INDIANA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY

Volume XLIX DECEMBER,1953 Number 4

Fusion Out of Confusion, 1854 Roger H. Van, Bolt* As the year 1854 opened, an Indiana correspondent of the Western Christian Advocate wrote: “Our Wealth is now rapidly increasing and our railroads are waking up every Poor Old Rip Van Winkle in the land. The Methodists are rich people in Indiana, and their whole country is growing so rapidly ‘that they will become immensely wealthy in a few short years more. The whole system of things’ is pass- ing away, and for one, I say let it go; give us the new life of the new age; let us feel the impulse of a new power, the forerunners of the millenium. Away with the old fogies . . . . To work is the way to live and to go to heaven. To make plen’ty money and keep it, it is soul suicide; to be lazy and not make any is soul and body suicide; to make it and scat- ter it in blessings over our earth, is sober, Christian, God like action. This is an age of works. One reform produces another.”1 There were indeed signs of progress. Indianapolis was now a city of 15,000 people, with eight railroads completed to it. Its Union S’tation attracted the attention of visitors, for “the sight of four locomotives abreast in it was a sight worth seeing.”2 Even before the news came from Washington that Ste- phen A. Douglas had reopened the sectional case, the coming political season promised to be a “sight worth seeing,” too. The party factions were lining up abreast to await the out-

* Roger H. Van Bolt is Historical Research Specialist, Henry Ford Museum and Greenfield Village, Dearborn, Michigan. This article is a chapter of his Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Chicago, 1950, written under the direction of Avery 0. Craven. 1 Western Chrktian Advocate, January 4, 1854. ZZbid., January 26, 1854. 354 Indiana Magazine of History

come of political developments that promised to interest Indianians. On January 11, 1854, the State Temperance Convention opened at the Masonic Hall in Indianapolis with a meeting that filled the hall to overflowing. Temperance conventions had been held many ‘times before, but this one outdid all the former gatherings. The need for a strong prohibitory law to follow the ill-fated law of 1853 had aroused the tem- perance advocates to renewed vigor. To fit their demands, the Maine law type of legislation seemed ‘to be the most suitable. The convention did not go so far as to inaugurate a new party, as had been feared; it did declare that it would support only those parties that would make temperance an issue, thus putting ‘the matter directly in the laps of the politicians. The resolutions of the convention called upon the churches for support, de- claring that it was the duty of the ministers of the Gospel to interest themselves in the progress of the cause, and to bring the subject before their respective congregations “as often as they can make it! ~onvenient.”~ The organization of the temperance convention was sig- nificant in revealing the party affiliations of the delegates. The state central committee, appointed by the state oonven- tion for the purpose of organizing county meetings, was com- posed of two Democrats and three Whigs. The permanent organization of the state convention itself also cut across existing party lines. The President, Bishop Edward R. Ames, was a Democrat and a Methodist. On the list of vice presidents was Henry L. Ellsworth of Lafayette, king of the speculators in northern Indiana, a Free Soil Democrat, and a former commissioner of patents. James Blake of Indiana- polis was an old settler of that city, long active in the tem- perance reform as it evolved in the Methodist Church; a director of railroads and a merchant, he had been a prime mover of ‘the colonization society and for years was presi- dent of the Indianapolis Benevolent Society. Chauncey Carter of Logansport, born in Connecticut, had been a surveyor for the federal government; in 1847, he was appointed superin- tendent of the Wabash and Erie Canal. Stearns Fisher of Wabash County was a Whig and Baptist; born in Vermont,

3lndiana State Sentinel, January 16, 1854. Fusion Out of Confusion 355 this gentleman was a guiding light on the State Board of Agriculture. T. J. Sample of Delaware County in northern Indiana, a Methodist, had cast his first vote for John Quiniy Adams and had followed the party thereafter. A. Freeman of Valparaiso was a Democrat and a Methodist; his political positions included that of swamp land commissioner for the state. A. C. Stevenson of Putnam County was a Whig, an- other leader in the agricultural societies, and delegate to the constitutional convention of 1851.* These, all vice presidents, had supported many causes and been in numerous political battles in the past. They possessed the qualifications neces- sary to make something of the temperance movement, even if it required creating a new party. Many of them were to return to Indianapolis in July to lend their support to a fusion of the politically disgruntled. The fact ‘that so many of the leaders of the convention were Democrats brought from the Democratic Sentinel the cry that the convention was a Whig scheme to break up the Democracy. There seems to have been some justification for concern. Suspecting danger to their party, the Browns, edi- tors of the Sentinel, on the day of the convention had warned their readers : “There are interested partisans who are pleased with any movement tending to the discomforture of the dominant party in this State. A strong interest is to be sub- served by the defeat of the nominations of the Democratic party.”5 At least one party member tried to make the re- solutions more palatable to the Democracy; he urged the delegates to remove the “search and seizure” clause from the completed provisions. He was talked down, however. It was clear that the delegates did not intend to soften the attack on the liquor interests. Following the state convention came meetings of the county assemblies, which adopted resolutions similar to those of the parent body. The convention in Rush County asked the existing parties to nominate temperance men, declaring

4A Biographical Histow of Eminent and Self-Made Men of the State of Indiana (Cincinnati, 1880), District 7, p. 1; ibid, 102; ibid., District 10, p. 14; ibid., District 11, p. 16; ibid., District 6, p. 75; ibid., District 10, p. 18; Paul Wallace Gates, “Hoosier Cattle Kings,” Indkna Magazine of Histior2/ (Bloomington, 1905- ), XLIV (1948), 1-24; Jacob P. Dunn, Greater Indianapolis (2 vols., Indianapolis, 1910), I, 391; Indiana Daily Sentinel, January 12, 1854. 5 Indiana State Sentinel, January 11, 1864. 356 Indiana Magazine of History that if its wishes were not followed the temperance advocates would bring to the canvass independent candidates.e The growing temperance movement in Indiana was not part of a deliberate action to form a new political party, yet it developed certain features that made it resemble a politi- cal organization. There had been many temperance conven- tions before this time, but they had been held under the aus- pices of local temperance groups, organized at a local level, as, for example, the Washingtonians or the Sons of Tem- perance. There had been evidences of the church sanction- ing political reform, as in the resolutions of the Methodist conferences. But this January, 1854, state convention was not sponsored by the Methodist Church, despite the fact that the Western Christian Advocate reported that it appeared as if the whole Methodist, Church was present at the conven- ti~n.~If nothing else, the movement had all the appurten- ances necessary for the formation of an organization that could express itself upon political issues. All this took place before the old parties met in May. The temperance issue was hard put in its attempts to hold the center of the puMic stage, but the movement con- tinued to roll along as more county conventions met during the months following the state conclave. A correspondent of the Whig Journal lined up the cause with the forces of good when he wrote: “The spirit of Righteousness, Free- dom, and Temperance is one spirit, and that of Wickedness, Slavery, and Drunkenness is the other.”8 The growing poli- tical connotations of temperance were kept before the eyes of the party leaders, giving them much concern in the months before their conventions were to be held. Por example, a constituent, S. L. Ensley, wrote to Governor Joseph A. Wright warning him that he must hold with the temperance cause, even though the Sentinel had come out against the resolutions of the state temperance convention. Ensley claimed that there were as many temperance Democrats as Whigs, and that “Old Bill Brown” was wrong in the stand the Sen-

6Rushville Rewublican. March 8. 1854. cited in Charles Zimmer- man, “The OGgin-and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana, from 1854 to 1860.” Zndiama Magazine of History, XI11 (1917).. 215. 7 Western Christian Advocate, .January 18, 1854. 8 Indianapolis Morning Jouml, February 9, 1854. Fusion Out of Confusion 357 tinel had taken. He warned that the editor would get a “stab” that would last for years.e The danger of splitting the party was apparent to many, since the issue cut across party lines. The Sentinel, however, continued to warn the threatening insurgents: “If Whiggery and Abolitionism can throw in the Temperance question as an auxiliary to aid them in electing a Whig legislature, they will achieve a triumph by the aid of temperance Democrats, which their political principles can never command.”lO As the time for the Democratic convention neared, a journal as influential as the Madison Courier predicted that the prohibitory liquor law would be the foundation; on which the canvass in October would rise or fall. M. C. Garber, the editor, wrote: “The people appear to have taken sides; the politicians do not know exactly what to do in the premises . . . . The Temperance men stand with ‘the balance of power in their hands.”ll The temperance advocates-Whig, Democrat, Metho- dist-made up a sizeable group, able to unite in sympathy for a cause and to use the threat of a bolt from local parties to secure their goals of reform. This threat spelled trouble for the politicians, who preferred to choose their own weap- ons in a campaign. They had to face the fact that the re- formers were determined that the candidates should be considered primarily according to their temperance stand. In view of these conditions, even the proprietors of “Harris’ Panorama of Intemperance and Crime” promised to remain in Indiana at least until election day in October.12 While the press of Indiana was reporting the activities of the temperance advocates, it also was finishing a long story, that of the Freeman case. In January, 1854, Calvin Fletcher, cashier of the Indianapolis branch of the S’tate Bank, was receiving remittances from those who desired to aid an Indianapolis free Negro to pay the expenses of his fight against the Fugitive Slave Law.lS This fund-raising campaign was the anticlimax to the affair. The Reverend

