DOCSLIB.ORG

World Bank Document

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
World Bank Document This paper is prepared for staff SAIDA~<2use and is not for publication SW r P43 The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Bank. Public Disclosure Authorized INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMNT ASSOCIATICN Economics Department Working Paper No. 43 TAXATION AND EARMARKING IN D f E & D April 1, 1969 SEP 2 1 8 INTERNAIONAL BANKrOR This study of earmarking OR V9T.OP*aper on "The Earmarking of Taxes for SrlnoAa5y In Develop- Public Disclosure Authorized ing Countries", (Economics Department Working Paper No. 1). The limited objective of this paper had been to establish enpirically whether any relation- ship appears to exist between earmarking and a higher relative expenditure allocation for highways than in the absence of earmarking. The present study is much wider. It makes an overall evaluation of earmarking in developing countries in which the findings of the highway study have been incorporated. The analysis is theoretical but is supported by empiri- cal studies. It focuses in particular upon the relation- ship between earmarking and certain crucial problems of public expenditure determination as they arise in Public Disclosure Authorized developing countries (e.g. political decision-making, bureaucratic inefficiencies, the undesirable growth of non-development expenditure, etc.). I am indebted -9 \ g in particular to Stanley Please, Chief of the Fiscal Policies of Developing Countries Division, for helpful WBG comments throughout this study and also to my other colleagues, especially John Holsen. In the IMF, both Leif Iliuten and Joergen Lotz have taken their time to discuss with me the findings of the study. I have also received valuable suggestions from Dr. Charles J. Goetz of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute. How- ever, I am solely responsible for this draft. Fiscal Policies of Developing Countries Division Public Disclosure Authorized Prepared by: Per Eklund Assisted by: Rosalinda Dacumos TAM,E OF CONTENTS Page No. SUMMARY (i vi) CHAPTER I EVOLUTION OF EARi4ARKING 1 -- Introduction 1 -- Literature 2 -What is an earmarked tax? 4 -Types of earmarking 5 -Insulation of revenue 5 -The tax base - earmarking versus general fund 6 -Developed countries 6 -Developing countries 7 -Earmarking and degree of social and economic development 7 CHAPTER II BUDGET POLICY AND EARAA.RKING OF TAXES 9 -Targets of budget policy 9 -The benefit of theory of taxation 10 -Satisfying collective wants 11 -The Lindahl theory 13 -User charges 14 -Annex Chapter:-II CHAPTER III COiPARISON OF AN ACTUAL SYSTEA OF PARLIAAENTARY DEMOCRACY WITH THE LINDAHL THEORY 16 -Individual evaluation 16 -Reflections of individual Preferences in political programs 18 -Accommodation of minority and special interests under majority voting 18 -Number of groups 18 -Voting and legislative procedures 19 -Correction of divergences 19 -Costs and benefit evaluation of public expenditure 19 -Separation between basic and appropria- tions legislation 20 -Unstable majority coalitions 21 -i4inority groups 22 -Time dimension 23 (ii) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page No. CHhPTER IV THE LINDAHL THEDRY APPLIED 24 -Summary 24 -Developing countries 26 -Unstable majority coalitions 27 CHAPTER V TWO SPECIAL CASES 29 -Earmarking and Local Government 29 -IMlustrations 30 -Foreign Aid 31 CHAPTER VI BUDGETING UNDER INEFFICIENCY 33 -Political interference 33 -Administrative inefficiency 34 -Remedies - the role of earmarking 34 -A bias against developmental goods and services in the budget making? 36 -Earmarking promotes the development effort 38 -The bureaucracy - To reach agreement to shift to earmarking? 38 -Savings through taxation - A reality or mirage 40 -Annex Chapter VI CHAPTER VII EARKA9RKING FOR HIGHW4AYS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - AN EAPIRICAL STUDY 43 -3urvey results 43 -Earmarking and non-earmarking countries -- Cross section analysis 44 -Earmarking countries 45 -Time series analysis 46 -Countries which initiated or discontinued earmarking 47 -Summary of findings 48 -Explanation of findings 49 -A new theory of the budgetary process 49 (iii) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page No. CHAPTER VIII BENEFITS VERSUS COSTS OF EARARKING 53 -Budget rigidity 53 -Periodic re-evaluation of the earmarking arrangement 54 -Statutory versus constitutional earmarking 57 -Betterment levies 57 -Earmarking for maintenance or for investment 59 -Program and performance budgeting and earmarking 60 -Survey 62 -Earmarking and short-run demand control policy 62 CHAPTER IX ELMRMARKING IN THE