Tanzania and the Pan African Quest for Unity, Freedom, and Independence in East, Central, and Southern Africa: The Case of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and the Central Africa/Pan African Freedom Movement for East Central and South Africa
by
Azaria Mbughuni, Ph.D. [email protected] Assistant Professor of History Spelman College, Atlanta, Georgia
Abstract
The Pan African struggle for unity, freedom, and independence was intensified in East, Central, and Southern Africa with the establishment of Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in 1958. The Organization changed its name to Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) in 1962 to include southern African countries. The organization has been mostly ignored by scholars and is seen as having accomplished very little. Closer examination of PAFMECA/PAFMECSA shows that the organization helped advance the struggle for freedom and independence. The organization provided a platform for independence movements from different countries to coordinate their activities and build unity. The organization initiated numerous successful campaigns. One example is the boycott South Africa campaign. The organization initiated the boycott South Africa Boycott campaign in the region and eventually implemented the campaign in Tanganyika (Tanzania) and Kenya. PAFMECSA’s campaign to unite independence groups from Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and efforts made to put pressure on the British colonial government to set a date for Legislative Council elections was a success; the election would allow the African nationalists to gain control of the legislative body and set motion towards independence. While the organization carried out successful campaigns to advance the independence movements, efforts made to establish regional unity through political Federation were unsuccessful. This failure was partly the result of outside interference.
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The Pan Africanist former President of Tanzania (then Tanganyika), Julius K. Nyerere argued in a paper entitled “United States of Africa,” in 1963 that African unity already existed in one sense; he asserted that this unity existed in the “sentiment of ‘African-ness’a feeling of mutual involvement, which pervades all the political and cultural life of the continent.”1 Nyerere would go on to make a strong case for African unity. He warned that “African nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic, and dangerous, if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism.” Indeed, Nyerere was a committed Pan Africanist. And as such, he helped launch the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) in 1958. The organization broadened its scope to include Southern Africa and changed the name to Pan African Freedom Movement for East Central and South Africa (PAFMECSA) in 1962. The founding members of the organization espoused a regional approach to coordinating independence struggle and building unity. Nyerere and Tom Mboya of Kenya came to the conclusion that regional unity was the building block for the establishment of a United States of Africa. Before such a goal could be established, Africans leaders in East and Central Africa had to come together to coordinate their activities to remove the yoke of colonialism and apartheid. PAFMECSA was the most powerful regional organization working to win freedom and independence in east, central, and southern Africa between 1958 and 1964. For the east African leaders like Nyerere and Mboya, the Pan-African movement and Pan-African nationalism were not mutually exclusive. As the Chairman of PAFMECA in 1960 and as the President of Tanganyika after December 9, 1961, Nyerere pushed for the idea of East African Federation; he wanted to establish a Federation made up of Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar, and Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi). Nyerere’s strategy was to start with regional unity and eventually establish the “United States of Africa” as he argued eloquently in 1963. PAFMECA, therefore, helped advance the independence movements in the region and provided a platform for building regional unity with the ultimate goal of establishing continental unity.
Independence groups from east, central and southern Africa came together under the umbrella of PAFMECA for the first time in September of 1958. By linking up independence movements from neighboring territories, Nyerere hoped that the organization would provide leaders with a platform to begin to think about eventually uniting their territories. However, the first priority was to work towards winning independence. PAFMECSA was an organization established to provide nationalists with a platform to share ideas, resources, and assert political pressure to end colonialism and apartheid. The colonial regimes worked diligently to suppress this body; they saw it as a threat to their interests.
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The British colonial administrators in Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Uganda, Kenya, and Zanzibar cooperated to undermine the work of the organization. It was because of PAFMECA’s program of unity, mutual support, and the commitment of its leaders to use Pan Africanism as a tool for liberation, that the organization became a formidable force in the fight for freedom and independence in the region. The organization helped bring together rival groups in Zanzibar, it pushed for a successful campaign to boycott South African goods, helped advance the struggle for independence in Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and finally after 1960, pushed for regional federation. The organization provides an example of how the Pan Africanism helped bring together groups from different territories to fight for independence and unite.
PAFMECA was the most important regional organization in East, Central Africa, and southern Africa between 1958 and 1964. Scholars have not paid much attention to this organization. PAFMECA/PAFMECSA has been relegated to the footnotes and is mostly considered to have accomplished very little. The organization was started in Tanzania (then Tanganyika). Historians of southern Africa and Tanzania in particular, devote very little attention to this regional body. Two history books on Tanzania, one edited volume by I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu and another book by John Illife, mostly overlook PAFMECA/PAFMECSA.2 Numerous writers studying the Organization of African Unity (OAU) examine PAFMECA/PAFMECSA briefly. Most of these studies tend to dismiss the organization as inconsequential. Mahmoud H. Fagal discuses PAFMECA in his thesis on the OAU’s African Liberation Committee (ALC). He asserts that PAFMECA achieved very little.3 Another author, A.F. Addona, argues that PAFMECSA was more “symbolic than substance, “he adds that “it initiated many resolutions but implemented very few.”4 More recently, Peter Ateh-Afac Fossungu briefly compared PAFMECA and Kamerun Idea from Cameroon. He argues that PAFMECA was built “only on a highly personalized coincidence of the personal visions and ambitions..” Fossungu adds that such organizations came as the result of the work of “a very small handful of leaders known for intriguing and twisting plain facts to serve their self-centeredness.” 5 By focusing on the analysis of the motivations of the leaders, Fossungu fails to address the accomplishments of PAFMECA, even if one accepts the assertion that the leaders did it for selfish reasons.
There are numerous authors who view PAFMECA/PAFMECSA as an organization that made important contributions. Colin Legum argued that PAFMECA was the only effective political organization as a co-ordinating body in the continent before OAU was established.6 Alfred T. Moleah argued that PAFMECA provided positive influence towards greater African unity through their political program. He asserts that the organization allowed liberation groups to be active participants in determining the agenda.7 More recently, Issa G. Shivji examined PAFMECA as it mostly relates to campaigns in Zanzibar. He analyzes PAFMECA’s involvement in the tension between Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP).8
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Shivji also contributes to our understanding of Nyerere’s East African Federation project. Lastly, he provides an insightful analysis on the differences between Nyerere and Nkrumah on achieving “United States of Africa.” Shivji does not examine the administrative makeup of the organization or the success it had in advancing the struggle outside of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. None of the authors pay attention to the overall impact of the organization in the region. The only exception to this is the books by Richard Cox and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Cox is the only study that has focused solely on PAFMECA/PAFMECSA; his book Pan Africanism in Practice: An East African Study; PAFMECSA, 1958-1964 was published fifty years ago in 1964.9 This seminal book provides useful details of the organization and documents both the success and failure of the organization. This book is informative, but it is now outdated. Nye argues that PAFMECA was important, but did have limitations. For Nye, the organization was a important because it provided an avenue for leaders to discuss ideas and strategize.10 The lacuna left on the role of PAFMECSA has led many writers to the erroneous conclusion that the organization did very little to advance the independence struggle and the quest for unity.
Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa
Pan Africanism had ardent followers in east Africa in the 1940s and 1950s. The Tanganyika African Association (TAA) started adopting a Pan African orientation during the second half of the 1940s in Tanganyika. TAA defined itself as an ‘African Association for the whole of Africa,’ whose mission was “to safeguard the interests, not only in this territory, but in the whole of Africa.”11 The party reached out to Pan African leaders in Europe to establish linkages. The Association made contact with George Padmore in Britain in 1946. 12 It was with the leadership of Julius K. Nyerere that TAA would be transformed into a nationwide nationalist organization in 1954 and took steps to help launch and support a Pan African organization.
Nyerere was elected the President of TAA in 1953; the name of the organization was changed to Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954. Nyerere earned his Masters of Arts degree from Edinburg University in Scotland in 1952. He became interested in the developments in Ghana and was influenced by George Padmore while still in Europe. Nyerere drew from Padmore’s book The Ghana Revolution when he set down to rewrite TANU constitution in 1954. TANU focused its efforts on building a nationalist movement and gaining support of the Tanganyika people between 1954 and 1958. The efforts of TANU paid off when in 1958, the party won all the seats they contested in the Legislative Council. The victory was a turning point for the drive towards independence. This victory empowered Tanganyika leaders to launch a Pan African organization.
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Independence groups from east and central Africa converged into Mwanza, Tanganyika to discuss their plight and find ways to assist each other on September of 1958. Delegates from Malawi, Zanzibar, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika, travelled to the northern district of Tanganyika with one goal in mind: to look for ways to collaborate in their common struggle to get rid of colonialism and foreign tyranny. The delegates came from difference background, they spoke different languages, and belonged to different religions; yet there was something they had in common: they were all under the colonial yoke and wanted to build unity and end colonial rule. The outcome of the meeting was the formation of PAFMECA on September 18, 1958.13 The main goal of the new organization was to coordinate their activities to end colonialism and imperialism. While the initial focus was to be on East and Central Africa, the organization ultimately wanted to expand its work and help establish “democracy and self-government throughout Africa.”14 PAFMECA sought to bring together groups from Africa to build unity and rid Africa of the colonial yoke and apartheid. Lastly, the organization considered the idea of establishing a Federation.
The decision to establish a Pan African organization came after the March 1958 anniversary celebrations of Ghana’s independence. Nyerere and Tom Mboya of Kenya attended the celebrations and were impressed by what they saw at the celebrations and by the idea of an All African People’s Conference to be held in December of 1958. Nyerere and Mboya met at the residency of Mboya in Nairobi, Kenya and discussed the idea of establishing a regional Pan African body. The two agreed to establish a regional organization for East and Central Africa to bring together nationalist movements.15 However, only Nyerere was in a position to launch such an organization. Kenya was under the State of Emergency from October 1952 to December 1959. Mboya was not in position to launch such an organization. Therefore, it was Nyerere who made a call for a conference that established the PAFMECA. The site of the conference was selected so as to make it easier for delegates from Kenya and Uganda to attend. The city of Mwanza is located along Lake Victoria, close to the border of Uganda and Kenya.
Thirteen nationalist organizations sent representatives to attend the inaugural conference. Representatives came from Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi), Kenya, the Congo, Uganda, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Zanzibar, and Nyasaland. The conference was held for three days from September 16 to 18, 1958. The leading delegates included E.M.K. Mulira of Uganda Progress Party, Francis Khamisi of Mombasa Democratic Union, M.W. Kanyama Chiume of Nyasaland African Congress, and Abeid Amani Karume and Abdulrahman Babu, both of Afro Shirazi Party from Zanzibar. The conference agreed to establish an organization they called PAFMECA. They stated in their constitution that Pan Africanism provided the armament to “rid East and Central African territories of imperialism, white supremacy, economic exploitation, and social degradation.”
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They added that only by holding on to Pan-Africanism and committing to unity, would Africans succeed in reaching the ultimate goal of “self-government and parliamentary democracy.”16 Finally, a proposal was tabled to discuss Federation. A decision was made to postpone the idea until a later point when the independence movements had advanced in their respective territories. The die for a new regional organization was casted. Members of the organization went to work immediately.
PAFMECA established a governing body called the Coordinating Freedom Council. The Coordinating Freedom Council was composed of representatives of the different liberation groups in the region. The Council submitted annual reports to the general assembly, elected new officers, and made recommendations for appropriate action.17 Membership in PAFMECA was open to organizations and individuals alike. Individuals paid an annual fee of £25 and organizations contributed £250 annually. Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika became the headquarters of the new organization. TANU provided an office for the organization at its own headquarters in the city. The Kenyan delegate, Francis Khamisi (d. 2000) was elected as its chairman. I.M. Bhoke Munanka, TANU’s National Treasurer, was chosen as General-Secretary. In 1959, Khamisi took over temporarily the position of General-Secretary when the colonial authorities imprisoned Munanka. He resumed his duties once he was released from jail. Munanka continued in his position until 1960 when he was replaced by Jeremiah Bakampenja, a former reporter and a member of TANU.
PAFMECA officers held their posts for about a year. It was not, however, until the Mbale, Uganda conference of October 24, 1961, that a decision was made to have a full-time General-Secretary to run the organization. TANU was asked to carry out the search for a highly qualified candidate to fill the post. Nyerere’s choice fell on the Kenyan Pan Africanist Peter Mbiyu Koinange (d. 1981). Koinange was exiled in Ghana at the time and served as the African Affairs Advisor to President Nkrumah. Tom Mboya concurred with the selection. The PAFMECA conference held in February 1962 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, confirmed the appointment. Koinange was one of the prominent African nationalists to attend the Manchester Congress. His commitment to pan- Africanism won him the confidence and admiration of Kwame Nkrumah who appointed him Secretary of the Bureau of African Affairs. Koinange, confident of President Jomo Kenyatta, occupied different ministerial posts in independent Kenya, including the most powerful cabinet office of Minister of State.
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The position of chairman of the organization rotated annually. The chairmanship passed from Khamisi to Nyerere in 1959. Tom Mboya became the Chairman in 1961. The post was then handed over to Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in 1962. People from a particular country or specific leaders did not dominate the organization. The organization provided opportunities for groups from different countries to take the Chairmanship of the organization. This provided independence movements from different countries with an opportunity to lead the organization and make their impact in the region.
Collecting funds for keeping PAFMECA active was a difficult task. The organization faced constant shortage of funds. Most members of the body did not pay the annual fees and entrance fees.18 The organization faced constant shortage of funds. Yet the little that was raised went a long way to support the organization’s initiatives. Financing an organization such as PAFMECA before the country became independent was a very costly venture for TANU. It meant taking money that was badly needed for struggle to end British colonial rule and giving it to neighboring movements. Tanganyika leaders had made a commitment to work with different groups to end colonial rule. It was a commitment that Tanganyika leaders felt was worth the investment. Exactly how much money Tanganyika gave to PAFMECA is not clear. TANU paid for the office space and most of the cost for the administrators and campaigns launched by the organization. For example, the government supported a staff of several employees who were paid salaries and benefits. The secretary was paid 600 shillings and a clerk received 150 shillings every month.19 In addition to paying the salaries of employees, the government provided funds every year for running the organization. Government of Tanganyika issued a voucher for the amount of 15, 040 shillings to PAFMECA on January 22, 1964.20 This was a large sum for the government just two years after independence. The money was paid at a time when the Government of Tanganyika was slowly closing down the operations of the organization and transferring it to the African Liberation Committee. The total contributions made by TANU to PAFMECA/PAFMECSA between 1958 and 1963 are not clear. However, a payment of 15, 040 shillings made to the organization when it was being shut down in 1964 suggests that larger amount may have been given to the organization previously when it was in full operation.
