Interpretation A JOURNAL J_OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Winter 1998 Volume 26 Number 2

149 Jules Gleicher Moses Politikos

183 Tucker Landy The Limitations of Political Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Charmides

201 Jason A. Tipton Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny: A Commentary on Plato's Hipparchus

217 Larry Peterman Changing Titles: Some Suggestions about the "Prince" Use of in Machiavelli and Others

239 Catherine H. Zuckert Leadership Natural and Conventional in Melville's "Benito Cereno"

257 Jon Fennell Harry Neumann and the Political Piety of Rorty's Postmodernism

Book Reviews

275 George Anastaplo Aristotle's "Physics": A Guided Study, by Joe Sachs

285 Michael P. Zuckert Shakespeare and the Good Life, by David Lowenthal

295 Joan Stambaugh Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, by Rudiger Safranski

299 Patrick Coby Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau and the Ethics of Politics, by Ruth Grant

305 Susan Orr Leo Strauss and the American Right, by Shadia Drury

309 Will Morrisey Public Morality and Liberal Society: Essays on Decency, Law, and Pornography, by Harry M. Clor Interpretation

Editor-in-Chief Hilail Gildin, Dept. of Philosophy, Queens College Executive Editor Leonard Grey General Editors Seth G. Benardete Charles E. Butterworth Hilail Gildin Robert Horwitz (d. 1987) Howard B. White (d. 1974) Consulting Editors Christopher Bruell Joseph Cropsey Ernest L. Fortin John Hallowell (d. 1992) Harry V. Jaffa David Lowenthal Muhsin Mahdi Harvey C. Mansfield Arnaldo Momigliano (d. 1987) Michael Oakeshott (d. 1990) Ellis Sandoz Leo Strauss (d. 1973) Kenneth W. Thompson International Editors Terence E. Marshall Heinrich Meier Editors Wayne Ambler Maurice Auerbach Fred Baumann Amy Bonnette Patrick Coby Elizabeth C de Baca Eastman Thomas S. Engeman Edward J. Erler Maureen Feder-Marcus Pamela K. Jensen Ken Masugi Will Morrisey Susan Orr Charles T. Rubin Leslie G. Rubin Susan Meld Shell Bradford P. Wilson Michael P. Zuckert Catherine H. Zuckert Manuscript Editor Lucia B. Prochnow

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Jason A. Tipton Tulane University

INTRODUCTION

Tyranny is something political philosophy should always keep within its realm of inquiry: it should seek to understand the conditions under which tyr

it.1 anny emerges so as to recognize it when confronted with Political philoso phy must turn its attention to tyranny if it is concerned with examining and preserving the conditions under which philosophy thrives. The Socratic philoso phers displayed this concern, not only by inquiring into the nature of tyranny, but also by engaging tyrants and potential tyrants (Alcibiades, Dionysius, Cri tias, Alexander), often risking their own safety to do so. Plato's Hipparchus; or, The Lover of Gain is initially striking in that it is named not only for someone who is not present, but for a long-dead Athenian tyrant. In the Hipparchus, Socrates discusses the love of gain (philokerdes) with

nameless.2 a Comrade who remains In general, the dialogues get their names either from their subject matter (Republic, Laws) or from someone present (Charmides, Alcibiades I, Critias); given this fact, the namelessness of the Comrade only draws attention to the person for whom the dialogue is named. The argument concerning the love of gain unfolds in two phases interrupted by a digression concerning the Athenian tyrant Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus. The introduction of Hipparchus into the conversation is, for some readers, quite

unexpected and unnerving. Lamb finds the connection between the content of

the conversation and the digression strained at best:

After proving that gain is not made from worthless things, and that it is not the same as good, Socrates gives an account of the wise and beneficent rule of Hipparchus in Athens and of the cause of the conspiracy which brought about his death. This digression, although it gives its name to the whole dialogue, is connected with the conversation by but one flimsy thread one of the maxims

These thoughts on the Hipparchus owe much to my teacher Ronna Burger. While my indebted ness to her is hard to measure, her influence permeates the entire work. I also wish to thank her for reviewing the manuscript and making many helpful suggestions. I would also like to acknowledge my gratitude to Steven Berg, with whom I have had many delightful conversations on this dialogue and other related topics.

interpretation, Winter 1999, Vol. 26, No. 2 202 Interpretation

which Hipparchus inscribed by the roadside for the edification of the people: this friend' maxim 'Deceive not a has a bearing, not on any subject of the debate, friend.5 but only on a momentary difference between Socrates and his

While we should not dismiss this sober observation too quickly, I believe it is not only fruitful but necessary to attempt to incorporate the digression into an interpretation of the dialogue as a whole in order to understand how the discus sion of the Athenian tyrant contributes to the task of understanding love of gain. The dialogue would certainly fail to live up to the standard Socrates holds up for an artfully constructed written work as an organic whole (cf. Phaedrus 264b, 275d) if it had no more unity than what Lamb allows in his introduction dialogue.4 to the The question then becomes, What does the tyrant Hipparchus wish to gain? The story of Hipparchus, in one version or another, would have been famil iar to Athenians during Plato's life. The assassination of Hipparchus by Harmo- dius and Aristogeiton was generally held to be the founding moment of the Athenian triumph of democracy over tyranny (cf. Aristotle, Politics 1311a37; Plato, Symposium 182c). Thucydides introduces the story at the very beginning of his history, however, as an example of the way in which traditions have been passed down without any critical reflection (Thucydides 1.20). He returns to the story later to recount the events leading up to the assassination of Hipparchus in order to demonstrate that "the Athenians are no more accurate than the rest of the world in their accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of their own history" 6.54).5 (Thucydides To use a Platonic image, Thucydides observes that few people are willing or able to question the opinions of the cave in which they live. Aristotle discusses Hipparchus and the events surrounding his assassination in the Politics in the context of his discussion of the causes of revolution and ways of preserving particular regimes (1311a35). In the Athenian Constitution, Hipparchus is said by Aristotle to be "fond of child's play (paidiodes), an erotic (philomousos)" (erotikos) and a lover of the muses (Athenian Constitution XVIII). This description is very similar to the picture that emerges in Plato's Hipparchus, and it would not be surprising if Aristotle were in fact referring to dialogue.6 the Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle all give varying accounts of Hip parchus' demise: Plato seems to be carrying on a dialogue with Thucydides, and Aristotle appears to be some in dialogue with both about the tyrant's psy chological makeup and the passions that work to overthrow tyranny.

