University of Nigeria Research Publications
NWANKWO, Ben Author Author PG/M.Sc/03/34838
Elections and Politics of Transitions in Nigeria: An Institutional Assessment of
Title INEC and it's Conduct of 2003 Elections in Anambra State
Social Sciences Faculty Faculty
Public Administration Department Department
April, 2006 Date Date
Signature Signature
BECll)#I AND POLITICS OF TRANSITIONS IN NEERlk AN INSTITUTIINAL ASSESSMENT ff INEc Alul ITS CONMCT ff 2003 ELECllONS IN ANAMBRA STATE.
- INEC HEADQUATERS ABUJA
of Nigeria Nsukka blic Admini stration a mment
BEN NWANKWO PG/M.Sc/03/34838 4 L.-.a@ TITLE PAGE--
ELECTIONS AND POLITICSOF TRANSITIONS IN NIGERLR; AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT OF INEC AND ITS CONDUC'I 01- 2803 ELECTIONS IN ANAMBRA STATE.
BEN NWANKWQ PGIM.Sc103134838
A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED 7'0 THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, UNlVERSlTY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF M.Sc DEGREE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT. * APPROVAL PAGE
This thesis have approved for the award of the degree of Master of Science (M.Sc) in Public Administration and Local Gvernment, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
Head of Department CERTIFICIATION
This research Project titled; "Elections and the Politics of Transitions in Nigeria: An Institutional Assessment of INEC and its conduct of 2003 Elections in Anambra State", written by Ben Nwankwo (,PGIM.Sc103134838)meets the regulations governing the award of the degree of Master of Science (MSc.) of the Unlverslty of Nlgerla, Nsukka, and Is approved for its contribution to scientific knowledge and literary presentation.
The work embodied in this research is original and has not being submitted in part or full for any other diploma or degree of this and other University.
Supetvisor
External Examiner. AKNOWLEDGEMENT
In the process of this research work, I found the assistance and contribution of many people very useful. I am profoundly thankful to them.
Notwithstanding, I am obliged by obvious circumstances to register the kindness and persistence of my supervisor, Prof. F. C. Okoli, under whose tutelage, I profusely admit, 1 have learnt a lot. Osisioma may God cultivate in your vineyard. Many thanks to Dr. N. N. Elekwe my head, Dr. Fab Onah, Dr. A. 0. Onyishi, Dr. E. N. Aguigwo and Dr. C. J. Nwale, who rendered helps at various stages.
The Library of the Head of Service, the Library of the Secretary to the head of service, the Library to the Government of the Federation, the Library of the Federal Ministry of Finance, Abuja and the Library of the University of Nigeria; to their management and staff I am grateful to for their resourceful assistance.
I appreciate very immensely the support of my colleagues in the M.Sc Class 2004; we loved and co-operated amongst us and for the usefulness of such attitudes I register my gratitude. To Sir M. N. Okoli and Senator C. N. Ukachukwu, I salute; for a determined effort as dearly pillars; to render helps especially when it mattered most.
My brothers and sisters deserve my commendation for their unequal love shown to me very unflinchingly and remained very unshakeable even when the storm was high. The entire people of Orumba, who at all times I had presented myself for their service, they enthusiastically consented, even in 2002 when I was away by enemies ploy - you made a choice. And the choice is 1. I am enslaved to your passion, love and solidarity. Our vision is SURE.
My wife, Chi-isco kept the home front when 1 abandoned them to pursue the course of destiny. Baby, I am grateful to you for looking over Mmesoma, Nwannem, Dumebis, Chikamso and Nkemjika during the time I went for 'war'.
The assistance of my personal aides - Chidi, Chris, Evans, Eboh and a whole lot of others 1 hereto place on records. To all these and many others whose mention I cannot complete under limited space and time, I immensely acknowledge. DEDICATION This work is dedicated to Chief N. N. Nwankwo (1912-1989),
Ohamee of Akpu. Father, that the foundation, which you ably laid, may not be in vain. -. 'IirhIP 0/'~'011/~~11/ TABLE OF CONTENT ['age Title Page
Approval Page I
Certification II .-. Acknowledgements - 111
Dedication - v Table of Content v i CHAPTER ONE 1.0 Introduction 2 1.1 Background to the Problem 14
1.2 Statement of Problem - 14 1.3 Objective of Study 15
1.4 Significance of Study - 16
1.5 Scope and 1.-imitation of Study - 17
CHAPTER TWO 2.0 Literature Review
2.0.1 Ecology of Electoral Process... 2.0.2 Elections and Political Conflicts.. 2.3.0 Comparative Explot-atiori Egypt France Brazil Germany Mexico United Kingdom United States Japan 2.4.0 Gap in the LAerature - 2.4.Q.1 Hypothesis 2.4.0.2 Operationalization of the Key Concepts 2.4.0.3 Methodology -
2.4.0.4 ~escri~tivdMethod - 2.4.0.5 Theoretical Framework
2.4.1.0 , Characteristics of the theory - 2.4.1.1 The Application of the theory To study -
2.4.t.2 Method of Data Collection - 2.4.1.3 DocumentS - 2.4.I .4 Participant Observation
2.4.1.5 Method of Data Analysis - I
CHAPTER THREE 3.0 The Study Area CHAPTER FOUR 4.0 Data Presentation Analysis and
. Findings -
4.1 Data Presentation and Analysis -
4.1 .IAnambra 2003 - 4. I.2 Governorship Nomination I 4.1.3 National and State House of Assemblies Nomination by PDP - 4.1.4 General Elections 4.1.4(A) Governorship - 4.1.4(B) National Assembly - 4.1.4(C) State Assembly - CHAPTER FIVE 5.0 Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion 5.1 Summary 5.2 Recommendations
5.3 Conclusion I
Appendix References
1.0 Introduction.
The History of present-day African States could be traced to colonial rule, courtesy of the Berlin Conference of 1885, which divided African territories into areas of influence of European powers. The actual rule was brief or long, depending on the policy of the colonial powers. At the end of the colonial rule, independence was granted as a result of mutual settlement or prolonged war of independence.
At independence, African States established their government based on the liberal democratic principles with a flourishing multi- party system. Within a few years, multiparty systems collapsed, giving way to one party rule or military authoritarianism. These systems of government continued to dominate the African political landscape until the end of the 1980s.
With the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the end of the Cold War, a revolutionary change took place in the political history of the world. This change led to the retreat of socialist government and the resurgence of liberal democratic government. This development affected the political history of Africa.
What Macmillan, a one time British Prime Minister, in the 1960s, described as a w ind of c hange became a tornado i n the 1 990s. Variously described as the third wave, Aperture (a team for Political opening by Richard Joseph) a wind blowing African coconut trees (a term used by President Bongo of Gabon) and second independence, this political tornado changed the political map of Africa
From the Northern Horn to the Southern Cape; and from Tropical Savannah of the West to the Equatorial Region of East, the entire continent was caught in a wave of democratization. Indeed, democracy became the only game in town. One of the essential features of democratization process is election. As correctly observed by Bratton (1999).
The consolidation of democracy involves the widespread acceptance of issues to guarantee political participation and political competition. Elections - which empower ordinary citizens to choose among contestants for top political office - clearly promote both sort of rules.
ii. Since independence, Nigeria has faced considerable difficulty in successfully conducting transparent and fair election aimed at establishing an enduring democratic system. Most analysts agree that all elections since 1965, with the exception of the I993 polls have been marred by violence and malpractices
with the ' political parties and incumbents at the core of the difficulties.
There is a strong theoretical tie between elections and democracy, the principle being a settled one that elections do sustain democracy, and consequently promote political stability. The 2003 General elections are the first civilian-to-civilian transition process and the outcome has led to a need for an institutional assessment The question therefore is what are the democratic characters of this election and its reciprocal capacity to build democracy, promote stability and the principle of mass participation, while engendering conflict settlement? Or is the reverse the case?
The consolidation of democratic rule remains one of Nigeria's greatest national challenges, largely as a result of the following; The long period of military rule had far reaching effects on governance system and the political behaviour of the Nigerian people. Civil society was particularly weakened through oppression and there is widespread distrust of government institutions (including INEC). Worst still, most Nigerians have very little understanding of the democratic process or the willingness for active participation.
The first years of the democratic system, the country witnessed a number of unexpected ethnic and religious conflicts complicated by economic recessions and very low level of political motivation. Tools and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts, violence and hostilities are not yet institutionalised.
Although results of the 1999 elections were accepted, it exposed the need for an institutional enhancement of INEC's capacity for better performance and worst still, the 2003 general elections further eroded the reputation of INEC i n the conduct of credible e lections. T his situation further interrogates the independence of INEC in the performance of her constitutional duties, vis-a-vis the clutching hands of the Federal Executive powers that funds its operations. Of greatest concern in the whole democratic arrangement is the imminent need to evolve a framework that will generate an electoral mechanism capable of credibility, integrity and capacity to wield together the centrifugal elements in the democratic process of Nigeria.
The world today tilts towards the system of governance, which generates social justice, equality and liberty. Democracy possesses these features. The practice of this system in a plurinational state like Nigeria can only succeed if transparent electoral system is instituted as an important aspect of our political system.
Paradoxically, election and the whole gamut of the electoral process in Nigeria have been the bane of our democratic development and consolidation. In the history of electoral politics in Nigeria, the vital connectivity between the elected and the electors necessary for a liberal democracy has been missing (International IDEA 2000:216). This missing link is the aberration tenable only in coups and electoral frauds. Both variables are the two sides of a single coin. In coup-de-tats the use of military weapons and tactics are employed to wrest power or worst still 'take over' the powers of the state. On the other hand, in electoral fraud, violence, guns, acids and other weapons, including negatively conceived political ingenuity are employed to 'take-over' or in another language, purport to have won elections using the tools and machineries of the state to pervert its constitution and the people. Infradique! Perfidy! And absurdity!
iii. Electoral Commission is a body set up with the responsibility of organizing and conducting elections in a country. In the case of Nigeria, the genealogy of Electoral bodies can be traced to the pre-independence era when the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) was established to conduct the 1959 general Elections. The Commission was headed by Chief Commissioner Mr. R. E. Wrait. Mr J. J. Warren was appointed the Executive Secretary. Both were British. Although four Nigerians joined the expatriates later as commissioners. They were Alhaji Muhammed Bello (North), Mr Anthony Aniagolu (East), Prof. Oritsejolomi Thomas (West) and Mr. M. A. Shosilva (Lagos).
By 1960, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) was established. It was the FEC that conducted the post independence federal and regional elections of 1964 and 1965 had Mr. Esau as Chairman. This electoral body was however dissolved in I966 by the military government who usurped power from the civilian. On November 15, 1976 the Federal Electoral Commission was inaugurated by General Olusegun Obasanjo regime. Late Chief Michael Ani headed the commission. It was FEDECO that organized the 1979 general election that ushered in the then second republic. It also conducted the 1983 general elections before the military interregnum. FEDECO was dissolved by Buhari ldiagbon regime in 1983. By 1987, there was another military coup headed by General lbrahim Babangida who established the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to carry out the Government transition to civil rule programme. The NEC organized and conducted all elections that put in place all necessary democratic structures beginning from Local Government to the National Assembly. Unfortunately, the presidential e lection t hat was conducted u nder t he same regime on June 12, 1993 was annulled by the same government. However, towards the end of 1993, NEC was reconstituted to organize another presidential election but failed to see the light of the day when it was dissolved by another military junta headed by General Sani Abacha on November 1993.
In December 1995 the military government of General Sanni Abacha established the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON), which also organized and conducted another sets of elections from Local Government to National Assembly. However, these elected institutions were not inaugurated before the sudden demise of ,General Abacha on June 8, 1998. After the death of Abacha, GeneralsAdbulsalamiAbubakar headed the new military government that came to power. He dissolved NECON and established the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). This Commission organized and conducted the election that ushered in the Nigeria fourth Republic on May 29, 1999. INEC conducted the 2003 elections throughout the federation.
Nonetheless, there is never a time in the history of the country that Electoral Bodies or Commissions operated without the undue interference of the executive or other powerful individual in the society. For instance, during the First Republic the then Electoral Body that conducted the general and regional elections was favourably disposed to the government of the day. Most of the candidates from the ruling party, (NCNC) in the Eastern region declared unopposed in most part of the region. (Ojiakor 1981:20). This same development was applicable to other regions.
In the Northern region over 60 candidates of the Northern People Congress (NPC) were returned unopposed (Ojiakor 1981:20). This signified the full control exercised by Balewa government over the then Federal Electoral Commission.
The 1979 general election also show case the extent at which FEDECO was subjected to the whims and caprices of the then military government. The Electoral Decree No 73 of 1979 vested on FEDECO the regulatory powers over the roles of parties in the election process. Section 76 of the Decree stipulates that; "No association by whatever name called will be allowed to function in a political party unless it is registered as such by the Electoral Commission and such registration is subject to the fulfilment of condition prescribed under the Decree. iv. lNEC as a body is presumably an unbiased umpire, free from the control of any individual or group of individuals in the state. Its position is important and strategic in the democratic process and national development, since it pronounces those that occupy the apex positions of governance in any democratic system after the people might have expressed their wishes through the ballot boxes. Such a body is presupposed to have autonomy or independence, free of all manipulations by those in authority who may want to use the Commission as a mere political mercenaries to attain their selfish goals and perpetuate their hold on power.
The freedom of the Commission in its exercise of constitutional functions will bring integrity to democracy as goodwill is cumulatively built on the system following transparent performances. On the contrary, bias, manipulation, dependency and corruption on the side of this political umpire will maliciously impugn the process, malign integrity, social justice, equality and equity while jettisoning nation building and democratic stability. v. The Electoral Commission - An Institutional Frame Work. The Electoral system a nd politics i n itself take p lace within a nd between the political systems of the state. Functioning like a social system, political systems are involved in the making of authoritative, public decision - a set of institutions like parliament, bureaucracy, Court, Electoral Commission - that formulate and implement the collective goals of a society or government. Political systems feature government at their core, but they also encompass important parts of the environment in which governments operate. The systems therefore mould and I reciprocally are moulded by a domestic and international environment. The system receives inputs from these environments and shapes them through its outputs. The boundaries of political systems are defined in terms of persons, territory and property. That is why this research study is about the electoral system of Nigeria, operating within the larger political system that depicts the system of Nigeria.
UNITED STATES
FIGURE 1.1 The Political System and Its I Environment
------Source Comparabve Polit~csToday by Gabriel Almond el a/, Pearson Educallon 2004
Figure 1.I shows that a political system exists in both domestic and international environment, moulding these environments and in turn being moulded by the environment. The political system therefore is conceived to be a set of institutions and agencies concerned with formulating and implementing the corporate goals of a sovereign society. The electoral system of Nigeria is located within the institutional structure of the political system, with a two way inter-ractional process between the former and the later. It is therefore safe to say, that the electoral system is reflective of the entire political system of Nigeria, while the political system in itself portends some of the characteristics of the entire Nigerian state.
JAPAN
Legislatures Courts
FIGURE 1.2 The Political System and Its Structures
Source. Comparative Politics Today by Gabriel Almond el al, Pearson Education 2004
While figure 1.1 shows the inter-dependence between a system and its enviro,nment, figure I.2 locates within the political system, six types of political structures - political parties, 'interest groups, Legislatures, Executives, bureaucracies, and Courts. The understanding of how each of the six fold classification works will lead to a precise and technical understanding of the operationalizations of the entire system.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
MEXICO - -- .- A' FIGURE 1.3 The Political System and Its Functions
Source: Comparative Politics Today by Gabriel Almond et a/. Pearson Educalion 2004
As in figure 1.1, although United States is the central actor, but other countries are used as environmental examples. Figure 1.3 shows how we relate structure to function; and process, to policy and performance. Before policy is made and implemented in any given political system, it usually will walk through the pathway of interest articulation, interest aggregation, policy making, policy implementation and adjudication. These are process functions because they constitute the components of the policy-making mechanism in any political system.
INEC therefore will be institutionally assessed, and the examination will involve a systemic analysis of the electoral body, bringing out its strength and weaknesses while surveying how far these strength and weaknesses have influenced the performance of INEC in the conduct of elections, especially in Anambra State, using the 2003 elections as a benchmark.
A comparative analysis of electoral systems of other world democracies will be attempted. Much as the central theme of the study is on the Independent National Electoral Commission and its "- impact and relevance or otherwise in the power transition process in Nigeria, the focal point of the research is Anambra State, one of the units in the federal union of Nigeria. Special survey of some of the elections conducted by INEC in 2003 will be made as well as a comprehensive analysis of the unfolding political events and activities in the state. During the study we intend to interrogate, and define the co-relational relationship between INEC as an institution that conducts elections in Nigeria and the stability or instability observable in the polity as a result of activities of the Commission. In other words, we shall seek to equilibrate the reciprocal relationship between the electoral process and the consequential results t hat it inherently produces, using Anambra State, in the South East Nigeria as a case study.
1.I BACKGROUNG TO THE PROBLEM
It is a settled principle that free and fair election is key to democratic development in a polity. In most of the world's known democracies, elections are reflective of the wishes of the masses, showing a full consummation of the principle of popular sovereignty. But in African states, particularly Nigeria, there is no election since independence that is not marred by controversies, petitions, allegations of myriads of misconducts and malpractices, bruising the collectivism with which election' is universally distinguished.
The problem highlighted in the foregoing is a pointer to the institutional inhibitions of the Independent Electoral Commission in carrying out her function to the Nigerian people. The study therefore is set to closely examine the problems identified above.
I .2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM This research study will be guided by the following problemlquestions; 1 How does the quest for power at all cost, and the tendentious perpetuation in power by leaders affect the principles of free and fair election. How does corrupt practices affect the overall results of elections thereby turning it against the wishes of the people in the country? How would a truly independent electoral institution affect t he p rocess of d emocracy and i mpact o n t he achievement of social harmony and political stability? What are the effects of abuse of due process in electoral matters on the overall political and economic development of Nigeria? How would the ruling party and the incumbency factor affect the independence of the electoral institution and its ability to conduct free and fair election under a presidential system of governance? What is the role of an unfettered judiciary in promoting a just electoral system, which in turn impacts on political stability and rule sf law in Nigeria?
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY The specific objectives of the study are to: Trace the evolution of the electoral institutions in Nigeria and the past elections and identify the problems and difficulties in achieving free and fair election. Copiously examine the effect of adequate monitoring, supervision and evaluation of field officers especially during election on the final result of the election. Study the impact of true independence of the electoral institution and its overall integrity in the entire political scenario of Nigeria. 4) Study the roles of institutional framework, rule of law and the Electoral Act 2002 in the functional process of electoral institutions in Nigeria. 5) Examine critically the role of the judiciary - an 'independent' judiciary - in the overall performance of iNEC as well as on the political process and stability of Nigeria.
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY The study will be significant in the following ways: 1) It will show how inordinate desires to hold unto power by all means, bribery and corruption have made the electoral institution less effective in carrying out its constitutional duties. 2) It will also show how insufficient monitoring of staff, motivation and lack of election logistics and technology mar the conduct of elections in Nigeria. 3) The study will reveal how political parties; especially, the ruling party and the power incumbents bridle the operation of the electoral institution and negatively affect its constitutional obligation to the Nigerian people. 4) The study will show also how the judiciary can abate or unabated the excesses and abuses in the political system of Nigeria. The effect of the independence of the Judiciary, concept of separation of powers and true adherence to rule of law on political process and stability will be surveyed. The consequent effects of corruption on the political process and growth of democracy will be wholesomely aggregated. 1.5 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY This research focuses on the electoral body of Nigeria, carrying out an institutional analysis of INEC in the performance of the constitutional role as the electoral umpire in Nigeria. The study further explores the nexus between INEC, her official conduct and promotion of political stability in Nigeria. Although INEC is a national b ody w hose j urisdiction covers the 36 states of N igeria, logistic reasons a nd control of many extra venous factors would not enable a proper smooth analysis in the entire areas of coverage of the INEC, i.e the 36 states, therefore Anambra state, easily one of the states where the out come of the 2003 elections conducted by INEC is fingered as a major reason for political instability and conflict. This study therefore is limited in scope in terms of national coverage and does not cover the examination of all the key functions of INEC as a Public institution in Nigeria. Literature Review
Research Method 2.0 Literature Review The Encyclopaedia of social sciences defines election as; "the process of selecting the officers or representatives of an organisation or group by the votes of its qualified members" Although Bain (1964:162) does not agree with the above definition, but more inclusively added that election is "the formal process by which the electorate selects officials and determines issues submitted to it. It is therefore a procedure for choosing officers or making binding decisions concerning policy by the vote of those formally qualified to participate"
Election there connotes decision. Decision underlines all voting and when voting has finally been made a decision has been taken and consequently a declaration of that decision is made.
Akzin (1960:706) distinguishes between technical and social significance of election. According to the eminent scholar, election, in a technical sense is "the process by which an office is assigned to a person by an act of volition needing the simultaneous expression of opinion by many paople. Socially, he continued, election is; "the process by which a person is linked to an office with due provision for the participation of the people meant to come under the officers authority1' This suggests the idea of ruling a society with the consent of the ruled. This is tantamount to democracy, and differentiates election from appointment or forceful take over of power without the consent of the people either by military weaponry or electoral fraud. Elections can take place in both private and public sector or in a country like Nigeria. Our concern here is the election, its process and institutional framework or system in Nigeria.
In the words of Mayo (1960:73) the main "purpose of the whole electoral process is to produce a government with legitimacy" Nnoli (1990:42) captures it more aptly when he succinctly wrote that; "an election may be defined as the manner of choice agreed upon by a group of people which enables them to select one or a few people out of many to occupy one or a number of positions of authority" To him therefore, election is vital if not the key to any democratic arrangement. "it is so closely tied to the growth and development of democratic political order that it is now generally held to be the single most important indicator of the presence or absence of democratic government" In the context therefore, election signifies and depicts democracy, in fact, the consequential output of democracy. Its conduct therefore exposes the character of the democracy.
Agreeing with Nnoli's conceptualisation, is Diamond (2002:353) who asserts that "Elections are the litmus test of a democratic system" This is such that to define democracy is in essence to underline the centrality of elections. Many attempts have been made by political theorists and scholars in the past to establish the theoretical linkage between election and democracy. Powell, Bingham (1982), Huxtable, P. A. (1998), Hyden, Goran (1992), Bratton, Michael and Posner Daniel (1999) Joseph, Richard (ed 1999) Mkandawire, Thankika (1999). Among their perspectives is that elections serve as means of legitimizing regimes and sustaining the ruling e lites i n power. Another perspective a rgues that elections do provide the best means for orderly leadership succession in liberal democracy. It is therefore a means of ensuring popular participation in political arrangements. Election is also one of the means of establishing legitimate government and exercising popular control over the nations leaders. (Grag, D. William 1979:202) Electoral contest can therefore institutionalise the regularity of competitive elections. In this way elections do sustain or help democracy to survive (Bratton and Posner, 1999:378)
Another school of thought argues that elections paradoxically do not guarantee democracy, especially among developing states of Africa. Instead, the electoral system have been so manipulated that they indeed have re-tyrannised some societies. Most elections have witnessed elections that have brought tyrants into power or such elections have been stage managed to retain such civilian dictators in power. While some countries have elected regimes which have directed or guided the advancement of democracy, some have organised elections that put in place regimes with moderate democratic characteristics. Some countries in the same vein have elected regimes with ambiguous or circumscribed democratic commitments. (Bratton, Michael and Posner Daniel (1999), Momah, Abubakar, said (1999) Mkandawire, Thandika (I999). Elections are therefore fundamental not only for installation of legitimate government, but also for broader democratic consolidation. The core task of this work is to explore the nexus between elections and political stability, while at the same time carrying out a SWOT analysis of INEC as managers of the electoral system. The regularity, openness and acceptability of elections signal whether basic constitutional, behavioural and attitudinal foundations are being laid for sustainable democratic rule (Bratton and Posner, 1999:379).
The argument of Bratton et al above is that elections can bring about re-tyrannisation or still, criminalisation of the state. Find a passionate support in the prepositions of A.C. Smock (ed) (1973) that Political mobilisation would entail the ability of a political system to penetrate and control society, and thus direct change; such capacity should be regularised and effective. He further notes; "When a political system lacks the structural, functional, ideological or cultural requirement for political mobilisation, it will flounder under these burdens and the society will suffer.. ." From the argument above, it would mean that for an electoral system of Nigeria to work, it should institutionalize characterising a structure that has evolved towards effective performance.
It theoretically therefore explains why some electoral systems by themselves are capable of criminalising the powers of the state to the extent of securing the tenures of offices of the incumbents and their cronies. Therefore a low input mechanism to the political system will serve the whims and caprices of the power merchants who see the state as a limited liability enterprise to guzzle her resources without qualms of conscience or fears of any prosecution. Understandably such beneficiaries being in power will not favour any institutionalized electoral system, which will produce credible, out-puts acceptable by all reasonable approximations.
Democracy is indeed important in the politics and development of any n ation. T hus countries I ike N igeria e ven with l ong h istory of military rule strive to achieve this. The underlying thesis is that; "Democratization process by their very nature of mobilizing greater participation and placing the question of control and sharing or distribution of state power and resources on top of the political agenda, exacerbate conflicts and tensions and therefore make their management a critical matter. This is not only for the survival of the state as a whole" (Osaghae, 1994:l). Yet democracy is crucial to our daily life. To Robert Dahl (1963: 133) e lection of p olitical 1 eaders i s c rucial t o a d emocratic process since it gives the ordinary people the leverage to choose leaders of their choice. This is why Schumpeter, simple notes that democracy is nothing but an institutional arrangement through which individuals acquire power by means of competitive struggle for people's votes (Dahl, 1971). ..r,%, A ~,-i.~k
The i mportance a nd p rospects for d emocracy i n n ot j ust N igeria but developing countries as a whole remains valuable process and prospects. This is because; "The prospects for democracy in the third world area are a subject of practical concern. They have generally failed to produce material prosperity or practical stability and their repressiveness has at best curtailed freedom or expression and at worst involved incarceration and brutality. But is awareness of the consequences of dictatorship enough to ensure the triumph of democracy?" (Pickney, 1993:5). The substance of our nascent democracy as Bello (2003) has observed entails a successful transfer of power from a one regime to another through a credible electoral process. But in Nigeria this has been difficult to achieve. The examples of 1964, 1983 and 2003 are clear paradoxes.
For elections to deepen the roots of democracy, it must mean perfect a translation of the will of the people into the choice of the leadership the electoral systems seek to choose. Elections therefore must be free and fair.
Elections have become the cardinal point of democracy given the fact that democracy necessitates majority participation in governance and this can only be properly done by elections. Popular elections give rise to free expression of public opinion, and a fair system of appointment of people to public offices. It also give credence to the fact that it broadens the democratic freedom through which freedom of association and assembly by which political parties can be formed so that citizens can have a variety of choices among competing political programmes, parties and candidates (Bello, 2003; Agbese, 1997). Having done the above conceptual explorations, what then are the functions of elections and the distinguishing characteristics?
Elections g enerally perform the following functions (Zabad 2 003; Madenzie, 1967) i) they help in the process of choosing/selecting leaders and representatives; i i) elections also legitimise regimes when they are re-elected or votes a new regime into power; iii) it also performs the function of punishing bad leaders. When non-performing leaders are voted out of office, it is a punitive action. iv) Also, elections help in resolving conflicts especially in multi-party system, i t g ives t he voters the o pportunity to choose between two or more conflicting manifestoes, candidates, etc. '4 Elections a Iso e nable u s to h ave o rderly t ransitions a nd successions. This allows stability, continuity, change and development in the system.
Continuing, Zabad 2003 et a1 identify the following characteristics of an election; (i) there must be an independent judiciary, free from political influence and control, which can interpret rules governing elections, fairly and impartially. (ii) There must be an honest, competent, non-partisan administration to conduct and manage the elections. (iii) There must be a developed system of political parties, traditions and terms of candidates before the e lections c an have a lternatives b etween w hich to choose.
(iv) . There must be a general acceptance, both by the politicians and by the general public (MacKenzie, 1967). However, in Nigeria, the c haracter of elections and conduct h as hardly made it possible for these objectives to be REALLY achieved. This is because of the various forms of malpractices that dominate the process. The electoral process is manipulated in Nigeria mostly through rigging and other forms of irregular conducts, corruption and favouritism. Generally, rigging is part of the tendency to limit franchise to a few people in the society and indeed scheme the masses out of political control. This restricts many from voting. In fact; "The restriction of voting rights is used to ensure the entrenchment of power and limit the accumulation of power and wealth to a few hands in Nigeria, the franchise was made universal at an early stage of its political development. However, in order to ensure the entrenchment of power in a few hands, the main actors manipulate virtually every election through rigging and
. violence" (Awa, l997:127) This is simply so because; "The basic Nigerian problem is an over-valuation of materialism against high morality. This leads to both a prebedel view of politics and the quest for the primitive accumulation of wealth (Awa, 1997:141 )." It is this excessive desire for politics as means of capitalist accumulation that gives rise to managing or controlling the electoral process to produce predetermined results. This is seen basically as electoral malpractice, which hardly is in accordance with the rules of free and fair elections (Ochai, 1984; Salifu, 2002; Ali, 2002).
This is closely tied to the fact that election and subsequently p~~blic offices it generates enable people to have easy access to the public treasury. More so, the gamut of the political system lack approximate will per I aw to e nforce desired o rder a nd discipline. Political competition therefore is reduced to warfare, a game only the mightier by muscle, wealth and violence wins against the collective of the peoples' will. A do or die affair! "With election so critical in a democratic political system, it is understandable why we should be concerned with its freeness and fairness. As argued by the The Nigerian Social Scienfisf (2003) "without elections being held regularly and seen to be conducted in transparently free and fair manner, democracy remains a sham, a forlorn hope, indeed an empty shadow of itself." It is precisely because of this effect, that virtually every analyst who comments on democratic elections, particularly in Nigeria, always stresses the issue of freeness and fairness (among others Ujo. 2003; Olaleye. 2003; Bello. 2003; Nzongola - Ntalaja, 2001; and Diamond. 2002). It is well known that elections are often characterized by all manners of malpractices which, particularly in the case of Nigeria, yield violence and credibility or integrity problem that seriously constitute apparent contradictions to the principles and character of democracy.
Our project therefore is motivated by the need to contribute positively to the quest for free and fair elections in Nigeria by carrying out proper institutional analysis, interrogating the relationship models between the incumbent and the independence of the electoral body and will explore the nexus between the elections as conducted by INEC and the stability of the government that emerges from its out-put mechanisms. As usual, Anambra State is our study base.
The Nigerian Social Scientist (2003:l) raises a poser that: "a committed and vigorous defence of the integrity and a spirited promotion of the vitality of free and fair elections together become a crucial sacred task and challenge on the political and academic agenda of the political and the scholar, both of whom are presumed to believe in democracy as the best form of governance."
To make our exploration more meaningful, we have chosen to define the concept of free and fair election functionally rather than abstractly, in this respect, we shall draw generously from Diamond's elaborate exposition on the concept, which in effect serves as a framework.
Diamond (2002:354/355) highlighted four major variables on which the concept of free and fair elections rests. These are a) The political parties b) The individuals, c) The voting process and d) The election outcome. Starting with the political parties, he argued that in a multiparty democracy, for an election to be considered as free and fair the; "Parties must be free to compete, to organize, to recruit members, to articulate policies, to stage rallies and solicit votes. The less the political system restricts opposing parties from the business of organizing and campaigning, and the less it systematically favours a particular party (typically the ruling party) the freer and fairer the election may be said to have been."
By the same logic, for an election to be free and fair; "the individual must be free to participate in the political process - to join the party of their choice, to campaign for it, to seek political office on its platform and of course to vote for it (or not to vote at all)."
Furthermore, on the voting process; "Each person should have one and only one vote and each should be counted equally. No one who satisfies some limited set of conditions (such as minimum age and sound mind) should be refused registration. No registered voter should be prevented from voting nor should anyone be allowed to vote more than once, nor should any votes be counted for a party except those of individuals legally cast. Nor should any legally and properly cast votes be discarded or disregarded."
And on the election outcome, an election would be free and fair if the results are "Accurately reported a nd the I egitimate victors a llowed to assume office." When all the conditions germane to the four variables as defined above a re o bserved i n t he p rocess, conduct a nd o utcome of a n election, that election could be considered to be free and fair. It is possible as is often the case in reality that only some and not all of the conditions for freeness and fairness are met or observed. In this case the election would be considered to be partially free and fair or not free and fair depending on the gravity or degree of its deviation from the above defined standards.
We have seen the conceptualisation of election as an institutionalized procedure for choosing leadership, but Nigeria's various general elections from its independence in 1960 up till 2003 had always fallen short of expectation in various aspects.
On the aspect of political parties, many parties had always been allowed to operate as witnessed in the first, second and fourth republics. The only exception to this was in the abortive Third Republic (1992-1993) when the military government overseeing the democratic transition then, outlawed the different political parties in existence and decreed to parties into being, the different parties had also been free to compete, organize and recruit members, to articulate their policies state rallies and campaign for votes. The only shortcoming in this regard was that the ruling party in elections organized under civilian governments constituted by one of the competing had always enjoyed the perquisites of power, which conferred advantage on it over and above its rivals. For instance the government of the ruling party at the centre had always been constitutionally vested with the power to appoint officials of the national electoral body, which served as the umpire during elections, and also to propose electoral laws. This apart from the regular governmental responsibility of control over other resources and the coercive apparatus (police, armed forces etc) of the state. The only exceptions to this 'systemic' advantage which yield electoral gains for a ruling political party were arguably periods when elections were administered by outgoing apparently non-partisan military regimes (in 1979 and 1999).
When it comes to the voting process however, elections in Nigeria had always left much to be desired. Legally, each eligible adult had only one vote, which counted equally with the vote of any other. Legally too, every individual who satisfied the minimum age requirement (i.e 18 years) and was of sound mind was registerable and could exercise hislher voting right. in reality, a combination of administrative inefficiency and deliberate political scheming by some of the stakeholders in the electoral process (government and political parties) had always raised obstacles that would expose the voting process to serious credibility crisis. Taking a historical view of election in Nigeria, Diamond has this to say; "The first decade of national electoral competition in Nigeria ... (the 1950s) witnessed the raucous and often violent campaigning, the determined and often coercive mobilization of the illiterate by the dominant class, the obstruction and harassment of opposition parties and candidates, and the intimidation and repression of opposition supporters." Profusely continued; "Following independence in 1960, the performance of the electoral s ystem.. . d eteriorated. The regional e lections of 1960 and 1961 continued the abuses of previous elections - the harassment, intimidation, even imprisonment of opposition politicians and their followings . . . During the 1964 federal election, this process deepened significantly . . . Well in advance of the voting controversy enveloped the preparation of the preliminary list of voters . . . names were misspelled and placed in the wrong wards, addresses were jumbled or omitted."
No wonder Chief Chris Uba (Sunday Champion June 8, 2003:ll) the self made god 'father' of Anambra state, unmistakably averred; "I feel that what I have done for Anambra state, and I have given then is therefore the best that they can get any
where ..." 'I.. it is not just the Governor and the Deputy that 1 sponsored; there are also three (3) Senators, ten (10) members of House of Representatives and thirty (30) members of the House of Assembly . . . and this is the first time in the history of Anambra state that one single individual would be putting every public officer in the State in power." Historical. Voodooism. Hysterical. He speaks and acts like an emperor or better still, Pharaoh, negating the collectivism inherent in democracy and conferring on himself, the power to choose, sponsor and install. Is this election?
This situation held true for virtually every election in Nigeria down to the last general elections in 2003. In fact, the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), which monitored the 2003 elections, came out with the following findings among others; "Some of the activities organized by the [electoral] commission preparatory to the elections such as the voter's registration, the registration of political parties and the display of the voters [list] were marred by inefficiency, confusion and corruption. Hundred of thousands of prospective voters could not register in the voters registration exercise organized by the commission . . . for a number of reasons, including the fact that many of its officials ... claimed that they did not have enough registration materials .. . In addition to this, the comrl.lission's process of [issuance of] voters' cards has been so inefficient that a day to the elections, millions of prospective voters had not been able to get their voters' cards (Sha, 2003:7/8).
