MICHAEL". 75 glorious years. Vunapope, Catholic Mission, 1975 M1HALIC, F. Grammar and dictionary of neo-Melanesian. Techny, 111., Mission Press, 1957 MORE PACIFIC ISLANDS PORTRAITS, edited by Deryck Scarr. Canberra, Australian National University, 1978 MOUTON, Octave. The New Guinea memoirs of Jean Baptiste Mouton. edited, with an introduction by Peter Biskup. Canberra, Australian National University, 1974 MURRAY, A.W. Missions in Western Polynesia. London, Snow, 1863 MURRAY, J.H.P. Papua of Today. London, King, 1925 MURRAY, J.H.P. Papua or British New Guinea. London, Fisher Unwin, 1912 NELSON, Hyland Neil (Hank). Black, white and gold: goldmining in Papua New Guinea 1878-1930. Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1976 ORAL TRADITIONS IN MELANESIA, edited by Donald Denoon and Roderic Lacey. Port Moresby, The University of Papua New Guinea and the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1981 OSBORNE, Ernest. The plantation manager (a novel). Sydney, NSW Bookstall Co. Ltd., 1923 OVERELL, Lillian. A woman’s impression of German New Guinea. London, John Lane, 1923 PAPUA NEW GUINEA PORTRAITS: THE EXPATRIATE EXPERIENCE, edited by James Griffin. Canberra, Australian National University, 1978 342 PARKINSON, R.H. Dreissig Jahre in der Sttdsee. Stuttgart, Verlag von Strecker und Schroeder, 1907. (English translation "Thirty years in the South Seas; the Bismarck Archipelago - land, natives and customs" by N.C. Barry (typescript) held in library of (former) Department of Native Affairs & District Administration, Konedobu, Papua). PICTURESQUE TRAVELS NO. 4. Sydney, Burns Philp, 1914 POWELL, John H. The postal history of the Territory of New Guinea: from 1888 to 1942. Melbourne, Hawthorn, 1964 POWELL, Wilfred. Wanderings in a wild country. London, Sampson Low et.al., 1883 PREUSS, Paul. Die Kokospalme und ihre kultur. Berlin, Reimer, 1911 READINGS IN NEW GUINEA HISTORY, edited by B. Jinks et. al. Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1973 REED, Stephen Winsor. The making of modern New Guinea. Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1943 REEVES, L,C. Australians in action in New Guinea. Sydney, Penfold, 1915 RICHARDS, A. Practical planting in the Territory of New Guinea. Rabaul, n.p., 1951 ROBSON, R.W. Queen Emma; the Samoan-American girl who founded an empire in 19th century New Guinea. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1973 ROMILLY, H.H. Letters from the Western Pacific and Mashonaland. London, Nutt, 1893 ROWLEY, C.D. The Australians in German New Guinea. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1958 SACK, Peter G. Land between two laws; early European land acquisitions in New Guinea. Canberra, Australian National University, 1973 SCHMOKEL, Wolfe W. Dream of empire; German colonialism 1919-1945. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964 SCHNEE, H. The German colonies under the Mandates. Leipzig, Huelle & Mener, 1922 SCHNEE, Heinrich. German colonization past and future; the truth about the German colonies. London, Allen <5c Unwin, 1926 SCHOLEFIELD, Guy H. The Pacific, its past and future. London, Murray, 1919 343 SECOND WAIGANI SEMINAR: The History of Melanesia. Papers delivered at a seminar sponsored jointly by the University of Papua and New Guinea, the Administrative College of Papua and New Guinea, and the Council of New Guinea Affairs. Port Moresby, 1968. Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, and the University of Papua and New Guinea, Port Moresby, 1969 SHEARSTON, Trevor. Something in the blood. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1979 SINCLAIR, James. Kiap. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1981 SINCLAIR, James. Wings of gold: how the aeroplane developed New Guinea. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1978 SMITH, Woodruff D. The German colonial empire. Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina, 1978 SPOEHR, Florence Mann. White falcon: the house of Godeffroy and its commercial and scientific role in the Pacific. Palo Alto, Cal., Pacific Books, 1963 STANNER, W.E.H. The South Seas in transition: a study of post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction in three British Pacific dependencies. Sydney, Australasian Publishing Company, 1953 STEVENSON, R.L. A footnote to history: eight years of trouble in Samoa. London, Dawson, 1967 (reprint) STEVENSON, William. The ghosts of Africa. New York, Harcourt, 1980 STEWART’S HANDBOOK OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 1912. Sydney, McCarron, Stewart, 1912 STEWART'S HANDBOOK OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 1918. compiled by Percy S. Allen. Sydney, McCarron, Stewart, 1918 STEWART'S HANDBOOK OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 1920. A reliable guide to all the inhabited islands of the Pacific Ocean for traders, tourists and settlers, with a bibliography of island works (by Percy S. Allen). Sydney, McCarron, Stewart. 1920 STUART, Robert. Nuts to you! Sydney, Wentworth, 1977 STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN AFFAIRS, edited by Persia Campbell et. al. Melbourne, Macmillan, 1928 Taim bilong Masta. a series of cassettes produced and presented by Tim Bowden. Australian Broadcasting Commission, 1981 THRELFALL, Neville. One hundred years in the islands: the Methodist/United Church in the New Guinea Islands Region, 1875-1975. Rabaul, United Church, 1975 344 TOWNSEND, G.W.L. District Officer: from untamed New Guinea to Lake Success, 1921-1946. Sydney, Pacific Publications, 1968 TOWNSEND, Mary Evelyn. The rise and fall of Germany's colonial empire 1884 1918. New York, Fertig, 1966 WAWN, William T. The South Sea islanders and the Queensland labour trade, edited, with an introduction by Peter Corris. Canberra, Australian National University, 1973 WEST, Francis. Hubert Murray: the Australian pro-consul. Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1968 WEST, Francis. Selected letters of Hubert Murray. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1970 WESTERN SAMOA: LAND, LIFE AND AGRICULTURE IN TROPICAL POLYNESIA. edited by James W. Fox and Kenneth B. Cumberland. Christchurch, N.Z., Whitcombe & Tombs, 1962 WHAT DO WE DO ABOUT PLANTATIONS? edited by M. Walter. Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research Monograph no. 15. Boroko, The Institute, 1981 WHITTAKER, J.L. et. al. Documents and readings in New Guinea history; prehistory to 1889. Milton, Q., Jacaranda, 1975 WILKINSON, B.A. & R.K. Wilson. The main line fleet of Burns Philp. Canberra, The Nautical Association of Australia Inc., 1981 WILLIAMS, Ronald G. The United Church in Papua, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. Rabaul, Trinity, ?1972 345 ARTICLES BENNETT, Judith A. "Oscar Svensen: a Solomons trader among ’the few"' in The Journal of Pacific History, vol. XVI, no. 4, October 1981. pp. 170/189 BISKUP, Peter. "Dr Albert Hahl - sketch of a German colonial official" in The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. XXIV, no. 3, December 1968. pp. 342/357 BISKUP, Peter. "Foreign coloured labour in German New Guinea" in The Journal of Pacific History, volume five, 1970. pp. 85/107 BISKUP, Peter. "Hahl at Herbertshohe, 1896-1898: the genesis of German native administration in New Guinea" in Second Waigani Seminar: The History of Melanesia. Papers delivered at a seminar sponsored jointly by the University of Papub and New Guinea, the Administrative College of Papua and New Guinea, and the Council of New Guinea Affairs. Port Moresby, 1968. Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, Canberra, and the University of Papua and New Guinea. Port Moresby, 1969 BOLLARD, A.E. "The financial adventures of J.C. Godeffroy and Son in the Pacific" in The Journal of Pacific History, vol. XVI, no. 1, January 1981. pp. 3/19 BOLTON, G.C. "The rise of Burns Philp 1873-1893" in A. Birch and D.S. MacMillan (eds), Wealth and Progress: Studies in Australian Business History. Sydney, 1967 BURTON, J.R. "The Australian mandate in New Guinea" in Studies in Australian Affairs, edited by Persia Campbell, et. al. Melbourne, Macmillan, 1928 CAULFIELD-KELLY, E.T. "Quality and reputation in copra from the market viewpoint" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, vol. 3, no. 2, December 1937. pp. 32/42 CAULFIELD-KELLY, E. "Suggestions for the improvement of New Guinea copra - bagging and shipment" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, vol. 