PAFMECA carried out numerous campaigns that helped build unity and advance the independence struggles in the region. One of the successful campaigns was the boycott of South African goods. The ANC branch in Johannesburg issued a statement entitled the “Students Support Boycott” in June of 1958. The ANC called for a boycott of Rembrandt products made in South Africa. It specifically asked people to boycott cigarettes, tea, and coffee.21 The ANC decided to take this campaign to the All African People’s Conference in Ghana. The ANC delegates appealed for an international boycott of South African goods.22
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The All African Peoples’ Conference in Ghana passed a resolution calling for a boycott of South African goods in December of 1958. PAFMECA under the Chairmanship of Julius Nyerere took up the boycott against South Africa as one of its campaigns in 1959. Nyerere was the main speaker at the meeting that launched the boycott South Africa Campaign (later became the British Anti-Apartheid Movement) in June of 1959. M.W. Kanyama Chiume, PAFMECA representative for Nyasaland, made arrangements for Nyerere to talk at the meeting.
Tennyson Makiwane, Vella Pillay (d.2004, member of the South African Communist Party exiled in UK), and Chiume, were among the people who attended the important meeting at Holborn Hall in London that launched Britain’s antiapartheid campaign. Over 500 people attended the meeting. The meeting called for the boycott of goods, such as fruits and cigarettes that Britain imported from South Africa. The outcome of the meeting was the Boycott South Africa Movement.
Julius Nyerere, Chairman of PAFMECA/TANU, was the keynote speaker. He gave his full support to the movement and pleaded with the British public not to buy South African goods. He said, “We are not asking you the British people for anything special. We are just asking you to withdraw support from apartheid by not buying South African goods.”23 The boycott was yet another weapon in the arsenal of liberty and justice that would certainly overwhelm apartheid South Africa. It was clear as far back as 1959 that isolating South Africa economically would be a powerful vehicle for forcing the apartheid government to change. Nyerere added that “the South African Government is fighting against history and they are bound to lose. We know that the liberation struggle will triumph in South Africa.”24 PAFMECA was, therefore, involved in the struggle for South Africa within a year of its formation. The boycott against South Africa became one of the organization’s most successful early campaigns.
East African leaders moved quickly to support the boycott once they agreed on it in PAFMECA. In August, 1959 Tom Mboya, cofounder of PAFMECA, announced plans to organize a more comprehensive boycott of South African goods through the agency of the Kenya Federation of Labor of which he was General-Secretary.25 To the government of South Africa, an East African boycott organized by labor was indeed devastating for it would impact negatively on South African economy. Consequently, Mr. Eric Louw, member of the South African cabinet, approached the British High Commissioner in South Africa to express his government’s concern about the boycott, particularly as proposed by Tom Mboya.26 Unwilling to involve the governments of the colonies in the issue, the British Government, nonetheless, appeased the government of South Africa by preventing African nationalists from entering Uganda.
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These nationalists intended to attend meetings in Kampala to be convened by PAFMECA and trade unions from Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika, where the Boycott South Africa goods would be visited and harsher measures would certainly be taken. Among the nationalists who were declared prohibited immigrants were Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga (d.1994), Dr. Julius Gikonyo Kiano, David Kiamba, and Dickson Oruko Makasembo.27 Subsequently, the British High Commissioner in Pretoria informed Mr. Eric Louw of the decision to brand all the delegates prohibited immigrants.28 The colonial authorities in Uganda went further and banned the meeting of PAFMECA altogether citing unrest in the state of Buganda. Albeit the disturbances in Buganda factored in the decision to ban the conference, it is clear that the primary reason for the decision was the desire to appease the South African government. Dismayed by the decision, the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) sent a telegram to the Colonial Office in London contesting the ban and requested that it be lifted immediately.29 London however declined the request to intervene with the colonial officials in Kampala, leaving PAFMECA with no option but to find another venue that would host the conference with the minimum interruption.
The intervention of the South African government on the PAFMECA conference reveals that they took the organization seriously and viewed it as a threat. Although the boycott organized by the organization would not have crippled South Africa’s economy, it would have forced them to find other places to export their goods. The potential for this boycott to spread beyond east Africa with new groups joining PAFMECA was another issue that South Africa wanted to prevent. The British authorities were inclined to side with South Africa because they also saw the collaboration between these groups from different territory as a threat. South Africa and Britain were able to prevent Africans from holding a meeting in Uganda. Tanganyika became the only place where the Africans could convene another meeting with little intervention. The choice fell on the town of Moshi in Tanganyika.
Julius K. Nyerere gave the opening speech at the conference PAFMECA conference in Moshi, Tanganyika. The speech discussed the boycott of South African goods, French nuclear tests in North Africa, and the subject of human rights; the main theme of the speech was human rights.30 Resolutions passed at the conference covered a wide range of subjects from the condemnation of the French nuclear tests to the support for the boycott of South African goods. PAFMECA endorsed the boycott against South Africa; what was left was to agree on the type of boycott.31 Two labor union leaders, Mboya and Rashidi Kawawa from Tanganyika were given the task of formulating a boycott strategy for East Africa.
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Mboya and Rashid Kawawa, President of Tanganyika Federation of Labor, held intensive discussion on boycott against South Africa a month after the conference. 32 The two trade unionists understood that the consumer boycott should not be the domain of trade unions exclusively and that the whole issue should be discussed again at the following PAFMECA meeting. In addition, they agreed to compile a list of South African goods subjected to the boycott, contact other countries and organizations, and encourage them to lend their support to the boycott. Finally, they concluded that perhaps the most effective step in the campaign would be to goad labor into refusing to handle all South African goods. Albeit, the PAFMECA territories implemented the sanctions with a great energy, initially through labor unions, and after independence, a comprehensive state supported boycott was carried out.
Nyerere and Kawawa made a strong case for implementing the boycott in Tanganyika. Members of TANU agreed and a date of November 1, 1959 was set for the boycott of South African goods. Initially, the boycott was applied on South African wines, spirits and hoes. They also considered including boycott of the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WNLA) which was recruiting laborers from Tanganyika to work in South African mines and boycott of the handling of South African cargoes at ports and railways.33 Tanganyikans began to work for implementing the PAFMECA resolution and campaign for a wider boycott against South Africa after the Moshi conference. The campaign against South African products in Tanganyika increased in the middle of 1960. In May 1960, TANU launched an effective campaign to get consumers to abstain from purchasing South African goods. TANU refused to accept a check of 1,500 Shillings donated by a South African bank for building a TANU school.34 TANU and trade union officials warned shopkeepers stocking South African goods that they would be boycotted if they continued to sell South African products.35 The pressure was mounted throughout Tanganyika. Even stores selling goods from South Africa to Europeans in the southern provinces came under pressure. A Tanganyika newspaper Mwafrika reported in July 1960: “maduka matano ya Waasia huko Dodoma yamesusiwa na wananchi kwasababu maduka hayo yameendelea kuuza bidhaa za Afrika Kusini.” [Five stores owned by Asians in Dodoma were boycotted by the people because they continued to sell South African products.]36 The newspaper also reported the TANU branch in Dodoma planned to ask churches not to purchase wine from South Africa. The boycott movement also gained momentum with unions. Transport and General Workers Union of Tanganyika that represented 20,000 members voted to boycott all South African goods in protest against the policies of the South African government in August 12, 1960.37
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TANU and labor officials were fairly successful by the end of August 1960 in their boycott campaign. A British Tanganyika intelligence report stated that “in most Provinces South African goods have virtually disappeared from shop-keepers’ shelves, as a result of pressure from TANU and Trade Union Officials.”38 This was a victory for Tanganyika as well as PAFMECA. The campaign initiated by PAFMECA to launch a campaign to boycott South African goods was implemented successfully by the Tanganyika and Kenya leaders using both the labor unions, TANU, and Kenyan African National Union (KANU).