Thucydides provides an important clue to the significance of the legend of

Hipparchus when he introduces it in the context of a discussion about Alci biades. The Athenians recognized Alcibiades, perhaps more than anyone, as a potential Socrates' tyrant. One might wonder whether association with Alci as biades, Plato represents it in numerous dialogues, was an attempt to moder ate and tame him. Likewise, one might suppose that Plato's journeys to Sicily, Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny 203 which we learn about in the Seventh Letter ascribed to Plato, were an attempt to transform the young Dionysius into a philosopher-king and realize his republic. From such anecdotal evidence, it appears as if Socratic philosophers have a particular, perhaps practical, interest in reforming tyrants. The Hipparchus rep resents Socrates doing something like this in his account of Hipparchus, if only in speech. The direction of this transformation in speech is indicated by the Socrates' most striking way in which account differs from that of Thucydides and of Aristotle in the Politics: there is no mention in either of these of Hip parchus being an educator of youth. The first phase of the conversation in the Hipparchus culminates with an

exchange of accusations of deception between Socrates and the unnamed Com

rade. It is this exchange which introduces the discussion about Hipparchus.

Hipparchus is presented as a teacher whose education projects involve three

stages that seem to evolve one from the other. The first stage involves the

poetic education of the citizens, while the second stage involves the poetic education of the country folk which is described as a means of attracting them to the city. The poetry of the second stage is Hipparchus', while that of the first is produced by Homer, Simonides and Anacreon. The third stage involves the Hipparchus' education of an unnamed youth; it is this act that leads to mur

Socrates' der a fact that can't help but evoke comparisons with execution. The first two programs, directed to the citizens and the country folk, employ poetry as a means for an education distinctively political in nature, in contrast to the private association with the unnamed youth. These first two stages, which involve the citizens generally and those outside the walls of the city, are initi Socrates' ated by Hipparchus as a political wise man; they lend support to initial characterization of Hipparchus as a wise man (228b 1). To engage in the

third stage, his private education of the youth, it is not clear that Hipparchus must be a wise man in the same sense; perhaps being a seeker of wisdom would be enough.7 Hipparchus seems to move beyond thinking himself wise, poetry and the desire for recognition toward some private affection. In adding this stage to his account, Socrates, however playfully, seems to have painted a pic Socrates' ture of the legendary tyrant which makes him mirror, in some form, own situation.

The second phase of the argument about love of gain attempts to continue where the conversation had been going prior to the digression. As the aporetic ending approaches, there emerges the suspicion that the loss of the Comrade's initial low opinion regarding love of gain might be a gain, a possibility not accounted for in the speeches defining profit or gain; in this way the deeds or action of the dialogue would correct or augment the speeches. But why would Socrates be interested in disabusing the Comrade of his low opinion regarding the love of gain? One possible explanation is suggested by the features in the Comrade's heated condemnation of the lover of gain which could be equally

applied to the philosopher. The Comrade identifies the lovers of gain as "those 204 Interpretation

(hupe- who, out of an emptiness (aplestia), are always striving preternaturally

gain"(226d7-el).s phuos) for insignificant things of little or no worth in loving Socrates' To the nonphilosopher it might look as if tireless pursuit of a wisdom he never seems to achieve (cf. Apology 20e) is the act of a madman possessed of some preternatural desire for something that continues to elude him; the knowledge of ignorance Socrates has gained might indeed look like an insig nificant thing of little or no worth. The suggestion that the philosopher may be a noble form of the lover of gain, not after money or power but wisdom, is made stronger when Socrates introduces the good into the discussion: "So you call those who love the good,

gain" lovers of (227b 1). If the description of the lover of gain as being driven by some feeling of emptiness (aplestia) or desire is not immediately obvious as a description of the philosopher (unless one identifies eros as such a state; cf. Symposium 203c ff.), the association is certainly strengthened by the suggestion that the lover of gain is really the lover of the good. In discussing the Hip parchus, Alfarabi notes that Socrates "explained the relation of the things useful and gainful in the eyes of the multitude to the things truly useful and gainful, how [tme] gains or the goods are nothing but that knowledge and that desired way of life, and how the practical arts are not adequate for obtaining the

gain."9 gain that is the true

I. LOVE OF GAIN AND PHILOSOPHY

As is characteristic of many of the dialogues or more broadly characteris tic of political philosophy the investigation into what is the love of gain and who are these lovers of gain begins with an opinion: "In my opinion (dok- ousin)," the Comrade explains in answer to the question with which Socrates initiates the discussion, "they are those who think it worthwhile (axiosin) to things" (225a3-4).' make a gain from worthless This definition focuses on the starting point or the material, the worthless material, the lover of gain seeks to turn into profit.