PHILIPPINES - A CASE STUDY 65 -Revenues 65 -Unstable majority coalitions 66 -Political interference 66 -Administrative inefficiency 66 -Earmarking for eco mmic development 67 -The highway special fund 70 -New Tax program 71 -Conclusion - Philippines 71 -Recommendation 72 CHAPTER X CONCLUSIONS 73 -M<ultiple preferences for public goods and services 73 -Theory versus a model parliamentary democracy 74 -Theory versus developing countries 75 -Displacement effect 77 -Empirical findings 77 -Developed versus developing countries 79 -Re-evaluation of earmarking 79. (iv) TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) ANNEX I DECISION i4AKING IN A PARLIAKENTARY DENOCRACY -- K.kJORITY VOTING ANNEX II EA.RARKING FOR HIGHWAYS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES -Statistical tests ANNEX TO CHAPTER II THE THEORY OF SATISFYING COLLECTIVE WANTS -The Lindahl theory -How to reach the equilibrium -Benefit allocation versus redistribution equity considerations -Revelation of preferences -A more realistic model with two public goods -Group behavior under voting - A majority rule budgetary model ANNEX TO CHAPTER VI CHANGES FROM GENERAL FUND TO EARMARKING -- A THBERETICAL ANALYSIS -Reduction of unit costs -Change in budgetary ratio REFERENCES The motivation for this study within the Bank came from two directions. At the operational level, we have been concerned that the Bank has been in danger of a schizophrenic attitude on the desirability of earmarking as a fiscal device. Whilst at the macro level of fiscal policy discus3ion there has been a widespread (though not universal) ten- dency to deplore earmarking, at the project level the Bank has concurred with, encouraged and even insisted on the earmarking of government funds. Secondly in trying to bring to bear upon this operational question, the findings of analytical and empirical study to be found in the literature on public finance, we have been surprised to find how little attention students have given to this precise issue. Thus a need has arisen to help fill part of this gap in our basic knowledge. The study sets out to explore more fully the widespread dislike of earmarking by many students of public finance. The basis for this dislike is quite simple. It merely states that earmarking imposes a constraint on the rational allocation of a given volume of government funds to different func- tions, regional groups, etc. and as a consequence prevents the implementation of a flexible budgetary policy for maximizing society's welfare. It is analogous to a constraint which prevents a person consuming out of his given income a bundle of goods and services such that the weighted marginal utility of each component of the bundle is equal. Just as individual welfare is maximized by ensuring that this optimum expenditure pattern is achieved, so society's welfare is maximized by ensuring that marginal allocations of budgetary funds can be so adjusted that the last unit of money spent in all directions gives the same utility. In effect what this study emphasizes is that this conventional attitude towards earmarking is based on analysis which is not only simple but also simplistic. In doing so it does not reject the dangers which arise from a misallocation of resources due to earmarking. On the contrary, it is emphasized that this is one of the major elements in the trade-off exer- cise which has to be undertaken to determine the desirability of earmarking in any particular case. However, the study argues that the process by which both the level and pattern of government expenditures are determined is far more complex in both conception and execution than is implied by an analogy with a housewife spending the weekly household income on food, clothing, luxuries, etc. To begin with, in conception this analogy is largely irrelevant. Except in the most dictatorial of political regimes, no single preference function exists. Society is a complex organization in which group interests rarely coincide and thus the process by which political decision-making comes about is crucial. Theorists and practitioners in the field of public finance typically ignore this complexity and more typically still, external observers and advisors on national tax policy analyze and prescribe with virtually no - ii - recognition of the problems arising out of the decision-making process within a particular country. This study has pursued the decision-making process more fully. In doing so it has drawn heavily upon the work of Erik Lindahl.l/ This theory deals with the analogy between budget determination in the public sector and price formation in the market for private goods and services. As such it draws out more explicitly the view of NIusgrave 2/ and others that: "'....the inter-relation betwfeen the tax (cost) and experiditure (benefit) side of the budget is the essence of fiscal economics and that a theory of taxa- tion distinct from that of expenditures has little meaning." To Lindahl the central issue is the need for a simultaneous consideration of the level and pattern both