Actual voting itself during all the elections in 2003 was reportedly marked by: "disruption of poll or absence of elections in some poling centers, vote buying, stealing and stuffing of ballot boxes, improper set-up and voting procedures, multiple, ghost and under aged voting ... Collaboration of INEC officials to commit electoral fraud, absence of polling officials at polling units, and intimidation of election observers ..." (Sha. 2OO3:lO) With the voting process poorly handled and highly corrupted, it is not surprising that election outcome were always highly disputed, and often rejected by declared losers. It would either be that results would be declared for a particular candidate or party where voting had not taken place, or that the actual result would be altered at any stage between voting and the final declaration of result or that candidates who won elections were short changed for those who didn't face the ballots. The effect of course was to give victory to the wrong party or candidate. In the celebrated case of June 12, 1993 presidential election, the counting of votes was scuttled a nd the a pparent winner of the e lection w as d enied t he opportunity to assume office. The overall effect of all these manipulations had always been large-scale violence and de- stabilization of t he polity. I n the F irst a nd S econd Republics this outcome let do the overthrow of the civilian government in place then (1966 and 1983). while it led to the prolongation of military rule in the aborted Third Republic (1993). Already, the outcome of the 2003 elections in the Fourth Republic had exasperated so many people so much that an analyst exclaimed; "if this is how democracy is practiced then we might as well ask when it will end!" (Sha, 2003:2).
The shortcomings in successive elections in Nigeria are attributable to many factors which have been summarised by Ujo (2003 (a) :5) as; i. The activities of the institutional structure responsible for conducting elections. .. II. A poor economic environment, which did not make it possible for democratic, values to thrive. .. . 111. The lack of political integration, which made the electorate to interpret modern politics in primordial terms. iv. The universal law of organization, which made party leaders to adopt undemocratic means as a strategy for survival in power.
Of all these factors, the first one appears to us here to be the most critical given that what happens at the level of institutional administration of election process determines whether the process would eventually be free and fair. This position is obvious in the analyses of other commentators on Nigeria's electoral history. For instance, most of the factors listed by Sha (2003:Z) as causes of flawed elections in Nigeria (i.e poor administration and organization of the electoral process, poor communication of election results, control over voter registration, poor funding of elections and institutions in charge of elections) are those arising from the institutional administration of the process. So also Diamond (2002:357/358) was categorical in his declaration that the crisis over the I964 federal election was brought to a boiling point by the administration of the election itself." And yet again that the then unprecedented rigging witnessed in the 1965 Western Regional election was helped by 'the administration' of the election which was in the hands of officials ... who were responsive to direction and pressure from the ruling party'
The Transition Monitoring group (TMG) observed that the administrative body for the 2003 elections, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was widely perceived as lacking in independence due to the commission's activities and utterances b y various c ategories of its officers, which s uggested that it was pandering to the whims of the Executive (Sha, 2003:7)
Our exploration portray the picture and character of our electoral system, they have also defined elections and in some cases show the relevant functional connectivity between elections and democracy o n o ne h and; a nd c redible e lection o r o thewise a nd the stability or criminalization of the governance process. It is an acceptable argument that election is at the centrality of any liberal democracy, as well that only an electoral system that is institutionalized can produce credibility and integrity in return. A valid thesis it is also that there is a necessary direct relationship - unfettered and unchanged,- between votes cast in an election and results declared from any electoral process. The violation of this cause and effect relationship is worrisome and detrimental to the development and consolidation of democracy in developing African states. This study posits that where the collectivism of the people is violated, 'the government so enthroned through illegal instrumentality of the electoral system lacks legitimacy and is imbued w ith a n i nherent capacity to brew conflicts, v iolence a nd instability within the territorial jurisdiction it seeks to govern. This is so because the principle of democracy vests the power to rule on the people who are at liberty to enthrone or dethrone.
No wonder therefore that the Political Bureau set up by the Government of Nigeria in 1986 to study the causes of failure of election in Nigeria identified the conditions under which a free and fair political competition can take place. Kurfi (1983) amplifies the conditions with the following positions:
an election is not free unless voters vote freely; an election is not free if those in power manipulate the process to perpetuate their own power; fairness of election is at its maximum where there is provision for universal adult suffrage; a democratic political system consist of several parts - the people, the electorate, political parties and the three arms of government. Elections may considered to be free only when they are free from the point of view of each of these parts, There is, however, one of Mckenzie's conditions which appears controversial. This has to do with the view that political parties are virtually indispensable to a political system. Rose, quoted by Sada (1990), moderates this and suggests that what matters is that elections must competitive either between political parties or candidates. Nyerere (1996) argues that Africa does not need inter- party contests: To him, the one-party state best suits the continent. To drive home his point, Nyerere pathologically traces the origin of political parties in Africa to the war against colonialism. According to him, the parties evolved essentially as nationalist movements, which in each country aggregated the aspirations of all the people. Nyerere's premise is that with the departure of the colonialists, the nationalist movements no longer had oppressors to fight and, therefore, did not need to break into ideological cleavages or factions against one another. To him a consensus of interest would advance true African values in the political process.
The turn of events in the continent proves Nyerere's thesis wrong, as some nationalist movement have neither democratic foundations nor ideology. Most nationalist leaders sought for power a nd n ot democracy. 0 nce i n power, African I eaders were able to discourage opposition and perpetuate themselves in office with the antithesis that only unity of purpose could solve problems of under-development in Africa. This, according to Ake (1992:2) led to "the criminalization of political dissent and the inexorable march to political monolithism". Blueway (1992) agrees with Ake's thesis and adds that the trend made it impossible for public accountability and political culture to be institutionalized in most African societies.
Thus the nationalist leaders evolved an unsophisticated political culture which Bergnes (1991:68) says was based "more on the charisma of individuals rather than political ideals" contrary to Nyerere's thesis, a bitter class struggle emerged between those in power and their supporters, who insist on status-quo, and a congregation of dissidents, oppressed and reformers who adopt violent strategies against the ruling class. This is why the elite group often resorts to what Momoh (1992:147) call "the use of rigging and instrument of coercion against those who challenge their hegemony." To a large extent, this constitutes a major clog in the wheel of Africa's drive for democracy.
Ekeh (1989:3) presents a convincing historical answer to Africa's weak democratic foundations. According to him, political cultures of African societies evolve from the continent's epochal history - the slave trade and colonialism. The type of violence engendered by the bizarre excesses of the slave trade is, in Ekeh's words, "inhospitable to the formation of enduring state structures: destructive of human beings in its sway and subversive of internal law and order." As for colonialism, Ekeh argues that it led to the dissolution of pristine political systems leaving behind a high level of arbitrariness, which conferred, on African political culture, attributes of negativity - corruption, violence, mistrust, etc. This probably gives a theoretical explanation to the failure of democracy to concretise or to for a centripetal mechanism that would hold values, culture, conceptual principles of the system together.
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN NIGERIA. As attested to by Adamu and Ogunsanwo (1982), Nigerians are unopposed to electoral malpractices. In fact, the expectation that history would repeat itself in any election in relation to electoral misconducts has been in the words of Joseph (1991 :160), "a rational and. self-fulfilling one for the Nigerian' citizen". Thus, political violence subsists in the collective consciousness of Nigerians. This also implies that over the years, the Nigerian environment itself has been conducive to the sustenance of negative political culture. As a matter of fact, the conduct of elections within the Nigerian environment has to contend with many problems - one of which Jinadu (1990:34) describes as "the vastness of the country, its variegated climatic conditions and its tortuous and harsh terrains particularly in the riverine, mountainous and Sahelian areas of the country"
This problem is further complicated by under-development which Bangura (1991) appears convinced that Nigeria's electoral crises are due partly to the stunted nature of the country's social and economic profiles which is the result of its limited development since colonial times. Nigeria is therefore a nation with a weak infrastructural base in which the conduct of elections is necessarily and naturally encumbered.
Under the situation, complimentary facilities for the attainment of an otherwise simple goal such as the compilation of a voters' register is a mirage. Unfortunately, it has not been easy to redress the situation because as Sada (1990:30) observes, "there are no up to date maps of the cities, many of the streets are not named, they run across wards and are not named in the delimitation document". What t his i mplies i s that an E lectoral C ommission i n Nigeria is limited in operation by other negating factors other than culminating form their own operational misconducts.
Other fundamental issues like the quality of the voting population in the society also call for question. Here, it is appropriate to recall the view of Appadorai (1975) that the ability of voters to take reasonable decisions during elections depends on their intellectual maturity. In support of this view, Adedeji (1991) says education is one of the highest determinants of whether a particular population is able to play a positive or negative, a dynamic or passive role in the political, social and development process at a particular point in time. But what do we ding in the Nigerian environment? Unesco- Unicef (1990:7) report reveals what it calls "a de-schooling phenomenon" in all African countries where the number of illiterates in on the increase while enrolments at both primary and secondary school levels have declined. Worst still, political education and socialization machineries are not effective. This therefore renders the voting population not only ineffectual, but susceptible to wanton manipulation by a hegemonic machineries.
To move the nation towards democracy, therefore, there is the need to mobilize the people appropriately because as Akidele and Ajila (1992:85) argue, the attainment of democratic governance in a society "is contingent on the psychological readiness and positive mental set of the citizens". Accordingly, electoral reforms and innovation have to be pursued seeking in the main to institutionalize high political values and socialization. This is necessary because democracy is not just an ideal, which all citizens of a given society should strive to attain; it is a way of life that should permeate all social institutions and human activiti,es in that society. This may be the background to the original brief of organization like MAMSER, but its structure and functions remain depict an elitist system incapable of permeating the diverse and complex Nigerian population and institutionalise political culture to the extent of being resistant to electoral robbery, manipulations and brigandage.
Paradoxically, the scenarios of elections in Nigeria are anti-ethical to democracy and to our mind equilibrate the forceful take over of power by the military, both having common characteristics of absence of consent and inherent criminality. For example, a shocked former US President Jimmy Carter in a evaluative report of the 1999 election reveals a disparity between the number of voters observed at the polling stations and the final results"
Against the foregoing therefore, we are bold to assert that the emergence of winners in certain elections or the calm atmosphere is which some other elections were held do not controvert the basic contention of this study that every Nigerian election is an ordeal and amounts to a bruise and robbery of the collective of the electorate. The power to choose is stolen from the voter by the merchants and barons of power and their agents, leaving the helpless voter's conscience bleeding in the perpetual disability to change his circumstances and condition through a constitutional right to vote in order to make a difference. 2.0.1 The Ecology of Electoral Process and Party Politics in Nigeria (1922- 2003) Ever since Nigeria came into existence, there have been series of elections in both colonial and postcolonial times. With the amalgamation exercise in 1914, of the Northern and Southern protectorates, the colony and protectorates of Nigeria came under a unitary administration headed by Lord Lugard as the Governor- General. The aims were to extend to the South the Native authority system established by Lord Lugard as High Commissioner in the North 1900- 1906, and to also provide technical services on all Nigeria basis. Southern and Northern Nigeria administered separately by their various Lieutenant Governors.
However, there was an advisory Nigeria Council, its thirty- six (36) members included six unofficial European and six unofficial African members. This arrangement did not go down well with the people and thus in 1992; Legislative Council replaced it for the colony and the Southern part of the protectorate.
The legislative council was empowered to enact ordinance and to establish regulation for the administration of justice, which might be necessary for the peace and good governance of the colony (Okafor, 198156). The council included ten unofficial African members out of a total of forty six of which three were elected by Lagos and one by Calabar on a franchise Limited to male with a gross income of at least 100 pounds (N200) a year, a British subject or native of the protectorate (Ahmadu, l983:2). -. .. - ~gyoj'Electora1 systerns
Table 2.0: A profile of Governments since independence; political, military and economic changes
Dates Main Salient Military, Political Protagonists and Economic shifts
Oct '60 - Prime Minister First post-independence Jan. '66 Balewa, Alhaji government led by an alliance Elected, civilian Ahmadu Bello of the Northern Peoples' with strong (Premier of the North), Congress; small military regional bias Chief Awolowo (10,000) Colonial in orientation, (Premier of the West), but professional in character, Dr Okpara ((Premier drawn into internal security by of the East), President rising political tension, Azikiwe especially in the Western and North-Central region; Economy largely agrarian.
Jan - July Military junta General A. lronsi Period of high political tension '66 after first coup arising from the assassination of prominent political leaders - especially in the north; Destruction of the military espirit de corps and professionalism.
JuI '66 - Collegial General Gowon and Broad-based support of all Jul '75 Military junta, members of the armed forces for military junta in weak at Supreme Military spite of earlier problems, gained inception, but Council legitimacy in the aftermath of strengthened civil war; largely ignored by civil war restructuring of the post war victory. military institution.
July '75 - Military junta Generals Mohammed, As above, but with more Sept '79 Obasanjo, Yar'Adua, credibility and more emphasis Danjuma, and middle- on professionalism and political level officers who change. overthrew previous junta
Oct '79 - Elected civil President Shagari of Limited control of the military; Dec '83 rule under 1979 the National Party of creation of alternative base in constitution Nigeria; multiparty police force as well as political structure, patronage to ensure loyalty to presidential style of government. government
Dec '83 - Popular military Generals Buhari, Professional-political Aug '85 junta ldiagbon prerogative; nationalist and authoritarian regime with a largely inward looking agenda.
Au~'85 - Transition from General Babangida Co-optation of the military in the Aug '93 junta to was the main player ruler's personal project via personalised with 'bit parts' to close patronage and deft political A:-L..L---L:- :- - -:..:I:--- --A -:I:&--. -----.... ,.:--- PL-..-&..--I ------The Ecology of Electornl sy.s/erns
palace coup 'politicians' adjustment and preference for capital.
lnterim Chief E. Shonekan, Clear military control of a government Head of Interim government that lacked $93- representing an Government, and legitimacy and popular support Nov '93 interregnum General Abacha, in a period of high political after the Defence Minister tension. annulled elections and exit of Babangida
Nov '93 - Full-blown General Abacha Undermined military June '98 military professionalism, increased use dictatorship of intelligence and security outfits, especially death squads, against political and military opponents.
June '98 - Military General Abdulsalami Focus on political transition and May '99 dictatorship Abubakar preparation for withdrawal from with a human government. face - under pressure to reform politically and exit gracefully
May '99 - Elected civilian General Obasanjo Authoritarian residues, rather ? government civilian government than democratic control of with a non-ideological, security structures; commitment centrist notion of to military professionalism but politics but weak party increasing privatisation of structure and a security in the wake of militarily imposed organised crime, ethnic and constitution religious disaffection and economic challenges. Source: Fayemi, J.K. 2001. Entrenched Militarism and the Future of Democratic Transitlon in Nlgeria. In: Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (eds.) Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy. London: Zed Books.
The constitutional arrangement that was provided by the 1922 constitution remained unchanged until 1964. P rior to this period, there were serious oppositions from African organizations outside the Legislative council. The Richard's constitution given by Sir Arthur Richards - has the aim of: "Providing for the unity of Nigeria, to provide adequately for the diverse elements which makeup the country and to ------The Ecology of E1ector.d .systems
secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their affairs"
Richard's constitution divided Nigeria into three regions, the North, the West and the East, this was informed by the fact that there are differences in race, custom, out look, religion and traditional systems of government. Also, it was i nformed by the fact that a central legislature was not enough to serve the entire nation.
Fig 2.1: The Ratio of the Geographical Extraction of Nigeria's Heads of Government since independence.
r' Source: based on the author's research
The constitution therefore established single regional council in the East and West and it was called House of Assembly in addition to bicameral regional council in the North. In all the regional councils or Houses of Assembly there were unofficial (and African) majorities but they consisted of members selected by the native authorities. The regional councils had no legislative powers but only limited financial ones. Executive powers remained in the hands of British officials at the center as well as in the regions. The constitution contained elective principle but the arrangement did not go down well with the emergent educated elites of Nigeria. Therefore, political development of Nigerian system stemmed from the political reforms. Thus after the world war (ll), there were vehement reactions to the enactment of the Richard's constitution. Therefore, the elective representation applied by Clifford's constitution led to the earliest political organization to grow up in Lagos where late Herbert McCauley formed the Nigeria National Democratic Party (NNDP) to enable them to contest the 1992 elections. In 1937, Nigeria Youth Movement (NYM) was formed and was led by H. 0. Davies. This party successfully contested the Lagos Municipal Elections in 1938 against the NNDP. The NNDP took upper hand in the Lagos town council bye-election of 1943. This was as a result of intra party squabbles among the Nigeria Youth Movement, following the legislative council bye-election of 1941.
With the return of Nigerians that went to the United States of America, novel ideal were injected into the Nigerian political system. Armed with the spirit of true Nationalism, they formed political party that was Nationalistic in character and formation. The National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) was formed in 1944 under the leadership of Herbert McCauley and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The aim of the party was to bring up a broad-based political movement to press for self-government.
The NCNC criticized the new constitution because of its failure to enlarge the size of the electorate and extend the principles of Ecology qfElcctor.nl .sy.stcrrrs direct election to the people. Following this development, in 1948, the new Governor, Sir John McPherson agreed to change the Richard's constitution that was problematic. The new constitution of 1951 therefore, established legislatures in each of the three regions, which were empowered to legislate on specific subjects. With this, there were many elections that followed afterwards.
A. PRE-INDEPENCE COLONIAL ELECTIONS Following the above constitutional provisions, many more elections took place in Nigeria. One of such elections is the general election of 1951, which was aimed at choosing representatives into the Regional House of Assembly through the Electoral College. There was also the Federal Elections of 1954, the first ever elections into the federal House of Representatives. Being the first of its kind, the arrangement was somewhat unusual as in the Eastern Region; all the adults were eligible to vote.
The Electoral College was used in Northern Region and the Southern Cameroon and the various stages of the elections were spread, over two months.
(i) THE WESTERN REGION ELECTION (1956) According to Nwolisa (1983:32), the Western Region Election of 1956 was conducted under the general supervision of the colonial government headed by Governor General McPherson and with P.H Balmer (Briton) the Federal Electoral Commissioner. The major parties involved in the election were the Action Group (AG), National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) and the ------The Ecology qfElec!oral .sy.s!em.s
Table 2.0.1 :RESULT OF THE 1954 FEDERAL ELECTIONS POLITICAL NORTHERN WESTERN EASTERN SOUTHERN PARTIES REGION REGION REGION REGION Northern --- People's Congress (NPC) National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) Action GrouplUnited National Independence Party Alliance Kamerun National Congress (KNC) Others
Total
Source: Ojiakor, J. (1981), Nigeria: Yesterday, Today ar
Dynamic Party (DP). He quoted Philip Whitaker as saying that there was free campaign, but there were use of thugs and minor violence occurred thus: "The number of persons injured more or less seriously as a result of the election must certainly have run into three figures and causalities might have been more 'numerous but for police precautions (W hitaker, 1960:101 )" The election was characterized by bribery, which led to rigging by politicians and their parties. The nomination exercise, which was done in May 1956, was very peaceful as there were no cases of fraudulent returns. Seemingly, voting was of orderly and good
48 conduct. The counting of votes was carefully and impartially done by mainly, missionaries, British officials or their wives. The result showed that. the Action Group (AG) won 48 seats, NCNC 232 seats, other parties and independent candidates no seat. The verdict was generally accepted with confidence reposed in the Electoral Commission. There was however, litigation as some candidates alleged irregularities in some polling stations. Generally accessing the elections, Whitaker writes: "It must be said at the outset that the writer was deeply impressed by what he saw in the Western Nigeria,. On the whole, everybody could be well pleased with the way thing had gone all through the period of the election. There was no loss of confidence in the electoral Commissioner and the staff
(ii) EASTERN REGION ELECTION 1957 The Eastern Region election of 1957 was done under the supervision of a colonial Federal Government under Sir Robert de Stapleton (British) as the Governor. The major parties involved in the election were the NCNC and AG. The campaign began on February 8 with the NCNC men going from village to village. It was later in -the month that Chief Awolowo (late) launched his party's campaign tagged 'operation broom (gbale)' in Uyo and men moved into the major cities.
During the campaigns, occasional clashes ensued between the supporters of AG and Zikist National Movement. Following the violent outbreak like the one at Aba, police made some arrests and the culprits were later convicted and sentenced consequently (Price, 1957: 150). Nevertheless, the election was considered generally peaceful and the result showed that the NCNC won 65 seats while the AG won 13 seats. Both UNlP and the independent candidates won 5 seats and 1 respectively out of the 84 seats available. The verdict was accepted and there was no available record of litigation confirming electoral malpractices.
(iii) THE FEDERAL ELECTION OF 1959 The Federal Election of 1959 was the last election conducted by the colonial administration in Nigeria. The Federal Electoral Commission was headed by the Chief Electoral Commissioner R. E wraith and the Secretary was J. J warren both of them British. The major political parties then were the NCNC, AG the Northern People Progressive Union (NEPU).
There were complaints of shortage of registration materials and discrimination against their supporters. About 9,043,404 names were registered. Mackenzie (1958: 13-14), observed that a good register is the foundation of electoral administration as everything rest on it. In a press statement issued on October 28,1959, His Excellency the Governor-General announced the dissolution of the Federal House of Representatives with effect from November 1" and consequently, December 12'h was election day for the new House of Representatives.
Election would be held in 312 single-member constituency throughout the country, (elections for 8 seats for southern Cameroon's Representatives were suspended pending the out come of the plebiscite on the future of the territory to be held before March 1961) on which 174 were in the Northern Nigeria, 26 were in the Western Nigeria 73 were in the Eastern Nigeria and 3 were in Lagos (Ojiakor, 1981:67).
In the course of the campaign for the election, pockets of disturbances and violence were recorded as Chief Awolowo's entourage was stoned at Abuja on his way to Bida. In the East, a mob attacked the house of Mr. C. Obioha a candidate of a minor party-Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroon, and at Enugu, fighting broke out between rival party supporters at a DPNC rally.
At Bida in the North October 7, an NCNC team was attacked and at Nguru, rioting broke out on the 161h of October after the district head refused to extend NCNC permit to hold a meeting in the area. In the process, NEPU office was burnt down and houses of many lbos were damaged. Towards the end of October, Zik made statement complaining that the police allowed attacks to be made on the NCNC supporters without intervening and therefore he warned as follows: "The NCNC will not under any circumstance allow itself to be intimidated by any other political party. Our members shall obey the law and respect the constituted authority: but we shall be obliged to defend ourselves, if we are not given protection by the police. It is a well-known saying that self- preservation is the first law of nature". The election went on smoothly without hindrances on the votinglpolling day as police and soldiers were drafted at many strategic places. Voting was by secret ballot. The British officials and missionaries who supervised the election made sure there was no partial counting. Table 2.0.2 : RESULT OF THE 1959 NEW FEDERAL HOUSE OF REPRESENTKWES ELECTION. I Political Parties No of seats Distribution of seats 1 Northern People's Northern Nigeria 174 I Congress (NPC) 1 I National Council Western Nigeria 62 I of Nigeria and I Cameroons (NCNC) Action Group Eastern Nigeria 73 Northern People's Lagos capital territory I Progressive I 3 Southern Cameroon 8: The election was suspended pending the out come of the plebiscite of 1961.
I I I Source: Ojiakor, J. (1981), Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and
The result showed that NPC won 148 seats, NCNC 89 and the AG 75. The verdict was generally accepted. A coalition government was formed between NPC and NCNC. In the arrangement Alhaji Tafawa Balewa became the Prime Minister and Dr. Nanamdi Azikiwe became the President. The alliance between NPC, NCNC and the NEPU paid of for them while Chief Obafemi Awolowo The Ecology of Elccforal sysferri.~ became the Leader of the opposition in the House of Representatives.
The media remained unattached, the police under the British Inspector-General C.S.K Bovel, did his best to remain neutral albeit problems emanated from the native authority police. In view of the above, Kes Post Made a historic predictions as follows;
"In Nigeria, there was no conflict of principles in 1959, nor were there any rules of the game. We have seen also that the independence of the judiciary and the administration was very much dependent upon the particular conditions of the moment and there was reason to doubt the will of the politicians to preserve it. It may be that the next federal election will fail to qualify for the adjectives "free and fair"
B. POST - INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA
(i) THE FEDERAL ELECTION OF 1964 The Federal Election of 1964 was the first to be conducted after the independence of Nigeria in 1960. It was also the first to be organized and supervised by the Federal Electoral Commission appointed and inaugurated by the Federal Government made up of Nigerians.
The Electoral Commission delineated 312 constituencies based on the 1963 census figures and compiled voters register. In the Northern Region, only males were registered. The three major political parties involved in the election were the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) made up of the NCNC, AG ------The Ecology of Elector~rlsystenrs and the Northern progressive front and the Nigeria National Democratic Party, (NNDP) Mid - West Congress and the Dynamic Party.
Unlike the pre-independence elections, the campaign took a different dimension as politicians focused on sentiments and tribal differences rather than ideas and issues. Thuggery and oppression were the instruments of campaigns in many parts of the country. There were misuse of local police and customary courts. Political opponents were denied the fundamental rights to campaign freely in certain areas; freedom of speech, movement and association were restricted. Nomination, on the other hand, was not any better as it was characterized by intimidation of some sort as nominators were either arrested or kidnapped such fraudulent actions denied many candidates their chances of submitting their nomination papers accordingly. Amidst this backdrop, UPGA called for postponement of the election in a meeting with the president but the prime minister advised that the election be held as scheduled, as he did not see any proper reason for the postponement of the elections. But Oyediran (1981 :3) remarked that the nomination exercise a nd t he e lectioneering campaign w ere c haracterized b y victimization, arrests of UPGA members who were to contest the election particularly, in the Northern and Western Regions.
Following the ugly development, the leaders of UPGA called on their supporters to boycott the polling booths on the election day. As a consequence, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe prophetically observed as following; "What is happening in Nigeria today does not inspire me to be optimistic that we shall survive as one nation. It is possible that Nigeria will disintegrate because I cannot conceive of a united country where the citizens of region always regard their compatriots as interlopers." The result of the election was finally contested and Tafawa Balewa despite Zik's objection claimed that his party NNA won the election with clear majority and therefore insisted on reappointment as the Prime Minister. Following the development above, a meeting of the leaders-of-thought was conceived and it was agreed among other things that the president shall reappoint the Prime Minister; a fresh election to be held in the East and the people of the Western Region should be allowed to choose their own government. All these took place and at the end, the overall result stood as below: NPC - 162 seats NCNC - 84 seats NNDP - 36 seats AG - 21 seats. NCNC then left UPGA and formed a coalition government at the center with the NPC.
(ii.) THE WESTERN REGION ELECTION OF 1965 The Western Region Election of 1965 took place under the NNDP government that had federal support. This was sequel to declaration of state of emergency in the Western Region. Action Group (AG) was no longer in contention. The Federal Electoral Commission's Chairman Mr. E. E. Esua administered the election. Table 2.0.2:THE RESULT OF WESTERN REGION ELECTION OF 1965 Date Party No of Seats Alhaji Adeg benro NNDP 25 13'~0ct 1965 NNDP 65 NNDP Organ UPGA 10
Source: Ojiakor, J. (1981), Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and?
A deluge of violent outbreak trailed the nomination and campaigns. This led to the banning of all public meetings and processions. Many Law enforcement agents who were drafted to the area lost their lives. The attempt made by AGlNCNC alliance to stop the reckless rape on democracy failed. On the election day, all forms of rigging were witnessed as women became pregnant with ballot papers, orchestrating a great deal of stunning misconducts throughout the election. Serious riots broke out in various parts of the Western Region, in some constituencies, the police opened fire and killed civilians thus (Ojiakor, 1981 :217) noted as follows; "At least, five people were killed in the final stages of the election as the atmosphere grew tensed in the region. On Sunday October 10, 1965, an 18 year old senior electoral officer was shot dead in his office and later two electoral officers and two party polling agents were reported to have been killed too." Following the reports of massive rigging in the election and the controversy that ensued, Alhaji Adegbenro formed a ten-man "Interim Government" saying he was convinced that UPGA has won the election. On the 14'~October 1965, Alhaji Adegbenro and his party men were arrested and detained, while NNDP formed the new government. The situation did not call for litigation but instead an unprecedented large scale looting, maiming, burning of houses and killing of political opponents were witnessed. This was when the West went wild, hence the 'Wild-Wild West.' It was a political inferno.
The situation continued unabated till the military coup of 15th January 1966 occurred and drew the curtain for the First Republic and a ban on all political activities was rolled out.
(iii) THE FEDERAL ELECTION OF 1979 The military ruled the country for thirteen years including the period of the civil war since the January 1966 coup until the general election of 1979. Within this period of military rule, Gen. Murtala Mohammed came on board on July 29, 1975 and set in motion a programme of event that aimed at returning the country to a civilian rule. Part of the programme was to hand over to a democratically elected civilian government on October 1, 1979. The programme also included enactment of a new constitution, establishment of Electoral Commission, creation bf new states, etc.
The 1979 general elections were based on the new constitution, which provided for a Presidential system of government. With the death of Gen. Murtala Mohammed in an attempted coup of 1979, General Obasanjo succeeded him and went ahead to inaugurate a new Federal Electoral commission (FEDECO) on November 15 1976. The commission was headed by Chief Michael Ani and was charged with the responsibility of conducting and supervising the 1979 general election. On the 21'' of September 1978, the Federal Military Government lifted ban on politics and political activities in the country. The government further assured FEDECO of independence and Security of tenure and expressed their determination not to interfere with the activities of the electoral body (Ojiakor, 1981: 229).
FEDECO immediately went into action and delineated the constituencies in the country. It also registered all the eligible voter which came up to 48,499,091 and six political parties namely, Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) and the People's Redemption Party (PRP).
The election proper was fairly peaceful as there were no proven cases of rigging except for few agitations from the Unity Party of Nigeria. (UPN) and that of litigation concerning the Governorship of Kaduna State, which eventually went in favour of PRP.
However, according to Onwukike (1993:143) as the result for the presidential election was being released, it became clear to the politicians that none of the presidential candidates would emerge winner in the first ballot. This led to the problem of what constitutes two-third (213) of the 19 states of Nigeria. Different answers from politicians, lawyers, mathematicians and laymen began to emerge (Ojiakor, 1981:3l6). Eventually, FEDECO amidst controversy, as to what constitute the two-third of 19 States declared Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN, the winner of the presidential election on 16'~ August 1979. Other parties, following this declaration alleged that FEDECO has misinterpreted the relevant sections of the constitution. (Daily Times, August 18, 1979). The leaders of other parties described the action of FEDECO as a brazen act of fraud against the state and an unwarranted assault on democratic principle (New Nigeria 21 August, 1979).
Following the petition filled by Chief Awolowo at the Special Election Tribunal and was finally determined at the Supreme Court, who on a 6-1 division held that Alhaji Shehu Shagari was validly elected. And so Shagari became the first Executive President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Ojiakor et al, l983:7).
However, according to Major General Oluleye's report of the meeting of SMC, August 4, 1979, it is good to note here that the Supreme Military Council whose chairman was the head of state, Gen. Obasanjo, influenced the decisions of FEDECO, the Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court. It is therefore ironical that the same Head of State who promised non-interference with the activities of the Electoral Commission at inauguration has been found to support the fraud as reported by major General Oluleye.
(iv) THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1983. President Shehu Shagari in July 1980, appointed Mr. Justice Victor Erekeke Ovie - Whisky as the FEDECO chairman. This was amidst several challenges in the law court against FEDECO concerning certain provisions of the Electoral Act.
Therefore, Justice Ovie Whisky became the chairman of the electoral body that would conduct the first post independence civilian - to - civilian rule election in Nigeria. The Commission started by registering the sixth political party, National Advanced party (NAP) that was refused registration in the 1979 exercise. According to Toyin, Falona and Julius lhonvbere (1983: 206). the registration of NAP by FEDECO was to take some votes away from UPN come 1983 general elections. Thus NPN, the ruling party, was set to solve the problem of 12 2/3 majority votes once and for all through FEDECO.
Table 2.0.3:1983 GENERAL ELECTION S/No Party Senatorial Result HOR Result
No. of seats won No of State Won
1. NPN 59 264
2. UPN 17 33
3. NPP 13 48
4. PRP 5 41
5. GNPP 1 NIL
6. NAP Nil NIL
Total 95 386
Source: The Gerian Observer, August 27, P.6.
About 65, 304, 818 votes were registered for the 1983 general elections (west Africa, 8thAugust, 1983: 1805). The registration of voters was marred by unimaginable irregularities. Incredible number of votes was registered and some popular politicians have their names missing from the list. A man was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for possessing 4000 voters card in Makurdi. It was also alleged that FEDECO was actually not ready for the elections but in order to accomplish the desires of.the incumbent, the initial arrangement was altered by starting with the presidential elections and ended with the State House of Assembly election.
Campaigns of all the parties were characterized by verbal wars between political parties, casting of aspersion on one another, character assassination, physical confrontation and outright attacks with the use of political thugs. Became the work of the day.
Owing to the obvious inefficiencies on the part of FEDECO, many eligible votes were disenfranchised. This development made rigging very easy for the political parties especially the ruling party, NPN, who used the state apparatus under its control to intimidate others. It was also alleged that the ruling party NPN used fake policemen to manipulate the electoral process, the extent of rigging was directly proportional to the amount of resources available to political parties (Falona and Ihenvbere, I985:Z 16). The amount of electoral fraud reached such an alarming proportion that Times international Monday April 11, 1983: 7 had to report on it. Professor Wole Soyinka, provoked by the turn of events, alleged that the overall result was greatly influenced by the ruling party, NPN. The result of the presidential Election of August, 1983 was as follows: NPN got at least 25% in 7 states, NPP got in 4 states, PRP got in 1 state while GNPP and NAP did not score up to 25% in any state. The election result did not go down well with other presidential candidates thus Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, NPP's presidential candidate remarked as follows:
"I will not accept the presidential election's results of Saturday because it was not fair, my party is protesting over their figures. I accuse the NPN of Masterminding Malpractice at the polls by Tele-quiding FEDECO To make their Officials and materials available in Areas where NPP has large followers. If I lost the election on the grounds Of malpractice, I cannot see how I could congratulate the winner after what happened on Saturday (The Nigerian Observer Thursday August ll.l983:3)".
Consequently, what happened in the presidential election therefore law the foundation for a spiral effects on the subsequent elections. There was a Progressive Party Alliance PPA by some parties to check the excesses of the NPN. This did not help matters as the NPN took over all the strong holds of other parties including the home states of their presidential candidates. Yet, the NTA, another government agency, described the election result variously, in there. "Verdict 83" as 'landslide,' 'moon slide' and 'sea slide' victories. Violence continued and consequently, maiming, thuggery and arson rose to unimaginable proportions.
What actually happened in 1983 election in terms of rigging showed that our political history has witnessed great improvement in the technology of "rigging". The rigging was a clarion call to violence. Babangida, (1992:16), once remarked that intercepts at rigging are undemocratic because it distorts the verdict of the people, it indirectly disenfranchises the populace.
And so, the general election of 1983 became ridicule to the whole nation. And the world community, Shagari was for a second time declared the winner, despite protests. Special Electoral Tribunals were set up but it was of no use because judgments were pre - determined. All these point to the connection with the incumbency and the electoral process. The party that rules government consequentially rules the electoral body, the police and the courts.
The crises that ensued following the actions of the central government caused commotions in all aspects of lives socially, politically and economically as the economy deteriorated and dwindled continuously (Adesina, 1984: 25). The problem became unabated and the Military intervened and wrestled power from Alhaji Shehu Shagari in a Military coup led by major - General Mohammadu Buhari on December 31'' 1983.
(v) THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1993 The Military Government, headed by General l brahim Badamasi Babangida organized the election. Babangida, it was, who took over power from M ajor G eneral B uhari o n A uc lust27, 1985ina palace coup.