This first definition is quickly revised by the Comrade when Socrates asks whether he would call these lovers of gain fools if he thinks that they don't know worthless- the things are worthless. If they were simply ignorant of the ness of the things with which they hope to make a profit, the Comrade, and the city for that matter, could not condemn and punish such behavior. It is difficult the to justify punishment of a fool; the Comrade calls the lovers of gain rogues

(panourgoi) and evildoers (poneroi). The Comrade seems to be indignant at the of the lovers of daring (tolmao) gain; they know the worthlessness of the thing but still dare to seek gain from it through shamelessness (225b). (On the con nection between daring, tyranny and some of the passions involved, see Repub lic 575a.) The Comrade is the criticizing shameless, daring means by which the Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny 205 lover of gain profits his criticism is a political condemnation insofar as he is

indignant at the profiteer's transgression of certain social or contractual bound aries. The business of the city cannot support shameless profiteers who do not recognize contracts.

The lover of gain is someone who rejects conventional restrictions while

wholeheartedly seeking his own profit. The individual who appears to go as far as possible in this direction is the tyrant (Gorgias 469a ff.). But one who pas sionately pursues his self-interest and in doing so may set himself beyond the law is a description which seems as if it could apply just as much to the indi vidual diametrically opposed to the tyrant the philosopher. Socrates admits at his trial that he would not give up philosophy even if commanded to do so by 29c-30c)." the city (Apology From the Comrade's perspective, love of gain is primarily concerned with love of money; but there seems to be no reason why the term should not be applied to a broader field, which would encompass not just money-making, but also politics and maybe the quest for wisdom. Abstracting from the Comrade's concern with the shamelessness of the prof iteer's wanting to profit from worthless things, Socrates asks whether he means someone like a farmer who plants a worthless plant, raising it and hoping to make a profit from it. While this example may be funny to the reader of the dialogue, it can't help agitating the Comrade. Socrates appears uninterested in the Comrade's indignation at the shameless daring of the profiteer. In this way, Socrates appears shameless. The Comrade responds by suggesting that the lover of gain wants to profit from everything (pantos) (225b9-10) nothing is off limits to the profiteer. It is no longer just the worthless things that are of interest

to the profiteer but everything. If the first definition was concerned with the

material of the profiteer, the Comrade now highlights the means with which the profiteer operates. Presumably it does not matter whether the material with which the profiteer works is worthless or not; in this revised definition, it is the means he utilizes that evoke the Comrade's anger (which may be rooted in jealousy). The Comrade's response draws a strong rebuke from Socrates not to answer (adikemenos)" 1- so aimlessly "as though you had suffered some injustice (225c 5). This seemingly insignificant comment about the Comrade's behaving as if Socrates' he had suffered an injustice is followed almost immediately by refer ence to lawcourts (tas dikas) (225c). The Comrade's indignation would be justi fied, Socrates implies, only if he had suffered injustice at the hands of the lover Anytus' of gain. (Cf. Meno 92b, where Socrates implies the same thing about indignation against the sophists.) The issue of justice, which begins to emerge here, will reappear when Socrates introduces Hippparchus in defense against an accusation by the Comrade (228a8-10). Socrates' With rebuff the conversation starts anew. Socrates gets the Com

rade to agree that the profiteer does know about the worth (axias) of the things

from which he thinks it worth while to make gain. Socrates turns the profiteer 206 Interpretation into a knower of the worth of things; it is clear that he continues to ignore what the Comrade considers to be the shameless actions of the profiteer.

Socrates' The first oath of the dialogue is uttered in response to question about the farmer: "Is there any farmer man (georgon andron), do you know (gignon), who knows (gignori) he plants a worthless plant and thinks to make a it?" gain from (226a3-4). The question affects the Comrade to the point of

I." evoking the oath, "By Zeus not Socrates has phrased the question in such a way as to ensure such a reaction. No doubt the Comrade has on his mind as examples of profiteers something less benign than the farmer. He probably is thinking of businessmen who have broken contracts, con artists who sell to the vulnerable, quacks who prescribe snake oil for every ailment or maybe even those who profess to teach virtue in the city.

These last two examples illustrate an ambiguity in the argument that has already been alluded to: Is the Comrade decrying the means of the profiteer or what he hopes to make a profit on? At this point, there are at least two models: the condemnation is directed at the means or, alternatively, at the material or starting point of the profiteer's actions. In other words, snake oil is worthless to the sick man while the quack continues to peddle it, making it an instance of profiteering defined by the material from which gain is extracted. This is an example that would conform to the Comrade's description of the profiteer as knowing the worthlessness of the thing from which he dares to profit (225b 1- 4). On the other hand, the profiteer can take something which has some intrin sic worth and through shameless means attempt to make some profit. This

Protagoras' seems to be in line with the accusations against the sophists: claim to teach virtue has made him a rich man (Meno 9 Id). Of course it is not so easy to separate the two models; the means the quack employs are themselves less than virtuous, in large part because of the material on which he attempts to profit.

Virtue is something worth while (either in itself or for its consequences), yet the sophists shamelessly use it to make a monetary profit for themselves. They are also condemned for shamelessly manipulating language to win arguments. Both cases seem to be consistent with the model of profiteering stressing the shameless means. Of course, Socrates appears at times to manipulate language shamelessly (cf. Apology 18b, 19b-c); but the resemblance that Socrates shares with the sophists diverges when monetary profit is introduced (Apology 19d; Cf. Sophist 223b). If Socrates is profiting from his discussions about virtue, it is surely a kind of profit of which the Comrade is unaware. This would seem to suggest that there may be two versions of the love of gain, a high and a low.

