SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON> GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1299

One battalion (2 Cambridgeshire) was sent to a preparatory step to a further withdrawal and one (5 R. Norfolk) was held should such become necessary. in reserve at . 356. At the same time, by agreement with 352. At about 0200 hrs. i6th January the the Commander Westforce, I placed the whole leading Japanese troops crossed the River of the Muar front temporarily under the Com- at a point a few miles up-stream from the mander 3 Indian Corps. My reasons for this town and by 0900 hrs. had reached the road were : — and established a block 2 miles east of Muar. (a) I thought it difficult for the Commander During the morning some sharp fighting took Westforce with his small staff to give the place in this area. At 1300 hrs. a further col- close attention to the 'Muar front which the lection of barges or landing craft appeared off dangerous situation there demanded as well Muar, some of which were sunk by our artillery as controlling the operations on the fire. 'Continuous fighting went on throughout front some 70 miles distant. the afternoon in the outskirts of the town. By (b) It would obviously be necessary to the evening of the i6th all troops of the 45 build up a supporting front west of Yorig Brigade south of the river, except for the right Peng in order to keep open communications forward battalion, were concentrated in the both with the Muar and Segamat forces. This Bakri area and the Brigade Commander was could only be done by troops at that time planning a counter-attack to recapture Muar. under command of 3 Indian Corps. Early on the iyth January the Commander Westforce withdrew the 2/29 Bn. A I.F. from 357. On the morning of the igth January the Segamat front and despatched it to Bakri very heavy fighting again developed in the to meet the threat which was now developing. Bakri area. The enemy again struck at our It arrived in the afternoon. communications destroying some transport which was parked in rear of the defensive posi- 353. The enemy's attack from Muar, though tion and blocked 'the road. About midday the it had not yet been possible to assess the full right forward battalion of . the 45 Brigade (4/9 strength of it, obviously constituted a very real Jats) which had remained detached was am- threat to Westforce's communications in the bushed when rejoining the main force and area, for if the enemy could reach suffered heavily. Brigade Headquarters was the road there the whole of the Segamat force practically wiped out by a bomb. would be cut off. I discussed the situation with The Commander 53 British Brigade was now the Commander Westforce and the Commander made responsible for the Bukit Payong — Yong ii Indian Division at Rear Headquarters West- Peng area, under 11 Indian Division, having force at 1200 hrs. iyth January. We were been relieved of his responsibility for Batu loth to order an immediate withdrawal from Pahat. " The 3/16 Punjab Regt of 11 Indian Segamat which we thought would be damaging Division was placed under his orders. to morale and decided to strengthen the Yong Peng-Muar front by every means at our dis- 358. At 1420 hrs. igth January I held a posal. I arranged to make available immedi- conference at Yong Peng at which the Com- ately the 2/19 Australian Battalion from manders 3 Indian Corps, Westforce, 11 Indian , relieving it temporarily by the Division and 53 British Infantry Brigade were reserve battalion of the 53 Brigade. present. The following orders were issued : — (a) The 53 Brigade Group to hold a posi- 354. Early on the morning i8th January the tion from the bridge at to the 45 Indian Infantry Brigade, with the 2/29 high ground S.E. of the junction of the Yong Australian Battalion attached, was strongly Peng—Mua r and Yong Peng—Bat u Pahat attacked by the enemy in its perimeter position roads. west of Bakri. Nine enemy tanks were (6) The 45 Brigade Group to be ordered destroyed by the Australian anti-tank guns and to withdraw at once through the 53 Brigade tank hunting platoons. The enemy cut the Group to a position west of Yong Peng. road between this force and Brigade Head- (c) The Segamat Force to continue its with- quarters situated a short distance to the east withdrawal. but with the arrival of the 2/19 Australian (d) The 22 Indian Infantry Brigade, on its Battalion the situation was restored. In the arrival at Yong Peng on the night 20th-2ist evening the Japanese again attacked heavily January from the Segamat front, to be at the but were repulsed. disposal of ii Indian Division. On the afternoon of 'the i8th the enemy 359. Events, however, anticipated the imple- landed a strong force on the coast a few miles mentation of this plan, for on the afternoon of north of Batu Pahat. the igth January an enemy force attacked and captured the defile east of Bukit Payong and 355. Our Intelligence Service on .this day later occupied the bridge at Parit Sulong. An reported that the Japanese were advancing with attempt the following morning to recapture the two divisions in front line, a Division of the defile by counter-attack was only partially Imperial Guards ibeing in the Muar area and the successful, and eventually our troops took up 5 Division on the main road. The latter was a a defensive position at the west end of a cause- crack division which was known to have been way which crossed a marshy area a little further specially trained in landing operations. The full extent of the threat from Muar now became east. clear. I felt that our chances of holding up 360. In accordance with the orders to with- this thrust for any length of time were not great draw, sent by W/T from Westforce which was and that a withdrawal from Segamat would the only means of communication then open, sooner or later be forced upon us. I therefore the Muar Force started to concentrate on the approved a proposal by the Commander West- evening of igth January but was attacked from force on the evening/-i8th January for an imme- all sides and suffered heavily. Early on, the diate withdrawal behind the River Segamat as 20th the withdrawal started, 'the force -being.