Another successful PAFMECA campaign was in support of Northern Rhodesia’s (Zambia) independence. The organization changed its name from PAFMECA to PAFMECSA in order to include countries from southern Africa in 1962. The Northern Rhodesia independence movement was facing many obstacles in 1962. One of the main problems was disunity between the various groups in the country. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council elections were set for October of 1962. Legislative Council was the main legislative body and whoever controlled it could determine the future of the country. The two main independence groups-the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress and United National Independence Party- could not win majority and take over the government separately. It became apparent in 1962 that the best weapon for wining control of the government and eventually independence, was to forge unity between the different groups in the country; in particular between two main groups, United National Independence Party (UNIP) under Kenneth Kaunda, and Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC) led by Harry Nkumbula. PAFMECA’s strategy in 1962 was to focus most of its resources to support Northern Rhodesia nationalist. This was part of a larger scheme, the “domino effect;” free Northern Rhodesia, the weakest colonial power in the region, and from there move on to the neighboring colonial territories.
PAFMECA leaders placed all their efforts on Northern Rhodesians. Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya called for unity in Northern Rhodesia and tried to reconcile Kaunda (UNIP) and Nkumbula (NRANC). The Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Rashid Kawawa, also tried to bring the two leaders together. Kawawa informed them that “the people of Northern Rhodesia must unite strongly, even it meant death, and we, the people and Government of Tanganyika will die with them.”39 A decision was made to send PAFMECSA Secretary General Peter Koinange and a Tanganyika official I.M. Bhoke Munanka to help resolve the differences on November 9, 1962. Koinange and Munanka were successful in their mission. Having convinced the two Zambian leaders to form a coalition, they returned to Dar es Salaam in the company of Harry Nkumbula on a plane chartered by PAFMECSA.
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Nkumbula and Kaunda not only decided to contest the election as one party, but also to present jointly, at the advice of Nyerere and Kenyatta, the case for a new constitution in London.40 TANU is said to have offered Kaunda an undisclosed sum of money as well as a Land Rover to assist the coalition in the election campaign. Kaunda declined to confirm or deny the report when probed about the offer. He said “I have no intention of announcing what I have got from my friends whether it is so many thousands of Pounds, so many Land Rovers, or so many cars.”41 Albeit, it is no secret that TANU donated vehicles to various organizations that enabled them to campaign for support within their respective territories. For example, it has been well known that TANU had supplied the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in early 1963 with a number of Land Rovers.42
Northern Rhodesia and PAFMECSA leaders decided to hold a meeting and then a rally in Mbeya, a small town located on the southern border separating Tanganyika from Northern Rhodesia. The leaders wanted to pressure the British colonial officials to allow elections to take place. Tanganyika officials expected a large crowd of up to 20,000 to attend the mass meeting. More than 300 members of UNIP arrived from Northern Rhodesia and more were expected to come. Several hundred people went out to greet Kaunda, who arrived with R.S. Makasa, UNIP representative in Tanganyika. The government of Tanganyika took every precaution to avoid disturbances. The Home Minister of Tanganyika, Oscar Kambona, instructed the police to be on the alert, ready to quell the eruption of commotions, which would certainly spill over into Northern Rhodesia.43 Accordingly, the borders were sealed up for the duration of the conference. In a move to avoid confrontation, Kaunda postponed the “Freedom March” to Northern Rhodesia, which was organized by UNIP in collaboration with World Peace Brigade, and Reverend Michael Scott.44 The Pan Africanist and civil rights activist from the US, Bill Sutherland, played role in organizing the Mbeya campaign in conjunction with PAFMECA, UNIP, and the Tanganyika government. There were many obstacles set to disrupt the march at the time. There were rumors that the Federation authorities sent spies as well as a group of gangsters to disrupt the meeting. While the march did not take place, delegates from Northern Rhodesia and Kenya did attend the conference; the delegates formulated strategies to help Northern Rhodesia nationalist win Legislative Council election that were set for later that year.
The Tanganyika government paid most of the cost of the conference and for providing financial assistance to Northern Rhodesians. The government paid for accommodating, meals, and transportation for 35 people at the cost of shillings 9342.10.45 The government paid for various campaign activities, including paying for 850,000 posters, for the total sum of 3,350 British Pounds. 46 All these funds were channeled to Northern Rhodesians through PAFMECA. The organization took chances by putting all its efforts in supporting Northern Rhodesians; the calculated gamble worked.
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According to Bill Sutherland, the British officials changed position about holding elections in Northern Rhodesia just as the rally in Mbeya was about to be launched. Citing a police offer in Northern Rhodesia, Bill, asserted that he learned much later that the British government took the march from Mbeya very seriously.47 The decision by Britain to finally allow elections in Northern Rhodesia was a turning point in the struggle for independence. The strategy worked since the Northern Rhodesia nationalists won the election of 1962. The victory set the path for Northern Rhodesia to win independence in October 24, 1964 as Zambia. This was not just a victory for Zambia; it was a victory for the entire southern Africa. Zambia would eventually become an important rear base for the liberation movements from Zimbabwe Namibia and South Africa.
Northern Rhodesia’s victory was the final blow to the white controlled Central African Federation. The Federation was an attempt by white minorities in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, to forge unity and prevent Africans in the region from winning independence. With Northern Rhodesians controlling the Legislative Council, they would be in position to block their country from participating in the Federation and it would bring them closer to independence. The victory had larger implications in the entire region of southern Africa; the ANC of South Africa leaflet Spearhead reminded the victorious leaders about their responsibility as PAFMECSA member to “concentrated all their efforts on assisting the struggle” in other places. They added that “Pan-African brotherhood and unity cannot be a one-way street” and that “ the onus is now on Northern Rhodesia nationalists to use the power they have won effectively.”48 The statement was a reminder for Northern Rhodesians of their new responsibility to assist others in the region still struggling for freedom and independence.
The two PAFMECSA campaigns, the boycott South Africa and the assistance to Northern Rhodesian independence movements, provides us with example of the organization’s key contributions to independence struggle in southern Africa. While the campaign to support independence movements was prioritized, the quest for regional unity in the hopes of eventually establishing a “United States of Africa” became increasingly important for PAFMECA/PAFMECSA after 1960. Julius Nyerere was the main proponent of building unity through Federation.
The campaign to link up independence movements was important for PAFMECA. However, there was another objective for the organization that was equally important; that was the quest to unite different territories into a political Federation. Nyerere used the organization to establish a platform for groups from different countries to begin to work towards Federation. Nyerere’s view was that the independence movements should come together once they were strong enough, demand independence on the same date, and start after independence as a Federation.