In addition to the farmer as an example of one who needs to be considered as a lover of gain according to the Comrade's model, Socrates adds the horse trainer, pilot, flute general, player, harper, and bowman. In summing up this section, Socrates asks if "in short, any one of the artisans (demiourgoi) at all, or of the other men with any intelligence (emphronon), think to make a gain with Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny 207

worthless?" tools or with any other equipment whatever that is (226c7-10). Of these examples, the pilot seems to be conspicuous in that it does not fit the formulation used for all the others. The question in the case of the pilot is not

so much one of gain but survival. The pilot's own preservation is at stake in his outfitting of the ship. It is interesting that Socrates does not describe the general in the same terms. One would think that a general might be equally concerned with losing his life in battle if his army has worthless weapons, but of course he can save his life in a way the pilot cannot. The pilot not only runs the risk of not profiting from equipping his ship with worthless supplies but he is the only one who is said to suffer loss (226b5-6) he destroys himself and his ship. By not caring for the ship, he indirectly punishes himself. In his consideration about gain, the pilot cannot abstract from his own preservation his own good

Socrates' is inextricably bound to the ship. exemplification of the lover of gain by the pilot of the ship can't help making us think of the traditional use of this figure as an image for the statesman in the polis (see Republic 488b-489a). This would help prepare for the introduction of the preeminent political man, the tyrant who perhaps can be taught that even his own self-interest depends on satisfying the interests of the citizens. (Cf. Xenophon's Hiero 11.1.5, where Simonides encourages Hiero to look after the common good of his citizens.)

Socrates' In light of conclusion about there not being one lover of gain among humans according to the proposed definition, the Comrade revises it: "But I, Socrates, want to say that the lovers of gain are those who, out of greed (aplestias), are always striving preternaturally (huperphuos) for insignificant

gain" things of little or no worth in loving (226d7-el). This marks a shift in the condemnation from both the means and the material of the lover of gain to the

end of that love. It is the end the profiteer desires that now seems to be the fo

cus of the Comrade's ire. The end or goal of the profiteer's striving is said to be

insignificant or of little worth. The Comrade suggests that the profiteer is an aberration or a departure from the natural. What exactly the Comrade means by

"nature" is not clear, but he seems to think of it as the average. Nature is a

standard in light of which the lover of gain can be said to have excessive desire or longing for what the Comrade considers insignificant. Without much strain, such a description could be applied to Socrates. Surely

Socrates has a desire that seems to far exceed that of his fellow citizens, appear ing almost supernatural at times. The Socratic project aims at knowledge, but as know.'2 we know, Socrates only claims to know that, or what, he does not Knowledge of ignorance or perplexity would certainly appear worthless from

the perspective of one who liked to acquire money, power or honor. After all,

what kind of profit is knowledge of ignorance? In recognizing one's own igno rance one is aware of a certain emptiness. But it is out of a feeling of emptiness (aplestia), according to the Comrade, that the lover of gain loves gain. The lover of gain recognizes his own neediness and that fuels his love of gain. Again, it sounds as if this might apply to Socratic eros (Symposium 203d). 208 Interpretation

The Comrade's observation regarding the greed and desire of the lover of gain seems like an interesting move in the conversation, yet Socrates does not pursue this avenue of inquiry. Perhaps he senses that it comes too close to associating love of gain with philosophy, thus exposing the latter to condemna tion. Socrates needs to change the way the Comrade thinks about the "insignifi

cant" things the profiteer strives after before revealing any connection between the philosopher and the profiteer, if that is indeed what Socrates wishes to do. The shift that has taken place in the argument, from emphasis on the lover of gain's means to his ends, is not really acknowledged by Socrates. He dismisses the Comrade's revised definition by returning to the examples about the farmer, general and horse trainer which had illustrated the argument about the material the lover of gain uses (226a6-e3). These examples already showed, Socrates now claims, that it is impossible for the lover of gain to be ignorant of the

"things." "things" worth of the Are the here the ends that the lover of gain desires or the materials he begins with? Socrates uses this ambiguity to move the argument in a direction that we presume he wants. While apparently dismissing the Comrade's new proposal that the profiteer is someone who longs for insignificant things out of an insatiable desire, Socra tes actually addresses it indirectly. As is evident in the very name, the lover of gain loves gain, which is an end. The Comrade thinks that the end which the profiteer strives after is insignificant, which would make the love of gain Sis yphean or ugly. Socrates attempts to change the way he views that end. Socra tes gets the Comrade to agree that gain is the opposite of loss (226el0-227al). It is not good for anyone to suffer loss. Human beings are harmed by loss and thus it is bad (kakon). Since gain is the opposite of loss, the argument goes, gain is a good. Through this inadequate argument, which seems to abstract from the worth of that which is acquired or lost, the Comrade agrees that the lover of gain is a lover of the good (227b 1-2). This agreement, taken together with the Comrade's earlier statements about the striving of the lover of gain, arouses the suspicion that the philosopher may be one species of profiteer, maybe even the best exemplar of love of gain. Socrates would then be alluding to philoso phy in his attempt to elevate the Comrade's low opinion of the lover of gain. If it is those who love the good that are lovers of gain, then perhaps it is with some irony that Socrates remarks, "at least the profiteers are not madmen, my friend" (227b3). (Cf. Sophist 216d, where the philosopher is said to be some times mistaken for a madman.)

