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Canadian Military History

Volume 8 Issue 4 Article 2

1999

The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval Battle for Supremacy on Lake

Robert J. Williamson

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Recommended Citation Williamson, Robert J. "The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval Battle for Supremacy on ." Canadian Military History 8, 4 (1999)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Williamson: The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Nav

The Burlington Races Revisited A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval Battle for Supremacy on Lake Ontario

Robert J. Williamson

'Q:om the safety of the Lake Ontario shore near Macdonough at the . It is ll Burlington. military and civilian observers almost certain that Macdonough found the log of witnessed the jockeying for position of many the Wolfe, awaiting delivery to the Admiralty, in sailing vessels during the afternoon of Tuesday. Downie's personal effects. Before being sent to September 28, 1813. They likened the event to a Washington, the log was viewed and signed by yacht race. Thus, a pivotal naval engagement that Commodore Issac Chauncey, the senior officer would determine the outcome of the ofthe US Navy on the . was facetiously labelled, "The Burlington Races." The facts of this important piece of Canadiana. The Burlington Races occurred just 18 days have, like so many significant historical events. after Commodore Perry's stunning victory on been cloaked by myth and misconception until . Many historians, however, have failed recently. The discovery in the US National to realize that Perry's success was meaningless Archives of the log of the British flagship of the without the necessary sequel on Lake Ontario, Lake Ontario Squadron, HMS Wolfe, has made the key to the Great Lakes. Commodore it possible to interpret this episode in Canadian Chauncey, having been overshadowed by his history more accurately. subordinate's victory, was under pressure to administer the "coup de grace." The British lion The Wolfe's log came to light by accident on Lake Ontario had to be caged in order to bring during research for the Hamilton and Scourge about an end to hostilities in Upper , the project in 19 71. How the log book of the Wolfe principal theatre of the war. This would allow found its way to Washington was, until recently, Major-General Wilkinson to safely tranship his a bit of a mystery. On 7 September 1999, the American army on the to the National Archives in Washington verified that the St. Lawrence River where, according to the United log was received in Washington on 2 December States government's revised strategy for the war, 1814 from Captain Tho. Macdonough of he would co-ordinate with Major-General Plattsburgh, . Therein lies the link with Hampton from Plattsburgh, New York, in a two­ Captain George Downie who, in June 1814, was pronged attack on Montreal. A stranglehold on appointed to command HMS Wolfe or Montreal this choke point, the heart of the Canadian as she had just recently been renamed. The name colonies, would end the war. On the other hand, change would have made the log of the Wolfe, an unchecked under the command dated 8 June- 20 December 1813, redundant. of the feted Commodore Sir James Yeo, roaming As an archival record, it would have been the freely on Lake Ontario, could spell disaster to captain's responsibility to safeguard the log until this new American offensive. Therefore, the event it could have been forwarded to the British that was to be called the Burlington Races would Admiralty. At the end of August, Downie was prove to be a crucial naval engagement and hurriedly ordered to the Isle-aux-Noix shipyard indeed, a turning point in the war. on Lake Champlain to command the newly­ launched HMS Conjiance. On 11 On paper, the American squadron had the September 1814. Downie was killed in action and advantage in numbers, ten vessels to six; and in his squadron surrendered to Captain firepower, a broadside weight-of-metal ratio of