9 S. L. Ensley to Joseph A. Wright, Annapolis, Indiana, February 24, 1854, Joseph A. Wright Papers, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis. 10 Indium State Sentinel, March 14, 1854. 11 Madison Couher, April 18, 1864. 12 Western Christian Advocate, March 29, 1854. 13 Zbid., January 25, 1854. 358 Indiana Magazine of History

Pleasant Ellington of Kentucky had claimed that John Free- man of Indianapolis, a free Negro, was in reality Sam, his escaped slave. The trial had turned into a farce when the real Sam was found in Canada and Freeman’s former owner arrived in Indianapolis from Georgia to identify the accused man, who was forthwith freed. After his acquittal, at the instigation of those who sought to extend the case, the Negro sued his false accuser and won his case. Then he brought charges against John L. Robin- son, the United States marshal. In his complaints, Freeman charged that he had been assaulted and had been exposed to being carried into slavery by fraud and perjury. Fur- ther, he had been the victim of extortion to the sum of three dollars per day during his imprisonment. Thus, until it ended in 1855, the case continued to keep the aggravating Fugitive Slave Law constantly in the public eye. Those who came forward to aid Freeman in his defense included an impressive number of leading citizens. The note which was drawn to support the bail for Freeman was signed by one hundred citizens of different parties. Among the signers were Judge Isaac Blackford, the dean of Indiana’s legal profession ; William W. Wick, postmaster and ex-con- gressman who had figured prominently in the politics of the late forties; Calvin Fletcher, a leading citizen, reformer, and banker; and N. B. Palmer, life-long Democrat, and rail- road president.l* A bond for four thousand dollars was also signed by a number of citizens who owned more than a half million dollars worth of property. The men of property and standing in the community, regardless of party, felt called upon to act not only in behalf of the free Negro but also in protest against the working of a law, a law that had been administered almost too well. For this reason, Robin- son, the marshal, became a whipping boy, the symbol of the slaveholder seeking to recover his reputed property and the embodiment of all that was evil in the Fugitive Slave Law. The Madison Banner commented: “Ellington and his men may have a motive, but none can be seen for Robinson, unless it be a natural hate of justice or a penurious desire to obtain the five dollars he will lose if Freeman is not returned to

14Berry R. Sulgrove, History of Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana (Philadelphia, 1884), 215, 169. Fusion Out of Confusion 359

slavery.” The Indiana Democrat also vehemently attacked the marshal by comparing him to the infamous Haynau in Austria. The Freeman case, with its many injustices, probably harmed the Democratic party, since it aroused many who had previously been somewhat indifferent about the question of slavery. Robinson was also connected in the public mind with the Democracy, to the detriment of the party, for he became known as “The Ellington Watch Dog,”l5 and, more significantly, as the Democracy’s “watch dog” in the state. While the state capital was agog with temperance and the Fugitive Slave Law, down in Dearborn County, in Febru- ary, 1854, the first council of the Know-Nothings was formed. At first relatively unnoticed, the movement reached the communities of southern and central Indiana during March and April. Diamond-shaped pieces of paper scattered about streets and pasted on doors of public buildings announced the presence of new councils. The Democratic editors al- most immediately saw Know-Nothingism as a rehashing of nativism and attacked it as a Whig plot to bring disaster to the Democracy. As it gained momentum, the movement gained strength and picked up new leaders. Soon it at- tracted such men as Godlove Orth, Richard W. Thompson, and Schuyler Colfax, all of them Whigs, into its membership. By May, three months after the appearance of the order in the state, it claimed thirty thousand members in Indiana.16 Those whom the Know-Nothings decried were aroused by the movement. Early in the year, the Germans met in Indianapolis, which was rapidly becoming a center for this immigrant group. Most of the German population of Indiana had found its way into the state as an overflow from Cin- cinnati, so that Lawrenceburg, Terre Haute, Madison, Evans- ville, and New Albany were chief centers for the German population of Indiana. More Germans were scattered about the farming areas of southern Indiana, with a particularly large group in Dubois County. They were a small minority in the total population, since the number of foreign-born in 1850 amounted to only 28,000 persons out of a total of

15 Zbid., 185. 16Carl F. Brand, “The History of the Know Nothing Party in Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of Histow, XVIII (1922), 58-61. 360 Indiana Magazine of History

600,000. Yet, along with all the other changes occurring in Indiana, there was an increase in thd number of foreign immigrants. The Germans who had arrived early in the state were led by the editor of the Democratic Indiana Volksbktt, foun- ded in 1847. The new Freie Presse, founded in, 1850, advo- cated the cause of the more recent arrivals, the “forty-eight- ers.” The newer group was accused by the Volksblatt of stirring up antagonisms against all the Germans: “For all their [the newcomers] lunacies they soon found worthy organs in the German Press, which through their clamor contributed not a little to turn the attention of the Nativistic Party to their obnoxious principles, and in its hands they became weapons against us all !”17 The Germans in Indiana, in 1854, were divided between two groups: the older settlers were under the domination of the Democrats; the newer arrivals seemed to be followers of such leaders as Karl Heinzen, then of Louisville, and Frederick Hausserak of Cincinnati. Externally, they were caught between two movements : attacked by the rising Know- Nothings on one hand, their socia’l habits were assaulted by the temperance advocates on the other. Both the nativ- ists and the anti-liquor forces were driving them closer to the Democracy; at the same time, through its Nebraska stand, the party was forcing the Germans away from itself. A last but not unimportant event to worry the people of Indiana before convention time was the run on the state’s free banks, which took place in May. These financial insti- tutions, which had been established by the politicians in 1852 and had mushroomed overnight in the state, were hard- pressed when eastern banks, hit by the financial crisis re- sulting from the Crimean War, began ta redeem ‘their paper currency. Governor Wright forced the hand of one of the new banks by ordering the treasurer of the state to test the solvency of a Terre Haute bank by presenting paper for redemption in the name of the state. When the bank “squat- ted,” in the vernacular of the day, it brought on a full- fledged bank run. The result was that the free banks were forced to close their doors. The governor was accused by

17 Indiana Volksblatt, March 31, 1855, quoted in Dunn, Greater Indianapolis, I, 204. Fusion Out of Confusion 361

his political enemies of accepting funds from the old state banks men to carry out this design. The financial crisis created new enmities among the politicians, and contributed to the general state of confusion.1s The political year promised to be an interesting one even without the slavery extension issue. The Hoosier De- mocracy had trouble at home which threatened to upset the state party : temperance, anti-Fugitive Slave Law excite- ment, nativism, and the banking crisis all provoked political controversy. The political stew was boiling vigorously when into the pot was thrown the issue of slavery extension. The resulting concoction had an over-powering flavor-anti- Democracy. When the Kansas-Nebraska bill was introduced in Con- gress in January, 1854, some of the Indiana delegates felt called upon to state their views; others remained in the back- ground. The first to speak was William H. English, who, after the introduction of the bill, arose on the floor to state what he termed to be his objections to it. He complained of the proposed boundaries of the territory. Then, unlike some of his colleagues, he declared that he was unafraid to “face the music” on the subject of slavery. He wanted the people of the territories to regulate their affairs in their own way. Furthermore, he desired that the section repealing the Missouri Compromise be stricken from the, bill. English declared: “If the act of 1820 was superseded by the act of 1850, why repeal the former?” In his. proposed amendment, English would repeal “so much of any existing act of Con- gress as may conflict with the right of the people to regulate their domestic institutions in their own way.”l9 In the next month, Daniel Mace, Democratic congress- man, expressed his views. The Lafayette member, unlike English, was opposed to the bill in its entirety. He had been elected, he claimed, because of the finality resolutions of the Democratic party.2o

18 Maurice O‘Rear Ross, “An Analysis of Commercial Banking in the State of Indiana” (Ph.D. dissertation, Departmenti of History, The University of Chicago, 1936), 68; Logan Esarey, “State Banking in Indiana, 1814-1873,” Indiana University Studies (Bloomington, 1910- ), I (1910-1913), 284. 19 Cmgresswnal Globs, 33 Cong., 1st Sess., 296. 20 Ibid., Appendix, 163. 3 62 Indiana Magazine of History