5, no. 2, June 1939. pp. 10/15 CHURCHILL, William. "Germany's lost Pacific empire" in The Geographical Review, August 1920. pp. 84/90 CILENTO, Raphael. "The New Guinea eruption of May, 1937" in The Historical Society of Queensland Journal, vol. HI, no. 1, December 1937. pp. 37/49 COOKE, F.C. "Copra deterioration during storage and shipment" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, vol. 6, no. 3, November 1940. pp. 6/15 "Copra again" in The Rabaul Record, vol. 2, no. 4, 1 April 1917 DAWS, Gavan. "On being a historian of the Pacific" in Historical disciplines and culture in Australasia: an assessment, edited by John A. Moses. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1979 346 Documents Fifth Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations. Data paper. "Labour conditions in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea" by Margot Hentze and S.H. Roberts, vol. VIII, Banff, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1933 DWYER, R.E.P. "A survey of the coconut industry in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, vol. 2, no. 2, October 1936 (whole issue) FIRTH, S.G. "The New Guinea Company 1885-1899: a case of unprofitable imperialism" in Historical Studies, vol. 15, no. 59, October 1972. pp. 361/377 FIRTH, Stewart. "Albert Hahl: Governor of German New Guinea" in Papua New Guinea portraits - the expatriate experience. James Griffin, editor. Canberra, Australian National University, 1978 FIRTH, Stewart. "Captain Hernsheim - Pacific venturer, merchant prince" in More Pacific Island Portraits, edited by Deryck Scarr. Canberra, Australian National University, 1978 FIRTH, Stewart. "German firms in the Western Pacific Islands" in The Journal of Pacific History, Vol. Eight, 1973. pp. 10/28 FIRTH, Stewart. "The transformation of the labour trade in German New Guinea, 1899-1914" in The Journal of Pacific History, vol. XI, 1976 Part I. pp. 51/65 FIRTH, Stewart G. "German firms in the Pacific Islands, 1857-1914" in Germany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870-1914. edited by John A. Moses and Paul M. Kennedy. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1977. pp. 3/25 GAM MAGE, Bill. "Oral and written sources" in Oral tradition in Melanesia, edited by Donald Denoon and Roderic Lacey. Port Moresby, The University o f Papua New Guinea and the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, 1981 GAMMAGE, Bill. "The Rabaul Strike 1929" in The Journal of Pacific History, vol. 10, 1975. pp. 3/29 GREEN, M.D. The problems of a labour supply for plantation agriculture in the Solomon Islands, 1908-1912. Long essay in partial fulfillment of the requirements of a Master of Arts degree, University of Auckland, 1974 GROVES, William C. "Life on a coconut plantation" in Walkabout, 1 July 1935. pp. 33/36 HEMPENSTALL, Peter J. "The reception of European missions in the German Pacific Empire: the New Guinea experience" in The Journal of Pacific History, vol. ten, 1975. pp. 46/64 HUDSON, W.J. "New Guinea mandate: the view from Geneva" in Second Waigani Seminar: the history of Melanesia. Papers delivered at a seminar sponsored jointly by the University of Papua and New Guinea, the Administrative College of Papua and New Guinea, and the Council of New Guinea Affairs. Port Moresby, 1968. Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, Canberra, and the University of Papua and New Guinea. Port Moresby, 1969 347 HUNTLEY, W.R. "Vunakabi Industrial Mission" in The Missionary Review, August 6, 1934. pp. 17/20 JACOBS, Marjorie. "German New Guinea" in Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea (Volume A-K). Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1972 JACOBS, Marjorie. "The New Guinea Company" in Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea, vol. 1 A-K. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1972 Journal of the House of Representatives, New Zealand, vol. 1, 1874. Papers relating to South Sea Islands, A.3. Memorandum by H.B. Sterndale - "Memorandum by Mr Sterndale on some of the South Sea Islands", pp. 1/55. Wellington, Government Printer, 1874 LEYSER, J. "Title to land in the Trust Territory of New Guinea" in The Australian Yearbook of International Law, 1965. Butterworths, Sydney, 1966 LOUIS, Wm. R. "Australia and the German colonies in the Pacific 1914-1919" in The Journal of Modern History, vol. 38, no. 4, December 1966. pp. 407/421 LYNG, J. "How to be a coconut planter" in Rabaul Record, 1 August 1916 MCLENNAN, a . "The population problem of New Guinea" in The Australian Quarterly, vol. X, no. 1, March 1938. pp. 44/52 McNICOLL, R.R. "Sir Walter McNicoll as Administrator of the Mandated Territory" in Second Waigani Seminar; The History of Melanesia. Papers delivered at a seminar sponsored jointly by the University of Papua and New Guinea, the Administrative College of Papua and New Guinea, and the Council of New Guinea Affairs. Port Moresby, 1968. Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, Canberra, emd the University of Papua and New Guinea. Port Moresby, 1969 MOSES, John A. "The coolie labour question and German colonial policy in Samoa, 1900-1914" in The Journal of Pacific History, vol. 8, 1973. pp. 101/124 MUNZ, PETER. "Cast a cold eye" in Historical disciplines and culture in Australasia: an assessment, edited by John A. Moses. St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1979 MURRAY, George H. "Outbreak of Promecotheca Antigua - Lindenhafen Estate" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, vol. 3, no. 2, December 1937. pp. 1/12 MURRAY, G.H. "Pawpaws (or PAPAYAS)" in New Guinea Agricultural Gazette, vol. 4, no. 2, April 1938. pp. 37/38 OSBORNE, Ernest. "Australia and the Pacific Mandates; the position of Germany and Japan" in The Defender, vol. 1, no. 1, July 1936. pp. 53/63 POLANSKY, A.E. "Rabaul" in South Pacific Bulletin, vol. 16, 1966. pp. 42/47 348 RADI, Heather. "New Guinea under mandate 1921-1941" in Australia and Papua New Guinea, edited by W.J. Hudson. Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1971. p. 85 ROWLEY, C.D. "The area taken over from the Germans and controlled by the A.N.M.E.F." in South Pacific, vol. 7, no. 9, April 1954. pp. 824/839 ROWLEY, C.D. "Native officials and magistrates in German New Guinea, 1897 1921" in South Pacific, vol. 7, no. 8, January-February 1954. pp. 772/782 ROWLEY, C.D. "The promotion of native health in German New Guinea" in South Pacific, vol. 9, no. 3, March-April 1957. pp. 391/399 SACK, Peter G. "Law, politics and native 'crimes' in German New Guinea" in Germany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870-1914. edited by John A. Moses and Paul M. Kennedy. St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1977 SAXBY, K.A. "The baron of Maron" in The Bulletin. December 5, 1956 SCHMOKEL, Wolfe W. "The hard death of imperialism: German and British colonial attitudes, 1919-1939" in Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial rivalry and colonial rule, edited by Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967. pp. 301/336 SMITH, Gaddis. "The British government and the disposition of the German colonies in Africa, 1914-1918" in Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial rivalry and colonial rule, edited by Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967. pp. 275/300 "Statement by New Guinea Planters' and Traders' Association to the Commonwealth Government" in F.W. Eggleston, The Australian Mandate for New Guinea. Melbourne, Macmillan in association with the Melbourne University Press, 1928 SWEETING, A.H. "Civilian wartime experiences in the territories of Papua and New Guinea", an appendix to Paul Hasluck, The government and the people, 1942-1945. Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1970 TOWNSEND, Gordon. "Land settlement in New Guinea" in The Australian Quarterly, no. 32, December 1936. pp. 49/54 VARPIAM, Theo and R.T. Jackson. "Rabaul" in An introduction to the urban geography of Papua New Guinea, edited by Richard Jackson. Port Moresby, University of Papua New Guinea Department of Geography Occasional Paper No. 13. March 1976 WILTGEN, Ralph M. "Catholic Mission plantations in mainland New Guinea: their origin and purpose" in Second Waigani Seminar: The History of Melanesia. Papers delivered at a seminar sponsored jointly by the University of Papua and New Guinea, the Administrative College of Papua and New Guinea, and