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Kant and Lindahl
    KANT AND LINDAHL By John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre February 2021 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2278 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY Box 208281 New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 http://cowles.yale.edu/ “Kant and Lindahl” by John E. Roemer, Yale University, and Joaquim Silvestre, University of California, Davis* February 2021 1. Introduction A good is public if its consumption is nonrival, and some public goods are nonexcludable. We consider three different ways by which the amounts of a public good and the distribution of its costs are determined: (i) The political system; (ii) Private supply by voluntary contributions; (iii) The supply of an excludable public good by private firms. 1.1. Public provision by the political system For many public goods, the decisions on their provision and financing are made by the public sector. These goods are quantitatively important, their supply requiring a substantial fraction of the budget at all levels of government. Knut Wicksell (1896) and Erik Lindahl (1919) analyzed the operation of a representative parliament.1 They envisaged a negotiation among the various parties in the parliament until all universally beneficial alternatives were exhausted. The resulting unanimous agreement yields (Pareto) efficiency. Section 2 below offers a precise model. 1.2. Private provision by voluntary contributions Some public goods are provided outside the public sector and outside the market by individual voluntary contributions: the textbook example is public radio. These tend to be quantitatively less important than the ones provided by the government. But information is a public good par excellence: thanks to the internet, much information is now provided on a voluntary contribution basis (Wikipedia, consumer ratings of products…).
    [Show full text]
  • Structural Reform and Economic Policy
    Structural Reform and Economic Policy Edited by Robert M. Solow Structural Reform and Economic Policy This is IEA conference volume no. 139 This page intentionally left blank Structural Reform and Economic Policy Edited by Robert M. Solow Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA, USA in association with the INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION © International Economic Association 2004 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–3646–3 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.
    [Show full text]
  • Exorbitant Privilege and Exorbitant Duty∗
    Exorbitant Privilege and Exorbitant Duty∗ Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas Hel´ ene` Rey Nicolas Govillot University of California at Berkeley London Business School Direction Gen´ erale´ du Tresor First dra: August 2010. is Version: October 25, 2017 Abstract We provide a quarterly time series of the historical evolution of US external assets and liabilities at market value on the 1952-2016 period. e center country of the International Monetary System enjoys an “exorbitant privilege”, a sizeable excess return of gross external assets over liabilities that signicantly weakens its external constraint. In exchange for this “exorbitant privilege” we document that the US provides insurance to the rest of the world, especially in times of global stress. We call this the “exorbitant duty” of the hegemon. During the 2007-2009 global nancial crisis, wealth transfers from the US to the rest of the world amounted to about 19% of US GDP. We present a stylized model that accounts for these facts and links the shrinking size of the hegemon in the world economy to the decline in the world real rate of interest. ∗We are very grateful to our discussants Jesus Fernandez Villaverde and Fabrizio Perri. We also thank Hanno Lustig and Adrien Verdelhan as well as 2017 NBER Summmer Institute participants for useful comments. Pierre- Olivier Gourinchas acknowledges nancial support from the International Growth Center grant RA-2009-11-002. Contact email: [email protected]´ ene` Rey is grateful for the funding of the European Research Council (grant number 695722). Email: [email protected] 1 Introduction Understanding the structure of the International Monetary System is an important task.