General Babangida established some transition institution, pretending to return to civil rule in a hurry. The horse-trading game deepened from October 1989 promise till an eventually step aside in 1993 by a coalition of civil force, including the press. .------Tlw Ecology qj'Elector-crl systems
The National Electoral Commission (NEC), established in 1987 along with the Center for Democratic Studies (CDS), in 1989 which gave hopes for an immediate transition. According to Omoruyi (1999:41), under the design of the democratic transition programme enclosed in Decree No. 19 of 1987 and amended by Decree No.26 of 1989, the presidential nomination process in August I September, 1992, was to have produced the Presidential candidates for the two political parties from a pool of 23 aspirants but for t he d readed h idden a genda, i t d id n ot. T he e lection of a president in November 1992 would have completed the phased transition programme.
After this second dribbled based on the alleged hidden agenda, the self proclaimed president, General Babangida directed the National Electoral Commission (NEC), to call for the registration of Political Associations that will eventually transform to political parties. Within that period, Nigerians who were not affected by the blanket ban, the new bread politicians quickly came together and formed political associations.
In 1989, General Shehu Musa Yar' Adua founded the political Association called the Peoples Front of Nigeria (PFN). Others includes people's solidity party (PSP), Nigerian National Congress (NNC), Liberal convention (LC), Republican Party of Nigeria (RPN), All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP), and Patriotic Party of Nigeria (PPN). The PSP has a strong Yoruba footing. All together, the associations came up to 38 in number. By the end of July dead line, only (13) thirteen succeeded in having their Associations ------The Ecology of Electornl systenls presented for registration by NEC (Egwu, 1998:25). It is evident however, that out of the eventual (13) thirteen political Associations, non had evidence of the desired national spread instead, there was a strong manifestation of ethnic cum regional bias of their founders and financiers (Egwu, l998:27).
The Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and the Head of State did not find any of the eventual (6) six political Associations worthy of registration into a full - blown Political Party under strict scrutiny and they were eventually dissolved on the ground that: "Old times of cleavages - ethnic, geo-political, religious and class, surfaced in bold discomfort in the new political associations. The new bread associations, which were expected transcend these lines of cleavages and promoted issue based politics instead relapsed into debilitating in fighting each group within itself. Quoted in (Olagungu and Oyoybaire,l995:5) In a nationwide broadcast made by the head of state, General Babangida on October 19, 1989, the disqualification and disbandment of the six political associations was announced. Consequently, he announced the establishment of two "grassroots" political parties: the social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) with the ideologies of a little to the left a nd a little to t he right respectively. As noted by (Omoruyi, 1999:47), the SPD was an amalgam of two political associations, the People's Solidarity Party and the People's Front of Nigeria (PFN) while the NRC was a fusion of politicians of dissolved political associations such as NNC, LC and the RPN. The party drew the bulk of its support from the core North embracing mostly the supporters of the defunct NPN (Egwu, 1999:29).
The Local Government Election of 8'h ~ecember1990 was a good opportunity for NEC to test the "open ballot" system, which was designed and chosen to eliminate rigging and other electoral malpractices, which has been the bane of democracy in Nigeria. According to Nwankwo A. in Onwukike (1993:164), the 1990 Local Government Election was marked by artificiality. Right from the nomination of candidates for various elective positions to the actual conduct of the election itself, the process was fraught with falsity and flagrant abuse of electoral procedures. The height of the malpractice was when votes were manufactured mysteriously without regard to the voters' strength in the specific ward and Local Government Area. The open ballot was made to look inadequate as double voting and manipulation of figures and electoral violence become the rule rather than the exception.
Subsequently elections like the Gubernatorial and the state House of Assembly, the senatorial and the House of Representatives which took place respectively on December 14, 1991, and July 14, 1992 did not record any improvement from the local Government election, instead the political process was monitized the more as campaigns degenerated into a material contest of the survival of the richest (Nwankwo, 1993: 137). In some states, the incumbent Governors determined who became the candidates of the parties for the Senate and House of Reps elections and this attitude so relegated competence and merits to the background that the eventual election was a charade, a huge national disgrace and therefore an insult on democracy. The results were falsified and figures and awarded with liberty. (News watch December 21, 1992,~~21- 22).
The presidential primaries and the election proper was the last in the phased transition to civil rule programmer. It came two phases in 1992. One was in August 1" and the other on September 12, 1992. The others took place on September 19 and 26, 1992. The outcome of the primaries was so bad that members of the public and the independent political observers called for cancellation boycott and court cases at best.
One of the independent observers was the Catholic Archbishop of Lagos and the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). He described the primaries as an electoral mess necessitated by the irresistible and pernicious influence of money. He remarked as follows: "We have witnessed the most distasteful happenirigs in our Country. Never before in the history of elections in this Country has money been the only decisive factor for winning Votes from the electorates who understandable had no choice But to accept happily a temporary means of filling the stomach Owing to impoverishment caused by the same people." (News Watch October 19. 1992p.19).
At the wake of the above, the Federal Military Government directed that NEC should carry out a full investigation on the allegations of extensive use of money and other vices, to ascertain the true position of issues and submit its reports to the Armed Forces Ruling Council, (Babangida (1992) in Omoruyi (1999:6O). The ------The Ecology of Electoral systerns electoral body did as was directed and got back to the authorities. It was clear from the response of the AFRC that they were no longer comfortable with the 'hidden agenda' issue, which was manifesting more prominently in every phase of the transition. Based also on the report of NEC, the Head of state, General Babangida made a presentation in form of an address to the nation and the highlights of the address are as follows:
(a) the presidential primaries of the two political parties negated the principles of democratic election (b) the leadership of the parties conducted themselves with such flagrant disregard for decorum and decency; and (c) the suspended electoral primaries failed to produce a nationally acceptable leadership that would be capable of carrying the whole country along the line of political unity, stability and progress.
In conclusion, the president observed that the aspirants without exception had wantonly contravened the provision of Decree 37 of 1992, which was hurriedly put together to bring order to the second attempt at choosing presidential candidates for the two parties. Some punitive measures were also adopted as a fall-out of the ill- fated p residential primaries. The AFRC a mongst other m easures ordered the cancellation of the primaries; immediate dissolution of the executive of the two political parties at all levels. NEC should prescribe a relatively trou ble-free election process to produce a nationally acceptable president for the nation. Such a person should take into account the following: The Ecology of'E1ecfor-olsysferrls
(i) That Nigeria is in an unusual time, which requires an unconventional political approach to secure its unity, cohesion and stability; (ii) That Nigerians believe fundamentally that every leader in this country has a practical constituency and hence a practical legitimacy; and (iii) That Nigerians are capable of making analytical distinction between politics and government.
Nigeria, once again became so troubled with the unfolding of events. The argument of the Northern Elders was that the primaries in which Allah secured two Northern cum Muslim candidates shouldn't have been cancelled. The president did not only cancel the primaries he went ahead to slam a ban on Mallam Adamu Ciroma and made a pronouncement that Major - General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua was an extremely ambitious and vicious person (Omoruyi, 1999: 61) this development, obviously, prepared good grounds for extending the transition to civil rule programme time table which as a consequence was already inevitable.
The nation entered another phase of the transition with a broadcast by the Head of State, General Babangida who on November 17, 1992 announced the extension of the transition programme from January 2, 1993 to August 27, 1993 and a ban of all the 23 Presidential aspirants of the two political parties. He reaffirmed his regime's strong commitment to the process of democratization by adopting the following measures: Dissolution of the AFRC, the Council of Ministers which in effect implies abolition of the office of the unelected Vice president, establishment of the .------The Ecology of Elcctorul ~:vsterns
National Transition Council (NTC) to be in change of the day-to- day administration of the country throughout the remaining period of the t ransition programme, s wearing-in of the members of t he National Assembly on December 5, 1992 and the adoption of option A4. The essence of option A4 was to determine those who have grass roots support, those who have roots without grass and those who have neither roots nor grass (New watch March 29.1 9931p.9 - 17).
Therefore, the cancellation of the botched Presidential primaries, the revitalization of the transition programme, the emergence and implementation of option A4 thus provided erstwhile observers the opportunity to get involved in the new dispensation.
With the popular option A4 in action, Chief M.K.0 Abiola emerged the winner of the presidential primaries of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) while Alhaji Bashiru Tofa picked the ticket for the National Republican Convention (NRC).
Following the successful conventions of the two parties SDP and NRC, the campaign started and the shortness of the period of campaign (February to June 1993) made it to be so intensive that it ran through the days and nights. The election monitoring groups made up of 3,000 observes out of which 135 were foreigners and these foreigners came from countries like Britian, U.S.A, France. Denmark, Canada, India Netherlands, Belgium, Chaina, Italy, Jamaica and Ethiopia. Their ambassador in Nigeria led each group; the group of seven Industrialized Nations of the World (G7), the United Nations Security Council were also represented. The election proper took place on June 12,1993. It was a peaceful election though with one or two pockets of Complaints but nevertheless, it was judged to be free and fair by Nigerian's and the observers from all walks life. While serious minded Nigerians were thinking positively on how to make the transition a success, an unpopular group known as the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) led by the maverick politician, Chief Arthur Nzeribe was seriously campaigning for the extension of Babangida's Military Rule by four more years. The Association was also pressuring NEC through an Abuja High court not to conduct the election. Therefore, on June 10, 1993, the Abuja High Court gave an injunction suspending the election scheduled for June 12, 1993. The action astonished the planners and implementers of the elections and the international community. But for the timely intervention of the United States of America, the illegal ambush and anti - democratic actions of the ABN and the Abuja High Court would have put a final end to the much cherished transition to civil rule programme (Omoruyi, 1999:85).
The injunction of ABN from the Abuja High Court restraining NEC from conducting the election was not heeded to by NEC and this attracted a serious legal battle between the Abuja High Courts in Lagos ordering NEC not to release the results of the election and two other High Courts in Lagos and Benin ordering NEC to release the results (News watch, June 28, 1993pp. 18 - 21).
NEC went ahead to release some result of 14 States and Chief MKO Abiola was on a good lead. The confusion that ensured was The Ecology oJ Elecforal sys feins so high and out of hands that NEC on June 16, 1993 announced its suspension of the release of remaining presidential election results. On J.une 26,1993, the President, General Babangida gave Nigerians the greatest shocker ever in electoral history by announcing that the June 12. 1993 Presidential election has been annulled. He alleged that the two Presidential candidates had breached some electoral laws, which includes widespread use of money during the election. The President's announcement was supported by a publication of the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture tilled "June 12 and the future of Nigerian Democracy". In this same edition of 1996 :I,the Ministry maintained that there had been a court ruling from the Abuja High Court restraining NEC from conducting the elections but NEC was adamant and therefore violated the court order and went ahead to conduct the elections. It was the refusal of NEC to obey the stage - managed court order that began the s eries of crises, which e ngulfed the e ntire n ation and resulted in a political agitation that is now popularly referred to as 'June 12" as usual, the President, General Babangida had to unfold a new plan for another Presidential election (News watch, July 5 1993, pp. I6 - 18). Paradoxically, today in civilian apparels he seems to want to seek the favour of the Nigerian people in the same ballot box as a President.
(vi) THE 1997 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER ELECTIONS. General Babangida, the president, stepped aside on Thursday August 26, 1993, when the pressure of the annulment became too much for him to handle. He supervised the less than 25 minutes The Ecology of Electot~nlsyvtetn.s swearing in of Chief Ernest Shonekan whom he appointed to head the Interim National government (ING).
The Military Government of president Babangida had sealed up everything about June 12, election, he had given the interim government of chief Shoneken a mandate to organize a new election and hand over to a democratically elected president.
The agitation for the actualization of "June 12" mandate from the entire landmass Nigeria made it impossible for the interim National Government (ING) to function. Similarly, the military, headed by Gen. Sani Abacha who was the Secretary of Defense then was not in support of the ING. Therefore, on November 17, 1993, Gen Sani Abacha forced Chief Ernest Shonekan to resign as the Head of the ING. H e went further to d issolve a II political i nstitutions i ncluding the National Electoral Commission (NEC). He established the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC).
Once again, the nation was to go through another cycle of transition without end as it has entered into another full-blown Military ,Administration. Gen. Abacha's emergence as the head of state was alleged to be a fulfillment of his part-to-rule agreement with Babangida. The events that took over the cloudy political weather seem to give credence to the allegation.
The new dispensation started with the Local Government Elections on non-party basis, in March 1996. Later it progressed to party basis on March 15, 1996, and this time around, all the registered parties participated. Nominations and campaigns were not without the traditional use of thugs, which facilitated rigging and other forms of malpractices in the election proper and this put the United Nigerian Congress Party (UNCP) in an unassailable position as they swept the polls everywhere. On December 6, 1997, there were State Houses of Assembly elections and the UNCP consolidated its position in an election that less than 10% of the registered voters voted. From the beginning, the parties were seen as parties set up to advance General Abacha's personal political interest (Report of the Transitional Monitoring Group, 2002: 13). As events unfold, the self-succession ambition of Gen. Abacha started becoming clearer to the people. Some members of the military ruling class started being very uncomfortable with his plans to perpetuate dictatorship in Nigeria and it became more worrisome when their integrity was being put to doubt. General Abacha started clamping down on those whom he felt could be a hindrance to his self-succession bid, alleging that he had uncovered a plot to overthrow him.
He held and convicted his second in command, Lt. Gen. Oladipo Diya and other acolytes like Major Gen. Tajudeen Olarenwaju, Major .Gen, Abdulkareem Adisa etc, as being part of those who were planning to overthrow him. As the environment became apparently unsafe for the few remaining militant- pro-democracy groups, a good number of them fled to foreign countries especially the US and Britain. The clamour for Abacha to succeed himself became increasingly stringent among a cross section of opportunists and political sycophants whose activities became so shameful and menacing that even some called him (Abacha) the only key that opens the door or the man whom the cap fits. It Tlw Ecology of Elecroml sy.s~errl.s became obvious that Abacha would not stop at anything in making himself the civilian president of Nigeria, come 1998.
The bulk of the orchestrated work on the self succession bid tell more on some sponsored "shadow organization" among which were the Youth Ernestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) led by one Daniel Kanu; M ovement for Abacha for P resident l ed by C hief 0 rji U zo Kalu; National Mass Movement of Nigeria led by Buker Mandara, and the Ndigbo Progressive Union led by Chief Arthur Eze who led 150 t raditional rulers from I gbo l and to Aso Rock to " Plead' with Gen. Abacha to succeed himself. What a history!
Some well-meaning and leading politicians who tried to dissuade Gen. Abacha from succeeding himself include a group called G-18 composed of a group of northern politicians like Chief Solomon Lar, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi and Dr. lyorchua Ayu. Others are politicians from the south, which swell the group to became G-34 under the leadership of the second Republic Vice-president Dr. Alex Ekwueme and Dr. Chukwemaka Ezeife, one of,its arrowheads (TMC, 2002: 13).
(vii) THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1999 The sudden death of General Sani Abacha created a vacuum for the seat of Head of State and as a result of that, General Abubakar stepped i n a s t he Head of State a nd C ommander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
One month after he succeeded ~bacha,he unveiled his transition programme on July 20, 1998. According to the programme as was drawn by him and the PRC, six months would be enough to transit and hand over power to a democratically elected President. Thus making his transition the shortest one ever to be organized by the military in the history of Nigeria. One of the points proved by this approach is that previous transition programmes had really been cat and mouse chase or ploys to keep the unwholesome ambitions of their initiators afloat (TMC, 2002:18).
Party formation and registration came immediately between August and September 1998, while the registration of voters was to be completed by November ending. The Local Government Council Elections was to take place in December 1998. The Governorship and State Assembly Elections were slated for December 1998 and January 1 999. The P residential a nd National Assembly e lections were to come up between February and March 1999. The swearing -in of the President was to come up on Saturday, 2gth May 1999. This is an example of Management By Objective (MBO)
Unlike Babangida and Abacha's transition programmes, Abdusalami did not have any enabling agencies, under any guise to facilitate speedy transition yet within six months; he was able to achieve what Babangida could not achieve in eight years. All he did was to appoint a 25- member Constitution Committee to collate proposals and prepare a new constitution using the 1995 draft constitution and the 1979 constitution as benchmarks, and present them to the PRC for approval. Also as a tradition, General Abubakar restructure NECON to be known and called the Independent 'National Electoral Commission (INEC) and inaugurated it under Decree No. 8 of 1998. Precision! The newly constituted electoral body started its work by registering voters and political parties. The registration of voters kicked off 51h October 1998 and ended on the 191h of October 1998. It created about 111,434 registration centers and at the end of the exercise, about 53,161, 687 voters were registered.
With the successful completion of the registration exercise, the body went ahead to register political parties. Following the guidelines as provided by the government, twenty five (25) political Associations p resented t heir papers for registration a s full b lown political parties. Eventually, only nine (9) of them got the provisional approval to be registered as political parties on the 291h of October, 1998 and only these would fill in candidates for the December 5, 1998 Local Government Elections in the 774 Local Government areas in the country with a proviso that they must win at least 5% of the votes cast in at least 24 States of the Federation. The essence of this, according to INEC, is to determine whether they would be given final registration for the remaining elections. INEC went on further to announce that if only five parties meet the 5% requirement, it would register the three best parties. Following these requirements, the following parties received the provisional registration;
(i) Alliance for Democracy (AD) (ii) All People's Party (APP) (iii) Democratic Advanced Movement (iv) Movement for Justice and Democracy (MJD) (v) National Solidarity Movement (NSM) (vi) People's Democratic Party (PDP) (vii) People's Redemption Party (PRP) (viii) united Democratic Party (UDP) (ix) United People's Party (UPP)
Parties started their nomination and campaigns almost at the same time soon after they were formed. This approach was informed by the shortness of time to prepare for the election proper. The nomination of candidates for other elections other than the gubernatorial and presidential were totally monopolized by party executives with little or no input from the rank and file of the party. The nomination exercise witnessed massive use of money as it exchanged hands freely especially during the screening process. Most often party chieftains at state a nd n ational levels i nterfered with the process to make sure their favoured candidates were victorious. This meant that in most cases, most popular candidates did not 'win'. This imposition method also affected parties' performances in some states and Local Governments as the internal structures a nd operations of the parties have little or no democratic pretension and pedigree.
When PDP, AD and APP finally emerged as the three strongest parties of all, the conventions to select their flag bearers differed in some respects. While the AD adopted what was called a zonal caucus whereby the six geopolitical zones were to nominate their candidates who would g o for a r un-off to d etermine whom t he party's Presidential candidate would be, the APP convention was marred by controversies and manipulations and undemocratic practices. The main problem arose from the deep division within the party over the plan to zone the Presidential ticket to the south and enter into an alliance with the AD. This made the party to loose
some of its ' members to PDP. The PDP presented the most effectively managed convention. Although huge sums of money changed hands openly, the national convention held on the 131h and 14'~of February, 1999, in Jos the Capital of Plateau State. It was orderly and on the convention floor there were decorum and fair conduct when contrasted with obscured process adopted by other parties. At the end of the convention, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo emerged the Presidential flag bearer of the PDP with 1658 against Dr. Alex Ekwueme's 521 votes. A total of 2467 delegates voted. The stage was set for the real final theatrical battle.
Chief Olu Falea was nominated as the AD'S Presidential flag bearer while APP later settled for an alliance, which eventually picked Chief Falae as the "Consensus" candidate. It is important to note that INEC did not allow the alliance to adopt a>common name symbol instead, it was more of internal arrangement that it possible for APP'S candidates to step-down for the AD'S candidate.
The limited time for the campaign actually affected the range of issues canvassed or discussed in the election's campaigns, the humid nature of party formation and selection of candidates and the failure of the political parties themselves to promote issue oriented campaign made the entire efforts to be influenced by personalities, block voting and ethnic loyalties. Much of creativity was not seen in the campaign strategies of the parties. There were actually few rallies and most legislative and gubernatorial .------Tlze Ecology of Elecroral sysrcnis candidates who emerged almost at the last minutes in many cases had to limit themselves to one short procession along the streets with singing and dancing in the name of campaigns.
The elections proper were generally fairly peaceful, starting from the local government election of December 5, 1998 although there were reports of relatively few cases of violence at some polling stations, the use of money was visible and imperative too because there were needs for good deal of financial resources to mobilize the electorate for the required spread which was a condition for registering the party.
Following the commanding lead of the PDP, the APP alleged that it was rigged out of victory by the PDP in many states. The party also accused the INEC of colluding with the PDP and the Police to rig the elections. This was because of INEC'S poor logistics preparation and inadequate training of personnel, among other discernable misconducts.
The Gubernatorial and States House of Assembly election, which took place on January 5, 1999, was one of the most keenly contested elections. In the election, the candidates appeared to matter more than the parties, reasons being that there was actually not much difference in the ideologies of the parties. It was actually in this particular election that the parties were narrowed down to three and these were the PDP, APP and the AD owing to their overwhelming victories at the local government poll. The official poll result announced by INEC showed that 24,649.434 out of the 53,161,689 registered voters voted in the elections and average turn out 46.36% was witnessed (TMG, 2000:64). Also, the result of the Governorship and the States House of Assembly are presented.
As usual the States House of Assembly elections were marked by widespread complaint of irregularities and malpractices. Alhaji Mohammed Waziri of the APP urged members not to allow themselves to be out-rigged again thus showing that similar malpractices had happened in the previous elections, therefore they should endeavour to counter the rigging too.
The National Assembly Elections held on Saturday 2oth ~ebruar~ 1999, witnessed a very low turnout of voters. Reports indicated that in most cases, the turnout did not exceed 20% as it fell below 10% in some cases.
Despite the low turnout, it was recorded by INEC that the turnout was high as people came out in large numbers to cast their votes. By their own imagination and making, Political observes noted that the said low turnout was as a result of low-keyed campaign activities. People were not adequately mobilized to turnout for the elections. Other reasons according to them included the rushed nomination of candidates and the late clearance by INEC. All these put together did not permit sufficient time for Nigerians to know who the candidates were. There were usually reports and complaints of electoral malpractices, which ranged from inducement or harassment of voters and electoral officials to outright intimidation by the law enforcement agents. The summaries of the results of the elections are as contained in this analysis. The last in the series was the Presidential Election held on Saturday February 27,1999.
INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION FEBRUARY 27,1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ANALYSIS OF V01 iS CAST ON STATE AND PARTY BASES AD APP PDP Votes Votes Votes %Votes %Votes %Votes Scored Scored Scored Scored Scored Scored 1676 0.31 175095 32.57 360823 67.12
3872 0.46 177868 20.95 667239 78.99
0 0.00 152534 17.27 730744 82.73
2254 0.27 199461 23.88 633717 7586
1 26 1 NIGER 1 873269 27 OGUN 475904 28 ONDO 801965 168 0.02
29 OSUN 795518 879 0.11
30 1 OYO . 1 924989 1 3811 1 0.41 31 1 PLATEAU 1 673621 ( 1179 1 0.18
TARABA
YOBE
36 ZAMFARA 380648 569 0.15
37 FCT 99022 0 0.00 I I I I 2938361 35174 0.12 TOTAL 5 Table 2.0.4
The election was contested by Chief Olu Falae the joint candidate of AD and the APP on the platform of APP and General Olusegun Obasanjo on the platform of PDP (TMG final report of the l998/99,2OOO: 132), observed that the trend of awarding high votes
Table 2.0.5 THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION HELD ON SATURDAY FEBRUARY 27,1999 S/No CANDIDATE PARTY NO. OF
VOTES
I 1. I General Olusegun Obasanjo I PDP
2. Chief Olu Falae APP- AD
Source: INEC Headquarters, Abuja
in excess of the actual number of accredited voters which had been observed during the National Assembly elections and other elections assumed greater proportions during Presidential elections. It went further to observe that the incidence was so high in some areas that it completely distorted the results. T he most disgusting aspect was the report that the law enforcement and electoral officers colluded a cross the n ation i n t he falsification of results activities.
However, the turnout was higher than what was witnessed in the previous elections owing probably to the increase in campaign strategies and civil education which sensitized and mobilized the voters for the election despite the fact that there were little time between the nomination and clearance of candidates, particularly when we put into consideration the size of the country in terms of landmass. Some observers noted that the overall conduct of the presidential election could not be described as being free and fair nevertheless, there was an improvement from what use to be.
INEC Chairman, justice Akpata, announced the official results of the election at Abuja on The 1st of March 1999 and the breakdown is embodied to this account.
Following the result as announced by the INEC Chairman, General Olusegu-n Obasanjo was declared the winner and therefore the President elect having met all the requirements as stipulated by law. Obosanjo's declaration as the winner of the election confirmed and consolidated PDP's leadership potion amongst the parties, which it had maintained throughout elections.
Chief Olu Falae the consensus Presidential candidates of the APP- AD alliance who contested along: side Gen. Obasanjo, refused to accept the results as announced by INEC as he alleged widespread malpractices in the election. Chief Falae and his party members pursed their claim of irregularities even up to the Supreme Court but their effort did not change the verdict of INEC. A President had been proclaimed, it would seem, and so is.
Thus on the 2gth of My, 1999, General Abdusalami Abubakar the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief off the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, handed over power to the acclaimed winner of the February 27, 1999 Presidential election, General Olusegun 0 basanjo as promised at the inception of his administration (Nigeria return to Democracy first year of Anniversary 2 9th may 2 005:5). The singular a ct of h anding over power to the civilian President by Abubakar as 'he promised, earned him great reputation and recognition all over the world. He proved both Abacha and Babangida and their likes around the world wrong or worst still as political rascals.
(viii) THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 2003 The preparation for this election started rather on a very controversial footing. The controversy was around the enactment of the Electoral Acts of 2001 and the amended electoral Act of 2002.
The general elections of 2002 according to Umeh (2003:36) "represent Nigeria's major solemn investment in democracy and nation building. Unfortunately the act (the main compass for this navigation) like most human engineering has some lapses". The most controversial was the smuggling in of some clauses; clause 80 section (1) where the President and his aids tampered with the original provision of the bills so that his party the Peoples Democratic Party (PDD) will have an advantage over the rest of the Political Parties.
Further to the arrangement for the smooth take-off of the election 2005, the INEC embarked on revision/registration of voters exercise. The exercise took place between 12'~ and 23rd September 2002 and following complaints from the public a make- up exercise was carried out for a week in December.
Altogether, sixty-seven million, eight hundred and ninety two thousand seven hundred and sixty-two (67,892,762) applications were got and sixty million, eight hundred and twenty-three thousand and twenty two (60,823,022) voters were registered (Ndujihe 2003:8).
The registration exercise was rife with fraud so much so that INEC suspended over 250 Electoral Officers (Okocha 2003: 1) according to Mr. Okpo Sam Okpo, the National Commissioner in Charge of information "some of the electoral Officers have been placed on suspension arising from the role they played in the last voters' registration exercise." He further said that the Commissioner found out that some of them (Electoral Officers) either colluded with politicians to either sell forms or engage in actions which sought to compromise the integrity of the commission". -iCTC RAL Cc PRE! IDENT rH Tt EIR R1 S.No NAME OF CANDIDATE SEX PARTY BUHARI MOHAMMADU 1 OKADIGBO CHUBA WILLIAM ANPP MALACHY OJUKWU CHUKWUEMEKA 2 ODUMEGWU APGA --BAYERO SANI IBRAHIM n OKEREKE OSITA EMMANUEL APLP TUKURU ALHAJI K. EZEMUE NDU ARP HAJLA ASMAU ALIYU NNAJI IFEANYICHUKWU GOODWILL BNPP SULEIMAN MOHAMMED AWWAL FERREIRA A. ABAYOMI JORGE DA EBOIGBE EHI CHRISTOPHER OGENEBROIRE OKOTIE JP HABIB MAIRO BATURIYA (MRS) CHIEF CHRISTOPHER PERE AJUWA 0 LDPN I MAHAMMED NASIR I YUSUF MOHAMMADU DIKKO Y- MDJ CHIEF MELFORD OBIENE OKILO MAJOR MOJISOLA ADEKUNLE 10 OBASANJO MMN - I MOAMMED IBRAHIM I AGORO (DR) OLAPADE (ROLAND NAC
HAJIA MAIMUNATU LATA TOMBA NAP
13 NCP I JEROME (FERRY) TALA GOPYE SEN. IKE OMAR SANDA NWACHUKWU I NDP HABU FAR1 ALIYU DR. KALU IDIKA KALU NNPP
PAC
1 '/ PDP ALH. ATIKU ABUBAKAR NWANKWO AGWUCHA ARTHUR PMP BATUBO BENETT RAYMOND MUSA ABDUKADIR BALARABE l9 PRP OKAFOR ERNEST NGOZI SEN. NWOBODO JIM 20 IFEANYICHUKWU UNPP GONI MOHAMMED Table 2.0.6
Generally, there were a lot of irregularities in the whole exercise. For instance, according to the Commissioner, it will be recalled that last month, the Commission forwarded a list of about two million fake voters to the Police. Also the Police had d,iscovered in a Lagos business center where about five million fake voters card were to be printed (Okocha 2003:6). However INEC registered a total number of 60,823,022 voters.
In 1999, nine (9) Political Parties were registered to participate in the general election, but after the general election it was only three parties that finally emerged as strong parties; AD, APP and PDP. Political associations and other Political parties that were not strong enough kept making moves for full registration. Then on July 2 6'" 2 002, t hree n ew P olitical P arties were registered; t hey include All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) and National Democratic Party (NDP).
The agitation continued, some even went to court. On 8th November 2002, the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled in Abuja in favour of five (5) Political Parties/associations that they must be registered as Political Parties; The Parities are National Conscience Party (NCP), the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJ), and Nigeria Peoples Congress (NPC).
Then in December 2002, INEC registered (24) twenty-four new political parties thus bringing the number of political parties that will contest the 2003 general election to (30) thirty. In the electoral guideline given out by INEC, the Commission re-ordered the order of the election with the Presidential election coming on first. This arrangement had a lot of criticism. Among it was that the ruling party (PDP) was only intimidating other parties and that it was going to produce bandwagon effect for the incumbent president to the d etriment of others. H owever, I NEC started t he e lection with National Assembly.
In addition to the above, INEC seemed not to be ready for the election and if it were ready, the entire election preparation and administration of the guidelines were shredded in secrecy. The guideline also included the election timetable, which scheduled the election as follows:
Saturday, April 12, 2003 - National Assembly Elections Saturday, April 19,2003 - Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections. Saturday, May 3rd2003 - State Houses of Assembly Elections. Parties' conventions took place between November 2002 and January 2003. The Convention returned the parties candidates at various levels. The election took place as scheduled and it was regarded as the worst election ever conducted in Nigeria. It was regarded as appointments rather than election.
In one of the EU EOM report, it was stated that the Presidential elections were marred by serious irregularities and fraud. In some States minimum standard for democratic elections were not met. The results of the election are as follows: Senate - PDP - 76 seats ANPP - 27 seats AD - 6 seats UNPP - - APGA - - 109 seats House of Representatives PDP =222 seats ANPP = 97 seats AD = 33 seats APGA = 3 seats UNPP = 3 seats NDP = Iseat 358 seats
In the Presidential Election, Chief Olusegun Obsanjo, the presidential candidate for PDP polled 24,456,140 votes or 61.94% of the total vote cast in the election. He had more than 25% of the votes cast in 32 out of 36 States. General Muhammadu Buhari, The ANPP's Presidential candidate polled 12,710,022 votes representing 32.19%. While Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) had 1,297,445 votes representing 3.30% of the total votes cast. The results of the gubernatorial election are as follows: PDP won in 28 States, ANPP in 7 States and AD in 1 State. It is the same for States Houses of Assembly election. This performance was for the PDP an improvement on what it had in 1999 when it won 21 out of the 36 States. Its greatest gain came from the Southwest, the strong hold of its Presidential candidate, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo where it snatched five of the six States in the zone from the Alliance for Democracy. The AD is left with only Lagos State. PDP lost in K ano to the ANPP, b ut it made up by defeating the party's incumbent Governors in three States under ANPP control. The States are Kwara, Kogi and Gombe. Except in the Northwest where the ANPP remains the dominant party, PDP is now the leading party in the remaining five Geo-political zones of the country.
The opposition parties; All Nigeria peoples Party (ANPP), the United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP) and other parties hotly disputed the result. The ANPP's National chairman, Chief Don Etiebet and his UNPP counterpart Alhaji Saleh Jambo told newsmen that they said the figures were concocted. Worst still, the election witnessed the greatest aberration in Anambra States, the home front of APGA was taken over by PDP and in the same state, victors announced in the National Assembly election of 12 April were stepped down brazenly in favour of a team of candidates who never featured in the ballot exercise, INEC purporting to act on the enrolled orders of an Abuja High Court of llth~pril, one day to the election proper.
In Ana.mbra, Enugu and Ebonyi States, there were other reports that elections were rigged. It was alleged that the results were written by one or few party men. This suggest why there were protest in Anambra State when the results were declared and the PDP's Dr. Chris Ngige (OON) was announced the winner by the INEC.
There are many electoral cases pending in the election tribunals ranging from that of the ANPP's Presidential candidate to that of .------Tile Ecology of Electoral .systems various States Houses of Assembly and National Assembly, we shall in subsequent chapters zero on the case of Anambra State, our study base.
THE COMMISSION: STRUCTURE The commission was established in accordance with section 153(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The headquarters of the commission is located at Plot 436 Zambezi Crescent, Maitama, Abuja, Federal Capital territory.
Composition The Commission consists of a Chairman who is the Chief National Electoral commissioner and the Chief Executive of the Commission and twelve other members known as National Electoral Commissioners. The Chairman and members of the commission are not less than 50 and 40 years of age respectively and persons of unquestionable integrity. The Chairman has a tenure of five years. Appointment to the office of Chairmen is subject to confirmation by the Senate after nomination by the President. The Council of State (comprising the President, Vice President, all former Presidents of the Federation and all former Heads of State, all former Chief Justices of Nigeria, the President of Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Governors of the States of the Federation, and the Attorney general of the Federation) advises the President in the exercise of his powers with respect to the appointment of the Chairman and members. The current Chairman is Sir Abel lbude Guobadia.
The twelve other members known as National Commissioners are also confirmed by the Senate after nomination by the President and upon the advise of the Council of State as stated above. Their tenure is also five years. There is also a Secretary to the Commission who is an officer of the Public Service of the Federation not below the rank of permanent Sectary. The Secretary who is appointed by the President is the accounting officer of the Commission. Subject to the general direction of the Commission the Secretary shall be: responsible for keeping proper records of the proceedings of the Commission. head the commissions secretariat and be responsible for the administration thereof; and responsible for the direction and control of all other employees of the Commission with the approval of the Commission. - NATIONAL LEVEL [CHARMAN]
Securily Unit Audit Unil
12345 National 6 7 8 9 (NECON) 10 11 12 13 (INEC)
[SECRETARY: DG (NECON)
Pension Unit Commissions Secrelariate Direclors 1 Public Legal Finance PersLnel Planning Logistics Field Estate and Affairs Services & Sypplies Management Research & Operations L $Ay& nrnhmr PalW h&+Ls Fllm zJ&-&?fdWmlns -!LaRmmh LL&&y~onmrnm & Wmnd eav ~'bbr ROLXDIS~ ~mm &am1 ' Wnua MRd@ans Dang ldmamn h Pvliny
--T-Resident Elecloral Commissioner
Adminislralive Secretary 7- HOD -- I 1,ql, Planning Public Legal A7 "p" Works. Logislics Field Research & Affairs Services Finance personnel Slalislics & Sypplies Management Services
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA LEVEL
ELECTORAL OFFICERS r-I Personnel Field Management Services
Source Research Deparlrnenl INEC Head Quatlers.Abuja Figure 2.0 The Chairman presides at all meetings of the Commission but if he is absent from any meeting of the Commission, the Commission members present shall elect one of their number to preside.
94 Questions put before the Commission at meeting are decided by consensus and where this is not possible, by a majority vote the members present and voting. The quorum for meetings is eight. In the case of equality of votes, the Chairman has a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote.
State Level: Appointed by the President for each state of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is a Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC). The Resident Electoral Commissioner is a person not less than 40 years of age of unquestionable integrity. An administrative Secretary assists the REC in the states and the FCT offices of the Commission.
Local Government Level The government area office is headed by an Electoral officer.