the Council of New Guinea Affairs. Port Moresby, 1968. Research School of Pacific Studies, the Australian National University, Canberra, and the University of Papua and New Guinea. Port Moresby, 1969 349 WU, David Yen-Ho. "To kill three birds with one stone: the rotating credit associations of the Papua New Guinea Chinese" in American Ethnologist, vol. 1, no.3, August 1974. pp. 565/584 350 PAPERS - PERSONAL AND/OR UNPUBLISHED ARCHER, F.P. Various papers, including letters, notes, press clippings, reports, photographs, drafts of material (for books?, articles?), maps and illustrated material on Wuvulu islands. In the possession o f his niece, Brisbane. BEAZLEY, R.A. New Guinea adventure. (Typewritten manuscript of adventures in the Territory o f New Guinea from ca.1920 to ca.1935). Beazley Collection, Fryer Memorial Library of Australian Literature, University of Queensland Library CAHILL, P.H. The Chinese in the Bismarck Archipelago. Seminar paper, UPNG, 1973 CAHILL, P.H. The Chinese in Kaiser Wilhelmsland. Seminar paper, UPNG, 1973 CILENTO, Raphael. "Draft report of the medical significance of the recent eruption in Blanche Bay, Territory of New Guinea". Rabaul, July 1937. Cilento Collection, Fryer Memorial Library of Australian Literature, University of Queensland Library GRUNDLER MEMORIAL: translation of a memorial referring to the German New Guinea Budget for 1915, 1916 and 1917. Dated 28th February 1915 and signed by Grundler (an Assistant Secretary of the German Administration) KLUG, Dr. Joseph. Letter of 5th August 1962 to Crown Solicitor, Rabaul. (written at Catholic Mission, Vunapope. Klug was District Officer, Herbertshohe, until he moved to Rabaul in 1909) LATHAM Papers. National Library of Australia. MS1009/297454. Secret memorandum on the Pacific, 23 July 1918 LUTTON, Nancy F. The Kwato community: Mission industrial education and plantations. University of Papua New Guinea and Department of Primary Industry "History of Agriculture" Discussion Paper no. 28. Waigani, UPNG, 1970 MILLER, Lulu. Reminiscences. typescript manuscript 1964. New Guinea Collection, UPNG Library MURRAY, George H. Letter of 14 September 1937 to Prime Minister of Australia. Cilento Collection, Fryer Memorial Library of Australian Literature, University of Queensland Library RICHARDS, A.A. Various papers, including rough "diary" of occupations 1915/1916; notes on copra and cocoa production; lists of former German properties in New Guinea and current owners (ca. 1962/1963). In possession of Mrs C. Bailey, Gold Coast, Queensland SACK, Peter G. Black through coloured glasses: a mosaic of traditional Tolai leaders, typewritten manuscript, Canberra, 1976 THE SEPIK RIVER EXPEDITION, February 20th to March 10th, 1919. author unknown (? J. Lyng). Richards papers. 351 SMITH, S.S. Notes on Tolai land law and custom, stencil. Kokopo, Native Lands Commission, 1961 WAYNE, R.N., pp. 76/98 "The Volcanic eruption in Rabaul 1937" from Notes and photos from journal of R.N. Wayne prepared by Mrs Helen Wayne. (R.N. Wayne was a resident of Rabaul and area 1924/1942, originally with the Methodist Mission at Ulu on the Duke of York Islands, and later with the New Guinea Administration. With the exception of this extract, all his journal material was lost during the Japanese invasion of Rabaul in January 1942) WESLEYAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY. A great mission scheme, (typewritten manuscript concerning settlement and work scheme on Island of Ulu, Duke of York group, New Britain), ca.1897. held in Alexander Turnbull Library, National Library of New Zealand, Wellington 352 THESES BREDMEYER, T.R. The registration of land in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983 CAHILL, P.H. The Chinese in Rabaul, 1914-1960. (MA thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1973) COUPER, A.D. The island trade: an analysis of the environment and operation of seaborne trade among three island groups in the Pacific. (Ph.D thesis, Australian National University, 1967) GIBBS, H.T. The laws of the Territory of New Guinea - their constitutional source and basic content. (LLM thesis, University of Queensland, 1945) HOPPER, Patricia Wiseman. Kicking out the Hun: a history of