Armed with the connection that has been forged between gain and the good although no real content has been assigned to the good Socrates turns the dis cussion to the Comrade's own experiences. From the acknowledgment that the Comrade all loves good things (227b9-10) and the fact that Socrates loves at least some good things (227c 1-2), the Comrade admits that it looks as if all human beings love good things (cf. Symposium 206a). Such a generalization is possible due to the emptiness of his concept of the good. The Comrade's love for Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny 209

all good things is emphasized by the second oath of the dialogue (227b7). The Comrade is sure that he loves all good things even though he may not know what those good things are precisely.

The argument has now moved from a condemnation of the means or mate rial the lover of gain uses to a condemnation of the end he seeks. In focusing on the material, it appeared as if no one was a lover of gain: no one tries to profit from a thing knowing it is worthless. Yet now, when the end of gain seeking is examined, everyone appears to be a lover of gain. It is the abstraction from either the means or the end and the empty notion of the good that makes the argument wobble back and forth. The Comrade attempts to regroup by introducing the honest (chrestos) man as a standard against which to identify the lover of gain: "The correct view of the lover of gain is that he is one who is serious about, and thinks fit to make gain from, things which the honest men do not dare (tolmosi) to make gain from" (227dl-4). The Comrade replaces nature in favor of the honest as his standard, although the notion of the average may be the root of both standards. The tyrant and philosopher definitely are not average, although they deviate from the average in different ways. The honest man accepts conventional re strictions on what is permitted in seeking gain for oneself. Again the Comrade expresses a concern about the daring of the profiteer. He is daring when com pared to the honest man. Why the Comrade chooses the honest man and not the gentleman (kalos kagathos, cf. 228c) is not clear. What is clear is the re-emer gence of the Comrade's concern with shame as he holds up the honest man as his standard. Socrates continues to ignore the Comrade's moralizing about the profiteer's daring, concentrating instead on the good as the end of gain loving. This is made easier by the Comrade's choice of standards the honest (chres tos) can be rendered useful (chrestos) and connected with the good. The Comrade now suggests that his conception of the connection between

gain and the good might not be adequate; he admits that one can be harmed as a result of wicked gain (227e6). When the conversation began, the Comrade ob viously subscribed to the notion that gain is unequivocally reprehensible be cause it is only acquired by wicked means; wickedness and gain had gone together in the Comrade's mind. It now appears as if the Comrade might accept the idea that gain can be acquired by something other than wicked means. Likewise, losing something bad is potentially a good. Both gain and loss can be independent from good and evil. Instead of pursuing this change in the argu ment, Socrates forces the Comrade to admit that they had previously agreed that gain is always a good and as such is the opposite of loss which had been assumed to be always bad (228al-7). With the Comrade's apparent change in thinking about gain and loss, Socrates accuses him of deception by deliberate contradiction. Along with the concept of justice, deception appears to be a Socrates' recurring theme (226a 1, 229b 1). unwillingness to change what was previously said, together with the accusation directed at his interlocutor, leads 210 Interpretation the Comrade to make a strong counter accusation, made even stronger by the third oath of the dialogue (228a8). The Comrade does not approve of the way in which it appears Socrates has manipulated the arguments based on the Com rade's opinions; it is surely the case that the Comrade's indignation should be directed at his own thinking and not Socrates (cf. Apology 23c-d). We can easily imagine Socrates being playful when accusing the Comrade of deception; we cannot imagine the Comrade being so playful in his counter accusation.

II. DIGRESSIONHIPPARCHUS' THREEFOLD EDUCATION

It is with the exchange of accusations of deception that the person for whom the dialogue is named is introduced. It appears as if we get to a discussion of Hipparchus by accident; but in fact this discussion promises to help answer the "who" question that is part of the double question which initiates the dialogue

(What is the love of gain and who are the lovers of gain?). Who is a lover of gain? We must consider Hipparchus as a possible answer to this question. The tyrant looks as if he might be the pre-eminent lover of gain within the political sphere. If there are at least three spheres in which love of gain may be found the monetary, political and philosophical love of gain may have to be under stood as a neutral term in itself with respect to praise or blame. Socrates responds to the Comrade's accusation of deception by appealing to the counsel of an Athenian tyrant. The way in which Hipparchus is introduced Socrates' (euphemein)," foreshadows reconstruction of the story: "Hush Socra tes says after being accused of deception, "I would not be doing something

man" beautiful, not obeying a good and wise (228b 1-2). Socrates uses a word (euphemein) to denote the pious silence in the presence of a god as he intro duces a tyrant who will challenge the authority of the conventional, Olympian gods (see Forde, p. 25, n. 7). In addition to calling him good and wise, Socrates refers to the tyrant as a fellow citizen (228b4), certainly not the way the Athe nian demos would refer to him. Whether Socrates and Hipparchus are fellow citizens in Athens or in some other community one that would have to en compass tyrants and philosophers is not clear.