Key Functions: The functions of the Commission as stipulated in part 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution are as listed below: i. Organize, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and Vice-president, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a state, and to the membership of the Senate, the House of Representatives and the House of Assembly of each State of the Federation; ii. Register political parties is accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and an act of the Nation Assembly; The Ecology of El'lec!oml .sy.s!e~il.s iii. Monitor the organization and operation of the political' parties, including their finances; iv. Arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political parties, and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information; v. Arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election under this Constitution; vi. Monitor the political campaigns and provide rules and regulation's, which shall govern the political parties; vii. Ensure that all Electoral Commissioners, ' Electoral and Returning officers take and subscribe to the oath of office prescribed by law; viii. Delegate any of its powers to any Resident Electoral Commissioners; ix. Carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly 2.0.2 Elections and political conflicts in Nigeria (1964- 2003) The 1964 general elections were conducted by the Federal Electoral Commission of Nigeria (FEDECO). The first coalition being the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), made up of the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the New Nigerian Democratic Party (NNDP) while the other coalition, the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) composed of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Action group (AG). It is important to not that certain animosities were carried from the elections of 1959, p art of which broke the coalition between the NPC and NCNC.
The conflict associated with the 1964 general elections started with the 1963 population census. The electioneering campaign for the 1964 federal election was proceed by the announcement in February 1964, of the 1963 census figures by the Federal census Board, which recorded the following population figures for the component parts of the federation. Northern Region - 29.78million Eastern Region - 12.39million West (with Mid-West) - 12.81million
Federal Territory of Lagos - 0.68million Total - 55.65million Source: (Cited in Kurfi, 1983:P.ZO)
The announced figures generated tension among members of the political parties in the different regions as the census figures were used to reallocate the 312 seats in the Federal House of Representative. Therefore, t he campaigns for t he elections were characterized' in all regions with thuggery, violence, arrests and - imprisonment of political opopenents by agencies of regional governments and denial of permits to hold public meetings or processions. Apart from all these, infringements on people's Fundamental Human Rights were also glaring in the campaigns as peoples were banned from free assembly, expression of free speech and the rest. This made the leaders of all the political parties to meet in Lagos in October 1964 and agreed to let peace reign.
However, the "Peace Agreement" did not change any of these negative acts and the President off the Federal Republic, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, in a dawn broadcast on 10 December 1964, proclaimed that "if the politicians had decided to destroy our national unity, then they should summon a round-table conference to decide how our national assets should be divided ... "(Kurfi, 1983: P21). This shows the extent of the crisis, which the President termed "incredible and challenging".
The last straw that broke the camel's back was the observation that barely tow weeks to the election of 30 December 1964, 66 candidates of the NNA and 15 UPGA candidates had been returned unopposed. This became unacceptable to the UPGA, which declared its intention to boycott the elections. In reactions to the gross misconduct of the electoral body, some members of the Federal Electoral Commission resigned from the Commission in an attempt at demonstrating that they were not prepared to underwrite the elections. This notwithstanding, the Chairman of the commission went ahead and announce the results of the election with NNA having won the majority of the seats in the house. This misconduct made the president to refuse to reappoint Tafawa Balewa to head the new government of the Federation. The intervention of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justices of regional High Courts resolved the constitutional stalemate and Tafawa Balewa was reappointed to form a new government.
The rescheduled election in the Eastern region and the elections to the West Regional Assembly in 1965 became other sources of conflicts, which culminated in the military coup of January 1966 and the end of the first republic.
The military took over the reign of government through a counter coup in July 1966 and since then, political activities were banned and the constitution suspended automatically. It is important to stress that one major reason given for the military coup was the barbaric act of the politicians especially with thuggery and violence that characterized the conduct of the 1964 Federal Elections. The military ruled for thirteen years, that is, between 1966 and 1979. for mush of this period, Nigeria was fighting to contain the threat of succession and possible disintegration, and policy was dominated by the one primary consideration of maintaining unity of the state (Dudley, 1982:P.283). however, despite the attempts made by the then Federal Military government, centrifugal forces overwhelmed the centripetal forces and led the country into the avoidable civil war between I967 and 1970.
By 1970, the Gowon led administration was preoccupied with reconstruction, reconciliation and rehabilitation of the country. This occupied the minds of the government that no date was given for the handing over of power to a democratically elected government. Therefore, by 1975, military government was overthrown by another military government led by Generla Muritala Mohammed. The Murital led administration was short-lived as a failed was organized which led to the death of Muritala himself. In a swift reation to the demise of the General, the number two man in the administration -General Olusegun Obasanjo took over the reign of government. Immediately Obasanjo took over, he set the machinery in motion for handing over of government to a democratically elected civilian and the date was fixed for October 1979.
The formation and registration of five political parties heralded the way for elections, which were held on 7th JUIY (to the Senate and the National Assembly), Mth JUI~ (to the House of Representatives) 21" July (to the State Assemblies), 28 July (for the Gubernatorial Offices) and 11 August (for the Presidential Office). The arrangements for the elections were handled by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) (Dudley l982:P.l98).
Although, the elections were generally agreed to have been conducted in an orderly manner, and were in the main, free and fair, however, several allegations of rigging and violence were raised in some quarters. Nevertheless, agitations about the improprieties in the election were down played due to anxiety of the Nigerian people to take over power from the military.
It could be said that animosities and people's grouse about the 1979 elections played out in the 1983 elections. This is well reflected by Falola and lhonvbare (1985:P.2006) when they assert that campaigns for the August - September 1983 general elections started as soon as the results of the 1979 elections were announced. The rabid corruption of political office-holders, the failure of some state governors to perform, personality clashes, intra-party feuds, conflicts between some sate governments and I the federal government and clashes resulting from efforts to superimpose the political party's constitution and structure over the power and authority of elected officials were bound to impact upon the 1983 elections. As also put by the duo. "the desire to manipulate the power of incumbency in order to remain in power, the challenge to incumbent officials by alienated or opposition elements in the struggle to win acces to the state and its resource, the desire to expand the power and sphere of interest of particular parties and the subsequent registration of a sixth political party were also major factors with affected the 1983 elections. The intra-class contradiction of this period also affected the 1983 general elections as this led to several alignments and re-alignments of class forces. There were "decampings", mostrly from the UPN to the NPN and vice- versa" (Falola and Ihonvhare, 1985: P.208). There were, on the whole, several inadequacies on the part of FEDECO in the conduct and organization of the elections. This contributed in no sall measures to the conflict generated by the 1983 elections. As a matter of fact, the electoral body provided the leeway for the politicians, especially NPN, to perpetuate its evil acts. This was well captured by lfeanyi Azuka when he asserts "the behaviour of Nigerian politicians... so lacking in restraint, tolerance, morality and modesty". . . (cited in Joseph, 1991:P. 158).
In as much as we did not intend to x-ray the activities of the political parties that competed for elections in this analysis, one cannot but mention that maneuverings of NPN in the second republic went beyond being a ruling party whose strength exceeded that of other parties, to one which enjoyed a monopoly of power within the political system. This was achieved as the party extended its tentacles to increase the number of states under its control and did everything within its reach to take over Kano, Anambra an and Oyo formerly being controlled by oppositions. This created serious electoral disorder in the country and coupled with other factors, the 1983, the government of Shagari was terminated by another military coup, which brought in the Buhari administration and the country went back to square one.
The period between 1984 and 1992 saw a different Nigeria from what was experienced under the civilian administration in 1979 and 1983. The regime that outed the Shagari regime (the Buhari regime) was short lived in a palace coup of August 27, 1985 headed by General lbrahim Babangida, the Chief of Army Staff under the Buhari's regime. The major reasons given for this change of government was the failure of the former to announce the handing over date to a civilian regime, which made the later endeared to Nigerians and the political class. The first step taken in this regard by Babangida was to inaugurate a political bureau to study the political history of the country and point out the problem and remedies to them. The submission of the report of the bureau was followed by the opening of the political space and political associations started to spring up.
The Babangida administration was the first and only military regime that made use of the highest number of intellectuals in his administration. This initially deceived the Nigerian people who thought the military junta had good intentions. However, Babangida fell out of favour with Nigerians when it became obvious that he had come to launch himself as the 'Gadafi' of Nigeria. The first move that disclosed his intentions was the change of title from the known military head of state to military President. Secondly, the change in handing over date from 1990 to 1991; 1991 to 1992 and later to 1993. Meanwhile, political processes were embarked upon with manipulations of different sorts. There were banning and un-banning of the political class at different time and annulment of primary elections.
The democratization process or what was described as transition programme of Babangida was the most expensive, wasteful and ridiculous venture Nigeria ever invested in under Babangida. The original programme started with the initiation of two political parties; the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), which became government babies throughout the transition period. As anxious as Nigerians were, they did not contest the formation or imposition of these parties, which Babangida said, "we are all co-founder and co-joiner". People joined either of these parties and the political process was set in motion with the presidential election fixed for June 12 1993. the annulment of the primary elections held by the former political parties willingly formed by the people; screened and registered by the National Electoral Commission culminated in the inauguration of the two parties. The adoption of option A4 by the electoral body made the process to look wholesome as candidates were made to seek nomination from their wards. Eventually, two candidates emerged for the two political parties. As for the Social Democratic Party (SDP), late Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola became'the flag bearer while Bashir Othman Tofa had the flag for the National Republican Convention (NRC). These two personalities were known in their various wards as giant business moguls.
Despite a dubious Abuja High Court injunction on June 10 that sought to restrain the NEC from organizing the election, the June 12 presidential elections passed peacefully, freely and fairly. Indeed, the election marked a watershed in Nigerian history (Suberu, 1997:P.309). The election was declared the freest and fairest in the political history of Nigeria by both national and international observers. However, the problem with the election started when the military junta, Babangida urged the result of the elections not to be announced as a result of another Abuja High Court Injunction which sought to stop the announcement of the elections results. At this point in time, about 55% of the election results had been announced in favour of Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola. By June 26, 1993, the 'president' in a television broadcast announced that the June 12 1993 presidential election result had been annulled. This annulment was greeted with serious crises and violence in different parts of the country. According to Suberu (1997:P.307), "this annulment of the results of a free and fair contest was merely the most dramatic and tragic of several assaults that Babangida had unleashed on the redemocratization programme in order to perpetuate his rule". In the views of Adedibu (1997:P.379) "the election, as events after the annulment showed, was a firm resolution by Nigerians to consign military rule to the dust bin of history and join the world in embracing the civilized mode of governance - democracy". Therefore, by Tuesday 2gth June, the protest against the annulment had spread to major towns in Ogun, Ondo and Lagos states. There were exodus of people form their places of abode to their home towns and villages, especially the lgbos and the Hausas in the South West and similarly for the Yorubas in the North and the East.
As a matter of fact, some had expressed that it was divine intervention that saved the country from another civil war as a result of the conflict generated by the annulment of the June 12 1993 Presidential elections.
As earlier on pointed out, the crisis generated out by the 1993 elections culminated in the inauguration of an Interim Government ...... Political Co~~/lictsin Nigeria headed by Chief Ernest Shoneka in August 27 1993. However, this administration was terminated in a palace coup organized by General Abacha in November 17 1993. It is important to note that the regime of Abacha was the worst in the political history of the country as the human rights record of the country declined drastically and Nigeria became t he outcast among the comity of nations especially with the killings of Ken Saro-Wiwa, an environmentalist and human rights activist of the Ogoni People.
The demise of Abacha on June 7 1998 was greeted with jubilation both within and outside the country. The political class became the happiest in this regard as they constituted the most humiliated and intimidated group of people under Abacha. This led to Abdul- Salami Abubakar becoming the new Head of State. Abubakar's regime was short as he organized a transition to civil rule within ten months and handed over power in May 29 1999. the elections of February 1999 was characterized with tolerance and perseverance among Nigerians. Like what happened in 1979, Nigerians decided to ignore irregularities observed in the conduct of the elections. However, animosities were down played as people were interested in sending the military to the barracks. This ushered in another civilian administration headed by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, former military Head of State that handed over power to the civilians in the second republic.
POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND THE 2003 GENERAL ELECTIONS. Initially, there was tension and fear among Nigerians over the ability of the ruling civilian government to organize elections to transit from one civilian administration to another. This was as a result of their experience in the second republic where the process led to the intervention of the military in the political process, which terminated the civil rule of the second republic.
Prior to the 2003 general elections, it was obvious that the elections will throw the country into pandemic situations as the country was in the grip of fear due to the dreadful and heart rending increase in the state of dastardly acts of violence and politically motivated assassinations,, to use Ologbenla's words. This is not peculiar to any particular region of the country as it cuts across all the political divides of the country. As a matter of facts, what was experienced in the country before the 2003 elections was more than what happened in 1983 when the military seized power from the civilian administration. However, this did not happened in the 2003 election not because the military now had a new orientation nor had it gone into extinction, but because it was not the wish of the political class that the military should come at this point in time. This attests to the fact that the involvement of military in politics in most cases may not be as a result the internal dynamics of the military organization as a school of though had made us to believe but the external environment of the society, especially the orientation of the political class. ~he'humiliationand inhuman treatment melted on the political class by the A bacha's regime served as a great lesson to the political class, which made them to contain the tension and the ferocity of the violence of 2003. it must be stated that political assassinations that enveloped the country before the 2003 general elections were unprecedented and flagrant in the political history of the country. As cited by Ologbenla, Chief Uche Ogbonnaya, a former commissioner in Chief Achike Udenwa's government and the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) Senatorial candidate for Orlu Senatorial District of Imo State was assassinated for political reasons. Similarly, Mr. Theodore Emeka Agwatu, Principal Secretary to the Imo State Governor, was brutally murdered by unknown gunmen (Ologbenla, 2003:p.80).
In what seem a flagrant disregard for law and order in the country, the Attorney General of the Federation, Chief Bola Ige was brutally murdered at his lbadan home shortly after the murder of Mr. Odunayo Olagbaju, the speaker of the House of assembly in Osun State. As if that was not enough, on March 6 2003, barely six weeks to the elections, Chief Marshall Harry, chieftain oft he All Nigerian People's Party was assassinated by unknown gunmen in his Abuja residence. Also, in Kwara and Ogun States, Alhaji Ahman Pategi, PDP Chairman in Kwara State and Dele Arojo, PDP governorship aspirant in Ogun State were kicked ruthlessly. The Commissioner for Women Affairs in Nasarawa State, Mrs. Maimuna Joyce Kutai and two others were murdered in cold blood by poiitical opponents in Toto. All these were the reported cases while a host number of such incidence happened in different parts of the country, which are not reported.
Apart from this, there were long lists of people whose lives were threatened or who had actually survived assassinations. Many of these generated as a result of mutual distrust and disagreements between a governor and his deputy; a godfather and godson; individual political opponents from different political parties and so on. The very question that comes to mind at this juncture is that what causes all these? The answer to this is not far fetched. The nature of politics in the country is such that has been described as a "hobbessian war" (the war of every man against another man). Since political offices have been turned to avenues for amassing wealth, every Nigerian looks up to the political environment for purely economic gains.
The killings that characterized the 2003 general elections notwithstanding, it must be pointed out that the road to the elections were heralded by tensions over the voters' register and the electoral laws fraught with serious irregularities. While all these were being debated, the primary elections of the parties came with highest degree of insincerity and malpractices. This created problems among party stalwarts. It was obvious that the choice of Muhammad Buhari, a retired military Head of State between 1983 and 1985, as the presidential candidate for ANPP will create problem for the country as these created problems among the Northern elders.
What happened in Kwara, Enugu and Anambra States were highly instructive to the political class and the Nigerian populace in general. The fights between Governor Muhammad Lawal and his godfather, Dr. Olusola Saraki over the control of the state was great lesson to the political class. The crisis started with the pronouncement by the godfather to make his blood son the governorship candidate of the PDP in the state for the 2003 elections. This did not go down well with Lawal who had the ...... Politico1 Conjlicts in Nigerin intention of ruling the state for another term of four years. This led to serious quarrel between the two and their supporters.
In a similar vein, Governor Chimaroke Nnamani fell out of favour with his godfather, Chief Jim Nwobodo who claimed that the governor rode on his back to power. Therefore, Chief Nwobodo did everything possible to ensure that Nnamani lost the election for the second term and presented Chief Alex Obiechina as the governorship candidate for the United Nigeria Peoples Party (UNPP). However, Nnamani was able to survive the trouble due to his popularity among the people of the state.
The Anambra's case was the worst. This created a very bad image of the kind of democracy being practiced in Nigeria. Aside from the tension this crisis in Anambra state generated within the state, the abduction of the governor from the state house was described as the "first civilian coup detat" in the country. 2.3.0 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES OF THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION. We have copiously traced the historical trend of the evolution of elections and its processes in Nigeria, locating the characteristics of the system within the
Nigeria environment and the political system. Let us therefore pan across other countries of the world, attempting a summarized exploration across eight countries, randomly related, but much that almost every continent of the global community is represented. The comparative analysis will help to situate the Nigerian experience, and possibly, act as a benchmark for reforming critical operational strategies, which will be recommended in chapter 5. The random exploration will further h elp to u nder study, c ontextualise a nd compare the c haracter of N igeria's d emocracy a nd therefore the electoral systems, including the consequential out-puts. Electoral System in EGYPT
EGYPT fled Sea
0 HO Ill& 6 r a-,
I-,-. RWUA A PEEP INTO EGYPT -- COUNTRY BIO-EGYPT Population 69,5 Million (July 2001 Head of Prime Minister Atef Ebeid estimate) Government Territory 386,660 sq.mi Language(s) Arabic (official), English or French widely used by Year of 1922 Independence educated classes Religion Muslin (mostly Sunni) 92%, Year of Current 1971 Constitution Coptic Christian and other 8% President Mohammed (unofficial estimates) -Head of State Hosni Mubarak
(I) BACKGROUND Egypt is an ancient country, famous for its pharaonic monuments and fertile Nile valley. Its strategic location at the intersection of Asia, Africa, and Europe underpins its weight in the Middle East region and its importance to external powers. That continuity and centrality remain prominent aspects of Egyptians' sense of identity. - Local Legislative Executive Judiciary Referendum to elect
elects 213 of V -
3
n 10
Figure 2 3:O;Structure of the Egyplian Government Today (11) THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT Although Mubarak asserts that Egypt adheres to the U.S. system of separation of executive, legislative, and judicial power and, on paper, the Egyptian system resembles the mixed French presidential parliamentary system; power is highly concentrated in the executive branch. Under Mubarak, the judiciary has achieved some autonomy and has occasionally limited the actions of the executive and legislature; nonetheless, the courts remain fettered in important respects. Power and authority are centralized geographically, since the central government appoints the governors and mayors; local councils, although elected, have limited authority (Figure 16.4).
Egypt's p olitical s ystem i s m odeled i n p art o n the French Fifth Republic. The president is elected for a fixed term of six years. The president appoints the prime minister and Council of Ministers who are also responsible to the People's Assembly. Ministers supervise the bureaucracy. The People's Assembly is elected for a five-year term, but it can be dissolved at any time by the president. The upper house - the Consultative Council - is partly elected and has largely advisory functions. The High Constitutional Court and Council of State have powers of review that blend the US. and French models (see details in the section on the judiciary). Formal relations among the institutions resemble the "mixed" model but practice follows the "concentrated" authority model, in part because of the extraordinary powers accorded to the executive branch under the State of Emergency that has been in effect for two decades.
(Ill) PARTY SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS At first glance Egypt appears to have a robust multi-party system. Since 1976, political parties have competed for seats in the People's Assembly. Today's 16 legal political parties present programs to the electorate and express their views through party newspapers. Behind the image of competitiveness, however, the picture emerges of a largely "contrived multiparty system."
There are three primary reasons for this situation: (1) The multiparty system was instituted from the top down, with the president initially establishing several opposition parties and the government able to veto the registration of new parties; (2) opposition parties cannot make significant inroads into the dominant position of the governing party; and (3) significant political movement s are not allowed to form political parties by which they can contest the ruling party's control. In sum, Egypt's system offers the appearance of choice while ensuring that the governing party wins the elections. Moreover, the party system cannot play an effective role in interest aggregation or even interest articulation, given these constraints.
(IV) MANIPULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS Direct intervention in elections is evident in many aspects of the election process: 1. Since the public prosecutor must approve each candidate, the government can easily disqualify candidates from opposition parties. 2. The government monopoly of television and radio prevents opposition parties and independent candidates from using the media to inform voters of their views. The parties only have a half-hour slot on TV and radio, during the entire campaign, in which to present their platforms. In contrast, the achievements of government ministers and NDP candidates are trumpeted in daily news broadcasts. Party newspapers have a small circulation and cannot reach illiterate voters. 3. Even though each party is allowed to place observers in the polling stations, NDP observers or government personnel sometimes refuse to let them enter or arrest them prior to election day. In 1995 the police arrested 688 lslamist poll watchers just before the election, which left many polling stations without any non-NDP monitors. 4. NDP candidates intimidate voters by hiring male and female thugs to scare them away from the polls. Central Security Forces (CSF) and police block voters from reaching the polling stations. In 2000, busloads of NDP voters were allowed to pass through police barriers, whereas voters lacking the white NDP- issued voting cards were frequently barred from entering the polling stations. That tactic did not always succeed: even though 20 Central Security Force trucks were stationed outside a district polling station in Tanta, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate won. 5. The assembly rejects court challenges to the voting results. In 1995, even though administrative courts ordered elections suspended in 112 districts and the Court of Cassation voided 188 v ictories, the a ssembly did not remove any of the MPs, conduct recounts, or hold new elections. The speaker argued that the Assembly had the authority to make its own rules. However, when two Muslim Brotherhood activists (one a woman) were poised to win in Alexandria in 2000, the speaker swiftly invoked a court ruling on election irregularities in order to suspend the balloting. The NDP then engineered those activitists' defeat in new elections in 2002. In contrast, when the Court of Cassation invalidated the results in three constituencies because voters had been prevented from accessing the polls, the speaker reasserted the Assembly's right to make its own determination concerning the validity of voting results. Electoral System in FRANCE
FRANCE FRANCE: Profile of Political and Electoral Systems. COUNTRY BIO-FRANCE- -. Population 59.5 Million Head of prime Minister Jean Pierre Government Raffarin Territory 21 1,208 sq.mi Language(s) French loo%, rapidly Year of 486 declining regional dialects Independence and languages (Provencal, Breton, Alsatian, Corsican, Year of Current 1958 Catalan, Basque, Flemish) Constitution Religion Roman Catholic 9O0/0, Head of State President Jacques Protestant 2%, Jewish 1O/O I Chirac Muslim 1%, unaffiliated 6%
The results of the first round of the presidential elections on April 21,2002 were supposed to be more or less predictable. The two top contenders - the sitting president, Jacques Chirac, and the sitting Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin - would win the two top spots for the second round two weeks later. In fact, the candidate of the extreme right National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen won the second spot, creating what was called a "political earthquake," and throwing the political system into a state of confusion. In the end, Chirac crushed his opponent, winning more than 82 percent of the vote, with the declared support of both the established left and the established right. Thus, Jacques Chirac, whose presidency had been compromised by serious corruption scandals, became a most unlikely saviour of republican value. In every legislative election since 1981, the French electorate has favoured the opposition, and the legislative elections in 2002 that followed the bizarre presidential election, reaffirmed that pattern. Nevertheless, overall, French citizens now appear to have more confidence in the key institutions of the Republic than they have had at any time in French history, although increasingly they have little confidence in the politicians who are running them. The stability of the republic has surprised many of the French as well as the outside world. By combining two models of democratic government, the presidential and the parliamentary, the Fifth Republic has succeeded in a constitutional experiment that now serves France well. For the first time since the French Revolution, there is no important political party or sector of public opinion that challenges the legitimacy of the regime. Local Governments Legislature Government Judiciary
Elects
Nalional Assembly I - Elects I Prime Minister
Cabinet IJ1u
(President of Senate) selects
I__ Figure 2.3.2: Structure of the French Government.
The Electoral Process; In most democracies, no form of political participation is as extensive as voting. Although France is a unitary state, elections are held with considerable frequency at every territorial level. councilors are elected for each of the more than 36,000 communes in France, for each of the 100 departments (countries), and for each of the 22 regions. Deputies to the National Assembly are elected at least once every five years, and the president of the Republic is elected (or reelected) at least once every seven years (every five years after 2002). In addition, there are elections for French representative to the European Parliament every five years since 1979,
France was the first European country to enfranchise a mass electorate, and France was also the first European country to demonstrate that a mass electorate did not preclude the possibility of authoritarian government. The electoral law of 1848 enfranchised all male citizens over the age of 21, but within five years this s ame mass electorate had ratified L ouis N apoleon's coup d'etat and his establishment of the Second Empire. Rather than restrict the electorate, Napoleon perfected new modern techniques for manipulating a mass electorate by gerrymandering districts, skillfully using public works as patronage for official candidates, and exerting pressure through the administrative hierarchy.
From the Second Empire to the end of World War II, the size of the electorate remained more or less stable, but it suddenly more than doubled when women 21 years of age and older were granted the vote in 1944. After the voting age was lowered to 18 in 1974, 2.5 million voters were added to the rolls. By 2002, there were more than 40 million voters in France.
Electoral Participation and Abstention Surprisingly, in both the Third and the Fourth Republics general disenchantment with parliamentary institutions never prevented a high turnout at national elections. Since the consolidation of republican institutions in 1885 (and with the one exception of the somewhat abnormal post-World War I election of 1919), electoral participation never fell to less than 71 percent of registered voters, and in most elections participation was much higher. TABLE 2.3.0 -- "Yes" Votes + "No" Votes + Votes for winning Votes for Losing Cnrtdihte Carrdidnlc Registered Abstentions (percentage (percentage (percentage (percentage Date Voters (percentage winner Loser registered) cast) registered) cast) (Millions) registered) 26.6 15.1 66.4 79.2 17.4 20.7 - 27.2 23.5 55.9 75.3 18.4 24.7 27.0 24.4 64.9 90.7 6.6 9.3 27.6 22.7 46.4 61.7 28.8 38.2 28.2 15.4 44.8 54.5 De Gaulle 37.4 45.5 Milterrand 28.7 19.4 36.7 46.7 41.6 53.2 28.8 30.9 37.2 57.5 Pompidou 27.4 42.4 Poher 29.1 39.5 36.1 67.7 17.2 32.3 Giscard 42.8 29.8 12.1 43.9 Millerrand 50'7 d'Estaing 49.3 Giscard 5H0181(P) 43.8 52.2 Millerrand 40.1 47.8 dtEslaing 518188(P) 43,8 54.0 Minerrand 37.3 46.0 Cllirac 11/6188(R) 26.1 80.0 6.5 20.0 9/20192(R) 34.9 50.8 33.8 49.2 5/7195(P) 39.5 52.6 Chirac 35.6 47.4 Jospin 9/24100(R) 18.6 73.2 6.8 26.8 6/5/02(+) ' 41.2 20.3 62.0 82.2 Chirac 13.4 17.8 Le Pen Source: Official results from [lie Ministry of lhe Interior.
Nole: French Referendums (R) and Second Ballols of Presidential Elections (P), 1958-2002 (Voting in Metropolitan France)
Voting participation in elections of the fifth Republic has undergone a significant change and fluctuates far more than during previous republics. Abstention tends to be highest in referendums and Europeans elections, and lowest in presidential contests, with other elections falling somewhere in between (see Table 2.3.0). In 2002, a n ew record was s et for a bstention in a presidential election, when 27.9 percent of the registered voters stayed home. During the 1980s, the normal level of abstention in legislative elections increased substantially, and remains high. In the 2002 legislative election, an abstention rate of 35.6 percent set a record for legislative electrons for any of the French republics. The elections for the European Parliament always attract relatively few voters, but in 1999 more than half the registered voters stayed home (slightly more than in 1994). For referendums, a new record was set in 2000. Almost 70 percent of the registered voters chose not to vote in a (successful) referendum to reduce the presidential term from 7 to 5 years (after the elections of 2002).
These high and growing levels of abstention, which are such a striking departure from what had come to be regarded as the norm, are not equally distributed among the electorate. Abstention has grown faster among voters of the left than among voters of the right, and faster in working class constituencies than in more middle class constituencies. Rising abstention seems linked to a I arger phenomenon of change i n the party system. Since the late 1970s, voters' confidence in all parties has declined, some of which is expressed through growing abstention rates among voters who formerly voted for both right and left. The highest abstention rates in 2002 were among those voters who expressed no preference between parties of the right and left.
Abstention from voting is one aspect of the major structural change in the French party system. Even when the abstention level declined to around 30 percent during the electoral cycle of 1992-1997), it never reverted to the pre-I981 average. Nevertheless, in contrast with the United States, among the 90 percent of the electorate that is registered to vote, individual abstention appears to be cyclical and there are almost no permanent abstainers. In this sense, it is ,possible to see abstention in an election as a political choice (42 percent of them in 2002 said that they abstained because they had no confidence in politicians.
Parliamentary electoral process: Since the early days of the Third Republic, France has experimented with a great number of electoral systems and devices without obtaining more satisfactory results in terms of government coherence. The stability of the Fifth Republic cannot be attributed to the method of electing National Assembly deputies, for the system is essentially the same one used during the most troubled years of the Third Republic, as in the United States, electoral districts (577) are represented by a single deputy who is selected through two round elections. On the first election day, candidates who obtain a majority of all votes cast are elected to parliament; this is a relatively rare occurrence because of the abundance of candidates. Candidates who obtain support of less than 125 percent of the registered voters are dropped for the "second round" a week later. Other candidates voluntarily withdraw in favour of a better-placed candidate close to their party on the political spectrum. For instance, pre-election agreements between Communists and Socialists (and, more recently, the Greens) usually lead to the weaker candidate withdrawing after the first round, if both survive. Similar arrangements often exist between the Rally for the Republic (RPR) and the Union for French Democracy (UDF), although more recently they have not competed in the same district even on the first round. As a result, generally three (or at most four) candidates face each other in the second round in which a plurality of votes ensures election.
This means that the first round is somewhat similar to American primary elections, except that in the French case the primary is among candidates of parties allied in coalitions of the left or center-right. In the end, bipolarity generally results. There is considerable pressure on political parties to develop electoral alliances, since those that do not are placed at a strong disadvantage in terms of representation.
The National Front is more or less isolated from coalition arrangements with the parties of the center-right in national elections (though less at the sub-national level). Consequently, in 2002, with electoral support of 11.I percent, none of the Front candidates was finally elected. In comparison, the Communist Party benefited from an electoral agreement with the Socialists: With a mere 4.7 percent of the vote, 21 of their candidates were elected. Not surprisingly, the leading party (or coalition of parties) generally ends up with a considerably larger number of seats than is justified by its share in the popular vote. Electoral System in BRAZIL BRAZIL THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE LATIN AMERICA: BRAZIL
COUNTRY BIO-BRAZIL Population 169.8 Million Head of President Luiz lnacio Government Lula da Silva Territory 3,286,470 sq.mi Language@) Portuguese Year of 1822 Independence
Year of Current 1988 Religion Roman Catholic 70%. Constitution Protestant 15%,
Head of State President Luiz lnacio Lula da Silva
Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world, the fourth most populous democracy, and the ninth largest economy. In the 1980s, it m ade a transition from m ilitary authoritarian rule to a democracy, and in the 1990s, it began one nearly as dramatic from a state led to a market-oriented economy. In 2002, Brazilians once again took a bold step in a new direction, this time in handing the presidency in a land-slide to a former metalworker and leader of Latin America's largest traditional party of the left, the Workers' Silva, or "Lula" as he is known in Brazil, followed the two-term administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a president with an international reputation as a leading intellectual who delivered stable prices, a more open economy, rising levels of school enrollments, and a more efficient administration of many public services. Yet, Brazilian voters rejected his heir apparent in favour of Lula. They could have been deterred by the fact that Lula's past labour and political radicalism, and the pronouncements of some members of his party on free trade and foreign debt obligations, shook confidence in the Sao Paulo stock exchange and international financial markets. Against these odds, Lula's stunning election resulted from a mix of hopefulness among the Brazilian downtrodden, curiosity between the better-educated middle class, and resignation by the military. But Brazil's bold step can perhaps best b e u nderstood a s a protest against t he country's past. Brazilians wished to imagine a country with a more representative, honest, and accountable democratic government, one that could adequately house, feed, educate, and protect its people - in short, they loudly proclaimed themselves to be in favour of a.fairer and more equitable society. The way in which all sectors handled the election and the smooth nature of the transition are a remarkable testimony to the maturity of Brazil's democracy and electoral process.
Voters as a percentage of the population rose sharply from 6 percent in 1930, to 13 percent in 1945, to 18 percent in 1960. Many of these new participants, especially from the urban areas of the South and Southeast, were incorporated in the political system through loose associations with leaders, parties, and institutions that together formed a system of populism. Populist governing coalitions h eaded by charismatic politicians normally united those of industrial entrepreneurs as they did across postwar Latin America. But in practice the urban lower classes were well controlled. The rural lower classes were excluded from political life altogether. Their interests were not represented through any political party, they were not allowed to organize rural unions, a nd most rural workers, who were illiterate, could not vote.
In the next two decades, s everal political p arties competed for power at the national level although political bosses still exerted a great deal of control locally. The country prospered, especially during the late 1950s when physical infrastructure was laid, foreign auto plants settled in Sao Paulo, and a new capital, Brasilia, built in the interior. In the early 1960s, however, Brazil's political system began to strain. With 13 political parties in the Chamber of Deputies and the share of seats won by small parties on the rise, the party system was so fragmented that Congress was ineffective and no president could count on a stable base of support. Elites became threatened by the mobilization of peasant leagues, the electoral 'advance of the populist, Brazilian Labour Party, or PTB, and the leftist rhetoric of Joao Goulart, who assumed the presidency in 1961 (see Figure 15.1). In March 1964 amid high inflation and a stagnating economy, Goulart advocated revolutionary change in the countryside and the Congress, and he supported the mutiny of a group of enlisted sailors against naval officers. Brazilian military officers, who had come to view movements of the left as threats to national. security and economic instability as a breeding ground for subversive ideologies, interpreted these events as a signal that Brazil had entered a dangerous phase of an internal war. Believing that civilian politicians were ill equipped to contain such a threat, they concluded that they themselves should assume an expanded role in government and in politics.
Nature of Year Government President 1946 Civilian' Eurico Dutra (PSDIPTB) 1951 Civilian Gelulio Vargas (PTBIPSP) 1954 Civilian" Joaco Cafe Filho (PSP) 1956 Civilian Juscelino Kubitchek (PSDIPTB) 1961 Civilian Janio Quadros (UDNIPDCIPUPTN) 1961 Civilian" Joao Goulart (PTB) 1964 Military Humberto Castelo Branco 1967 Military Artur Costa e Silva 1969 Military Emilio Garrastazu Medici 1974 Military Ernesto Geisel 1978 Military Joao Figueiredo 1985 Civilian" Jose Sarney (PFUPMDB) 1990 civilian Fernando Collor de Meilo(PRN) 1992 civilian" ltamar Franco 1995 Civilian Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) 1999 Civilian Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) 2003 civilian Luis lnacio Lula da Silva (PT) . 'Dutra was himself a general, but was directly elected as a candidate of the PSD and headed a civilian government. "Not directly elected. FIGURE2.3.3: Brazilian Administration Since 1945 Elect president for four.year lerm by majorily vole (in second round, runoff, if necessary) t-1 t-1 Fl Council government (Union) Elect 81 senalors statewide by pluralfly for staggered, eight-year terms ,PI Elect 513 deputies slalewide by propofionai representalion for lour-year terms #I1
Elect governors lor four-year term by majority vole Stales (26) and (in second round, runoff, if necessary) + -1 I~e~islalive~ssembliesI Federal District -1 I Elect state deputies by proportional representation for four-year terms f
County Elect nrayors lor four-year terms + [councils government (5.513) FI I (municipals) Select local counctilors in proporbonal elections for four-year terms 4
FIGURE 2.3.4 ;The Structure of Brazil's Federal Government The electoral courts constitute a subsystem of the federal judicial system. The Superior Electoral Court, or Tribunal Superior Electoral (TSE), came into being in 1932 to check the rampant electoral fraud in the Old Republic. Today electoral courts at all levels rule on a variety of areas relating to party registration, the mandates of elected members of Congress, the admissibility of candidacies, procedures for counting ballots, and even the constitutionality of legislation governing these areas. The TSE has played an active role since 1985 in guiding Brazil's electoral process.
