Factors that affected the Tunisian industrialization movement
in the era of Ahmed Bey (r. 1837-1855)
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of History of the College of Arts and Sciences by
Ali Eltarhuni 2015
M.A. University of Benghazi August 2005
Committee Chair: Elizabeth Frierson, Ph.D. Abstract
The Tunisian industrial movement began in the era of Ahmed Bey, crowned ruler of the Ottoman province of Tunis in 1837. Throughout his reign, Ahmed Bey faced a series of exceptional challenges: the ruling class in Tunisia felt the direct external dangers that surrounded them and threatened their security, as Algeria was occupied by France and the Ottomans re-controlled
Tripoli. Ahmad Bey loved independence, aggrandizement, and greatness; he was convinced that
Tunisia must take advantage of progress, civilization, and military power following the modern
European example. This meant that his reform had a solid ground to stand on it, but it would face difficulties and grow in a tough environment. Under those conditions, Tunisian affairs mandated a rapid and uprising “reform thought” that would secure wealth and military power in a short time. The strategy of Ahmad Bey at first was to build a strong modern army that would keep
Tunisia safe and enhance his own power. Hence, he built a military school and brought highly qualified European officers and administrators to run it, and then he sent students to European schools to learn various disciplines and skills, while at the same time exposing them to the
European culture. The outcome of the strategy favored the reform movement, as it produced an intellectual insemination and in few years served as a vehicle of change. Eventually, none of
Ahmed Bey’s reforms met with unequivocal success. This study examines the modern industrialization reform during the era of Ahmad Bey. It analyzes both external and internal factors that motivated for reform and the effect of pressure from Europe as well as the replication of the European models of modernity. The evaluation elaborates on the successes and failures of the economic, administrative, and political reforms, plus it explains the extent of their effects on the Tunisian budget.
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Content
Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………..… 6-13
Chapter One: External Factors. ……….………………………………………….…….... 14-35
1. The Impact of Europe...………….……………………….…………………………...14
a. The Role of Consuls and European Communities………………………………....15
b. The Journeys of Tunisians to Europe……………………………………………....20
c. Translation of European Books to Arabic Language……………………………....24
d. The Magnitude and Extent of the European Civilization……………………….….25
2. Ottoman Empire and Its Impact: …………………………………………………...…28
a. The Journeys of Official Delegates between Istanbul and Tunisia .……………….29
b. The Role of Ottoman Regulations ...……………………………..………………...30
3. Egypt and Its Impact …………………………………………………………………..31
a. The Journeys of Tunisians to Egypt ……………………………...……………...…32
b. Modern Books Written by Egyptian Reformists………………………..………….33
c. The Magnitude and Extent of the Egyptian Influence………………...……………34
Chapter Two: Internal Factors. ………………………………………………………….…36-56
1. The Policy of Ahmad Bey…………………………………………………………..…36
2. The Impact of Ahmad Bey’s Cabinet on Tunisian Finance and Economy…………….42
3. Administration Sector……………………………………………………………….…49
4. Reformist Thought.………………………………………………………………….…52
a. Executive Pragmatic Thought…………………………………………………..…..52
b. Planned Reform Thought……………………………………………………..….....54
Chapter Three: Traditional Industries. ………………………………………………….….57-71
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1. Remarkable Traditional Industries in Tunisia ………………………………………….57
a. Chechia Industry…………………………………………………………………….58
b. Textile Industry……………………………………………………………….……..60
c. Mills, Olive Presses, and Their By-Products……………………………………..…61
d. Tanning and Leather Products………………………………………………………63
e. Other Traditional Industries…………………………………………………………65
2. Handicraft Regulation…………………………………………………………………...68
Chapter Four: Modern Industry. ……………………………………………………………..72-89
1. Military Industries ………………………………………………………………………72
a. Weapons Industry………………………………………………………….….……..72
b. Gunpowder Industry …………………………………………………….…….….…74
c. Ship Industry ………………………………………………………….……….....…76
2. Civil Industries ……………………………………………………….…………………79
a. Mineral Extraction (Mining) ……………………………………….………….…..…79
b. Textile Factory ……………………………………………………….……….….…..82
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………….…..……90
Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………..……..93
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Introduction
The Tunisian industrial movement began in the reign of Ahmed Bey, the Ottoman appointed ruler of Tunisian province, in 1837. Ahmed Bey began his career as an
Ottoman officer and utilized European manpower and ideas to modernize his realm. Like
Muhammad Ali of Egypt and the Ottoman Sultans of the time, Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839) and Abdulmecid I (r. 1839 -1861), Ahmed Bey implemented an strategic plan that used
European ideas, manpower, and finance to modernize his territory in a way James Gelvin describes as “defensive develop-mentalism”.1
This study examines the modern industrialization reform during the era of Ahmad
Bey. It analyzes both external and internal factors that motivated the reform, and the effect of pressure from Europe as well as the replication of the European models of modernity. The evaluation elaborates on the successes and failures of the economic, administrative, and political reforms; it also explains the extent of their effects on the
Tunisian budget. This topic will demonstrate the importance of the industrialization movement and its contemporary and future benefits; this subject has not previously been studied in detail or with precision. Most of the scholarly studies done about this era of
Tunisian history were focused on agriculture and trade over the long term, despite the many stacks of documents on this topic in the national archives of Tunisia.
The research questions investigated in this study are enumerated as three points.
First, what were the factors that led to the industrialization movement and affected its development? Second, what were the goals and achievements of industrialization
1 James Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History (Oxford, 2004), 71. 6 policies? Third, what were the roles of Europeans in this movement? Fourth, what types of industries were in Tunisia before the start of reforms? Fifth, how did the Tunisian budget affect the reforms? And sixth, in what ways did industrialization succeed and in what ways did it fail?
The first chapter focuses on the European impact, as it was a significant external factor. It discusses the role of European consuls and communities, the journeys of
Tunisians to Europe, and the translation of European books to the Arabic language. It also examines the extent of the influence of the European civilization, the Ottoman
Empire, and Egypt on Tunisia. The second chapter deals with internal factors, such as
Ahmed Bey’s politics, the administrative system, and the emergence of reformist thought in Tunisia. Chapter three highlights traditional industries and their contribution to the
Tunisian economy. Chapter four surveys Tunisia’s modern industry that was divided into a military industry and civil industry. The analyses in this chapter present a case study about the textile factory dar al-malf, which was considered an important industrial achievement for its period of time. The data for this case study largely come from the
Tunisian National Archives; the principal documents include the letters of its director,
Mr. Faussie, that describe the situation of the factory and its component parts. Also included are other letters from European engineers that showed the role of European design in the factory as well as the situation of Tunisian workers in the production process and their financial and professional status.
Primary sources for this research are predominately from the Tunisian National
Archive with printed materials in the Arabic Language that go back to the nineteenth
7 century. The noted historian and public official Ahmad ibn Abi al-Diyaf (1804-1874), well known as Ben Diyaf, wrote a six-volume history attached with two bibliographical volumes under title “Ithaf ahl al-zaman bi akhbar muluk tunis wa ‘ahd al-aman”
(Presenting Contemporaries with the History of the Rulers of Tunisia and the
Fundamental Pact), which has been partially translated and edited by L. Carl Brown:
“Consult Them in the Matter: A Nineteenth-Century Islamic Argument for
Constitutional Government” (University of Arkansas, 2005).
The sources can be divided into three types. The first type is as described above; the second type is the correspondence among political authorities, treaties, agreements, and contracts; and the third type is the correspondence with engineers, consuls, and other foreigners. More than half of these documents were written in Arabic, and they contain important information from a variety of sources that are unique.
The archival documents are indispensable for determining the reality of day to day events, but useful manuscripts and printed materials found in the Tunisian National
Library enhanced this research. The first is the aforementioned work by Ben Diyaf, and the second is a five-volume work by Muhammad Bayram al-Khamis titled “Safwat al-
I’tibar bi Mustawda al-Amsar wa al-Aqtar” (A Consideration of the Treasury of Cities and Districts) that is described by L. Carl Brown as “[a]n indispensable source for nineteenth-century social history”.2
The most important secondary source for this study is Carl Brown's book, The
Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, which has been hailed as one of the greatest works for
2 L. Carl Brown, The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 1837-1855 (Princeton, 1974) 8 understanding the reforms of the Arab countries in general and Tunisia in particular during the nineteenth century. First, the author depends on primary sources from a variety of places to obtain general information (public archival collections in Tunisia, France, and Great Britain and some manuscripts) that increase the value of the book since most
Tunisian historians did not consider these different archives in unison when studying this subject. Second, the author divides the book into two parts. The first part is "The
Traditional Political Class," which provides information about the political class and the web of the government; this part provides background for part two, "The Westernizing
World of Ahmad Bey." The author begins part two by discussing Ahmad Bey's life, and then he shows the conditions in Tunisia amidst an encroaching outside world, military reforms, and the marks of modernity. Finally, the author outlines the main points of the book and summarizes the history in a few concise pages. Unequivocally, this book is one of the most important books written in the field.
Brown's book is the only book written in English about this study topic; however, there is much more literature available on this topic in Arabic. A list of the books, articles, and theses that dealt with the subject of the economic and industrial life in
Tunisia, directly or indirectly, are: Rashad al-Imam, Ideas and Thoughts for Reform in
Tunisia during the 19th century, Khalifa al-shater, The World Economy and the Bazar
Economy, Tunisia before French Protectorate, al-Habib al-Janhane, Tunisian Reforms in the Second Half of the 19th Century, and Lila Zaghdoud: Reforms and Modernization in
Tunisian Navy.
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As an attempt to summarize research on this topic, I can say that the historians in this field focused on five major points. First, most of them argue that Ahmad Bey felt that there was a threat from the Ottoman Empire as well as a danger coming from France and Britain. Therefore, he found that the only way to remove such risks was to start the repair and modernization of the army, as the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II and Muhammad
Ali Pasha in Egypt had done earlier in the century. But these studies do not explain why
Ahmed Bey organized the army imitating the French model or why his officers received
Frenchmen to build a new army if there was a threat from the European military (as they argue, especially France, whose occupation of Algeria began in 1830). The second point is that some studies focus on the Bardo School that was established in 1840, near the capital city, with the purpose of modernizing the army. This school was the nucleus of modern education in the country as it included many subjects such as the Arabic language and the French language (both undergoing standardization and repurposing for new administrative and other tasks), in addition to Islamic studies, mathematics, engineering, history, geography, and military science. The staff in this school included European as well as Tunisian teachers. Furthermore, to meet the needs of the new Nizami army,
Ahmad Bey established industries that had to be researched in order to investigate their feasibilities, such as the making of guns and bombs and the textile industry what employed four hundred Tunisian workers. In addition, he built new leather factories in
Muhmmadiya city and modern mills to produce olive oil and soap, and tanneries for leather. The third point that these studies focus on is the higher education provided by the Zaytuna Mosque in the capital city, which included changing the management and
10 staff, teaching, and financial measures designed to make the pursuit of Islamic knowledge more stable. The fourth research studies topic focused on the public library in the
Zaytuna Mosque, established in 1840. Ahmad Bey appointed two officers in the library to look after its management, thereby facilitating the pursuit of knowledge for the poor and the rich alike. This kind of information is far from the framework of my research. The fifth area that receives a great deal of focus in scholarly studies is the abolition of slavery in 1846. Ahmed Bey prevented the export of slaves from Tunisia in 1841 and in 1842 prevented their sale in markets in order to stop their importation into Tunisia. Finally, he abolished slavery outright in 1846.
In general, most of the studies show that the reforms of Ahmad Bey were very expensive, beyond what the Tunisian budget was able to afford since state income was too low. Most Tunisian historians blame the European engineers, particularly the French, for the failure of projects. Here, I would like to argue that neither the weak state income nor the European engineers were the major reason for the failure of the projects that
Ahmad Bey undertook in Tunisia. Instead, I would like to point out three other primary reasons explored in the next few chapters. The first reason I will consider is the budget spent to build palaces, and the thefts by the state officials, particularly the chief ministers.
The second point is the failure of the Tunisian regime to come up with a comprehensive reform plan that would lead to the modernization of the society. The third point is that the weakness and the corruption of the administrative apparatus was the reason behind the officials’ rejection of reform and modernization.
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Throughout his reign, Ahmed Bey faced a series of exceptional challenges. In the absence of a traditional local paradigm on which to model his responses, he acted much as his earlier counterparts, Muhammad Ali in Egypt and the Ottoman sultans Mahmud II and Abdulmecid I, had in similar circumstances: initiating in a pragmatic manner many ideas that deviated radically from past practices. Because Ahmed Bey and the elite circle around him constituted the sole group articulating the need for major changes, such changes always came from above, where the raw power to impose them existed but were rarely matched by an awareness of their impact at the grassroots level. Virtually none of
Ahmed’s reforms met with unequivocal success. In order to achieve his two essential goals of building a strong and independent nation and assuring a prominent position for his country among the nations and nobility for himself among the leaders of the World,
Ahmad Bey would take any opportunity to show that he was not under the control of the
Ottomans. Unfortunately, his attempt to have peer to peer relations with France and other
European countries was ingenuous. It was merely motivated by admiration of their modernity and civilization; he never realized France’s vigorous plan to eventually occupy
Tunisia. In addition, his inefficient administration system weakened his control over the ruling class members who were looting the country’s revenues and accumulating their personal wealth, a practice that led to Tunisian bankruptcy.
The intent of this dissertation is to enlighten historian in the debates outlined by contributing a close reading of primary sources to heighten the understanding of the economic factors that hampered Ahmad Bey’s reformist agenda. This dissertation will also bring needed information about the Tunisian history and Mediterranean reformers
12 and their practices during the mid-nineteenth century into the English language. The
Tunisian case will help to fill out a picture of the Middle East and North Africa, which has turned on three poles: Ottoman heartlands, Egypt, and Iran. The historiography of
North Africa, other than Egypt, is much underwritten in European languages, including
English. By focusing on Ahmad Bey, I hope to engage the central debates of the history of North Africa and add to the empirical base of knowledge about economic reform, colonialism and imperialism, and the place of North Africa in the rapidly changing economic and political environments of the nineteenth century Mediterranean area.
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Chapter One
External Factors
1. The Impact of Europe
Before the nineteenth century, the Tunisian province (al-Eiala al-Tunisia) was strongly connected with European states through their consuls and communities. The activities of those consuls and communities were barely commercial.1 The impact of the
European communities in Tunisia was manifested, clearly, in the political and administrative fields. Some of the Europeans were employed in high government positions as consultants, while others were agents for private businessmen. Since the lack of references and sources makes it difficult to identify the impact of European communities and consuls before the eighteenth century, this section focuses on the
European’s impact on Tunisian reformists during the nineteenth century. This discussion also highlights how the European Renaissance and the era of French Revolution influenced the reformists’ ways of thinking in Tunisia. In the nineteenth century, several factors played important roles in bringing about the change and adoption of the Western- style reform; the first was the presence of European consuls and communities in Tunisia, the second was the journeys of Tunisians to Europe, and the last was the translation of
European books into Arabic language.
1 Godfrey Fisher: Barbary Legend; war, trade, and piracy in North Africa 1415 – 1830, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957) 285. 14
a. The Role of Consuls and European Communities
In 1577, France established its consulate in Tunisia. It was the first European consulate in Tunisia, followed by the English consulate in 1623, and then the Genoa consulate in 1674. In the nineteenth century, other European countries established their consulates in Tunisia. For example, the Spanish consulate was established in 1815, the
Belgian consulate was established in 1829,2 and the Austrian consulate was established in
1849.3
The consuls had a positive influence in the evolution of reform thought in Tunisia, especially the French and the British consuls. Those consuls urged the Tunisian rulers and elite toward reforms, mainly to enforce their own agenda. In fact, in their call for reforms, they would sometimes threaten Tunisian rulers that they would use force to implement reforms if those reforms were not carried out peacefully. By dictating their plans, they succeeded in establishing new modern courts of justice (al-mahakim al-
Adliya), and they enforced the enactment of the country’s constitution o in 1861.4 The goals behind their actions were to preserve the interests of their own countries and to let their communities in Tunisia have more freedom and safety when doing business governed by European laws and values.