In the initial discussion of the bill in the Senate, Jesse Bright remained silent, but John Pettit approved the act in a speech. He claimed he saw nothing sacred in the Mis- souri Compromise and had no sickly sympathy with the Negro. “Cupidity and not philanthropy,” he declared, “has dictated the course which the North has pursued in refer- ence to this matter.” Pass the bill and it would forever end the slavery agitation, he maintained.21 The remaining Indiana congressmen were silent until May, when the bill came up for discussion again. Meanwhile, the Indiana politicians in Washington con- ferred among themselves and with their constituents regard- ing their relative positions in this situation. Many were ob- viously perplexed by the sudden turn of events. At the very time that English was stating his objections to the bill, Jesse Bright penned a note to him from the Senate chamber: “I am almost as much interested in your political posi- tions & future success as yourself. Hence, you will pardon me for venturing to advise you not at this time to go into Caucus or make any committals against the Bills now before Congress for the organization for territories. I know the value of the advise I give Go to your fm‘ends for council always, not your enemies.”22Bright no doubt feared that his protCgC was drifting from the path. In Indiana, John L. Robinson, displeased with English’s original speech on the bill and hoping that his objections were in some way susceptible to change, wrote the congress- man: “It is important that we all stand together on that bill.”23 John B. Norman of New Albany, editor and politi- cian, also wrote to English a revealing letter, which was representative of the original impact of Douglas’ bill, before the issue had been kicked from pillar to post. He wrote: “It seems to me the Nebraska bill is a very ill-advised scheme and ought not to have been introduced. I do not think the South asks the annulment of the Missouri Compromise, or think it will thank Douglas for introducing his proviso to

21 Ibid., Appendix, 212-221. 22“Some Letters of Jesse D. Bright to William H. English,” In- diana Magazine of Histmy, XXX (1934), 381. 23 John L. Robinson to William H. English, Rushville, Indiana, February 6, 1854, English Collection, Indiana Historical Society Li- brary, Indianapolis. Fusion Out of Confusion 363

that effect . . . . It is certainly new to many that the Com- promise of 1850 was intended as an annulment of that of 1820. Certainly no such avowal’ was made at the time ‘that compromise was pending . . . . His wholesale denunciation of the opponents of this bill as ‘abolitionists’ and nigger sympathizers will avail him but little, People are not to be frightened from their propriety by such epithets now-a- days, whatever may have been their effect a few years since.”24 Daniel Mace, who had spoken out against the bill, was also interested on the one hand in the reactions of his con- stitutents and, on the other, in setting his course right. The congressman wrote to the editor of the Lafaye‘tte Courier expressing his intention to oppose the Democracy on this issue. He called it a violation of a plighted faith and claimed that such a bill would shut out his constituents from the new territorie~.~~Robinson warned that “Mace has despoiled his property” by his letter on the Nebraska E. M. Chamberlain, congressman from the tenth district, wrote to the Indianapolis Journal that he was going to stand on the Missouri Compromise. Andrew J. Harlan, also from northern Indiana, informed his constituents that he could not reconcile the Kamsas- Nebraska bill with the national Democratic platform of 1852 : “One great objection is the bringing of slave labor in com- petition with the free labor and industry of my own race. The degrading and debasing consequences ‘that naturally grow up between free and slave labor is a strong, reason for my oppositi~n.”~~Later the perturbed Harlan wrote to Daniel Pratt, a friend at home, that he would probably be slaughtered for going against the Nebraska bill, but du%y and honor demanded that he do it.2s

24 John B. Nonnan to W. H. English, New Albany, Indiana, Febru- ary 8, 1854, ibid. 25 Indianapolis Morning Journal, February 11, 1854. The Sentinel gladly printed those letters from Democrats who repudiated Mace’s leadership. See Zndianu Stat0 Sentinel, February 17, 20, 1854. 26J. L. Robinson to W. H. English, Rushville, February 20, 1855, English Collection. 27Logansport Journal, March 18, 1854, cited in Zimmerman, “The Origin and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana from 1854 to 1860,” Indiana Magazinei of History, XIII, 222. 28A. J. Harlan to D. D. Pratt, Washington, April 18, 1854, Pratt Collection, Indiana State Library. 364 Indiana Magazine of History

James H. Lane of the fourth district in southern Indiana wrote to Brown of the Sentinel. His denunciations of the bill centered about the Clayton amendment. He concluded : “How far shall we go to humor our southern friends, and what effect will the repeal of the Missouri compromise re- striction have upon the slavery agitati~n?”~~Lane sent Mace’s anti-Nebraska speeches under his own frank about the district.30 Thus, after the proposition had been introduced, the politicians did not know whether to approve or disapprove it. The bill had not been discussed in the canvass and the Hoosier politicians fumbled about, seeking the line of action that would satisfy the constituents. Bright in Washington and Robinson in Indiana must have done yeoman service in lining up the stragglers. The political whips had work to do and public opinion had to be measured before the final bill came up for passage. The political editors of Indiana immediately took the stage to arouse public opinion. Through the columns of the Jour- nal, John Defrees began his campaign against the Democ- racy of the state and nation-he spoke of the Missouri Com- promise as a “sacred compact.” Schuyler Colfax began to talk of Douglas’ “shameful” bid for the presidency, and of “the conspirators against freedom.’’s1 The Sentinel, under the leadership of William J. Brown, who had been too antislavery to suit Jesse Bright years be- fore, now became the leading spokesmaq for the Democracy. It labeled “abolitionist” all those who opposed the bill or refused to pledge complete loyalty to the Democracy. “The organization of every new territory is a God send to fanatical abolitionism. It opens a new field for slavery agitation; and enables them to rake up the dying embers of sectional strife.”32 For the Sentinel, there was no middle road. In this respect, its policy was much like that of the leader of the Hoosier Democracy, Jesse Bright.

29 Indiana State Sentinel, March 24, 1854. So J. L. Robinson to W. H. English, Rushville, February 26, 1854, English Collection. 31 Willard H. Smith, “Schuyler Colfax and the Political Upheaval of 1854-1855,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1914- ) , XXVIII (1941-1942), 384-385. 32Zndiana State: Sentinel, February 3, 10, 20, 1854. Fusion Out of Confusion 365

When the church leaders of Indiana, also, became inter- ested in the Nebraska issue, the mouthpiece of the Demo- crats hurled vehement charges at the clergy. They had no business in politics, was the view of William J. Brown. The clergymen were “called” to preach the G-ospel: “ ‘Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature.’ Query-does this special mission embrace matters connected with the Nebraska discussion, or any political object what- ever! Have clergymen a license to speak in His Name, upon any and all subjects which may come under their Soon after, Brown issued another Mast at the ministers who had been turning “their sacred desks into political ros- trums.” He accused the preachers of being ignorant politi- cally. Their task was! to call the sinners from the darkness while Congress would settle the affairs of the nation.34 The Sentinel had stirred up another hornet‘s nest, for the Western Christian Advocate soon answered the charges, lining Brown up with Satan when it reported: “The devil is mightily pleased with such non-intervention, and he has so long had politics & political men in his keeping that he does not want any interference n0w.”~5 Other Democratic editors rushed headlong into the Kan- sas-Nebraska tumult. Some papers stood with their local representative in Congress, such as the Lafayette Courier which supported Mace’s attacks on the Nebraska issue. The editor warned that it would be party suicide to make it B Democratic measure in the coming state convention of the Demo~racy.~~ The allies of William R. Ellis of the Lafayette Courier were formidable opponents. William Ellis’ brother, E. W. H. Ellis, was a long-time editor of the Goshen Democrat. The Ellises had supported the Wright faction of the party and in Jesse Bright’s eyes were not “Honest Democrats.” In Madison, M. C. Garber and the Courier roared out against the Nebraska outrage. Garber had lost face with the old liners three years before. Page Chapman had left journal- ism for a time, but before long he was again writing editori-

g3 Ibid., March 25, 1854. 34Zbid, March 28, 1854. 35 Western Chrkth Advocate, April 5, 1854. aeLafayette Coumkr, October, 1852, quoted in Avery Craven, The Coming of the Civil War (New York, 1942), 324. 366 Indiana Magazine of History als for Chapman’s Chanticleer, founded by his son a short time before the political excitement of 1854. Chapman had also been opposed to the regulars before, and Bright had placed him on the outside. Since that time Chapman, too, had aided the Wright faction. These influential editors had all been either read out of the party by Bright or had fallen away from the sharp line of party regularity before 1854. Thus their opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act could not have been a surprise either to the politicians or the people. It would be difficult to interpret the stand these editors took as a concerted spontaneous reaction within the Democracy, since they were no longer members in good standing with the administrative wing of the state The press, which was a powerful medium in spreading far and wide the iniquities of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise as well as the political and moral crimes of the Democracy, was aided by the somewhat sporadic meetings that took place all over the state. Indianians generally need- ed little prodding to attend a gathering of fellow citizens. The reason for the meeting was often unimportannt to those who attended, but once there they could be aroused to heights of enthusiasm and emotional fervor by a local spell-binder. The winter of: 1854 seems to have been a particularly good revival season. The Western Christian Advocate had to re- duce its editorial columns to allow more space for the reprt- ing of revivals. Temperance conventions, as has been noted above, were held in many counties during the early winter. The advent of the railroads which converged on Indianapolis made it possible for many of the citizens to travel about the state in the “cars” with comparative ease. There were many who could spend the day in Indianapolis and return to farm or village at the close of the day. When the anti-Nebraska meetings came, they fitted easily into the scene as an ad- ditional excuse to bring Hoosiers together. Some of the temperance conventions were turned intn anti-Nebraska meetings of a sort. John L. Robinson revealed how this was done when he wrote: “The opponents of

