U.S.-ROK Military Exercises: Provocation Or Possibility?

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Perspective & Analysis Focus Asia March 2018 U.S.-ROK Military Exercises: Provocation or Possibility? Joint military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea have been a longstanding component of the two countries’ defense alliance. Though they are important for maintaining a deterrence, among a host of military, political, and diplo- matic objectives, they are nonetheless viewed as a provoca- tion by North Korea. This essay by Major General (ret.) Mats Engman, puts the military exercises into perspective and, in the emerging context of dialogue and reduction of tensions, suggests how they can be adjusted to support the positive momentum, without jeopardizing their key objectives. ince the end of the Korean War the security di- 1976, the U.S. and ROK have been focused on con- mension of inter-Korean relations has to a large ducting two major annual exercises – the first being extent been driven by nuclear deterrence and “Foal Eagle”, and the other being “Ulchi Freedom Sthe development of their respective military capabili- Guardian-UFG”, which was renamed “UFG” from ties. In more recent times, the two Koreas have been “Ulchi Focus Lens” in 2007. The same year, another increasing their military capabilities in an asymmetric exercise called “RSO&I” (Reception, Stage, Onward way. While the Republic of Korea (ROK) has sought movement and Integration) was renamed “KR” (Key to develop its conventional weapons and bolster its al- Resolve), and since 2002, RSO&I/KR have been con- liance with the U.S., North Korea has put more focus ducted in combination with Foal Eagle. Foal Eagle/ on developing its non-conventional weapons. Key Resolve normally takes place in early spring and Ulchi Freedom Guardian in early autumn. Both ex- For South Korea, the defence alliance with the U.S. – ercises are designed to meet their stated purposes of based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defence Treaty signed enhancing readiness, defending against possible North in 1953 – is a central part of its defence policy. In turn, Korean aggression, protecting the region, and main- conducting combined and joint military exercises is an taining stability on the Korean Peninsula. integral component of the defence treaty. Accordingly, the large-scale exercises have been, and continue to be, necessary to achieve the intended conventional deter- rent and capability. Major General (ret.) Mats Engman is a Distinguished Over the years, several different types of large-scale Military Fellow at ISDP. military exercises have been conducted. But, since Institute for Security & Development Policy 2 – March 2018 Foal Eagle is a combined field-training exercise that The Institute for Security and Development generally lasts up to two months. Currently one of the Policy is an independent, non-partisan largest military exercises in the world, it involves sev- research and policy organization based eral hundred thousand soldiers and civilian personnel. in Stockholm dedicated to expanding It is also a very complex exercise encompassing dif- understanding of international affairs. For ferent types of smaller exercises in the air, at sea, and over a decade, ISDP has through its Korea on land. Key Resolve is a computer-simulated com- Project provided a platform for discussion mand post exercise which employs modern simulation and debate between Northeast Asia experts technology to train staffs at various levels using various focused on security issues on the Korean scenarios and simulated events. Peninsula. As such, it is committed to sharing different perspectives on important issues so Ulchi Freedom Guardian is also a computer-assisted as to enable constructive debate. command post exercise and is arguably the largest computer-assisted simulation exercise in the world. For enquiries, please contact: [email protected] All services – the army, navy, air force and the marine corps – are engaged in the exercise as well as civilian No parts of this paper may be reproduced elements. without ISDP’s permission. Over time, the exercises have naturally developed both Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this in scope and in nature. The last decade has seen a more paper are those of the authors only and do not deliberate use of computer-assisted and simulated ex- necessarily reflect those of ISDP or its sponsors. ercises. One reason for this, is that it is a cost-effec- tive way of training, but it also somewhat reduces the negative perceptions among neighbouring countries of the “provocative” nature of the exercises. A more de- eral months of preparation. liberate focus on aspects of crisis management and the role of the United Nations Command, have also been The military drills, led by the ROK-U.S. alliance, are evident in the exercises during recent years. also joined by other nations, namely the 16 countries that participated in the Korean War under the UN The majority of soldiers and civilians participating in Command (UNC) established in 1950. The Multi Na- the exercises are from South Korea. Before 2009, most tional Coordination Centre (MNCC) was created in of the U.S. soldiers