Electoral Geography and Conflict: Examining the Redistricting through Violence in Kenya Kimuli Kasara Columbia University∗ March 2016 Abstract Politicians may use violence to alter the composition of the electorate either by suppressing turnout or by permanently displacing voters. This paper argues that politicians are more likely to use violent redistricting where it can sway electoral results and when their opponents sup- porters are less likely to return if displaced by violence. I explore the relationship between electoral geography and violence in Kenya’s Rift Valley Province during the crisis that fol- lowed Kenya’s disputed 2007 general election. Using the proportion of migrants in a neigh- borhood as one proxy for residents’ propensity to relocate, I show that more violence occurred in electorally pivotal localities as well as in localities that were both electorally pivotal and contained more migrants. ∗Address: Department of Political Science, Columbia University, International Affairs Building, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027,
[email protected]. I thank Kate Baldwin, Joel Barkan, Rikhil Bhavnani, Luke Condra, Catherine Duggan, Thad Dunning, Lucy Goodhart, Jim Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, Saumitra Jha, Jackie Klopp, Jeffrey Lax, Peter Lorentzen, Gerard Padro ´ı Miquel, Kenneth McElwain, Stephen Ndegwa, Jonathan Rodden, Jack Snyder and seminar participants at the Yale and NYU for comments on a previous draft of this paper. Ayla Bonfiglio, Benjamin Clark, and Kate Redburn provided excellent research assistance. The Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University provided research support. All mistakes are my own. 1 Introduction Elections are associated with conflict in several new democracies.