Greece Political Briefing: SYRIZA and the Center-Left Political Spectrum George N

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Greece Political Briefing: SYRIZA and the Center-Left Political Spectrum George N ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 15, No. 1 (GR) February 2019 Greece political briefing: SYRIZA and the center-left political spectrum George N. Tzogopoulos 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 SYRIZA and the center-left political spectrum In view of the next national election SYRIZA presents itself as a political party representing the center-left political spectrum in Greece. This tendency has caused frustration to the Movement for Change, widely known as PASOK a few years ago. It boosts the attempt of Premier Tsipras to attract additional social-democratic voters. This effort of Tsipras might not only have a short-term effect but possibly be a key factor for Greek politics in the long-term.. Following the next national election, even if SYRIZA will lose to New Democracy as opinion polls are projecting, the political battle to cover the center-left political spectrum will continue. The pre-election period has already started in Greece. Irrespective of the timing of the new national election, the governing SYRIZA party is elaborating on its strategies to persuade Greek citizens about the efficiency of its political agenda. Different priorities can be sketched out. Perhaps the most significant one has been the trend of the party to cover the center-left political spectrum which traditionally belonged to the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). PASOK, currently known as the Movement for Change, is stigmatized for being largely responsible for the Greek economic crisis and the country’s bankruptcy. So, as long as the latter is considered unreliable by the majority of Greeks and its percentages in opinion polls remain low, SYRIZA presents itself as a social-democratic party. While SYRIZA is part of the family of leftist parties at the European level, it sees a clear opportunity to practically replace PASOK in Greek politics. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has made a political opening to politicians belonging to the old-PASOK, in particular the ones who are close to former Prime Minister George Papandreou. The recent reshuffle of the Greek government has been indicative. Thanos Moraitis, a long-time PASOK cadre who also served in Papandreou’s cabinet from 2009 until 2011 was appointed as deputy infrastructure minister. And Angelos Tolkas, another erstwhile PASOK cadre, was selected as deputy migration policy minister. Against this backdrop, several commentators are posing the question whether a ‘PAKOKization’ of SYRIZA or a ‘SYRIZAtion’ of former PASOK members has already started to take place. Generally speaking, the process is not new but began a few years ago. The main difference is that SYRIZA is currently a governing party and not a protest one as it had been the case in 2011 when it first embraced some PASOK politicians 1 Tsipras seeks to create what he calls a ‘progressive front’. The official reaction of both the Movement of Change and To Potami has been negative. As a result the proposed front has not yet materialized a party level. In particular, the leader of the Movement of Change Fofi Gennimata said at a meeting of her party’s executive secretariat: ‘we are at war with Tsipras and his cabal’ while the party issued a statement accusing Tsipras of trying to ‘loot’ it. The government spokesman Dimitris Tzanakopoulos commented SYRIZA expressed and represented the progressive people of Greece and criticized Gennimata for being herself responsible for keeping her party away from the proposed front. For his part, the leader of To Potami Stavros Theodorakis, who disagrees with Gennimata on other fronts, shares her view about Tsipras’ proposal for a ‘progressive front’. In his opinion, his support for the Prespes Agreement does not mean a simultaneous support for SYRIZA. The potential creation of a ‘progressive front’ may be an ambitious project but does not necessarily finds SYRIZA united. The so-called ‘Group of 53’, a radical faction within the party, has been skeptical. It believes that by giving ministerial positions to former PASOK members, SYRIZA risks to demonstrate signs of opportunism in its day-to-day politics. In so doing, it might indirectly boost the narrative of New Democracy that the governing party is offering cabinet posts to former PASOK members in exchange for political support. Moreover, the ‘Group of 53’, a special leftist political group within SYRIZA argues the task to find common ground with officials of the center-left should be the job of the party and not of the government. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras looks at the coming national election when proposing the creation of a ‘progressive front’. He seeks to send a message to potential supporters of the Movement for Change that SYRIZA could offer a better political alternative for them. The effort will be practically assessed in the next national election when the political behavior of voters will be measured. The risk the Greek Premier undertakes is the possible political rallying of supporters of the Movement for Change. These supporters could see the initiative of Tsipras as threatening the very existence of the Movement for Change and could therefore vote for this party in the next national election. Some of them are also emotionally linked to PASOK and also Fofi Gennimata as her father was a historical PASOK member. This is perhaps the main reason Gennimata managed to win the internal leadership battle against a much younger candidate, Nikos Androulakis. While attention is being naturally directed towards the next national election, Tsipras’ choices should not only be seen from a short-term perspective. Even if SYRIZA loses the next election as all opinion polls are anticipating, the political future of Tsipras can be bright. He is 2 young, now more experienced in comparison to his pre-2015 political career and will have to be patient as the leader of the main-opposition in order to come to power again in the national election that will take place in 2023. It is not expected Tsipras will face internal challenges within SYRIZA. He brought the party into power four years ago and managed to survive from 2015 until 2019 on the grounds of delicate political maneuvering. A potential stay in the opposition will perhaps make Tsipras more mature to elaborate on the ‘progressive front’ agenda. Under current circumstance, his party leadership will hardly be contested and therefore he will be able to implement the already launched political strategy concerning the center-left political spectrum. As already mentioned, several former PASOK politicians have joined SYRIZA. Some of them, who have refrained from making this step yet, are seriously considering this possibility in the long-term. These do not only include aides of former premier Papandreou but also supporters of another former PASOK prime minister, Costas Simitis. Additionally, intellectuals defining themselves as belonging to the center-left political spectrum are searching for their new political affiliation. Events and discussions discussing this issue are frequently taking place in Greece. The poor performance of the Movement for Change in opinion polls and limited chances for a dynamic recovery are the main reasons why the party is not any longer attractive for numerous former PASOK members. The next national election will be possibly followed by the formation of a coalition government composed of New Democracy and the Movement for Change. The latter is expected to be the minor coalition partner. Fofi Gennimata will negotiate with the leader of New Democracy Kyriakos Mitsotakis for some of her colleagues to occupy key ministries in the government. Although this governmental aura will certainly empower the Movement for Change, it does not necessarily mean this party will be able to overcome its problems, regain its reputation, inspire the society and make a successful comeback as the key social-democratic player in Greek politics. By contrast, a potential damage of the image of the new Greek government in the medium-term will definitively bury such a political ambition from the part of Gennimata. As the leader of SYRIZA in the opposition, Tsipras will not only have the opportunity to criticize the Movement for Change for possible governmental failures or omissions but also to invest political capital on the creation of the ‘progressive front’. Additionally, he will be able to consult with disenchanted politicians and intellectuals, who might be marginalized by Gennimata in the next coalition government and modernize his party according to relevant European standards. The 2023 national election will be organized under a different electoral 3 law that abolishes the bonus of 50 seats for the first party. Tsipras believes a solid social- democratic front will function as a successful political pole in a period during which Greece is heading towards the need of forming broader coalitions. Conclusion Before the outbreak of the economic crisis, SYRIZA had been a leftist political party fighting to surpass the 3 percent threshold and enter parliament. After 2009, it saw the crisis as an opportunity to increase its percentages by attracting voters who were disappointed with mainstream political parties. In so doing, it won the election of January 2015 promising the implementation of a revolutionary agenda that would, among others, have included the renegotiation of the bailout. SYRIZA landed into reality in July 2015 and following its acceptance of a new bailout, it has acted as a mainstream political party. Four years after its victory in the election of 2015, SYRIZA is looking towards the future and endeavors to politically capitalize. It believes it is now successfully representing the center-left political spectrum causing anger in the Movement for Change. The next years will define if Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras will determine whether he will succeed in forging a ‘progressive front’ under SYRIZA.
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