© CanadianMiliiary History, Volume 8, Number 4, Autumn 1999, pp.7-l5. 7

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Commodore Commodore Sir James Yeo NAC C 10926 NACC22895 three to two. They outgunned the British in long are force 5 with wind speed between 17 and 21 range cannon by three to one. The only statistic knots.:; The gale force winds of legend appear to that favoured the Royal Navy was a 20 percent have been only in Chauncey's mind as he surfeit in short range smashers or . searched for excuses to explain his later actions. These statistics are based on a report made by Yeo, havingjust arrived at York that morning, sent Commodore Yeo to Admiral Warren on 29 a boat ashore with dispatches. At 10:00 am the September 1813. 1 In reality, the combatants were enemy squadron bore down on the anchorage. more equal than the figures imply. Six ships of By 10:30, Yeo had recovered his dispatch boat the American squadron were converted merchant and weighed anchor. He headed out into the lake , not fighting ships. They were more to gain "sea room" on a port tack. Since the wind useful as for bombardment than naval was from the ENE, this would have placed him battles. Top heavy and unwieldy in bad weather, on a SSE course towards the . At their sailing characteristics were so divergent that 12:30 pm, he manoeuvred to bring the American Chauncey had great difficulty in keeping his ships squadron within range of his while in formation; so much so that in this action, three at the same time causing the sluggish American of the schooners were tied to mother ships in a formation to become very extended. towing formation. While these vessels added to Consequently, as the two squadrons engaged, it the weight of Chauncey's firepower, they seriously was the two flagships, HMS Wolfe and USS Pike, hampered his speed and manoeuvrability. On the that took the brunt of the action. It should also other hand, the British ships were faster, held be noted that Yeo had manoeuvred the Americans their formation well and could better concentrate into a position where their gunnery solutions were their effort. complicated. They had to engage the enemy with their port side guns while heeled over to port on When the two squadrons met off the port of a starboard tack. Nevertheless, by l :20 pm. the York () on this fateful day, the weather, Wolfe's main and mizzen topmasts were shot described in the log of the Wolfe, was "cloudy away while the Pike had been dangerously holed with fresh breezes of E.N.E. wind."2 According below the water line and had serious damage on to the navy's Beaufort Wind Scale which her forward gun deck when one of her own measures wind force from 0-10, fresh breezes cannons exploded, killing or wounding a large 8 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss4/2 2 Williamson: The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Nav

number of her crew. The damage to the Wo~fe's his recent book, Lords of the Lake. Military logic sails meant a critical loss of manoeuvrability, but dictates that because of battle damage to the the disciplined British formation, led by HMS Wolfe's sails, Yeo could not engage in battle Royal George, intervened and helped extricate manoeuvres and would have to attempt to make their flagship from the close action. In Yeo's report a stand from an anchored position on a friendly of the battle, he wrote, "[When] the main and shore. An examination ofthe ship's log confirms mizzen topmasts of this ship were shot away, by this. It states, "At 4.30 arrived with the squadron which she became unmanageable on the wind, I and came to an anchor off Burlington Bay, close put the squadron before the wind for a small bay in shore with springs on the cables." 5 By at the head of the lake where he [Chauncey] would anchoring his ships on their back springs (a have been under the necessity of engaging on heavy hawser pulled the anchor to the ship's more equal terms. this however he declined ... and stern) the ships could be swung in the wind by on approaching the bay, he hauled off, leaving us releasing the spring hawser, thus presenting a in this state perfectly unmolested to refit the fresh bank of guns to the enemy when necessary. squadron." 4 Yeo would have doubled his firepower by this procedure and negated his loss of Yeo's phrase, "engaging on more equal terms" manoeuvrability by establishing a strong and has never yet been satisfactorily explained by compact defensive unit at anchor. This was a historians. It certainly does not imply that he standard tactic of the period, used by the intended to run away and hide behind a sandbar American squadron successfully against the at the head of the lake, an impression held by British at Plattsburgh in 1814 on Lake many people until Robert Malcomson published Champlain. Fifteen years earlier in 1798, the

Ninety minutes after tile engagement began tile British line, led by HMS Royal George. intervened to llelp extricate their damaged .f1agsl1ip from tile close action witll USS Pike. This painting "Engagement in tile Gale" is by Canadian marine artist Peter Rindlisbacller and tile original is lleld by tile Davies Charitable Foundation.