The French consuls were the pioneers in bringing about the ideas of reform in
Tunisia. They took advantage of the Tunisian interest of being independent from the
2 Ahmad Ibn Abi Diyaf, Ithaf Ahl al-Zaman bi Akhbar Muluk Tunis wa Ahd al-Aman (Presenting Contemporaries the History of the Rulers of Tunis and the Fundamental Pact) Edited by a committee from the Ministry of Cultural Affairs (Tunis, al-dar al-Arabia le al-kitab, 2002) Vol. 4, 34. 3 Ibid., 84. 4 Ibid., vol.5, 77. 15
Ottoman Empire and supported this idea locally and globally. France wanted to ensure that it kept Tunisia without external support, especially after the occupation of Algeria in
1830, in order to keep the Ottoman Empire far from Algeria’s border, which was a former Ottoman province. The French strategy in driving Tunisia to achieve its independence escalated the necessity and acceptance of the reform idea. There were, however, Tunisian rulers who believed and supported the need for reform; eventually, when Ahmad Bey came to power in 1837, the reformist thought had emerged, and the ruler and his men carried its banner.5 The successful work of the French consuls had culminated when Ahmad Bey went to France in a state visit in 1846; this famous and historic visit was a turning point and opened a wide door for renewal and reform in
Tunisia based on the French model of modernity. Accordingly, many historians consider
Ahmad Bey’s era, in its entirety, as the beginning of the Tunisian renaissance that replicated the European model.6
Aside from France and Britain, the two countries which had the major influence in
Tunisia, politically and economically, other European countries and their consuls in
Tunisia were only concerned with keeping their commercial businesses and their communities safe.7
European communities in Tunisia in the nineteenth century had begun coming to
Tunisia in the early years of that century. The first families who came were European slaves who gained their freedom later; others who arrived were adventurers who sought
5 Jean Ganiage, Les origines du Protectorat français en Tunisie (1861-1881) Trans. Adel Yousif, Ed. Ahmad Khaled, (Tunisia, 2012) 22-23. 6 Ibid., 22. 7 Ibid., 46. 16 wealth and prosperity by working for Tunisian governors (the Beys).8 Most of those communities worked in trade, particularly the foreign trades. Muhammad Bayram stated in his book that “The local people were inactive in the field of trade … and most of the export and import from Europe were accomplished by the European traders, with insignificant exceptions”.9
The European industry and the reduction of the maritime piracy helped Tunisia to establish heavy connections with European trade, and thus Tunisia slowly distanced itself from the Middle Eastern trade zone.10 Consequently, the Tunisian economy moved to a region dominated by economically strong European countries, and as a result of that, many European traders came and settled in the most important coastal cities of Tunisia, especially Tunis, the capital city and the government center.11 In Tunisia, these European traders organized themselves in groups, engaged in business, and formed powerful communities that had western values and influence; the French community was the most prominent of all. During the nineteenth century, the European intervention was associated with the deterioration of the political, social, and economic conditions in Tunisia. In the beginning the French only managed to protect their communities, but the end goal was to control and occupy Tunisia; in fact, the European countries were competing with each other in colonizing foreign lands during the nineteenth century colonial race. As a result,
8 Rashad al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics in Tunisia 1782 – 1814, (Tunis, Tunisian University press, 1980) 239- 243, 279-284. 9 Muhammad Bayram al-Khamis, Safwat al-Itibar bi-Mustawda al-Amsar wa al-Aqtar, (Cairo, Media press in Egypt, 1884) vol. 2, 119-120. 10 Khalifa al-shater, Tunisia and the Ottoman Empire, Journal of Arab History Vol.41, Issue 4 (Damascus, 1982) 89. 11 Khalifa al-shater, the world economy and the Bazar economy, Tunisia before French protectorate (Tunis, 1988)26. 17 a large number of Europeans settled in Tunisia and controlled its economy.12 When
Tunisia decreed laws that allowed property ownership and business activities, many more migrants flocked from different European countries.13
The Italian community became the largest European community in Tunisia,14 because the majority of them were either fleeing army recruitment or were criminals fleeing from justice in Italy. Because they had no allegiance to Italy, in turn Italy had no influence in Tunisia as did France and Britain. In the Maltese community, they were the poorest among all the immigrants, so their influence was insignificant. The number of
European immigrants in Tunisia was more than 19,000, and they were concentrated mainly in the city of Tunis where they represented an important part of the urban social fabric.15
A fair evaluation of the Europeans role and their contribution in Tunisian economy would confirm that it enhanced and refreshed the foreign trade that had been hindered since the shift of global trade routes between Europe and the Far East, from the
Mediterranean into the alternative route via the Atlantic Ocean turning around Africa.
The flourishing of foreign trade had led to a booming agricultural sector that was completely local. Farmers gained new markets in which to trade their products, and they expanded their crop productions by adding new products. Opportunities arose that allowed the agricultural sector to grow bigger and to move out of its narrow boundaries
12 Ali al-Zawee, Arrivals to Sfax City During the 18th and 19th century, the social life in the Ottoman provinces, (Tunisia, the Ottoman Studies and Research Center, 1988) 370. 13 Saad Badeer al-Halwanee, the Modern African History, (Cairo- 1999) 124. 14 Nicola A. Ziade, Origins of nationalism in Tunisia, (Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1962) 15 Abd al-Hamid al-Arkash, Municipal Corporation and Urban restructuring in Tunisia during 19th century, Maghreb Historical Journal, 14, issues 47-48 (Tunis, 1987) 25-26. 18 of local consumption. For example, olive oil and wool production increased rapidly to meet the needs of the European markets. In addition, the expansion in European trade led to farming new products, such as tobacco and tomatoes, in Tunisia for the sole purpose of exporting them.
However, the people of Tunisia did not benefit much from the booming that occurred in the agricultural and trade sectors; their gains were trivial and limited because the foreign trade was monopolized by the European communities in the mid nineteenth century.16 The negative consequence of the trade activity with Europe was that the advanced industry in Europe and its large scale production almost eliminated local traditional industries. Similar to the local farmers who did not gain any serious benefit from the expansion of the agricultural sector, the Tunisian merchants were not able to earn significant profits. The Muslim merchants were unable to participate in foreign trade because the commercial transactions were not in line with the Islamic code of conduct. In fact, all transaction, were based on forbidden (Haram) practices, such as usury and interest.17 The prosperity and gains from both the agricultural expansion and the booming foreign trade were mostly enjoyed by the European communities and the Tunisian elite
(the Bey’s entourage).
Since the early years of nineteenth century, the European communities in Tunisia were in control of some industrial sectors, especially olive mills imported from Europe and the market for olive oil. They specialized in manufacturing good quality shoes and
16 Lila al-Sabagh, the Development of the European Communities in the Arab and Muslim World during the Ottoman Rule. The eighth conference of Islamic thought, the Ministry of Education publications (Algeria- 1974) vol. 1, 73 17 Ahmad al-Kasab, Tunisian Modern History, (Tunis, Tunisian company press, 1986)175-176. 19 the steel industry as they were far ahead and in advance of Tunisians in those fields.18
Few of them held professional jobs in such work as physicians, teachers, engineers, soldiers, and administrators. The majority of them dwelled in Tunis, Sfax, and other coastal cities; they had their own distinctive neighborhoods in those cities.19
Disputes between the Tunisian government and the European consuls became common. The consuls would always ask Tunisia to modernize and make changes in rules and regulations that were applied to resolve problems that might arise between Tunisians and the Europeans, but the government would be reluctant to deviate from the rules that had governed for centuries. The European influence reached its peak during the reign of
Ahmad Bey when most of the top administrative positions, aside from religious position, were held by Europeans.20 For instance, the foreign minister was Mr. Raffu who became the master mind of the Tunisian foreign policy; he was able to convince Ahmad Bey that accepting a Western style reform was the only way to bring progress and civilization to
Tunisia.21 Unfortunately, the available sources and references consulted for this dissertation did not elaborate on the role played by this exceptional foreign minister.
b. The Journeys of Tunisians to Europe
At first the relationship between Tunisia and Europe was limited to the trade activities and the existence of European consulates in Tunisia. Gradually, the European communities started growing; many professionals and merchants arrived and settled in
18 Bayram, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 2, 128. 19 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 7, 135. Also, al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics, 310-315. 20 Bayram, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 2, 125 21 Rashad al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia during the 19th century, (Tunis, Maison Sahnoun, 2010) 37 20
Tunisia during the nineteenth century. The interaction and intermingling between the
Europeans and Tunisians brought a sense of admiration and willingness to follow the
European way of life among Tunisians.
Historical sources indicate that between thirteenth and eighteenth century there were no Tunisian communities in Europe; consequently, Tunisia had no consuls or ambassadors located in Europe. However, brief and unreliable statements pointed out that
Tunisian consuls and delegates visited certain European countries.22 Apparently, either the absence of Tunisians in Europe during those centuries was due to their lack of knowledge about the Europeans or their fear of being vulnerable and unprotected from the European governments, but above all, the reason was religious. European countries were considered lands of nonbelievers in the Islamic sense, and hence it was forbidden for Muslims to settle or even travel for short period in such regions.23 This concept of isolationism was probably prevalent in all Islamic countries at that time.
However, in the nineteenth century, the inclination in Tunisia was to visit
European countries. This tendency escalated when Tunisian felt their weakness when compared to European countries and the Ottoman Empire. The fear even became worse when the Ottoman Empire decided to reinforce its power and control its provinces in
North Africa, Tripoli, Tunisia, and Algeria and implement direct control by sending new governors as replacements for the previous ones.
22 al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics, 406 – 413 23 Bayram, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 1, 10 - 15. Bayram issued a Fatwa that allowed Muslims to travel to Christian countries and quoted from Koran and Hadith.
21
Ahmad Bey was one of the first rulers of Tunisia who initiated travel to Europe; he was known as a pioneer reformer and a firm independent seeker from Ottoman
Empire. In 1846, he decided to visit France and declared that he made this decision in response to the invitation offered to him by the sons of the king of France, Louis Philips
(1830 - 1847); the invitation offer took place when the three sons of king of France visited Tunisia and stayed there for over two months.24 In fact, Ahmed Bey had two other goals in mind besides just visiting France. First, he sought to strengthen the relationship with France and ensure Tunisia’s protection in case of any attack from the Ottoman
Empire; this was in line with his policy of independence, and in fact in France he was received like a king who has his own sovereign authority. Second, he wanted to view closely the modernity and civilization of France and confirm the truth and validity of the stories he heard from the French consuls, physicians, and engineers.25
Upon verifying the truth and validity of advancement in France, Ahmed Bey swiftly and firmly implemented new procedures in Tunisia. The young and ambitious ruler started a reform in the military and civil administrations in line with the French model immediately after his return from France. His visit to France was unprecedented by a Tunisian ruler. The voyage started at the port of La Goulette (Halg al-wadi), north of the country near the city of Tunis. He boarded a warship and was accompanied by his entourage and top officials; among them was the famous Ben Diyaf. 26 Ahmad Bey arrived at the port of Toulon in France and visited its industrial region, and then headed
24 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 4, p. 91-92 25 Al-Habib al-Janhane, Tunisian reforms in the second half of the 19th century, Annals of Tunisian University, issue 6 (Tunis, 1969) 111, 163, 117. 26 He devoted a chapter of his Ithaf to record the Bey’s state visit day-by-day, especially vol. 3, 92 -113 22 toward Paris. King Louis Philips received him, immensely, as a ruler of an independent country and celebrated his presence generously. A ceremony and a military parade were held in his honor, and he toured the milestones, parks, and museums in Paris. He returned to Tunisia joyfully after witnessing the power of wealth and advancements of science; he was delighted to see magnificent architectural buildings to an extent such that he would thereafter always say: “I wish we had this or that in Tunisia”.27 All those who escorted
Ahmad Bey on his journey enjoyed the trip, in particular, Ben Diyaf who often declared his admiration of Western civilization in his important book; he repeatedly praised the power, rules, justice, and work of Europeans as well as their distinction.
After this successful royal voyage to France, the people of Tunisia were eager to travel to European countries in order to witness the advances of these countries. Official delegates and ordinary citizens began travelling to France and other European countries.
The relationship between Tunisia and France was consolidated through the elites, students, and ordinary people that went there for treatment or pleasure.28
Travel to France was not restrictively to civilians, but military officers were also sent to complete their education in military institutions of France or to upgrade their skills. For instance, in 1852, Ahmad Bey dispatched General Rasheed 29 on a mission to meet the French ruler, Napoleon the Third (1848 – 1870).30 This visit took place just six
27 Ibid., vol. 4, 108 28 Bayram went to Europe for three times, two for treatment and one for official work. Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 1, 94. In this vein, a number of Tunisian reformist and officials went to Europe including; Muhammad Makhluf, the writer of Shajarat al-Nur al-Zakiya Fi Tabaqat al-Malikiy and Khayr al-din al-Tunisi the writer of Aqwam al-masalik fi maarifat ahwal al-mamalik. 29 After this trip by one year, he became the General Commander of the Tunisian troops that sent to stand by the empire agents Russia in Crimean war 1854. 30 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 43. 23 years after the remarkable journey of Ahmad Bey, an indication that the ruler of Tunisia had the desire to continue his reform plan following the example of France. He was determined to advance the training of his army officers and increase their knowledge and military skills.
In discussing the legitimacy of travel beyond the borders of Islamic lands, it can be observed that religious scholars may change their positions for the sake of accepting the opinion of a ruler. The Grand Mufti of Tunisia at that time, Muhammad Bayram al-
Khamis, declared that “A Muslim is allowed to travel to the non-Muslim lands according to the Islamic Law”.31
c. Translation of European Books to Arabic Language
The translation of European books to Arabic Language enhanced the idea of reform in Tunisia. A military school was founded in Bardo in 1840, and Ahmad Bey appointed a staff of European civilians and military officers to teach and administer this school;32 a few Tunisian teachers joined the staff, the most famous of whom was
Mahmud Qabadu who taught Arabic Language and Islamic studies.33 Ahmad Bey had realized the importance of translation, and hence he gave orders to translate books from
European languages to Arabic language, a task that was carried out by the teachers and students of the military school. He commanded Mahmud Qabadu to translate and edit the summary of lessons that were taught by foreign teachers at that school.34 The teachers
31 Bayram, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 1, 15. 32 Mahmmud abd al-Mulla, Bardo Military School, (Libya, al-Dar al-Arabia le al-Kitab, 1977) 33 al-Habib al-Janhane, Tunisian reforms, 118 34 Mihammad al-Fadil Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis (Tunisian intellectual history (Cairo, Arabic study center 1956) 13. 24 and the students at the military school enthusiastically started a translation project, and they were able to complete the translations of many books.
This was a vital milestone that paved the way for renewal and reform based on
Western style; the project transformed knowledge in the fields of science and military skills into the Arabic language.35 The ruling class and the elite of Tunisia supported the translation project; they were joyful when the first publications appeared, and they marked this event as the beginning of progress and civilization.36 Only a few copies of the translated books were published, apparently because the Arabic printing press was not available at the time; Tunisia had its first printing press in 1860.37 In 1867 a book titled
“Aqwam al-masalik fi maarifat ahwal al-mamalik.” (The Best Ways in Knowing the
Conditions of Kingdoms) was written in the Arabic language; it dealt with political and administrative issues as well as the controversial idea of reform.38
d. The Magnitude and Extent of the European Civilization
The interactions with the European consuls and the members of the European communities positively affected the ruling class and the elite of Tunisia. They gained awareness and realization that Europe had once suffered from in dark ages but rapidly progressed and attained an advanced civilization. The need for reform in Tunisia became urgent and essential, and it had to be founded on modern science to guarantee power, progress, justice, and regulations that were based on the European model. In order to
35 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 47. 36 Mahmud Qabado, collection of poems, collected and edited by Abdullah Senoussi, (Tunis, Tunisia state press, 1867) vol. 2, 54. 37 G.S. Van Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi 1850-1881, Trans. Ben Salama, (Tunis, Dar Sahnon, 1988) 14. 38 Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, Aqwam al-masalik fi maarifat ahwal al-mamalik, (Tunisia – 1867) 25 achieve those valuable goals, the Tunisians had to abandon their prevalent scientific knowledge base and adopt the European methodology. The influence of European civilization on the thoughts of the Tunisian elite during the first half of nineteenth century was tremendous to the extent that they saw the European model was the only way for reform and progress.39
The strategy of Ahmad Bey at first was to build a strong modern army that would keep Tunisia safe and enhance his own power. Hence, he built a military school and brought highly qualified European officers and administrators to run it. Next, he sent students to European schools to learn various disciplines and skills, while at the same time exposing them to the European culture. The outcome of the strategy was in favor of the reform movement as it produced an intellectual insemination and in few years served as a vehicle of change.