The goodness and wisdom of Hipparchus were reflected in his beautiful deeds. These beautiful deeds included: introducing Homer into Athens and compelling the rhapsodes to recite the epics in relays; bringing the lyric poet Anacreon of to Teos the city by means of a fifty-oared ship; keeping Simonides of Ceos around his court. In each case Hipparchus uses compulsion or persua sion to into the city. bring poetry The tyrant does not feel any need to expel the poets from the city, he can bring them under his control. How he compelled the rhapsodes is not made clear. We imagine Anacreon of Teos was persuaded by either the honor or of fear force that accompanied a fifty-oared ship. And of course, Simonides was persuaded by money and gifts. Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny - 211

Socrates tells us why Hipparchus wished to harness the power of poetry: "He did these things wishing to educate the citizens, so that he would rule over people who were the best possible; being a gentleman (kalos te kagathos), he

wisdom" thought no one should be begrudged (228c4-6). Such a doctrine im plies that either he was educating friends and enemies alike or he considered all of the citizens his friends. (Contrast this with Hiero's distrust and fear of the wise, Xenophon, Hiero 5.1.) This poetry education induces those in the city to Hipparchus' marvel (ethaumazon) at wisdom (228dl). Hipparchus, at this point, wishes to turn himself into an object of wonder. Through this enlightenment project, Hipparchus attempts to make others wise so that they may recognize his wisdom. If he desires honor or recognition, it should be satisfied with his education program at this stage.

After establishing the education of those in the city, Hipparchus, according Socrates' to story, turned his attention to educating those in the country. Either

citizens' his desire is not satisfied by the recognition of his wisdom or that recognition makes him desire more. Like an expanding empire, Hipparchus desires to exert his influence over a broader area. Like the townsfolk, those in the country also received a type of poetic education as Hipparchus composed elegiac prose to inscribe (graphe) on Hermae set about the country. Not only is Hipparchus a tyrant who brings in foreign poets, but he is also, apparently, a poet himself. The education of the city dwellers appears to be verbal; presuma bly, on the other hand, Hipparchus has to write in order to reach those who are outside of the city (and, therefore, perhaps out of his control). Of the many wise sayings of Hipparchus, Socrates highlights two in particu

thoughts" lar: "This is a memorial to Hipparchus: Walk thinking (phronon) just friend" (229a4-bl).13 and "This is a memorial to Hipparchus: Don't deceive a Socrates connects this latter saying of Hipparchus with his own defense against the Comrade's accusation that he was being deceived; Socrates would never dare (tolmoen) to deceive the Comrade (229b2). If Socrates were willing to deceive the Comrade, saying he wouldn't dare might be a perfect deception. Hipparchus inscribed his sayings on the Hermae so that the country folk would not marvel at the sayings associated with the god "Know thyself and

overmuch" "Nothing (228el-6). His writings are an alternative to the sayings of

god.14 the In addition, he hoped that in traveling they could read his speeches, getting a taste of his wisdom, and come out of the countryside to complete their education. The country education is a partial education that is not adequate Hipparchus' in itself for the students to be able to marvel in recognition of wis dom; it is meant to lure the country folk into the city. Yet it is only the country Hipparchus' education, through own wise writings, which challenges the god's

authority.

It is not, however, the challenge to the gods implied by the second stage of Hipparchus' his education project which leads to tragic end, but rather a dis honor to two rivals Aristogeiton and Harmodius who are popularly held to 212 Interpretation be the founders of Athenian democracy. As Socrates explains, there are two versions of the fall of Hipparchus. The many suppose that it resulted from a dishonor to the assassin's sister; it is said that she was not allowed to bear the basket in the Panathenaic procession. The more cultivated (chariesteron) people believe a different account of his death. In this account, two strands, an educa tive and an erotic one, come together to precipitate the murder. It is difficult to know which strand was more central to the plot. As we are told, Aristogeiton educated his favorite, Harmodius. Aristogeiton considered himself an educator

thoughts" of humanity (literally he had "big about his educative ability). Thus he considered Hipparchus a rival (antagonisten) educator and held some ani mosity. Harmodius is said to be Aristogeiton's favorite, yet the emphasis in the description of their relationship seems to be on his education. Harmodius, Socrates goes on to explain, happened to be the lover (eronta) of one of the most beautiful and well-bom youths. This is the first and only ex plicit reference to eros in the dialogue. Nothing is said about Harmodius as educator, yet the youth marveled (thaumazein) at the wisdom of both Harmo dius and Aristogeiton. At least, Socrates explains, he marveled at their wisdom until he came to associate (sungenomenon) with Hipparchus, at which point the

them.15 youth turned his mind (kataphronesein) away from Socrates' Harmodius and Aristogeiton, according to account, were so pained by the dishonor in the youth turning away from them that they killed Hip parchus. The version told by the many involved an intentional dishonor on the tyrant's part; according to the more cultivated, there is no intention in the dis honor. The effect on Harmodius and Aristogeiton issuing into their joint deed is an unintended consequence of the relationship between the tyrant and the youth. The founding of the Athenian democracy is an accidental benefit of their dishonor.16 perceived

Hipparchus' How does association with the youth fit into his other education programs and the motivations associated with each? What does Hipparchus hope to gain? He started by educating those in the city out of what looked like a desire to gain recognition. The education of those in the country was an attempt to lure those people into the city to continue their education, by means of a challenge to the gods. In his association with the youth, Hipparchus enters into a private and personal relationship compared to the political nature of the ear Hipparchus' lier projects. motivation seems to evolve from desire for universal recognition for his wisdom to something else in his relationship with the youth Hipparchus' (cf. Hiero 6.1-3; see n.12). relationship with the youth is appar

erotic.17 ently educative and It leads the young man to denigrate the wisdom of others he previously admired, which arouses the jealousy of those others and results in his own downfall. This is, in fact, what Aristophanes portrays in the Clouds. As improbable as it sounds, in the end Hipparchus looks like Socrates Socrates' and the tyrant in the end of account like the philosopher (Bloom, p. 47). Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny 213