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Numbered Log Entries of HMS Wolfe

The Burlington From 0 10:40 -formed battle order, cleared for action York f) Noon - enemy on weather quarter, 1Y, miles 6) 12:30 -tacked with squadron in succession, Races commenced action 0 0 1 :20 - Wolfe's main and topmast shot away, 28 September 1813 bore up and stood before the wind 0 2:00 -[Royal George intercedes], wreckage HMS Royal George It cleared, stood towards Head of Lake

HMS Wolfe W 0 ~ a... 0 .... o- ~ ,R ~- .... Eta-. w w R ~e -to 0 Burlington •• Bay 0 • i ~uss Pike W, O ~uss Wind R Madison e R w ~ 4D : N '~~ ~ 4D W~E British Squadron •• 4lllll American Squadron • s From Niagara

French fleet attempted this same strategy at making so much water that it required all our Aboukir Bay in Egypt against the formidable pumps to keep her free, owing to our receiving Admiral Nelson. However, through daring and several shots so far below the water's edge that superb seamanship, Nelson was able to envelop we could not plug the holes from the outside." 7 the French line and destroy their immobile ships Many historians, having accepted the American one by one. But Commodore Chauncey was no claim to victory, have conveniently overlooked the Nelson. Having put the British to flight, he was fact that the Pike was perhaps more badly satisfied to claim a partial victory. He declined damaged than the Wolfe, and probably in danger to take any further risk by being drawn into a of sinking. Furthermore, the weather was situation where he would have to engage the deteriorating and it was not the American policy enemy on more equal terms. It was a decision to fight under such conditions which negated the that would haunt his reputation ever after. accuracy of their long range guns. Chauncey turned away in order to get back to port in the By forming a battle line close into the shore Niagara River as quickly as possible. From there in a constricted area at the head of the lake, Yeo's he was able to make repairs and keep the British, back was protected and the American ships, most who were anchored on the lake. under his of them rather unwieldy, especially those towing observation. If he was unable to defeat the British schooners, would have found manoeuvring in squadron, then his primary objective was to keep such close environs very difficult and dangerous. them away from the American convoys sailing Chauncey made note of this in his report; "I from Niagara carrying the American army to the considered that if I chased the enemy to his St. Lawrence River for the pending attack on anchorage, we should [all] go on shore; he Montreal.~ No one, of course, had any inkling of amongst his friends, we amongst our enemies .. .! what misfortune lay ahead for the Americans at [therefore] relinquished the opportunity of Chrysler's farm and Chateauguay. acquiring individual reputation, at the expense of my country."6 In other words, he rightly It is a Canadian myth that the British perceived the danger. Furthermore, in Chauncey's squadron made a daring escape from Chauncey Report to the Secretary of the Navy, he stated, by sailing through the four-foot shallows of the "At the time I gave up the chase, this ship was Burlington Bay mouth sandbar at the head of

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This dramatic painting. e11tilled "Burlington Races" by Peter Rindlisbacller, portrays the damaged Wolfe approaching the sandbar at the head of Lake Ontario, perpetuating the myth that the British squadron crossed into Burlington Bay to escape their encounter with tile Americans. This painting was commissioned by the Hamill.on - Scourge Foundation.

the lake. This embellished account, full of depiction of the Wolfe running close inshore at swashbuckler "derring-do," first appeared in a Burlington Beach. magazine serial for the Canadian Collier's Weekly in 1913. It was to be part of the Yeo did not have to hide his squadron behind celebrations for the centennial of the War of 1812. the safety of a sandbar to escape an enemy who Local historians in the Hamilton- Burlington area had long since turned away, or to seek shelter embraced the exciting story with pride, even from a non-existent gale. Tucked into the though the author warned in his introduction, Burlington shore on Lake Ontario, he was that imagination had been used to "clothe the perfectly safe, for he knew the capabilities of his dry bones of record with the flesh and blood of enemy. Considering that Yeo arrived in Canada fancy." 9 That fancy has become fact Many writers after a court martial for grounding his last since that time. including myself. have command, it is highly unlikely that he would have perpetuated this account. A provincial historical risked his entire squadron in the shallow channel plaque on Burlington Heights now gives credence entrance to what is now , to this myth. The Hamilton-Scourge Foundation especially when it was unnecessary. But, legends has further popularized the incident with their die hard. 10 beautiful prints of renowned Canadian artist Peter Rindlisbacher's outstanding and dramatic The only way of setting the record straight is to let the eye witnesses whose words were