The influence of the European communities in Tunisia was limited to the ruling class and the elite at the beginning of nineteenth century. However, when the government set forth procedures for practical implementation of reforms, many prominent figures participated and joined the reform campaign, among them Mustafa Khaznadar, Ben
Diyaf, and Qabado, as well as the students of the military school who were either in ruling or represented the elite. They all declared the need for reform following the
European model and demanded immediate procedural actions. In all aspects of life such as politics, economy, and public behavior, people accepted and adopted the Western styles that eventually became dominant.
39 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 53. 26
When Ahmad Bey returned to Tunisia from his trip to France, he started building a modern army following the French army example. In a short time he had more than twenty-six thousand soldiers; he recruited European military officers and trainers to advance the skills of his army. He built several factories to melt iron, manufacture artillery and ammunition, and create textile to produce good quality clothing; he established a navy ship and docking stations replicating what he saw in the port city of
Toulon; he also built a compound for the army and changed the army uniform to
European style. In the architectural field, he built a replicate of Versailles Palace of Paris in Muhammadiya. He supported building modern schools in Tunisia, similar to what he saw in France.
When Ahmad Bey witnessed the huge difference between France and Tunisia in regards to justice and freedom, and in the court system, he was concerned. Right after his return from France, he avoided sitting in the court and resolving disputes arbitrarily.40
According to Ben Diyaf, after Ahmad Bey avoided sitting in the court, he intended to decree new laws for Tunisia that would be used in resolving disputes.41 However, the intended laws did not appear until the reign of Muhammad Bey, who issued the well- known “Ahd al-Aman” (A Fundamental Pact). After 1850, the European influence escalated and completely touched all aspects of life in Tunisia. The scholar, Ibn
Khaldoun, explained the relationship between the winner and the loser, “The loser thinks the winner is perfect, hence, he imitates him in his slogans, dress, justifications, and all
40 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 4, 102 -103. 41 Ibid., 121. 27 other conditions”.42 And as he said, “The public follow the religion of the king … for the king controls his subjects, and the people imitate him seeing perfection in him. Just as children believe in their father, and students believe in their teacher.”43
In his book, Muhammad Bayram wrote that Tunisians followed Europeans in all aspects of life, such as dress, houses, furniture, music, and food. For example, some government officials and elite in major cities imitated Europeans in eating their meals, as each would use his own dish and utilize knife and fork instead of using their hands or sharing a common dish.”44
2. Ottoman Empire and Its Impact
In the first century of the Husaynid Dynasty rule in Tunisia, the intellectual or educational system was dominated by religious and Arabic studies. The mosques and regular schools focused on teaching the Arabic language and Islamic disciplines, following the footsteps of previous generations. Even in eighteenth century when the rulers (Beys) opened many new schools, the curriculum was not changed.45 For instance, during the reign of Hamuda Pasha, Tunisia had good relations with European countries such as France, Denmark, and Spain. However, Hamuda Pasha never thought about making changes in the educational system or implementing a reform based on the
European style, despite the fact that the French Revolution was during his reign and he had established a unique friendship with Napoleon the First.46
42 Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldoun, The Introduction, (Beirut, literary press, 1900) 147. 43 Ibid., 147. 44 Bayram, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 2, 129, 142. 45 Hassan Hosny Abd al-Wahab, The Summary of Tunisian History (Tunis – 1924) 153. 46 For more information about Hamuda Pasha, al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics. 28
Noticeably, the Ottoman Empire introduced new reforms that used the Western styles as their model, particularly by changing its ineffective educational and military systems by the beginning of nineteenth century. Istanbul was determined to catch up with
Europe by advancing its military and educational systems; therefore, it began an urgent campaign calling for reform in all its provinces, including Tunisia. The new rules and regulations introduced by Istanbul in its provinces were under consideration in Tunisia, and they were easily accepted and implemented, with appreciation and credit given to
Ottoman Empire for its advice.47 This section details how the Ottoman Empire indirectly influenced Tunisia, in accepting and implementing the Western-style reform, in two ways:
a. The Journeys of Official Delegates between Istanbul and Tunisia
It was customary to send a delegate to the Sultan of Ottoman Empire whenever a new ruler (Bey) came to power in Tunisia in order to receive the “Furman Ottoman law,” an irreversible official document stamped and signed by the Ottoman sultan validating his order and approval of the new ruler. In addition, the Tunisian ruler was obligated to send delegates to offer military support in times of war.48 The delegates of such journeys were composed of several top government officials and would spend many days in the historical city of Istanbul; they would visit military and educational institutions and hold meetings with dignitaries.
47 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 59 – 66. 48 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 4, 156-157. Bayram, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 3, 87 -88. 29
Often the delegate members would take such opportunities to bring new ideas home and implement them in Tunisia; even the European ideas related to educational or military systems would easily be accepted when they came through Istanbul, an indication of the influence of Ottoman Empire on religious and worldly affairs.49 The ordinary Tunisians continuously made trips to Istanbul; they were able to witness reforms that took effect in Istanbul in first half of the nineteenth century. Ben Diyaf stated that most of the new regulations and reforms in Istanbul reached Tunisia in details through unofficial travelers.50
b. The Role of Ottoman Regulations
During the entire period of the Ottoman Empire, the government system was absolute authoritarian, but in the first half of nineteenth century they introduced changes in what is known as the Tanzimat period. 51 In 1839 a new law known as the “Hatii
Sharif of Gülhane,” was established, which was a decree that demanded equal rights for all people in the Empire. This new decree was sent to all provinces and officially reached
Tunisia in 1840 during the reign of Ahmad Bey.52
Ahmad Bey accepted the decree but did not execute the new laws so that he could show other countries that Tunisia was not part of Ottoman Empire.53 He postponed the execution of the laws by claiming that implementation of such laws were impractical in
49 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 61. 50 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 1, 44. 51 The Tanzimat were a series of reforms in the Ottoman Empire that brought the culture, education, and society more in line with Europe. 52 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 1, 39. 53 Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 12. 30 rural areas of Tunisia.54 He kept sending gifts to the Empire in an effort to show his loyalty to the Sultan, but pressure and threats continued from Istanbul and even from
Western countries. Eventually, in 1857 the fundamental pact “Ahd al-Aman” appeared in
Tunisia during the time of his successor Muhammad Bey.55 It should be noted that most of the items of the fundamental pact were driven from the Ottoman Tanzimat and the decrees that issued in Istanbul were impacted by French law.56
3. Egypt and Its Impact
After the invasion of Napoleon in Egypt in 1798, the Egyptians were exposed to
European thought and in particular to the French culture. The military occupation of
Egypt lasted only three years, but the impact of that period was great; the scholars who accompanied Napoleon established friendships with the Egyptian scholars. The invasion itself was unique, and it could be considered a scientific discovery rather than a military invasion. The French took over buildings and transformed them into libraries, laboratories, and printing machine houses. They invited the Egyptian scholars to visit them at those facilities; this gesture positively affected the Egyptians who showed their appreciation and admiration of the French knowledge of science.57 Those Egyptian
54 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 1, 64. 55 Ibid., vol. 4, 56. 56 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 66. 57 Ahmed Ezzat Abd al-Karim, the history of education in the era of Muhammad Ali, (Cairo, the Egyptian Renaissance Library, 1938) 24-25. 31 scholars would later produce various translated books and enrich the Egyptian culture, especially during the reign of Muhammad Ali.58
Muhammad Ali started a new policy of comprehensive reform founded on transforming the knowledge of the West. This policy lead to the translation of European books in modern sciences into Arabic language, and in addition, new schools were built in the European style. Many Egyptians were sent to different European countries to learn modern sciences, especially in military fields, which was similar to the reform movement of the Ottomans and Tunisians. Those who completed their education in Europe would return and start teaching in newly opened modern schools, work in factories, or military institutions, as the priority was to build strong modern army. This reform movement had an effect on a similar movement that took place in Tunisia during the first half of nineteenth century.59 This section presents the two major ways through which Egypt had its influence on the reform movement of Tunisia:
a. The Journeys of Tunisians to Egypt
The geographical location of Egypt between Arab Maghreb and Hijaz made Egypt the most important center for Maghreb pilgrims for they would stop in Egypt on their way to Hijaz and on their return home. Cairo was considered an essential transitional station for the Maghreb pilgrims until the end of nineteenth century.60 Travel to Arab
58 Jamal al-din al-shiyal, Refaa Rafia al-Tahtawi 1801 – 1873 (Cairo, Dar al-Maarif press, 1958) 14-15. 59 Jamal al-din al-shiyal, History of the translation and cultural movement in Egypt during the era of Muhammad Ali, (Cairo, Dar al-fiekr al-Arabi press, 1951) 77 -80. 60 Lila al-Sabagh, the Presence of Maghreb in East Arab countries, Maghreb Historical Journal, issues 7-8 (Tunis, 1977) 78-98. 32
Mashriq from Arab Maghreb was not restricted to religious duties, as gaining knowledge was also a crucial reasons, for Mashriq was seen as a place of knowledge.61
Many Tunisian students headed to Egypt in order to complete their education at al-Azhar after finishing their early years at Zitouna Mosque; their number was huge to the extent that al-Azhar designated a place adjacent to it called “Gallery of
Maghrebah”.62 Maghrebah communities in several Egyptian cities were formed. The members of those communities settled in Egypt, but their aim was either pilgrimage to
Mecca, to continue their education, or commercial activities.63
b. The Modern Books Written by Egyptian Reformists
The most popular books in Tunisia that were written by Egyptians in the nineteenth century were those by the prominent reformer Rifaa al-Tahtawi. Most of the
Tunisian elite read his famous book about the city of Paris and its dwellers, titled peculiarly, “Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz.” The subject of the book was the progress and the civilization he witnessed in the few years he spent there before 1846. Bin Diyaf mentioned that when he accompanied Ahmad Bey in his visit to France, they found that
Paris was magnificent and advanced in all aspects of life, just as Rifa'a al-Tahtawi had described in his book.64 The impact of this book was so great that Ben Diyaf would quote from it and use it as a reference, despite the fact that he seldom quoted or referenced from
61 Ibid., 83 62 Ibid. 63 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 77. 64 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 1, 46. 33 non-Tunisian authors.65 The Tunisian reformer, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, also stated, in his book “Aqwam al-masalik” (the best ways in knowing the conditions of kingdoms) that whoever wanted details about France should read Chapter 13, Essay 3 of al-Tahtawi’s book.66 Furthermore, the Tunisian Mahmmad Makhlouf commented on his admiration of
Tahtawi’s book.67
c. The Magnitude and Extent of the Egyptian Influence
The influence of Egypt on Tunisian reformists during the first half of nineteenth century was different from the impact of Europe and the Ottoman Empire because of the following reasons. First, the news about reform and civilization in Egypt after Napoleon’s invasion rapidly reached Tunisia, unlike Europe and Ottoman Empire. The reason might be the constant flock of people between the two countries. Second, the pilgrims and the students who visited Egypt at that time were representatives of all classes of Tunisia; they were not limited to the ruling class or the elite. Therefore, the majority of people heard about Egypt news rather than news of the other two areas. Third, Tunisians would prefer to accept ideas from Egypt rather than from the Ottoman Empire; this was because many characteristics were similar and held in common between Egypt and Tunisia whereas the
Ottomans were viewed as occupiers who sought securing their own interests.68 The feel of viewing the Ottomans as occupiers was manifested in the independence movements that appeared in Egypt and Tunisia during the early years of the nineteenth century.
Egypt and Tunisia had a common ethnicity and spoke the same language; therefore, it
65 Ibid., vol. 4, 91. 66 Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, Aqwam al-masalik fi maarifat ahwal al-mamalik, (Tunis, Tunisian press, 1867) 69. 67 Muhammad Makhluf, Shajarat al-Nur al-Zakiya Fi Tabaqat al-Malikiy, (Cairo–1930) vol. 2, 107 68 Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 12. 34 was normal that the influence of Egyptian reformers was huge in magnitude and their books were widely spread in Tunisia. The Ottomans influence would be second in rank because the Turkish language was considered second in line after Arabic.69
In his elaboration about the reform movement in Tunisia during the reign of
Ahmad Bey, historian Ibn Ashur stated that “the reform movement benefited from the personality of Ahmad Bey who was ambitious and seeking independence from Ottomans by any means … and wanted to follow the Egyptian renaissance example. This view had its deep effect on Tunisian renaissance; especially, because of Arabism, closeness, and flood of Egyptian publications”.70
In confirmation of the Egyptian influence on the reform of Tunisia, it is important to mention that the leaders of the two countries had good relations. The Tunisian ruling class saw Egypt as an example to be followed, and Ahmad Bey’s admiration of
Muhammad Ali was great. The Tunisian commission in Cairo and Alexandria that sent newspapers and books to Tunisia played an important role during the reign of Ahmad
Bey; as a result, many Egyptian intellectuals went to Tunisia and held positions as politicians, businessmen, and consultants.71 Proof of good relations between the two countries was that no Egyptian publications were forbidden from being distributed in
Tunisia during that time.72
69 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 77. 70 Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 12. 71 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts for reform in Tunisia, 341. 72 Ibid., 78. 35
Chapter Two
The Internal Factors
1. The Policy of Ahmad Bey
Ahmad Bey is considered one of the reformers who had perceived the foundations of the Western renaissance in the modern era. He was keenly observant and following the debates about Western-style reform in Istanbul and Arab Mashrig among the contemporary thinkers and the advocators of reform. His dream was to build strong country and achieve an industrial and a scientific leap that was similar to the European renaissance. He realized that accomplishing such a task was not easy, especially because of the European tendency to control Ottoman provinces.