37 Compare the view of Logan Esarey, History of Indiana (2d ed., 2 vols., Indianapolis, 1918), 11, 638, who attached importance to the wholesale defection of these important editors as significant of change brought about by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The political change had begun years before. Fusion Out of Confusion 367 the Nebraska bill are busy secretly and stealthily circulating petitions; they are uniformly found either in the hands of open abolitionists or [?I Whigs. They seized the occasion of the 22nd at the county ‘Temperance Convention’ to cir- culate them.”38 The old antislavery men were given a new lease on their political life and such men as Cassius Clay of Kentucky and Stephen S. Harding of Indiana spoke at meetings in the state. Finally, there was the action of the churches. The Methodists, as the largest single denomination in Indiana, attacked the politicians from the pulpit. Other denomina- tions were also active. Conferences, presbyteries, and meet- ings, as a matter of church business, passed resolutions de- nouncing the actions of Douglas. The line between church and state was drawn extremely thin. Whether instigated by politicians or nonpoliticians, the meetings added fuel to the fire of political excitement. The numbers alone were significant, but of more importance, perhaps, was the fact that they did not have unified leader- ship. The Whigs were reluctant to take the lead, and the leadership fell to the disgruntled members of several groups. They did, however, have a common goal-they were anti- Nebraska and against its supporters, the Democracy. Annoyed politicians, crusading preachers, and local re- formers of Indiana crystallized this uprising of the anti- Nebraska men. The common citizen, however, who absorbed the stock of stump clich6s of the spell-binding politicians and the haranguing editors, had some political opinions of his own. This fact gave the pyramid of discontent a popular basis which cut across party boundaries. Popular feeling meant little to the politician unless it would change ballots. The mixing of the ingredients-electoral behavior and the element of protest-did concern him. One observer, writing to his congressman, described the situation thus: “In a word, then, the Douglas bill (as it is understood out west here), is exciting no little interest . . . . Personally I have not the remotest idea that any part of the New Territory aluded to would ever become slave states even were the restrictions

98 John L. Robinson to William H. English, Indianapolis, February 24, 1854, English Collection. 368 Indiana Magazine of History

of the 1820 act withdrawn. But the people will not view it in that light . . . . Nothing will work so readily & pro- foundly, you know, on the minds of the msof the people as a real or imagined effort to restrict the area of Free- d~m.”~~ In the midst of all these chaotic outpourings of politi- cians, editors, and citizens, it was rapidly becoming more difficult for Indiana to stand on the great middle ground that Governor Wright had proclaimed in his flights of oratory; yet he continued to sing out the theme that Indiana was the heart of the Republic. At a meeting which he attended in March with the governor of Kentucky, Jo Wright deliv- ered a speech that sounded similar to those he had given in 1850. He stressed the community of interest between the peoples of the two states: “In this valley, thank heaven, we have no men who go to bed simmering, and rise in the morn- ing boiling with rage about northern rights and southern rights. Here we sit quietly under the shade of our mighty oaks, each state attending to its municipal government . . . . Kentuckians and Indianians teach their children that this Union consists of something more than iron mills and fac- tories in the north, and cotton bales and sugar farms in the south.” In a burst of enthusiasm, he announced: “Peace dwells in this Valley.”4o But there was no peace within the states of the Ohio River Vdlley even as the Governor spoke, for their political representatives were finding it difficult to select a proper course of action. The initial shock of Kansas-Nebraska was being shaken off in Congress and the Indiana delegation was lining up with the Democracy, while politicians at home were preparing for the state conventions. In the Senate in Washington, Bright and Pettit had both supported the Kansas-Nebraska bill from the first ; but in the House, the threatening insurgency in the Hoosier delegation was being put down. James H. Lane, who had at first expressed his- dissatisfaction, was reputed to have been flooded with petitions from his constituents. In ad- dition, he was prodded by the leaders of the party. As the

3QA. B. Archer to William H. English, February 23, 1854, Eng- lish Collection. 40 Indiana State Santiml, March 4, 1854. Fusion Out of Confusion 369 time for balloting neared, the congressman from southern Indiana fell into line after Pettit in the Senate supported the English’s opposition was short-lived, and in May he was taunting his colleagues for deserting the prin- ciples of General C~SS.~~Although Cyrus Dunham deplored the renewal of the agitation of the subject of slavery, he supported the measure. He feared that it would “breathe the breath of life into the almost dead body of the Whig party.” When the people understood the bill, the excitement would be hushed as it had been in 1850.43 The other con- gressmen who were about to cast their votes for the bill remained silent in debate. When the vote in the Senate came, on March 4, both Indiana senators supported the measure. In ‘the House, when ten Indiana representatives voted on May 22, only two anti-Nebraska Democrats voted-A. J. Harlan and Daniel Mace. E. M. Chamberlain was detained at home. Samuel Parker, the Whig, also joined the opp~sition.~~The Indiana Democrats had given majority support to the Kan- sas-Nebraska bill; the final division was seven Indiana con- gressmen in favor of the measure, four opposed to it. The winter and spring had produced a considerable de- gree of rank growth on the party vines of ‘the Democracy. In May, at convention time, the keepers of the party had the choice of either pruning or supporting the lateral bran- ches of this plant, which was being stimulated by a fertile mixture of reform, religion, discontent, and opportunism. The Democracy, as the remaining major party, had the opportunity ‘to draw to itself the increasing number of isms and at the same time gather up the loose remnants that sought a political outlet for their demands but were reluc- tant to break away and enter the race for ballots indepen- dently. Any program that would accomplish both these tasks-of incorporating new materials and tightening the bonds of the old-would of necessity have to be unusual in its approach, just as the political unconformities that had

41Wendell H. Stephenson, The Political Career of James H. Lane, Kansas State Historical Society Publications (3 vols., Topeka, 1886- 1930), 111, 38 n. 42 Congressional Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., 608, 43 Ibid., 1233. 44 Zbid., 1254. 370 Indiana Magazine of History arisen during the winter of 1854 were unusual. Each ex- citement had created complications that defied easy solu- tion. Along with all these new tensions in the political sib uation, there were some old ones left over from earlier times. One of these involved Indiana's growth. The northern section of the state was growing at a more rapid rate than the old upiland areas which extended away from the Ohio River. Many of the recently arrived northern Hoosiers were Democrats from Ohio and Pennsyl- vania; others had moved north from the older settlements of the state. Observing this expanding area, the politicians naturally desired to get for it a more adequate share of party benefits. Another region experiencing the same rapid growth was the Whitewater Valley, where the Democracy had first received the spoils of office when George Julian had formed a successful coalition of Free Soilers and regular Demo- crats in 1848. The Changing population picture brought new optimism to the Democrats, traditionally the minority group of this region. Collectively, the growing Democratic strength in the north and in the Whitewater Valley was influencing the po- litical organization of the whole state. Jesse Bright, how- ever, balked at recognizing these changes, showing reluc- tance at permitting a more equitable distribution of the spoils and offices. Bright had seemingly not forgotten or for- given the shameless flirtation between the voters of the Up- per Wabash and the Free Soilers. But more important per- haps was that his unflagging antagonist, Jo Wright, had many loyal supporters in this northern area. Bright WM never a party leader to tolerate any divided loyalties. One of his more recent frustrations had been' the victory of John Pettit of Lafayette over his personal choice, Graham Fitch, in the senatorial campaign of 1852. The local Democratic politicians north of the National Road were becoming uneasy over the changing population picture. A few days before the convention, one of them insisted to those in political control that there should be a fairer distribution of offices over the state. All the present incumbents came from below the National Road or from the Fusion Out of Confusion 371 area near it. The northern Democrats, the politician claimed, were regarded as “hewers of wood and drawers of water” for the Democracy. Disgruntled because party spoils were not being distributed in northern Indiana, he accused the party leaders of corruption, specifically charging ‘that the auditor of the state was realizing $30,000 to $40,000 “direct- ly and indirectly” from his office.*5 Internally, Indiana’s development was paralleling that of the nation and producing parallel political problems. In the forties the Northwest had felt neglected, just as did northern Indiana in 1854. At the same time, it was the least developed part of the state although it was growing the most. The comparative political stability of the southern portions of the state had been reached early, as it had in the old South of the nation. Years before, the national leaders of the South had not been willing to trust such party up- starts as Hannegan, Douglas, or Allen. Similarly, Jesse Bright seemed determined to withhold the reigns of power from the upstarts of the state party. By 1854, Jesse Bright had made scores of,enemies; but he had also, during the fourteen years of his political career, welded a political machine. With it, the Democracy had withstood the stress and strain of party warfare every year, even seeming to thrive under the annual test. The winter of 1853-54, however, had been a particularly rug- ged one, and some Democrats were worried. As one of them pointed out: “the coming canvass must be managed very carefully, and with unusual skill & energy.”46 On May 24, 1854, the state Democratic convention met at Indianapolis. The anti-Nebraska wing of the party ar- rived with little hope of creating a stir. The county con- ventions had been organized along strict lines, had endorsed the Kansas-Nebraska bill generally, and ‘then had gone on to oppose “Maine Law” legislation. When the resolutions committee brought out the plank in favor of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, Henry L. Ellsworth from Lafayette and Joseph McDonald from Lake County arose in protest. The unit rule was then effected and the