The story of Hipparchus would then be addressing one of the central prob lems of the first part of the dialogue if it offers a suggestion to fill out the empty concept of the good or the end of the love of gain, namely friendship for the sake of a common pursuit of wisdom. If Hipparchus had been satisfied by

citizens' the recognition of his wisdom, if he had achieved what he sought in his attempt to replace the authority of the god, perhaps he would not have been motivated to engage the youth in what looks, as Socrates portrays it, like a philosophical relationship. He would have continued on the path leading toward a universal recognition of his wisdom and would have kept expanding his sphere of influence, hoping to have all the people in the region and then the world recognize his wisdom. But apparently Hipparchus is not satisfied by the political, public recognition of his supposed wisdom. Perhaps he is not satisfied

because he harbors suspicions about his lack of wisdom. It would be the loss of the opinion concerning his own wisdom, in that case, which would initiate the change in motivation leading to the association with the unnamed youth. If recognition is replaced by affection, Hipparchus must also harbor some doubts about the satisfaction associated with recognition and a desire for recognition.

III. GAIN THROUGH LOSS OF OPINION

The Comrade is not convinced by this digression that Socrates is not trying to deceive him. As in a game of draughts, Socrates allows him to change any thing in the argument he wants (229e4-8). This is something that Socrates had not allowed previously. The Comrade chooses to alter the notion that gain is

always good, which had been suggested in the first half of the dialogue (227a 12). But because we have a transcript, so to speak, of the conversation, we notice that the Comrade had attempted to change this element of the argument previously (227el); it was indeed this move that precipitated the exchange of accusations and the story of Hipparchus. The notion that all gain is not good thus brackets the digression concerning Hipparchus. While Socrates had not seriously pursued this line of inquiry before the digression (except indirectly in the content of the digression itself), he now allows provisionally that some gain is good and some bad (230a3).

Socrates asks whether one of them, bad or good gain, is more gain than the other. Socrates must explain what is meant by such a statement; just as good (agathon) food and bad (kakon) food are equally food and similarly decent (chrestos) and evil (poneros) human beings are equally human beings neither evil (poneros) nor decent (chrestos) gain is more gain than the other (230c8- d2). Evil or decent would presumably characterize the source or manner of acquiring the gain, which might still only count as gain if it were good. The original question, then whether good (agathon) and bad (kakon) gain would 214 Interpretation equally be gain has not yet been addressed. The question lurking here is how gain should be defined, if not simply in terms of the good. Socrates attempts to find out what the Comrade sees as the same in both good and bad gain; they search for an idea of gain. Socrates illustrates what he wants by turning to food again: good food and bad food are equally food be cause they are both dry nourishment for the body (230e3-4). The Comrade does not apply this model to gain. Perhaps Socrates is suggesting, though, that gain is nourishment of the soul (cf. Minos 317e ff.). It would seem, then, that different gains are worth more than others and the model of food should be altered. Even if the essential definition of food is dry nourishment of the body, we all know different foods have different nutritional value, not to mention different capacities to produce pleasures. The fact that different kinds of foods have different effects on the body indicates that good food and bad food are not equal in what is gained from them (231b2-ll). Obtaining any possession without regard to the worth of what is secured is not good, while it still might be considered, by some, to be gain (23 lb9). In the beginning, the concern about worth (axion) dealt with the starting point or material with which the profiteer worked (225c3-6). Socrates now observes that the conversation is coming around to the same point made earlier, namely that gain is good. Unlike the earlier point, though, an attempt has now been made to explore what exactly is meant by the good and how it might provide a standard by which to judge gain. In this way the conversation has progressed despite what the Comrade may think. Foreshadowing the apparently inconclusive ending of the dialogue, Socrates tells the Comrade that "not unjustly (adikon) are you bewildered [poor or with (aporon)" "poor" out resources] (231c6). In being in this way, perhaps the Comrade has been enriched. What has been gained from the discussion is per plexity, which might confirm the prejudice in some eyes that lovers of gain strive out of insatiable greed for insignificant things (226d7-8). The Comrade, however, is not persuaded to give up his opinion about the love of gain but rather compelled (232b3-4). As readers, on the other hand, we may have come to understand that the love of gain is a neutral term, and the end being sought has to be analyzed before automatically condemning the lover of gain. The loss of an unthinking opinion regarding the love of gain might well be a great gain, whether or not the Comrade considers it such.

NOTES

1. See Leo Strauss, On Tyranny; Including the Strauss-Kojeve Correspondence, Victor Goure vitch and Michael S. Roth, eds. (New York: The Free Press 1991). 2. The Minos; or, On The Law is the other only Platonic dialogue named for a legendary figure of the past to whom reference is made in the discourse. It is interesting to note that both Minos and Hipparchus are, in a sense, enemies of see Leo Minos," Athens; Strauss, "On the in The Roots of Love of Gain, Philosophy and Tyranny -215

Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues, Thomas Pangle, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell Uni versity Press, 1987). Strauss's very brief comments on the connection between the Minos and the Hipparchus (pp. 78-79) are powerful and suggestive. The word philokerdes is restricted to the Hipparchus and Book IX of the Republic where the tyrant is being contrasted with the philosopher; philokerdeia occurs one time in the Laws (649d5) in the context of a discussion about shamelessness and daring. The Hipparchus is one of the smaller dialogues of Plato, and its peculiarities have led many scholars to doubt its authenticity. For a nice discussion of the debates surrounding the authenticity of many of the Platonic dialogues see Thomas Pangle's introduction to The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues. See also W. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philos ophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), vol. 4, p. 41, and A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (New York: Dial Press, 1927), p. 534. My aim is not to enter this debate on the status of the Hipparchus but to use the dialogue as vehicle for thought. The historical question of

"Platonic" whether the dialogue was or was not written by Plato is not at stake here; it is enough to warrant serious consideration philosophically. 3. W. R. M. Lamb, Plato, vol. 12 The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927). 4. In discussing elements of Plato's style, Robert Brumbaugh says that "[the use of digression] is a matter of style that has an air of paradox about it, when the supposed deviation is really the

consideration" Form," central ("Digression and Dialogue: The Seventh Letter and Plato's Literary in Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings, Charles Griswold, Jr., ed. (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 84.

