The Burlington Races Revisited: a Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval Battle for Supremacy on Lake Ontario
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Canadian Military History Volume 8 Issue 4 Article 2 1999 The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval Battle for Supremacy on Lake Ontario Robert J. Williamson Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Williamson, Robert J. "The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval Battle for Supremacy on Lake Ontario." Canadian Military History 8, 4 (1999) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Williamson: The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Nav The Burlington Races Revisited A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval Battle for Supremacy on Lake Ontario Robert J. Williamson 'Q:om the safety of the Lake Ontario shore near Macdonough at the Battle of Plattsburgh. It is ll Burlington. military and civilian observers almost certain that Macdonough found the log of witnessed the jockeying for position of many the Wolfe, awaiting delivery to the Admiralty, in sailing vessels during the afternoon of Tuesday. Downie's personal effects. Before being sent to September 28, 1813. They likened the event to a Washington, the log was viewed and signed by yacht race. Thus, a pivotal naval engagement that Commodore Issac Chauncey, the senior officer would determine the outcome of the War of 1812 ofthe US Navy on the Great Lakes. was facetiously labelled, "The Burlington Races." The facts of this important piece of Canadiana. The Burlington Races occurred just 18 days have, like so many significant historical events. after Commodore Perry's stunning victory on been cloaked by myth and misconception until Lake Erie. Many historians, however, have failed recently. The discovery in the US National to realize that Perry's success was meaningless Archives of the log of the British flagship of the without the necessary sequel on Lake Ontario, Lake Ontario Squadron, HMS Wolfe, has made the key to the Great Lakes. Commodore it possible to interpret this episode in Canadian Chauncey, having been overshadowed by his history more accurately. subordinate's victory, was under pressure to administer the "coup de grace." The British lion The Wolfe's log came to light by accident on Lake Ontario had to be caged in order to bring during research for the Hamilton and Scourge about an end to hostilities in Upper Canada, the project in 19 71. How the log book of the Wolfe principal theatre of the war. This would allow found its way to Washington was, until recently, Major-General Wilkinson to safely tranship his a bit of a mystery. On 7 September 1999, the American army on the Niagara Peninsula to the National Archives in Washington verified that the St. Lawrence River where, according to the United log was received in Washington on 2 December States government's revised strategy for the war, 1814 from Captain Tho. Macdonough of he would co-ordinate with Major-General Plattsburgh, New York. Therein lies the link with Hampton from Plattsburgh, New York, in a two Captain George Downie who, in June 1814, was pronged attack on Montreal. A stranglehold on appointed to command HMS Wolfe or Montreal this choke point, the heart of the Canadian as she had just recently been renamed. The name colonies, would end the war. On the other hand, change would have made the log of the Wolfe, an unchecked Royal Navy under the command dated 8 June- 20 December 1813, redundant. of the feted Commodore Sir James Yeo, roaming As an archival record, it would have been the freely on Lake Ontario, could spell disaster to captain's responsibility to safeguard the log until this new American offensive. Therefore, the event it could have been forwarded to the British that was to be called the Burlington Races would Admiralty. At the end of August, Downie was prove to be a crucial naval engagement and hurriedly ordered to the Isle-aux-Noix shipyard indeed, a turning point in the war. on Lake Champlain to command the newly launched frigate HMS Conjiance. On 11 On paper, the American squadron had the September 1814. Downie was killed in action and advantage in numbers, ten vessels to six; and in his squadron surrendered to Captain firepower, a broadside weight-of-metal ratio of © CanadianMiliiary History, Volume 8, Number 4, Autumn 1999, pp.7-l5. 7 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1999 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 8 [1999], Iss. 4, Art. 2 Commodore Isaac Chauncey Commodore Sir James Yeo NAC C 10926 NACC22895 three to two. They outgunned the British in long are force 5 with wind speed between 17 and 21 range cannon by three to one. The only statistic knots.:; The gale force winds of legend appear to that favoured the Royal Navy was a 20 percent have been only in Chauncey's mind as he surfeit in short range smashers or carronade. searched for excuses to explain his later actions. These statistics are based on a report made by Yeo, havingjust arrived at York that morning, sent Commodore Yeo to Admiral Warren on 29 a boat ashore with dispatches. At 10:00 am the September 1813. 1 In reality, the combatants were enemy squadron bore down on the anchorage. more equal than the figures imply. Six ships of By 10:30, Yeo had recovered his dispatch boat the American squadron were converted merchant and weighed anchor. He headed out into the lake schooners, not fighting ships. They were more to gain "sea room" on a port tack. Since the wind useful as gunboats for bombardment than naval was from the ENE, this would have placed him battles. Top heavy and unwieldy in bad weather, on a SSE course towards the Niagara River. At their sailing characteristics were so divergent that 12:30 pm, he manoeuvred to bring the American Chauncey had great difficulty in keeping his ships squadron within range of his carronades while in formation; so much so that in this action, three at the same time causing the sluggish American of the schooners were tied to mother ships in a formation to become very extended. towing formation. While these vessels added to Consequently, as the two squadrons engaged, it the weight of Chauncey's firepower, they seriously was the two flagships, HMS Wolfe and USS Pike, hampered his speed and manoeuvrability. On the that took the brunt of the action. It should also other hand, the British ships were faster, held be noted that Yeo had manoeuvred the Americans their formation well and could better concentrate into a position where their gunnery solutions were their effort. complicated. They had to engage the enemy with their port side guns while heeled over to port on When the two squadrons met off the port of a starboard tack. Nevertheless, by l :20 pm. the York (Toronto) on this fateful day, the weather, Wolfe's main and mizzen topmasts were shot described in the log of the Wolfe, was "cloudy away while the Pike had been dangerously holed with fresh breezes of E.N.E. wind."2 According below the water line and had serious damage on to the navy's Beaufort Wind Scale which her forward gun deck when one of her own measures wind force from 0-10, fresh breezes cannons exploded, killing or wounding a large 8 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss4/2 2 Williamson: The Burlington Races Revisited: A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Nav number of her crew. The damage to the Wo~fe's his recent book, Lords of the Lake. Military logic sails meant a critical loss of manoeuvrability, but dictates that because of battle damage to the the disciplined British formation, led by HMS Wolfe's sails, Yeo could not engage in battle Royal George, intervened and helped extricate manoeuvres and would have to attempt to make their flagship from the close action. In Yeo's report a stand from an anchored position on a friendly of the battle, he wrote, "[When] the main and shore. An examination ofthe ship's log confirms mizzen topmasts of this ship were shot away, by this. It states, "At 4.30 arrived with the squadron which she became unmanageable on the wind, I and came to an anchor off Burlington Bay, close put the squadron before the wind for a small bay in shore with springs on the cables." 5 By at the head of the lake where he [Chauncey] would anchoring his ships on their back springs (a have been under the necessity of engaging on heavy hawser pulled the anchor to the ship's more equal terms. this however he declined ... and stern) the ships could be swung in the wind by on approaching the bay, he hauled off, leaving us releasing the spring hawser, thus presenting a in this state perfectly unmolested to refit the fresh bank of guns to the enemy when necessary. squadron." 4 Yeo would have doubled his firepower by this procedure and negated his loss of Yeo's phrase, "engaging on more equal terms" manoeuvrability by establishing a strong and has never yet been satisfactorily explained by compact defensive unit at anchor. This was a historians. It certainly does not imply that he standard tactic of the period, used by the intended to run away and hide behind a sandbar American squadron successfully against the at the head of the lake, an impression held by British at Plattsburgh in 1814 on Lake many people until Robert Malcomson published Champlain.