The Electoral System Brazil employs three different electoral systems. The president, state governors, and mayors of cities with at least 200,000 voters are elected by majority vote. In the event that no candidate captures 50 percent of the vote in a first round, a run-off election is held between the top two vote-getters. In 1989 and 2002,a runoff election was held for president; in 1994 and 1998, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected on the first ballot. In 2002, 13 governor states and the Federal District a second round runoff election was required. Senators and mayors of cities with less than 200,000 voters are elected by a second system called "first past the post" - that is, they need only win a plurality of the vote to gain office and no runoff election takes place.
Federal and state deputies and local councilors are elected by yet a third system, open-list proportional representation with multimember districts. In Brazil, representatives are neither elected exclusively in a single territorial unit, nor are they the sole representatives of any electoral subdivision. Rather, more than one representative is elected per district, which in federal and state races is the state itself. Seventy deputies are elected to represent the state of Sao Paulo in the federal Congress, for example, and they draw votes from all over the state. Voters choose one candidate from any one of several party lists. Each party's list may contain up to one and a half times the number of candidates as the number of seats to be filled. The system works similarly for council elections, except that the municipality is the district, and each party may nominate up to three times the number of candidates, as there are seats to be filled. In a proportional representation system, the number of seats in a legislature or local council awarded to each party is based on the proportion of the total vote that the candidates for each party receive. In most electoral systems in which seats are awarded according to the principal of proportional representation, the list is "closed". Party leaders determine the order of the names on the party ballot. They can ensure the election of deputies needed to be in government as cabinet ministers or some other capacity as well as protect loyal deputies by placing them high on the party list, and they can just as easily punish deputies who might have been unfaithful in the key vote in the Congress by placing that deputy so low on the party list that reelection is improbable. In Brazil's open-list proportional representation system, by contrast, individual vote totals determine the order of deputies on the party list and which candidates will represent the party in the legislature.
Critics have contended that electoral systems like the Brazilian that give the greatest weight to popular voting and the least to party organization in determining which individuals gain access to the ballot and ultimately get elected undermine party organization and engender individualistic behaviour among politicians. Running in huge, statewide districts', deputies have greater incentive to campaign against members of their own party than they do against their opponents in other parties, which accentuates pork barrel politics and undermines adherence to a party platform. Yet because federal and state deputies and councilors automatically have the right to be on the ballot for the same positioning the next election, a right called the candidato nato (literally, the "birthright candidate"), politicians who violate the party's programmatic concerns and vote against the leadership still h ave a place on t heir party's ballot. They may even switch parties and be guaranteed the right to run for office on the new party's ticket. In either case, they enjoy broad autonomy from their party leaders in state and national legislatures. Weak party discipline, in turn, cripples the ability of governments to pass necessary legislation. Moreover, with extremely permissive legislation governing the formation of parties and no minimum percentage of the vote, or threshold, required to g ain seats i n the legislature, political entrepreneurs confront no real obstacles to forming new parties and thus further fragmenting the party system. On the contrary, given the prerequisites that party leaders enjoy in the Congress and the free television time g uaranteed to every party regardless of its size, politicians have every incentive to bolt from their parties and from new ones.
How constraining, in fact, are Brazil's electoral institutions on political party development? On the one hand, electoral rules have obviously contributed to the fragmentations of Brazil's party system, the lack of the cohesion and discipline in the legislature, areas, they would be better able to present ka program of government to the electorate at election time. On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that the PT and the PSDB, a labour party and social democratic party, respectively, are more disciplined and programmatically oriented than the parties dominated by Brazil's traditional politicians;, and they have nevertheless secured prominent places in Brazil's party system. Electoral System in . GERMANY
GERMANY Electoral Systems: The Dutch Angle - COUNTRY BIO-GERMANY -- Population 82.2 Million Head of Chancellor Gerhard Government Schroder Territory 137,803 sq.mi Language(s) German Year of 1871 Independence
Year of Current 1949 Religion Roman Catholic 34% Constitution Protestant 34%, Muslim 4%, Unaffiliated or Head of State President Johannes Rad other 28%
BACKGROUND In 2002 German voters decided the course of their nation for the next several years, choosing between continuing the leftist government under Gerhard Schroder or changing direction with a new conservative government. On election night the vote projections switched back and forth - much like the U.S presidential election in 2000.
Schroders Social Democratic-Green government was returned to power, but the closeness of the election illustrates the uncertainty about what policy course Germany should follow in the years ahead.
The elections also reflect the lingering consequences of an even more revolutionary event: with the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9. 1989, East and West Germany began an amazing process leading toward unification. Since the end of World War II, Germany was divided between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West, and communist-led German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East. In 1989 "people power" protests rose up in revolution against the communist regime. The East Germans' willingness to take a stand against the state, and the state's unwillingness to suppress its people with force, brought the communist system to its end. The once formidable East German government collapsed almost overnight and all eyes turned West, toward the Federal Republic of Germany as a source of stability and political reform. German unification suddenly appeared a real possibility. Protesters who had chanted, "we are the people" when opposing the communist government in October took up the call for unification with refrain: "we are one people." In less than a year, the unimaginable was a reality. Two German states - one democratic and one communist, one with a market economy and one with a socialist planned economy-were united. 7-Federal chancellor
L----*( Federal Convenlion )
16 Lander governments +
FIGURE 2.3.5; The Struclure of Germany's Federal Government
TABLE 2.3.2- Composition of Coalition Governments. -- Date Formed Source of Change Coalition Partnersa Chancellor September 1949 Election CDUICSU, FDP, DP Adenauer (CDU) October 1953- Election CDUICSU, FDP,-- DP, G Adenauer (CDU) October 1957 Election CDUICSU, DP Adenauer (CDU) November 1961 Election CDUICSU, FDP Adenauer (CDU) October 1963 -Chancellor retirement CDUICSU, FDP Erhard (CDU) October 1965 Election CDUICSU, FDP Erhard (CDU) December 1966 Coalition change CDUICSU, SPD Kiesenger (CDU) October 1969 Election SPD, FDP Brandt (SPD) December 1972 Election SPD, FDP Brandt (SPD) May 1974 Chancellor retirement SPD, FDP Schmidt (SPD) December 1976 Election SPD, FDP Schmidt (SPD) November 1980 Election SPD, FDP Schmidt (SPD) October 1982 Constructive no-confidence CDUICSU, FDP Kohl (CDU) March 1983 Election CDUICSU, FDP Kohl (CDU) January 1987 Election CDUICSU, FDP Kohl (CDU) December 1990 Election CDUICSU, FDP Kohl (CDU) October 1994 Election CDUICSU, FDP Kohl (CDU) September 1998 Election SPD, Greens Schroder (SPD) September 2002 Election SPD, Greens Schroder (SPD) CDU: Christian Democratic Union. CSU: Chrislian Social Union. DP: German Party. FDP: Free Democratic Party. G: All- German Bloc Federation of Expellees and Displaced Persons: Social Democralic Parly.
(11) THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM The framers of the Basic Law had two goals in mind when they designed the electoral system. One was to create a Proportional representation (PR) system-a system that allocates legislative seats on the basis of a party's percentage of the popular vote, its should receive 10 percent of the Bundestag seats. Other individuals saw advantages in the system of single member districts used in Britain and the United States. They thought that this system would avoid the fragmentation of the Weimar party system and ensure some accountability between an electoral district and its representative.
To satisfy both objectives, a hybrid electoral system was developed. On one part of the ballot citizens vote for a candidate to represent their district. The candidate with a plurality of votes is elected as the district representative. Half the members of the Bundestag are directly elected in this manner.
On a second part of the ballot voters select a party. These second votes are added nationwide to determine each party's share of the popular vote. A party's proportion of the second vote determines its total representation in the Bundestag." Each party receives additional seats so that its percentage of the combined candidate and party seats equals its share of the second vote. These additional seats are distributed according to lists prepared by the state parties before the election. Hall of the Bundestag members are elected as party's representatives. One major exception to this PR system is the 5-percent clause, which stipulates that a party must win at least 5 percent of the national vote (or three district seats) to share in the distribution of party-list s eats. The l aw is d esigned to w ithhold representative from the type of small extremist parties that plagued the Weimar Republic. In practice, however, the 5 percent clause handicaps all-minor parties and contributes to the development of a few large parties.
This unique system has several consequences for electoral politics. The party-list system gives party leaders substantial influences on who will be elected to Parliament by the placement of candidates on the list. The PR system also ensures fair representation for the smaller parties. The FDP, for example, has won only one direct candidate mandate since 1957, and yet it receives Bundestag seats based on its national Share of the vote. In contrast, Britain's district-only system discriminates against small parties; in 2001 the British Liberal Democrats won 18.3 percent of the national vote but only 7.8 percent of the parliamentary s eats. T he German two-vote system a Iso affects campaign strategies. Although most voters cast both their ballots for the same party, the FDP traditionally encourages supporters of its larger coalition partner to "lend" their second votes to the Free Democrats. In recent federal elections these split ballots kept the FDP above the 5-percent hurdle. Perhaps because of its mixed strengths, variations of the German electoral system have been used in the new democracies of Hungary and Russia; Italy, Japan, and New Zealand introduced versions of this system in the early 1990s.
One of the essential functions of political parties in a democracy is interest representation. Elections provide individuals and social groups with an opportunity to select political elites who share their views. In turn, this choice leads to the representation of voter interests in the policy process because a party must be responsive to its electoral coalition if it wants to retain its support. Electoral System in THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE
COUNTRY BIO-MEXICO Population 100.2 Million Head of President Vicente Fox Government Quesada Territory 761.602 sqmi Language(s) Spanish, various Year of 1810 Mayan, Nahuatl, and Independence other regional indigenous language Year of Current 1917 Religion Constitution Nominally Roman Catholic 89%, Head of State President Vicente Fox Protestant 6%, Quesada
BACKGROUND Mexico is a country where the rigging of elections had been practiced systematically by the ruling Partido Revolucionario lnstitucional (PRI) for more than six decades. After the hotly contested but fraud-ridden presidential election of 1988, it took six days for the government to release even preliminary results. Since then, Mexico has experienced a remarkable passage from a political system in which vote fraud and abuse of government resources by the ruling party were condoned by senior political leaders and cynically a ccepted by t he g eneral public to o ne in which government respect for voters' preferences is expected indeed, demanded. This and other key elements of modern democratic politics are swiftly becoming routinized in Mexico .
Recurrent economic crises (1976-1 977, 1982-1989, 1994-1996) were the most powerful catalyst for this revolution in citizen expectations. The vast majority of Mexicans suffered severe economic pain during these two decades, directly attributable to government mismanagement of the national economy. Millions of jobs were lost, real wages were stagnant or declining in all but a few years of the period, savings and businesses were decimated by inflation and currency devaluations, and government benefits for t he m iddle a nd l ower classes were slashed in the a usterity budgets necessitated by the economic crises.
The 1988 presidential election brought a tidal wave of antigovernment protest voting, with the PRl's candidate eking out a bare majority victory.
POLITICAL PARTIES The Partido Revolucionairo lnstitucional The Partido revolucionario lnstitucional (PRI) was founded in 1929 by President Plutarco Elias Calles to serve as a mechanism for reducing violent conflict among contenders for public office and for consolidating the power of the central government, at the expense of the personalistic, local, and state-level political machines of the decade following the 1910 - 1920 revolution. Between 1920 and 1929, there had been four major rebellions against the national executive by these sub-national political machines. As historian Lorenzo Meyer has observed, the PRI was a party born not to fight for power, nor to share it with the opposition, "but rather to administer it."
For more than half a century, the ruling party served with impressive efficiency, as a mechanism for resolving conflicts, for co-opting newly e merging interest g roups i nto the s ystem, and for legitimating the regime through the electoral process, Potential defectors from the official party were deterred by the government's manipulation of electoral rules, which made it virtually impossible for any dissident faction to bolt the party and win the election, Dissident movements did emerge occasionally, but before the neo-Cardenista coalition contested the 1988 election, no breakaway presidential candidacy had been able to garner more than I6 percent of the vote (by official count). In 1938 President Lazero Cardenas transformed the official party from a mechanism for elite conflict resolution and co-optation into a mass-based political support for government polices and mobilize participation in elections. Cardenas accomplished this by merging into the official party the local state-, and national - level organizations of peasants and urban workers that had been created during his presidency. These reorganizations established the party's claim to be an inclusionary party - one that would absorb the diverse economic interests and political tendencies represented in Mexican society. By including lower-income sectors, it reinforced the revolutionary credentials of the party, as well. The official party and its affiliated mass organizations occupied so much political space that opposition parties found it difficult to recruit supporters.
From the beginning, the official party was appendage of the government itself, especially of the of political competition. A handful of nationally powerful party leaders, such as Fidel Velazquez the patriarch or the PRI -affiliated labor movement his death in 1997, occasionally constrained government actions, but the official party itself never determined the basic d irections of government economic and social policies. Indeed, one of the key factor underlying the erosion of party unity and discipline since the late 1980s and t he P Rl's overwhelming feats in s tate-level elections beginning in 1995,leding to its loss of the presidency in 2000, was party's inability to distance itself from the unpopular austerity policies made by the technocrats in the federal government.
In the 1993-1994 electoral code reforms, ceilings on private contributions were set very high-the equivalent of $650,000 for an individual contribution, with its privileged access to financing from big business, the PRI continued to outspend its opponents by a huge margin, even without cash from government sources. In 1994, the PRI legally spent $444million on its presidential campaign. It had even more money to spend on its campaigns, at all levels, than even before, despite the contribution limits included in the electoral code reforms. In the same year, Roberto Madrazo, the PRI candidate for governor in the state of Tabasco, spent in excess of 550 million on his campaign many times the limit for a gubernatorial race. This abuse came to light only after the defeated PRD candidate produced massive, incontrovertible evidence.
Yet another round of electoral reforms, passed by Congress in 1996, limited total contributions to any party to 10 percent the total amount of regular public financing to all parties, and no individual can contribute more than 0.05 percent of the total regular public financing. Also, the reforms greatly increased public funding for all parties. The law also added a new prohibition on" the use of public resources and programs to benefit any political party or electoral campaign." The abuses did not disappear, however. After the 2000 presidential election, won by the PAN, the federal internal auditor discovered that the government-owned oil company , PEMEX, had made a $140 million loan to the oil-workers' union, of the two most important PRI- affiliated labor unions. These funds were subsequently donated to the campaign of PRI candidate Francisco Labastida. By late 2002, the Attorney General's office was preparing to prosecute the directors of PEMEX, the leaders of the union, and the financial officers of Labastida's campaign.
Historically, the official party's most potent advantage over the completion was its ability to commit electoral over the competition was its ability to commit electoral fraud with relative impunity. A wide variety of techniques were used: stuffing the ballot boxes; disqualifying opposition party poll watchers; relocating polling places at the last minute to sites known only to PRI supporters; manipulating voter registration lists, padding them with nonexistent or nonresident PRlistas, and/or rasurando ("shaving off") those who are expected to vote for opposition parties, issuing multiple voting credentials to PRI supporters, buying, "renting," or confiscating opposition voters' credentials, often in return for material benefits; organizing carruseles ("flying brigades") of PRI supporters transported by truck or van to vote at several different polling places; and so forth. Moreover, in the past, the PRI held majority representation in all of the state and federal government entities that controlled vote counting and certification. The PRI could count on these bodies to manipulate the tallies to favour its candidates or, in cases where the opposition parties, was the most common, form of electoral fraud. In some predominantly rural districts, this practice led to election results in which the number of votes credited to the PRI candidate exceeded the total number of registered voters, or even the total number of adults, estimated from the most recent population census.
I Year FIGURE 2.3.7; Le Psrlida Secrefa (The Presidenls Secret Budget) Same Smlllqo Levy. 'El I'rescpusb 6 Eg~esosda Is Fedeldon,' Esle Pats (h'mxim). Cciober 2x0 p 3
In a successful effort to build up domestic and international credibility for the 1994 national elections, the Salinas government introduced a number of important safeguards against fraud. New, high tech, photo-identification voter credentials were issued to virtually the entire 42.5 million-person electorate. The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was greatly strengthened and given greater autonomy. The PRI and its government representative's were denied a majority on the IFE's decision-making board. A new system of independent electoral tribunals was established to adjudicate election disputes, and a special prosecutor's offer was established to investigate alleged violations of the electoral laws. The law defined a broad range of electoral offenses - not previously subject to prosecution - as electoral crimes (though the special prosecutor was appointed by the president and responded to the federal attorney general, who was unlikely to bring charges against important PRI leaders or government officials). The role of independents, Mexico dozen observers in monitoring the casting and tallying of votes was formally recognized, and the presence of foreign electoral observers (euphemistically termed "international visitors") was legalized. Exit polls of voter and "quick counts" of the actual vote in sample precisely the IFE as well as private organizations were authorized and publicly announced on election night.
Taken together, these innovations, which cost the Mexican taxpayers more than $1 billion, represented a major advance toward improving the security, professionalism, and fairness of the Mexican electoral system. However, various types of irregularities especially violations of ballot secrecy and efforts by local bosses to induce voters to support the PRI - were still widespread in the isolated, rural areas. Subsequent state and local elections in various parts of the country have demonstrated that sub national PRI leaders continues to use direct threats and other forms of intimidation, particularly against peasant voters.
The 1996 electoral reform greatly increased the institutional autonomy of the IFE. The Interior Minister was removed as president of the Institute and replaced by a nonpartisan president and eight non-partisan commissioners. These nine electoral commissioners were elected for a seven - year term by a two- thirds vote of the Chamber of Deputies. Since no party can control more than 60 percent of the seats in the lower chamber, the IFE commissioners are elected by consensus of all of the parties. In the 1997 and 2000 national elections there was very little evidence of fraud. Since the IFE controls most of the process in a nonpartisan manner, the remaining sources of electoral fraud are vote-buying (still common in some states, especially in the Southeast), and the buying or renting of voter credentials. Both practices are illegal, but neither is easy for federal electoral authorities to police. 1946 1952 1958 1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 Year. IGURE 2.3.8; Support for PRl's Presidential Candidate, 1946-2000) 'Pacenlnp bare indudosvotescasl mbj la reglsleled ad lanrqlslaed candidates
Nds. The I976 FRI canWa!e, hs~lopxPor(lo. rarviltudty urrppnsrdheoame Iha PAN laled lo mminale acadrlale The onty lher r;gflW rardldale was Vdenlin Canlpn spesenliq the Commmhl Pmly, vAwchwar nd iqdk rqbbred lo partkipire ~nIhe 1979 eledon More than 5% d Ihe wrsweoimlcd
Smme Dala from Commis!m Federd Elcclaal. 1946.1988. Imm lnsllulo Federd Ei-al, 194-2W. I I i 1 Electoral ~ystem'in THE UNITED KINGDOM Ld :*
UNITED KlNGDOM UNITED KINGDOM COUNTRY 610-UNITED KINGDOM -- Population 86.6 Million [ Head of Prime Minister Tony Government Blair Territory 94,525 sq.mi Language(s) English, Welsh (about Year of from 12Ih century 600,000), Scottish form Independence of Gaelic (about 60,000) Year of Current unwritten; partly statutes, I Constitution partly common~lawand Anglican 26.1 milliion, Religion practice. Roman Catholic 5.7 million, Presbyterian Head of State Queen Elizabeth II 2.6 million, Presbyterian, Methodist 1.3 million, Other Christian 2.6 million, Muslim 1.2 milliom, Sikh 600,000, Hindu 400,000. Jewish 300,000. The remainder have no religious identification. 1
BACKGROUND In a world of new democracies, England is different, because it is an old democracy. Unlike new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America Africa and Asia, England did not become a democracy overnight due to the collapse of a dictatorship. It became a democracy by evolution rather than revolution. Democratization was a slow process that occurred over the centuries. The rule of law was established in the seventeenth century; the accountability of the executive became clear in the eighteenth century; political parties o rganized i n the nineteenth century; and, even though competitive elections had been held for more than a century, the right of every adult man and woman to vote was not recognized until the twentieth century. The evolution of democracy in England also stands in contrast to the dominant European practice of countries switching between democratic and undemocratic regimes. Whereas the oldest English person has lived under the same constitution all his or her life, the oldest Germans have lived under four or five constitutions, two democratic and two or three undemocratic.
The gradual evolution of political institutions means that at no point in history did representatives of the English people meet together to decide what kind of government t hey would like to have, as happened in the American constitutional convention of the 1 780s, and i n dozens of new democracies in the past two decades. Politicians have been socialized to accept institutions as a legacy from their predecessors; these are the rules of the game by which they compete for office. Ordinary citizens have been socialized to accept established institutions too. Prime Minister
Nondepartmenlal Welsh assembly
\ Electorate
FIGURE 2.3.9;The Slruclure of the British Government
The Electoral Process A prime minister may be self-interested but he or she is not self- employed. To become prime minister, a politician must first be elected leader of his or her party. The only election a prime minister must win is that as party leader. Six of the eleven prime ministers since 1945 - Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, AlecDouglas - Home, James Callaghan, and John Major - i nitially e ntered Downing Street d uring the m iddle of a parliament rather than by winning a national election. In the 15 elections since 1945, the prime minister of the day has eight times led the governing party to victory and seven times to defeat. British government is party government, for parties nominate parliamentary candidates and elect a leader who is prime minister or in charge of the Opposition. An election gives voters the choice of deciding between parties competing for the right to govern.
Because parties compete against each other, in a two-party system, the failure of one tends to benefit its opponent. When the Labour Party became unpopular in the 1980s, this enabled the Conservatives to win four successive elections with well under half the popular vote. When the Conservative government subsequently became very unpopular, Tony Blair's New labour Party won a landslide victory with a lower percentage candidates have received when they lost an election. When both the largest parties are discredited, this gives an opportunity for a third party to gain support, such as the Liberal democrats in England or the Scottish National Party. A Multiplicity of Choices A general election must occur at least once every five years; within that period, the prime minister is free to call an election at any time. Although every prime minister tries to pick a date when victory is very likely, often this does not happen.
A general election offers a voter a very simple choice only one office is at stake, that of MP for the constituency, and an elector endorses one among a handful of candidates to represent the constituency in the House of Commons. A person will usually vote for his or her party, even if dissatisfied with its local candidate or ignorant of the candidate's name and character. The party leader's name is not on the ballot. Within each constituency, the winner is the candidate with the largest number of votes, even though this can be less than half. The winner of the election nationally is the party that wins the most constituency seats. In 1951 and again in February 1974, the party winning the most votes did not win the most seats and thus did not form the government.
Between 1945 and 1970, Britain had a two-party system, because the Conservative and Labour parties together took an average of 91 percent of the popular vote and in 1951 as much as 97 percent (figure 8.6) The Liberals had difficulty finding candidates to contest most seats and even more difficulty winning votes. Support for the two largest parties was evenly balanced; Labour won four elections and the conservatives won four.
A multiparty system emerged in 1974. The Liberals won nearly one-fifth of the vote, and the Nationalists did well in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in both contests that year. Together, the Conservative and Labour parties took only 75 percent of the vote. The 1980s saw the Labour Party vote plummet as the Alliance of. Liberals and Social Democrats won almost a quarter of the popular vote, and nearly surpassed Labour's reduced support. Although the Alliance broke up after the 1987 election, the fragmentation of voters and parties has continued since.
1. In England, three parties -New Labour, Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats- compete for votes. In 2001 an anti- European Union United kingdom Independence Party fought a majority of seats too. In Scotland and Wales there are normally four parties, for the Scottish National and Plaid Cymru (Welsh Nationalist) parties win seats too. In Northern Ireland, at least five parties normally contest seats.
2. The two largest parties do not monopolize the vote. Since 1974, the Conservative and Labour parties together have won an average of j ust under three -quarters of t he vote. I n the 2001 election, parties took 72 percent of the total vote, leaving more than a quarter divided among more than half a dozen other parties.
The Electoral System. British parliamentary elections use a first-past-the-post electoral system. If only two parties contest a constituency, the candidate with the most votes will have an absolute majority. But when three or more candidates do so, a candidate with less than half the vote can win the seat thanks to the division of the vote among a multiplicity of competitors. In the hard-fought 1992 contest between four parties in Inverness, the Liberal Democrats won the seat with only 26 percent of the vote there. At least three parties now contest most constituencies.
To win a substantial number of seats in the House of Commons, a party must either gain at least one-third of the popular vote nationwide or concentrate its votes in a limited number of constituencies. Nationalist parties in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland win seats because they concentrate their candidates in one part of the United Kingdom. Although the Liberal Democrats win more than a sixth of the popular vote because their support is spread relatively evenly across the country, their candidates are far more likely to finish second or third rather than first. (2001 Election) Seats 64% 0 nVotes
18%
9% 3% 1 " Conservative Labour Other Democrats
FIGURE 2.3.10; Effects of a Disproportional Electoral System
Britain has a system of disproportional representation that manufactures a House of Commons majority for one party with barely two-fifths of the popular vote (figure 8.7). The Conservative Party won almost a third of the vote but took only a quarter of the seats. The Liberal Democrats were specially disadvantaged by the electoral system. In a totally proportional system of representation, the party's vote share would have given it 120 seats; in fact, it gained less than half this number. Even more important, in a proportional representation system New Labour's vote would not have given it a majority of seats in the commons. In a PR system, the formation'of a government would depend on a coalition of at least two parties, since none would have a majority of parliamentary seats.
Defenders of the British electoral system argue that proportionality is not a goal in itself. If it were, then the United States could not have a president chosen through an electoral process that sometimes awards the White House to a candidate with less than half the popular vote. The first-past-the-post system is justified because it clearly places responsibility for government in the hands of a single party rather than diffusing it in a coalition, as happens in continental European countries where Parliaments are elected by proportional, representation. Critics say it is wrong to give the party coming third in the popular vote the power to determine who governs by choosing whether to ally itself with the party second or first in the popular vote in order to produce a majority coalition.
The strongest advocates of proportional representation a re t he Liberal Democrats, the party that would benefit most from a change in the electoral system. A change is also supported by those who believe that a coalition government is a better government because it encourages a broader inter-party consensus.
Successive British governments have altered the electoral system for contests that do not affect the composition of the Westminster Parliament. Northern Ireland votes have used a form of proportional representation for more than three decades. The new Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly are elected by a system involving proportional representation is used. In the election of the Mayor of Greater London in 2000, the alternative vote was used to make sure that the mayor was the first or second choice of more than half the voters.
In his first term of office, Tony Blair encouraged talk about electoral reform, and alternative proposals have been put forward by a government -appointed commission. Electoral System in
UNITED STATES --.-----.------C,'ottrpnr~~/iveExplot.u/iot~
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES: BRIEF ILLUSTRATION COUNTRY BIO-UNITED STATES Population 270.3 Million Head of President George W. Government Bush Territory 3,475,031 sq.mi Language(s) English Year of 1776 Spanish,(spoken by a Independence sizeable minority)
Year of Current September 17, 1787 Religion Roman Catholic 28%, Constitution Effective March 4, 1789 Protestant 56%, Muslim 2%, Mormon 2%, Head of State President George W. Jewish 2%, none 10% Bush
(i) Federalism: Federalism is a system in which governmental power is divided between a national government and several sub national governments, each of w hich is legally s upreme in i ts a ssigned sphere. This s ystem h as some ancient precursors, notably t he Achaean League of Greek city-states in the third century B.C. and the Swiss Confederation founded in the sixteenth century A.D. But the men who wrote the American Constitution established the first modern form of federalism.
America's founding fathers regarded federalism as more than a political expedient. James Madison, for example believed that the greatest threat to human rights in a popular government is the tyranny of popular majorities that results when one faction seizes control of the entire power of government and uses it to advance its own special interests at the expense of all other interests. He believed that of power between the national and state governments, combined with separation of powers is the best way to prevent such a disaster. A Two-Party System: The Characteristics The American party system is usually a nearly-pure two-party system: that is, one in which two major parties are highly competitive with one another and taken together win almost all the votes and offices in elections. As Figure. 2.2 shows, the only notable exception since the 1930s came in 1992, when independent H. Ross Perot won 19 percent of the popular votes for president (Democrat Bill Clinton won 43 percent and republican incumbent George H. W. Bush won 38 percent). After the election Perot founded the Reform part and ran as its presidential candidate in 1996, but, as the figure shows, his vote share fell to 8.6 percent. He did not run in 2000, but his party's presidential candidate, Pat Buchanan, got less than I percent of the votes.
1984 Democrat ' Republican Others FIGURE 2 3 12, Party Shares of Presidential Votes, 1980-2000 Sme S(dsbcali\Dslmd ollhe Uldcd %les 2W1 (Washnqlm. DC Burem ol IheCmws 2001) Tabb378. p 223 In 2000, in addition to Democrat Al Gore and Republican George W. Bush, there were presidential candidates from 14 other parties on the ballot in one or more states. Together, these other parties polled 3.7 p ercent of the popular votes. After t he I996 congressional elections all 100 members of the Senate and 434 of the 435 members of the House were Democrats or Republicans. (One odd man out was Socialist Bernard Sanders, elected in 1990 as the first candidate other than a Democrat or a Republican elected to either House of Congress since 1954; he was re-elected in 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2000; the other was Senator James Jeffords of Vermont, who, in 2001, announced that he was leaving the Republican party to become an Independent, and allied himself with the Senate Democrats).
The Presidential Election of 2000: Reflecting the US Electoral Process.
Candidate Popular Votes Electoral Votes
George W .Bush, 50,456,169 Republican Al Gore, Democrat 50,996,064 Ralph Nader, 2,882,708 Green
The presidential election of 2000 was not the closest in history nor the first in which the candidate who received the most popular votes lost in the Electoral College; but it was the first decided by the United States Supreme Court. The main events leading to this unprecedented outcome were the following.
At the end of election night, Gore had won or was leading in twenty states and the District of Columbia, totaling 266 electoral votes, while Bush had won or was leading in twenty-nine states, 246 electoral votes. Thus whoever won Florida's 25 electoral votes would achieve the majority in the Electoral College required by the U.S. Constitution to win the presidency.
Florida's preliminary official returns showed that'~ushhad 48.85 percent of the votes to Gore's 48.84 percent. The state's election law provided that if the winner's margin was less than one-half of one percent there had to be a recount, which consisted mainly of re-certifying each county's returns and re-adding the candidate's totals. This was done, and Bush's tiny margin-537 votes out of 5,963, 110 cast - was reaffirmed. The Gore forces, however, argued that there had been many errors in the casting and counting of the votes in several counties, notably Broward, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade. They petitioned Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris to hold up any announcement of the winner until there had been a manual recount of the votes in these countries; but Ms. Harris (a Republican who had co- chaired Florida's Bush for President organization) rejected any manual recounts and refused to extend the November 15 deadline for certifying the votes (and Bush's 537-vote plurality). A Gore legal team sued in the Florida courts to postpone the certification deadline and order the manual recounts.
The case then came to the Florida Supreme Court (made up of Democrats appointed by previous Democratic governors), which gave Gore his first legal victory. On November 21 they ruled that the certification deadline should be extended and that manual recounts should take place in the counties the Gore group had named, with a mandate to discern in each ballot "the intent of the voter." The Bush team petitioned the United States Supreme Court to overturn the Florida court's ruling.
This was the beginning of the end. Despite many legal commentators' observation that the U.S. Supreme Court had almost never interfered in a state's election process (on the often-stated ground that such was an unjustified invasion of the states' constitutional prerogatives), the case was accepted. The Supreme Court remanded it to the Florida court asking for a fuller exposition of its position and ruled that the manual recounts it had mandated be stopped until the legal issues were resolved (Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court's leading conservative, commented that allowing the manual count to continue "does, in my view, threaten irreparable harm to (Bush), and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election''). The Florida court responded, but on December 12 the U.S Court announced its per curiam (no individual justice named as author) decision in Bush v. Gore 121 S.Ct. 525 (2000). The Court held that in not specifying the standards that each and every country must use in discerning the intent of voters but leaving it up to the election officials in each county to apply the standards they thought appropriate, the Florida Court had violated the US. constitutional requirement of "equal protection of the laws." Since there was not enough time for the Florida Court to specify such standards and for the counties to recount employing the standards, all recounts were halted and Ms. Harris's original certification had to stand. So Bush had won, and Gore conceded the next day.
Many things have been said about the Supreme Court's decision and the political and legal controversy that surrounded it. Perhaps the clearest characteristic of the controversy was this: almost everyone who favored the positions taken by the Gore team (e.g. the Democrats on the Florida Supreme Court) wanted Gore to be president; and almost everyone who favored the positions taken by Bush team wanted Bush to be president - e.g., Katherine Harris, the Florida Governor (Jeb Bush, the candidate's brother), the republican majorities in Florida's legislature, and, above all, the conservative members of the U.S. Supreme Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas (the more liberal justices - Breyer. Ginsberg, Souter, and Stevens - all dissented in Bush v. Gore).
So how you saw the legal issues depended on where you stood politically. And those who favored Bush occupied the key decision making positions in both Tallahassee and Washington.
One consequence was that many Gore supporters believed Gore had been cheated, and questioned the legitimacy of Bush's presidency ("Hail to the Thief' read one sign at his inaugural parade).
But all that changed on September 11, 2001...... Comparative Explorn~iorr
Electoral System in JAPAN
JAPAN THE ASIAN EXAMPLE COUNTRY BIO-UNITED STATES Population Head of Prime MinisterJunichiro Government Koizumi Territory 135,882 sq.mi Language@) Japanese Year of 660BC Independence
Year of Current 194; Religion Observed both Shinto Constitution 1 and Buddhist 84%, other 16% (including Head of State Em eror Akihito Christian 0.7%)
Japan is a democracy, but its political institutions, like its economy, are considered by many to be somehow atypical and perhaps even suspect. The advent of postwar democracy was in the form of a Constitution imposed on Japan by U.S. led Occupation authorities in 1946. And while the Japanese have never seen fit to amend that Constitution, many believe that its foreign origin and alien ideals cause it to be undermined by actual political practices in the country. Stories abound of inveterate corruption among politicians, and domination of policymaking by autonomous and powerful bureaucrats. Do Japan's political institutions function differently from institution in other democracies? Does the Liberal Democratic Party's dominance of government from 1955 to 1993 reveal undemocratic practices? How has Japan maintained such a high level of political stability? The parliamentary structure Japan has a parliamentary system of government. Its parliament the National Diet, consists of two legislative chambers: the House of Representatives (also called the Lower House) and the House of Councilors (the Upper House). Both chambers must pass a bill in identical form for it to become law, with three important exceptions: the House of Representatives alone chooses the prime minister, passes the budget, and ratifies treaties. In these three areas, arguably the most important tasks for a ny government, the U pper House m ay offer a n o pinion o r counterproposal, but it cannot compel the Lower House to pay any attention (as stipulated in Articles 59 and 60 of the Constitution). For all other legislation, however, the Lower House must accommodate the preferences of the Upper House, a distribution that places t he latter some where between th U.S. Senate and German Bundesrat in terms of its power among upper chambers
The Electoral Experiences Electoral rules determine the nature of competition among politicians for office. Such details as the size location of electoral districts, the number of seats up for grabs, and the number and partisanship of competitors determine how politicians must behave in order to win. Also important, of course, are the particular configurations of voters' interest and the rules concerning what sorts of campaign activities are allowed and disallowed. Since voters care about what politicians do once they are elected, electoral rules also have had profound consequences for policy.
The two chambers of the National Diet use different electoral rules. The rules for the more powerful House of Representatives were changed in 1994, but since only two elections have been held under the new rules (in 1996 and 2000), vestiges of the pre- reform political practices remain. Hence we begin by focusing on those rules that governed political competition up until the 1994 reform. We then discuss the new electoral rules, and their consequences, before turning to a brief discussion of the House of Councilors.
The Old Electoral Rules - House of Representatives According to the Constitution, members of the House of Representatives are elected to four-year terms, but these usually end early, as the prime minister may dissolve the chamber and call elections at any time. Two basic changes were instituted for the first postwar election, held in 1946: (I) women were granted the right to vote, enabling all Japanese 20 years old or older to vote in national and local elections, and (2) the Communists Party was legalized. A new system produced a plethora of new parties, and the Socialist Party performed best of all. In 1947, SCAP insisted that another election be held to ratify the new seat, the top two to six vote -getters (depending on the number of seats available in a district) each received a seat in the House of Representatives. So in a 5-seat district, coming in fifth place was good enough to win a seat.