First, Ahmed Bey made several administrative decisions in an attempt to gain popularity and secure the domestic front. He eliminated taxes that were imposed on the markets.1 Then, he moved forward in achieving his reform objectives by progressively expanding the military sector.2 The number of soldiers committed to military services reached almost thirty thousand, and they were trained and equipped following modern standards. However, faced with financial difficulties, he could not complete his mission; however, his reign witnessed great development and improvements in comparison to the previous reigns. In 1840, he established the military school and brought trainers and teachers from France and Britain to teach modern sciences; this school contributed to
1 Muhammad Othman al-Sonosi, Mosamarat al-dhreef Be Hosin al-Tareef, Ed. Muhammad al-Shathly, (Tunis, Dar Bu Salama press, 1983) 53. 2 Muhammad Bu Teraa, al-Muhammadiya “the Versailles of first Mushir”, (Tunis, Dar Carthage, 1995) 21. 36 translating books into Arabic language (informal Arabic).3 He was able to bring expertise from Europe because he had good relations with European countries in all aspects of life4. He developed the Navy by improving the Navy Base at Porto Farina (Ghar al-Milh) and adding twelve warships to its fleet, he founded the Arsenal of La Goulette (Halq Al-
Wadi) in an attempt to imitate European kings, and he built the Palace of Muhammadiya just fourteen miles southeast of the capital. Unfortunately, his successors abandoned this palace after his death.5
His famous visit to France in 1846 stood as an evidence and reflected his interest in reform; right before his departure from Tunisia, he addressed his people and said: “… surely, the public interest necessitated my action to visit France, only God knows that my passion to you and to the interest of the Beylik compelled me to conquer fear for your security, and bear the travel hardship for your comfort.” 6
Ahmad Bey’s attempt to achieve independence from Ottoman Empire became clear through his conduct. First, his direct communication with European countries escalated with the passage of time, but unfortunately the Europeans took advantage of him. They disguised their colonial orientations and used him in an effort to assure security and equal rights to Europeans in Tunisia. Second, he was worried about potential external dangers, from Ottomans and to a lesser degree from the Europeans. The fear was justified because the Ottomans re-controlled Tripoli following the occupation of Algeria
3 One of those books “Mohmat Sna’at al-Tubjiai”, Tunisian national library, Category No. 18671. It is a manuscript written in clear Maghreby hand writing. Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 14. 4 Ziade, Origins of nationalism, 13 5 Muhammad Bu Teraa, al-Muhammadiy, 23 -27. 6 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf: vol. 4, 93. 37 by France. The outside threat played a vital role in opening the communication channels with Europe and in particular with France.7
The communication with France was not limited to political affairs, but it was extended to the economic field; the French provided assistance and sent him expertise in response to his request as ge intended to establish several projects. The most important of them was the textile factory (Dar al- Malf), in addition to some renovations in other sectors, but the majority of his projects failed.8 The decisions and deeds of Ahmad Bey paved the road for the independence of Tunisia. The Beylik that was relatively closed on itself started a new policy of openness toward the outside world, independently making its own decisions. However, the religious and worldly ties with the Ottomans were not cut; this fact was proven when Tunisia sent naval support to the Ottomans during the
Crimean War.9
The policy of Ahmad Bey was focused on developing the Army and the Navy.
The two sectors were his favorites and had his continuous support without regard to their financial expenses. It was questionable that the Beylik needed the huge buildup of the
Army because Tunisia was of no match to either of its two powerful neighbors, the
French and the Ottomans. For instance, if a large scale invasion was carried out by
France at that time, the Tunisian resistance would not have been able to last for long. The
Bey was aware of this fact and accordingly directed his policy toward developing good relations with France; he would not even hesitate to seek help from them if he felt
7 Muhammad Mowada, Tunisian Translation Movement, (Tunis, al-Dar al-Arabia, 1986) 34. 8 Al-Hadi al-Taimomi, Tunisian peasants in the countryside (Tunis, 1999) vol. 1, 142. Also, Brown, the Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 353- 369. Brown refer the projects failed to its high costs. 9 Muhammad S. Mazli, the Heirs of Husayni Throne, (Tunis, Tunisian press, 1979) 32. 38 pressure from the Ottomans, with whom he had unstable relations. The frequent demand of Ottomans for reform enforcement and payments of dues worried Ahmad Bey, especially considering their re-establishment of direct control of Tripoli in 1835. The support from France was guaranteed because any direct control of Tunisia by the
Ottomans meant facing the Sultan’s military on the eastern border of Algeria. The relation between France and Tunisia came into existence. In 1836, rumors spread that
Istanbul intended to send its fleet to Tunisia, hence the French government did not hesitate to dispatch its warships to Tunisian territorial waters. Istanbul understood this warning, and thereafter followed a restricted policy of strengthening relations with
Tunisia.10
During that time a dispute emerged between Ahmad Bey and the Ottomans.
Ahmed Bey refused the credential approval of the Austrian consul who had been sent by the Austrian Consul in Istanbul instead of being sent directly from Vienna by the head of the state. The rejection indicated that Ahmad Bey would not acknowledge being part of the Ottoman Empire. Immediately, he sent a delegate to Istanbul to further explain his position; surprisingly, the result of the discussions was in his favor. The Sultan appointed
Ahmad as Bey of Tunisia for life, and eliminated forever the annual due payment. Since that date (1845), the Sultan never sent the yearly regular authentication letter (Faraman) to Tunisian province in order to renew and confirm the validity of the ruler for another
10 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 21. 39 year. Furthermore, he stopped requesting the annual amount due and asking for reforms.11
When rumors spread that the Ottoman Empire was preparing for an attack on
Djerba, the French consul assured Ahmad Bey that he would get their full support to repel any aggression from Istanbul. During his meeting with Ahmad Bey, the consul mentioned the word “independence”; however, the Bey and his consultant wanted to avoid any surprising incidents, hence they preferred to wait until they received an official letter from the French government in confirmation to the consul’s statement. The French government backed away, fearing a negative outcome on the international level,, and instead they chose silence as the best strategy.12 Ahmad Bey discussed the subject of independence with Louis Philippe I, the King of France, in a private conversation; however, the King commented that “It is too early to talk about independence. But you can depend on France in maintaining the status quo.”13 The pragmatic ruling class of
Tunisia was aware that it would be unrealistic to consider independence without the support of France. The Tunisian military might be able to repulse any Ottoman aggression from sea or land; however, Ahmad Bey and his men had a firm believe that the best defense would be the clear support of France. Istanbul would not take the risk and involve confrontation with France in Tunisia.
Nevertheless, the Bey continued advancing the Tunisian military; he was not fond of the military and its maneuvers, but he had the tendency to greatness and majesty. He
11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 22. 13 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf: vol. 6, 17-18. 40 was following the examples of the Sultan and the Egyptian ruler, both of whom were focusing on building their armies to evolve within the direction of their plans for development; Ahmad Bey’s focus was no exception. The Tunisian experience had positive aspects. First, the military school provided modern education and gave opportunities to that generation to advance and achieve progression. Second, the new factories, such as the textile factory, opened the doors for employment and for obtaining gainful skills. Third, new procedures were using modernization to replace the old system that was unproductive.
In 1852, the ruling class of Tunisia openly discussed the need and the feasibility of maintaining huge military sector; this issue was also raised by some Cabinet members in
1850 right after the cholera epidemic. However, this time they opposed Ahmad Bey who always refused any reduction in the budget allocated to the military sector, without considering the status of the treasury. The opposition was based on the shortage of revenue. The Minister of War and the Minister of Navy declared that the fundamental task of the military was to secure the domestic front, and the fund allocated to the military was far more than what was needed for that task. Tunisia had little use for a huge army because international agreements were the basic policies that governed and regulated relations between countries; the Bey reluctantly accepted their opinion.14
It is unusual to observe such a democratic debate in a monarchy system, but the reality was still far from a democracy. The ministers would not dare to challenge the opinion of Ahmad Bey, but the scene was set before they were involved in discussions.
14 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 4, 147-148. 41
The ministers’ objection and argument had the support of the powerful Prime Minister,
Mustafa Khaznadar, who was the valuable assistant of Ahmad Bey and had earned his unquestionable trust. Despite the fact that the military was an important source of personal profits and wealth for Mustafa Khaznadar, he had no choice but to reduce the size of the military and the number of soldiers because the Treasury was empty.15
2. The Impact of Ahmad Bey’s Cabinet on Tunisian Finance and Economy
During the Ottoman Empire, it was customary to buy young children from the slave markets in Istanbul, raise them in an Islamic way, and then set them free. The
Mamluks were disciplined and had a highly efficient military training; occasionally, they would move up to top positions in the Ottoman provinces. Since the reign of Ahmad Bey in Tunisia, the top Mamluks who assisted him were called ministers. Some of them had military ranks with glorified titles, such as Emir Alai (colonel). They held several top positions in Tunisia, such as the Prime Minister, Minister of Labor, the War Minister, the
Navy Minister, and the Foreign Minister. Their task limits were not clearly identified and their powers were at the discretion of Ahmad Bey, who used to send them to other countries to perform a task, consulted with them on urgent matters, or dispatched them domestically for an inspection tour or a security issue.16
The Beylik autocrat system produced the elements of corruption within the government officials and the ruling class.17 The most influential and important minister
15 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 24. 16 Al-Hadi al-Taimomi, Tunisian social history (Tunis, 1997) 13-14. 17 General Hussayn, Hasm al-Aldad Fi Nazilt Mahmud bin Ayad (the detailed facts of bin Ayad’s case) Ed. Bin Bilghith, (Tunis, 2002) 10. 42 during this reign was Mustafa Khaznadar,18 originally a Greek, who sincerely served his master Ahmad Bey and the country at the beginning. But later he focused on accumulating wealth for himself, even at the expense of the public.19 He was the most influential person in the ministery because he held his position for thirty seven years, and through cleverness and greed he collected money.20 However, he did attempt to save
Tunisia using his wealth when the country declared bankruptcy. He took practical measures to fulfill this task; he had eliminated unnecessary expenses of the palace at
Bardo, reduced the staff and members of committees, and stopped the execution of several projects.21 However, Mustafa Khaznadar inflicted more harm to Tunisia than good, as his corruption and financial thefts along with those of his assistants stood as clear proof of that. But the grievous mistake he made was his proposal of getting loan from abroad and his plan to borrow money from the European businessmen in Tunisia; this action created debt distress in the country.22
The above discussion about the policy carried out by Mustafa Khaznadar provides a look at the effects of such policy on the financial conditions of Tunisia. As mentioned above, Mustafa Khaznadar stayed in power for more than three decades while accumulating wealth, but eventually he put the country at risk. His self-centered mentality, greed, and injustice led him to develop an irresponsible system that could be classified as feudalism. For example, any newly appointed qaid had to pay specified
18 Mustafa Khaznadar was the first one named officially minister in the province. Muhammad Bin al-khoja, Pages of Tunisian History, Ed. Hamady al-Sahly, (Beirut, Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1986) 119. 19 Ziade, Origins of nationalism, 11. 20 al-Taimomi, Tunisian social history, 14. 21 Ziade, Origins of nationalism, 15 22 Abd al-Rahman Tshanji, Tunisian issue and the Ottoman Empire, Trans. Abd al-Jalil Tmimi (Tunis, 1973) 40. 43 amount to the Chief Minister at the time of his appointment; otherwise, the qaid must relinquish his position. The qaid would usually collect more than what he had to pay from the people under his authority. He would sell all the commercial licenses issued for import and export, and control the employment market, appointing people in positions based on the amount of bribe they pay. In addition, he would take the wealth and the property of rich people if they had no heirs.23
In addition, he exploited the revenues of the country with the help of Mahmud bin
‘Ayad who in turn collected huge amounts and fled to France; no doubt Khaznadar got his share.24 After Mahmud bin ‘Ayad fled the country, Naseem Shamama was put in charge of the Beylik’s revenue money; he had no wealth when he was appointed in that position, but he rapidly enjoyed wealth to the extent that he loaned the government twelve million francs.25 The taxes imposed on agricultural products was one-tenth of the quantity produced (oshr) in accordance to the Islamic law, so the oshr collected from the wheat production was under the disposal of Naseem Shamama who had the approval of
Khaznadar.26
Deliberately, Khaznadar would bargain or delay the salaries of government officials in an effort to force them accept any amount he would suggest; he even had price tags on military ranks and medals. His uncontrollable desire of accumulating wealth
23 Muhammad al-Sonosi, al-Rihlla al-hijaziya,) a Trip to Arabian Peninsula) Ed. Ali al-Shunofi (Tunis – 1981) vol. 2, 476-291. 24 General Hussayn, Hasm al-Aldad, 23-30. This is something apparently repeated in Tunisian history, see Muhammad bin Omar al-Sonosi, Tashhied al-Adhhan be bilad al-Arab wa al-Sudan, Ed. Khalil Asaker, (Cairo, 1965) 15-17. 25 After a short period he fled, too, to Italy. General Hussayn, Hasm al-Aldad, 26 T. N. A, the financial notebooks, Notebook 2020, specified for the export of wheat based on the commercial licenses 44 led him to transfer some of the money allocated for the Zaghouan Canal project to his personal projects. Another example of his theft was his exploitation of the Muhammadiya
Palace fund, a project that was carried out under the supervision of his assistants. But by far, the worst of all his actions was taking over all the money and jewelry of the Bey and members of his family right after his death.27 He also participated in financial trade with the European banks28 and stopped sending financial assistance to the sacred Masajid in
Hijaz until it was resumed when Khayr al-Din Pasha took responsibility for that fund.29
Thus the Tunisian revenue and the personal wealth of many individuals were misused or stolen by Khaznadar; he deliberately and systematically inflicted bankruptcy on Tunisia, and as a result of that, the International Financial Committee (International
Commission) had the upper hand over Tunisia in 1869.30 It was not strange that later
Khayr al-Din wrote that he was responsible for leading the country to bankruptcy.31 In
1853, the Crimean War started, and Ahmad Bey had decided to help the Ottomans militarily, but he was desperately in need of money to fund the military mission. It was domestically impossible to secure the amount needed for the mission; he had no choice but to borrow from Paris. He asked Khayr al-Din to accomplish that task.32
27 al-Sonosi, al-Rihlla al-hijaziya, 495- 498. 28 Muhammad bin al-Asfar, the Financial Speculation of Khaznadar in France and the world, al-Ithaf Journal, 11, issue 68 (Tunis, 1996) 11-16. 29 Muhammad Bin al-khoja, al-Surrah, (the Hijaz Fund, how it started and how it ended) Zaytona Journal, (Tunis, 1937) 38-39. 30 al-Sonosi, al-Rihlla al-hijaziya, 505. 31 Ahmad al-Sonosi, a letter from Khayr al-din to khaznadar, al-Sadikiya Journal, issue 20 ( Tunis, 2000) 24. 32 Khayr al-Din originally a Caucasian and at that time was in charge of the Military School, a good Brief biography for Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi in; al-Sadik al-Zomaraly, Famous Tunisian, Ed. Hamade al-Sahely (Beirut, 1986) 97-100. 45
Khayr al-Din carried on negotiations with the French in order to obtain a loan in the amount of twenty million Francs. The loan contract was signed in November 1853, but its execution was delayed to a later time.33 Ambiguity surrounded the role of Khayr al-Din in that matter; Ibn Diyaf stated that he intended to delay the negotiations and the completion of loan process.34 If Ibn Diyaf’s claim was right, then Khayr al-Din would not act alone without the support of others. The possible reason would be receiving order from Khaznadar, to delay finalization of the contract due to the fact that Ahmad Bey had been partially paralyzed since the summer of 1852 and all power was in the hands of
Khaznadar, the Prime Minister.35
The other interpretation of the failure to secure immediate loan from Paris was the controversial lawsuit between the Tunisian government and a province Tunisian official who fled to France after being accused of stealing the province money. The French planned to delay the loan until the lawsuit was settled; Tunisia was demanding fifty million Francs from the previous official who became a French citizen later on in 1853 by a decree from the king of France.36 However, the accused official filed a counter lawsuit against the Tunisian government in an equivalent amount. The previous official was none other than the notorious Mahmoud bin Ayad (1810 – 1880); he was born in
Tunisia and in 1847 became a partner of Khaznadar, who granted him all government funding agencies. In addition, he was the contractor who was in charge of buying supplies for the Palace and the military and also the director of the state stores.
33 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 2.6 34 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 4, p. 156 35 Ibid., 157. 36 General Hussayn, Hasm al-Aldad Fi Nazilt Mahmud bin Ayad. 46
Furthermore, he was responsible for monitoring Tunisian trade with assured support from
Khaznadar as well as running the National Bank that was established in 1847with the task of issuing currency for the province. Within a period of five years (1847 – 1851), the profit of those two partners was estimated as being between fifty to sixty million
Francs.37
Bin Ayad travelled to Paris with the intention of buying wheat after the shortage that occurred as a result of the cholera epidemic. He took the opportunity to apply for
French citizenship for himself and his partner in case they invoked the anger and wrath of the Bey. The situation in 1852 was critical with a severe shortage of wheat after a bad harvest season; this was the indication to bin Ayad that time had come to flee the country.