the Expropriation Board of the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, 1920-1927. (MA thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1980) IRWIN, P.G. Land use in the Blanche Bay area of New Britain. (MA thesis, University of Newcastle (NSW), 1973) LEADLEY, A.J. A history of the Japanese occupation of the New Guinea islands, and its effects, with special reference to the Tolai people of the Gazelle Peninsula. (MA thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1973) PIERARD, Richard Victor. The German Colonial Society, 1882-1914. (Ph.D thesis, State University of Iowa, 1964) POWER, Anthony Patrick. A study of development in Niugini from 1880 to 1940. (MA thesis, University of Papua New Guinea, 1974) TATE, Russell S. Plantation production in the Pacific area. (MA thesis, Duke University, 1940) VALENTINE, Charles A. An introduction to the history of changing ways of life on the island of New Britain. (Ph.D thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1958) 353 ARCHIVAL MATERIAL AUSTRALIAN ARCHIVES, CANBERRA: Series CRS A1 CP146. Department of Home & Territories Correspondence files. Annual single number series. item 23/2018 Dr Hahl and Rudolf Wahlen - seeking entry to New Guinea 23/6377 Valuation of coconut plantations 23/17117 Disposal of copra in New Guinea (Expropriation) 23/22237 Expropriation Board Staff, New Guinea 25/17935 K. Rundnagel - Expropriation and return to New Guinea NG23/31 Agriculture. Copra buying. Plantations. New Guinea Series CRS A2 CP 146. Prime Minister’s Dept. - File of Papers (annual single number series) item 18/39 "Copra” Series CRS A2 CP146. Records of the Dept, of the Interior. General correspondence 1901-1943. item 20/2787 Trading with the enemy - enquiries and advices re firms in Australia - New Guinea Series CRS A4. Department of Home <5c Territories item NG24/9 Plantations in New Guinea 1918-1919 NG24/12 Correspondence re attempt by Burns Philp to secure agencies of German Companies in New Guinea. 1915-1918 NG24/21 Correspondence re food supplies to Rabaul during shipping strike and export of copra to Singapore. 1920 Series CRS CP176/83. The Office of the Public Trustee emd Custodian of Expropriated Property. Subject Index to General Correspondence of the Public Trustee. item A314 "Melanesia Company Limited. Application to charge its rights under contracts of sale in favour of the British and International Trust Limited, and appointment of Receiver on behalf Debenture Holders", 1928-1931 Series CRS A456. Department of the Treasury. item 650/4 Territory of New Guinea. Administration - Central. Employees wives and families admission to the Territory. 354 item 720/7 Territory of New Guinea Administration - Law Dept. - German law applicable in New Guinea V3/19 Returned Soldiers. Preference to Returned Soldiers in Rabaul Series CRS A456. Department of External Affairs. item G118/7 New Guinea. Expropriation properties - letters for transmission to Treasury Department Series CRS A458 ? Department of the Treasury. item G118/7 Summary of statement made by unidentified person to Mr Brown, Special Magistrate, Rabaul. Series CRS A518. Department of Territories. item C.46 "Charging Agreements - Approval by the Custodian (1929— 1936)" F824/1 Part I "Dummying in Expropriated Properties 1929" F824/1 Part II "Dummying in Expropriated Properties 1929" G812/1/1 Part I "Territories, General. Commerce, Copra Prices" Series CRS A571. Department of the Treasury. Correspondence File, Annual Single Number Series item 29/1555 "Report on questionable transactions in office of Custodian", 1929 29/4348 "New Guinea Plantations", 1919-1930 Series CRS A1781. Custodian of Expropriated Property. Correspondence File. A Series item A77 Claims of shortages 1926-1931 A99 "Balance sheet of the Custodian as at 30th June 1928 (1921— 1929)" A136 Accounts for NG Gazette Notices, 1925-1930 A191 Melanesia Company Limited. (1926-1929) A234 Nerein der Enteigneten Deutschen aus N[ew] Guinea, 1930 1931 A238 Property payments - Demands on WRC[arpenter ] and B[urns ] P[hilp](C34). (1930-1933) 355 item A232 Sales by dummying (1926-1932) Part 1 A232 Sales by dummying (1929-1934) Part 2 Series CRS A1782. Department of Territories, Custodian