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York Burlington Races • uadron Movements 28 September 1813 American Squadron

Lake

Ontario

Fort George•

Queenston e o Lewiston

Q: ~ &, The Falls ~ Although the log of HMS Wolfe does not record the speed or distance travelled, it does give time, direction and juxtaposition of ships. Estimating an average speed of 10 mph, the above plan view presents a reasonable depiction of what happened on 28 September 1913. Note that by anchoring at 4:30pm. the British Squadron could not have reached, according to legend, the confines of what is now known as Burlington Bay or Hamilton Harbour.

recorded, tell us what happened. They are the anchored at 4:30 pm, just three hours after watchkeeping officers of the Wolfe who made the putting before the wind off York. The British entries in the ship's Remarks Log. Although their Admiralty charts of 1815 show an anchorage off individual script, with unique characters and long Bronte. Time and distance calculations indicate flourishing down or cross strokes, requires that this anchorage is the logical position reached careful study, their record is legible. The log does by the British squadron. If these calculations are not record speed or distance travelled, but it does correct, then the British could not have reached give date, time, weather, direction of movement the confines of Burlington Bay as the legend and position of ships. To depict the action of 28 states. September 1813 on a map to scale, an estimated speed of the Wolfe is required. To establish this, There is, however, even more compelling the writings of Patrick O'Brian, regarded by many evidence in the log. The squadron came to anchor as the greatest navy historical authority of the off Burlington Bay, not in it. Each day from Napoleonic period, have been consulted. Eleven Tuesday, September 28 to Monday, October 4, knots or 12.7 mph appears to be the top speed while at anchor, the log of the Wolfe records that for a war ship under perfect conditions. 11 the enemy was in sight off Niagara. This However, most marine engineers agree that 7 observation would only have been possible if the knots is a more reasonable speed, considering British anchorage was in Lake Ontario off Bronte. the manoeuvering of the squadron and the Wolfe's On 29 September, HMS Melville and HMS battle damage. The average speed of advance Beresford weighed anchor and were sent to scout would therefore have been about 8.05 mph or out the enemy. On 2 October, at 6:00am the sick 13 kph. The distance from York to the head of and wounded were sent to hospital in York on the lake, over water, is 50 kilometres. It would board the Mary Ann. At 8:00am the entire have taken the Wolfe at least four hours to reach squadron weighed anchor and made sail towards the bay at the head of the lake. However, she 4 Mile Creek Uust east of the Niagara River). Late 12 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss4/2 6 Williamson: The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Nav

that afternoon near 12 Mile Creek (St. Catharines), a boat came off shore with Colonel Harvey to communicate with the Commodore. The next morning, Sunday, October 3, the squadron returned to their anchorage at the head of the lake. 12 During all these activities the log does not make any reference to crossing or re-crossing the sand bar into Burlington Bay. Such freedom of movement could only have been possible if the squadron was anchored on the lake. A provincial plaque on Burlington Heights erroneously gives credence The legend also claims to the myth that during the battle, the British squadron ran away that the Canadian pilot of the and hid in Burlington Bay. Wolfe, James Richardson Jr., was awarded a greatest damage was done to his reputation. pension for his part in guiding the ship over the During this engagement when he appeared to sandbar. Richardson wrote his memoirs after the have attained the upper hand, he proved wary war. While there is extensive coverage of his life and excessively cautious, not making the best use on Lake Ontario, and in particular, the Battle of of his force. In 1814 he became even less effective. Oswego where he lost his arm, there is no Throughout the war, he failed, except for brief mention of any heroic passage over the sandbar periods, to establish a naval superiority on Lake into Burlington Bay. His pension was most likely Ontario. At last, the confidence of President awarded for the loss of his arm at Oswego, not Madison was shaken, and he ordered his supposed navigational expertise.I3 Commodore Decatur to relieve him. 15 But the damage was done. Without naval superiority on The Wolfe's Remarks Log and Richardson's Lake Ontario, the Americans had no chance of memoirs are the only contemporary records of winning the War of 1812. what happened that day. If the squadron had crossed the sandbar and entered Burlington Bay, In the aftermath of this event, both sides these most relevant sources would have recorded attempted to preserve a measure of pride the fact. They do not. Therefore, the story is a commensurate with the battle's historic myth, a tale dressed up to make an interesting importance. Incredibly, both American and magazine series, almost one hundred years ago. Canadian historians have generally accepted that it was an American victory because the British In reality, the British and Americans eyed "ran away." However, on closer examination, we each other suspiciously from their respective can interpret that the British squadron only anchorages across the lake and licked their retreated to where it could assume a strong wounds. Their commanders evaluated their defensive position by anchoring with springs on situation and made out their reports. Chauncey their cables, close inshore at the head of the lake. stated that he had 27 men killed and wounded This was a standard practice employed by all including 22 by the bursting of a gun. 14 The log navies of that period. With the American of the Wo{fe reports, "two men viz. John squadron heading for home, it was unnecessary Edwards, seaman and Charles Kinslea M. Arms, for the British to salvage victory from defeat by killed and two seamen, Robert Archibald and brazenly crossing the sandbar and hiding in John Baker wounded." If casualty reports mean Burlington Bay (Hamilton Harbour). That is pure anything to the outcome of a battle, then myth. It was, in fact, the Americans who turned Chauncey clearly had suffered the most. But the away, their flagship in jeopardy of sinking, their