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It is clear that Nyerere was already thinking about federation when PAFMECA was established in 1958. Nyerere was asked a question about Federation by an American, Philip Mason Sears, as far back as November of 1958. The question by Sears came after PAFMECA decided in September of 1958 to defer the question of Federation until a later point. Nyerere’s answer suggested that Federation would be revisited once self- government was within sight. Tanganyika would then “..draw to itself the nationalist movements in both Uganda and Kenya.”49 Therefore, as far back as 1958, Nyerere had the vision of bringing together nationalist movements from different countries as they win self-government in order to establish a Federation once they win independence. As far as Nyerere was concerned, the pursuit of freedom and independence was concomitant with the quest to establish a Federation. Indeed, Nyerere spearheaded a campaign within PAFMECA and elsewhere for a Federation starting in 1960 once it became clear that Tanganyika would win self-government. PAFMECA provided African nationalists from East, Central, and Southern Africa with an opportunity to discuss a proposal for Federation of the territories.50 Nyerere was the leading proponent of the Federation proposal.
TANU won majority in Legislative Council elections of 1958 and 1959. The victory of 1959 insured that TANU would have control of the government within a short time. Nyerere announced in January 1, 1960 on BBC television program that Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda should eventually join together in a Federation.51 The announcement came as TANU was preparing for self-government. Nyerere took his case to the Conference of Independent African States in Ethiopia in June of 1960; he announced at the conference his willingness to delay Tanganyika’s independence for up to six months in order to allow the formation of East African Federation. He expressed the desire to see Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar, join to demand independence from Britain as a unit.52 Like Nkrumah had done with his Federation initiative in 1953 and again in 1958 with the union with Guinea, Nyerere came to believe that the regional approach to African unity was more practical. Nkrumah called for a West African Federation in 1953. He again called for the “amalgamation of territories on a regional basis and methods of progress towards ‘an ultimate Pan-African Commonwealth of Free, Independent United States of Africa’ in November of 1958. 53 Ghana also united with Guinea in November of 1958. Nkrumah’s support of regional federation would later change, particularly as the Union between Ghana and Guinea faced challenges and eventually collapsed. Nyerere was committed to regional Federation approach as the best strategy to unite Africa; he embarked on a campaign for the establishment of East Africa Federation starting in 1960.
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Nyerere took his case for a Federation to PAFMECA once again. Nyerere met with Tom Mboya in the end of August 1960 to discuss the idea of Federation of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar. Nyerere made the case that Federation should be established once the East African territories became self-governing and that they should move to independence as a political unit.54 Nyerere convinced Mboya of the proposal. The two leaders agreed to bring up the proposal to the upcoming PAFMECA conference scheduled for October in Uganda.
PAFMECA held a two-day conference in Mbale, Uganda in December 24 to 25, 1960. Nyerere presented his proposal for Federation at the conference. He tabled a memorandum entitled “East African Federation (Freedom and Unity)”for discussion and approval by the organization. Nyerere told the conference that Federation was “politically and economically essential for unity and social betterment” of the people of East Africa. He argued that Federation would present a formidable challenge to the white minority regimes and colonial governments in central and southern Africa. Nyerere argued convincingly that Federation would lead to the departure of British imperialists from Uganda and Kenya. Not all PAFMECA members agreed with Nyerere’s proposal wholeheartedly. Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia stated at the conference “I am a Pan-Africanist and I believe in larger units. But this must be based upon the consent of the people.”55 He emphasized that the consent of the people must be sought before the decision to federate was made. PAFMECA passed a unanimous resolution supporting Federation despite the reservation of some of the members. The organization agreed to address the question of Federation at the conference scheduled for January 1961.
Tanganyika continued to push the idea of East African federation after winning independence in December 9, 1961. East African leaders Kenyatta, Nyerere, and Milton Obote of Uganda met numerous times between 1962 and 1964 to discuss Federation. The three east African leaders met in April of 1962. Nyerere made an appeal for Federation. He stated “We have got to begin thinking of building bigger nations” and abolish the “Balkanization of Africa.”56 Nyerere feared that the chance of establishing a Federation would diminish further once the other countries gained independence. He made concerted efforts to convince the leaders of Kenya and Uganda to agree to a Federation before winning independence. The other PAFMECSA leader from Kenya, Tom Mboya, was also vocal in pushing for East African Federation. Mboya gave a speech in Uganda in May 31, 1962. Mboya emphasized that the four East African countries of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar must “work together, think together and move together.” He added that the four countries could “no longer ‘shy away’ from the question of their future relations in an East African union.”57
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He asserted further that East Africa had its “own personality and did not recognize “artificial boundaries.” The idea of Federation was already facing resistance in Uganda from some leaders at the time Mboya spoke. Uganda became independent in October 9, 1962. The Independence made it less likely that a Federation would be established. However, there was still hope as long as Kenya wad not yet win independent.
The Tanganyika government campaigned to Britain in 1963 and 1964 to speed up the drive towards Kenya’s independence in order to establish a federation once they won independence. Rashidi Kawawa, the Vice President of Tanganyika, travelled to London to hold talks with British government official about the need to expedite Kenya’s independence so as to establish the East African Federation.58 The establishment of East African Federation was one of the top priorities for the Tanganyika government between 1963 and 1964. Oscar Kambona was appointed as the new Foreign Minister in the beginning of 1963. He told an American diplomat that one of the reasons for his appointment was to “move swiftly to Regional Federation before new governments Kenya, NR [Northern Rhodesia], Nyasa [Nyasaland] became institutionalized as to make federation arrangements more difficult.”59 Kambona’s main task was to work towards establishing East and Central African Federation. Nyerere’s most ambitious call for unity came in March 1963 when he published a paper for the first edition of the Journal of Modern Africa Studies entitled “United States of Africa.” He argued that “Nothing short of United States of Africa must be accepted as our ultimate destiny.”60
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in Ethiopia in May 25, 1963. OAU established the Committee of Nine (African Liberation Committee). The Committee subsequently replaced PAFMECSA. Nyerere continued to push for Federation. Kenyatta, Obote, and Nyerere met in June 5, 1963 to discuss Federation. The decision came after Kenyatta won elections in Kenya and before a date for independence was set. According to an American diplomat, Britain prepared to advance the date for independence by “several months in order to facilitate the formation of a federation.”61 Nyerere exerted pressure on the British government to grant early independence to Kenya in order to facilitate the formation of a Federation. The three East African leaders agreed to issue a declaration of Federation. The Declaration stated:
We, the leaders of the people and governments of East Africa, assembled in Nairobi on June 5, 1963, pledge ourselves to the political federation of East Africa. Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism, and not by mere selfish regional interests. We are nationalists, and reject tribalism, racialism or inward-looking policies. We believe that the day of decision has come, and to all our people we say:-There is no more room for slogans and words……
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We believe that the East African Federation can be a practical step towards the goal of Pan-African unity. We hope that our action will help to accelerate the efforts already being made by our brothers throughout the Continent to achieve Pan-African unity. We share a common past, and are convinced of our common destinies. We have a common history, culture and customs which make our unity both logical and natural… For some years we have worked together in the Pan- African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa, where we have accepted common objectives and ideas, and created the essential spirit of unity between ourselves and among our people….”62
The declaration further asserted that Federation was a regional promotion of the spirit of Pan-African unity and made it clear that other neighboring countries were welcomed to join. A working group was established to propose a draft constitution. The probability of an East African Federation was so likely that the American Ambassador in Tanganyika, William Leonhart, urged all plans for aid to East African countries to be “halted and recast in anticipation of early federation.”63 Nyerere travelled to the US to meet with President John Kennedy in July of 1963 and he stopped in UK to meet with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to discuss East African Federation. Nyerere pitched the idea of Federation in the US in his speech to the National Press Club in Washington DC; Nyerere stated:
“But for all this it is still true that in the world society we individual states of Africa are almost in the position of beggars talking to millionaires. And we don’t like it. We are all endeavoring to develop our own economies, but the more we try the more we are forced to realize that only through African unity can we really make a break-out from the vicious circle of poverty. Only African unity will enable us to carry forward the work which the freedom movement began-only internationalism can take nationalism to its goal.”64
It was important to work on the West so as get them to speed up the independence of Kenya. He took the campaign to Britain after leaving the US. Nyerere held talks with Prime Minister Macmillan in July of 1963. Nyerere urged Macmillan to come up with an earlier date for the independence of Kenya so as to facilitate the establishment of Federation.65 Nyerere proposed to Britain that the Federation would establish links with the European Economic Community while remaining in the Commonwealth.66
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The talk for East African Federation between the three East African leaders from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika did not go well the end of 1963. The Ugandans expressed reservations about the proposal. It was clear by the end of July 1963 that Uganda leaders changed their mind and opposed to the Federation. Different factions in Uganda agreed that it was in the interest of the nation to “go slow on creation of East African Federation.” Local kingdoms, central government, monarchists, Protestant and Catholic groups agreed that they should delay the move towards Federation.67 The four hereditary monarchs in Uganda did not want Federation because they would lose power. Furthermore, Uganda leaders feared that they would lose out with Federation since they had a trade surplus and a balanced budget while neighbors such as Kenya had a large deficit. Benedicto Kiwanuka, leader of Uganda Self-government, and Milton Obote, first Prime Minister of independent Uganda, came to oppose Federation after July of 1963. Adoko Nekyon, Uganda delegate to Federation constitutional negotiations pointed out that he saw “..no point anybody trying to hurry us up;” Nekyon added “I find it practically impossible to have the Federation by this year and I am sure others will find it so also.”68 During the negotiations, Nekyon made demands that both Tanganyika and Kenya could not agree to. For example, he insisted that each country should maintain a separate foreign representation. Nyerere told an American diplomat in August that Uganda was pulling out of the agreement they signed in June of 1963. He stated that the problem was not with the concept of Federation itself, but that Ugandans were making frivolous demands for jobs and the site of the capital. Nyerere added that there were “various external influences” at work in Kampala, Uganda.69 The Tanganyika Foreign Minister, Oscar Kambona, also identified Uganda as the “main deterrent.” He stated that Uganda wanted to have their own separate representative to the UN and feared they would become a junior partner.70 Besides Ghana that campaign actively to kill the Federation initiative, there were at least twenty African heads of state that wrote to Nyerere in 1963 in support of the East African Federation.71 Nevertheless, the change of policy against Federation stemming from Uganda marked the end of the initiative.
Kenya called a meeting with Tanganyika and Uganda in September of 1963 as they prepared to go to Britain to discuss a date for Kenya independence. President Obote of Uganda did not attend citing illness. Nyerere, who had been sick, travelled to Nairobi despite Doctors orders not to travel. 72 Ugandans spoke of “difficult and complex issues” that required more time to resolve before proceeding with Federation. There were internal and external factors influencing the decision by Ugandans to resist Federation as Nyerere pointed out. Ghana vehemently opposed the East African Federation after it was announced in June of 1963. Nkrumah was opposed to the idea and saw it as “Balkanization of Africa.” As far back as the beginning of 1962, Ghana made it clear that it did not support the idea of East African Federation and PAFMECSA.
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After the PAFMECSA conference in Ethiopia in 1962, John K. Tettegah, member of Ghana’s CCP Central Committee, told reporters in Addis Ababa that it was the view of Nkrumah that local associations, regional commonwealth, and territorial groupings were just another form of Balkanization.”73 A little more than a year later, Nkrumah gave a speech to the Ghana National Assembly in June 21, 1963 stating the “idea of a political federation of East Africa” was supported by the British because they wanted to be “sure of retaining their rapidly waning influence in Africa.”74 Ghana closed down its embassy in Tanganyika and moved most of the staff to Uganda. Nkrumah continued attacking East African Federation in August of 1963 asserting it was a “transparent piece of neocolonialism..”75 Nkrumah sent letters to East African leaders attacking the Federation. He also sent a letter to Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia, who forwarded the letter to the government of Tanganyika.76 According to A.L. Adu, Ghanaian Secretary General EACSO and representative for East and Central Africa, two Ghanaian officials, A.K. Barden and Busumtwi-Sam, were the main persons responsible for sabotaging the East African Federation in Uganda.77 Adu believed that Milton Obote of Uganda was “completely in Nkrumah’s pocket.”78 Different Ugandan leaders united in opposition to Federation by August of 1963; this opposition was a reversal of policy that led Obote to sign the Declaration of Federation in June of 1963. As Nyerere pointed out, this reversal on the part of Uganda leaders was partly due to external influence.
There were also attempts to reach out to some Kenyan leaders to foster opposition to the Federation. Odinga Oginga of Kenya flew to Ghana to speak to Nkrumah. Oginga later alleged that Nkrumah attacked Nyerere saying he wanted to create Federation “as a personal vehicle for self-glorification.79 The East African Federation agreement signed in June was dead by the end of August 1963. The main opposition to the Federation, however, stemmed from Uganda and not Kenya. Yet, it later emerged that Kenyatta may not have been all that interested in Federation in the first place.
Kenya won independence on December 12, 1963. This was a victory for Kenyans; however it was another blow for Nyerere’s quest to establish East African Federation. Questions were asked later if Kenyatta was really interested in establishing an East African Federation or if he was using the proposal as means to speed up the move towards independence of Kenya in the end of 1963. At least one event suggests that the first was true. During a speech at a mass rally in Kisumu, Kenya in August 2, 1964, Kenyatta stated that he gained early independence for Kenya by “tricking Mr. Duncan Sandys” who was the UK Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary. 80 He said Britain was not ready to grant Kenya independence, but was supportive of East African Federation. Kenyatta stated that “..he and the leaders of Uganda and Tanganyika met in Nairobi and called for Federation by the end of 1963 in order to get Britain to name the date for Kenya’s independence.”81
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Kenyatta asserted that he had sent his officials to England and they came back and told him “Say you want federation, if you want your freedom.” He then called a meeting in Kenya of East African leaders and they signed a Federation agreement to be achieved before the end of 1963. The Kenyan government later issued a statement denying that Kenyatta had ever used the word “trick” in his Kisumu speech. However, even the official Government news agency reporting on Kenyatta’s speech mentioned the fact that he had used the word “trick” in the speech.82 Prime Minister of Uganda, Benedicto Kiwanuka, strongly condemned Kenyatta’s claims to “tricking” Britain during an interview with a reporter. Kiwanuka stated that Kenyatta has done Africans “a great disservice.”83 He stated he did not blame Kenyatta for using that strategy to speed up independence, after all, “That is politics.” He added “I criticize him for “revealing all this now.”84 The Tanganyika State House issued a statement on August 3, 1964 denying that Nyerere participated in a “trick” to deceive the British or East Africans in order get independence for Kenya. The statement acknowledged that there was no doubt that the June 1963 Declaration of Federation did help expedite Kenya’s independence. However, Nyerere signed the declaration “in all honesty believing that the federation was genuinely wanted.”85
The East African leaders would continue to negotiate political Federation in 1964 and afterwards. The closest they ever reached to a Federation was the June 1963 Declaration. Negotiations did not produce any agreement. The best they were able to do was to establish East Africa Community between 1967 and 1977. The idea of an East African Federation as agreed in 1963 was never given a chance to be tested as a step towards establishing the “United States of Africa.” However, Tanganyika did embark on another initiative partly motivated by Pan African ambitions in April of 1964; Tanganyika and Zanzibar united in April 26, 1964 to establish the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The new Republic became known as Tanzania in October of 1964.