He set for France to sell oil-export licenses and buy wheat for his country using the money he would receive. When he reached Paris, he remained there, justifying his action by saying that he was sick and to stay there for treatment; he never went back home.38
The seriousness of bin Ayad’s case was not realized momentarily; When Naseem
Shamama, who was in charge of the state’s revenue money, submitted the accounting books of his former director to the Prime Minister, the truth was revealed.39
In general, the lawsuit was not settled until 1856, when an arbitration committee appointed by Napoleon III was finally able to reach to a resolution. The time to resolve the lawsuit was prolonged to three years; the extension was not because of the skill of the
37 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 27-28. And General Hussayn, Hasm al-Aldad, 40-66 . 38 Ibid., 29. 39 Naseem Shamama (1805-1873) a Tunisian Jews fled to Italy in 1864, after being accused of stealing the state money, amount of 20 million and General Hussein was in charge of the lawsuit which took 10 years to be solved. Hasm al-Aldad Fi Nazilt Mahmud bin Ayad, 37. And, Ganiage, Les origines du Protectorat, 151. 47 lawyers or the geographical distance between France and Tunisia but most probably the position of Khaznadar contributed to the delay based on a letter he wrote to Khayr al-Din.
As mentioned above, Khaznadar was a partner of bin Ayad, but when bin Ayad fled and the lawsuit was filed, his position in Tunisia was not weakened. He was able to convince
Ahmad Bey that he was innocent of any guilt and was not aware of bin Ayad’s deeds; the only embarrassment he was encountered would be the refusal of French authorities to grant him citizenship. Indeed he was worried about the lawsuit, because his name might come up during the investigation. However, he was able to avoid this impasse by refusing to provide the documents related to the grain deal that had an estimated value of more than sixteen million Francs.40
After three years of disputes and evidence, the outcome of the lawsuit was in favor of bin Ayad. The court rewarded him sixteen million Francs as reimbursement in return for the material that he delivered to the Tunisian government without payment and for his loss of property and wealth that had been confiscated by the government. This verdict also gave the Tunisian government fourteen and half million Francs from bin Ayad for the bank currency and oil-export licenses. The verdict was against Tunisia mainly because of the denial of the arbitration committee to give Tunisia its requested oil-export licenses and the refusal of Khaznadar to submit important documents.41
All Tunisian ministers and deputies were involved in theft and corruption; they were mostly self-centered officials who sought luxurious life and accumulation of wealth
40 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 32. 41 Ibid., 33. 48 at the expense of the poor farmers and laborers. Even Khayr al-Din, the enlightened reformer, had accumulated great wealth; he had land, olive presses, public bathes, and palaces for which he imported furniture from Europe.42 Many people who were not from
Tunisia would persuade him to grant them gifts and he would give them generously.43
The corruption of the top government officials that lead to the bankruptcy of
Tunisia raises the question about the administrative system that was implemented and its efficiency. In other words, was there any role for the administration system in impacting the economy and the reform movement in Tunisian province?
3. Administration Sector
The Husaynid Dynasty reign was known for “its administrative corruption and thefts.”44 Nevertheless, some officials were honest and able to earn huge wealth in a legal way; on the other hand, there were others who misused the Beylik revenue and utilized it to cover their own personal expenses.45 The administrative structure favored the old
Ottoman way; the country had sixty qaids (governors), each of whom was assisted by a deputy and tribal chiefs. The qaid acted as a bey in his district; he was responsible for tax collection and performed the duties of a judge, but he could be removed from his position by the bey at any moment. Since the reign of Hamuda Pasha, the administrative positions had been bought and sold, but when Ahmad Bey came to power he cancelled this method. In spite of this edict, buying and selling of positions continued in a disguised
42 al-Taimomi, Tunisian social history, 14. 43 T. N. A, B. 78, F. 926, D. 3, from Ahmad Faris al-shidiyak to Khayr al-Din, thanks him for the gifts 44 General Hussayn, Hasm al-Aldad, 10. 45 Muhammad bin al-Asfar, The judge’s Notes in a case between Bin Ayad and Naseem Shamama, al-Ithaf Journal, issue 67 (Tunis, 1996) 15-16. 49 ways, and bribes and compulsory gifts were common. Certain families had monopolized the positions of qaids since the eighteenth century; for example, the qaids in the northern rich districts and oasis were Mumluks. They earned huge wealth by controlling the olive and grain trades, and their collection of taxes was imposed on markets and on agricultural lands owned by the Bey. Usually, the Mumluk qaids of those rich districts would reside in
Tunis, the capital city, near the ruler’s palace, while their deputies acted on their behalf in the districts.46
Notably, the districts created many nonessential administrative positions, and as the folk saying states, “Gifeez mashaykh ala wabiyat ra’ya” or out of the basic unit of measurement branched many small units. Creation of extra positions without the need for them was a form of political posing.47 The people and the chiefs in the districts complained about the extravagant positions;48 even the deputies expressed discomfort because of their increase in number and the ambiguity of their duties.49 After 1830, the
Beylik administrators would lend the farmers certain amounts of money before crops maturity, but then they would take over their production at a low price, frequently using excessive force. This was true especially for olive crop, because the foreign demand for olive oil was high, and they would make significant profits from the oil trade.50
The qaids and the deputies were not paid by the government, but they were allowed to take a certain percentage of the taxes collected in their districts, hence they
46 al-Taimomi, Tunisian social history, 14-15. 47 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf: vol. 5, 127. 48 al-Taimomi, Tunisian peasants, 151. 49 Al-Dhawe Khwaildiya, al-Humama in 19th century, 1 ed (Tunis) 99-100. 50 al-Taimomi, Tunisian peasants, 152. 50 would consider their positions as service in a private “Feudal Land” that could make them rich in a short time. They would exploit the farmers and expose them to the worst kind of blackmail, delivering only one-fifth of the taxes collected to the central government. The qaids and deputies believed that their positions were not secure and the
Bey could terminate them at any time, so in turn they put pressure on their subordinates; this was a major flaw of the administrative system.51
The political and the administrative positions were associated with heinous acts, such as imposing unfair taxes, bribes, and exploitation of power.52 In an attempt to avoid those wicked practices and reform policies, Ahmad Bey cancelled certain types of taxes, offered gifts to the government officials, removing fees that were paid when a tribal or a village chief was nominated, and also removing extra taxes imposed on markets.53 In order to prevent the government official from imposing more taxes in the future other than those decided by the central government; the officials would be paid decent salaries that would avert them from other revenue sources.54 In other words, “No official should extend his hand, or make gesture by his eyes, or desire; to take money or property from the public, small or large”.55 Finally, in order to assure justice and fairness, the government relinquished four percent of its taxes to the tribal chiefs. If the decree was implemented properly, it could have made a considerable change in Tunisian administrative and financial policies and the people would have gained from elimination
51 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 216. 52 T. N. A., B. 141, F. 512, D. 17405, a letter from the martial low council to the Bey status the persecution of the Beylik. 53 Baron De Canon, Omana al-Sowak (Trustees markets in Tunisia) Trans. Abd al-Jalil al-Tamimi, Maghreb Historical Journal, issues 7-8 (Tunis, 1977) 121. 54 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 46-47. 55 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 4, 205. 51 of trespasses.56 The negative impact of the administrative misconduct was not limited to causing damage to the public, but it also reduced the state’s revenue and had harmful security and political consequences.
4. Reformist Thought
In any society, the implementation of reform comes after in-depth discussions and debates about its advantages and disadvantages. The leading groups in such discussions should always be composed of the ruling class and the intellectuals; however, the discussions become productive and effective only if they objectively rise from within. In other words, ideas or reforms dictated from external sources would not be valuable unless there are individuals or groups inside the society who would accept, defend, and execute them and would continue working within those boundaries. The internal impacts of the reformist thought in Tunisia were so efficient they strengthened and purified the call for reform. The reformist thought was manifested through the executive pragmatic thought and planned reform thought; those two patterns of thought dominated Tunisia during the period 1837 - 1857; they were connected, interacted, and overlapped each other.57
a. Executive Pragmatic Thought
The ruling class in Tunisia felt the direct external dangers that surrounded them and threatened their security, as Algeria was occupied by France and the Ottomans once again controlled Tripoli. Ahmad Bey loved independence, aggrandizement, and greatness; he was convinced that Tunisia must take advantage of progress, civilization,
56 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 47. 57 al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts, 101. 52 and military power following the modern European example. This meant that reform had a solid ground to stand on it, but it would face difficulties and grow in a tough environment. Under those conditions, Tunisian affairs mandated a rapid and uprising
“reform thought” that would secure wealth and military power in a short time.
During the time of 1830 – 1835, along with the “Executive Pragmatic Thought,” two other popular trends appeared that were dominated by “lack of experience and simplicity”.58 The supporters of the first trend yielded to the power of the Western civilization, The French occupation of Algeria convinced them that the West had overwhelming superiority; hence, they advocated taking from the West as far as circumstances permit. On the other hand, the supporters of the second trend were repelled from all other prevailing thoughts. They were full of anger and despair, classifying the new conditions in the country as a mark of religious demise. They avoided interacting with that life style, and they saw the greatest success for themselves in being safe from the end results.59
Ahmad Bey, as the ruler of the country, had the final say in determining the outcome of those debates; in 1837, the decision came from Bardo Palace in favor of the executive pragmatic thought. This point of view was the most realistic of all, given the circumstances of that time; it appeared to be the best way to achieve the crucial goals.
The pillars of this reform plan were a group of prominent leaders. The most important of them were Ahmad Bey, Mustafa Sahib al-Tabia, Ben Diyaf , and Mustafa Khaznadar
58 Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 9. 59 Ibid., 10. 53
(who was at the beginning of his reign); all three worked as consultants with Ahmad and
Muhammad Bey. The dominant idea in this reform identified industry as the basis of
European renaissance that they had to emulate in order to follow the example of the
Europeans.60
In 1837, the reform started enthusiastically and steadily based on the European procedures and methods. Aggressive reforms were introduced in public administration, the Army, and the Navy. They built schools (most important was the Military School), camps, and factories. They brought in military officers, teachers, engineers, and physicians from Europe, and they sent students to learn sciences and military skills. This reform movement was practical and had a restricted goal whose main purpose was to rescue the country from foreign interference. However, what it did do was to create awareness among the elite and developed an idea calling for an absolute comprehensive new reform instead of a pragmatic partial one.61
b. Planned Reform Thought
The planned reform thought appeared when the activities and performances of the executive pragmatic thought were at their peak; this new trend came into existence as a result of implementing the first trend. Mahmoud Qabado, the pioneer of the new trend, was not well known until he had the opportunity to interact with the European teachers in the Military School.62 This was a good opportunity for him to learn directly from the
European scholars, and he benefited from the lessons they taught. His background in the
60 Al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts, 104. And Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 12-14. 61 Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 15-17. 62 Makhluf, Shajarat al-Nur al-Zakiya Fi Tabaqat al-Malikiy, 393. 54 field of Arabic language and Islamic studies did not hold him captive within the boundaries of the two disciplines. This sufi, writer, and poet was eager to increase his knowledge in modern sciences as well. He had the chance to understand modern sciences in depth when Ahmad Bey asked him, along with an Italian administrator and chosen group of students, to translate and edit the summary of lessons that were taught by foreign teachers at that school as well as books in the military arts and skills.63
The idea of Qubado about reform is based on taking modern sciences from the
West, focusing on applied sciences and mathematics, and sending students to Europe to learn and transform their knowledge. His book thoroughly elaborated on instructional ideas about reform in all aspects, such as his call for reform in governing systems and regulations of the administrative sector, following in European methods.64 He also called for reviewing and regulating the economic system, emphasizing that there would no progress unless the economy began to progress. His opinion in regards to the military was to preserve the regular official army and to introduce modern training and procedures in all military sectors. He encouraged building military institutions such as compounds, equipment, and ports, as well as preparing factories, engineers, and military expertise.65
His ideas were widely accepted among two groups, the Military School with its distinctive members, khayr al-din among others, and Zaytouna Mosque, where Qubado previously had taught. Here, he was able to form a chosen group who adopted his reform ideas. By the end of Ahmad Bey’s reign, the planned reform thought was the most
63 Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 13. 64 Mahmud Qabado: Diwan Qabado (collection of poems) vol. 2, 34-35. 65 Ibid., 39, 45, 49, 60. 55 popular and dominant idea in Tunisia. Ahmad Bey agreed to introduce changes and make reforms in the governing system based on laws and regulations that would secure rights, administrative regulations, financial control, and assure fairness in development.66 The new laws and regulations determined the introduction of a new way of life in Tunisia during the reign of Ahmad Bey’s successor. In 1857, the Security Pact was issued; this was followed by the country’s constitution in 1861.67
The negative conduct of the government officials caused huge damage to the
Tunisian economy in general; nevertheless, the Tunisian society gradually moved toward progress and development. This was because people were relatively homogeneous, they had lived together for a long period of time, the majority of them followed the Sunni school of thought, they spoke one common language, and the number of unsettled
Nomads was reduced.
66Ibn Ashur, al-haraka al-Adabiya wa al-Fikriya Fi Tunis, 16, 31. 67 Al-Imam, Ideas and thoughts, 146. 56
Chapter Three
Traditional Industries
1. Remarkable Traditional Industries in Tunisia
During the nineteenth century the dominant type of industry in Tunisia was traditional handicrafts in spite of modernization attempts. The definition of the term
“industrial handicraft” was used ambiguously; it meant multiple and various trades that could not be identified clearly. Tunisian cities were known for the diversity of handicraft activities that were the source of income for many city residents. Some of those handicrafts, in particular carpets, copper, and leather, were sold beyond the boundaries of the cities and the province; they reached Islamic and European countries.1
Notwithstanding the slowdown in the business of handicraft during Hafsid Dynasty rule2 by the end of eighteenth century and the beginning of nineteenth century, this sector gained ground and vast recovery.3
In the middle of nineteenth century, multiple and various handicrafts were successful and profitable in Tunisian. The following section elaborates on important and actively dominant handicraft sectors at that period of time. Those handicraft industries
1 al-Habib al-Janhane, Kairouan in the boom of Islamic civilization in Arab Maghreb, (Tunis, Tunisian press, 1968) 137. 2 Robert Brnschwak, history of Africiah in the Hafsid era, Trans. Hamadi al-Sahily, (Beirut, Dar al-Gharb al-islami, 1988) 208-211. 3 al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics, 268-269. 57 include various types of textiles, ceramics, and leather, most of which were exported in big quantities to foreign countries and generated considerable revenue for Tunisia.4
a. Chechia Industry
The chechia industry in Tunisia had existed since the time of the Hafsid Dynasty, but it was on a small-scale. During the time of Othman Dey (1598 - 1610), the promotion of this industry expanded. The expansion occurred mainly because the immigrants who came from Andalusia (the Iberian Peninsula) who were skilled in this trade; hence, it became one of the important sources of revenue in Tunisia.5 This trade activity continued to increase in size and its quality elevated, and when Hamuda Pasha came to power, he increased its funding and protected it. The prices for this craft product increased annually, and its market was added to several Islamic countries.6
According to Magdeesh, the chechia industry was profitable and continuously increasing around the end of eighteenth century and the beginning of nineteenth century.7
Eventually, as a result of the foreign economic influence, its rate of production fluctuated in Tunisia; as Bayram V and al-Hasheshi mentioned, the reason behind the fluctuation was the tremendous increase in its supply from the European large-scale producers and the decline of its prices.8
4 Luis Valencia, Maghreb before the occupation of Algeria 1790-183, Trans. Elias Morcos (Beirut, Dar al-Hakika, 1988) 68-69. 5 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 2, 31. 6 al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics, 272. 7 Mahmmoud Magdeesh, Nozhat al-Andhar Fi Ajaib al-Twareekh Wa al-Akhbar, Ed. Ali al-Zawy, ((Beirut, Dar al- Gharb al-Islami, 1988) vol. 1, 118. 8 Muhammad al-Hasheshi, al-Adat Wa al-Takalid al-Tunisia (Mores and Traditions) Ed. Al-Jilany bin Yahya (Tunis, 1996) 108. Bayram al-Khamis, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 2, 127. 58
In 1837, Tunisian’s export from this craft reached 1,742,000 Tunisian Riyals, which was equivalent to 2 million French Francs;9 the export revenue escalated until it reached its peak at 3 million Francs between1861 -1863. The annual export revenue started going down because of the crisis and the high competition in Tunisia until it reached 250,000 Francs in 1875.10 These amounts indicate the rise and decline of revenues generated from exporting chechia; the reason becomes clear by noticing that the early Beys focused on developing this sector, and hence its activities escalated. For example, it went up during the reign of Ahmad Bey because he was determined to introduce reforms and strengthen his foreign relations; thus the export moved up leading to an increase in production until it reached its peak in 1863. At that point the country became unstable because of multiple riots, starting with Ali bin Ghadahim’s up rise in
1864,11 and eventually, the debt accumulation on the province led to the appointing of the
Financial Commission by Europeans.