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HMS Wolfe leads the British Squadron out Q[ Toronto Harbour; September 28, 1813 by Peter Rindlisbacher.

ungainly mixture of ships wary of manoeuvring With the aid of information provided by the on a lee shore in deteriorating weather conditions log of HMS Wolfe it is now clear that the naval and their unwilling to face the British engagement known as the Burlington Races, was on "more equal terms." Under these conducted by the British with characteristic circumstances, one can hardly describe this event professionalism, in keeping with the high as a British defeat. standards of the Royal Navy during the Nelson period. By maintaining the integrity of his However, strategically, the Americans squadron, Yeo played a far more important role accomplished their goaL While the refitting in the events of the War of 1812 that shaped our squadrons surveyed each other from across the future, than generations of historians have been lake, General Wilkinson moved his army from prepared to grant him. If the British naval the Niagara Peninsula to the St. Lawrence River, squadron on Lake Ontario had not thwarted unmolested. In the end, however, this strategy Chauncey's attempt to attain complete control accomplished nothing. It was, in fact, a disaster of the Great Lakes on 28 September 1813, it is for the Americans. Both armies came to ruin in safe to say that Southem Ontario would probably the St. Lawrence Valley: General Wilkinson's be a state of the American Union today. If in doubt army at Chrysler's farm and General Hampton, about Yeo's accomplishment, then refer to the at Chateauguay. The assault on Montreal fizzled words of the greatest military authority of that out. The British army, meanwhile, occupied the period, the Duke of Wellington, who is reported weakened Niagara frontier and captured Fort to have said, "Any offensive operation founded Niagara, thereby making the Niagara River a upon Canada must be preceded by naval British supply port for their troops on the Niagara superiority on the Lakes." Peninsula. Yeo's Lake Ontario naval squadron survived the scrape of 28 September as strong as ever. In fact, it went on the offensive in the Postscript following Spring and helped to capture Fort Oswego along with enough naval stores to I\ 11 too many historians of the War of 1812 have significantly delay Chauncey's ship building r-lfailed to show the relationship between land program at Sackets Harbour. This had serious battles and the less glamorous but vital, naval consequences for the American offensive in the control of supply routes. Consequently, events summer of 1814. such as the "Burlington Races" are dismissed as