45Zndiana State Sentinel, May 16, 1854. 46Phineas M. Kent to William H. English, New Albany, May 17, 1854, English Collection. 372 Indium Magazine of History opposition was lost in the voting that followed. Then Ben Edmondson of Dubois County introduced a resolution which would expel all those who were opposed to the Nebraska plank. At this, Oliver P. Morton and the others who would not support the resolution walked cut of the convention amid jeers and the taunting cries of “kinkey head” and “go equal- ize The anti-Nebraska men were then read out of the party. The temperance resolution brought more confusion, and even the Sewtinel reported that the members “couldn’t get together very well” on the resolutions. While the Democratic leaders were willing to admit that intemperance is a great moral and social evil, for the restraint and correction of which legislative interposition is necessary and proper,” they were “opposed ‘to any law upon this subject that will authorize the searching for or seizure, confiscation, and de- struction of private property.”48 This was not enough to satisfy the demands of those who sought more stringent leg- islation. Men like James Blake of Indianapolis, who had been a leader in the temperance cause, left the party. The temperance plank, however, was not a party test; rather, it represented the refusal of the Democracy to allow what it considered a moral issue to enter into the political arena. Those who did not agree with this stand were not pushed out of the party-they left of their own volition. Those who objected to the state planks of the party could still support its national views. The Know-Nothings were also criticized in the plat- form. The convention resolved to “openly and avowedly condemn any organization, secret or otherwise that would aim to disrobe any citizen, native or adopted, of his political, civil or religious ‘liberty.”4g Although it did not appear in the platform, an informal plank that resulted in alienating the preachers of the state was brought forth in the convention. John L. Robinson, in his speech before the convention as its chairman, took it upon himself to push the Methodists out of the party. In

47 William Dudley Foulke, Life of Oliver P. Morton (2 vols., In- dianapolis, 1898), I, 39. 48 W. E. Henry (comp.), State Platforms of the Two Dominant P.olitica1 Parties in Zndhna, 1850-1900 (Indianapolis, 1902), 9. 49 Zbid. Fusion Out of Confusion 373 sarcastic tones, he referred to the ministers as the “3000 Abolitionists sent out of New England,” and as “non-tax- paying itinerant vagabond^."^^ By the time the conventi,on adjourned, the Democrats had somewhat clearly delineated those who could still belong in the ranks .of the party. Rather than make bids for new followers, they had decided which of the existing groups they would carry along with them, and had alienated all oth- ers. From New York, Horace Greeley reported in the Tri- bune that the Indiana Democratic leaders had done to them- selves what their opponents could not do: Jesse Bright had made the Nebraska and temperance laws the objectives of a party test.b1 The Democratic boss and his helpers had pruned away the rank growth of the party vine. It remained to be seen if the remaining branches would bear enough fruit for the October harvest. The dictatorial methods of Jesse Bright produced resent- ment that was bitter and lasting. He had put Democratic orthodoxy to a severe test. Those who had been driven out of the party appealed to principle, claiming that they were the true followers of Democratic doctrine. The insurgents who had been cut loose from the De- mocracy probably reacted in many different ways. Some had been out of favor for many years, and, opportunistic, fore- saw political capital in greener fields. Others who had no political ambitions were turned away filled with hatreds and feelings of revenge. The blow was particularly hard to bear by those to whom the Democracy was not only a political group but was also a social institution. They no longer “belonged”; instead they were left to cast about with those they had mercilessly at’tacked or disdained for so many years. It must have been difficult for those who now found themselves among the disinherited to fraternize with the despicable “wooly heads” or “cold water boys.” The role of the Wright faction in this process is not clear. It seems, however, that many of his followers fled

60 Esarey, History of Indiana, 11, 612. 61 New York Tribune, June 6, 1854, cited in Helen M. Cavanaugh, “Anti Slavery Sentiment and Politics in the Northwest, 1844-1860” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, the Univer- sity of Chicago, 1938), 103. 374 Indiana Magazine of Histow or were excommunicated. Among them were Page Chap- man, E. W. H. Ellis, and W. R. Ellis, all editors who had supported the Governor. Wright himself had too much to lose by becoming an anti-Nebraska insurgent. Since the election (of Pierce, he had been able to gain ground on his old rival, Bright. The President had worked through Gov- ernor Wright on the matter of patronage, much to Bright‘s chagrin. The press was thus divided between those who were blessed with patronage in the form of printing, and those who took the “Jesse Bright” side. In Indiana politics, however, the actions of Jesse Bright must have given Governor Wright uneasy moments. Both men supported the Nebraska cause, but the wholesale expul- sion of Democrats from the party harmed the Wright faction considerably. In addition to the anti-Nebraska insurgents mentioned above, the temperance advocates who left the party had been supporters of the Governor, who had taken the pledge himself years before. The Methodist Church, which had been the object of Robinson’s attack, had also been part and parcel of the Governor’s support. In the past, the opposition had frequently delighted themselves in prod- ding him in the canvass concerning his holier-than-thou bear- ing. As one of his contemporaries remarked, he did his most effective electioneering within the When Jchn L. Robinson and Jesse Bright watched the political scene in the summer of 1854, they must have been delighted with the exodus from the party of their moral enemies of long standing, even if the Governor remained. Wright himself must have been tempted to join the late departed; but he was to wait until 186 to join Chapman, Ellis Morton, and others, at which time the became a Repub- lican) A week after the Democratic convention, some of the anti-Nebraska followers were plotting a possible course for the Governor. One reasoned thus: “The Chapman move against Nebraska, Whiskey, and Infidelity, meets with a harty [sic] Response from all parties if you pursue a cor-

52 Newton D. Mereness, “Joseph Albert Wright,” Dictionmy of American Biography (20 vols., New York, 1943), XX, 559-560; Wil- liam W. Woollen, Biographical and Histcori~tl Sketchs of Ewlg In- diana (Indianapolis, 1883), 103. Fusion Out of Confusion 375

rect course [nonaction] you can yet put your foot on Bright’s neck instead of as he Says, ‘has his foot on your neck.”’65 The insurgents had hoped that the Governor would be on their side, if not in fact at least in spirit, to their own political advantage. This same correspondent wrote : “Of late, the Nebraska Party claim you-and the Antis regret it very much, as they wished to knock Bright’s Brains out with YOU. This district is largely anti-Democratic, but if in other places the Party is as much DividCed] as they are here, it will be a total overthrow of the party . . . if you could have felt it your Duty to have espoused the Anti Ne- braska cause you would have ‘the state at your control-as it is perhaps you will, doubtful verg doubtful.” The writer further urged the Governor to take a stand if he were a Nebraska The break in the ranks of the Indiana Democrats was not only a split over principles such as slavery’ and temper- ance, but it was also a manifestation of a deep-seated fac- tional quarrel, born nlot alone of dissatisfaction within the party, but also of political ambition. When the malcontents threatened to leave ‘the Democracy, Jesse Bright opened the door for them, strengthening his own position. While Jo Wright’s friends must have gormed a sizeable number of those who left, he himself remained to battle his enemy Bright. Had he opposed the, Kansas-Nebraska bill, he would not have been a Democrat. The insurgent groups began to organize almost as soon as they arrived home from the state convention. Meetings were held, not only to protest, but to organize and select candidates for the canvass. The dispossessed-among them Daniel Mace, the congressman, and those political editors who were anti-Nebraska-addressed crowds in many villages and towns in the state. The speakers denied the rights of the so-called “packed convention.” At other meetings, ‘these discordant Democrats signed pledges to support only anti- Nebraska men for Congress and only temperance men in state offices. For a Wabash County meeting, a declaration was made: “The Democracy of Wabash county know, and