However, the most important factor for the fall of this industry was the increase in the number of foreigners in Tunisia and their control of the local trade and industry; in addition, the counterfeit chechia coming from Istanbul had an impact.12 Since, the
Tunisian craftsmen were exporting to the Islamic world, in particular to Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, the number of workshops in the capital Tunis was more than three hundred,
9 al-Kasab, Tunisian Modern History, 193. 10 Ali al-Mahjoby, French protectorate in Tunisia, Trans. Omar bin Dhow, (Tunis, Dar Siras, 1986) 19. 11 Al-Basheer bin Salama, the revolution of Ali bin Ghadahim, (Tunis, Tunisian press, 1967) 12 al-Kasab, Tunisian Modern History, 196. 59 employing more than seven thousand craftsmen and assistants.13 After 1863, the number of workshops went down to around one hundred at most due to the foreign competition; in spite of its low quality, the foreign products widely spread in Arabian markets because they were cheap.14
b. Textile Industry
The Tunisian textile industry was considered the most vital sector in the Beylic, with tens of thousands craftsmen working in this sector. Some cities, such as Djerba,
Gafsa, and Bilad al-Jareed specialized in making blankets, while other wool weaving products were produced in various Tunisian centers such as Tunis, Kairouan, Sossue,
Monastir, Djerba, and other coastal cities.15 The most important center of all was Djerba which was famous for producing good quality scarves along with luxurious wool products such as blankets, and aba’at. This industry generated great profits for Djerba, which meant they enjoyed the highest living standard in Tunisia.16 Notably, the quality of products in this industry were distinctive from one area to another, as such each was known by its city in spite of utilizing the same traditional tools (Minwal),17 due to the availability of good quality raw materials and the difference in skills among those areas.
In this industry, Djerba and Sousse were the best centers; therefore, in international exhibitions the Beylic used to bring blankets and abaat from Sousse.18
Clearly in this sector, there were distinctive variations in the quality and the values of
13 Abd al-Aziz al-Thaliby, Tunis al-Shahieda (the Martyr), Trans. Hamadi al-Sahily, (Beirut, Dar al-Gharb al-islami, 1988) 116-117. 14 al-Kasab, Tunisian Modern History, 197. 15 al-Thaliby, Tunis al-Shahieda, 117. 16 al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics, 275. 17 al-Hasheshi, al-Adat Wa al-Takalid, 121. 18 T. N. A, the documentary catalog , a century of participations in international exhibitions, (Tunis-2004) 81. 60 products among the Tunisian cities, depending on the skills of local craftsmen in each area. In addition, the carpet industry that needed skillful craftsmen and was produced at residential homes was given a special place among the various textiles because the majority of workers in this were women. Its distinctive qualities were known even beyond the borders of Tunisia: the popularity was a result of its attractive and homogeneous colors as well as its natural dyeing materials.19
c. Mills, Olive Presses, and Their By-Products
The cultivation of grains and olive trees, the main agricultural products, created two important industries, namely milling and olive pressing. In rural areas, milling was often done in residential homes; women would mill each day their needed grains. Mills that operate using animal-power, which were classified as traditional, were used in cities and were owned by Tunisians.20
The center of olive presses was Sfax City; the olive oil from here was shipped to
Italy and other European coastal countries. Due to the spread of olive gardens in Tunisia, new centers for olive pressing were established in various areas within the province.21
The concentration on olive pressing was not solely because of availability of huge quantities of olive, but it was also due to the difficulty of extracting oil from other plants.22
19 Amal al-Mahfudy, Merchants and craftsman in Kairouan, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of History (Tunis, 1993) 51. 20 Muhammad al-Marzoky, al-Badw in their Travel and Settlement , (Tunis, al-Dar al-Arabia, 1980) 215. 21Kamal BuAtor, Supply and Pension in Tunisia, College of Arts and Sciences, Department of History (Tunis, 1991) 90-91. 22 Aiz al-Din Mousa, the economic activity in Islamic Maghreb (Beirut, 1988) 239. 61
In the nineteenth century, the olive pressing business was run by experts, and the director was known as “El-Rraiys.” The pressing factory was called “Sultan’s pressing” or “Edababah”; its cost was high and an ordinary person could not afford to buy it.
Sometimes Beys would give it as a gift to the officials or their family members; in a letter from Bin Diyaf to Khayr al-din, he informed him that Ahmad Bey granted Khayr al-din’s father a milling machine and an olive pressing machine.23
The by-product of olive pressing was the soap industry; people rented many shops in order to make soap, and this industry especially flourished in cities.24 The prosperity in this industry was due to the availability of the raw material (oil) in many Beylic areas, and in particular, the coastal cities; the Tunisian soap became popular even in foreign countries, and it was exported from Sfax generating reasonable revenue in comparison to other principal products.25 During the reign of Ahmad Bey, he established a soap management department in order to prevent increases in its price and cheating in its weight; this industry was regulated by controlling soap weight and setting reasonable prices.26 The prices were determined based on the quality of the soap; often, good quality soaps were exported while the low quality ones were left for local consumption.27
As a consequent of the grinding or milling industry, the need for the utilization of sieves became essential, and hence its industry appeared in Tunis, Kairouan, and Sousse.
The work in this industry depended on traditional tools such as halfa plants and leather
23 Muhammad S. Mazli, Tunisian Documents (Letters from Ben Diyaf), (Tunis, Tunisian press, 1996) 20. 24 al-Mahfudy, Merchants and craftsman in Kairouan, 54. 25 T. N. A., Notebook 1937 specified for the export from Sfax city. 26Muhammad bin al-Tib bin Salama, Al-‘ikd al-Monajjid fi akhbar al-Mushir al-Basha Ahmed (The well-worn string of pearls of the narrative of the high pasha Ahmed) Tunisian national library, Manuscripts, Category No.18618 (Tunis) 91-92. 27 T. N. A., the documentary catalog, 81. 62 robes. In fact, the size of holes on the sieve would always determine the type of material used; this trade was purposely centered in grain markets, near the Zaytouna Mosque and
Bab al-Manarahto serve the local needs.28 The city of Nabeul was famous of making rugs, and the number of workers was in hundreds. Their products were sold all over
Tunisia, and sometimes exported to Algeria and Libya, but they were often created for local consumption, too.29
The basket industry was available in all areas of Tunisia because of the availability of its materials (reeds, Halfa, and palm fronds). The most important product in this industry was “The Umbrella”, a large hat that was used at field or as a protection from the sun’s heat. The basket industry included several other products such as dish-covers, fans, different sizes of baskets carried on horse or camel backs, rugs, brooms, and various kinds of robes.30 Tunisia produced huge quantities of Halfa roots that were popular and profitable; it was an ancient industry that had markets until the twentieth century and was used to make various items. It was customary to appoint a person to be in charge of those markets; this industry had skilled craftsmen who were mostly Tunisians, specifically from Tunis, the capital city.31
d. Tanning and Leather Products
Leather tanning was a large source of revenue, and its industrial activities in this sector were important.32 The leather tanned in the city of Kairouan gained considerable
28 al-Hasheshi, al-Adat Wa al-Takalid, 157. 29 Muhammad S. Mazli, the development of Tunisian economic, 172. 30 Ibid.,172. Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 243-244. 31 al-Hasheshi, al-Adat Wa al-Takalid, 143. 32 al-Thaliby, Tunis al-Shahieda, 117. 63 reputation for its superior quality, matched only by the famous Moroccan leather tanning industry.33 However, this industry was continuously declining for two factors: first, the competition from European products that were much cheaper in price than the Tunisian leather, and second, the government’s monopolization of the leather tanning sector. Ibn
Diyaf stated in his book that “the government takes over most of the province leather, from butchers and others, paying low price … no one should dispose leather without permission from the state.”34 Surely, this latter factor played the big role in preventing people from entering the leather tanning trade. In 1845, Ahmad Bey issued orders to regulate this sector after realizing the inefficiency of the old rules and receiving many complaints from the public; the regulations were intended to release the pressure that was imposed on people.35
Shoe manufacturing represented the vital part of the leather industry; it employed thousands of workers, mostly in Tunis, Sfax, and Kairouan. Tunisian made shoe were popular in the Islamic countries located on Mediterranean Sea.36 This shoe industry also suffered from severe foreign competition, as imported shoes were of higher quality than the traditional ones produced in Tunisia. By the beginning of the second half of nineteenth century, the traditional makers had no customers other than rural people who still wore traditional costumes.37 We could infer that the Tunisian craftsmen did not adjust their products in accordance with the consumer market demand while their
33 al-Mahfudy, Merchants and craftsman in Kairouan, 53. 34 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 4, 55-56. 35Ibid., 80. 36 al-Thaliby, Tunis al-Shahieda, 117. 37 Bayram al-Khamis, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 2, 127-128. 64 competitors acted accordingly. However, what the local craftsmen would say is that they were firmly attached to what they had traditionally learned, and they would not introduce any changes.
Arabian saddle making was one of the important traditional industries; its market in Tunis was the biggest in the country, with around seven hundred workers were in this trade. This work force was composed of the owners, the master craftsmen, and the regular laborers; the saddles were decorated with silver and stone ornaments.38 This handicraft started declining when the military force, the regular customers of this trade, was reduced after the reign of Ahmad Bey. A European traveler visited the leather warehouse in Bardo and noted that the value of decoration on some saddles reached twenty thousand riyals.39 This European traveler had great admiration of those saddles; he mentioned that he asked the craftsman to make for him a replicate of one of them.40
This craftsmanship continued even after the army reduction during the reign of Ahmad
Bey, because the tribes that surrounded the cities preserved the custom of riding horses and the knighthood.41
e. Other Traditional Industries
The metals industry contained copper and any craft work related to blacksmithing and dyeing. This sector had about 46% of the craftsmen in the mid-nineteenth century
38 Ibid., 128. 39 Boclair Muskauo, Smiloso in Africa (German prince trip to Tunisia) Translated from German to Arabic by Munir al-fendri, (Tunis, Bayt al-Hekma, 1989) 129. 40 Ibid., 166. 41 al-Mahfudy, Merchants and craftsman in Kairouan, 55. 65 and contributed a big share of the Tunisian revenue.42 It supplied the items and tools needed by the majority of the Tunisian population, and in particular, the tools that were used in rural areas. For example, the traditional tools that were in use at that time helped the blacksmithing sector; they provided scythes, plows, and any low-tech tools that could be crafted by a blacksmith at his shop. There were also sword makers who had a profitable trade with Africans.43 Many of the sword makers were located in Tunis.44 The copper pot craft was one of the oldest crafts that could be found in many Tunisian cities and still contributes to the country’s economy; the workers in this sector represent a big percentage of the craftsmen in Tunis.
The wood industry was common in the northern forest areas and coastal part of
Tunisia; this craft was mostly limited to supplying the quantity needed for local consumption, such as agricultural tools and household furniture.45 The craft of inscription on stone was diminishing, but when one of the ministers, Yusuf Sahib al-Tabia, started building the mosque that was later named after him, he chose a group of craftsmen to decorate it, and since then the craft has revived again.46 In 1844, the King of France,
Louis Philippe, wanted to decorate his palace, so he asked Ahmad Bey if he could send him skillful craftsmen; a group of them were dispatched to France in order to accomplish that task.47
42 Ibid., 55. 43 al-Hasheshi, al-Adat Wa al-Takalid, 112. 44 Gustav Nachtigal, Ṭabib al-Maḥallah (The camp doctor), Tunisia in 1863 – 1868 German physician’s letters, translated from German to Arabic by Munir al-Fendri (Tunis, 2003) 141. 45 Muhammad S. Mazli, the development of Tunisian economic, 176. 46 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, vol. 7, 89-91. 47 al-Hasheshi, al-Adat Wa al-Takalid, 117-118. 66
The ceramics industry has existed in Tunisian since the reign of Phoenicians.48
However, its development reached the peak when the immigrants from Andalusia
(Iberian Peninsula) came to Tunisia; many of them were skillful in this craft. Top quality ceramics that had beautiful pictures and attractive colors were made and painted in workshops at Tunis, Nabeul, Kairouan, Sussoe, al-Monastir, and Djerba.49 The most outstanding ceramics were made in Djerba and Nabeul; for example, the pottery made in
Djerba was famous and shipped to most Mediterranean countries via Djerbian boats.50
The craftsmen in Djerba benefited from the huge quantities of soft mud that were at their disposal; from it they made attractive white ceramic pots and shipped them to Tunis and
Tripoli.
The perfume industry was concentrated in Tunis, Nabeul, and Sfax, which used to export most of its products; this sector had the support and encouragement of the government.51 The availability of various types of good quality trees in Tunisia helped this sector, with jasmine and rose serving as the most important trees.52 The rose perfume produced in Tunisia was of good quality that almost matched the Indian rose; it was competitive and used to be exported abroad in large quantities.53 However, the competition from European perfumes that were popular in Tunisia contributed to the decline of the local perfume production; notably, the makers and traders of perfume in
48 Edward Ray, Arab Maghreb, Tripoli and Kairouan, in 19th century, Trans. Mustafa Mahmud (Tripoli, 1968) 161. 49 Muhammad S. Mazli, the development of Tunisian economic, 170. 50 Edward Ray, Arab Maghreb, 161. 51 al-Thaliby, Tunis al-Shahieda, 118. 52 Boclair Muskauo, Smiloso in Africa, 70. 53 al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics, 276. 67
Tunisia were considered among the Tunisian notables.54 They had a designated area called the market of Atareen; this market still exist in a location adjacent to Zaytouna
Mosque.
There were other traditional craft shops that provided services or satisfying the needs of people. For example, wool weaving, food processing, baking, sweet makers, musical tool crafting, and book binding were specifically in Tunis.55 In general, the traditional industries had to be monitored, administered, and regulated because of their important effect on the economy and the security of the country. It was essential for the
Beylic to regulate the traditional handicraft sector; hence, the following section presents the enforced regulations in Tunisia during the nineteenth century.