This contribution of a nontransferable vote with multi-seat districts created a variety of incentives and consequences to which parties and candidates had to respond. Any party seeking a parliamentary majority would have to win at least 256 seats, or an average of almost exactly two seats per district (256 seats1129 districts). It follows that it had to nominate an average of at least two candidates per district, and probably more, since it could not expect every candidate to win. Furthermore, each voter could vote for only one candidate, which meant that the candidates from the same party had to compete directly with each other for the favour of the same voters. Indeed, a candidate's most bitter rivals were not members of other parties, candidates in the same party.
Numerous scandals plagued the LDP during its 38-year reign. Money-intensive campaign strategies have made Japanese elections perhaps the most expensive in the world. Businesses, small and large, have been consistent LDP contributors in exchange for a variety of favourable policies, from Agricultural subsidies to protective regulatory regimes. Here are brief summaries of three of the most infamous episodes. In 1976, former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was arrested for having accepted a bribe while in office from the U.S. aircraft manufacturer Lockheed, in exchange for facilitating the sale of aircraft to Japan's major domestic airline. Actually, Tanaka had been forced from office two years earlier, after a series of other financial misdeeds were exposed in the popular journal Bungei Shunju. The Lockheed scandal dragged on for several years before Tanaka was finally convicted, in 1983. The most extensive scandal, both in terms of the amount of money involved and the number of recipients, was the 1988-189 Recruit scandal. The president of Recruit Cosmos Corporation (an employment information and property management firm) sold Recruit shares to a variety of politicians and a few bureaucrats during 1985 and 1986 at far below their actual value. When Recruit shares were offered to the public in 1986, their value skyrocketed, giving those in the loop enormous windfall profits. When the scandal came to light, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and four other cabinet ministers were forced to resign from government. In the early 1990s, Sagawa Kyubin, a package delivery company, donated illegally large sums of money to powerful L DP members, i n hopes of obtaining favourable changes in trucking regulation. The high light of this scandal came when prosecutors raided the home of party kingpin Shin Kanemaru, and found millions of dollars in gold and cash hidden in his basement. The public outrage at this corruption contributed to t he party s plit that finally cost the LDP its legislative majority.
In January 1994, several months after wresting power from the LDP, a seven-party coalition government enacted a major restructuring of the Lower House electoral rules. The news rules set the size of the house of 500 seats, later reduced to 480. Of these, 300 are elected on the basis of equal- sized single- member districts, and 180 (original 200) are elected from 11 regional districts by proportional representative (PR). Each voter casts two votes: one for a candidate in the single-member district, and one for a party in the PR region. As in Germany, Italy, Venezuela, and New Zealand, which use similar systems, a candidate may run in a district and appear on the corresponding party list I the larger region; so unsuccessful district candidates can be "saved" by the list.
The key improvement that this system was expected to produce was the elimination of intra-party competition. No longer do members of the same party have to compete against one another (at least in front of the voters - they still have to compete within the party for endorsements and good spots on party lists). Instead,' electoral contests now focus on competition between parties. Another major expectation, arising from the introduction of single-member districts, movement toward a two-party system. Of course, the PR component of the electoral rule will ensure that some small parties continue to survive, but they should fade away in the single -member districts, where only large parties have a realistic chance of winning. (but in the 2002 election, interestingly, the conservatives and Komeito, both small parties, managed to win a handful of single-member districts because the LDP, which needed both parties to form a government coalition, agreed to endorse their candidates in those races instead of running its own candidates- Table 11.4) In fact, the 1996 and 2000 elections and the party reorganizations that have been ongoing since the reform, suggest that two large parties may well arise as the major sources of power under the new rule. The LDP, so far, has maintained its position as one of those parties, and currently, the Democratic Party appears to be the likely future LDP challenger in most single-member districts nationwide. ------. - 0 altematiw wte block 17 block-first-past-the-post I3 first-pas t-t he-pos t H firstpast-thepost-block half plurality; half nationwide party-list-PR Mixed member no direct election H Parallel: block H Parallel: first-past-the-post 0 Parallel: party block 0 Parallel:single non-transferable vote H Paral1el:two-round system H Party block ------<---A- _ ------_ ------. ------. - - -- - _ -___I-__- ._ . ______-I- ._ - Source: based on data from NationMaster (2003). Analysis of Electoral Systems in I00 countries around the world.
electoral systems . . alternative vote block block-first-past-the-post first-past-the-post first-past-the-post-block I3 ha# plurality; ha# nationwide party-list-FR H Mxed member no direct election H Parallel: block Parallel: first-past-the-post Parallel: party block El Para1lel:single non-transferable vote I kral1el.t~n-rntmd svstem I hrtv hlnck
Source: based on data from NationMaster (2003)...... Conzparative Exploration
Uganda Malaysia Tonga Rwanda Saint Lucia Kenya Morocco Palau Analysis of Bahamas, The Afghanistan Electoral Systems Jamaica Gambia Belize in 100 countries Bhutan Malawi around the world. Zambia Montserrat Grenada Kazakhstan India Trinidad and Tobago Tanzania Congo, DR of the Cayman lslands United States Tuvalu Ghana Bostwana Marshall lslands Pakistan Korea, North Yemen Turks and Caicos Islands Mongolia Sudan Saint Kitts and Nevis Syria Burma Nepal Dominica
' Nig'erfa -' Bangladesh Antigua and Barbuda Canada Papua New Guinea Niger United Kingdom Seychelles Guatemala Barbados Bermuda Korea, South 1 Ethiopia Maldives I Italy Guinea ' Lesotho Laos I Hungary Armenia Zimbabwe Kuwait i Venezuela ; Cameroon Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Philipines 1 New Zealand Solomon lslands Russia Mexico , Mauritius Somalia Micronesia, Federated States of Thailand , Germany 1 Japan I Swaziland ( Bolivia I
Source: based on data from ~t?%n~aster(2003).
OVERVIEW OF LATIN AMERICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEMS INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
This page contains a brief summary of the electoral systems in Latin America. (source: Inter-American Dialogue)
Arqentina I Bolivia I Brazil I Chile I Colombia I Costa Rica I Dominican Republic I Ecuador I El Salvador I Guatemala I Honduras I
Mexico 1Nicaragua I Panama I Paraquay I Per11 I Uruquav IVenezuela
------. ...., - .." - Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information -- - - . .- ~r~entina~he president is ~icameral ~overnorsand In December of 1983, elected for a four- Congress. local authorities are Argentina returned to a year term with the elected according democracy and since then possibility of one The 257 deputies to the 25 provincial has had free and fair sucessive term. are elected for four- constitutions. democratic elections. In April If none of the year terms and may 1994, elections were held to candidates be re-elected. Half form a Constituent Assembly. receives 45% or of the Chamber of The Assembly modified the more of the votes in Deputies is 1953 Constitution with the first round of renewed every two several reforms, including voting, a second years. reduction of the president's round is held. term -- from six to four years, The 48 senators with the possibility of of a are elected a second term -- and the ccording to adoption of a second round procedure of voting if no candidate established in local receives a majority in the first movincial round. In addition. the "-- - .. - - +- - -.. .- - - *. -." - . -- - . constitutions. One reforms abolished the third of the Senate electoral college system. is renewed every two years. A - + - .- . - .- A - --- - "- -- --" ----*--.------Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information - . *" - ----. - - _ _^ _____I_-______- Bolivia Beginning in 1997, Bicameral Bolivia is divided Two successive Congresses the president will Congress. into departments must pass the same bill in be elected for a and there is one order to reform the five-year term The 130 deputies prefect0 (governor) Constitution. Many reforms to ' without the and 27 senators are per department. the Constitution were passed possibility of elected for five-year The prefectos are in August of 1994: the voting consecutive re- terms without the elected for five-year age was lowered from 21 to election. The possibility of re- terms and have 18 years and the terms of president may nm election. general executive office for the president and for ofice again powers. both houses of Congress afier one term has were increased from four to passed. If no Municipal councils, five years. candidate receiv es which in tur n elect a majority, the mayors, are elected Bolivia is also in a process of Congress chooses every two years. decentralization. In April the president from Mayors are elected 1994, a "popular amogn the top for five-year terms. participation" law was passed three candidates in which gave local a secret ballot. governments more control , over their communities. In December of 1995, reforms were passed to give more power to the prefects of th e departments -- ~residential- ~e~islative Governors and General Electoral Country System System-. Municipalities- - Information - .------Brazil The president is Bicameral All state legislators In 1993, a popular elected for a four- Congress. and governors are referendum was held to year term without elected for four- choose among moving to a the possibility of re- The 51 3 members year terms. parliamentary system, election. If none of of the Chamber of returning to a monarchy, or the candidates Deputies are Mayors and city keeping the presidential receives a majority elected from party council authorities system. A great majority of in the first round of lists for four-year are directly elected those people who voted voting, a second terms and may be for four-year terms. supported the existing round is held. re-elected. When presidential system. In 1994, elections are held, an amendment to the all of the 51 3 seats Constitution reduced the term are up for election of the president from five to at the same time. four years.
The 81 senators 1994 marked the second are elected to seme presidential election held in eight-year terms Brazil since the end of and may be re- military rule. elected. Two-thirds of the Senate is renewed at one time and four years later the remaining one-third is renewed. In 1994, two-thirds of the Senate was renewed and in 19 98 the remaining one-third will be up for renewal. Members nf hnth houses are elected by a system of proportional representation. ------A ---.--A- -A-.L-----.---- Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information -1 %_----_-__4---_ - -1__---- _ ------Chile The president is Bicameral Chile is divided into In October 1988, a plebiscite elected of a six- Congress. regions with one defeat ended Pinochet's year term with no intendente military dictatorship. possibility of re- There are 120 (governor) per election. If no members of the region. lntendentes In July 1989, a referendum candidate receives Chamber of are appointed by approved sixty-four reforms a majority of the Deputies. They are the president for a to the Constitution. The votes, a second elected from party six-year term and measures increased the round of voting is lists for four-year may be replaced at number of directly elected held. terms and may be any time during senators from 26 to 38, re-elected. their tenure. The reduced the president's term last in tendentes from eight to six years, and There are 46 were appointed in prohibited re-election of the members of the March 1994. The president. Senate. The next appointments senators are will be made by the In November 1991, Congress elected for eight- new president in approved constitutional year terms and may March 2000. changes to local government be re-elected. that provide for the Every four years Municipal replacement of centrally half of the senate authorities are appointed local officials with seats are renewed. directly elected for directly elected Thirty-eight of the four-year terms and representatives. 46 senators are apoint the mayors. elected and eight Tensions with the military are appointed. Of continue, and the executive the eiaht senator s does not have full Dower over - - - - . ------A - -. ------three are selected the military is constitutionally by the armed subordinate to the president forces, two by the through the defense minister, president, two by but the president must have ; the Supreme Court, approval of the military's and one by the National Security Council to , National Security remove service chiefs. Council. All are appointed for eight- year terms. In addition to the eight senator who are appointed, all former presidents are automatically members of the Senate.
In 1989, all 38 of the senate were elected. Eighteen of the 38 were elected for four-year terms. The remainign 20 elected in 1989 are serving full eight- years terms which end in 1997. Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information A - . Colombia The president-is Bicameral Governors are In July 1991, the new elected for a four- Congress. elected for four Constitution was a~~roved ------. - - year term without ))ear-terms. Since which granted rights to the possibility of re- The 161 members 1988, mayors have minorities and introduced election. If none of of the House of been elected for many political reforms aimed the candidates Representatives two-year terms. at decentralizing authority. In receives a majority and the 102 May 1994, vice presidential of votes in the first members of the elections were held for the round of voting, a Senate are elected first time. 1ndigenous second round of for four-year terms peoples have been allotted . voting is held. and may not be re- two seats in the Senate. elected to consecutive terms. ------" - . - Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities lnformation .---- . --- - . ------L --..A------a- Costa The president is Unicameral Governors are Elections have been free and ' Rica elected for a four- Congress. named by the democratic in Costa Rica year term without president for four- since 1949. the possibility of re- The 61 members of year terms. election. If one the National candidate receives Assembly are Municipal more than 40% of elected for four- authorities are the vote, no second years and may not elected for four- round voting is be re-elected for year terms. held. consecutive terms. ------.------Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities lnformation .-. - - - - -. ------+ - - A------Dominican The presidentis. Bicameral hegovernors of In May 1994, the Dominican Republic elected for a four- Congress. There the 29 provinces Central Electoral Board year term without are 120 members are appointed by declared President Balaguer the possibility of of the Chamber of the president. The the winner in a contest consecutive re- Deputies and 30 sindico (mayor) of international observers cited election. The members of the each province is as plagued by "serious mesident mav run Senate. All elected. Both serve ~roblemsand irreaularities" ------"------+- " -- for office again members of four-year terms. which may have affected its after one term has Congress are out come. PRD opposition passed. If none of elected for four- candidate Francisco Peiia the candidates year terms and may Gomez officially lost by only receives a majority be re-elected. 22,000 votes. After lengthy of the votes, a negotiations between parties second round of and candidates, Congress voting is held. reduced President Balaguer's term to two yeats and prohibited the consecutive re-
election of fu ture presidents. '
In May 1996, first round presidential elections were . held. Jose Francisco Peiia Gomez won 46% of the vote, Leonel Fernandez 39% and Vice-president Jacinto Peynado won 15%. None of the candidates received a majority, so a run-off election was held on Ju ne 30,1996 between Fernandez and Peha Gomez. Fernandez who was formally endorsed by President Balaguer and former President Juan Bosch, was elected president with 51.25% of the vote. Presidential Country Legislative Governors and General ~lectoial System System Municipalities Information Ecuador The president is Unicameral Governors are In May 1996, congressional elected for a four- Conaress. The 82 a~~ointedbv the eelections were held and the -- - ..- - -- .. . " - year term without deputies of the president for two- Social Christian Party won a the possibility of Chamber of year terms. majority in Congress. A party ' consecutive re- National representing the indigenous election. The Representatives Municipal groups in Ecuador also won president may run are elected by a authorities are six seats. for office again system of elected for four- after one term has proporfional year terms. Prior to 1995, two passed. If no representation. constitutional reforms passed - candidate receives There are 12 which have influenced the a majority, a national deputies election of the president. The second round o f who are elected for first reform revokes a voting is held. four-year terms at previous law, which required the na tional level that candidates for political and there are 70 office must belong to a provincial deputies political party, now allowing who are elected for independen ts to run for any two-year terms at office. The second reform the provincial level. allows the president to run for All deputies may be re-election after one term has re-elected. passed, which means that President Durfin-Ballen may run for a second four-year term in the year 2000.
In May 1996, the first-round presidential elections were held. None of the candidates received a majority of the votes, so a run-off election between Abdala Bucaram and Jaime Nebot was held on July 7, 1996. Bucaram was elected nresident with 5d0/n of ------.- th e vote. . .- - . . - - . - - - - . Presidential Legislative - ~ove-iorsand General ~lectoral Country System System Municipalities Information ,. ___ "l"_- - _ _ . _I,I .------"- ._--_---A- -_- -. - - - El The president is Unicameral The Office of the In 1994. national and Salvador elected for a five- Congress. Governor does not international observers year term without exist. At the judged the elections as the possibility of The 84 members of municipal level, having been generally free, consecutive re- the National local authorities are fair, and non-violent despite election. If none of Assembly are elected for three- some irregularities. The the candidates elected for three- year terms. former guerrilla movement receives a majority year terms and may Farabundo Marti National of the votes, a be re-elected. Liberation Front (FMLN) second round of participated as a political voting is held. party in the elections in alliance with reformist groups and it became the second- largest political group in Congress; however it did poorly in local elections. The ARENA won a landslide victory. Presidential Legislative Governors and ~en&alElectoral Country System Municipalities Information System ------.-. - - -...... - -. -- .. .. Guatemala The president is unicameral' - Governors are In 1993, former President elected for a four- Congress. appointed by the Jorge Serrano was year term without president. The constitutionally deposed after the possibility of re- The 80 members of duration of their he attempted to seize full election. If none of Congress are terms is also power. As a result of the the candidates elected by decided by the crisis Congress elected receives a majority proportional president. At Ramiro de Leon Carpio to be of the votes, a representation. The present, elections president and finish out second round of candidates are are beina Serrano's term. voting is held elected by a considered as an national and a alternative In 1994, the president held departmental list mechanism for the congressional elections and procedure. Of the selection of presented a referendum of 80 candidates in governors. constitutional changes to the the last election , 16 Guatemalan people. The were elected from Mayors are directly level of voter participation in the national lists elected for terms of the referendum was and 64 were four years. extremely low, but the elected from the constitutional reforms were departmental lists. approved. Thes e reforms votes are cast reduced the president's term separately fro the from five to four years and , national and the number of deputies in departmental lists. Congress from 116 to 80. The new president is likely to propose decentralization laws : that may allow elections for
I governors. -- .-. . . - . - - --L-- - 4------Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information -- .--" ------.- - - . . - - - . - Honduras he bresident is Unicameral ~overnorsare November 1993 marked the elected for a four- Congress. appointed for four- fourth consecutive election of year term during year terms. a civilian president since , one round of voting The 134 members 1982 when Honduras and may not be re- are elected for four- Municipal returned to civilian rule. In elected. year terms and may authorities are January 1995, the police be re-elected. elected for four- force came under the Members of year terms. direction of the civil Congress are government while the techni elected on a cal judicial police (i.e., federal proportional basis, investigative police) came accordina to votes under the direction of the ------P - .+. -- - PA------cast for the Attorney General. In May presidential 1995, an all-volunteer military candidate oft heir was put in place which ended
party- forced conscription. In 1 addition to these changes, many judicial changes are a Iso under way. - - . - - . -. - . . . ---. ------"- -- Presidential Legislative Governors and Country General Electoral System System Municipalities Information I------. - - - . - - -. ------. - - . - -.__.I--_-__- _.-.I ' Mexico The president is Bicameral Governors are The official party, the PRI, elected for a six- Congress. elected for six-year has won every presidential year term and may terms according to election since 1929. not be re-elected. The 500 members the organization Measures have been taken in There is only one of the Chamber of and calendar of Mexcio to open up the round of voting. Deputies are each state. The elctoral process to other directly elected for Constitution allows political parties. In recen three years; 300 for the replacement years. through the reforms to are elected from of governors by re- the Mexican Congress in late single-member election during the 1993, as well as the creation constituencies and first two years of of the autonomous Federal 200 chosen under a their terms and b y Electoral Institute (IFE) to system of presidential oversee federal elections, proportional appointment after opposition parties have representation. The that time. steadily expanded their majority party will representation in the political hold no more than Municipal system. 300 seats. authorities are elected for three- The 1994 elections were At the present time year terms. The seen as critical because prior there are three mayor of the to the election the country senators for each Federal District will was plagued by a series of state; however, in be elected, not crises, including the 1994. a six-~ear amointed. for the assassination of the PRI -- -- - . ------+ ------.-. ------_- - -._I_ period of transition first time in 1997. presiential candidate Luis began which will Donaldo Colosio. For the first culminate in the time, the Mexican formation of a new government asked th e system for electing United Nations to train senators by the Mexican electoral monitors. year 2000. This The PRI candidate, Ernesto new system will Zedillo, defeated the PAN guarantee that at le candidate Diego Fernandez ast 25% of the and the PRD candidate seats in the Senate Cuauhtemco Cardenas in the will belong to 1994 election. The election members of was generally regarded as minority parties. In free. the 1994 Senate elections in each state, the two candidates who received the most votes were elected to be senators and a third senate seat was given to the minority party in that state which obtained the most votes. All of the senators elected in 1 994 are now serving six-year terms. In the 1997 mid-term elections, a fo~irth senator * -- - .- - - - . . -.- - -. . --. . . .- . from each state will be elected for a three-year term. In the year 2000, elections will be held and three senators will be elected by direct vote in each state and a fourth senator will be allotted to the majority opposition party within the state. - -. - - -- - presidential Legislative ' ~over'ors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information -.+a --- -. -- -*-.-* -.--- ..-- . ------.. ------. ------. .- - - -. -- Nicaragua The current Unicameral The Office of The UNO coalition, once president was Congress.The 92 Governor does not consisting of 14 parties, no elected for a six- members of the exist in Nicaragua longer exists in Congress. In year term and may National Assembly except in the March 1994, Congress not run for re- were elected for autonomous reduced the future terms of election. The next six-year terms by Atlantic and South the president, members of president will hold a proportional Atlantic regions. Congress and mayors from five-year term. If representation and Elections were held six years to five years. none of the may be re-elected. ther in March 1993. Congress has also prohibitied candidates The next members the election of the president's receives 45% or elected to the Municipal close relatives. President more of the vote, a National Assembly authorities will be Chamorro's nephew, Antonio second round of will be elected for elected for five-year Lacayo, has challenged this votin g will be held. five-year terms. terms. restriction.
In 1996, the new Liberal Alliance coalition will support the main presidential candidate, Arnoldo Aleman, the former mayor of Managua. - . - - - - .- - . - - - -.> . -- -- - A- - . ------Panama The president is unicameral Governors of the On May 8, 1994 Ernesto elected for a five- Congress. nine provinces are Perez Balladares of the PRD year term and may named by the defeated Mireya Moscoso, not be re-elected. The 72 members of president and may widow of former President There is only one the National be removed at any Arnulfo Arias of the Arnulfista round of voting; the Assembly are time. Party, and salsa singer candidate who elected for five-year Ruben Blades of the Papa receives a plurality terms. Municipal Egoro Party. International of the votes authorities are also observers found the elections becomes president. appointed by the to be free, fair and non- president and serve violent. President Perez five-year terms. Balladares will meside over -- - . --. ------. ------. - - - . -- - - - the crucial transition period of the Panama Canal and thousands of acres of prime land which are scheduled to be handed over to the Government of Panama by the Unit ed States by the year 2000. - - - * ------.---- .--. -----A Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information ------,- n7 - -" ------. - . Paraguay The president is Bicameral Governors are In February 1989, the elected for a five- Congress. elected for five-year overthrow of General Alfredo year term and may terms. Stroessner initiated a not be re-elected. If The 80 deputies transition to democracy in no candidate and 45 senators are Municipal Paraguay. The elections of receives a majority elected for five-year authorities are May 1993 were the first free ' in the first round of terms and may be elected for five-year and uncontested elections voting, a second re-elected. terms. with an all-civilian slate of c ' round is held. andidates since 1928.
On June 20,1992 a new Constitution was approved that created the Office of the Vice-president and prohibits the president and vice- president from succeeding themselves. The Constitution also established an Electoral Tribunal which is headed by three M inisters of Electoral Justice who must be confirmed by Congress. Munici~alauthorities are now ------A ------.-- - - - elected and no longer appointed by the president. All parties reached a decision by consensus to postpone the municipal elections until the end of 1996 in orde r to give the new Electoral Tribunal adequate time to prepare for the elections.
In April 1996, the commander of the armed forces, General Lino C6sar Oviedo attempted an unsuccessful coup detat. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and the United States responded with strong support for President Wasmosy. In addition, the Paraguayan people protested the General's attempt by supporting- the President. ------.- . .." ----.------7 ------Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral- Country System System Municipalities Information -"--- -- ... . >" - - . - - -- - . ------. A Peru The president is Unicameral The Office of -In April 1992, President elected for a five- Congress. Governor does not Fujimori dissolved Congress year term and may exist. The and called for new be re-elected for a The 120 members Constitution of congressional elections.The consecutive five- of Congress are 1993 dissolved new 80-member Congerss year term. If no elected for five-year regional served for two years and candidate receives terms and may be government. Pen2 drafted a new Constitution a majority in the re-elected. is organized into which was approved by a first round of votina. de~artmentsand its nationwide referendum in Oct .- . . ------. -+ -- a second round is authorities are ober 1993 by 52% of the held. named by the people who voted. The new president. Constitution dissolved regional government and Municipal created a larger 120-member authorities are unicameral Congress. The elected for a three- new Constitution also permits year term. the president to run for re- election. " ------. -. " - -. "------A --- A- - Presidential Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information __-I"______-___I -_ ._ I___-r - -- A __ - Uruguay The president is Bicameral Governors and Since the end of military rule elected by a party Congress. municipalities are in 1985 three presidents have. list procedure for a elected for five-year been elected. five-year term The 99 deputies terms. without the and 30 senators are In May 1996, the Senate possibility of elected by a system voted on an amendment to consecutive re- of proportional the Constitution which will election. The representation for change the process of president may run five-year terms and electing the presidnt by for office again may be re-elected. including a primary election . after one term has This change has not yet been passed. There is approved. one round of voting in the election. - -.-- - . .. - - .. -- - presidentis1 - Legislative Governors and General Electoral Country System System Municipalities Information Venezuela 'The presient is Bicameral Governors and Venezuela has a long- elected for a five- Congress. municipal standing history of year term and may authorities are democratic rule which bean run for office again The 203 deputies elected for a three- in 1958; however in 1992 after two and 53 senators are year term. there wer two COUD attem~ts ------. " -- . - -- .- - -. -- presidential terms elected for five-year and in 1993 President Carlos have passed. terms and may be Andres Perez was There is no second re-elected. In 1993, impeached. round of election half of the members for President. of Congress were In June 1994, the elected directly for government under President the first time. The Caldera suspended many other half-continues constitutional freedoms in to be elected by a order to provide legal means system of to address the country's proportional economic and financial crisis. representation. Political guarantees, such as Many deputies and the freedom of travel within senators represent the country, have been multiple parties. reestablished, but the government is still legislating on most economic matters by decree.
Table 2.3.4 2.4.0 Gap in the literature: The literature review in the foregoing paragraphs underpins the problems arid the environment of the electoral process in Nigeria in the perspective of the character, of our democracy as well as political behaviourism tenable in a developing African State. The manifestation among others include electoral malpractices of the greatest dirriensiori, conflagrant disregard of rulesi of the process, display of brute force, hooliganism and in some cases gangsterism and other forms of' militancy which have characterised political cornpetition in this rnodern African sovereignty. Issues in the rnain becarne that even under democracy presupposing majority rule by the consent of the ruled are the rules elected or even electable by the ruled? Do the actions or choices of the voters count orAranslate into the final out-put obtainable through a typical electorate process, for instance in the case of the 2003 general elections in Anambra State?
Does the constitutional framework under which the electoral process is conducted able to guarantee and unfettered judicial process'? And still, does the leadership designed or enthroned through the iristrurnentality of an illegality of the electoral process cornrnandeer legitimacy? As these review provoke these question and they, to some extent depict the ugly scenarios of Nigeria's electoral situation, there is also need to examine the institutional structures of the electoral managers as well as interrogate the phenomenon of legitimacy of leadership vis--a--vis emergence by electoral fraud or misconducts. Summarily Lht:refore, tho wholistic internal and external system of INEC and its conduct of gerieral elections (2003) in,Anambra State over and above the spate of political crisis persistently noticeable in that political territory between 2003 and present date should be beamed on a searchlight or inquiry. 2.4.0.1 Hypothesis: The following hypothesis are formulated arid adopted from the foregoing review of existing literatures to scientifically guidc the conduct of the research work.
(1) Election results decla,red by INEC at the conclusion of each electoral process typically reflect the actual votes cast by the electorate in Anambra State in the 2003 general elections.
(2) Political leadership that emerges through elecl.oral rrialprac11c;es lacks inherent legitimacy and does not guarantee stability of the democratic system.
2.4.0.2 Operationalization of the key concepts. Electoral Process: Series of actions, changes, functions or operatioris relating or resulting to elections.
Electorate: I The body of enfranchised citizeris, emlitled or qualified arid registered to vote and participate in an electoral process. In the case of Nigeria, persons of sound mind, above 18 years of age is by law entitled to register and belong to this body of electors. Institutional framework: A simplified description of a complex entity or process, showing the fundamental assumption, values, concepts and principles it encompasses the rules or law, organizational structures and operational mechariisrri upon which an organization oxisls Judicial Process: The action system relating to the function of judging or tleterrriining cases and administering justice. Political leadership: Authority and power exercised by person elected or related to occupy public positions established law for the conduct t or governrrient of the territory. Such leadership rriay characterize political or party and depicts clearly defined t-iicxxhical and jurisdictional orders and functional relationst-iir) in an inter- dependent system. Electoral Malpractices: Negligence, misconduct and dereliction of professional duty in the coriduct and management of the electoral process especially ;as a result of undue influence an unethical behaviours on the si& of the managers and competitors. Legitimacy: Lawfulness by virtue of being authorized or in accordance with the law; undisputed credibility, authenticity and genuineness over claim especially as to the authority of the governor over the governed.
Stability: I The state or condition of being resistant to charigc, dcterrnirialiori or displacement. Constancy of character or purpose; steadfastness, reliability and dependability. This also refers lo the ability of an object, system, process, institution or concept to maintain equilibrium or resume an upright position after displacement, as by strong winds, storm, cornmotion or turmoil. Democratic System: A synergy of social, economic or political organizational forrri, characterized by the pflinciples of social equality and popular thought. A functionally related set of elerr~onts sccking to aJvocate, accumulate or conform with the principles of rrlajority government.
I 2.4.0.3 Mehodology;
In Social Science research, the nature and (:or~cc>pl.ualisatiorioi 21 problem are the key considerations as to the choice of design of the study. In this work for instance, the research problem revolves around the institutional capacity of INEC as an electoral body in Nigeria and its success or ot!ierwise in the conduct of 2003 elections in Ariambr'a State. It follows therefore that Historical method is most appropriate. 'llis will enable a systemic or content analysis of INEC as a body including a review as is already done of its history and major development. The method would enable the &searcher to trace the strmgth and weaknesses of INEC as well as relating same to the rnariagernerit of the 2003 general elections in Ariambra State.
2.4.0.4 Descriptive Method: In addition to the method aforementioned, the study will adopt the descriptive method. This design methodology will contextualize arid deal with contemporary issues regarding the management of elections by INEC, whatever weaknesses are identified will receive antidotes as conceptualised by the research
2.4.0.5 Theoretical framework: The framework that guides this study is the systems theory, whose most notable protagonist are Talcott Parson and David Eastori. According to Easton (1965.), the theory explains a phenomenon not necessarily from the standpoint of ifs constituent units, but from a holistic perspective of the contributions of the parts to the survival of the whole.
2.4.1 -0 Characteristics of the theory; Quoting Russel Ackoff, orange (1996) argues that the theory conceives a system as a whole which cannot be taken apart without the loss of its essential characteristics as foll~ws; A systern posses set of ot~jectiveswhich tr1c critity swks lo achieve and without which it cannot exist or even survive. A hierarchy of interdependent units, that is the sub-systerns among which the objectives are divided for implementation. Specificity of roles for each unit, meaning that each sub-systern has a defined and specialized role in the realization of the total purpose of the whole. An input transforming technology, which refers to the process and techniques, by which resource inputs extracktl .from within and outside of the systerns are transferred into inputs. A clearly characterized boundary, which excludes other systems a'nd defines the thresh-Iiold among all the systems of the universe. The environment, meaning the larger context in which the system is situated and engaged in rnutual transaction through the agency of input and output.
2.4.1.1 The Application of the theory to Study; Election which is at the social point of this study is a rnulti tlirnc-;nsiorml process, which involves inter-related or inter dependent segrnerits as registration of parties, registration of voters, delimitation of constituencies, training, deployment of men and logistics, planning, enforcernent of order and rule of law and control of electioneer~rig campaign, etc. All these depict process, while rnariy of tksc clec1or;zl processes are handled by different persons units or deparlrneril wilhiri the organization of the Electoral Cornrnissiori. Some rnay be done by outside agency. Other items however would usually be urider the control of some other bodies, bringing into an issue the in-evitability of' inter-- relatedness in the management of the electoral process. This point in the main underpins the theory's greatest attribute, which is a chain of inter-dependency action system which takes place in the conduct or management of the electoral pnocess.
We hold that the success or accuracy of an electoral process depends largely on a proper equilibration of these inter-relationship functions between different parts of the organizational network. This essentially is in tandem with the principle of the systern theory.
It is our assertiori that the application of the system theory to this study enables a comprehensive analysis of the stages and segments of the electoral process in line with the foregoing argument. INK as an institutional body has a hierarchical range of organizational segrrionls which the study would seek to analyse in lirio with the thesis of the system's theory
2.4.1.2 Methods of Data Collection: Historical and descriptive rnethods presupposes that the went have taken or is taking place, in some cases, the researcher is not a participating observer and as such will rely on existing documents, records evidence and in somei cases relies on expedence or opiniori of observers of the event, or existing relevant literature. In corisideration thereof, this study shall adopt the following methods of data collection;
2.4.1 -3 Documents; I Nwana (1992) argues that data can be collectetl from documents in the context of any written material that is already inexistence and produced for some other purposes other than the benefit of the researcher. Such data according to him, "second hand", but warned that it is not in the sense of "a used article or second item or.lower quality product", but in the sense of the original direct :field work having t~eeridone by someone else. Despite the second hand attribute, such data are very valid, he asseted.
I
The use of this type of data is justified on the ground that the researcher can not wind t)ack,the past event, but can, of course, reconstruct those experiences through the existing written evidence (Nwana, 1992).
In the circumstances, this study will collect data from docurrierits such as the Nigerian constitution, Electoral Act 2002, Decrees, INEC Guidelines, Newspapers, books, magazines, courts, etc.
2.4.1 -4 ' Participant ~bserlation: According to Laboritz and t-lagedorn (1976), observers (:orme under tho labels of judges or participants. In adopting the participant-observation method, we are aware of some of its weaknesses, but at the same time, we are reinforced by its inherent advantages. First the observations lake place in a natural setting and the observer is able to perceive the derneanours of the subjects. :Again, over time, calculatively a 101: of information is collated. Another advantages is ,that the observerlparticipant is able to record the context, which gives rrlearling to the respondents' expressions of opinion and value. Finally, with a greater ability., the observer can ask questions hat would othc-xwise riot be possible (Laboritz Hagedorn, 1976:79).
The researcher has participated in general elections bctwoen 1990 and I 2003 in Anarnbra State as Party Representative arid in Ihe caw ol 3003, National Assembly Election, a candidate for Orunba North and South Federal Constituency. t-le has lived and worked in sensitive public positions in Anambra State within the period under reference. lie qualifies in appropriate cases as both and observer and a participant, and in both capacities, very actively too.
2.4.1 -5 Method of Data Analysis; Due to the nature of the research design, which collects data from documents, observation and participations, the prcsentatiori arid analysis will be by qualitative and deductive means. In qualitative analysis, it is possible to show other scientists how the conversion was made from a particular range of qualitative phenorrieria to a specific hypothetical coristruct (Cartwright, 1953). To achieve this, the contents of the materials will be.classified into appropriate categories to eriable ordered description. This process is commonly referred to as "content analysis". According to Berelson (1952), conterit analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description for k the rrianifest conterit of materials. 2.4..1.5 ' Method of Data Analysis; Due to the nature of the research design, which collec(s data frorn documents, 'observation and participations, the presc-mtation and analysis will be by qualitative and deductive rneans. Iri qualitative 1 analysis, it is possible to show other scier~tistshow thc conversion was made frorn a particular range of qualitative pkicmornorm to a specific hypoth,etical construct (Cartwright, 1953). -1-0 achieve this, the contents of the materials will be classified into appropriate categories to enable ordered description. This process is cornmonly referred to as "content analysis". According to 13erelsori (1952), content analysis is a research technique for the objectivc-?, systematic and quantitative description for the rnanilest. contcnt ol materials.
I - The Study Area GENERAL INFORMATION ...... Sturly Area: Annmbra Stnte.