    [Show full text]
  • Tax Fairness and the Tax Mix David G. Duff Associate Professor Faculty
    Tax Fairness and the Tax Mix David G. Duff Associate Professor Faculty of Law University of Toronto Visiting Associate Professor Faculty of Law University of British Columbia November 2008 I. Introduction Justice, John Rawls famously wrote, is the first virtue of social institutions.1 Since a society’s tax system is one of its most basic and essential social institutions, the justice or fairness of this tax system is an important subject for social and political theory, as well as for practical politics. In order to assess the fairness of any particular tax or the tax system as a whole, however, it is essential to consider the purpose of the tax and the tax system in general. Although the most obvious purpose of most taxes is to raise revenue to finance public expenditures, this is not the only rationale for taxation which may also be employed to regulate social and economic behaviour and to shape the distribution of economic resources.2 For this reason, the concept of tax fairness is necessarily pluralistic, depending on the particular purpose for which the tax is imposed. Not surprisingly, therefore, modern welfare states typically levy a mix of taxes, including personal and corporate income taxes, broad-based consumption taxes, excise taxes on specific goods or services, payroll taxes, property or wealth taxes, wealth transfer taxes, as well as user fees and benefit taxes. Since the justification for any tax presumably depends on the legitimacy of the underlying purpose which it is designed to promote, the concept of fair taxation is necessarily secondary and derivative – depending on more fundamental principles concerning the fairness or justice of the public spending that taxes finance, the regulatory goals that they support, and the distribution of economic resources that they help to define.
    [Show full text]
  • HVPE Prospectus
    MERRILL CORPORATION GTHOMAS// 1-NOV-07 23:00 DISK130:[07ZDA1.07ZDA48401]BA48401A.;44 mrll.fmt Free: 11DM/0D Foot: 0D/ 0D VJ J1:1Seq: 1 Clr: 0 DISK024:[PAGER.PSTYLES]UNIVERSAL.BST;67 8 C Cs: 17402 PROSPECTUS, DATED 2 NOVEMBER 2007 Global Offering of up to 40,000,000 Shares of 1NOV200718505053 This document describes related offerings of Class A ordinary shares (the ‘‘Shares’’) of HarbourVest Global Private Equity Limited (the ‘‘company’’), a closed-ended investment company organised under the laws of Guernsey. Our Shares are being offered (a) outside the United States, and (b) inside the United States in a private placement to certain qualified institutional buyers (‘‘QIBs’’) as defined in Rule 144A under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the ‘‘U.S. Securities Act’’), who are also qualified purchasers (‘‘qualified purchasers’’) as defined in the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the ‘‘U.S. Investment Company Act’’) (the ‘‘Global Offering’’). We intend to issue up to 40,000,000 Shares in the Global Offering. In addition, we intend separately to issue Shares to certain third parties in a private placement in exchange for either cash or limited partnership interests in various HarbourVest-managed funds (the ‘‘Directed Offering’’ and, together with the Global Offering, the ‘‘Offerings’’). We will not issue, in the aggregate, more than 85,000,000 Shares in the Offerings. The Shares carry limited voting rights. No public market currently exists for the Shares. We have applied for the admission to trading all of the Shares on Euronext Amsterdam by NYSE Euronext (‘‘Euronext Amsterdam’’), the regulated market of Euronext Amsterdam N.V.
    [Show full text]
  • Paul Samuelson and Global Public Goods
    Paul Samuelson and Global Public Goods William D. Nordhaus Yale University1 May 5, 2005 A commemorative essay for Paul Samuelson ________________________________________________________ It is both easy and hard to write an essay commemorating Paul Samuelson’s contributions to economics. Easy, because he has created so much of modern economics that you could write on virtually anything – stabilization policy, economic growth, international trade, welfare economics, or just about any topic that caught your fancy. Hard, because, like Buridan’s ass, you could easily procrastinate forever in deciding which of the many treasures of his ideas to draw from. In the end, I chose to draw from Paul’s writings on public goods. In two and one-half pages, he reshaped the way economists and political philosophers think about the distinction between private goods and public goods.2 Once those concepts are learned, we can never again forget why the allocational questions for bread are fundamentally different from those of lighthouses. I will focus on an important example of this topic, and one that poses particularly thorny practical 1 The author is Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University. 2 Paul Samuelson, “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4, Nov. 1954, pp. 387-389. - 1 - issues, which is the case of global public goods. A brief intellectual history of the concepts is appended. What great blessings or scourges have befallen humanity? Consider issues as disparate as greenhouse warming and ozone depletion, the Internet and William Shakespeare, terrorism and money laundering, the discovery of antibiotics and nuclear proliferation.