2. Handicraft Regulations
During the nineteenth century, the handicraft shops in Tunisia were individually owned and operated; few of them had affiliation to associations. The associations would usually be formed by individual craft shop owners in order to regulate business within the sector and to set the rules that would govern interactions with the outside world. For instance, the “Chechia Group” had a board that was composed of ten distinctive members; they would select one member to act as a director, whose role was to oversee the conditions of this industry and the rights and the obligations of group affiliates.56
The origin of the handicraft associations in Tunisia came from the principles of
“Foundation Trustees” or “Board of Trustees,” which had well known expertise as its
54 al-Hasheshi, al-Adat Wa al-Takalid, 131-132. 55 Ibid., 123. 56 Bin Salama, Al-‘ikd al-Monajjid fi akhbar al-Mushir al-Basha Ahmed, 214. 68 members; the association system in Tunisia goes back to the Hafsid Dynasty (1228-1574) or even earlier than that period.57
A group of craftsmen who own craft shops in any craft would establish an association and select ten experts in that field to form a board of trustees. In the association hierarchy, the president would be at the top, followed by the masters (shop owners), then the apprentice or trainees who work for free (sometimes they would be given a minimal grant for meals) to learn the craft and eventually be promoted to the rank of senior apprentice (Kalfawat); apparently this ranking system was common in Maghreb region.58
The craft shops would have a designated area for each type of the handicraft alongside the roads inside each city; the crafts such as leather tanning that require large areas would be located in the outskirts of the city. In the nineteenth century, the conditions for the craftsmen started to decline as a result of the European economic interference; the government reaction was strict adherence to the old system. The prevailing system of associations eliminated competition between craftsmen and hindered creativity because the advocators would refuse any new methods of performing a task, always claiming that their goal was maintaining their high quality products.59
During the reign of Muhammad al-Sadig Bey, the government took practical decisions to regulate this sector by giving orders to keep the ethics of the industry. For instance, in respect to the chechia industry several orders were issued: “1863 Order,”
57 Brnschwak, history of Africiah in the Hafsid era, vol. 2, 208-211. 58 Valencia, Maghreb before the occupation of Algeria, 69. 59 al-Taimomi, Tunisian peasants in the countryside, vol. 1, 396-397. 69
“1870 Order,” “1878 Order,” and “1880 Order.” The first three orders were about the ethics of making chechia, but the most important order was the “1880 Order”; according to this order, selling European chechia was forbidden except in shops that were exclusively allotted for them, so that customer would not fall victim to mixing fraud.60
In 1875, Muhammad Bey issued a new legislation concerning the weaving handicraft with the help of the weavers themselves who were eager to protect this industry and maintain its ethics.61 This legislation came as a result of complaints submitted by the weavers against those craftsmen who use artificial colors in dyeing their products instead of using the natural colors extracted from leaves of plants. In spite of the government’s regulations of the traditional industries and its decisions and orders to maintain and protect the ethics of the handicraft sectors, the move was political and administrative or within the framework of the tax system.62
After all those procedures, the government kept the inefficient association system unchanged; because no improvements were achieved, the limited procedures were insufficient to make progress in the handicraft industry. When Khayr al-din became the prime minister, he faced the challenge of advancing the handicraft industry, but he could not make any changes. As one of the scholars pointed out, the main factor for the weakness of the traditional industries in Tunisia was “The international trade agreements
60 Muhammad S. Mazli, the development of Tunisian economic, 101-102. 61 Ibid., 103. 62 al-Mahfudy, Merchants and craftsman in Kairouan, 67. 70 signed by the Beylic, made Tunisia, practically, an open market for foreign commodities; in spite of the increase of the import taxes from 3% to 8%”.63
The handicrafts industry regulation with its multiple rules played the role of preserving the status quo but in turn hindered any industrial progress. It was for the protection of the conservative craftsmen while an obstacle for the creative ones. In fact, the regulation prevented innovators from developing new methods that could bring progress to the industry and assist them in overcoming the foreign competition.
63 Krieken, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, 252. 71
Chapter Four
Modern Industry
The Bey’s industrial reforms were not limited to a particular industry, but they were intended to impact multiple industries. The military industry was the utmost vital sector for him, followed by the civilian industries that supported the military sector such as the textile factory and the extraction of minerals; there were some attempts to modernize traditional industries. This chapter discusses modern industry during the reign of Ahmad Bey, and its two major components: military industries and civil industries.
1. Military Industries
An integration existed between all facilities that belonged to the military sector that combined theoretical and practical branches. At the theoretical level, Ahmad Bey established the military school in Bardo for the purpose of training Tunisian officers who would eventually replace the army officers who were predominantly of Turkish background and command a 26,000-man army that was projected to stand as a symbol of
Tunisia's sovereignty.1 On the practical level, he built factories for weapons and war ships for his Nizami army and other military troops.
a. Weapons Industry
Tunisia had a weapon factory that contained several sections for making guns and shells. One section was for dissolving and molding copper and iron and another section was for making shells. The dissolving and molding factory, named by Ben Diyaf as “Dar
1 Harold D. Nelson, Tunisia, a country study (Washington, D.C., 1988) 26. 72
A’mal al-Madafia” or the house of making shells, was established at the beginning of
Hammuda Basha’s reign in a suite at the Hafsid Palace.2 The bey took care of that factory and frequently visited it in an effort to encourage and motivate workers. He was interested in the factory to the point that when the Moroccan Sultan gave him a large quantity of copper he dissolved it and made more than a hundred guns.3 However, this factory was incapable of suppling all the needs of Tunisia; hence, the state had to import military items from Europe according to Buckler Muskau, who visited Tunisia in 1835 and stated that “the guns he saw were most probably made in European’s”.4
In 1840, Ahmad Bey established Kashlat al-Tubjia, which was a military compound outside the capital on the main road to Bardo. He designated it for manufacturing and maintaining the artillery. The building was originally a palace that belonged to his father’s uncle, which he widened to hold 4,000 soldiers with their weapons, storage, and horses; one section of the compound was designated as weapon factory.5 Ahmad Bey also renewed and organized the iron dissolving factory that was built by Hammuda Basha.6 By the beginning of fourth quarter in the nineteenth century, those factories were idle, as Muhammad Bayram stated, “the artillery factories were closed.”7 The reasons for shutting down the factories were not because of the lack of skilled workers but rather due to the difficult economic conditions in Tunisia, especially after the debt crisis. The Tunisian workers were well trained and skillful, as they knew
2 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf Ahl al-Zaman, vol. 2, 165. Suliman Mustafa Zabies, The monuments of Husseiniya State in Tunisia, (Tunis, Sabie press, 1955) 44. 3 Ibid., vol.3, 39. 4 Buckler Muskau, Semilasso in Africa, translated from German to Arabic by Munir al-fendri (Tunis, 1989) 64. 5 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf Ahl al-Zaman,vol. 4, 30. 6 Rashad al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics in Tunisia, 220. 7 Bayram al-Khamis, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 2, 128. 73 how to make and repair weapons.8 In addition to the shortage of funds to cover the expenses of those factories, the other reason for closing of those factories could be traced back to the interest and willingness of the beys who succeeded Ahmad Bey to continue in the development of the military sector; they were not eager to allocate fund to this sector and they had no military ambitions.9
b. Gunpowder Industry
A gunpowder factory existed in Tunis, the capital, before the reign of Ahmad
Bey; this factory was founded by Hamuda Bash in 1787,10 and after three years it was able to produce more than 200 Quintal (Kantar) a year. The factory continued its production after the reign of Hamuda Basha, and in 1825, it became a franchised industry that was monopolized and managed by a French man. To strengthen this monopoly, a decree was issued to prevent the import of gunpowder.11 One of the travelers described this factory in 1835 by pointing that “the strangest thing was that the men [workers] seated at the entrance were smoking … And the type of gunpowder made here is thick.”12
This gives us an idea about the gunpowder industry before Ahmad Bey but it needs to be determined if changes occurred to the gunpowder industry during the reign of Ahmad
Bey or it stayed intact.
8 “Mohmat Sna’at al-Tubjiai”, Tunisian national library, Manuscripts Category No. 18671. First five pages. 9 Nicola A. Ziade, Tunisia in the protection era, (Cairo, the Arabs study center, 1963) 50 -51. 10 Suliman Mustafa Zabies, The monuments of Husseiniya State in Tunisia, 44. 11 Rashad al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics in Tunisia, 214, 216. 12 Bclair Muskau, Semilasso in Africa, 164. 74
Ahmad Bey built a gunpowder factory near Manouba and another one in Jam.13 It seems that this industry was enhanced by importing new machines from Europe by sending an engineer named Du Bois to purchase machines needed to make capsules and gunpowder, as Du Bois said in his letter to Mustafa Khaznadar.14 Notably, the process of buying new machines was a chance for Khaznadar to get valuable gifts; as the engineer mentioned at the end of his letter “I brought to you an ice maker machine, a telegraph apparatus, and other important tools that are the newest invention in Europe.”15 This indicates how much the Tunisian ruling elite were impressed by the European new technologies.
Information about this industry is rare, although some historians pointed out and agreed that this industry did exist and succeed in Tunisia, particularly during the era of
Ahmed Bey who had expanded his army by building new military factories.16 What may have been mentioned is that the gunpowder industry workers of Baja and Mater cities were more skillful than workers of gunpowder sector in other Tunisian areas.17
Apparently, the workers in this industry were careless in general as a traveler to
Tunisia described a bomb and gunpowder factory, saying that the workers were sitting and smoking in the arsenal without knowing how risky that was.18 Moreover, Ben Diyaf confirms that the gunpowder store near the capital city exploded as a result of smoking
13 Manouba: a city in the North side. Jam: a city located in the east coast of Tunisia. 14 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 571, D. 26, a letter from Du Bois to Mustafa Khaznadar. 15 Ibid. 16 See, Maan Ziade, Khayr al-din al-Tunisi and his book Aqwam al-masalik, (Tunis, University press, 1985) 36. Ahmad Taweily, Tunisian Civilization History, (Tunis, Tunisian company press, 2002) 150. 17 Bayram al-Khamis, Safwat al-Itibar, vol. 2, 129. 18 Boclair Muskauo, Semilasso in Africa, 164. 75 within the store.19 These incidents happened because the employees did not receive necessary training in safety procedures; this justifies the insistence of Ahmad Bey to have a comprehensive reform project that would lead Tunisia to modernization.
c. Ship Industry
Before 1837 a ship-factory was in La Goulette (Halk al-Wadi, north of Tunis); two warships were built in that factory in 1764 – 1765, as Ben Diyaf mentioned: “In a remarkable day the bey and his men attended the celebrations for pulling the two warships that were made in the factory”.20 It appears that the factory was expanded and its capacity increased to produce many and ships in the reign of Hammuda Basha. In
1791, the British Consul sent a report to his country stating that the Tunisian Navy was rapidly growing strong, and indicated that the reasons behind that were the new shipbuilding factory in La Goulette, and the abduction of foreign ships by Tunisian pirates.21 The factory continued in its goal and produced more ships.22
Ahmad Bey was interested in the ship industry in order to protect the Beylic and its water territories. Hence, he established another factory in La Goulette, which started operating in 1841, a place where the warship was built that was given as a gift to the
Ottoman Sultan, according to Ben Diyaf, “a fully equipped ship with all what it needs and loaded by artillery weapons that were made I Tunisian.”23 The shipbuilding industry was not free of mismanagement or faults, as it had faced multiple problems, such as the
19 Ben Diyaf, al-Ithaf, Vol 4, 142. 20 Ben Diyaf al-Ithaf, Vol 2, 162. 21 Rashad al-Imam, Hamuda Basha’s Politics in Tunisia, 221. 22 Ben Diyaf, al-Ithaf, Vol 3, 129, 158. 23 Ibid., vol. 4, 58. 76 interference of t politicians in the decision making of technical matters or inefficiency of planning strategies. Ben Diyaf narrated an incident that could cited as an evident of inefficient planning and interference by the bey in technical affairs. According to him, in
1853, Ahmad Bey and his official entourage came to La Goulette in order to celebrate launching of a newly manufactured warship named after the bey. But unfortunately, they failed to launch the ship because its size was larger than the harbor entrance. In fact, the
French engineer who made the ship had informed the authorities at the beginning of the project that it would not be technically feasible to build a ship of that size, but Ahmad
Bey insisted on the size he determined.24 This incident was embarrassing and caused great financial loss; it showed the extent of ignorance among the ruling class and how
Ahmad Bey would adhere to his opinion without knowledge. His industry reform failed because he made arbitrary decisions without prior planning or consultation with the experts in their fields.
Foreign competition was prevalent in the shipbuilding industry; many foreign companies found markets in Tunisia and other Ottoman provinces. The French companies sought to monopolize the Tunisian market; hence, they sent representatives to promote their Navy products. The French conducted the purchasing procedures by dividing the total purchase amounts into payments, not paid in cash, but as bonds valued in Tunisian oil.25 As a matter of fact, this shows the financial crises that Tunisia sustained
24Ibid., 142-143. Ben Diyaf commented on this by using a traditional saying “bringing the carpets before the construction of the Mosque!” 25 Lila Zaghdoud, Reform and Modernization in Tunisian Navy, Tunisian University, History Department (Tunis, 2002) 19-20. 77 in addition to the cost of vessel repairs. All this indicates how much expensive were these projects and the purchases of new military parts, which was unnecessary in any case.
After the reign of Ahmed Bey, the Tunisian Navy was impaired; a traveler to
Tunisia in 1864 reported that “after the death of Ahmed Bey the main factory for shipbuilding stopped operating.”26 The Tunisian Navy became totally dependent on the
European navy and the European ships manufacturers because there was not even a working maintenance station that would repair Navy vessels or other ships owned by the
Beylic; most ships needed frequent maintenance because they were old. The Tunisians had to send their ships to European harbors whenever they were disrupted, especially to
Marseille, France, since France monopolized the Tunisian market.27
The most prominent attempt to build the military after Ahmad Bey was carried out by Khayr al-din al-Tunisi, who was the Navy Minister. He attempted to develop the ship arsenal with the task of shipbuilding and repair instead of sending them abroad for repair, but the arsenal was still dependent on European experts. He renewed the La Goulette factory and brought new machines to make it work perfectly, but his attempt was not successful because it deteriorated after Khayr al-din left the ministry, and in fact, it became worse than before.28
Mysteriously, this industrial sector deteriorated and failed even to do maintenance or make repairs after it used to build ships. This decline might be attributed to the use of steam power that had been in existence since 1841, which was a new technology for the
26 Gustav Nachtigal, Ṭabib al-Maḥallah (The camp doctor), Tunisia in 1863 – 1868 German physician’s letters, translated from German to Arabic by Munir al-Fendri (Tunis, 2003) 95. 27 Lila Zaghdoud, Reform and Modernization in Tunisian Navy, 21-22. 28 Ibid., 23-24. 78
Tunisian workers29. Notably, the highly technical tasks in this industry were done by the
European experts, and thus Tunisian benefit from those industries were insignificant. In fact, this industry inflicted huge debts on Tunisia without adding any noticeable industrial development.30
2. Civil Industries
a. Mineral Extraction (Mining)
The development of mineral extractions was one of the most important aspects of the Tunisian economy. There were a few mining centers in Tunisia in the nineteenth century, but to what extent did the Tunisians contribute to mining activities?
The search for mining started before 1837; the first agreement was signed between
Mustafa Bey and Benoit, a French engineer, to utilize the lead mine near the capital.
Benoit stated that the miners confirmed the availability of metals.31 This mountain was known to the local people as the “Lead Mountain.”32 Benoit estimated the cost of extraction project to be around 220,000 francs, and he demanded 40,000 francs as his share for his services.33
Ahmad Bey signed an agreement with another engineer, Benfiglio from Sardinia, to search for the metal, and he issued a decree to give this engineer a license in 1838 for a period of 5 years.34 The information about Benfiglio’s search results is not available to elaborate on how his work was performed. In 1844, Ahmad Bey granted another license
29 Ben Diyaf, al-Ithaf, Vol 4, 31. 30 Lila Zaghdoud, Reform and Modernization in Tunisian Navy, 24. 31 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 575, D. 1, the agreement between the French engineer Benoit and Mustafa Bey. 32 Ben Diyaf, al-Ithaf, Vol 4, 77. 33 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 575, D. 1 the agreement between the French engineer Benoit and Mustafa Bey. 34 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 577, D. 10, Ahmad Bey’s decision to grant a license for searching minerals 79 to the French engineer Benoit to search for metal in the same location (Adjbh). Benoit submitted a detailed report about that site and the task he would carry out to extract the lead. This report was essential and practical for contingency measures as the report would help in determining the feasibility of the mining project. The result of his report was that
“the return from Adjbh section would be beneficial if the task of mining is performed appropriately, and skillful workers were employed; its production could be 65 % more than the production of the previous project.”35
The report emphasized the importance of employing skillful workers in order to achieve high production; since the domestic market had shortage in skillful mining workers, it would be essential to seek help from abroad at a higher cost. This engineer honestly conducted his task, but other cases revealed the dishonesty of foreign experts.