3.0 THE STUDY AREA: GENERAL INFORMATION ANAMBRA:
3.1 ANAMBRA GEOGRAPHY AND PEOPLE: Nigeria is a federalist union, among the component and intergral part of the sovereign agreement is Anambra State - a state located on the Eastern fringes of Nigeria - it is situated on the eastern plains of River Niger. The state is bounded by Imo in the South, Enugu in the North, Abia in the east and Delta in the Western axis; with the River Niger as the national boundary. The state has a somewhat compact geographical size of 4889 Sq.Km, making it one of the densest in the country.
ii. Population: The state level had a population of 2.768 million as at 19991- census figure and by projection 1999 yields a total population of over 3.488 million, making it one of the most populous states in the country. Urban growth is rapid, extending from Awka, Nnewi and Onitsha, to g radually A bangwa, E kwulobia a nd 0 tuoch. Urban - Rural population differential is 40160% respectively. Going by the same population profile, about 1,I 71 5 representing 49.16% of the population are male, while 1.773 million or 50.84% are female.
iii. Social Background: Ethnically the people are homogenous with one common language, lgbo widely spoken. As characteristics of an lgbo society, its family structure is patrilineal, with the man as head. The extended family network is dominant as regarded as a functional model as a kinship system and social welfare security mechanism.
The dominant religion is Christianity, made of essentially industrious and hospitable people.
iv. Political and Administrative Structure: Anambra until 1991, included Enugu and some parts of Ebonyi State, but became a state of its own following state creation in August '1991 .
There are 2 1 Local Government Areas functioning as su b-systems in the state as follows: Aguata, Anambra East, Anambra West, Anaocha, Awka North, Awka South, Ayamalum, Dumukofia, Ekwusigo, ldemmili North, ldemmili south, Ihiala, Njikoka, Nnewi North, Nnewi South, Ogbaru, Onitsha North, Onitsha South, Orunba North, Orunba South and Oyi. And elected Chairman by law is the statutory head of LGA as obtains n ationwide, b ut a re p resently a dministered by c are t aker chairmen, acting in concert with a set of committee appointed for each council by the Governor in the absence of any general election, which this study cannot foresee in the next 12 months.
The governor, Dr. Chris Ngige, a medical practitioner is presently at the helm of affairs in the state, by virtue of 2003 election, the veracity in itself one of the elements of this study.
The state is one of the political active territories in Nigeria, known to have high calibres in the national political scene, among them, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dr. Alex Ekwueme, Dr. Chuba Okadigbo, Dr. A. A. Nwafor-Orizu, Dim Odumegwu Ojukwu, Emeka Anyaoku, Arthur Mbanefo, Chukwuemeka Ezeife, Mbazulike Amechi, Austin Ezenwa, Roy Umenyi, Edwin Ume-Ezeoke, and a litany of others. In the South East Nigeria, it is the leader of thought and tops the human resource chart of the zone, easily the heartland of parades the chart bursting l ist of captains of industries and other worldly acclaimed figures, outside politics- Emeka Anyaoku and Cardinal Francis Arinze to mention only but a few.
The State has another political divisions along the lines of senatorial districts - North, South and Central, so far, the last two elected Governors - Dr Chukwuemeka Ezeife and Chinwoke Mbadinuju come from the South, while the present is from the Central. There is a clamour form the North for the next term of leadership - apparently by 2007. PDP is at present, the ruling Party in the State, although arguable, with the expulsion of the Governor from the party at the climax of the e nsuring P olitical crisis i n the State. A part from P DP, A PGA whose presidential flag bearer, Dim Odumegwu Ojukwu is from the state has a strong footing and at present contests the governorship election of 2003, claiming it is the rightful owner. There are a pocket of presence maintained by other Parties, especially, ANPP and UNPP. Among PDP's considered strongest support base, the reason being that, Dr. Alex Ekwueme, Nigeria's former Vice- President and a highly respected indigene of the State contested both 1999 and 2002 Presidential primaries of he party and the development no doubt mobilized high support for PDP ab-initio. He failed in the 2 attempts only for Ojukwu to emerge as a presidential flag bearer in 2003 under APGA, a Party known to be conceptualised of lgbo inters and agenda, like the Yoruba's AD and core North's ANPP. Dr. Chinwoke Mbadinuju, the erstwhile PDP Governor was among the 2 PDP Governors denied of return ticket in 2003, although he contested eventually under AD. His exit was masterminded by Chris Uba, a crony of the Presidency and the emergent self acclaimed godfather of Anambra politics. Data presentation, Analysis and Findings 4.0 Data Presentation, Analysis and findings;
The focus of this chapter is the conduct of the 2003 general elections in Anambra State. The chapter will present and analyse data as well as its finding in the context of the research hypothesis. To achieve this task, the chapter is organised under the following sub-themes; 4.1 Data presentation and Analysis. 4.2 Findings and Analysis of Hypothesis 4.3 Implications of the findings on the Hypothesis.
4.1 Data Presentation and Analysis.
The AprillMay, 2003 Election became the focus of the global community, not because of the country's desire for democracy and good governance, but for the antecedents that have trailed previous elections in the country. Nigerians have list confidence and hopes in the ballot boxes, which are supposedly their most reliable weapons of warfare in the libertarian democracy that we seemingly practice. The erosion stems from the weaknesses of the administrative and institutional frameworks of the political system, depicting the impotency of the system to yield to the entrenchment of a culture that guarantees constitutionality and freedom of the voters in any given election therefore became significant, because it seeks in the main to break the jinxed civilian - civilian transitional process in the country.
INEC, headed by Dr. Abel I. Guobadia very flamboyantly lauded its image, telling Nigerians of its preparedness to instil discipline, or order and rule of law in the system that have become very reflective of a decayed society. The commission upon receiving a whopping sum of N45 billion embarked upon logistics preparation, designing a new voters register, captured by electronic system, and including buying cars and lories for the historic event.
The elections were designed on a triple structure as follows; (i) National Assembly: April 12, 2003 (ii) Presidential and Governorship: April 19, 2003 (iii) State Assemblies: May 3, 2003.
4.1 .I ANAMBRA 2003: POLITICAL PARTIES AND NOMINATIONS It is a settled issue in law that only political parties have the exclusive rights to nominate and sponsor candidates for election. By section 65 (2)b of the Constitution of the Republic, no one stands election unless he is sponsored by a Political Party. Although such supremacy by law is vested on the parties, section 23 of the 2002 Electoral Act also limits such right by stating inter- alia: "Any Political Party which wishes to change any of its candidates for any election under this Act may signify its intention in writing to the commission not later than 30 days to the date of election." These Statutes are supported by already decided cases as per the authorities of; ONUOHA Vs OKAFOR (1983) 14 NSLL 494 and TURAKI Vs DALHATU (2003) 33 WRN 54. The courts in Nigeria remained focused and stripped themselves of any form of jurisdiction as far as matters considered 'party' or conceived to be pre-election are concerned.
Using the PDP which is the ruling party as well the party that claimed almost 96% of the elective posts in the State as a benchmark, our examination therefore is how the party has handled nomination in the State.
4.1.2 GOVERNORSHIP NOMINATIONS; Chinwoke Mbadinuju, of the PDP's 21 Governors became only but one of such privileged persons, refused a return ticket by the party. His political 'baggage' was filled with several cases of non- performance, and had become such a political albatross that the party had before hand informed him of their intention to try another hand. The exit of the incumbent Mbadinuju immediately created the chances that ushered in Dr. Chris Ngige, by then aspiring for Senate, Dr. Jerry Ugokwe, Hon Chidi Offordile and IG Abana. Ngige who had greater roots with the Party machinery, having held positions in the National working committee became a veritable choice of Chief Chris Uba, who appeared given the 'contract' by the Presidency to recruit a replacement by virtue of the vacancy created by Mbadinuju's rejection. First, he swerved Ngige from his Senatorial ambition to the Government House route. This Ngige would agree when he testified to the Oyinyola panel (2005) that he was 'persuaded' to contest for governorship against his will. Chief Uba upon testimony divulged that Nigige as an aspirant to the governorship under the PDP was not screened, and went further to allege that he convinced Audu Ogbeh, the them PDP National Chairman to sign a forged delegates list for him which he obtained tags used at the primaries, thereby stopping genuine delegates whom he feared would gave still routed for Mbadinuju, the incumbent. It is Ubas further submission that during the PDP governorship primaries, he used his acumen to 'compel' some of Ngige's opponents to step down for him and when two of them refused, he "used huge sums of money to execute the project" (Oyinyola 2005)
This position would reinforce Uba's affront, when he publicly boasted that he "Single-handedly sponsored the governor and his deputy, 10 members of the National Assembly and 30 members of the House of Assembly." This statement could mean that all that purposely stood election in the 2003 Election in Anambra, Uba sponsored, using his huge material and social capitals in the 'investment politics' in a manner that would seen he is a 'political contractor'.
The veracity of Chief Uba's statement can be tested by the version of N gige who a grees t hat U ba i s h is role benefactor a nd i n a ny case, he was 'persuaded' to contest for governorship. More than this, Dr Ngige stunned Nigerians with a revelation that the Chairman of the Committee on the primaries, Senator lbrahim Mantu, was given N50 million bribe by Chief Uba - apparently confirming his nonchalance and Uba's position as the sole undertaker of the project. Ab initio, there were no moral foundation on the side of Ngige as far as the determination to contest and win is concerned and this perhaps made him too weak and helpless in accepting every condition given and signed every agreement ...... Data Presentation, Analysis anti Findings prepared for him line, hook and sinker. This is more aptly captured by Oyinyola (2005) when his committee says; "Although Dr. Ngige claimed that some of the agreements were signed under duress, while other verbal contractual obligation were also made, it is a matter for regrets that the Anambra State Governor, in an attempt to satisfy Chief Chris Uba and obtain his moral and financial assistance .... Practically literally signed off his authority and responsibility as the Chief Executive of Anambra State. It would appear that Governor Ngige in the process "Sold" Anambra State to Chief Uba" The Governor had earlier narrated the gory stories of how he was slapped by Chuma Nzeribe, taken to Okija Shrine and his clothes severally thorn.
The foregoing depicts the character of our political parties as lacking p rofusely i n o rganisational i nternal d emocracy. T he T MG (2003) has this opinion to share; "The present political parties in Nigeria have not shown through their operations, action and conduct that they are political parties in the true sense of the word. They are disconnected from the people and have no patriotic and nationalistic orientation." The question that arise are do parties political as they are with the constitutional r ight to s ponsor c andidates p romote o r p ervert t he principles of democracy while discharging such functions? Following the foregoing data, who as to between Chris Uba and PDP in actual fact sponsored Dr. Chris Ngige as the candidate for 2003 gubernatorial elections in Anambra State? Did the constitution in divesting itself of every power of sponsorship or nomination of candidates in an electoral process and giving same ...... Data Presentation, Analysis and Findings holistically to the parties contemplate that the procedures for such nominations will be lacking in polyarchic character even when the general framework under which the supremacy is conceived is democratic? When a process has a procedural defects does the out-put arising thereupon posses legitimacy? We shall attempt the answers in the analysis of findings.
4.1.3 NATIONAL AND STATE ASSEMBLIES NOMINATIONS BY PDP The activities that characterize the nomination process in the gubernatorial category did not distinguish in the National and State Assemblies for the PDP which eventually clinged over 97% of the positions, including the governorship. The party in exercise of its constitutional authorities had submitted a list of nominated candidates on the 10" of February to INEC in a letter signed by the National Chairman and Secretary, Chief Audu Ogbeh and Prince Vincent Ogbulafor. Amidst protests and further political developments, PDP in a letter of 6" of March, 2003 to INEC Chairman, titled "Submission of Anambra State Nomination List of Candidates" took another turn, substituting or changing almost all the previously submitted candidates. The letter reads thus; "we wish to sincerely apologize for the delay in forwarding this list. We needed the time to ensure fair hearing of all concerned. Kindly accept the attached list for substitution of the earlier one. Your co-operation is highly appreciated. Kind regards.
Signed Chief Audu Ogbeh Prince Vincent Ogbulafor National Chairman National Secretary. The new list had overturned the fabricated list of Chief Uba's loyalists submitted earlier on loth~ebruary, among them, those he 'compelled' to step for Ngige in the governorship primaries. In the new list of 6'h arch, are Chief Ben Obi, Joy Emodi and Prince C. N. Ukachukwu for Senate and 41 other candidates for both House of Representatives and State Assembly seats.
A battle of supremacy of the two lists began, one contained those who were believed to have won the party's primaries in December 2002 against the earlier submitted list of Chief Uba's loyalists and stooges believed to have been handpicked by him 'single- handedly' to be foisted to the party for endorsement as its candidates.
Somehow, the PDP managed the heat until greater force emerged that wanted the status quo changed, but unfortunately time had elapsed for possible changes by virtue of the Electoral Act.
Sunday Champion March 30, 2003:3 has this to say; "The controversy surrounding the list of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) candidates for Anambra State has finally pitched the end the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in a test of strength with the later rejecting for a second time another back-dated list. . . .INEC was said to have rejected some changes in the list of candidates submitted to it by PDP since March 6, saying that s uch changes would a mount to violation of E lectoral Act 2002." The confusion caused by the circulation of the two lists to wit that of lothFebruary and the other 6th March led to avalanche of Court cases in order to determine as to between the names in the two instruments who the candidates are. From the deluge of orders made by the Courts, it appeared that the Judges abated the confusion. The confusion was such that the AD senatorial candidate for Anambra North and the Deputy Governor incumbent, Prince Chinedu Emeka instituted a case at the Federal High Court, Enugu o n the c laim t hat h e did n ot know a s to between E meka Anusike (contained in the list of loth February) and Mrs. Joy Emordi (contained in the later list of 6th March) he was contesting the Senate seat. On the strength of this application, INEC was subpoenaed in which it declared that Joy Emordi is the candidate and not Anosike.
INEC took a bold step and on 15th of March 2003, published the list of candidates who stand nominated (see Appendix A). The publication apparently ended the controversy and was duly captured i n a v ideo t ape m ade available to t his researcher. T he only deviation in the names of 6'h of March, and the Publication of 15'~of March is in item No. 14 in which the name of Nedu Ugochukwu was dropped and substituted. This is acting on the strength of PDP's Letter of Ilth arch 2003, one day to the end of the time frame under which changes are allowed. The inclusion of the name Ben Nwankwo in the INEC published list of 15~~March, show that the letter under reference was acted upon by the Commission a nd that the a uthentic I ist i n i ssue i s that of the 6th March, with the amendment in item No. 14 by virtue of lawful change of 1lth arch 2003. The above positions is eminently affirmed by the letter of INL.:C, Awka on the 11"' of April 2003, twenty four hours to the balloting, in an attempt to correct the placement of the name of the said Ben Nwanwko under lhiala instead of Orumba North and South Fotleral Constituency which appear as a typographical error. -l'hc->letter No INEC/AN/ADM/S.59/VoI.1/1 1 to the Electoral 0ffic:ers c:onc:c-,rned reads in part: (See Appendix C) "I am directed to inform you that the candidature of Ilori. Ben Nwankwo, stanbing for PW Orurnba North arid Oruriba South Federal Consitutuency is not in tloub\"
. . . .these corrections were deerrietl necessary in vicw of the typographical error in the publicatiori of INEC reccmtly. Please be guided" In another development two Senior Advocates C. 0. Akpangbo and Chirnezie lkeazor wrote letters dated 17'" and 15'" .July 2003 respectively to the Secretary, INEC seeking in the rnain to clarify which of the two lists contain duly nominated, sc:reenotl and cleared candidates for PDP (see Appendix D, E and 1:)
INEC up till that stage did not shake or yield ground. Orw list exists that is endorsed by INEC, known to thern to contain list oi nominated and cleared car~didatesas at the 15"' of March, 2003 and whose names were on the ballot for the 12"' April election into the 11 National Assembly and state Assembly seats in the state.
4J.4 GENERAL ELECTIONS; 4.1.4(A) GOVERNORSHIP 4.1 4(B) NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 4.1.4(C) STATE ASSEMBLY 4.1.4(A) GOVERNORSHIP
The 2003 elections in Nigeria was marred by allegations of massive electoral malpractices. Both Local and International observers in their various reports admitted that there were different dimensions of misconducts. The presidential candidate of ANPP, Mohammadu Buhari, described the elections as the "most fraudulent Nigeria has had since independence" (Quoted in Odeh, 2003:28). As an antidote, Buhari called for mass action. The general scenario of the elections was captured more sharply by Okolie 2004:113 when he asserted thus; "In the 2003 general election, the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) assiduously stood against formal elections and committed electoral fraud that remains unprecedented in Nigeria's political history. They made effective use of state apparatus and hold unto political power. . ..thuggery is rather revered as voting behaviour is remarkably vitiated1'.
The foregoing characterization of the 2003 general elections also marked the conduct in Anambra State, where PD~in an ordinary sense was running against an incumbent governor contesting under AD. The seeming chances of PDP are further slimmed by the dominant presence of Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu - a highly revered leader in lgbo race, contesting under APGA, though as a presidential flag bearer. APGA, a new party had Peter Obi - a versatile technocrat of distinction, vigorously campaigning for the governorship. The above political configuration notwithstanding, it was not difficult for Ngige emergence even when all the calculations for such victory appeared untenable, considering, especially his sponsorship background. And so to the greatest surprise of the voters, the declaration that marked the end of the process did not reflect the trend of their choice. The collectivism has been truncated, and the people helplessly watch as PDP won the seat against obvious contending forces, mustered by APGA's widening horizon of support among the Eastern people of Nigeria.
INEC's final declaration of Dr. Ngige and his eventual inauguration on May 29, 2003 left Mr. Peter Obi with only one option of heading to the Election Petition Tribunal at Awka. The case is still pending and it the circumstance the study will not base its data or analysis on the strength of Mr. Obi's petition to avoid Pre-Judicial committal, but watch with great suspense the out come of the judicial proceedings and to see to what extent it varies or agrees with the findings of this research. The extent of the variation or agreement will testify in strong terms the veracity of our data and analysis or other wise.
However, less than few months after being sworn in, the new governor and 14s god(father) came on a head-on-collusion. Violence, intrigues, accusation, horse-trading and intimidation became the order of the day as the politically packaged 'time bombs' and 'canisters' continue to explode intermittently. The task of this study is not to x-ray the chains of Political disturbances in Anambra, but to replicate same from the election that took place which saw the enthronement of that government that is under threat of extinction, day by day, so much so that an HIV patient has greater sense of security of life that the government at Awka.
The reason is perhaps not far fetched, he god(father) is angry. He sowed, he did not reap. He invested and there was no return. Worst still, his ego rather than receive a vigorous massage, flattens in the hands of a government, which he installed as part and parcel of his business enterprise. He once exploded to an international audience at the World lgbo Congress (2004), New York, "I don't control Anambra State, I control the Federal Government" The statement was widely reported and not known to have been denied or controverted by an official of the Nigerian Government. One then clearly understands the background to Uba's confession that; "We, the PDP, did not win the election (2003). 1 have gone to the church to confess. The election had no document; I called the result before 12 mid-night. I gave INEC the money and asked then to call the result. The person we took his thing is here" (pointing at Peter Obi who was among the audience).
The researcher watch some of the video clips where the Governor on motion said he resigned his position and in several instances, he was singing praises of Uba, attributing the SOLE the responsibility of h is e lectoral v ictory to h im. U ba was a Iso s een, boasting about his confidence in Ngige and what he can do for the people of Anambra State. Uba does not only speak like an angry god(father) he uses all the elements and documents to show that he does not boast empty. Beating his hand on his chest, he averred to Oyinyola's Committee (2005) that Ngige's certificate of election was handed over to him by Ngige after election. He likened the situation to a school child, who, upon receiving a Certificate after completing a course, hands it over to his father who sponsored him. The Governor denied this, but his denial didn't make a substantial deviation from Uba's position, when he replied the Oyinyola's Committee over his certificate; "I gave it to Engr. Emeka Eze Okeke" Engr. Okeke is the P.A. to his enstranged god(father).
On the 6" of December, 2004, the Chairman of PDP, Chief Innocent Audu Ogbeh in the tradition of statesmanship, wrote the President inviting him to rise to the challenge Anambra situation or face raging fire soon to consume the New Republic as a major threat. The President angered by Ogbeh's guts and allegations of mundane support to Chief Uba, the younger brother of his Senior Special Assitant, Andy Uba - the keeper of the President's Concsience, shocked Nigerians with another revelation of Uba's Confession over Ngige's electoral failure and the manipulations that followed. He posited in the reply letter addressed to ogbeh on 12" December, 2004 as follows; "... I got the real shock of my life when Chirs Uba looked Ngige straight in the face and said, "you know you did not win the election" and Ngige answered, "yes, I know I did not win". Chris Uba went further to say to Ngige, "you don't (sic) know in detail how it was done", Continuing, the shocked president wrote; "I was horrified and told both of them to leave my residence". The above position did not only reinforce the earlier confession of Uba, but exposed what he meant by 'single handedly' installed the Governor and others. The missing certificate of Ngige can be found in between the statements, while Uba's cautious amendment of his words later seem aberassive and does not convince anybody.
Most Nigerians believed the President, particularly considering the perceived fatal damage the weight of his evidence would inflict on the party he proudly leads. It is admission against interest and the Oyinyola Committee conceived his statement as follows; "the committee believes the evidence of Mr. President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo which claimed that Chief Uba alleged and confessed that there were manipulations at the elections in question. Again, the committee based its conviction on circumstantial evidence and witness of truth. Furthermore, the National Chairman of PDP has not denied that he was also duly informed of this development by the parties, while attempting to settle the dispute
, between the duo."
The foregoing reveals an obvious fact; the PDP lost the governorship election of 2003 in Anambra State by popular ballot to APGA which by. all pretensions had all it takes to clinch the victory, but the political machineries of the god(fathers) - using physical, material and social capitals at their disposal hijacked the process i n favour of a n i ndifferent N gige. F or a II t hese t hey d id; they want a pay back. But Ngige needed good governance which the god(fathers) care less to legitimise his stake to the highest position in the sub-national government. Crossroad! The god(fathers) are on the rampage. 'black market' democracy.
Wale Adeyemi-Suemi in Maduabuchi Dukar (ed) 2005 captured it thus; "...election which is one of the fundamental features of liberal democracy ceases to perform this function in the Nigeria experiment. This is made so as the godfathers determine who rules and not through the 'collective' democratic votes". The ruling Party's NWC in the event of all these scenarios adopted the recommendations of the Oyinyola's Committee .and expelled both the godfather and the godson. A move which Dr. Nigige has challenged in the Court of Law, claiming among other things that the Party has not exercised the authority in concert with its constitution.
4.1.4(B) NATIOANAL ASSEMBLY; The National Assembly elections were conducted on Saturday April 1 2, 2 003. i n A nambra S tate with s ome repeat e lections o n 16'~April. The National Electoral Commission in Conformity with its published list of nominated candidates announced Ben Obi, Joy Emordi and Prince C. N. Ukachukwu as Senators - elect on the platform of PDP for Anambra Central, North and South Districts respectively, and having been returned by their respective returning officers in the election. For House of Reps, Ben Nwankwo, Nze Duru, 0,C Egwuatu, Chima Nzeribe, Dr. C. C. Okeke, Gozie Ag bakoba among others were returned declared ------Datn PI-esentalion,Analysis and Findings from their various constituencies as winners. On the Mthof April, following the declaration from the various electoral commissions, Alhaji suleiman Hassan announced the victories of the above mentioned to the world, thus confirming the returns made by the respective returning officers.
Six days after the elections had been concluded, the same REC, Alhaji Hassan, issued a press release, (see Appendix G) purporting to have cancelled, withdrawn and invalidated all the forms EC8E and EC8E(i) issued to the winners at the end of the electoral process. He justified his action on the strength of a court injunction he received on the 1Ith of April, the eve of election.
The above position of REC is against the position of section 59 of the electoral Act which reads; "The decision of the Returning Officer on any question arising from or relating to (c) declaring of the scores of candidates and the return of a candidate, shall be FINAL, subject to review by a tribunal or Court in an election petition proceeding under the Act"
The President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo speaking on the impossibility of INEC cancelling the result of the Presidential election, on Daily Champion, Thursday, May 2003:2 said thus; "I understand that INEC having declared results and issued certificates may be limited in its administrative actions to redress (wrongs). .." The statement not only confirms the statutory provision, but is derivable from such provision and the Secretary of INEC, Dr. Hakeem Baba-Ahmed, in This Day, Wednesday, April 30:2 ...... Data Presentation, Analysis and Findings speaking on where INEC reversed the mistake of the REC, Abia State who had earlier cancelled the Abia South Election result after declaration confirms thus; "Once elections result has been announced, it cannot be cancelled" The foregoing did not deter the Resident Electoral Commission in Anambra State who claimed "pressures from the above" as the justification for his illicit behaviours nor is he ignorant of the provison of section 23 of the Electoral Act 2003 that all litigations on issues of any impending election must be determined and concluded 7 days to the election. In other words purporting to cancel an election and withdraw the result of an election is to act ultra vires since the order upon which such action is based is ab initio baseless. Oguntade G.A. (1993:2l6) ruled as follows; "Where a Court makes an order in contravention of a statutory provision which forbids it from making such order, the order so made is null and void and no appeal need be filed against the order" It is the submission of this study that the Court order procured on the eve of election and brought to the notice of the REC after the elections had been concluded upon which he now anchored his cancellation, withdrawal and invalidation of declared result is against all statutory provisions. The order is only a smokescreen upon which an electoral fraud is being conceived. To prove this point, the same REC on the 26'h April, following the cancellation of the previously issued returns, declared another set of winners, this time, names of those who did not face the ballot at all, claiming to be acting in tandem with a Court order not basing his actions upon any electoral process or by the provision of any law regulating such process. These actions of the REC, Suleiman, upturned the victories of the actual Candidates who were published by INEC on 15th of March as candidates of PDP and whose names were circulated to the respective constituencies as candidates for the ballot. In actual fact contested election and returned by majority votes cast by the returning officers Were chosen by the process of ballot by the electorate Confirmed winners by the REC through a Press Conference on the Mthof April, 2003.
Dissatisfied, the three nullified Senators-elect; Ben Obi. Price C. N. Ukachukwu and Joy Emordi and Representatives-elect; Ben Nwankwo, Chidi Duru, 0.C Egwuatu, Gozie Agbakoba, C.C. Okeke and C. I. D. Maduebum headed for the Election Petition Tribunal. The actions filed individually before Justices G. N. Nabaruma (Chairman), I. I. Agube, J. B. K Aladejana, P.A. Ohamade and A. 1. Maru in the main are as follows; 0). That they be declared validly elected and or returned as winners having polled the highest number of lawful votes cast at the said election and issued with forms EC8E and EC8E(1) as appropriate by the Ros. (ii) That INEC by itself, servants and agents have no powers under the states to cancel, withdraw or invalidate already declared result. (iii) That INEC have no powers to have declared those who didn't contest the elections as winners especially after the same INEC had declared them winners, claiming to be acting on the behalf of a spurious Court order procured at the eve of the election and served on INEC after the election.
Following a protracted legal tussle which lasted over twelve months at the lower Tribunal at Awka, the Justices held that the petitioners and not the respondents contested election and through individual judgements returned every of the effected candidates whose returnslresults were previously cancelled, withdrawn and purported to h ave been i nvalidated by t he P ress Release of the Resident Electoral Commissioner, who confessed in the proceeding that he acted on the instructions from above.
The provisions of the Electoral Acts is that where a matter is under determination, whosoever is declared by INEC occupies the position until the Court of Appeal, sitting as the Final Court says otherwise. While the lower tribunal therefore nullified the later declaration of INEC in 9 out of the fourteen National Assembly Seats existing in Anambra State, the Court of Appeal at Enugu took barely another year to have affirmed the decision of the lower Tribunal in the cases of seven person out of the 11 seats being contested. One was upturned while three others are at advanced stage of determination.
-Table 4.1.0 Analvsis of Senate SIN Senatorial District Action Lower Tribunal Senator C.N Ukachukwu was first Upheld Process by Justice declared returned Ukachukwu's Opere, delivered 1 Anambra South and given form election and held an incomplete EC8E(i) that Dr. Uba never Judgement, Dr. Ugochukwu Uba contested election upturning the - was a 2"dreturned on the strength of Court lower Tribunal. He Order og 1 1/4/03 himself came under trial by NJC. Abana appealed Senator Ben Obi was and his suit was Upheld the election first returned. Mr. I.G. dismissed, in place of Ben Obi andnd Abana a 2ndreturn on of him Ben Obi has Anambra Central held that the 2 the strength of been sworn in, return is an invalid spurious Court order while Abana was action. of 11 14103 walked out of the Senate Chambers. Senator Joy Omordi was first declared Affirmed the and result later decision of the cancelled by INEC. lower Tribunal. Upheld Mr. Joy Emma Anosike was Emordi was sworn Emordi's victory Anambra North awarded victory and in after Appeal and said 2ndreturn was sworn in. Action Court decision, of Anosike is invalid based on a spurious while Anosike flew Order of Abuja Court following the Court on the eve of the Order election.
Therefore in 3 Senatorial seats contested, the action of INEC is 2 cases represent 66.6 percent of the Senatorial elections in Anambra State were upturned by the Court, while one, being 33.4% was confirmed in an untoward circumstances by the same Court process.
House of Reps Action Lower Tribunal Court of Appeal Chidi Duru was first Returned Chidi Affirmed the declared, as a 2nd Duru as validly decision of the return Okey Enemuo elected against Tribunal and Chidi was declared based INEC decision on Duru replaced on the same Court Enemuo Okey Enemuo Order of 11104103 Ben Nwankwo first declared and given form EC8E(i) by Returned Ben Judgement ORUMBA INEC, later Chinedu Nwankwo being the awaited on NORTHISOUTH Ugochukwu was first elected as 2 1104105 awarded victory validly elected based on the same Court Other Gozie Agbakoba was Invalidated the 2nd first declared by Upheld Gozie return of Balonwu INEC and later Agbakoba who ONITSHA and held that Gozie returned Jessie then replaced NORTHISOUTH was the candidate Balonwu on the Jessie Belonwu at of PDP who strength of the Court the House of Reps contested. Order. Rescinded the The Judgement of AW KA 4peal Court is NORTHISOUTH awaited.
C.I.D. Maduabum Upheld CID 4ffirmed the was first returned and Maduabum as the decision of the NNEWl announced. Upon rightful winner. The lower Court and NORTHISOUTHI cancellation of his R.O. having also CID Maduabum EKWUSIGO result, a 2"d return, testified he replaced Harry Harry Ohaneze was returned him Ohaneze Made Emma Anosike was I first declared and Affirmed the upheld Apho later Okeke decision of the ANAMBWEASTI lgbeke and not was made as a lower court and WEST Ralph Okeke as second return. Alpho lgbeke replaced winner lgbeke claimed he Okeke. ought ANAOCHA I APGA candidate, NJIKOKA NOlitigation was declared winner I DUNUKOFIA I PDP candidate Nhuma Nzeribe was No litigation lHlALA Nil declared first, No 2nd return I Okwudili Uzoka (PD) OGBARU was declared first. No No litigation 2ndreturn rnadA Barr. Ugbanze was OYII AYAMELUM returned 1 no 2nd Nil 1 return was made Rescinded INEC's Dr. C. C. Okeke was second return and first return and issued declared C.C. form EC8E(i) by Okeke as the INEC. As a second IDEMMlLl NORTH rightful winner who return Jerry Verdict is awaited /SOUTH contested election Ugochukwu was and the RO having declared by virtue of testified that Jerry the spurious Court Ugokwe did not Order contest election A Table 4.1.1 shows that of 11 House of Reps seats, 7 is under contest at the Court, representing 63.6% of the total. Of the 7 being contested, 4 have been decided against INEC's declaration, while the other cases await the judgement of the final Court. It is the assertion of this study that the issues involved in the remaining cases are already settled and as such the verdicts are not likely to depart from the ones already made, voiding the 2"d declaration by INEC. This means that so far 4 of 11 House of Reps seats, representing 36.4% of the total has been voided by the Court, thereby effecting substantial changes in the House of Reps seats for Anambra State to the tune of 36.4%.
A further analysis of tables 4.1.0 and 4.1.1 shows that a total number of 14 National Assembly seats exist in Anambra State where INEC conducted elections on the 12'~of April, 2003. Of the total number of seats, 6 have been voided against INEC declarations, representing 42.9%. This means that 42.9% of the INEC's declared results in the National Assembly election in Anambra state have being voided, 21% is outstanding but critically awaiting nullification. Only 5 of the 14 seats, representing 35.7% stand the chance of not being nullified. This position shows a likely chance of 63.9% of the National Assembly election in Anambra State, being nullified as a result of the conduct and malpractices of INEC, the electoral managers.
4.1.4(C) STATE ASSEMBLY Elections into the House of Assembly seats of the state was conducted on May 3, 2003. The election did not deviate from the general character of the previously conducted elections especially in terms of the organisational framework of INEC of the existing 30 seats PDP won 29 seats, APGA won only one. However, following Court processes instituted by the AD candidate for lhiala I constituency, Hon Vitas Okafor, the PDP's victory at the constituency was voided by both Court below and the Court of Appeal, showing a 3.33% nullification of INEC verdict in that election in the State. Table 4.1.2 No of No, voided by PDP APGA AD Constituency Court 30 28 1 1 1
Table 4.1.2 shows a 3.33% deviation from the standard of electoral rule in the case of House of Assembly Election (2003) in Anambra State.
4.2 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Upon the data analyses presented in paragraphs 4.1, 4.1 .I, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.1.4(A), 4.1.4(6), 4.1.4(C), the following findings of facts are manifest that; (i) The Peoples Democratic Party on whose Platform the Governorship election was won in Anambra State did not ab initio sponsor Dr. Chris Ngige Instead, the Party willy- nilly contracted such sponsorship to Chief Chris Uba. Dr Ngige did by his own volition show that he was not even interested in the contest ab initio and gullibly surrendered himself wholesomely to the whims and caprices of his godfather. Party sponsorship would have entailed the towing of the party's ideology, its policy and programme network. In this case, Dr. Ngige was expected to pursue the ideology of Chris Uba, the defacto sponsor whose only known ideology is maximization of profit on investment. The volition of the godfather that he did everything possible including obtaining false list of ...... Data Presentation, Analysis and Findings
delegates, buttresses this finding. Okolie (2004:123) in his enunciation of the Interest Theory of Social order concurred that it is personal interest, which compels people, behave in a particular manner. People, he said naturally want to d o what t hey want to d o, n ot b ecause they are compelled to do so, but because it benefits them. This i s w hat h e a Iso called p rudential variant of i nterest theory. It is therefore the assertion of this study that, PDP as a party deliberately abandoned its constitutional role, political and social responsibility of sponsorship to Chris Uba and left Anambra State in the hands of a Merchant who picked the contract, executed it ruthlessly and in the same manner as in execution is asking for a pay back or return on investment. The Peoples Democratic Party sent a list of National Assembly Candidates as in 6th April and made only one specific change on that list on the Ilth of March 2003, the letter is appendixed accordingly, the list was acted upon by INEC by publishing same on the 15'~of March as required by law. However, being that it contained the names of independently minded candidates who won election at their various primaries, the political merchant requested a change and went ahead to make a list of his loyalties that he would comfortably sponsor on the basis of 'single-handedliness'. This list unfortunately came to INEC late and wouldn't be changed. godfathers don't give up easily, after all it is business. This situation culminated to the procurement of illicit Court order, asking INEC on the eve of election to swap the list of candidates already published for the election with the other list of Chief Uba's surrogates. It was impossible for INEC, since the order obtained at Abuja High Court could not have been rolled out same day and served at Awka same day. We found it impossible to believe that INEC ever sighted the order on the said 1 lthof April 2003, explaining why if still conducted the election with the original list.
This finding is further reinforced by the letter of INEC, Awka to EOs of Orumba North, Orumba South and lhiala on the same 11" April which stated inter-alia that "the candidature of Ben Nwankwo ... is not in doubt", himself, on the original list published on 15~March by INEC. The second reason is that if INEC received the said order of Court on the 11" of April, when did it screen and clear the names of the candidates in the list at required by law. It in fact did not, and therefore never presented the Uba's surrogates as candidates in the same manner Ngige was presented for the governorship race.