    [Show full text]
  • Following the Money: Lessons from the Panama Papers Part 1
    ARTICLE 3.4 - TRAUTMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2017 6:57 AM Following the Money: Lessons from the Panama Papers Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg Lawrence J. Trautman* ABSTRACT Widely known as the “Panama Papers,” the world’s largest whistleblower case to date consists of 11.5 million documents and involves a year-long effort by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists to expose a global pattern of crime and corruption where millions of documents capture heads of state, criminals, and celebrities using secret hideaways in tax havens. Involving the scrutiny of over 400 journalists worldwide, these documents reveal the offshore holdings of at least hundreds of politicians and public officials in over 200 countries. Since these disclosures became public, national security implications already include abrupt regime change and probable future political instability. It appears likely that important revelations obtained from these data will continue to be forthcoming for years to come. Presented here is Part 1 of what may ultimately constitute numerous- installment coverage of this important inquiry into the illicit wealth derived from bribery, corruption, and tax evasion. This article proceeds as follows. First, disclosures regarding the treasure trove of documents * BA, The American University; MBA, The George Washington University; JD, Oklahoma City Univ. School of Law. Mr. Trautman is Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics at Western Carolina University, and a past president of the New York and Metropolitan Washington/Baltimore Chapters of the National Association of Corporate Directors. He may be contacted at [email protected]. The author wishes to extend thanks to those at the Winter Conference of the Anti-Corruption Law Interest Group (ASIL) in Miami, January 13–14, 2017 who provided constructive comments to the manuscript, in particular: Eva Anderson; Bruce Bean; Ashleigh Buckett; Anita Cava; Shirleen Chin; Stuart H.
    [Show full text]
  • An Optimal Benefit-Based Corporate Income
    An optimal benefit-based corporate income tax Simon Naitram∗ June 2020 Abstract In this paper I explore the features of a benefit-based corporate income tax. Benefit-based taxation defines a firm’s fair share of tax as the returns to the public input. When the government is constrained to fund the public input through the use of a distortionary tax on the firm’s profit, the optimal benefit-based corporate income tax rate is a function of three estimable elasticities: the direct public input elasticity of profit, the indirect public input elasticity of profit, and the (net of) tax elasticity of profit. Using public capital as a measure of the public input, I calculate optimal benefit-based tax rates. Under plausible parameters, these optimal tax rates are quantitatively reasonable and are progressive. I show that benefit-based taxation delivers inter-nation equity. JEL: H21; H25; H32; H41 Keywords: benefit-based taxation; optimal corporate tax; public input 1 Introduction There is no consensus on the purpose of the corporate income tax. This lack of consensus on the purpose of the tax makes it almost impossible to agree on the design of the corporate tax system. Without guidelines on what we are trying to achieve, how do we assess any proposal for corporate tax reform? This concern is expressed most clearly by Weisbach(2015): \The basic point is that we cannot know what the optimal pattern of international capital income taxation should be without understanding the reasons for taxing capital income in the first place... To understand the design of firm-level taxation, however, we need to know why we are taxing firms.” ∗Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow and Department of Economics, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, St Michael, Barbados.