of Expropriated Property Correspondence File, C Series. item C28 Information re Titles (1928-1939) C37 "Moratorium - Suspension of payments on Expropriated Part 1 Properties", 1920-1930 C39 ("Expropriated Property in New Guinea"), 1930-1944 C42 Interest rates payable on purchase of expropriated properties (1931-1933) C57 "a) Shortage of palms, b) Native Rights", 1927-1935 C58 Titles N lew ] G tuinea] (1918-1932) Part 4 C83 "Transfer of Titles where Interests of purchaser have been transferred to one or more sub-purchasers", 1938-1939 C92 Copies of correspondence from Sale Files sent to Delegate Part 1 at Rabaul, Part 1 (1928-1941) C92 Fire at Rabaul, Part 2 (1933; 1939-1941) Part 2 C100 Volcanic Eruption - Rabaul. Relief to North Coast Planters 1937-1938 C102 W.R. Carpenter & Co. Pty. Ltd. C103 Properties re-possessed by the Custodian (May-June 1941) C105 Position of Delegate and Staff Series CRS A3934. Department of Defence item SC12(19) Secret memorandum of 23 May 1917 from Brigadier-General Hubert Foster to Secretary, Department of Defence Series (unnumbered) Individual plantations, New Guinea item S186 Maulapao plantation 356 PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1914-15-16-17. vol. 2. "Rabaul - Alleged misuse of Red Cross gifts, and looting by military officers and privates - report on, by Hon. W.M. Hughes, Attorney-General". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1917. pp. 369/378 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament (and ordered to be printed). Session 1914-15-16-17. vol. V. "The War. Returned soldiers: recommendations of Federal Parliamentary War Committee on Employment, 1915". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1917. pp. 1453/1455 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1920-21. vol. in . "Interim and final reports of Royal Commission on late German New Guinea". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1920. pp. 1539/1624 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1922. vol. II. "Report by the Minister of State for Defence on the Military Occupation of the German New Guinea possessions". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1922. pp. 1/24 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1923-24. vol. 4. "New Guinea - statement of accounts of the Expropriation Board for 1922-23". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1924. pp. 1329/1332 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1923-24. vol. 4. "General report by A.R. Cobcroft on the Expropriated Plantations in the Mandated Territory of ex-German New Guinea". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1917. pp. 1265/1328 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1923-24. vol. 4. "Report of expropriated properties and businesses by Yarwood, Vane and Co., with G. Mason Allard; together with comments thereon by Walter H. Lucas, Chairman of the Expropriation Board, and comments by F.R. Jolley, Deputy Chairman of the Expropriation Board, accompanied by a copy of a report by H.W. Simmonds, acting Government Entomologist for Fiji". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1924. pp. 1235/1328 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1923-24. vol. 4. "Report of inquiry into allegations of flogging and forced labour of natives" by A.S. Canning. Melbourne, Government Printer, 1924. pp. 1217/1234 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1923-24. vol. 4. "Report by Colonel John Ainsworth, CMG, CBE, DSO, on Administrative arrangements and matters affecting the interests of natives in the Territory of New Guinea". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1924. pp. 1819/1861 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1927-28. vol. II. "Report of Auditor-General". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1928. pp. 431/456 357 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1929. vol. IE. "Report of Auditor-General". Melbourne, Government Printer, 1929. pp. 61/74 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1937-38-39-40. vol. HI. "Report of Committee appointed to investigate new site for the administrative head-quarters of the Territory of New Guinea". 