53John Hunt to Joseph A. Wright, Cambridge City, Indiana, June 3, 1854, Wright Papers. 5.4 John Hunt to Joseph A. Wright, Cambridge City, Indiana, July 22, 1854, ibid. 376 Indiana Magazine of History fear no power that can make them countenance wrong, they work in no party traces under the lash, and swallow no pill compounded by political quacks.” They went further, pledg- ing themselves not to support any candidate who did not stand for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law.55 Conventions passed resolutions and the insurgent press castigated the Democracy for its attempts to bind and sell the populace to the “slave drivers of the south and the rum seller of the North,” but something more was needed for the defeat of the leaders of the regulars. Some Whig papers suggested and supported a plebiscite. Independent Demo- crats were to put up a ticket and the Whigs were ta do like- wise.56 In Madison, however, under the guidance of M. C. Gar- ber, fusion was suggested. A movement arose for meetings regardless of party. Onelsuch meeting, held in June, direct- ed its resolutions at the Indianapolis Democratic platform, charging that the Democratic party was pledged to the “ex- tension of whiskey; . . . to the extension of slavery; . . . to the contraction of religion.” Other counties followed this example, appointing delegates to a general meeting to be held in Indianapolis. The Chapmans declared that it was “high time for the WEST to speak for it~elf.”~’ The Whig Journal was reluctant, however, to fall in line and publicize the proposed meeting. John Defrees ex- plained his tactics in a letter to ‘the South Bend editor Schuy- ler Colfax: “I have been prevailing on others to make the move for a State Convention, preferring that it should come from Democrats, if possible. Had the Journal been the first to move, it would have been set down as a Whig movement . . . . Efforts must be made to prevent its becoming a failure. Come down, with as many Democrats as you can bring.”58 Godlove Orth was more direct in his views. He said simply: “The signs of the ‘times are propitious and augur

55 Chapnun’s Chunticleer, June 15, 1854, cited in Mildred C. Stoler, “Insurgent Democrats of Indiana and Illinois in 1854,” Indiana Mug& zine of Histmy, XXXIII (1937), 15; Indianapolis Morning Jou.mal, June 20, 1854. 56 Stoler, “Insurgent Democrats of Indiana and Illinois in 1854,” Indiana Magazine of History, XXXIII, 17. 67 Ibid., 17-18. 55 Ovando 3. Hollister, Life of Schuylw Colfaa (New York, 1886), 73 n. Fusion Out of Confusion 377 well for the Friends of Freedom & Temperance . . . . The Whigs must control that convention without seeming to do ~.’?69 These men belonged to that faction of Whiggery which was willing to abandon the par“ty. Orth and Colfax had long feared the “old Hunkers’’ in the party. John Defrees was of the same opinion. He justified his actions a few weeks later in a letter to Samuel Judah, for many years a stalwart In- diana Whig, who was reluctant to de-nationalize the old party. Judah was among those who wanted to carry on another campaign ; but an insufficient number shared this desire and the party went by default. Defrees,,on the other hand, spoke not only for a powerful group of former Whigs but also for a considerable portion of the Fusionists-to-be. He wrote: “I know that a number of such men as Tom Dowl- ing . . . who call themselves ‘National Whigs’ denounce me and the Journal because I did not go in for a call for a State Whig Convention and the organization of the Whig Party, for the present contest. They abuse me too, because of my opposition to slavery extension and to Northern Dough- facism. “They are the Union savers, and call everybody aboli- tionists who oppose slavery extension I care nothing for it-I am willing to have my judgement as to the true policy of the Whigs [?I by the result-Should we divide the Demo- cracy, any fool ought to see that it will . . . be to our bene- fit hereafter. The Game will go into our net-It will have nowhere else to go.”so James A. Mason, editor of the Vincennes Gazette, ob- jected to scrapping the old Whig party. Not ready to form a sectional party, he asked Defrees: “Suppose the mongrel organization to triumph. What are we ‘to do then. Mani- festly it is your policy-If you have any such-to adopt a platform, sufficiently abolitionized and sufficiently sectional to retain as many votes as possible. I protest against this-

69 Godlove Orth to Schuyler Colfax, Lafayette, Indiana, July 4, 1854, in Herman J. Sckauinger, “Orth, Native American,” Indiana Magazine of Histmy, XL (1944), 54. goJohn D. Defrees to Samuel Judah, September 21, 1854, Judah Papers, Indiana University Library, Bloomington. 61 James A. Mason to J. D. Defrees, Vincennea, Indiana, September 25, 1854, Judah Papers. 378 Indiana Magazine of History

It is giving the lie to the whole past history of the Whig party.”61 The somewhat uncertain ground of national interests was becoming dangerous underfoot. The growing sectional- ism had pretty well destroyed much of the old inclusiveness of the party. Indiana Whigs had complained years before that their task was to hold their own party together, not to attack the Democracy. When this procedure was repeated in each election, Whiggery slowly destroyed itself. Ambitious men like Orth and Colfax, interested in in- surance companies, farms, and newspapers, and traditionally distrustful of the old party leaders, must have been uncom- fortable among the old Whig lawyer-politicians. By 1854, almost any new organization would have seemed tempting to them, and when the nativist surge struck the Northwest, the Whigs rushed to join the movement. By summer, the Know-Nothings were nailing queer-shaped pieces of paper on courthouses in many county seats in the state. Although the Know-Nothings professed to know no party and to be purely American, one Democratic politician wrote that “every broken down Whig is trying to avail himself of the benefits of this association.”a2 From the small beginnings in February, then, the Know- Nothings had scattered into every corner of the state. More important than the rapid growth of the movement, however, was its degree of centralization. This factor in particular worried the political leadership of the state. The nativists were bent on organization and, having welded themselves into a workable unit, were intent on controlling the grow- ing fusionist movement. To get in on the ground floor of the July 13 Fusion Con- vention, the Know-Nothing state council held an organiza- tion meeting two days before. A state constitution was re- ported and adopted, along with a ritual and a set of regula- tions. Austin H. Brown of the Sentinel climbed to the top of an outbuilding of the Masonic Hall and spied on ‘the meet- ing until he was discovered. He revealed that several well- known politicians were in the group. They reportedly drew up a list of candidates who were to be presented to the Fusion

6*A. Bussey to William H. English, Laurel, Indiana, July 13, 1854, English Collection. Fusion Out of Confusion 379

Convention the next day. The assembly elected state officers for the coming year. The president was Godlove Orth of Lafayette, an ardent Whig for many years and a great friend of Schuyler Colfax. James H. Cravens of Ripley County had been the Free Soil candidate for governor in 1852. He was known far and wide in the state as an abolitionist. The chaplain was the Reverend James Havens, presiding elder of the Indianapolis district of the Methodist Church. “Father” Havens was then over sixty years of age, a patri- arch in the Church who had travelled and exhoPted in re- vivals throughout the state.s3 Another officer was the Rev- erend Samuel P. Crawford of Indianapolis. On the 13th of July, the new officers drafted a set of orders which con- cluded the work of the convention. The membership and strength of the organization is relatively unknown. “he difficulty in appraising its power would seem to be that many of its members were also equally strong supporters of the other elements that were to make up the Fusionists. Thus only a qualitative significance can be attached to their importance. The Know-Nothing state council, however, watched ‘the political developments during the week and represented one of the poli’tical factions that was awaiting the call on July 13, anniversary of the founding of the Northwest Territory. The citizens of Indianapolis of all parties joined to make the necessary preparations for the “mass meeting” at the state capital. A huge gathering assembled on the courthouse lawn in Indianapolis. From Tippecanoe County, Henry L. Ellsworth led a delegation of six hundred, marching as a body to the grounds. Other groups came, composed of Whigs, disgruntled Democrats, crusading temperance reformers, “Sams” seeking to halt the foreign invasion, the disillusioned and the ambitious, and undoubtedly some who were there simply to enjoy a good political gathering. No one was bar- red, and all were welcome. The permanent chairman was Thomas Smith, former Democratic congressman from southeastern Indiana, and one of the old party’s best stump speakers. He was introduced by M. C. Garber of Madison. The tenor of Smith’s keynote

68 William C. Smith, Indhna Miscellany (Cincinnati, 1867), 264- 285; W. R. Holloway, A Histovical and Statistical Sketch of the Rail- TO& City, Ind?hq~~lk(Indianapolis, 1870), 53. 380 Indium Magazine of History

address was that the masses were ready to pursue their own ideas rather than the dictates’ of party leaders. Others who spoke were the popular Henry S. Lane, confrere of De- frees-the Whig; the Reverend George B. Jocelyn-Metho- dist preacher ; H. L. Ellsworth-Free Soil Democrat ; John A. Hendricks-Democrat ; and finally, Thomas Bebb-Whig ex-governor of Ohio and bitter opponent of the Democracy everywhere.E4 The flurry of oratory over, the resolutions committee announced its report in the form of a statement, broad enough for all the assemblage to stand upon. This state- ment w51s not a platform in the strict sense; rather, it rep- resented a temporary agreement among a group of the politically discontented. The content of the People’s Statement is worthy of consideration as the initial document of a new, as yet un- tested, party. The preamble extolled the Northwest Ordi- nance as a document of freedom and referred to the recent repeal of the eighth section of the Missouri Compromise as a “gross and wanton violation of the faith of the Union, plighted to a solemn compact, restricting the extension of Slavery.” The four resolutions following the preamble were simple : the first repudiated the Democratic stand “endors- ing and approving the Kansas-Nebraska Iniquity,” since the committee was “unoompromisingly opposed to the extension of slavery”; the second resolution demanded that all former party predilections be waived in order that every branch of the federal government be filled with men who would assert the rights of freedom, restore the Missouri Com- promise, and refuse to tolerate the extension of slavery; the third clause attacked intemperance as a political, moral, and social evil, requiring a “Judicious, Constitutional, and Effi- cient Prohibitory Law” for the suppression of the liquor traffic ; finally, the committee deplored the abusive attacks on the Protestant ministry recently made from “various quarters,” continuing : “We cherish with gratitude, and pleas-