permanently deployed in South 2009 to facilitate and provide a meaningful platform Korea were mobilized during Foal Eagle/Key Resolve. for the UNC Sending States to the drills. One aim However, since 2010, they have also been mobilized of the UNC Sending States’ participation in the exer- during the Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercise. For both cises is to train for possible deployment of reinforce- exercises, the U.S. normally brings in re-enforcements, ments to the peninsula and to train for the evacuation which may vary in number. For instance, a sharp in- of their civilians living in South Korea. In this regard, crease was noticeable for Foal Eagle/Key Resolve, from participating nations can send civilians, observers, as 12,300 in 2015 to 31,600 in 2017. well as military personnel. The variation in the number of soldiers participating As the deputy director of the MNCC in 2014, Colo- in the military exercises can be explained by several nel Chris Austin, stated: “In recent years, the Sending different factors. Most likely, it is the result of different States have moved from observers and small contri- exercise objectives, modernization of capabilities and butions to a larger role.” Increased international par- systems, and new units participating in the exercises. It ticipation has been most visible during the Ulchi Free- may also be a reflection on the security situation at any dom Guardian exercise, which saw the involvement given time, though this is less likely to be the case as of as many as ten Sending States in 2014. By com- participating in these exercises normally requires sev- parison, Foal Eagle/Key Resolve brought together six The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu U.S.-ROK Military Exercises: Provocation or Possibility? sending states in 2016 and 2017. Among the Sending even conducts missile tests in conjunction with the ex- State nations, Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Unit- ercises, and engages in belligerent rhetoric threatening ed Kingdom, France, Norway, and New Zealand have dire consequences should the military drills go ahead. actively taken part several times, while Thailand, Italy, the Netherlands, as well as the Philippines have only The DPRK is not the only country reacting angrily participated once or twice. to the U.S.-ROK alliance exercises. China also criti- cizes the exercises as “provocations seen as a menace These exercises, as well as the increasing participation to the stability of the region.” In part as a response to of other nations, are an opportunity for the U.S-ROK the drills, Russia and China have conducted their own alliance to display a unified front to defend and sup- military drills. In December 2017, China conducted port the ROK. Committed to this aim, the U.S. is also an exercise at the same time as the U.S. was deploy- eager to bring in its strongest ally in the region, Japan. ing additional capabilities to the peninsula as part of Unable to take part in the drills under the banner of exercise “Vigilant Ace” – another U.S.-ROK alliance the UNC Sending States, the U.S. proposed a trilateral air defence exercise. China is thus displaying a will- military exercise on the Korean Peninsula involving ingness to maintain some balance of power through the ROK, the U.S., and Japan. Accordingly, in 2016, these “counter-drills.” Russia also joined the Chinese they held their first trilateral anti-missile drill. How- initiative in September 2017, conducting the first bi- ever, tensions in ROK-Japan relations also pose limits, lateral military drill in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of as evidenced in November 2017 when Seoul opposed Okhotsk with China. Japan’s participation in a navy exercise. Since 2010, with the approval of the “expanded tasks” Traditionally the large-scale exercises have generated which has seen it play an augmented role, the Neutral high tensions on the Korean Peninsula. While the U.S. Nations Supervisory Commission or NNSC (consist- and ROK present them as routine military exercises, ing of Swedish and Swiss observers) is invited to ob- purely defensive in nature and unrelated to current serve the U.S.-ROK exercises, and is tasked with pro- events occurring on the peninsula, the Democratic viding an independent, albeit confidential, report on People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) typically de- the character of the exercises to the Commander of nounces them as offensive and preparation for a dis- the UNC. guised attack on the DPRK. The DPRK sometimes The Institute for Security and Development Policy – www.isdp.eu 4 – March 2018 Key Objectives hardly overstated in case of a serious crisis. General Sir Rupert Smith writes in his book, The As any large-scale military confrontation on the Ko- Utility of Force, that one thing that unites all mili- rean Peninsula would require the massive coordina- tary forces in the world is that “they kill and de- tion and cooperation between the military and civil stroy.” One could also argue that another activity society, this is another important area for training that all military forces have in common is that they and exercises.
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