The formation of Organization of African Unity in 1963 and its African Liberation Committee made PAFMECSA redundant. PAFMECSA leaders agreed that the organization had to be dissolved afterwards. Kenneth Kaunda and Nyerere met in the end of September 1963 and agreed to dissolve PAFMECSA. Kaunda reported that he and Nyerere agreed to replace PAFMECSA with the OAU’s Committee of Nine.86 The decision to dissolve PAFMECSA was made in 1963; it would take until 1966 for the organization to be completely dissolved. There was a brief attempt in 1964 and again in 1966 to revive the organization.87 The attempts to revive PAFMECSA were not successful. OAU’s Committee of Nine (African Liberation Committee) gradually replaced the organization in the course of 1964.
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PAFMECA/PAFMECSA was successful in uniting independence movements and supporting the struggle for freedom and independence. The PAFMECA/PAFMECSA campaign to isolate South Africa and the efforts to support the Northern Rhodesia independence were successful. The quest for Federation never materialized. Nyerere acknowledged that establishing political Federation was a difficult challenge after his initiative in East Africa failed. It was to this end that Nyerere pronounced in a speech in January of 1964: “The Challenge of the 20th Century is the conversion of nationalism into internationalism.”88
Endnotes
1 Julius K. Nyerere, “A United States of Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, I, 1 (1963), 1.
2 I.N. Kimambo and A.J. Temu, eds., A History of Tanzania, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969) and John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, (London, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
3 Mahmoud H. Fargal, “African Unity and Liberation: A Study Based on the Role of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa” (M.A. Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1968).
4 A.F. Addona, The Organization of African Unity, (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1969), 63.
5 Peter Ath-Afac Fossungu, Democracy and Human Rights in Africa: The Politics of Collective Participation and Governance in Cameroon (Cameroon: Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group, 2013). 92.
6 Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
7 Alfred T. Moleah “Pan-Africanism and Liberation Struggles in Africa,” p.150. in W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe edition, Pan-Africanism: New Directions in Strategy, (Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1986), 155.
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8 Issa G. Shivji, Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union, (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2008), 69-70.
9 Richard Cox, Pan Africanism in Practice: An East African Study, PAFMECSA, 1958- 1964, (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
10 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Pan-Africanism and East African Integration, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967, 128.
11 Iliffe, 424.
12 Illife, 425.
13 Washington Post, 9-21-1958, A 10.
14 “Free Africa Movement,” Daily Defender, 9-23-1958.
15 There are at least two leaders active in PAFMECA who confirm that Nyerere and Mboya came up with the idea of PAFMECA: M.W. Kanyama Chiume and Tom Mboya. Author David Goldsworthy also maintains that the two came up with the idea of the organization. See Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963), p.206, Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget, (Nairobi, London: Heinemann, New York: African Publishing Company, 1982), p. 99 and M.W. Kanyama Chiume, Banda’s Malawi: Africa’s Tragedy, (Lusaka: Multimedia Publication, 1992), p.20.
16 For the constitution passed at the Mwanza Conference of September 1958 see “Background Survey of PAFMECSA,” PRO, DO 183/35.
17 J. Ayo Langley, Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856-1970: Documents on Modern African Political Through from Colonial Times to the Present, (London: Rex Collings, 1979), p. 777.
18 Nye, 123.
19 Letter from the Permanent Secretary to Bhoke Munanka, 10/14/1963. PAFMECA, 589, BMC 46/04. Bhoke Munanka Collection, Tanzania National Archives.
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20 Payment Voucher issued to PAFMECA. 589, BMC 46/04. Bhoke Munanka Collection, Tanzania National Archives.
21 “Student Support Boycott,” PP.SA.ANC (24-65), ICS, UK.
22 “The Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1959-1979: A Brief Survey of Its Foundation and the Development of its Work,” http:// www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/survey.html, accessed 3-5-06.
23 Abdul Minty, “The Anti-Apartheid Movement-what kid of History?” http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/symposiu,/html#syposium, accessed 3-10-06.
24 Quoted from Shula Marks, “Introduction,” http:www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/amm/symposium.html#Pillay, accessed 3-5-06.
25 Inward Telegram from Kenya, 8-7-1959. PRO, CO 822/1844.
26 Inward Telegram from Pretoria, 7-28-1959. PRO, CO 822/1844.
27 Saving Telegram from the Governor of Uganda to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10-8-1959.
28 Inward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office to Pretoria, 8-11-1959, PRO, CO 822.
29 Telegram sent to London, September 1960. PRO, CO 822/2097.
30 See “Chairman’s Opening Address to P.A.F.M.E.C.A. Conference,” The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
31There was a disagreement between Nyerere and Mboya on whether to implement total boycott of South African goods or just a boycott of specific items in which individuals, not institutions would take the lead in the boycott. Ultimately Nyerere changed his mind in support of total boycott of South African goods. Extracts from Kenya Intelligence Summary, PRO, CO 822/1844.
32 Extract from Kenya Special Branch Summary, November 1959. PRO, CO 822/1844.
33 Extract from Tanganyika Intelligence Report, September 1959. PRO, CO 822/1844.
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34 Mwafrika (Tanganyika), 5-14-1960, 3.
35 Extract from Tanganyika Intelligence Report-July 1960, PRO, CO 822/2924.
36Translated from a Tanganyika newspaper published in Swahili. Mwafrika (Tanganyika), 7-2-1960, 1.
37 Washington Post, 8-13-1960, A2.
38 Extract from Tanganyika Intelligence Report-August 1960, PRO, CO 822/2924.
39 Central Intelligence Committee, Lusaka, November, 1962. PRO, DO 183/138.
40 Central Intelligence Committee, Lusaka, November, 1962. PRO, DO 183/138.
41 It is not clear how much money or how many cars were actually given to Kaunda by TANU; however, it appears that such an offer was made. See Tanganyika Standard (Tanganyika), 5-15-1962, 1.
42 The information was revealed by the Tanganyika Government in a statement issued in response to Secretary of KADU, Joseph Shikuku, who charged TANU with supplying KANU with Land Rovers. The statement read: “Government and TANU have always declared their stand against any form of colonialism and their unqualified support of all liberation movements. This support is given to whoever approaches us and our decision is based on individual merits.” Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, 4-5-1965, RG 59, SNF 1963, Box 4057, NARA II, College Park, MD.