E4 Francis P. Weisenburger, The Passing of tbFrontiev, 1825-1850 (Columbus, 1941), 429-432; Zimmerman, “The Origin and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana from 1854 to 1860,” Indiana Magazine of History, XIII, 234-235 ; Stoler, “Insurgent Democrats of Indiana and Illinois in 1864,” Indiana Magazine of History, XXXIII, 20-21; Logans- port Pharos, July 19, 1854. Fusion Out of Confusion 381 ure, the memory of their patriotic zeal in the Revolutionary struggle.” Although it has been said that the platform did not contain a Know-Nothing plank, this fourth resolution could serve as a nativist appeal a‘t the same time that it dealt a blow at the Pope and John L. Robinson.e5 In the total picture, the problems of the resolutions committee may be overestimated. It is ‘true that there were divergent groups within this heterogeneous mass of tempo- rarily unattached voters. But the various factions and their leaders did appear to have anti-Democracy as their one de- finite motivating factor. First of all, every resolution was in specific opposition to the platform or the public views of the Democracy. Although perhaps for different reasons, the Fusionists were united solidly on ‘that score. There was also the factor of overlapping membership within the Fusion- ist factions, meshing the different causes into a general protest group. This is evident in the leaders themselves. Schuyler Colfax was a Whig, Free Soiler, Know-Nothing, temperance man, and Protestant; Lucien Barbour was equal- ly all these things, but he had been a Democrat. Through the rank and file of the new Fusion element similar over- lapping existed. Despite the one-idea advocates there was a great core that was capable of being organized effectively into a well- knit political group. The various isms themselves had a cohesiveness. They were born of a common parent, the Protestant Church, which had spawned temperance, anti- slavery, and anti-Popery. The members of the church tended to put their religious principles before their politics. Lew Wallace, many years later, describing the political scene in the turbulent days of 1854 wrote: “In truth the isms, despised and unassimilated though they were, had fighting force in quantity much greater than we were will- ing to allow them, and in their midst the old party was like a whale assailed at the same time by many boats harpoon- ing it from every direction; the best it could do was to fluke the water and blow.”6e The romantic Hoosier novelist‘s figure of speech might

811 George W. Julian, Political Recollections (Chicago, 1884), 144. eeLew Wallace, Lew Wdlaoe: An Autobiography (2 vols., New York, 1906), I, 237-238. 382 Indiana Magazine of Historg be somewhat altered. The Democracy was indeed a flounder- ing whale, but it was being attacked not from many boats but from one boat with many harpoons. The Democracy’s attackers were skilled in han,dling several weapons at once. The greatest weapon in the hands of the enemy, how- ever, was the Kansas-Nebraska Act. It was a tremendous charge that could be attributed to the Democratid party. Al- though a political question at the outset, the opponents of the Democrats soon made slavery extension a moral issue. The threatened extension of slavery, whether real or imag- ined, became in the eyes of many a wicked design of the Dem- ocrats to trample upon the rights of free men. Unlike the isms that had grown up gradually giving the people ample time to get used to them, and giving them in turn time to become adapted to the Indiana political climatw of 1854, the Nebraska question was dropped like a bomb into the midst of an unprepared populace. The suddenness of its appear- ance gave it an immediacy that the other issues lacked. The Nebraska question was a sectional problem, dan- gerous in its implications for the well-being of the federal process. There had been drunken members of society in Indiana for years. German and Irish neighbors and Catholic priests had been in the state’s villages and towns( for vary- ing periods of time; conflicts between these elements and the native Americans ebbed and flowed. Slavery extension had been in the political arena before, but under a different aspect; and when, with a rush, the sectional conflict was re- opened with new embellishments, there was an instantane- ous reaction. When the Fusion party’s principles had been established, it chose its candidates for the state ticket. The ticket re- flected the general character of the new group for here again most of the candidates were able to qualify under several labels. Very few of them had held office. They were new political figures, free from party sin, able to be presented to the voters of the state as the “people’s” candidates. Nom- inations for the five state offices were divided among three former Democrats and two Whigs. John Defrees, the old leader of the Whigs, had suggested this division so that the Democratic insurgents could lure more voters away from Fusion Out of Confusion 383 the “old 1ine1-s.”~~The ticket, like the platform, was com- posed of elements that advocated the various isms but had a common enemy, the Democracy.68 What the Sentinel was to call “all the odds and ends of society, politics, and reli- gion,” had combined into a political party.69 In their local conventions of July, August, and Septem- ber, the Fusionists followed the general pattern set at their Indianapolis conventi’on. In the selection of candidates, they tended to choose those who had been somewhat irregular in their party loyalty and those whose political garments had not been soiled too frequently. Several candidates were novices at the game of politics. Since few had held public office before, they could truly appeal to the voter as a “p- ple’s” candidate. There were local exceptions, however. In the third dis- trict, the first candidate to take the field, John A. Hen- dricks, a comparatively untried politician, was replaced by George C. Dunn, a Clay Whig, who, unannounced, gathered his old followers about him and forced the younger Hen- dricks to retire from the field. In the Fort Wayne district, Samuel Brenton, who had served in Congress before as a Free Soil Whig, was nominated by the Fusionists. The dusty roads of a drough‘t-stricken state were filled that summer with candidates. The campaigns had a new flavor, new arguments, and new fervor, and the hope of a political revolution. The Fusion had as varied a leadership as its factional character. Collectively, they were an impres- sive lot. They made the most of the excitement of the year. With M. C. Garber’s cry that it was “not a disaffection but a revolution,” the movement became the aggressor despite the relative inexperience of its organization. The Fusionists forced the Democracy into the defensive, a posi- tion it had not occupied for many years. Jesse Bright’s brother must have typified the appearance of many of the Democracy’s party stalwarts when John Lyle King observed of him: “He seems dreadfully puzzled as to the results of the next election and to have an idea that the undercur-

13’ Indiana State Jouml, July 15, 1854. 68 Zndiana State Sentinel, July 25, 1854; Zndkw State Jouml, July 16, 1854. 69 Indiana State Sentinel, October 26, 1854. 384 Indiana Magazine of History

rents are so mixed and complicated as to baffle the most prophetic foresight as to results.”7o The Methodist Church was a powerful ally of the Fusion- ists in the campaign. Encouraged by the resolution for their benefit in the Fusion platform, the leaders of the church also took the offensive. The JoumZ aided them by reprint- ing articles from the Western Christian Advocate which ar- rayed the church against the Democracy. Bill Brown and the Sentine2 were kept busy denouncing the Methodists: “Has it come to this-must a Democrat relinquish, abandon and repudiate his political principles, dissolve all connection with his political associates, and with his party, before he can be a consistent or esteemed member of any church.” The editor, inquiring as to the grounds of the attacks on the Democracy, claimed that the Methodist Church had al- ways received political offices and liberal favors from the party.71 Brown apparently considered the Methodist pa- tronage to have been sufficient to keep the members in line. The Advocate spoke out often in its columns against those in Indiana who were attacking the church. The Pope, the pro-slavery and pro-liquor advocates, and the devil were all engaged to destroy truth and righteousness from the The correspondent, the Reverend B. F. Crary, who also wrote for the Indiana press, led the charge against the Democracy. He described the Democratic platform as “the oldest, lowest, narrowest, ugliest, dirtiest thing that ever was made or seen before.”73 The church conferences themselves began to attack the slavery and liquor interests and urged the ministers to go out and preach against the evils of the Democracy. Crary described the Northern Indiana Conference thus : “The preachers are about as spirited and fearless as any body of men that can be found . . . . They had a committee on slavery, which very coolly brought in a report that in other places would have produced spasms in the body ecclesiastic.