27th April 1938. Canberra, Government Printer, 1938. pp. 669/709 Australia. Commonwealth. Papers presented to Parliament - General. Session 1937-38-39-40. vol. HI. "Report of Committee appointed to survey the possibility of establishing a combined Administration of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea, and to make a recommendation as to a capital site - 1) for the combined administration if that is favoured; or 2) for the Territory of New Guinea if the retention of separate Administrations is recommended. August 1939. Canberra, Government Printer, 1939. pp. 711/773 358 REPORTS - LAW "Mainka v. the Custodian of Expropriated Property" in Commonwealth Law Reports 1923-24. Melbourne, The Law Book Company of Australia, 1924. pp. 297/305 "Tolain, Tapalau, Michael Towarunga and other villagers of Latlat village v. the Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. In re Vulcan land" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1965-66. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. "Custodian of Expropriated Property v. Director of District Administration (Re Tonwalik)" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1969-70. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. "Custodian of Expropriated Property v. Director of District Administration (Re Wangaramut)" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1969-70. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. "Director of Native Affairs v. Custodian of Expropriated Property (Re Admosin Island)" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971-72. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. "Custodian of Expropriated Property v. Commissioner of Native Affairs (Re Jomba Plain)" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971-72. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. Judgment: "Custodian of Expropriated Property and Phoebe Kroening v. Commissioner of Native Affairs (Re Mortlock Islands)" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971-72. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. "Director of District Administration v. Methodist Overseas Mission Trust Association. In Re Vunagamata" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971- 72. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. "The Sacred Heart Mission (New Britain) Property Trust v. Numbumutka/Simbali and Another. In Re Toriu" in Papua New Guinea Law Reports 1971-72. Sydney, Law Book Company, n.d. 359 REPORTS - GENERAL Australia. Commission of Inquiry under the National Security (Inquiries) Regulations and National Security (General) Regulations into the circumstances relating to the suspension of the Civil Administration of the Territory of Papua in February, 1942. Report by J.V. Barry, K.C., (Commissioner), 1944-45. n.d., n.p. (stencilled copy provided by Australian Archives, Canberra) Australia. Interstate Commission of Australia. Report: British and Australian trade in the South Pacific. Melbourne, Government Printer, 1924 United Nations. Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Nauru and New Guinea, 1962. New York, United Nations Organisation, 1962 360 N E WSP AP ERS/ JO U RN ALS issues of: Brisbane Courier Rabaul Record Rabaul Times Smith's Weekly Sydney Morning Herald Sydney Sun The Bulletin Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates The Defender Great Britain Parliamentary Debates The Journal of Modern History The Journal of Pacific History New Guinea Gazette Pacific Islands Monthly 361 MAPS Der NBrdliche Teil der Gazelle-Halbinsel 1 : 100 000 Unter Zugrundelegung der Aufnahmen von Wilhelm Wernicke u. S.M.S. Mftwe gezeichnet von F. Bischoff unter Leitung von M. Moisei (Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebeiten, Band XXI, 1908) The Town of Rabaul prepared by Chief, Division of Surveys, Department of Lands Surveys & Mines, Port Moresby, ca.1965 War Department Corps of Engineers U.S. Army Blanche Bay S415-E15200/15 War Department Corps of Engineers U.S. Army Duke of York B56/2 New Britain Provisional map War Department Corps of Engineers U.S. Army Gazelle S415-E15215/15 New Britain Provisional map War Department Corps of Engineers U.S. Army Rabaul B56/2 New Britain Provisional map First revision 1943