(iii) Dr. Chris Ngige as PDP (or Uba's candidate) did not win the governorship election of 2003 in Anambra State. Uba who is culpable in the complicity said that much. Ngige's denial goes to no issue when in actual fact Uba's confession alleges that he (Ngige) did not know how it was done! This position is vigorously confirmed by the fact that Ngige's Certificate of election as Governor of Anambra State is in Uba's possession. If one ponders on the custody of. the Certificate, the veracity of the process that led to its issuance will be more deeply appreciated. Worst still, if Ngige even as Governor is not in possession of his Certificate of election, would he in actual fact be in the position to have known all the atrocities, violations of the law that saw his emergence, especially considering the position of weakness upon which he accepted to run. His wilfulness and co-operations in entering into all manner of agreement to appease and show loyalty to Uba attests to this. Given the circumstance, we assert that he couldn't have rerected any regulatory agreement with Chief Uba on the frequency of meeting with his wife.
The evidence of the President is very weighty, considering his position as head of government and leader of the Party in question. One therefore will in the manner as did Onyinyola panel admit his evidence as a witness of truth and a ttach accordingly a very h igh p robate value to t he admission that PDP as personified in Dr. Ngige did not win the governorship election in Anambra State. Although controversial, his expulsion by PDP is a conviction by the party that it did not win the position after all.
The study is therefore bold to assert that APGA, other than PDP won the governorship election in Anambra State and that INEC by deliberate misconduct and by the machinery of C hief C hris U ba cornered t he v ictory a s a result of his selfish purposes. His desperation for Ngige's victory is in his belief that he would manipulate him better to serve his ruthless quest for capital accumulation. The complicity of INEC is evident, when they thwarted the collective will of the masses of Anambra State who made a legitimate choice of leadership in the person of the APGA candidate. The actions of INEC is against the law, against the people, against democracy, against the State and more terribly, against God.
Democracy is a system of governance that underscores the plural nature of politics and gives rebognition to the diversity of social forces in the political community. Election in the fact, ought to design the interractional relationship between rules- ruler and- ruled. It is this relationship that INEC ought to mid-wife rather than destroy. Karl Max (1848) is right after all, that the State can be an instrument of class exploitation, where the dominant class uses the machinery of the State To serve its own interest, which involve the exploitation of the dependent class. It is our submission that INK, also an agency of the State is criminalizing the process of election, using its machinery against the helpless voters.
(iv) The political disturbances of Anambra State since 2003 is as a result of the actions of INEC in enthroning an un elected government which lacks legitimacy. Although the governor uses good governance and dividends to now legitimize his power and engender acceptability, the fact remains that moral and social foundations of his governorship is falsity and therefore his governance is to the extent, reciprocally illegitimate. He did not in actual fact .derive power from the power. He indeed derived instead from Uba and the criminality thereupon. The outrageous agreements he entered into with his godfather clearly show the functional relationship between the source of his power and loyalty he sought to give. The crises although with all its violence is highly condemnable, but its roots is in the violation and bruising of the collectivism which poor majority hold to themselves as the greatest tool in any democratic arrangement. An actual declaration of the popular candidate by INEC would have clearly isolated the hegemonization Uba is seeking and its consequential political albatross. Anambra people in the process should have been reaping peace, which they sowed by voting massively against Uba and his can of worms had INEC done that which they ought have done.
We therefore assert that upon the premises of the above argument, instability is tenable as a result of electoral malpractices. Illegitimacy cannot bring stability, only insitutionalization of the electoral process to the extent that guarantees integrity and transparency can translate to viable stability in the political system of Nigeria.
(v) INEC conducted the National Assembly election of 12" April, 2003 in 3 senatorial districts of Anambra State, out of which 2 were nullified, representing 66.6% of the entire conduct of elections in the Senate. In the House of Representatives, of the 11 seats, 4 seats have nullified against the position of INEC, while three others are on a critical list. Combined with the analysis of the findings in paragraph (iv) above, there is a relationship between the governorship election which Uba admitted he rigged, a nd b y m atter of findings of this work w as s een and proved to have been rigged in favour of PDP and the number of seats in the National Assembly which the law Courts are now retrieving in favour of the choices of the electorate. It is this same pathological behaviourism - 'single handedliness', 'sole sponsorship' and politics as business or investment that extended to the National Assembly seats. Uba by boasting of how he single- handedly put every public officer in Anambra State on the seats shows his congenial inquest for power and control. The same machinery he used to force INEC to cancel and invalidate already declared results of seven candidates of the PDP in the National Assembly, he also used to rig elections oft he governorship by the following week. He did after all boast that he gave INEC money and forced them to 'call result (of the governorship) by 12 mid-night.
Based on the foregoing therefore, Hypothesis (1): Election results declared by INEC at the conclusion of each electoral process typically reflect the actual votes cast by the electorate in Anambra State in the 2003 general elections is virtue of the findings of 4.2 (i), 4.2 (iii), and 4.2 (v) disproved. Findings reveal that there is no connection tangential or otherwise between the result declared and the votes cast in the said election. A conspiracy of the actions of Chief Uba as in 4.2 (i) and the collaboration of INEC as Electoral body made the Hypothesis impossible to be tenable. The hypothesis therefore fails. On the other hand;
Hypothesis (2) Political leadership that emerges through electoral malpractice lacks inherent legitimacy and does not guarantee stability of the I democratic system.
This hypothesis is tested against the findings in 4.2(i), 4.2(ii), 4.2(iii) and 4.2(iv) and in the overall showed a forthrightness, consistency and validity against all the analyses. It is a positive hypothesis, justified very vigorously by the findings in the afore- mentioned paragraphs. There is a perfect relationship between electoral misconduct - illegitimacy and - instability.
From the two hypotheses, whereas electoral malpractices remove the connectivity between the rules - the ruler and - the ruled in hypothesis (I), it brings the connection in the case of hypothesis (2) between malpractices - illegitimacy and instability in its perfect order. Therefore there is an equilibration of standard between the failed hypothesis (1) and the positive hypothesis (2). This interesting relationship and equilibration rightly approximates the validity of the date, method, analysis and the eventual findings. 1
I
I-.-summary, A- _ Recommendations and Conclusion ...... Summary Recommendation and Conclusiori
5.0 SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION.
5.1 Summary; The researcher is prompted by the political developments in Anambra State, of the South East of Nigeria and went ahead to survey the background to the problem. The work started with an introduction, giving various definitional concepts of elections. The literature Review which formed the major work in Chapter 2 went on very wide exploration, bringing the different understandings and perspectives to the subject to give a theoretical support and direction to the work. One of the pertinent arguments in the review is that elections much as is a fundamental practice in a democracy is not necessary synonymous with it, being that at times it becames an instrument in the hands of the elites and godfathers to hegemonize their hold on power. Such was the case in Anambra State, where the process of election became wholesomely criminalized - INEC ignominiously succumbing to the intimidatory demeanours of power merchants and orchestrated an untoward gangsterism upon the people of Anambra State. Pertinently therefore, we found a nexus between the literature review and our findings of fact. In fact the former gave a theoretical explanations to the startling discoveries in our chapter 4, where we found among other things, that;
(I) The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) abdicated its constitutional role of sponsorship of candidates in Anambra State, when it entered into an 'informal' contract with Chief Uba to do so. The 'political merchandising' that trailed Chief Uba's sole sponsorship mechanism as seen from the inquest to lay control over the machinery of power in the state is at the root of the electoral malpractices, instability and illegitimate occupation of public positions as in the case of Anambra state.
(2) Dr. Chris Ngige either as PDP or Chief Uba's candidate did not win the 2003 governorship election in Anambra State by m ajority votes, b ut through Chief U ba's rigging machinery. The PDP must have perceived and notices this 'technical Know-how' and capacity when it indeed 'awarded' this 'contract' of sole sponsorship to chief Uba as per the findings in above paragraph.
(3) In the National Assembly Elections of 12". April 2003, the names of those who actually contested Elections, declared by Returning Officers and given forms EC8E and EC8E(i) as appropriate were swapped after six days in a turn of events by the REC, claiming to be acting on the strength of an omnibus Court Order illicitly procured on the eve of the same election. Out of 11 of such results cancelled and invalidated by INEC, the Law Courts have so far over-ruled INEC on 6 cases, while others are critically waiting the sledge hammer of justice. Paradoxically, the only one case that escaped such justice is that of Dr. Ugochukwu Uba, the elder brother of both Chris Uba and Andy Uba, the president's Senior Special Assistant (on all matters) (4) INEC is culpable in the political crises that Anambra State is witnessing today, by all its complicities in the whole charade that took place in the state in the name of elections between April and May 2003.
(5) Election constructs a relationship between the Rules - Ruler and the Ruled, while on another hand electoral malpractices as in the case of Anambra's 2003 designs a causeleffect relationship with illegitimacy and instability. In other words, whereas transparent elections duly connects the rules, ruler and the ruled, there is a concomittal relationship between electoral malpractices, illegitimacy and instability of the political system. This is the case of Anambra State.
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS; Nigeria's successive Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) had been constituted in the past ostensibly with an eye to guaranteeing their independence. The institutional framework had disenabled the operationalisation of the independence, owing perhaps to lack of political will on the part of the central authority to lay off control of the electoral machinery for whatever reasons.
L
These electoral bodies were usually appointed and also removed by the incumbent president subject to confirmation (or address) by the senate. Under the 1999 constitution (third schedule, part I)the only prescription for appointment into the electoral body are that the persons shall be of u nquestionable i ntegrity a nd n ot be l ess that fifty years and forty years of age respectively for the chairman ...... Sunirnory Recorn~nend~~ionand Conclusion and other members. It follows from this that anybody including members or sympathizers of the ruling political party making the appointment could be appointed. When this is coupled with the fact that the ruling party, which constitutes the executive of government also usually, produces the majority of the membership of the senate, the picture of an electoral body predisposed to partisanship from its very origin is complete. This partisanship is of course in favour of the ruling party.
Also, it is well observed that elections so far held is Nigeria since independence ahd approached standards of freeness and fairness more when administered by presumably politically neutral outgoing military regimes (Bello, 2003:7; Diamond, 2002:366)
The implications of the points above could be stated thus; i) An electoral body constituted by the government of a ruling political party is bound to be loyal to the government that constituted it. ii) Loyalty to the government already predisposes the electoral body to partisanship in favour of the ruling party. iii) A partisan electoral body cannot conduct an election that will be free and fair to all; iv) Lastly and very importantly, only a non-partisan electoral body can conduct free and fair elections, and by this logic and the practical experience of Nigeria, a non-partisan electoral body is possible only under a non-partisan government. Based on the foregoing, the study is proposing that;
(i) Membership of the independent National Electoral Commission should be drawn largely from non-partisan and distinguished retired and serving civil-servants. A representative each from the existing political parties should be given thestaus of observers in the Electoral Commission. The commission members shall have such tenure as to out live the administration that appointed them. Under this dispensation, there shall be only one Electoral Commission for the whole country with state branches and it shall organize all elections. There shall be no state Independent Electoral Commissions. The commission should continue to be fully funded by government.
(ii) Election Management Each electoral event is complex, costly and multi-step task. The careful planning and budgeting of each task, using appropriate computer tools, is essential to ensure that timeliness, priorities and critical events are identified and costed, to the extent that where deadlines are not met, as is inevitable in such complex tasks, appropriate corrective action is taken to redress slippage and keep the plan on right track. Unlike many complex projects, electoral activities have fixed, statutory deadlines which cannot be moved, and so the knowledge which effective programme planning and management provides is essential to indicate when and where the additional resources are required. Equally, the establishment of clear plans will impose financial and ...... Surnrnary Recommendation and Coriclu.sion
administrative discipline upon those responsible for decision- making.
Planning needs to begin now to prepare for the 2007 elections- it should not wait until the legal framework is revised or clarified, a situation which unnecessarily hampered INEC's planning for the 2003 elections. INEC should work immediately to develop general timeline, containing target dates by which the legislative framework should be c larified, procedures for the elections developed and necessary systems and infr-structure designed and implemented. Following formulation of that overall timeline, INEC should work on specific operational plans, engaging its senior staff at headquarters and it the States in such process of planning.
All concerned departments, including Finance and Accounts, must be involved in the creation and delivery of INEC's operational plans. The establishment of a cross-department planning and monitoring team would provide a mean to enable coordination and commitment across the organisation.
For the Commission to put in place improved operational strategies, it also must review its structure and competencies. INEC, which inherited the bureaucracy of the former electoral administration, has a substantial establishment and recurrent cost structure both at
headquarters . and in the states. The size of this establishment does not necessarily contribu'te to effective and efficient electoral management.
A restructured INEC must ensure that management responsibilities and authority are effectively delegated to the organisation's executive officials and directors. Similarly, a much greater level of responsibility should be delegated to the States. This strategy can only be contemplated if there is significant strengthening of INEC's State offices, which should be considered in terms of their role and capacity, rather than simply in terms of the number of staff, which is already somewhat inflated.
To enhance the competencies of its staff, training of the Commission's core staff at headquarters and in the States, needs to be improved. At the same time, process of staff assessment should be put in place, linked to a programme of professional upgrading, and career development, in order to develop a cadre of competent election administration professionals. An INEC Training Department should not only focus on training ad hoc staff but should develop a comprehensive and coordinated training strategy designed to raise the standards and capacity of permanent staff.
For INEC to significantly reform its operational strategies it needs to address only the way in which it conducts the electoral, process - the procedures for voter registration and the elections, the materials utilised, the staff employed, and under-pinning logistics systems - but also must reform its own management of the electoral process. Such reform should include the use of project planning management methods, the delegation of decision-making, to the departments and the States, and staff development. This reform is necessary to ensure that the Commission continues to build on the gains it has made in transforming into a modern and professional election management body and to strengthen credibility of the electoral and democratic processes in Nigeria.
(iii) Elections and Technology Technology is essential to the conduct of elections. Technology is used at every stage of the election process, for example for compiling voters lists, drawing electoral boundaries, employing and training staff, printing ballots, conducting voter education campaigns and publishing election results. The appropriate application of technology to elections can increase administrative efficiency, reduce long- term costs and enhance political transparency.
Technology used for elections can be 'old' ones like printing presses, ball-point pens, manual typewriters, electronic calculators and radios, or 'new' technologies like computers, optical scanners, digital mapping and the internet. Without access to technology, the logistics of modern large-scale elections would be beyond our abilities, considering the geographic terrain of Nigeria and the size of the electorate...... Siirninary Recomnendation and Conclusion
The complexity of technology used for elections around the world varies enormously. The rate of technological change is so fast that INEC must regularly re-evaluate their use of technology to determine whether they should adopt new or updated technology to improve their performance.
This is not intended to imply that use of technology in elections is an end in itself. Rather, it is recognition that the same technological solution can apply to many different aspects of the electoral process. For example, electronic databases can be used for almost every part of the election process, including voter lists, inventories, staff payments, postal voting, vote counting and results dissemination. Considering the large chunk of money INEC has so far received, the achievement of this technology is by financial implication not untenable.
5.3 CONCLUSION Election is a constitutional instrument through which decision
and change are appropriated in line with the legislative and
administrative framework providing for such process in a
political system. Therefore security of tenure of the elite or
godfathers or their protegees depends in part on a low level
institutionalisation of the input mechanism to the political
system. Since political mobilization involves widespread ...... Suntmory Recominertdcrt~ortcmri Coilclusioil social and economic changes, policies of the government or party attempting such a transformation will almost assuredly arouse the hostility of the group whose privileges are being curtailed. By allowing or proposing meaningful competitive elections through far-reaching electoral reforms, the hegemonists would make both themselves and their agenda vulnerable to displacement. Our fear here is to what extent is any reform allowable or contemplatable. The findings of this research inter-alia show that a ruling party would relinquish sponsorship to a contract. The questions are who conceived of the contract? Who authorized? Who gave? And what is the intent or better still, the agenda? We have also found a close logical relationship the auspices under which the gangsterism and political brigandage are orchestrated on Anambra State and its people. The worry is that the political system is incapable of an institutional framework that is protective of its subject. Here we saw how the instrumentality and machinery of the state were cornered and utilized against it by itself and against the defenceless voters who by agreement the state as a federatory union ought to secure and protect...... Summary Recotnnzenrintion and Conclusiotr
The research therefore fingers the political parties as by all pretentious posing a serious threat to democracy that they compete for unless a reform is conceived. Political parties are agents in the game of democracy. They should be nationalistic and seek to carry the banner of nationalism, liberty, rule of law and development bold and high. They should cultivate and institutionalize values and culture under which democracy can consolidate. The implication of our findings is that there is even no internal democracy among the political parties. The parties in practice are structured along the lines of godfather - godson affairs and any crisis between the duo very easily pronounces a crisis for the party in whole. Our position therefore is that any electoral reform must seek to occasion consequential reforms or repercussions on the political parties. LlST OF CANDIDATES Mi0 STAND NOMINATED TO CONTEST ELECTIONS. 2003 STATE: ANAMBRA POLITICALPARTY: PDP
1 SMO. 1 NAME OF CANDIDATE - ~ OFFICE CONSTITUENCY 1. I Dr. Chris.Ngige .Governor Anambra 2. I Hon. (Dr.j Okey Udef; Deputy Governor 'I
I
Appendixes
7, ana rrvgreee Natlonal Sacratrrlrt: Plot 1970 Wadata Plaza Michael Okpara 3reet.W~Zone 5,, Abuii., Tel: 095232569.5233429.Fax: 095231299 !
C 1 i 11 March, 2003 i I 1 The Chairman INEC Headquarters i Abuja. 1 1 I : SUBSmON "OF ORUMBA NORTH AND SOUTH FEDERAL CONS~NCYIN NWMBRA. sTAm i I ! Ben Nvvmkwo is to substitute Mr. Nedu Ugochukwu in Orumba 1 North and South Federal Constituency. Ben Nwankwo is now the Party candidate for Orurnba North and South Federal Constituency of Anambra State. i I This substitution has become i;ccesscuy because Nedu 1 Ugochukwu has decamped to UNPP. I We are sorry for the inconveniences this may cause you.
Highest regards.
Appendixes
: F Apperrdk6p 1it2.0. AKP!AM~BO'A CHAMBERS . "-'- The Secretary, -- 'Mependent National Electoral Commission, yeadquarters, Abuja. My dear Secretary, . In the Anambra Election Tribunal holding at Awka in the petition of Hon Prince Ukachukwu v. INEC & Ors, two list of candidate who - stand nominated to contest Elections for Anambra State for the Peoples Democratic Party [PDP] was in Issue, one was signed by ... you on or about 6" of March 2003, with the list of candidates, which among others included Prince Ukachukwu and others. Same is "Annexure A". The order list was signed by the Administrative Secretary of State INEC Awka. [Anambra State] and certified on 07/07/2003, the same is "Annexure B". It did re+contaln the name of Hon Prince Ukachukwu. Iwould be grateful if you can clear thls Inconsistency, in the light of: - (a) whether you authorlsed the act of the Adminlstratlve Secretary, Awka [Anambra State] 7 .( kl. -, ('JJ (b) which of the two is the authentic list ' I am sorry to bother you in the last week. I am taking the liberty . of sending a copy of thls letter to the Chairman of the sald Tribunal Thanks for your co-operatlon. Yours Faithfully, Appendix 'E' CHAMBERS OF CHIEF (DR.) CHlMEZlE IKEAZOR, SAN 8 CO. Barristers and Sollcltors of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Legal Practitioners, Arbitrators and Notaries Public. ABUJA OFFICE: Plot 248, Monsterrado Street, Wuse Zone 4, P.O. Box 7581, Abuja Nigeria Phone: 09-5235677, 09-5237182,080-33063701,090-412618, Fax: 09-5235677. En~nil:~eazursn~~@~,re,nieTn~g~ LIIIII~~: ~.i~~~n~t~r(dy~!~~~~ 3othJuly, 2003 The Secretary, Independent National Electoral Commission (HQ.) Abuja. Dear Secretary, Re: The hnambra State Election Petition Tribunal holden at Awka will require at the hearing of the Petition of Ben Nwankwo Vs INEC and Other (EPT/AN/NAl4/2003) definite clarification and co~ation: (a) That the same Ben Nwankwo is the PDP's sponsored candidate for House of Representative April 12" 2003 Election in Orumba North1 Onunba South Federal Constituency. (b) That the said Ben Nwankwo is the same person whose name appeared in the INEC publication of the PDP candidates who had been cleared to contest April 12' Election. (c) That the apparent mistake of placing his name against lhiala Federal Constituency was a typographical error, which was corrected by INEC. For avoidance of doubt I have hereby annexed the Certified True Copy of the INEC authentic list of PDP sponsored candidates marked Anneme "A" It is noteworthy that the said list does not contain the name of Mr. Nedu Ugochukwu against Orumba North and Onunba South Federal Constituency for the said election. At the &bra Election ~etitMbuna1 CHIEF CHlMEZlE IKEAZOR. Senlor Advocate of Nigeria,, Hon. LLD. (Nlg), LL.0. (London). A.K.C., O.H.A.. B.L. (Grays Inn) Oboli Obosi Ill; Chief (Mw.) UJu Ikearor, BA. Educ. (Hons) IN!). 1L.B. (Hons). 0.1; Benl Lar. LL.6. (H0ns)B.L.; A.U.N. Obinmu, LL.B. (Hons) (Nig.) EL; Innocent Okoto, LL.B. (Hons), BL khtsProtSN.C. Obi. 8.5~; (Em).LLM.Ph.D(london),B.L, 1.0.G.Anhssha~~.Ll.B.(M) 11.8 (Ccuiab) 8.1:H.NC. Moghl, 11.8. (Hm)B.L: IAfgrm. 11 8. Polls) tll. khrOtlO!ubr.LLB. (Hm)B.L:Hon. S.1.OkonkwokwoUB.(Hons)B.I:WumegrmIlealycM.LL.B.(Hom), B.I:l.U bJI.lLB (Hons),B.L,:,Emeks Okoye, LL.6. (Honsl, B.L.; A ppentiires Appendix 'F' ...... C/LECIES/AN1322/54 ...... 18th. July, 2003 ...... I 'I'hank you. I for: SECRE'I'AR\'/IN KC PIIESS RELEASE 1:ollowing the receipt of the ;:-:lgrnent of the Federal I.ligli Court Ahuja dated I 1"' day of April, 2003 in Suit No. I:I ICIAI~JICSII 7612003 WENPeoples Democratic Party' & A~ir Vs. Independent National Electoral Commissior~& Anr by which the court granted an Order of'. Mandmus compelling the lridependelit National Electoral C'onunission to act on the list or Candidates attached to the l'coplcs l:)c~iioci-;]tic1 lctlcr or 6"' Milrcli 2003 which was ;~ttitclicd to tlic court process lilcd ill tlic Suit, tlic Coliitilissiori. ill compliance with the said jirdgniclit hereby ;t~inoi~~~ccs/dccl;~~-csthe following its tlic pcrsons duly elcctcd to thc Nittiotinl Assembly on thc platfor111 of the Pcoples Democratic Party in Anambra State: pflp =,-7- -+"'Xi" rr. J,-, A. SENATE * !*.'-k-q s F v -- NAME SENAIORIAI, DISTRICT ---- I-lon. Emtna Anosike Anambra North Sir I. 6.Abimh Anambra Central Dr. Ugocliukwo llba Anambra South ______------a REFERENCES Alkali; M. et al (1999), . "Nigeria in the Transition Years 9993-1999," Kuru Bukuru: A publication of the Presidential Advisory Committee, NIPS. Amadu, K. (1993). The Nigeria General Election 1959 and 1983 and the After Math, Lagos. Macmillan Nigeria Published Ltd. Babangida, 1. (1992), The Nigeria: Transcending More Geographical ~xpression,"Text of Address by Mr. President, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal republic of Nigeria at the Symposium to Mark the 22"d Anniversary of the National Day held on Thursday, September 24, 1992 at Abuja. Egwu, S. (1998), "Democracy at Ethnicity and Nigeria's Democratic Eclipse (1986-1995)", Africa Monograph Series No.5, Jos: Sky Holding Limited. Elekpo, M Nigeria: "On the march Again" The Catholic Periscope, June 199- 2000, Abuja: Press Club of the National Missionary Seminary of St. Paul. Falana, and Ihenvbere, T. (1985)' "The Military in Nigeria Politics in Nwankwo, A. ed Nigeria: The Political Transition and the Future of Democracy, Enugu: fourth Dimension Pub. Coy. Hobbes, T. (1955), ~eviathan,Oxford: Basil Blackweh Press. Independent National Electoral Commission's Diary 2001 National Electoral Commission's 1993 Diary. New watch Magazine, (1992) The News watch, Monday, October 19. New watch Magazine, (1992) The News watch, Wednesday, December 21. New watch Magazine, (1993) The New watch, Friday, March 29. New watch Magazine, (1993) The New watch. Saturday, June 28. New watch Magazine, (1993) The New watch. Monday, July 5 New watch The New watch, March 28, 2005. New Nigeria Newspaper, The New Nigerian Newspaper, August 21. (1979) Ndujihe, (2003) The Guardian", Thursday May 15'" Lagos: Guardian Newspaper Ltd. Nwankwo, A. 91993), Nigeria: The Political Transition and the Future of Democracy, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Pub. Coy. Nwolisa, 0. (1983), "Theory and Practice of Democratic Elections: A Critique of the' Nigerian Experience in Democracy and National Development: 1993 and Beyond proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Nigeria political Science Assodiation held at the University of Nigeria Nsukka, June 1-4,1983". Observer Newspaper, (1'983), The Nigerian Observer; Thursday, August I I. Observer Newspaper, (1983), The Nigerian Observer, Observer, Saturday, August 13 Ojiakor, J. (1983), "How Shagari was Confirmed President, the Legal Decisions of the Meaning of 12~'~of 19 States in Nigeria" Lagos: Tolkin Nig. Co. Okocha C., (2003) "This Day Newspaper", Tuesday February 18 Abuja: Leaders and company Ltd. Okafor, S. (1981), Indirect Rule, the Development of Central Legislature in Nigeria, Hong Kong: Thomas Mdson Publisher Ltd. Omoruyi, 0. (1999), The Tale of June 12,1993. The betrayal of the Democratic Rights of Nigerian'syJ.Lagos: Wordsmit hes Printing and Packaging Ltd. Onwukike, U. (1997), Democracy in Nigeria its Anthropological and social Requirements, Berkin: Peter Lang Ltd. Oyediran, 0. (1981), " The Road to the 1979 Elections" in Oyediran, 0. ed The Nigerian 1979 Elections, Lagos: Macmillan Nigeria. Price, L. (1957), The Eastern Region of Nigeria, March 1975 in Machinzee et a1 1960, Five Elections in Africa, Oxford: Press. Report of the Transition Monitoring Group, May, 2002. Report of the Political Bureau March 1987 Reproduced by MAMER, Abuja. Time International, Monday; April 11, 1983. Ujo, A. (1996), Political parties and Electoral Competition in Kaduna state During the Second Republic Kaduna: Pasmark International Coy. Ume C. (2003), . "This Day Newspaper", Tuesday April 1 Abuja: Leaders and company Ltd. 1 Whititaker; P. "(1960), The Western Region of Nigeria, May 1956" in Nwolisa o, Ibid. Dahi, R. (1971). Policyachy: Participation and Opposition, Yale, University Press, New Haven. 2'7'7 Ekwonusi, S. (2003). Real losers in Nigeria's Democracy" in This Day, April, 29"', P. 16. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperitv, New ~orkifree press. Ifionu, Okey (2004). "Democracy Paradoxes" in This Day. May ~7'~ Komiafe, Kayode (2003). "So, what is the content of this victory?"., This Day, 3oth April. Kukah, M.H. (1999). Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria, Spectrum Books, Ibadan. Machenzie, W.J.M. (1967). Free Elections, Gorge Allen and Unwin, London. Nwachukwu, Orji (2003). Civil Society and Democracy: reflections on I the Role of Civil Society in Post Authoritarian Nigeria,; Paper at NPSA Conference, ABU, Zaria, 13Ih - 15Ih January. Olaleye, A.O. (2203). Democracy, Succession and Electoral Violence: the Situation in Southwestern Nigeria". Paper at NPSA Conference, ABU, Zaria, loth- 15th January. Olukoshi, Bayo (1997). "Association al life in Diamond, Larry et al. (ed). Transition without End, Vantae Publishers, Ibadan. Osaghae, E. (19940. Ethnicity and its Manaaement in Africa: The Democratization Link, CASS Occasional Monograph, No. 2, Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos, Nigeria. Pinckney, R. (19930. Democracy in the third world, Open University Press, 2.78 Buckingham, Great Britain. I Salifu. D.O. (2002). "Institutional rigging, causes, mode and effects1'.Paper presented to the Benue State Government on Behalf of Benue State INEC, Makurdi. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracv, Allen and Unwin, Schumpeter, J. (1952). London. Seligman, A.B. (1992). The idea of Civil Society, Princeton University Press. Zabadi, IS. (2003). "Electoral Malpractice and the threat to Nigeria's Unity: the imperative of Equitable Democratic Practices". Paper presented at the NPSA Conferences at ABU, Zaria; 13'~- 15th January. Bello. M.L. (2003) "Democratic Succession and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal" A paper presented at the 22" Annual National Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA). Held at the Kongo Conference Hotel. A.B.U. Zaria. l3Ih - 25'h January, 2003. Diamond, Larry (2002) Free and Fair? The Administration and conduct of the 1998 Nigerian Elections" in Akinsanya. A Adeoye and Idang, J Gordon (eds.) Nigerian Government and Politics 12979-1983) Calabar: Wusen Publishers. Nzongola - Ntalaja. Georges "The Democracy Project in Africa: The Journey so far" in (2001) the Nigeria Social Scientist (A Publication of Social science Academy of Nigeria (SSAN) V01.4 No.1 March 200 1. Olaleye. 0. Adedayo (2003) Democracy. Succession and Electoral Violence: the situation in South- Western Nigeria1'A paper presented at % 7 0 the 22" Annual National Conference of the NPSA. Sha, Dung Pm (2003). "When will democracy End? Interrogation the Relationship Between the 2003 Elections and Democratization in ~i~e;ia"A paper presented at the 41h Annual Conference of Fulbright Alumni association of Nigeria (FAAN), held a: the National institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS). Kuru. Jos. 3othNovember to 3rdDecember 2003. The Niuerian Social Scientist (2003) Vol. 6 No. 1 March. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Niqeria. Ujo. A. Abdulhameed (2003a) Electoral Violence in Nigeria: problems and prospect1'A paper presented at the 22" Annual National Conference of the NPSA. Ujo. A. Abuihameed (2003a) "H~w~incumbencyfactor and Election Finance Made Nonsense of 2003 Elections" in the Daily Trust. Tuesday. December 9.2003. Admu, and Ogunsnwo: Nigeria: the making of the presidential system - 1979 (1982) General Elections. Kano Triumph Publishing Company Limited. Adedeji, A. (1991). Educational Policy for Socio-Economic Development in Africa: the challenges of the 1990s. United Nations: Economic Commission for Africa. Ake, C.(1992) "~e-tiinkingAfrican Democracy1'in Policy Analysis. Accra: Institute of Economic Akindele and Ajila (1992) Democratic Transition in Africa: A Psychological Perspective in B' Caron et al (eds) Proceedings of the symposium on Democratic Transition in Africa. lbadan June 16-19. Appadorai, A. (I975) The Substance of Politics (Eleventh Edition). Madras: Oxford University Press. 3.80 I Awofeso S. (1992) 'Africa' s long Odds' African Concord Magazine January 13 page 34. Awoniyi, T.A. and Ala A Handbook of Research Methods. Lagos: Okanlawon Adeyemi, F.0.(1990) Publisher Limited. Bangura, Y. (1991) Auth;oritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa: A theoretical Discourse UN Research Institute for Social Development Discussion Paper No. 18. Berelson, B. (1952) Content Analysis in Communication Research, Glecoe. The Free Press. Bergnes, G. (1991) "Cuba's Dead End". Journal of Democracy Summer. Blue Way G.K. (1992) "Democracy at bay: The Frustrations of African Liberals" in Caron et. Al (eds) Democratic Transition in Africa. Ibadan: Intec. Printers Ltd. Chapter J. (1999) A post election Assessment interview with the Media at the end of the Presidential Election of February 1999. Cartwright, D.P. (1953) "Analysis if Qualitative Material "In Festinger, L. and Ktz, D. (eds) Research Methods in the Behavioural Sciences". New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Chazzan, N (1987) African voters at the Polls: A re-examination of the role of elections in Africans in African Polities. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics Vol. 17 No. I. Easton, D. (1965) A frame work for political analysis Eagle wood Cliff NC, Prentice-Hall. Ekeh, P.P (1989) Nigeria's Emergent Political Culture in Ekeh et a1 (eds Nigeria since Independence. The first 25 years. Volume V Politics and Constitution. Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd. Jinadu, A. (1990) The National Electoral Commission, Elections and the 28 I ~ran'sitionProgramme in Jinadu and Edoh (eds). Elections in Nigeria Vol. 1 Case Studies. NEC Publication No. 4. Joseph, R.A. (1991) - Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria London: (Oxford University Press). Kukah, M.H. (1999) Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Kurfi, A. (1983) The Nigerian General Elections 1959 and 1979 And their'Aftermath: Ibadan: Mcmillan Nigeria. Labovitz, S. and Introduction to Social Research 2"ded. New York: Hagedorn, R. (1976) McGraw Hill. Lazorfied, P. and Barton, A.H. "Qualilative Measurement in the Social Sciences: In (1951) Lerner, D. and Lasswell, HID. (eds.) The Policy Sciences. "Stanford: Stanford University, Press. Momoh, A. (1992) "The Philosophical and Ideological Foundation of The Transition to Civil Rule in Niger1'in Canon et. a1 (eds) Democratic Transition in Africa Ibadan: lntec Printers Limited. Nnoli 0. (1990) "The 1987 Local Government Elections in the Eastern Zone: in Jinadu and Edoh (eds) Elections in Nigeria Vol. 1 Case Studies. NEC Publication No. 4. Nwabueze, B.O. (1994) Nigeria 93. The Political Crisis and Solutions (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited). Nwana, O.C. (1992) Introduction to Educational Research Ibadan: Heinemann Education Books. Nyerere, J. (1966) Democracy and the Party System in Freedom And Unity: A selection of Writings and Speeches (1952 - 65) (Dar es Salam etc.) Oxford University Press. Ojo, A. (1985) "Constitutions and Constitutional Changes since lndependence in Atanda J.A. and A.Y. Aliyu (eds) Proceedings of the National Conference of Nigeria since lndependence Zaria, March 1983 Vol. 1. Omoruyi, 0. (1999) The Tale of June 12. The Betrayal of the Democratic Rights of Nigeria 1993 London: Press Alliance Network Limited. Oronsaye, A. (1996) "The System's Appraoch" Lecture notes on lnter- Governmental Relations, MPA Department of Political Science, University of Benin. Oyediran, 0. (19890 "The 1983 Elections" in Ekeh et al (eds) Nigeria since 2x3. lnd&endence. The first 25 years. Vol. V. Politics and Constitution, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Limited. Sada, P. (1990) "Thedilemma of National Election as a political choice in Nigeria: A geographical dimension" in Tony Edoh (ed) Nigeria Journal of Electoral and Political Behaviour Vol. No. 1. September. A National Electoral Commission Publication No.8. Unesco-Unicef (1990) Special BREDA-STAT: Towards Education for ahin Africa. Unesco Regional Office for Education in Africa (B&DA), Senegal and Unisef West and Central Africa Regiotal Office (WCARO), Abidjan. Gabua, 0. P. (2003) An Introduction To Political Theory, New Delhi: Macmillian Press Maduabuchi Dukar Godfatherism in Nigerian Politcs (2003) Lagos: Essence International Journal Okolie, A. M. (2004) Political Behaviour, Enugu: Academy Press I Olowu, Dele et al (1999) Governance and Democratization In Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Thomas, Frank (1990) The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, New York: Oxford University Press. The Constitution of the Federal Rebublic of Nigeria (1999) Electoral Act 2002 Daily Champion (2003) Thursday, May 1,2003 P.2 This Day (2003 ) Wednesday, April 30,2003 P.2 Ejiofor, Lambert U. Nigerih Ideology, (2000) Abakaliki: WAP Obijiofor, J. 0. Philosophy, Democracy and Responsible (eds)(2003) , Governance in Africa, Enugu: Delta Boo