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insignificant engagements in comparison to the in the mouth of the Niagara River at daybreak. Battle of Lake Erie, which has for almost two Augmented by the troops from the local garrison centuries, overshadowed it. However, on further at Fort George, the 89th Regiment, under the analysis, the fallout of the "Burlington Races" had command of General Drummond, marched up a far greater impact on the outcome of the war the river road to play their part in Canada's than Perry's victory on Lake Erie. destiny along an insignificant farmer's lane within earshot of . Once again it can be For example, after 10 September 1813, with seen how the outcome of the War of 1812 can be Lake Erie under American control, the British traced to that pivotal naval engagement known on the frontier were completely exposed as the Burlington Races. on their southern flank and withdrew up the Thames Valley towards Burlington Heights. The Notes American army under General Harrison followed. On 3 October 1813, the British were defeated at 1. Yeo's Report to Admiral Warren, 29 September 1813, the and nothing stood Public Record Office, British Admiralty, London. between Harrison and Lake Ontario. It was one England. Courtesy Charles Trollope. of the darkest days in the War of 1812 for the 2. Log ofHMS Wolfe, 28 September 1813. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Record Group 45. British. Things were so bad that Governor Courtesy Robert Malcomson. General Prevost ordered General Vincent at 3. British Admiralty, Manual Q[Seamanship, Vol. II, 1951 Burlington Heights to abandon (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office. 1952), p. 717 and retreat to Montreal. Fortunately, General 4. Yeo's Report to Admiral Warren. 5. Log of HMS Wolfe. Vincent was made of sterner stuff, and like Nelson 6. H.A. Fay, Collection of Q{ficial Accounts in Detail Qf with his blind eye at the Battle of Copenhagen. all the Battles Fought by Sea and Land Between the chose to ignored his superior. After all, the British Navy & Army Q[ the United States & the Navy & Army Lake Ontario Squadron had not been defeated Qf Great Britain During the Years 1812·15 (New York: Printed by E. Conrad, 181 7), p.132 on 28 September and was presently anchored 7. Ibid.,p.131. on his doorstep at the head of the lake. He 8. A.T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of correctly assessed that Harrison was not a threat 1812, Vol. 2 (London: Sampson, Low. Marston & Co., as long as the Americans had not achieved naval 1905).p.109. 9. C.H.J. Snider, In the Wake Q{ the Eighteen Twelvers control of Lake Ontario. With Wilkinson's army (Toronto: Bell & Cockburn, 1913), pp. x-xi. heading eastward down the St. Lawrence River, 10. C.S. Forester, The Age Q[ Fighting Sail (Garden City, Harrison was quite isolated and had no choice NY: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1956), pp.97-98. but to return to his supply base at Detroit. Thus 11. Patrick O'Brian, H.M.S. Surprise (London: HarperCollins. 1996). p.255. ended the invasion of Upper Canada from the 12. Log ofHMS Wolfe. west. 13. Robert Malcomson, Sailors of 1812, Memoirs and Letters of Naval Officers on Lake Ontario (Youngstown, The invasion of Upper Canada from Buffalo NY: Old Association, Inc, 1997), p.13. in 1814 also failed because Yeo had been able to 14. Fay, p.132. 15. Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone. Dictionary of fend off the American attempt to take naval American Biography Vol. II (New York: Charles control of Lake Ontario. By maintaining the Scribner's Sons, 1930). pp.40-41. integrity of his squadron, Yeo was eventually able to go on the offensive and in the spring and Commander Robert J. Williamson, CD, summer of 1814 attained naval control of Lake RCNR Ret'd, a former Secondary School Ontario by default. Thus the British were at Principal, was the Commanding Officer of liberty to resupply and re-enforce their army on Hamilton's Naval Reserve Division, HMCS the Niagara Peninsula and thereby played an Star 1985-88. He has also served as a important but unsung part in the defeat of the member of the Directing Staff at the Canadian American invasion of Canada at the Battle of Armed Forces Staff College in Toronto. A Lundy's Lane. From the port of York on the published author, he has several heritage evening of 24 July 1814, HMS Star and HMS books to his credit including: HMCS Star, A Charwell embarked General Drummond, Naval Reserve History; and UNTiDy Tales Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, the hero of of Officer Cadets, an anecdotal history of Chrysler's Farm, and 400 men of the tough 89th the University Naval Training Divisions. Regiment. With a fair breeze, the ships arrived

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