7OJohn Lyle King, June 26, 1854, Diaries, Indiana Historical So- ciety Library. 71 Indiam State Sentinel, June 23, 1854. 72 Western. ChGtian Advocate, June 21, 28, July 5, 1854. 73 South Bend, Indiana, St. Joseph‘s Valley Register, August 10, 1854, quoted in Smith, “Schuyler Colfax and the Political Upheaval of 1854-1855,” Mississippi Valley Histhat Review, XXVIII, 390. Fusion Out of Confusion 385 Here they did not excite the preachers. They seemed as clever and temperate and cool about it as they would if discussing the subject of education . . . . They did not talk much but voted unanimously . . . . They may be all wrong; but how to cure them this deponent is not able to tell. They are not of a sort to get well of a complaint of that kind in a day. They have got it into their heads, somehow or other that they have a, right to speak, and there they stand, and smile, and talk daggers at the peculiar instit~tion.”‘~ During the campaign, the Democracy’s castigation of the Methodist preachers resulted in a counterattack that gave additional weight to the concept that the campaign wa+s a battle of good against evil. The Democracy was not pre- pared to have its party lined up on the wrong side of the moral fence; nevertheless it found itself forced to defend what some Hoosiers considered sin. The Democracy in the campaign found itself a party of justification. Lew Wallace described the Democratic can- vass as a campaign of “dodge, denial, deprecation or beg- ging the q~estion.?~The isms had all converged on the Demo- cracy, so that the party, hounded on all sides, resorted to a choice barrage of name-calling. It had been much easier to match political wits with the ruffle-shirted Whigs in the old days. The Democratic stump orators had to attack in all directions, at enemies old, new, and unseen. The Democratic attacks varied locally in proportion to the strength of the various elements in the opposition. In the back country of southern Indiana, William H. English, who was to become a near political monstrosity-a Nebraska Democrat who survived the election-defended his support of the Kansas-Nebraska Act by telling his constituents that he had discarded narrow sectional prejudices to give every- one a voice in making the laws under which he was to live. He claimed that the whole affair was merely a pretext to form a sectional political party. As the campaign neared its end, the Democrats sought a coalition with the old Whigs who were reluctant to join

74 Western Christian Advocate, October 4, 1854. 75 Wallace, Lew Wdlace: An Autobiography, I, 237. 386 Indiana Magazine of History

the new party. A call was made for a united effort of the national Whigs and the Democracy to defeat the abolition- ist~.~~ In September, Judge Stephen A. Douglas himself came to Indianapolis to address the Democracy. Jesse Bright traveled far and wide throughout the state to quell the up- surge against the party. Governor Wright attacked the Know-Nothings while he supported faithfully the Kansas- Nebraska test. He played upon his favorite theme-states rights versus ~entralization.~~ The Sentinel closed the campaign with this stirring ap- peal to the party: “Democrats, you are battling for your country, for the Constitution, for the holy and blessed Union which our fathers made, for Popular Sovereignty, and Popu- lar Rights, for Civil and Religious Liberty, for the glorious cause of National Democracy, the prayers and benedictions of patriotism and downtrodden humanity are being poured fofth for your success. On Freemen! On to Victory!”78 The summer had been hot and dry in Indiana; the Hoosiers bemoaned their parched fields. While the drought had created its share of havoc, the political climate had add- ed to the perplexities of the agricultural scene. Even agri- cultural improvement seemed to be in default. One agricul- tural society reported: “We found that on account of the frequent meetings for political speech making, it was im- possible to get sufficient numbers of farmers together to make it useful or interesting to get up agricultural addresses, so we have had none this year.’’ Another society recorded that it was “impossible to interest the same persons in two popular movements at the same time, so that we suffered some on that

76 Brand, “History of the Know Nothing Party in Indiana,” Indiana Magazine of History, XVIII, 68. 77 Wright’s correspondent, John Hunt, was not ready to accept the Governor’s campaign oratory. He wrote, “Such arguments will have more weight with, the Enlightened Dutch and Irish than with me. Why you might as well accuse the Whigs of introducing the Colera, as to impute these things to them.” John Hunt to Joseph A. Wright, Cambridge City, July 27, 1854, Wright Papers. ‘*Indiana State Sentinel, October 7, 1854. 79 Third Annual Report of the Indiana State €toad of Agrinclture for the Yew 1854 (Indianapolis, 1855), Extracts from Porter County and Delaware County reports, 15, 122. Fusion Out of Confusion 387

Election day, October 10, 1854, arrived at long last. Hoosiers gathered in county seat towns and crossroads vil- lages to enjoy their franchise as well as to exercise it. Amid banners and barrels (the “cold water” boys excepted) voters and vote-seekers mingled around the polling places to cast ballots which would climax the first campaign of the Fusion par“ty. The excitement of the campaign continued even on elec- tion day in same quarters. In New Albany and Jefferson- ville, riots occurred when imported poll watchers, who came across the river from Louisville, clashed with the German and Irish at the ballot boxes. The Irish were also accused of attacking the nativists in Gibson County.so In Madison, the Brights were active. King reported that: “Bright on yesterday made a bet of 500$ on Dun- hams election . , . . Twas Dick Bright who handled the money but twas Jess Brights property. This mjorning M. G. Bright was offering a thousand dollar bet . . . . If their plethora of Spoils, accumulated from the party can be tapped and a depleting process ensue, ’twill not be a bad thing for the Brights.”s1 The returns poured in. The Indiana Democrats were overwhelmingly defeated by the upstart Fusionists. In the state offices, the newl party rolled up a majority of 13,000 votes. The majority in the congressional campaigns over the whole state was 14,500 votes, while in the districts them- selves, only William H. English and Smith Miller had sur- vived the Fusionist onslaught. The remaining nine seats were won by the Fusion. In the legislature, where temper- ance was a test, the new membership consisted of fifty- eight Fusionists and forty-one Democrats. Only in the state Senate did the Democracy retain a slight edge of two seats.8p The victories of the two Democratic congressmen should be considered. The traditional interpretation of their suc-

8O Lewis C. Baird, Bairds Histow of Clark County (Indianapolis, 1909), 111. 81 John Lyle King, October 11, 1854, Diaries, Indiana Historical Society Library. 82 Whig Almwamd United States Registolr fwr 1855 (New York, 1855), 61. 388 Indiana Magazine of History

cess seems to be to attribute it to pro-southern constituen- cies, but this is perhaps too simple an explanation. It is true that the first and second congressional districts are in the heart of the southern upland limestone belt that ex- tends a finger into Indiana, and that many settlers there had migrated from the southern uplands. Yet when these fertile river bottoms and wooded hills were given political boundaries various factors molded the people. In Smith Miller’s district there were many Catholic parishes and Du- bois County was heavily populated by Germans. Miller was able to carry the district by 813 votes, yet in Dubois alone, his majority was 727 votes. Gibson County in his district had probably more people of southern origin than any other of his counties, yet the Fusionists carried it. English was able to carry his district by a slight margin by building up large majorities among the country Democrats away from the river. In the three counties in the northern end of his district, his majority was 863 votes, while his total majority was 586.83 It was among these groups of small farmers that the Democrats were able to make up for the losses in the more diversified counties. None of these factors in itself tells the complete story, yet considered together they seem to show that pro-southern attitudes alone cannot explain the voting behavior of the constituents. For the state as a whole, the Democracy at first blamed its defeat on the Know-Nothing men. This was followed by attributing the debacle to the “Nebraska Humbug” and later to the “ill-advised” temperance movement. However, a few Democratic editors admitted that former members of their own party had brought about the downfall. The Fusionists were more sweeping in their interpre- tation of the election results; to them it was a victory of principles, a revolt against political corruption. Jacob Y. Chapman termed it a victory of good over The Democrats had used all the weapons at their com- mand as well as all the volunteers they could muster for

83 The county returns are found ibid. 84 Stoler, “Insurgent Democrats of Indiana and Illinois in 1854,” Indiana Magazine of History, XXXIII, 30. Fusion Out of Confusion 389 the cause. The campaign had not been the more familiar encounter of politician matched against politician, using the usual weapons and with a common knowledge of the politi- cal terrain ; it was an all-encompassing battle of politicians and nonpoliticians alike. To single out causes is not sound, since the campaign was in reality extremely complex; it was a great number of local struggles without a single tactical plan. It had required all the resources that the opposition could acquire to defeat the Democracy for it was a firmly entrenched political party. Despite some weaknesses, it possessed an over-all condition of common feeling and soli- darity in the ranks that a single issue could perhaps damage, but not defeat. Indiana in 1854, although in a transition stage, possessed a great degree of uniformity to which the Democracy appealed. A predominantly rural community, in- habited by a comparatively uniform type of population that shared a common background were conditions that compen- sated for the Hoosier diversities. Thus to whip the Demo- cratic party required an all-out effort. The so-called “isms” had much in common and all were channeled to fight the Democracy. Once they had won the victory, however, the initial enthusiasms were endangered. A temperance law, for example, would bring a loss of incen- tive among the enemies of the liquor traffic. Once the re- sponsibilities of public office had replaced the enthusiasms new problems would arise that would make tougher demands on the still unhardened coalition. Some insurgent Demo- crats had paid a high political price for admission, while many Whigs had entered by default. Political speculators of all former parties dreamed of profits. After the election, there remained the matter of a settlement that would satisfy the practical-minded of the Fusion. Those who had entered the coalition in order to vent their wrath against the forces of evil could not readily com- promise their principles. If the high ideals of the campaign were to be sacrificed for the sake of organization and work- ability, the Fusion would lose some of its followers. These problems were to follow the first flush of success. 390 Indiana Magazine of History

Meanwhile] Bill Brown, confident that in a democracy there is always a next time for the politician to regain that which has been lost in an election] was organizing new Democratic

85 Esarey, H&wy of Indiana, 11, 639.