    [Show full text]
  • Percentage Tax Designation Institutions. on Sugden's
    International Review of Economics (2021) 68:101–130 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-021-00364-2 RESEARCH ARTICLE Percentage tax designation institutions. On Sugden’s contractarian account Paolo Silvestri1 Received: 12 September 2020 / Accepted: 27 January 2021 / Published online: 27 February 2021 © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract “Percentage Tax Designation Institutions”, also known as “Percentage Philanthropy Laws”, are fscal institutions through which taxpayers can freely designate a cer- tain percentage of their income tax to organizations whose main activity is of public interest: churches, third-sector organizations, political parties, etc. A comprehensive explanation of such systems is still lacking. In The Community of Advantage, Robert Sugden provides an original theoretical account of the Italian “8 × 1000” institution as one of those forms of regulation that “would be justifed as ways of expanding opportunity for mutually benefcial transactions” and, more particularly, as a lib- eral and “contractarian approach to the provision of public goods”. This article is an attempt to expand and deepen the understanding not only of the 8 × 1000 but also of the 5 × 1000 and 2 × 1000 institutions, by refecting on and possibly refning Sug- den’s contractarian account, at least with regard to the part that relies on and devel- ops the voluntary exchange tradition (Wicksell, Lindahl and Buchanan). To remain faithful to two normative premises of Sugden’s approach—the opportunity criterion and the correlated freedom of choice—we must introduce some theoretical adjust- ments to take into due account the way in which taxpayers’ freedoms—not only freedom of choice but also autonomy—are afected by default rules and the related redistribution procedures.
    [Show full text]
  • The Scandinavian Contribution to National Accounting
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Aukrust, Odd Working Paper — Digitized Version The Scandinavian Contribution to National Accounting Discussion Papers, No. 73 Provided in Cooperation with: Research Department, Statistics Norway, Oslo Suggested Citation: Aukrust, Odd (1992) : The Scandinavian Contribution to National Accounting, Discussion Papers, No. 73, Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192057 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
    [Show full text]
  • Ocument’’) and You Are Therefore Advised to Read This Carefully Before Reading, Accessing Or Making Any Other Use of the Attached Document
    NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IN OR INTO THE UNITED STATES OR TO ANY U.S. PERSON IMPORTANT: You must read the following disclaimer before continuing. The following disclaimer applies to the attached prospectus (the ‘‘document’’) and you are therefore advised to read this carefully before reading, accessing or making any other use of the attached document. In accessing the document, you agree to be bound by the following terms and conditions, including any modifications to them from time to time, each time you receive any information from us as a result of such access. You acknowledge that this electronic transmission and the delivery of the attached document is confidential and intended only for you and you agree you will not forward, reproduce or publish this electronic transmission or the attached document to any other person. The document and the offer when made are only addressed to and directed at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) who are “qualified investors” within the meaning of Article 2(1)(e) of the Prospectus Directive (Directive 2003/71/EC) (the “Prospectus Directive”) (“Qualified Investors”). In addition, in the United Kingdom (“UK”), this document is being distributed only to, and is directed only at, Qualified Investors (i) who have professional experience in matters relating to investments falling within Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005, as amended (the “Order”) and Qualified Investors falling within Article 49 of the Order, and (ii) to whom it may otherwise lawfully be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”).
    [Show full text]
  • Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
    1 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States GA Res. 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50 The General Assembly, Recalling that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in its resolution 45 (III) of 18 May 1972, stressed the urgency to establish generally accepted norms to govern international economic relations systematically and recognized that it is not feasible to establish a just order and a stable workd as long as a charger to protect the rights of all countries, and in particular the developing States, is not formulated. Recalling further that in the same resolution it was decided to establish a Working Group of governmental representatives to draw up a draft Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which the General Assembly, in its resolution 3037 (XXVII) of 19 December 1972, decided should be composed of forty Member States. Noting that, in its resolution 3082 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, it reaffirmed its conviction of the urgent need to establish or improve norms of universal application for the development of international economic relations on a just and equitable basis and urged the Working Group on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States to complete, as the first step in the codification and development of the matter, the elaboration of a final draft Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, to be considered and approved by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session. Bearing in mind the spirit and terms of its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing, respectively, the Declaration and the Programmed of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, which underlined the vital importance of the Charter to be adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session and stressed the fact that the Charter shall constitute an effective instrument towards the establishment of a new system of international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality and interdependence of the interests of developed and developing countries.
    [Show full text]