Hipparchus' 5. Thucydides tells the story of assassins, Harmodius and Aristogeton, in the midst of the account of Alcibiades being summoned from the Sicilian expedition to face charges for his supposed role in the defacing of the Hermae and the Mysteries affair (6.54). In the Hipparchus, as Thucydides' we shall see, Socrates deviates considerably from account of the death of Hipparchus. Socrates' The addition of the unnamed youth in reconstruction is perhaps the most striking depar ture. There is no talk of the education of Harmodius in Thucydides; rather, Hipparchus is said to have made several solicitations to Harmodius which enraged the lover Aristogeiton. While Thu cydides claims that the murder of Hipparchus was the result of a love affair, it is finally the Harmodius' dishonor to sister the account of the many according to Socrates that initiates the action that leads to the murder.

6. Aristotle says in the Politics that the attack on the Pisistratids took place for the sake of

Harmodius' revenge and not from a love affair (1311a35), referring, apparently, to the insult to sister. In the Athenian Constitution, Aristotle includes a younger half-brother of Hipparchus who is said to be the source of all their misfortunes (XVIII). The discussion in the Athenian Constitution

Hipparchus' supports Plato's Hipparchus in particular by recognizing efforts to bring the foreign poets Anacreon and Simonides to Athens (being a philomousos) and his suggestion that the ruler is an erotikos. 7. Very little attention has been given to the Hipparchus in the secondary literature with one notable exception. Alan Bloom's "The Political Philosopher in Democratic Society: The Socratic

View" is a very good treatment of the dialogue. Bloom suggests very plausibly that "this tale of Hipparchus is nothing but a description of Socrates, and the intention of telling it is only to explain why Socrates was later put to death. ... I would suggest that as Socrates equals Hipparchus, Anytus equals Harmodius, and Alcibiades equals the nameless youth. Just as Harmodius turned to Aristogeiton, Anytus turns to his educator and lover, the Athenian demos, for aid in revenging Alcibiades" himself on Socrates for stealing away (The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgot ten Socratic Dialogues, p. 47). My treatment of the Hipparchus suggests that the resemblance between Hipparchus and Socrates is the culmination of a sequence of educational efforts which seem to evolve from political to philosophic. In other words, I want to articulate a movement from one sort of education to another, which might be different in kind. This movement ultimately hinges on the motivations of Hipparchus, or what the tyrant wants to gain. I suggest that Hipparchus makes a Socratic-like turn, but from political rule, instead of pre-Socratic science, to philosophy. 216 Interpretation

In the brief description of the first two programs (228a-229b), there are at least nine occur

"wisdom" rences of the word (sophos) or one of its derivatives. In contrast, within the account of Hipparchus' "wisdom" relationship with the unnamed youth, the word occurs only once (229d4) and that is in reference to Harmodius and Aristogeiton. 8. While the ordinary understanding of aplestia involves greediness for money or wealth, it is used by Plato to describe the desire for other ends. Democracy is said to be greedy for freedom; it defines the good as freedom so that "it is the only regime worth living in for anyone who is by free" nature (562b-c). 9. Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, Muhsin Mahdi, trans. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 58-59. 10. Hipparchus; or, The Lover of Gain, Steven Forde, trans., in The Roots of Political Philoso phy: Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues. I have deviated slightly from the Forde translation only when necessary.

1 1 . The lawlessness of the tyrant seems obvious enough. On the possible lawlessness of philos ophy, see Republic 373d ff. 12. Socrates also describes how passionately he desires the acquisition of friends (Lysis 21 le), which might suggest that the pursuit of wisdom and the pursuit of friendship amount to the same thing, or are at least connected. This will be explored further in the analysis of the third stage of

Hipparchus' education. Cf. Theaetetus 150c, Apology 22d. Polemarchus' 13. Bloom (p. 46) suggests, perhaps thinking of definition of justice in the Re Hipparchus' public (332a ff.), that two sayings amount to the same thing, so that "justice is not deceiving friends. To put it otherwise, a man should behave decently toward others not because he has restrained his passions or given up his satisfaction but because they are friends, because his

them." satisfaction comes from benefiting 14. It was believed that Alcibiades had defaced the Hermae in a challenge to authority. See Thucydides (6.27 ff.). 15. This association between the youth and Hipparchus is a very important point of contact to the Minos, especially in what is said there of the Minos-Zeus relationship: Minos is said to be the associate (sunousiastes) of Zeus in his sophistic education. The connection between the two dia logues is indicated by a number of dramatic features: both take place with unnamed Comrades, and both are named after men of old, generally thought to be enemies of Athens. 16. The overthrow of Hipparchus establishing the democracy seems to be another point of contact with the Minos, which seems to question whether the founding of a political regime is the aim of or merely an unintended consequence of a relationship between Minos and Zeus. 17. The word chosen to describe their relationship sungenomenon is suggestive of both the educative (Phaedo 6 Id, Meno 91e, Republic 330c) and erotic (Republic 329c, Laws 930d) strands.