43 Inward Telegram, 5-3-1962, PRO, DO 183/145.
44 The World Peace Brigade (WPB) was set up to practice a Gandhian approach internationally and to inform activists on the strategies used by the Indian movement. The founding conference of WPB was held in Beirut, Lebanon in 1961. Michael Scott, A.J. Muste, and J.P. Narayan, a leader from India, were selected to be co-chairs. Julius K. Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda signed on as patrons of the new organization. Bill Sutherland, a Pan Africanist and a civil rights activist from the US, became involved WPB shortly after it was founded. WPB received an invitation from PAFMECA to attend the 1962 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Conference. WPB delegation to the PAFMECA conference included Bill Sutherland, Michael Scott, and Bayard Rustin, a civil rights activist from the US. in Tanganyika.
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Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer, Guns and Ghandi in Africa: Pan African Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle and Liberation in Africa, (New Jersey: Africa World Peace, Inc., 2000), p. 60-61; Central Intelligence Committee, Lusaka, May 1962. PRO, DO 183/138; Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, 5-9-1962, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 745C.00/5-962. NARA II, College Park, MD.
45 Note for P.M. [Tanganyika Prime Minister] by Parl. Sec, 4-5-62. 589, SHC 227, Bhoke Munanka Collection, Tanzania National Archives and Mbiyu Koinange to PM, 7-23-62. 589, SHC 227, Bhoke Munanka Collection, Tanzania National Archives.
46 Mbiyu Koinange to Prime Minister [Tanganyika], 8-3-62. 589, SHC 227, Bhoke Munanka Collection, Tanzania National Archives.
47 Sutherland and Meyer, 63.
48 Spearhead 11, 3 (March 1963): p.3.
49 British officials obtained details for the conversation from the American Consul Duggan. See “Substance of Mr. Mason Sears’ conversation with Mr. Julius Nyerere.”, PRO, CO 822/1362.
50 David H. John, “East African Unity-Problems and Prospects,” The World Today, 19, 12 (Dec., 1963), 535.
51 Tanganyika Standard, 1-6-1960, 1.
52 Tanganyika Standard, 6-24-1960, 1, Sunday Times (UK), October 30, 1960, Incoming Airgram from Dar es Salaam, 11-1-1960, RG 59, DF 1960-63, 778.02/11-160. NARA II, College Park, MD.
53 “Towards a “Pan-African Commonwealth,” The Times (UK), 11-24-1958.
54 The New York Times, 8-28-1960, 8.
55 Tanganyika Standard (Tanganyika), 1-14-1960, 1.
56 “Future Weighed by East Africans,” The New York Times, 4-15-1962.
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57 Aigram from Kampala to State Department drafted by Vanoss, 6-5-1962, RG 59, Decimal File 1960-63, NARA II, College Park MD.
58 “Market Impact on Africans,” The Times (UK), 1-22-1963.
59 Telegram from Dar es Salaam, control 13523, 3-19-1963, RG 59, Box 2693, NARA, College Park, MD.
60 Julius K. Nyerere, “A United States of Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, I, 1 (1963), 1.
61 Briefing Memorandum from Henry J. Tasca to Governor Harriman, 6-20-1963,Rg 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, Box 3892.
62 Press Release issued by Tanganyika Information Services, “A Declaration of Federation by the Governments of East Africa,” 6-5-1963, William K. Leonhart Papers, Subject Numeric File, Box 34, Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
63 Memorandum from Jesse M. MacKnight to Governor Williams on East African Federation, 6-15-1963, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1963, Box 3892, NARA II, College Park MD.
64 Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, Independence and Solidarity: Address by The President of the Republic of Tanganyika, National Press Club, Washington D.C., July 15, 1963, William K. Leonhart Papers, Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
65 “Nyerere, Macmillan Discuss Federation, The Washington Post, 7-24-1963.
66 “Julius Nyerere Visits London,” Atlanta Daily World, 7-28-1963.
67 “Uganda United on Federation Delay; Wants ‘Vital Problems’ Solved First,” The Washington Post, 9-10-1963.
68 Ibid.
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69 Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, 8-16-1963. RG 59. SNF 1963. Box 3893. NARA II, College Park, MD.
70 Memorandum of Conversation, Oscar Kambona and US Secretary of State, 10-16- 1963, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, Box 3892, NARA II, College Park MD.
71 Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, control 5254, 8-7-1963, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, Box 3892, NARA II, College Park MD.
72 Telegram from Dar es Salaam, control 16197, 9-21-1963, RG 59, SNF 1963, Box 4245, NARA, College Park, MD.
73 “Race Partnership a ‘Camouglage’”, The Times (UK), 2-8-1962.
74 Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, 8-15-1963. RG 59. SNF 1963. Box 3893. NARA II, College Park, MD.
75 Incoming Telegram from Accra, control 19744, 8-23-1963, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, Box 3893, NARA II, College Park MD.
76 Kambona reported about Nkrumah’s letters to the African leaders. He also stated that Nkrumah sent large sums of money to Harry Nkumbula. Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, 9-7-1963. RG 59. SNF 1963. Box 3893. NARA II, College Park, MD.
77 Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, control 14190, 8-17-1963, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, Box 3893, NARA II, College Park MD.
78 Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, 9-2-1963. RG 59. SNF 1963. Box 3893. NARA II, College Park, MD.
79 For Nkrumah’s connection to Oginga, see Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, control 11242, 9-16-1963, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, Box 3893, NARA II, College Park MD and Incoming Telegram from Accra, control 19744, 8-23-1963, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1963, Box 3893, NARA II, College Park MD and Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, 10-11-1963. RG 59, SNF 1963, Box 3893. NARA II, College Park, MD.
80 “Kenya Gain of Independence by a Ruse,” The Times (UK), 8-3-1964.
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81 For report of the denial by the Kenyan government and mention of an article by the Kenya Government news agency, see “Kenya Envoy Speaks Out,” The Times (UK), 8-4- 1964.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 “Tanganyika Denial,” The Times (UK), 8-4-1964.
86 “Dr. Kaunda Winds Up Pan-African Body,” The Times (UK), 9-26-1963.
87 Kaunda told Gwendolyn Carter in April of 1964 that PAFMECSA would be revived despite attempts by him and Nyerere to dissolve the organization. In the course of 1964, meetings were held under the umbrella of PAFMECSA by East African leaders to discuss the crisis in the Congo. Peter Koinange, Minister of Pan-African Affairs of independent Kenya in 1964, told an American diplomat that preparations were being made for a PAFMECSA meeting in Leopoldville in the end of April 1964. Attempts to revive PAFMECSA continued to 1966. It was reported in March of 1966 that Tanzania was attempting to organize a PAFMECSA Heads of State meeting in Nairobi, Kenya. For discussion between Kaunda and Carter see, Incoming Telegram from Lusaka, 4-8-1964, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, SNF 1964-66, Box 18012, NARA, College Park MD. The comments by Koinange were reported in an Incoming Telegram from Nairobi, Control 22260, 4-27-1964, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, SNF 1964-66, Box 18012, NARA, College Park MD. The discussion of reviving PAFMECSA in March of 1966 was reported in an Incoming Telegram from Dar es Salaam, 3-14-1966, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, SNF 1964-66, Box 18012, NARA II, College Park MD.
88 Dag Hammarskjoeld Memorial Lecture by Julius Nyerere, 1-23-1964, The Courage of Reconciliation, Published by Tanganyika Information Division of the Vice-President’s Office, Tanganyika, Subject Numeric File, Box 37, Kennedy Presidential Library, William K. Leonhart Papers, Boston, Massachusetts.
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