For example, in reports to the government from Tunisian officials who were overseeing the projects, many citations stated that Europeans were exploiting these mines, to the extent that they committed embezzlements. A case in point was a citation against an engineer named Maryano Yara, who had taken metal, and when the government official questioned him, his response was, “this would be sent to Malta for testing and analyzing.” Also, the government official complained that some Europeans were uncontrollable.36 This kind of conduct by the Europeans was frequently occurring in the mining extraction field.37
35 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 577, D. 92, B Benoit’ report regarding Adjbh mine 36 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 577, D. 34, a letter from Adjbh mine’s agent to the minister Muhammad Bo-Attur. 37 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 577. This file contains much communication from workers and supervisors with respect to these thefts. 80
The mine in Adjbh was not the only one in Tunisia, as other areas had minerals such as Tebourba. Mr. Letellier, who was the mine supervisor at this location, reported that the Tebourba’s mine had small quantity of metals compared to other locations, and he recommended discontinuing work at this location.38
In an effort to have a comprehensive evaluation of the mining industry in Tunisia,
Ahmad Bey entrusted a European expert, Mr. Letellier, in 1850 with the task of visiting the Tunisia mines and evaluating their feasibility.39 Mr. Letellier visited eleven different mines and submitted a detailed report on the geological components and how to perform extraction of the metals.40 Mr. Letellier stated that those mines would not be feasible unless the current work procedures were modified. Modification should focus on the extraction process that require certain conditions in order to be profitable. The most vital conditions mentioned on the report were the availability of firewood or briquette at a reasonable price, but Tunisia had lacked this condition. The second condition was the existence of water falls essential for operating the turbines, and again, the specified mine locations lacked this condition. Furthermore, roads were not prepared for transferring the raw materials to the deicing places.41
In addition, the lack of fuels and infrastructure such as roads were other reasons for inefficiencies in this industry. Careful examination of the mines files in Tunisian
National Archives revealed that there were no Tunisian workers in technical positions
38 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 577, D. 36, the result of research in Tebourba’s mine by Letellier. 39 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 573, D. 14, Ahmad Bey’s decree to Mr. Letellier. 40 T. N. A., B. 239, F. 571, D. 35, Mr. Letellier’s report. 41 Ibid. 81 since all those positions were occupied by the Europeans. Thus, the Tunisian contribution in this industrial activity was insignificant.
b. Textile Factory42
The textile factory, dar al-malf, was considered an important industrial achievement that will be used here as an example to examine the factors that affected the
Tunisian industrialization movement and to see if it was impacted by external or internal factors. The role played by unethical practices carried out by the state officials, the weakness and corruption of the administration, and the lack of a comprehensive reform guidelines that would lead to radical modernization will also be examined.
Ahmad Bey built a factory in a place named Tebourba, a village 20 miles west of
Tunis. It was chosen for the new textile factory because a dam could be constructed across the Medjerda River to provide water power. The dam and the factory were built under the direction of a French engineer, Mr. Francois Benoit. The opening of the factory was in 1844 with new machinery that was imported from Europe.43 As Ben Diyaf described, “it was a great factory with a high building, at the time, and the machines moving in amazing way that Tunisia has ever had like it before.”44 Ahmad Bey was at the celebration of the opening with his state official.45
42 T. N. A., B. 240, Files 601, 602 and 603all are specified for the textile factory 43 L. Carl Brown, the Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 298. T. N. A., B. 240, F. 602, D 49, Benoit report. 44 Ben Diyaf, al-Ithaf, Vol 4, 76. 45 Ibid., 77. 82
Most of the factory machines were brought in from Marseille by a French merchant to produce the clothing needs of the Tunisian Nizami Army.46 In 1845, the factory was enhanced by other machines, whereas Mahmud Ben Ayad entrusted Benoit to add more machines in the factory; he in turn had signed a contract with a French merchant to deliver the machines.47
One cannot see the importance of this factory without looking at the amount of production and the extent of its contribution on the state’s economy. First of all, the factory depended on the local primary material of wool. In this regard, a report by the factory agent based on a committee composed of five people in 1844,48 the first year of the factory, about the inventory of wool and fabrics in the factory estimated the quantity of wool as 835.770 quintals, collected from many areas within the state. Wool quantity of wool from Tunis was 256 quintals, from Houmama and Majir 168 quintals. Latterly, most of the wool came from Al-Kairouan according to the correspondence between the person who was in charge of wool provision (Rustom) and Qaid Awlad Eideer (one of al-
Kairoun’s tribes); these correspondences detailed the quantity of wools came from those areas.49
Those contacts shows that al-Kairouan was the major city for providing the factory with wool as it was dedicated to breeding sheep which led to its specialization in traditional woolen industries. These transactions provide an idea of how the factory
46 T. N. A., B. 240, F. 602, D 4, from Ahmad Bey to Jean Louis the agent in Marseille 47 T. N. A., B. 240, F. 602, D 38, from Mahmud Ben Ayad to Ahmad Bey 48 T. N. A., B 242, F 301, D 43 the factory agent report in 1844. 49 T. N. A., B240, F. 603, D. 9, a letter from Rustom to Muhammad Bin Wanis confirming that he has been received the wool. Also, there are other letters in the same file contains lists of wool coming from Mater, al- Kairouan, and Awlad Edeer, D 10 and 1. 83 created a movement of trade and economic activity between Tunisian cities. The report also touched on the quantity of fabric that was ready for sale in the factory stores of different types, which was a good amount compared to what was produced in traditional workshops.50
Regarding the fabric production, the factory also enabled the country to dispense in importing the fabric and start producing its own needs, especially for military dress.
Lists written in 1844 by Mr. Faussie, the director, show that the quantity of fabric made included 76, 280 meters of Blue Kings (a type of fabric) valued at 113.800 French francs.51 Another list by the same director estimated in 1844 the value at 108.149 French francs.52 Yet other notes show clearly that the textile factory in its first year was going in the direction of success.
In addition, the lists of machines and fabric written in Italian indicate that machines were brought from Italy too, and as the factory developed in terms of productions, Tunisia exported fabric to Italy during the era of Ahmad Bey.53 Thus exported fabric points out that it was of good quality; it added a new source of revenue to the Tunisian treasury. This can be verified from the contents of a letter sent from the factory director to Mustafa Khaznadar informing him what could be produced by the factory in terms of quality and quantity.54 Mr. Faussie commented in the factory productions by saying that “if the state continues to produce the fabric it would achieve
50 T. N. A., B 242, F 301, D 43 the factory agent’s report in 1844. 51 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 15. List of productions by Mr. Faussie 52 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 16. List of productions by Mr. Faussie 53 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 17, it is a list of machines that should be brought from Italy. The same file contains tens of documents for fabrics that have been sent to Italy, in Italian language. 54 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D. 12, from the factory director Mr. Faussie to Mustafa Khaznadar regarding the factory production. 84 an annual savings that could be thousands of francs as well as it would produce a high quality cloths to the army to make the soldier look like an officer.”55
The factory workers included Tunisians workers in addition to the European supervisors; their number reached 400 or more56, and workers were paid between 4 to 6 pence, which was adjusted for local food prices57. However, at times workers would not receive their wages or would be terminated without notice due to financial disputes between the supervisors and Tunisian government officials.58 This problem was amplified by ineffective management practices, theft, and inefficient work by the
Tunisian workers that contributed to closing the factory.
Essentially, several factors overlapped and affected the success of the factory.
Some were internal factors that related to the level of workers productivity and the mechanical maintenance as well as ineffective management practices. Prominent top officials like Hamida Ben Ayiad, Khaznadar, and al-Qaid Nassim benefited from the
Bey’s policy that increased funds for this project. External factors that affected the operation of the factory included the high wages paid to European technicians and the cost of frequently importing machines.
The factory operation started under normal circumstances, or at least there were not serious problems based on the factory agent’s reports in 1844.59 The factory had begun with simple modern techniques that were, in general, understandable to the
55 Ibid. 56 The number of workers might be more than 400 at period of time, whereas some worker lists without a date on it, and divided according to their job, show that their number reached 642. 57 Brown, 298. 58 T. N. A., B. 240, F. 602, D 14, a letter from smith in Paris to hamida Ben Ayad. 59 T. N. A., B. 240, F. 603, D. 39. And B 242, F 301, D 43, reports by the factory agents 85 workers. Later on they introduced the water engine and textile machines that required higher technical skills that the Tunisian workers did not have; as result, three years later the factory became unable to produce as it had been before. As Brown points out, the major problem faced by the European staff comes as no surprise to those familiar with the history of other peasant societies on the threshold of the industrial revolution. The
European supervisors found it difficult to keep the Tunisians at work, for the supervisors believed that the Tunisians were inclined to be a bit lazy.60 The modern equipment used in the factory, the engine and textile machinery, was complicated for Tunisian workers.
Benoit, the French engineer, visited the factory in 1847 and reported that the lack of control on the engine and textile machinery as well as the lack of maintenance of the factory and the inefficiency of the workers caused serious problems for the factory".61
Available documents show that problems had already begun by the time of Benoit visit to the factory. Many of the machines in the factory were broken down.62 Benoit mentioned, in another report about the factory in 1853, that the engine's major wheel had not been greased even once. Therefore, half of the machines were unfit for work. In the same report, Benoit indicated a lack of professional training to the workers. As a result, the production was different in terms of quality.63 In addition, Tunisian workers did not seem to care about their jobs or how their work should had been done or even cared enough about putting their lives in danger by working with a broken machine. This kind of careless work was common in Tunisia at that time, not only in the textile factory but
60 Brown, 297. 61 T. N. A., B 240, F 602. Benoit Report in November 25, 1847. 62 T. N. A., B 240, F 603, D 51. A report by Hamida den Ayiad sent to Ismael Sahib al-Tabia 63 T. N. A., B 240, F 602. Benoit Report in 1853. 86 also in the weapon factories as mentioned above. This happened because the Tunisian workers did not receive any kind of education or the necessary training to do their jobs.
The chaotic conditions in the factory gave chance to the corrupted officials to begin “stealing.” In fact, just a short time after the beginning of work in the factory, they started buying new machines.64 This factory not only had been subjected to the constraints on the level of workflow but also exposure to the obstacles of "corrupt management," as Mr. Faussie described in his report to Khaznadar.65 Bin Ayiad was requesting, repeatedly, for a financial prohibitive to undertake illusory reforms in the factory.66 Al-Qaid Nassim was also involved in the corruption, too. Proof of his corruption was manifested in taking for himself the amount of financial payment that was supposed to be paid to the workers as their wages. Also, he bribed government officials in order to cover his actions.67 In addition to all that corruption, the factory was looted several times.68
This factory faced challenges that were caused by requesting new machines and reforms from Tunisian officials and the European engineers as well. For example, Mr.
Faussie often requested new textile machinery. In 1860 he requested to refit the factory completely in a modern way;69 after three years he asked to reform the factory once again, but this time it was not only about the machines, he also added the revamping of
64 T. N. A., B 240, F 603, D 38. A letter from Bin Ayiad to Ahmed Bey in 1845. 65 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 3. A report from Mr. Faussie to Khaznadar about what the factory needs and included Bin Ayiad activity. 66 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 6. From Ben Ayiad to Khaznadar. And B 240, F 602. D.4. Musfa Khaznadar’s documents 67 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 24, a complaint against al-Qaid Nassim 68 T. N. A., B 240, F 602, D 22 69 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 3, 06/19/1860 87 walls and roofs.70 When Mr. Faussie signed the contract and received the factory for its operation and management in 1860, the fourth article clearly stated that “Mr. Faussie is responsible of all the financial responsibilities to maintain and manage the factory including the textile machinery”.71 Such payments increased the expenses of the factory and eventually led to unavoidable failure.
The high wages paid to the European technicians and the director of the factory also added to the cost of the factory operation.72 Furthermore, machines that were bought from France never arrived on time. In a letter sent from Mahmud Ben Ayad to Ahmad
Bey in 1845, he stated that he agreed with a merchant from Marseille (Pastry through
Benoit) to bring the fabric machine for the Tebourba factory, but the delivery was not accomplished on time.73
These overlapping operations and corruptions led to the factory decline. Ben Diyaf has the best description of the disappointing sequel to the textile factory project decline when he said: “If only he (Ahmed Bey) had considered that the greatest profit was in clothing his soldiers and the people of his country by this factory so that the value of cloth which is bought from others would remain in the country not to mention the benefits gained by those living near the factory and those working in it, all of which would increase the country's prosperity and stimulate the local markets, etc., then he would not have lost interest. Even giving the factory (free and without paying rent) to a
70 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 5 71 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 10 the contract with Mr. Faussie in 1860 72 T. N. A., B 240, F 601, D 5 and D 46, a letter from Mr. Faussie to Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, he mentions his monthly wages was1000 francs. 73 T. N. A., B. 240, F. 602, D 38, and 48 from Mahmud Ben Ayad to Ahmad Bey 88 merchant to produce the cloth would have been better than to let it remain idle, for it was built at great cost. However, the traits of ruler of the Maghrib tend toward great profits rapidly gained without thought of the future”.74
74 Ben Diyaf, Ithaf, Vol 4, 77. Quoted in Brown, The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 297-298. 89
Conclusion
Most of the modern industrial reforms implemented by Ahmad Bey were not successful, and Tunisia could not afford to carry the burden of them; hence the government decided to discontinue many industrial projects. They reduced the number of soldiers in the military sector and eliminated most of the industries that were supporting the military. By the time of Ahmad Bey’s death in 1855, the Military School at Bardo was the only surviving military institution; eventually, this school was abandoned following the nationwide uprising in 1864, and it was officially closed by the end of
1869.
The inefficiency and failure of the modern industrial reforms in Tunisia were due to the lack of financial resources and poor economy, but above all the policies of Ahmad
Bey in allocating available resources. He spent the country’s revenue in unessential luxurious projects such as building palaces and expanded the military institutions without much concern of how to cover the expenses.
Tunisia had shortage in capital, workers, and markets, which are the three components vital for any development and progress. It had no raw materials such as iron and coal; furthermore, it lacked a rich class that would fund industrial and economic projects. The Bey depended on taxes as the principal source of funding his projects, but the negative consequence of his action was the inability of people to buy commodities; this in return reduced the domestic consumer markets. The limitation in local labor market created the need for foreign skilled workers and expertise that could operate,
90 monitor, and maintain the modern machines. However, the financial burden of hiring the foreigners was huge.
Tunisia was in need of several conditions to achieve modern reforms that would bring about comprehensive change in the society. First, it was essential to have a group that believed in reform objectives. Second, it was vital to maintain a governmental system that would effectively implement the reform, in addition to a wide base of public support that would advocate the idea of reform and defend it. Even though Ahmad Bey and few members of the ruling class were willing to adopt modern reforms, many members of the ruling class, and in particular Khaznadar, would object to modern reforms for the sole purpose of self-centered greed and accumulation of wealth at the expense of the public.
The reform had no social foundation within the grassroots in Tunisia; the majority of the Beylic population was incapable of advocating or defending it; in the public opinion, the reform projects were not profitable and were only associated with excessive taxation. The reform projects were imposed by the ruling class without regard to the public point of view, a common practice in any autocratic system. The driving forces for
Ahmad Bey and the reform advocates were the admiration of the modern Western civilization and the ambitious plan to build a strong independent country; decisions were made subjectively and establishing feasible projects were neglected.
The desire of the European countries to find new markets for their commodities prompted them to look beyond their borders. Tunisia was one of their destinations.
During the reign of Ahmad Bey the number of Europeans and in particular the French in
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Tunisia escalated. They formed large communities, brought new ideas, and flooded
Tunisian markets with their commodities. Foreign competition had become an obstacle for the Tunisian renaissance and contributed to the failure of the reforms applied by
Ahmad Bey; however, the spirit of reform remained strong among the elite, especially among the graduates of the Military School at Bardo and some of the top officials who accompanied Ahmad Bey to France during his famous visit. In conclusion, the plan for reform during the reign of Ahmad Bey, had set the ground for the continuation of modern reform, the only positive outcome.
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